Testimony Prepared for Public Hearing on Proposed Merger of Fleet and Bar&Boston at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston on Ju
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Testimony Prepared for Public Hearing on Proposed Merger of Fleet and Bar&Boston at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston on July 7, 1999 bY Jim Campen Associate Professor of Economics University of Massachusetts Boston My name is Jim Campen and I am an Associate Professor of Economics at the University of Massachusetts Boston. Last year I completed a two-year term as a member of the Boston Fed’s Community Development Advisory Council. I will focus my comments today on the issue of mortgage lending to traditionally underserved borrowers, an issue on which I have completed several studies in recent years. 1. MY June report. In early June I released a report entitled “Does One Plus One Equal More Than Two? - Or Less Than One? A Study of Mortgage Lending Before and After Recent Mergers by Fleet and BankBoston.” (A copy is attached; it has previously been entered into the record for this application.) The main finding of this study was that - both in the city of Boston and in all of Massachusetts - lending to black, Latino, and low- and moderate-income (LMI) borrowers by Fleet in 1998 was approximately half of the total lending to these borrowers by Fleet and Shawmut combined in 1995. That is, the result of this most recent Fleet merger was “1 + 1 = 1.” In contrast, I found that lending to these borrowers by BankBoston in 1998 was approximately equal to the total lending to these borrowers by Bank of Boston and BayBanks combined in 1995. That is, the result of the most recent BankBoston merger was “1 + 1 = 2.” Fleet’s performance, but not that of BankBoston, fell far short of meeting the criteria of “1 + 1 > 2” that was emphasized by CEO’s Murray and Gifford at their joint March 15 press conference. My findings may be illustrated by one example (from Panel D of Table 1). LMI borrowers purchasing homes in the city of Boston in 1995 received 274 loans from Fleet and 400 loans from Shawmut, for a total of 674 loans. In 1998, Fleet made 335 loans, for a decrease of almost exactly half (the percentage decrease of 50.3% is reported in the right hand column). The same borrowers received almost as many loans from Bat&Boston in 1998 as from Bank of Boston and BayBanks combined three years earlier (the total fell from 269 loans to 255, a decrease of 5.2%). This particular finding is chosen as representative, not extreme; the same general pattern exists whether one looks at Boston or the entire state; at loans to blacks, to Latinos, or to LMI borrowers; at starting dates of 1994 or 1995 or ending dates of 1997 or 1998. And the findings reported for New York, New Jersey, New Hampshire, and Connecticut in Table 3 are even stronger than those for Boston in Table 1 and Massachusetts in Table 2. 2. Fleet’s response. Fleet’s principal response to my findings was stated in a June 29 letter from William Mutterperl to the Boston Fed’s CRA Officer, Richard Walker. Mr. Mutterperl points out that Fleet has ranked first in market share of lending to black, Latino, and LMI borrowers and that the percentage of its total loans that go to these borrowers is substantially above the industry average. This, of course, is not a refutation of my findings. Rather, Mr. Mutterperl has, perhaps unwittingly, underlined exactly why the substantial drop in Fleet’s mortgage lending to these borrowers following its merger with Shawmut is so significant. It is precisely because Fleet and Shawmut had such strong performance in lending to traditionally underserved borrowers that their decline matters so much. When a major lender cuts back its lending to middle- and upper-income households there is no reason for public policy concern, because there are plenty of other lenders aggressively seeking to lend to these borrowers. But when the largest lender to traditionally underserved borrowers cuts back substantially, there is a shortage of other lenders who will step in and take up the slack. Thus, even though Fleet’s cutback in lending to minority and LMI borrowers was approximately proportional its cutback in overall lending, while total lending (by all lenders) to all borrowers rose by 29% between 1995 and 1997, total lending (by all lenders) to black and Latin0 borrowers fell by 1% during the same period. When the two largest lenders to minority and LMI borrowers merge, it is possible for the subsequent lending of the surviving institution to fall to the level of the merger partner with the lower level of lending (that is, to fall by more than 50%, so that “l+l<l), while that surviving institution retains the positions of the largest single lender to blacks, Latinos, and LMI borrowers. Indeed, Fleet and Shawmut were by far the largest such lenders in 1995, and Fleet remains, as Mr. Mutterperl says, the largest lender. At this time, Fleet and BankBoston are the two largest lenders to minority and LMI borrowers. I doubt that Mr. Mutterperl means to suggest that it would be all right if the lending to these borrowers by the institution resulting from the proposed merger were to fall by 50% - as long as that institution retained a number one market share and continued to make a high percentage of its loans to these borrowers. 3. New results for six Massachusetts MSAs. I have attached to the written version of my testimony six newly completed tables that replicate for six Massachusetts metropolitan areas (MSAs) the analysis previously done for the City of Boston and the state of Massachusetts. These tables, numbered Tables 4 - 9 so as to not duplicate the table numbers from my June report, present new results for the three biggest MSAs in the state - Boston, Worcester, and Springfield - as well as for the three MSAs in the southeastern part of the state. ) I particularly call your attention to the tables for Springfield (Table 5) and New Bedford (Table 7). In Springfield, the state’s second most populous MSA, between 1995 and 1998 Fleet’s home-purchase loans to blacks fell from 46 loans to just 2, to Latinos from 99 loans to just 10, and to LMI borrowers from 226 loans to just 38. (The corresponding percentage declines, shown in the right-hand column were 95.7%, 89.9%, and 83.2%, respectively.) Meanwhile BankBoston’s lending to blacks and Latinos combined, as well as their lending to LMI borrowers, increased. In New Bedford, the state’s poorest MSA, (Table 7) total lending by both Fleet and BankBoston dropped precipitously. Total loans to blacks and Latinos by the two banks combined fell from 23 loans to 3, while total lending to LMI borrowers by the two banks combined fell from 127 loans to just 11. These dramatic numbers seem to me to offer grounds for serious concern, although I calculated them too recently to have had an opportunity to pursue any explanation of why lending in that city by these two banks fell so far and so fast. 4. The impact of branch/deposit divestitures on the “1 + 1 > 2” criteria. Fleet and BankBoston have suggested that the criterion of “1 + 1 > 2” should be modified to take into account the fact that the post- merger, post-divestiture institution will be only about 80% as large as the combined size of the two current banks - that is, that the appropriate criterion should be “1 + 1 > 1.6.” However, there is no guarantee that a bank acquiring divested branches will in fact engage in mortgage lending that will make up for a drop in lending by the divesting institution. I am aware of two cases in the last round of mergers where a substantial number of branches and deposits in a single MSA were divested to a single institution. Table 8 MORTGAGE LOANS FOR HOME PURCHASES IN THE MASSACHUSETTS PART OF THE PROVIDENCE, FALL RIVER, WARWICK MSA” Before and After Recent Mergers by BankBoston and Fleet, 1994 - 1998 * Most of this MSA is in Rhode Island; this table includes only loans in th Massachusetts part of the MSA. Data sources: Loan Application Registrar (LAR) data made available in accordance with the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). 1994-1997 data from CDs distributed by the Federal Financial Institutions Council. 1998 data obtained directly from BankBoston and Fleet. Data include all loans by identifiable afliliatates of lenders named. Low/Moderate Income (LMI): Defined for this table as up to 80% of the median family income in the Boston MSA. The maximum income to qualify as LMI was $41,000 in 1994, $42,000 in 1995. $45,000 in 1996, and $48,000 in 1997 & 1998. Table Prepared by: Jim Campen, UMass/Boston, July 6, 1999 Table 9 MORTGAGE LOANS FOR HOME PURCHASES IN THE BARNSTABLE-YARMOUTH MSA Before and After Recent Mergers by BankBoston and Fleet, 1994 - 1998 Data sources: Loan Application Registrar (LAR) data made available in accordance with the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). 1994-1997 data from CDs distributed by the Federal Financial Institutions Council. 1998 data obtained directly from BankBoston and Fleet. Data include all loans by identifiable aftiliatates of lenders named. LowModerate Income (LMI): Defined for this table as up to 80% of the median family income in the Boston MSA. The maximum income to qualify as LMI was 841,000 in 1994, $42,000 in 1995, $45,000 in 1996, and $48,000 in 1997 & 1998. Table Prepared by: Jim Campen, UMass/Boston, July 6, 1999 Does One Plus One Equal More Than Two? - Or Less Than One? A Study of Mortgage Lending Before and After Recent Mergers by Fleet and BankBoston bY Jim Campen Associate Professor of Economics University of Massachusetts/Boston* June 1999 *Home office durinn summer 1999: 17 Kelly Road, Cambridge MA 02139 617/354-5330 (phone) 617/354-1216 (fax) [email protected] Introduction At the March 15 press conference held to discuss the proposed merger of their two companies, CEO’s Terry Murray of Fleet and Chad Gifford of BankBoston emphasized a theme that was featured prominently on several of the slides projected for their audience: “1 + 1 > 2.” They argued, in other words, that the combined institution resulting from the merger would be able to do more for its stockholders, customers, and communities than the sum of what the two pre-merger institutions have done separately.