Transnational Consociation in Northern Ireland and in Bosnia-Hercegovina: the Role of Reference States in Post-Settlement Power-Sharing

Transnational Consociation in Northern Ireland and in Bosnia-Hercegovina: The Role of Reference States in Post-Settlement Power-Sharing INDRANEEL SIRCAR London School of Economics and Political Science. Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Government 2006 ABSTRACT Abstract The thesis considers ethno-territorial conflicts in which there are two conflict groups with corresponding ‘reference states’. ‘Reference states’ are internationally- recognised states with co-nationals in the aforementioned disputed territory. The literature on ethno-national conflict regulation largely neglects the potential constructive role of ‘reference states’. In particular, Arend Lijphart’s work on consociational democracy focuses on elite accommodation within the conflict zone, but views other agents as ‘external’ to the dispute. Unlike most of the current ethnic conflict literature, the thesis will use a theoretical approach to derive the features of a settlement, not distil traits from purely empirical research. An informal model is employed assuming that that a military option is not open to reference states and that disengagement from the co-nationals is costly. The actions of the reference state are simplified to four options: remaining at the same level of conflict, escalating the dispute, attempting cooperation, or disengaging from the dispute. The features derived for the resulting transnational consociation settlement are: durable reference state/co- national links, bipartisanship within reference states, intergovernmentalism between reference states, and consociational democracy internal to the disputed territory. The thesis then focuses on the post-conflict power-sharing settlements in Bosnia- Hercegovina and in Northern Ireland to investigate the features of transnational consociation in these two cases. The settlement after the Belfast Agreement exhibits the traits of transnational consociation , with a strong intergovernmental Dublin- London axis acting as reliable long-term guarantors of the settlement. By contrast, there is little intergovernmentalism between Zagreb and Belgrade regarding the settlement in Bosnia-Hercegovina. The post-conflict institutions are held together by international agencies that do not have as durable a link to the conflict zone as the ‘reference states’. Therefore, a durable transnational consociation with the ‘reference states’ as guarantors is more likely in Northern Ireland than in Bosnia-Hercegovina. 2 My Roots Provat Sircar Dhrubesh Chandra Kar Pratima Sircar Gita Kar 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS Table of Contents LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES 7 ABBREVIATIONS 8 CHAPTER I: ETHNONATIONAL CONFLICT REGULATION BEYOND BORDERS 13 ETHNONATIONAL CONFLICT REGULATION AND THE END OF HISTORY 13 BRINGING IN ‘E XTERNAL ’ ACTORS 14 AN ANALYTIC TURN 21 NETWORK OF RELATIONSHIPS 22 POSSIBLE CASES 26 WHY NORTHERN IRELAND AND BOSNIA -HERCEGOVINA ? 27 METHODOLOGY 31 REDUCING VARIABLES 34 CHAPTER STRUCTURE 35 CHAPTER II: CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY AND TRANSNATIONALISM 38 INTRODUCTION 38 NATIONS AND REFERENCE STATES 40 THE STATE AND ITS CITIZENS 43 INTRODUCING CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY 46 CRITIQUES OF CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY 50 CRITIQUING (B UT NOT DISCARDING ) BORDERS 54 STAGE I: COMPLEX POWER -SHARING 58 STAGE II: TRANSNATIONAL CONSOCIATION 59 CONCLUDING REMARKS 62 CHAPTER III: A THEORY OF TRANSNATIONAL CONSOCIATION 65 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 65 DISCLAIMER 66 THE EXISTING LITERATURE 67 IMPORTANT ACTORS 68 INITIAL CONDITIONS 69 DIFFERENT POSSIBLE OUTCOMES 72 REFERENCE STATE Α ESCALATES THE CONFLICT 74 REFERENCE STATE Α STAYS AT THE STATUS QUO LEVEL OF CONFLICT 74 REFERENCE STATE Α TRIES TO COOPERATE WITH THE OTHER STATE 75 REFERENCE STATE Α DISENGAGES FROM THE DISPUTED TERRITORY 75 STAGE I: REFERENCE STATE CO-OPERATION 77 ONE SHOT SITUATION 77 FINITE ITERATIONS 77 INFINITE ITERATIONS 78 PREFERRING LONG -TERM INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION 79 A SHORT NOTE ON FLANKING IN REFERENCE STATES 81 STAGE 2: MAKING AN OFFER 82 STAGE 3: THE SETTLEMENT 84 4 TABLE OF CONTENTS RESEMBLING CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY 85 ADDING TO LIJPHART 88 CONDITIONS FOR TRANSNATIONAL CONSOCIATION 89 CHAPTER IV: COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE OF THE BELFAST AGREEMENT AND THE DAYTON-PARIS AGREEMENT 92 INTRODUCTION 92 BOSNIA -HERCEGOVINA : BEFORE 94 NORTHERN IRELAND : BEFORE 97 INSTITUTIONS AND RULES : NOW 106 INTERNAL CONSOCIATION 107 PROPORTIONALITY 107 GRAND COALITION 112 MUTUAL VETO 115 SEGMENTAL AUTONOMY 118 REFERENCE STATES 122 REFERENCE STATE /C O-NATIONAL LINKS 122 INTERGOVERNMENTALISM 127 BEYOND TRANSNATIONAL CONSOCIATION 129 IMPLEMENTION 129 ARBITRATION 131 CONCLUDING REMARKS 132 CHAPTER V: REFERENCE STATE/CO-NATIONAL LINKS 135 INTRODUCTION 135 PRONOUNCEMENTS BY POLICYMAKERS 138 CONSTITUTIONAL LINKS 141 INSTITUTIONAL LINKS 144 MUTUAL DESTRUCTION CLAUSE 151 DIRECT POLITICAL LINKS 152 MILITARY /S ECURITY LINKS 155 ILLICIT CONNECTIONS ? 160 BRITISH COLLUSION WITH LOYALISTS ? 160 IRISH COLLUSION WITH REPUBLICANS ? 162 HDZ FUNDING A THIRD ENTITY ? 165 SERB -RS ORGANISED CRIME LINKS ? 166 CONCLUDING REMARKS 167 CHAPTER VI: REFERENCE STATE BIPARTISANSHIP AND INTERGOVERNMENTALISM 171 INTRODUCTION 171 WARS OF THE PAST 171 LONDON AND DUBLIN 172 BELGRADE AND ZAGREB 173 BIPARTISAN POLICY CONTINUITY 175 INTERGOVERNMENTALISM 190 CONCLUDING REMARKS 206 CHAPTER VII: INTERNAL CONSOCIATION 209 5 TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 209 COLLECTIVE DECISION -MAKING 209 NORTHERN IRELAND : GOOD NEWS 209 NORTHERN IRELAND : BAD NEWS 213 BOSNIA -HERCEGOVINA : GOOD NEWS 223 BOSNIA -HERCEGOVINA : BAD NEWS 227 AT LEAST THEY STOPPED SHOOTING … 236 EVALUATING POWER -SHARING 244 CONCLUDING REMARKS : ANY HOPE ? 249 CHAPTER VIII: SUMMARY AND FURTHER RESEARCH 255 RECAP 255 PUTTING TOGETHER THE PIECES 261 ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS 265 BOSNIA -HERCEGOVINA 265 NORTHERN IRELAND 270 RECOMMENDATIONS 276 ANSWERING QUESTIONS 279 WHAT MODIFICATIONS OF THE CONSOCIATIONAL PROCESS WILL OCCUR BECAUSE OF THE ROLE OF REFERENCE STATES? 279 IS THE INFLUENCE OF REFERENCE STATES MORE IMPORTANT THAN ANY OTHER ‘EXTERNAL AGENTS ? 280 FURTHER RESEARCH 281 CYPRUS 281 VOJVODINA 282 KASHMIR 283 IMPROVING THE THEORY 284 FINAL REMARKS 286 APPENDIX I 287 APPENDIX I.A 287 APPENDIX I.B 291 APPENDIX I.C 294 APPENDIX I.D 296 APPENDIX I.E 301 BIBLIOGRAPHY 304 OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS RELATED TO BOSNIA -HERCEGOVINA CASE STUDY 304 OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS RELATED TO NORTHERN IRELAND CASE STUDY 305 OTHER OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS 307 INTERVIEWS FOR NORTHERN IRELAND CASE STUDY 307 INTERVIEWS FOR BOSNIA -HERCEGOVINA CASE STUDY 309 NEWSPAPER ARTICLES , MAGAZINE ARTICLES AND PRESS RELEASES 312 BOOKS , JOURNAL ARTICLES AND OTHER SECONDARY SOURCES 316 6 LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES List of Tables and Figures TABLE 1: Relevant conflict regulation practices…………………………………...20 TABLE 2: Possible case studies……………………………………………………..26 TABLE 3: Payoff matrix for model of transnational consociation…..…………….288 FIGURE 1: Triangular relationship between reference states and disputed territory.23 FIGURE 2: Relationships between groups within reference states…………………24 FIGURE 3: Relationships between conflict groups in the disputed territory……….24 FIGURE 4: Relationships between reference states and co-nationals……………....24 FIGURE 5: Relationships between reference states………….………………….….25 FIGURE 6: Relationships between features of transnational consociation.….……..25 FIGURE 7: Transnational consociation in Northern Ireland...…………………….262 FIGURE 8: Current conflict geometry in Bosnia-Hercegovina…………...……… 262 FIGURE 9: Configuration for trasnational consociation in Bosnia-Hercegovina…263 FIGURE 10: Figure 9 without international community included………………...264 FIGURE 11: Ideal positions of reference state groups regarding the conflict….….296 7 ABBREVIATIONS Abbreviations ABiH Armija Bosne i Hercegovine (Army of Bosnia- Hercegovina) AOEBIH Association of Election Officials in Bosnia- Hercegovina AIA Anglo-Irish Agreement (1985) APNI Alliance Party of Northern Ireland BIC British-Irish Council BIIGC British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference BIIPB British-Irish Interparliamentary Body BiH Bosna i Hercegovina (Bosnia and Hercegovina) BIRW British-Irish Rights Watch CCBH Constitutional Court of Bosnia-Hercegovina CoE Council of Europe CoM Council of Ministers DFM Deputy First Minister of Northern Ireland DPA Dayton-Paris Agreement DRC Defence Reform Commission [Bosnia-Hercegovina] DS Demokratska stranka (Democratic Party) [Serbia] DSD Downing Street Declaration (1993) DSS Demokratske stranke Srbije (Democratic Opposition of Serbia) DUP Democratic Unionist Party 8 ABBREVIATIONS ECHR European Convention of Human Rights ECMI European Centre for Minority Issues ESI European Stability Initiative [think-tank] EUAM European Union Administration of Mostar EUFOR European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina FBiH Federacija Bosne i Hercegovine (Federation of Bosnia- Hercegovina) FCILC Foyle, Carlingford and Irish Lights Commission FM First Minister of Northern Ireland FRU Force Research Unit FRY Federal Republic of Yugoslavia GFA Good Friday Agreement (1998) [Belfast Agreement] GFAP General Framework Agreement for Peace [Dayton- Paris Agreement] HCHR Helsinki Committee for Human Rights HDZ Hrvatska demokratska zajednica (Croatian Democratic Union) HDZ-BiH Hrvatska demokratska zajednica Bosne i Hercegovine (Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia-Hercegovina) HNS Hrvatska narodna stranka (Croatian People’s Party) HR High Representative HSLS Hrvatska socijalno-liberalna stranka (Croatian Social Liberal Party) HSP Hrvatska stranka prava (Croatian party of rights) HSS Hrvatska

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