Peace in Presevo: Quick Fix
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PEACE IN PRESEVO: QUICK FIX OR LONG TERM SOLUTION? 10 August 2001 ICG Balkans Report N° 116 Pristina/Belgrade/Brussels TABLE OF CONTENTS MAP OF SOUTHWESTERN YUGOSLAVIA ..........................................................................................................................i EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....................................................................................................ii I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................................................................5 II. CONTEXTS .......................................................................................................................................................................2 A. LOCATION .................................................................................................................................................2 B. POPULATION..............................................................................................................................................2 C. A NOTE ON HISTORY ................................................................................................................................2 D. RECENT CONFLICT ....................................................................................................................................2 E. INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY CONCERNS ...............................................................................................4 III. THE SETTLEMENT ........................................................................................................................................................5 A. THE “COVIC PLAN” ...................................................................................................................................5 B. NEGOTIATED REOCCUPATION OF THE GSZ ..............................................................................................6 C. RECENT DESTABILISING INCIDENTS .........................................................................................................7 D. ETHNIC ALBANIAN ANXIETIES AND MOVEMENT .....................................................................................8 IV. THE CHALLENGES OF IMPLEMENTATION.........................................................................................................10 A. FRY SECURITY FORCES..........................................................................................................................10 B. POLICE REFORM ......................................................................................................................................10 C. POLITICAL REFORMS AND CONSULTATION ............................................................................................11 D. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT .....................................................................................................................12 E. BUREAUCRACY .......................................................................................................................................13 F. EDUCATION .............................................................................................................................................13 G. THE INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE.............................................................................................................13 V. THE STRATEGIC DIMENSION..................................................................................................................................14 A. JOINT SECURITY FORCE (JSF).................................................................................................................14 B. UCPMB...................................................................................................................................................14 C. KOSOVO ..................................................................................................................................................15 D. MACEDONIA ............................................................................................................................................15 E. SERBIA.....................................................................................................................................................17 VI. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................................................17 APPENDICES A. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP ..........................................................................................19 B. ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFING PAPERS ....................................................................................................20 C. ICG BOARD MEMBERS ...........................................................................................................................24 Presevo Valley ICG Balkans Report N° 116 10 August 2001 PEACE IN PRESEVO: QUICK FIX OR LONG TERM SOLUTION? EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS The past decade in the Western Balkans has seen After the fall of Slobodan Milosevic in October very few peacefully negotiated transfers of 2000, the new government in Belgrade prepared territorial control. The most recent example – a plan to reintegrate ethnic Albanians into state albeit one not involving any change of structures, along with guarantees to demilitarise sovereignty - was also the only one achieved by the region, create a multiethnic police force, and NATO’s direct mediation. In May 2001, the fully respect minority rights. Presevo Valley was brought back under Serbian government control, ending an ethnic Albanian Persuaded the reintegration plan was viable and insurgency that had lasted some seventeen keen to break links between ethnic Albanian months. forces in southern Serbia and northern Macedonia, where violence was building up This report traces the political process that dangerously, NATO dashed rebel hopes by achieved this transfer of authority over 1,200 taking Belgrade’s side. The alliance negotiated a square kilometres of territory, focusing on two phased reoccupation of the GSZ by FRY forces issues. First, it considers the reforms that are still that occurred between 14 March and 31 May needed to achieve lasting peace in the Presevo 2001. Contrary to many expectations, the area. Second, it considers the hopeful claim from reoccupation went smoothly. However, an some quarters that this transfer of authority, estimated 2,000 former fighters remain in the based on unprecedented cooperation between area, along with substantial arms caches. NATO and the new regime in Belgrade, may offer a model for tackling other disputes in the On the evening of August 3, the most wider neighbourhood. destabilising event since the FRY reoccupation of the GSZ occurred when an unidentified gunmen Ethnic Albanian rebels calling themselves the shot and killed two Serbian policemen and “Liberation Army of Presevo, Bujanovac and wounded two others. The killings were part of a Medvedja” (UCPMB in Albanian) exploited a wider upsurge of incidents that appear to be five kilometre-wide demilitarised strip along the coordinated and intended to derail the nascent Kosovo border inside Serbia – the Ground Safety peace process. Zone (GSZ), established in June 1999 to prevent accidental clashes between NATO forces and the The circumstances of peacemaking in Presevo Yugoslav Army. Operating from the GSZ, the were unique and cannot be emulated elsewhere. UCPMB attacked police and other state targets Recent events, moreover, illustrate that with virtual impunity. declarations of victory by Western observers remain premature. The insurgency in southern Peace in Presevo: Quick Fix or Long Term Solution? ICG Balkans Report N° 116, 10 August 2001 Page iii Serbia reflected real and deeply rooted problems, officers from wearing the purple camouflage both local and regional. Conditions for uniforms hitherto standard in the Presevo reconciliation are in place, but the process itself Valley. has hardly begun. The longer term prospects for peaceful reintegration now depend on effective EDUCATION follow through by the Serbian authorities assisted by ethnic Albanian leaders and the international 7. The United Nations Mission in Kosovo community. (UNMIK) should quickly create a system of certification of diplomas from the unofficial RECOMMENDATIONS: ethnic Albanian educational system that operated in Kosovo from 1991 to 1999 so GENERAL that ethnic Albanians will be qualified to work in the state sector and on state- 1. All parties involved – the governments of facilitated infrastructure projects in southern Serbia and the FRY, local ethnic Albanians Serbia. and the international community – should realise that the impressive achievements in 8. The international community should southern Serbia are merely the beginning of continue to target school construction and a long process of reconciliation and other education support as a top integration which will not succeed without development priority in southern Serbia. sustained commitment. ECONOMY 2. International organizations – the EUMM, OSCE, UN – and individual embassies 9. A substantial portion of international should maintain their current level of development aid for the FRY should be personnel stationed in and visiting southern earmarked for southern Serbia. Serbia. 10. Disbursement of funds for essential 3. Recognising that this process is fraught with infrastructure