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Simon Ostrovsky It Focuses on His Experience Being It Focuses on His Ukrainian Authorities

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Simon Ostrovsky It Focuses on His Experience Being It Focuses on His Ukrainian Authorities PERSONA curious conversationalist BEHAVIOURS NEEDS Finds news through social To feel informed + show media feeds others that they’re informed Enjoys storytelling and news To strengthen and share their editorials opinions GOALS PAINS Fill in gaps in their Overwhelmed by frequent knowledge about major news updates of major news stories stories in a digestible way News is often dry and hard to Have a meaningful discussion digest; prefers intimate and with peers, augmented by personal news stories Articles can be kind of their knowledge “ bland——photos, text, done. AWARENESS GATHER KNOWLEDGE FORM OPINION DISCUSS CUSTOMER This story seems big, I can't read every I lost track of the I want someone I should keep up relevant article on story. I have no trustworthy to just my feed opinion. tell me what happened. I can’t keep up with I don’t know enough I can’t contribute to FRICTIONS all the details and to form an opinion conversations with updates friends HAPPINESS AWARENESS GATHER KNOWLEDGE FORM OPINION DISCUSS CUSTOMER This story seems big. I can't read every I lost track of the I want someone I should keep up relevant article on story. I have no trustworthy to just my feed opinion tell me what happened. I can’t keep up with I don’t know enough I can’t contribute to FRICTIONS all the details and to form an opinion conversations with updates friends HAPPINESS addressing frictions friction friction I can’t keep up with I can’t contribute to all the details and conversations with updates friction friends I don’t know enough to form an opinion touchpoint Vice packages major news touchpoint stories into digestible, touchpoint more intimate “moments” Vice encourages users to Context videos and learning share their opinions with from the Vice journalist’s the journalist, and then firsthand perspective keeps with their friends the user engaged and enables them to develop opinions “The reporters are de sign deci sions 01 Like Reflective, People Scalable talking to not want Vice’s and a friend immediate opinion personal Alex Miller, Vice Global Head of Content Kevin Sutcliffe, Vice Head of News Programming Kevin Sutcliffe, Vice Head of News Programming Neiman Labs (2017) 02 Like Reflective, People Scalable talking to not want Vice’s and a friend immediate opinion personal Alex Miller, Vice Global Head of Content Kevin Sutcliffe, Vice Head of News Programming Kevin Sutcliffe, Vice Head of News Programming Neiman Labs (2017) 03 Like Reflective, People Scalable talking to not want Vice’s and a friend immediate opinion personal Alex Miller, Vice Global Head of Content Kevin Sutcliffe, Vice Head of News Programming Kevin Sutcliffe, Vice Head of News Programming Neiman Labs (2017) 04 Like Reflective, People Scalable talking to not want Vice’s and a friend immediate opinion personal Alex Miller, Vice Global Head of Content Kevin Sutcliffe, Vice Head of News Programming Kevin Sutcliffe, Vice Head of News Programming Neiman Labs (2017) because you’re solving a problem for them and creating an experience they non traditional “chatbot” traditional bot our bot Tells a story about the forces, Customer support, transactions, emotions, and choices behind or a personal assistant events that unfolded why mobile web? match user behaviour chatbots are feasible cookies save conversations 60% of Vice users consume their content on mobile Vice Media Kit, 2016 5/5 user testers only engage with Vice on the web, not app User research from sprint Paul Campillo, 2017 Landbot, 2017 differentiate innovate Under reported news Reporters as friends Straddles news and entertainmentraw Vice cut-off: VR app Provocative content On-the-ground journalism cultivate A knowledgable friend that hard-hitting intimate } tells you like it is HBO Skype On the Line Vogue deferential Vice x Airbnb USC Annenberg Hires young journalists collaborate validate brand analysis Marty Neumeier, The Brand Gap SOCIAL MEDIA ENTRY WEBSITE ENTRY entry point The primary entry point is through social media since our users primarily engage with the news through these channels raw intimate hard-hitting deferential on boarding From the entry point, users land straight into a greeting and introduction message to prep them for a conversational experience. Content warning and interaction onboarding are packaged together raw intimate hard-hitting deferential moment Each moment begins with a brief context video; details are revealed in the conversation below. Users have the option to continue conversing, or move onto the next moment. raw intimate hard-hitting deferential CHATBOT DETAIL Where were the counterprotesters? They were surrounding the rioters, trying to create a barrier to stop them. Did the groups fight Couldn’t the 360° photos each other? authorities stop them? + videos raw intimate hard-hitting deferential CHATBOT DETAIL audio clips raw intimate hard-hitting deferential CHATBOT DETAIL send your location raw intimate hard-hitting deferential CHATBOT DETAIL You asked a lot about the authorities in this story. I recommend Held Hostage in Ukraine, told by Simon Ostrovsky. It focuses on his experience being captured by the Ukrainian Authorities. Feb UKRAINE 2014 Simon Ostrovsky remember user input raw intimate hard-hitting deferential CHATBOT DETAIL demonstrate your knowledge raw intimate hard-hitting deferential conversation beyond vice At the end of the experience, we encourage the user to from their opinion and share it with their friends. This could continue the conversation beyond the experience and inspire others to do the same raw intimate hard-hitting deferential returning user Chat history will be saved in the user’s cookies, and users are given the options of continuing where they left off or starting the whole experience over raw intimate hard-hitting deferential adding reducing perceived value cognitive overhead Collection of key moments of a Avoid digging through multiple significant news story, from a articles to grasp what happened trusted source Chat UI patterns are familiar and Storytelling in digestible messages intuitive Combination of journalist’s Mobile-web to avoid downloading perspective and raw, hard-hitting app + entry from social media, multimedia deeply engages users where users usually encounter Vice Allows users to craft a conversation piece with their friends 01 data collection Vice can collect data through users engaging with the bot (e.g. most common questions asked, which moment had the most engagement) 02 outside viewership Through the social media entry point and the encouragement to share and start discourse, Vice can capture readers outside their existing audience value 03 to vice differentiation Since Vice straddles mainstream news and viral entertainment, this intervention owns that space to further differentiate Vice from its competitors limitations 01 02 03 not for everyone mixing fact and opinion messenger chatbot Poor fit for those that prefer Opinion pieces are not non- Our intervention overlaps with to consume traditional, partisan their existing chatbot factual news Mixing fact and opinion could But Messenger is limited to a Could antagonize or alienate bias the audience’s own single persona and a strictly those that have different beliefs linear story flow beliefs than the journalists Benes, R. (2017, Sept 21). Side effect of the pivot to video: Audience shrinkage. Digiday. Retrieved from https://digiday.com/media/side-effect-pivot-video-audience-shrinkage/ Ciobanu, M. (2015, October 19). Getting young audiences to watch longer videos online: The Vice News way. Retrieved November 16, 2017, from https://www.journalism.co.uk/news/how-vice-news-does-long-form-video-for-the- digital-age/s2/a575819/ Engel, P. (2017, March 27) These are the most and least trusted news outlets in America. Business insider. Retrieved from http://www.businessinsider.com/most-and-least-trusted-news-outlets-in-america-2017-3 Folkenflik, D. (2014, April 3). The Rise of Vice Media. NPR. Retrieved from http://www.wbur.org/hereandnow/ 2014/04/03/rise-vice-media Google. (2016) Inside Abbey Road [Interactive video]. Retrieved from https://insideabbeyroad.withgoogle.com/en/ welcome Mahler, J. (2014, January 24). When ‘Long-Form’ Is Bad Form. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/25/ opinion/when-long-form-is-bad-form.html Mortensen, D. (2017, February 24). THE IMMERSIVE VIDEO REPORT: How VR, AR, and 360-degree video are shaping the future of content creation. Retrieved from http://www.businessinsider.com/the-immersive-video-report-how-vr-ar- and-360-degree-video-are-shaping-the-future-of-content-creation-2017-2 Nededog, J. (2016, August 26). Viceland's low ratings doesn't mean you should write it off just yet. Retrieved November 16, 2017, from http://www.businessinsider.com/vicelands-low-ratings-disney-2016-8 Tran, K. (2017, June 21). Vice Media's strategy is what's important, not its valuation. Business Insider. Retrieved from http://www.businessinsider.com/vice-media-strategy-important-not-valuation-2017-6 Vice News wants to take documentary-style storytelling to hot spots around the globe. (n.d.). Retrieved November 16, 2017, from http://www.niemanlab.org/2014/01/vice-news-wants-to-take-documentary-style- storytelling-to-hot-spots-around-the-globe/ Widdicombe, L. (2013, April 8). The bad-boy brand. The new yorker. Retrieved from https://www.newyorker.com/ magazine/2013/04/08/the-bad-boy-brand.
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