INTRODUCTION 1. I Refer to Both the 'National State' and the 'Nation-State' Simply As the 'Nation-State'. Strictly S
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Notes INTRODUCTION 1. I refer to both the ‘national state’ and the ‘nation-state’ simply as the ‘nation-state’. Strictly speaking, the state is a ‘national state’ when its centralized, autonomous and differentiated structures uphold legitimate authority within a boundary which contains multiple regions. However, a nation-state exists only where the citizenry share a common code of national identity expressed in language, religion, myth and custom. The majority of modern European states are quintessentially national states, while only a small minority, ostensibly the Republic of Ireland and Sweden, could satisfactorily qualify as nation-states (Tilly, 1990, pp. 2–3). 2. A proliferation of smaller parties emerged to stand, with modest suc- cess, in the 1996 election to the Northern Ireland Forum. These par- ties recorded the following percentage share of the vote in this election: the UK Unionist Party (UKU), 3.69 per cent; the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP), 3.47 per cent; the Ulster Democratic Party (UDP), 2.22 per cent; the Women’s Coalition, 1.03 per cent; and, Labour, 0.85 per cent (Irish Times, 1 June 1996). It is appreciated that the fringe parties represent distinct positions in the spectrum of Northern Ireland poli- tics. However, limited space prevents a detailed consideration of these positions. 3. In the 1994 election to the European Parliament the percentage of the vote secured by these five main political parties in Northern Ire- land was as follows: DUP, 29.15 per cent; UUP, 23.83 per cent; APNI, 4.13 per cent; SDLP, 28.93 per cent; Sinn Féin, 9.86 per cent – giving a combined total of 95.9 per cent. In the 1997 Westminster General Election, the percentage of the vote secured by the five main political parties in Northern Ireland was as follows: DUP, 13.6 per cent; UUP, 32.7 per cent; APNI, 8 per cent; SDLP, 24.1 per cent; Sinn Féin, 16.1 per cent – giving a combined total of 94.5 per cent. 4. The use of words to signify communal allegiance in Northern Ireland is a subtle art form. Referring to Northern Ireland as either ‘Northern Ireland’, ‘Ulster’, ‘the North of Ireland’, or ‘the occupied six counties’ can convey communal allegiance. The use of terms in this book are not intended as a personal expression of communal allegiance. How- ever, I am aware that the use of some words for technical reasons, for example ‘sub-state’ (to denote the federal nature of Northern Ireland between 1921 and 1972), may be interpreted in some quarters as being politically motivated. 207 208 Notes 1 A POSTMODERNIST APPROACH TO COMMUNAL IDENTITIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND? 1. Agreement between the governments of the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom on the content of the Downing Street Declara- tion (1993) only came after at least 18 drafts had been circulated be- tween officials and ministers of the two governments (Aughey and Morrow, 1996, p. 213). 2. Despite the Commission’s wide-ranging consultation, Garvin notes an under-representation of voices from ‘hardline east Belfast and Border unionists on the one hand, and hardline nationalists from west Belfast on the other’ in the report (Garvin, 1994, p. 123). 3. A subsequent forum called ‘Democratic Dialogue’ has attempted to emmulate the Commission’s achievements in inducing communal self- reflexivity in Northern Ireland. To this end, it holds conferences and publishes reports on a variety of issues related to the Northern Ireland conflict (Democratic Dialogue, 1995; 1996). 2 INTERPRETING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATION, IRISH NATIONALISM AND ULSTER UNIONISM 1. As evidence of this, Unionists have cited what they referred to as the Republic of Ireland’s ‘illegal, immoral and criminal’ constitutional claim on Northern Ireland in Articles 2 and 3 of Bunreacht Na hÉireann/ Constitution of Ireland (Dr Ian Paisley in the Belfast Telegraph, 3 July 1996) and the violent campaigns of militant republican groups. 2. John Armstrong is another leading exponent of contextualizing the devel- opment of nations within the range of ethnicity. For Armstrong, the devel- opment of nations should be seen in terms of the longue durée whereby the seeds of ethnic identity, such as symbols and myths of descent, are continually revitalized and reinterpreted in a changing communal identity (Armstrong, 1982, pp. 4–11). Historians such as Hugh Seton-Watson and Suzan Reynolds offer their own contributions to the ethnicist approach. Seton-Watson distinguishes between ‘old’ and ‘new’ nations: ‘The old are those which had acquired national identity or national consciousness before the formation of the doctrine of nationalism. The new are those for whom two processes developed simultaneously: the formation of national con- sciousness and the creation of national movements’ (Seton-Watson, 1977, p. 6). Suzan Reynolds draws parallels between the features of customs, laws, and myths found in medieval kingdoms in Western Europe and those same features found in modern nations (Reynolds, 1984, pp. 251–6). 3. As well as reformation Protestantism, the settlers brought with them entrepreneurial and industrial skills that corresponded to modern re- quirements and made Belfast the industrial centre of the island (Ruane and Todd, 1996, p. 27). 4. Joyce had already left Ireland before beginning work on Ulysses. Anderson’s concept of ‘imagining’ (and re-imagining) communal ident- ity would, therefore, have been especially poignant in his case. Notes 209 5. Hobsbawm defines this invention of tradition as: ‘a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past’ (Hobsbawm, 1983, p. 1). 6. The nationalism of O’Connell focused on Catholic emancipation and the establishment of an Irish parliament ruled by the Catholic majority (Hutchinson, 1994, p. 58). 7. The Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) is the largest ‘nationalist’ party in Northern Ireland. 8. By John Hume, SDLP, Leader, (Hume, 1996, pp. 118–33); and by Mark Durkan, SDLP, Chairperson (1990–5) and Denis Haughey, SDLP rep- resentative in the EU Committee of the Regions, in the dialogues. 3 THE GOVERNANCE OF NORTHERN IRELAND: FROM MODERNITY TO POSTMODERNITY? 1. The Irish Free State government became the ‘Government of the Re- public of Ireland’ after the Government of Ireland Act, 1948. 2. These features are normally associated with the modern state in West- ern democratic society. 3. The Unionist communal truth continues to repudiate the commonly held perception of widespread discrimination against Catholics during this period. 4. While he was Tánaiste in 1947, Seán Lemass began to consider aloud the idea of a European Customs Union despite the prevailing protec- tionist ethos of the Irish Free State (Bew and Patterson, 1982, pp. 34–6). This fledgling step signalled the beginning of an extraterritorial context for the economic resource of the Irish Nationalist identity (Bew, 1994, p. 159). 5. Theoretically, non-consociational options for a modern state structure for Northern Ireland include: Assimilation into the UK; assimilation into the Republic of Ireland; joint authority; a UK federation/confed- eration; Irish federation/confederation; repartition of the island; inde- pendence; and majority-rule devolution. Each option would appear to suffer from serious drawbacks when theoretically applied to the politi- cal context of Northern Ireland (see McGarry and O’Leary, 1990, for details). 6. A co-signatory of the AIA with Mrs Margaret Thatcher. 7. Although Mrs Thatcher was initially frustrated by the level of security co-operation secured by the AIA (Bew, Gibbon, Patterson, 1995, p. 214). 8. Where the gains made by one community are perceived by the other to have been made at its expense. 9. The right to national self-determination is ‘understood as the right of . members of a nation to preserve their distinct essence, and man- age communal life in accordance with their particular way of life’ (Tamir, 1993, p. 69). 210 Notes 4 INTIMATIONS OF POSTMODERNITY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 1. DG-16, which is responsible for the regional fund, has a staff of 500 managers and field officers (Marks, 1993, p. 397). 2. It must be remembered that representatives coming from nation-states with a strong regional structure, such as Germany and Belgium, al- ready have much more power than MEPs. 5 THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE RESOURCES OF COMMUNAL IDENTITIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND 1. The Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation was announced in December 1994 from the EU budget for cross-border initiatives. 2. As well as the formation of other regional élites based on policy ar- eas creating maritime, underdeveloped or agricultural regions (Finan- cial Times, 6 September 1995). 3. Such as Lisnaskea and Clones Enterprise Development and the Strabane- Lifford Development Commission. 4. With the help of their Conservative allies at Westminster and the abstentionist policy of Sinn Féin. 5. Reaffirmed by David Trimble (UUP, Leader) in the Financial Times, 11 September 1995. However, this aspiration appears to have been ditched in the aftermath of devolution for Scotland and Wales. 6. James Anderson and James Goodman have criticized the unionist econ- omist Graham Gudgin of the Cadogan Group for citing British subvention as a ‘trump card’ against a ‘united Ireland’. They argue that this precarious reliance on the British taxpayer, as well as the peripheral location of the island in the EU, actually necessitates the development of economic strategies that includes the creation of North- South institutions (in Fortnight, no. 350, May 1996). 7. For Unionists, the preoccupation of Prime Minister Edward Heath with the accession of the UK to the EEC in 1972 was responsible for an ill-considered decision to prorogue the Stormont Assembly in that year.