Civil Wars As Challenges to the Modern International System

Civil Wars as Challenges to the Modern International System

Hendrik Spruyt

Abstract: The current international system is based on Westphalian principles in which authority is defined territorially. Within this territory, the state has sole jurisdiction. Adherence to these principles has contributed to the decline of interstate war. Conversely, applying these principles and correlated norms to states that gained their independence after 1945 has contributed to civil conflicts. These norms are opaque, as is the case with the principle of self-determination; or they lock in an unstable status quo, as with uti possidetis, the principle that borders inherited at the moment of independence should always be main- tained; or they are inconsistently applied and often violated, as with the principle of noninterference. Con- sequently, they provide poor guidelines as to when, and on which grounds, external intervention in civil wars might be warranted. I argue that the degree to which the combatants challenge Westphalian principles should guide policy responses. Furthermore, the international legal regime should reconsider uti possidetis. In some instances, partition might be a reasonable solution to civil wars.

The Westphalian agreements of 1648 set Europe on a course through which political authority became territorially defined and juridically autono- mous within recognized borders. In the centuries since, these principles of order came to define the very notion of what qualifies as “domestic” politics and what is “international.” Through these principles, European states devised a mode of governance that demarcated spheres of jurisdiction and thereby HENDRIK SPRUYT is the Norman facilitated regular interstate relations. Dwight Harris Professor of Inter- The treaties of Osnabrück and Münster set the national Relations at Northwest- foundations for the Westphalian system, articulat- ern University. He is the author of ing a particular logic of organization that differed Ending Empire: Contested Sovereignty in several key aspects from the preceding feudal or- and Territorial Partition (2005), The der. The feudal legitimation of authority, based on Sovereign State and Its Competitors: An Analysis of Systems Change (1994), and personal ties, contrasted with the Westphalian ter- Contracting States: Sovereign Transfers ritorial definition of authority. Moreover, Westpha- in International Relations (with Alex- lia presupposed, in principle, a hierarchical govern- ander Cooley, 2009). ment within the territorial space of a given state. Ju-

112 ridically, Westphalia recognized no higher ders has delegitimized the acquisition of Hendrik authority than that of the sovereign ruler, territory by force. Consequently, the sur- Spruyt in contrast to transterritorial imperial and vival rate of states has increased signifi- religious claims of emperors and popes. As cantly compared with earlier centuries.3 the conduit between the domestic realm Material conditions have also increased and interstate relations, the sovereign rul- the costs of warfare between the major er would handle international affairs. powers. Combined, these dynamics have Stephen Krasner has distinguished four made interstate war, certainly among the types of sovereignty.1 “Independence sover- major powers, virtually obsolete.4 eignty” refers to the degree of a state’s sen- Paradoxically, however, as interstate war- sitivity to globalization and international fare has declined, intrastate war has been flows across its borders. “Domestic sover- tragically common.5 In the half-century fol- eignty” denotes the organization of politi- lowing World War II, there were almost 150 cal authority within the state and the extent civil wars, averaging more than 143,000 ca- to which this authority can de facto exercise sualties each. effective control. Max Weber most famous- I submit that the global expansion of ly articulated this aspect of sovereignty, de- Westphalian principles and correlated fining the state as an entity that possesses norms partially contributed to the frequen- a monopoly on the legitimate use of force.2 cy and intensity of civil wars after 1945. That “Westphalian sovereignty” signifies that ju- is, even as it decreased interstate warfare, ridical authority resides fully with the hier- the very victory of the Westphalian system archical authority of the territorial realm. set the stage for the rise of intrastate con- No higher supranational authority exists, flict, particularly in those countries that unless the given state has voluntarily rec- became independent with decolonization. ognized such an institution. Finally, “inter- Moreover, Westphalian principles have not national legal sovereignty” refers to the rec- only created some of the precipitating con- ognition of the state by others as an inde- ditions of civil wars, but the confusion sur- pendent entity. rounding their application and the contes- Many states that were recognized as sov- tation with rival sets of norms have con- ereign territorial states prior to World War founded the search for policies that might II possess most of these traits. By contrast, address such conflicts. many of the states that emerged in the I begin this essay by tracing how the ex- wake of decolonization lack key features tension of Westphalian principles has af- of sovereignty. fected the occurrence of civil wars. Sub- While the Peace of Westphalia hardly sequently, I discuss how correlated norms heralded the victory of these principles, have had pernicious effects. In the final by the end of the twentieth century, West- section, I provide a typology of civil wars phalian principles had become the norm. to assess the type of threat posed by a giv- Today, sovereign territorial states are the en conflict. Depending on the type of civil constitutive actors of the international war, altering some of the correlated princi- system. Westphalian norms are thus not ples of the Westphalian order might serve simply moral precepts, but serve as rules as a partial guide for policy responses. with material consequences. The global spread of Westphalian princi- Developments in the last half-century ples in the course of the twentieth century have challenged the traditional under- has contributed to the decline of interstate standing of sovereign territorial statehood war. Respect for mutually recognized bor- in several ways. Prior to World War II, the

146 (4) Fall 2017 113 Civil Wars Montevideo Convention on the Rights and ated withdrawal, others got mired in the last as Challenges Duties of States (1933) put preponderant colonial wars. Britain largely exemplified to the Modern International weight on the factual control over territory the first process, while Portugal, France, System and the monopoly of force.6 Article 1 pro- and The Netherlands exemplified the lat- claimed that “the state as a person of inter. Ultimately, the “Winds of Change,” to ternational law should possess the follow- use Harold MacMillan’s phrase, blew de- ing qualifications: a) a permanent popula- cidedly against the imperial powers.7 tion; b) a defined territory; c) government; At the same time, the colonies resisted and d) capacity to enter into relations with efforts to make their independence con- the other states.” The Convention empha- tingent upon criteria of fitness. The fit- sized that a state’s international legitimacy ness benchmark evolved in the interwar did not hinge upon recognition from oth- period, when the colonial powers assert- er actors, thus endorsing the declaratory ed that their withdrawal, and subsequent theory of statehood, as stipulated in arti- recognition of independence for the colo- cle 3: “The political existence of the state nies, hinged upon suitable conditions. But is independent of recognition by the oth- Lord Lugard’s claim that the imperial power states.” Thus, the Weberian conception ers were bringing “the torch of culture and of the state, emphasizing de facto capabil- progress” to “the abode of barbarism” car- ity, claimed primacy over the recognition ried little appeal in the postwar era.8 of one’s own sovereignty by other states. The insistence of the superpowers fur- Developments following World War II ther expedited imperial withdrawal. Both enshrined the principle of territorial sov- the United States and the ussr sought to ereignty by extending independence and capitalize on the nationalist sentiments juridical equality to former colonies and in the colonies to enhance their respec- mandate territories. In the process, the in- tive positions in the Cold War. The Soviet ternational system separated the connec- Union hastened to support national strug- tion between de jure recognition and de gles of liberation, while the United States facto state capacity. International legal, de exerted pressure on the European colonial jure, recognition was bestowed on the for- powers through diplomatic and econom- mer colonies, irrespective of whether they ic means, most notably Marshall Plan aid. factually met the earlier Montevideo crite- In addition, multilateral organizations, ria. That is, the former colonies were rec- such as the United Nations, enshrined the ognized as juridical equals of already exist- principle of self-determination. The un ing states, and became fully independent, professed as one of its key objectives: “To even though their governments lacked the develop friendly relations among nations institutional capacity to effectively govern based on respect for the principle of equal their territories in the traditional West- rights and self-determination of peoples, phalian sense. Thus, paradoxically, short- and to take other appropriate measures to ly after the establishment of the Monte- strengthen universal peace.”9 Former col- video criteria, the constitutive theory of onies that had already gained their inde- statehood gradually gained primacy in the pendence, such as India, subsequently used decades following 1945. international organizations to further the There were several reasons for this shift. cause of decolonization, equating self-de- First, the colonial powers lacked the capa- termination of peoples with independence. bilities and will to hold subject territories. As a consequence, though some Euro- While some of the maritime empires with- pean powers were slow to recognize the drew in a process of calculated and negoti- changed conditions in the immediate after-

114 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences math of World War II, decolonization was verse in ethnicity, religion, race, and oth- Hendrik swift. Dozens of newly independent states er markers of identity remained grouped Spruyt emerged in the decade and a half after 1945. together within the territorial boundaries However, unlike the states that acquired created by the colonial powers.13 independence prior to World War II, the The historical legacy of combining het- newly independent states of the postwar erogeneous communities within artificial- era lacked Weberian characteristics, as ly evolved borders has complicated con- James Fearon’s essay in this volume notes.10 temporary efforts at state-building and European dynasts historically expanded economic development. In many cases the their control over rival warlords partially newly independent states resembled cap- by competition and selection over many stone governments.14 In such polities, the centuries of interstate war. The European ruling elite would share common traits but process of nation-building that coalesced govern vertically stratified societies. They within the fixed territorial parameters of lacked the infrastructural power and mon- the given state was long and arduous. In itoring capabilities that we have come to as- mobilizing their populations for war, rul- sociate with the modern state. Maintaining ers needed to expand administration, tax- control over diverse populations thus logi- ation, and public education. In so doing, cally meant that the ruling elite had to tol- they affected every aspect of society. The erate considerable autonomy of local pow- bellicist theory of state formation has per- er brokers and instead hope to rule by ad suasively argued for the importance of cen- hoc alliances with the local powers that be. tralization by warfare.11 As rulers either de- The desire to catch up to the Western feated or bought off their rival lords, they nation-state model, and to develop their acquired a monopoly over the means of vi- economies, subsequently influenced the olence. At the same time, local identities relations between state elites and their het- gradually transformed: individuals be- erogeneous societies. During the colonial came citizens and members of the imag- struggles, indigenous groups might have ined community, the nation. For sure, this forged a temporary unity by virtue of their process included frequent internal conflict, anti-European or anti-Western stance. The as Francis Fukuyama describes in the En- nationalist leaders who had led the strug- glish case. Yet, in the end, centralized state gles, such as Jomo Kenyatta in Kenya and authorities and relatively homogeneous na- Julius Nyerere in Tanzania, could be re- tions emerged.12 vered and provide for coherence. However, The territories dominated by the Euro- as the initial unity receded, state attempts pean colonial powers, however, did not un- to capture greater resources from their so- dergo such dynamics. These states gained cieties increasingly impinged on local au- independence in the wake of decoloniza- tonomies, leading to friction.15 tion, regardless of their capability to pro- The lack of interstate war further hin- vide a meaningful level of public goods, and dered many rulers of the newly independent regardless of their heterogeneity. Borders states. Whereas warfare and state-making were artificial relicts, particularly in Afri- coincided in Europe, the maintenance of ca, largely demarcated by the maps of Eu- existing borders, and thus the absence of ropean powers as the metropoles divided a security imperative in Africa, doomed the continent in the late nineteenth century. many of the newly independent states to Moreover, in most cases of decoloniza- weakness. The very strength of the princi- tion, the colonial borders remained intact, ple of international legal sovereignty, which no matter how artificial. Populations di- delegitimized changes in preexisting terri-

146 (4) Fall 2017 115 Civil Wars torial borders, made it impossible for these ed, as with the principle of noninterference. as Challenges weaker states to redress the problems they Moreover, the expectation that the Webe- to the Modern 16 International inherited from the colonial period. rian model of statehood would emerge has System As a result, local affinities of village, clan, proven illusory, and the attempts to impose tribe, ethnicity, and religion remained sa- it by external intervention have failed. The lient, precluding the formation of a com- combination of these factors has exacerbat- mon national identity. As Benedict Ander- ed the problems posed by civil wars, and has son has shown, the creation of an imagined provided little guidance for the settlement community, the nation, requires large- of some of those conflicts. scale public education, a shared language, To begin with the principle of self-deter- and high degrees of literacy in order to dis- mination of peoples, as enshrined in arti- place other sources of affinity.17 None of cle 1 of the un Charter: How are we to un- these conditions held in many countries in derstand peoples? Does this apply to any sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and community that defines itself as a nation? Central Asia. If so, the number of potential states is far larger than the current number of existing Decolonization expanded the Westpha- states (almost two hundred). Indeed, hun- lian system and brought with it a set of re- dreds more should be entitled to secession lated norms and expectations. Three norms and deserving of international recognition. in particular–self-determination, uti possi- However, for all the expansiveness of un detis, and noninterference–would govern Secretary General Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda the subsequent international relations of for Peace, he nevertheless argued for the the newly independent states. Decoloniza- maintenance of existing borders and states: tion entailed the right of self-determination “If every ethnic, religious, or linguistic of peoples. Uti possidetis iuris (as you possess group claimed statehood, there would be under law) stipulated the maintenance of no limit to fragmentation.”18 Read in this inherited borders: the newly recognized restrictive manner, the self-determination states were to leave the colonial borders in of peoples would thus refer only to the self- place, no matter how arbitrary. Noninter- determination of subject polities, such as ference meant that, in principle, no state the colonies and mandates of the pre– should interfere with the domestic affairs World War II era.19 of another state. In other words, states had Which interpretation should prevail? to respect each other’s juridical autonomy. Boutros-Ghali provided little help, observ- In addition to these norms, the expecta- ing that “the sovereignty, territorial integ- tion was that the newly independent states rity and independence of states within the would gradually develop along the West- established international system, and the ern model with increasing economic ca- principle of self-determination for peoples, pacity and a monopoly over the means of both of great value and importance, must violence in their territory. Modernization not be permitted to work against each oth- theory thus predicted that, over time, tra- er in the period ahead.” How to resolve this ditional societies would transform into the paradox in practice went unanswered. Western nation-state model. The rigorous application of uti possidetis Unfortunately, these norms can be has also come at a cost. To be clear: the new opaque, as is the case with the principle of African rulers themselves were not eager to self-determination; or they lock in an unsta- alter the inherited boundaries. By becom- ble status quo, as with uti possidetis; or they ing the new rulers of the former colony, they are inconsistently applied and often violat- acquired title to the resources, even if lim-

116 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences ited, that the preceding government left scribe, the European Union guidelines on Hendrik behind. Redesigning the territorial land- recognition stipulated several strict crite- Spruyt scape to more accurately coincide with eth- ria. The seceding republics had to adhere nic, tribal, or religious affiliations would to various international agreements, such threaten their own position. The new gov- as the un Charter, and guarantee rights of ernments thus endorsed the external le- minorities within their borders. Further- gal principle of uti possidetis iuris in order to more, they had to declare their respect for maintain the inherited borders. At the Or- democracy and the rule of law.23 ganization of African Unity (oau) confer- The application of a third legal princi- ence in Cairo in 1964, the heads of state thus ple, noninterference, has similarly been accepted “to pledge themselves to respect fraught with inconsistency, facing challeng- the borders existing on their achievement es from rival sets of principles and norms. of national independence.”20 The principle of noninterference in other First applied to the independence of Lat- states’ internal affairs, including civil wars, in American states in the early nineteenth is long-standing. States are obliged to re- century, uti possidetis subsequently played an frain from interfering in insurgencies in important role in the international arbitra- other countries. Even if the insurgent group tion of border disputes. As the Internation- has been recognized as a belligerent party, al Court of Justice noted: “The Chamber which grants it a limited legal personality, nonetheless wishes to emphasize its gen- third parties must refrain from premature eral scope, in view of its exceptional im- recognition of the insurgency. For example, portance for the African continent. . . . Its the British willingness to build Confeder- obvious purpose is to prevent the indepen- ate warships and to receive these warships dence and stability of new States being en- in British ports during the American Civ- dangered by fratricidal struggles provoked il War constituted a violation of neutrality by the challenging of frontiers following the in the judgment of an international arbitra- withdrawal of the administering power.”21 tion panel. Britain recognized the finding The African states were thus condemned to and settled the dispute with a substantial work with the arbitrary borders formulat- remuneration to the United States.24 ed by the former colonial powers. In practice though, the legal principle But uti possidetis itself is less obvious than has more often been honored in the breach sometimes imagined. To which borders rather than in its observance. Particularly does the principle apply? While secession- during the Cold War, the superpowers and ist movements of substate units have been their allies engaged in decidedly hot con- deemed illegal, as in the cases of Katanga flicts either directly or by proxy. Civil war and Northern Cyprus, secession by units combatants found diverse backing from the within a federal system might be accept- United States, Britain, France, the ussr, able, although to varying degrees.22 The and the People’s Republic of China. international community has, with reser- With the end of the Cold War, many of vations, extended the right of secession to the recipients of external aid faced a loss such units, provided the territorial borders of foreign support. With neither the Unit- that demarcated them within the federal ed States nor the Soviet Union and their re- system were retained, as was largely the spective allies interested in supporting the case with the former Yugoslavia. central governments of beleaguered states, However, here again other preconditions these governments became more vulnera- confound the principle of self-determina- ble to internal rivals. At the same time, di- tion. As Tanja Börzel and Sonja Grimm de- minished resources curtailed the capaci-

146 (4) Fall 2017 117 Civil Wars ty of governments to provide for essential poses an obligation upon the community as Challenges services, leading to the rise of alternate po- of sovereign states to punish those govern- to the Modern International litical organizations beyond the state. As ments that violate the basic rights of their System James Fearon demonstrates in his essay in peoples.28 Following the World Summit this volume, shifts in the balance of pow- Outcome 2005, the un General Assembly er in favor of potential rebel groups creat- thus affirmed that collective use of force ed windows of opportunity against an al- against a state could be justified underun ready weak central state.25 auspices when national authorities failed Further, the current international legal to protect their citizens. regime regarding external intervention cre- Extending this view, some have argued ates problems of its own. Given that mili- that good governance entails the ability tary action against another country is pri- of citizens to hold their own governments ma facie illegal in international law–unless accountable. Thus, external intervention authorized by a multilateral organization, against a target state might be justified not such as the United Nations Security Council merely on the grounds of a systematic vio- –the great powers have often sought multi- lation of individual rights, but by the very lateral approval for their actions, as did the nature of the target regime.29 two Bush administrations for their actions The strategic argument in favor of regime against Iraq in 1991 and 2003. The need for change finds another source in democratic multilateral approval inevitably raises col- peace theory.30 The crux of the theory is the lective action problems, complicating the view that the long-term prospects for inter- possibility of united action by the interna- national peace depend on the spread of de- tional community. Russia, for example, op- mocracy to authoritarian regimes. This per- posed intervention in Yugoslavia, as it does spective has been a virtual bedrock for U.S. today in Syria. Similarly, continued multi- foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. lateral restrictions on the government of The Bush administration articulated an Iraq from 1991 to 2003 proved difficult to even more expansive rationale for inter- maintain given fissures in the alliance. Even ference in other states to justify its inter- when external intervention on humanitar- vention in Iraq. While international law ian grounds might be needed, as with the can justify a preemptive strike–if that state Rwandan genocide, it has been difficult to realistically fears an imminent attack by realize. And as Barry Posen rightly notes, the target state–the Bush administration the shift from a unipolar world to a multi- also advocated for the justification ofpre - polar one will complicate collective action ventive war.31 Though the United States did even further.26 not face an imminent attack from Iraq, the Moreover, the principle of noninterfer- Bush administration attempted to justify ence–the respect for a state’s juridical au- U.S. military action against Iraq by citing tonomy–is not absolute. Competing in- the dangers of the weapons of mass de- ternational norms and various legal justi- struction the administration alleged were fications challenge the supremacy of the present there. By this view, states that ac- nonintervention principle. First, one can quire weapons of mass destruction–or, as argue that the failure of governments to in Iraq’s case, are suspected of attempting provide rudimentary public goods to their to acquire them–could be subject to mil- own populations, while in the process cre- itary action, even if they were not other- ating negative externalities for other states, wise poised to engage in war. justifies external intervention.27 The re- In this cauldron of competing norms and sponsibility to protect (r2p) doctrine im- justifications for and against noninterfer-

118 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences ence, national governments and subnation- No doubt each civil war presents many Hendrik al actors have tried to leverage legal and nor- unique challenges. How external actors will Spruyt mative changes in the international system respond to the challenges posed by specific to their advantage. Central governments civil wars will hinge on the geopolitical val- have argued for a strict interpretation of ue of the country in question, the strength noninterference and respect for Westpha- of the opposing forces, the target state’s re- lian principles. Conversely, secessionist gime type, and domestic sentiments in the movements have used emerging doctrines intervening countries, among other factors. such as r2p to obtain international support The many modalities of civil wars make it for their demands. For example, the seces- infeasible to develop an all-encompassing sionist components of Yugoslavia argued theory to guide policy in all circumstances. that Milosevic’s crimes against humanity Indeed, for that reason, predicting, let alone justified their claim to independence. Serbi- preventing, the outbreak of civil wars has an violation of human rights and democrat- met, at best, with limited success.33 ic principles served to invalidate Serbia’s Nevertheless, I contend that we can as- sovereignty, while it conversely validated pire to develop a reflective equilibrium be- the other republics’ sovereignty claims. tween abstract theories and the realities of In sum, opaque norms and conflicting case-by-case variation.34 Rather than as- principles present the international com- pire to general overarching theories, we munity with paradoxes, confounding the might classify cases by several patterns, search for solutions to civil wars. Respect which in turn might guide policy choices. for Westphalian regulative principles, such Any external response to civil wars first as uti possidetis, has contributed to the reduc- requires assessment of the type of threat tion of interstate war. Meanwhile, the same posed by the conflict. In their essays in principle contradicts the equally admirable this volume, Karl Eikenberry and Stephen goal of self-determination by locking in ar- Krasner as well as Stewart Patrick analyze bitrary borders of the colonial period. Non- civil wars in terms of their negative effects interference respects a government’s juridi- on other states to determine whether we cal autonomy, but also stifles the likelihood should view civil wars as relatively local- of external intervention in cases of civil and ized or with broader systemic effects. I human rights abuses, or even genocide. Are submit that whether a civil war presents any guiding principles possible given this local or systemic threats also depends on complexity? the objectives pursued by the combatants. Specifically, to what extent do they chal- Reassessing several international legal lenge the general principles of the West- principles as well as the goals of exter- phalian international order? nal intervention can provide some guid- With that in mind, one might rank vari- ance for how the international commu- ous challenges along a continuum of threats nity might respond to civil wars. I argue to the regulative principles that underlie the in particular that we might reconsider to Westphalian state system. One might dis- what extent extant borders should remain tinguish, first, civil wars aimed at conces- in place in all circumstances. In addition, sions by the extant government, such as we might adopt a less ambitious agenda re- increased participation in government or garding external state-building.32 Recon- changes in revenue distribution. These do sidering these principles alongside an as- not singularly pose a systemic threat. No sessment of the types of civil wars can pro- doubt these conflicts can have significant vide some policy guidance. external effects, such as refugee flows, the

146 (4) Fall 2017 119 Civil Wars possible spread of pandemic diseases, and we should reconsider the blanket rejection as Challenges criminal networks, which might precipi- of partition. Contrary to uti possidetis, re- to the Modern 35 International tate external actions. But the combatants drawing boundaries might be a solution System are involved in an internal conflict, and are if all else fails. Such proposals are already not pursuing wider systemic objectives. In being discussed regarding fractured states such cases, external intervention might such as Iraq, Libya, Yemen, and Syria. have salutary effects by providing media- One might also limit secessionist claims tion, by election monitoring, and by facil- to specific categories, such as the repub- itating credible commitments. As James lics or provinces of federal states, but deny Fearon points out, such interventions have claims by lesser administrative units with- achieved some success.36 in those states. For example, in the Yugoslav A second type of civil war, aimed at se- Wars, the international community recog- cession, challenges one corollary principle nized the republics that had delineated ter- to the Westphalian system, specifically the ritorial borders in the old polity, but was less principle of uti possidetis. However, actors responsive to demands by smaller political in these civil wars do not oppose the con- entities. cept of the territorial state per se; quite the Limiting secessionist demands to repub- contrary, they seek such a state for them- lics or provinces that form part of a federal selves. They object to the current borders structure also has advantages. The very ex- and seek de jure recognition as an indepen- istence of a federal system suggests a histor- dent state. In cases in which ethnic conflict ical legacy in which diverse populations al- has erupted within these states, one solu- ready had a degree of local autonomy with- tion might be to consent to or even active- in a given territorial space. Separation along ly aid the partition of the extant state and those lines would thus simply recognize the separation of belligerents.37 those preexisting historical features. One must weigh the benefit of potential Moreover, such units would already partition against the cost of weakening the have extant local institutions with some principle of maintaining existing borders. governing capacity. Recognizing the var- Will intervention precipitate a move along ious separate components of a previously the slippery slope, and potentially cause integrated federal state would not inevita- more civil conflicts? Standard arguments bly lead to a set of failed states. Hence, the against relaxing uti possidetis predict that international community might be more emboldening self-determination and legit- amenable to demands by federal units than imating secession would lead to the frag- to secessionist movements at lower levels. mentation of numerous states; the flood- Finally, some recognition of new states in gates would open to innumerous secession- the wake of civil wars has already occurred, ist civil wars. These concerns are reasonable as in Yugoslavia and Sudan.39 Whether but overstated. these constituted unique cases merits fur- I do not contend that partition should ther research, but the decades of peace fol- be seen as the first solution to secession- lowing the Yugoslav Wars suggest that sep- ist conflicts. Prior to endorsing partition, aration, albeit with commensurate domes- institutional solutions might be pursued, tic reforms, might terminate civil wars with such as increasing proportional represen- some long-term stability thereafter. Admit- tation or greater regional autonomy.38 Ex- tedly, as in the case of Sudan, partition by ternal actions might thus enhance the ben- itself may not be a panacea. efits for maintaining territorial integrity A third category of civil wars consists rather than pursuing partition. However, of cases in which combatants do not seek

120 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences control over, or concessions from, the ex- A more likely outcome is the emer- Hendrik tant state, nor do they seek a state of their gence of hybrid authority structures in Spruyt own. Instead, local power brokers seek to which public and private actors both seek use public functions of the state for their to benefit from external connections, with own gain and for their followers, resulting few gains in central state capacity. Other in the quintessential fragile state with dis- states might engage with government of- persed authority. State authorities them- ficials and local power brokers, but with- selves may even conspire with local pow- out any illusion this will result in some- er brokers and illicit networks, partially for thing resembling the Western state model. economic rewards, partially to counter do- Finally, the most problematic type of mestic rivals, as shown by Will Reno and civil war is the one in which actors fun- Vanda Felbab-Brown in their contributions damentally reject the regulative principles to this volume.40 of the Westphalian system and legitimate In these cases, the attempt to external- their authority in nonterritorial terms. ly impose something resembling the We- For example, as Tanisha Fazal shows, re- berian state model has proven illusory, as ligiously motivated combatants may seek demonstrated by the experiences in So- to control their religious community ir- malia and Afghanistan. Indeed, given the respective of existing borders.46 Conse- historical legacy of capstone governments quently, they contest the extant govern- in these countries, the very notion of a ment’s legitimate authority and, indeed, high-capacity, centralized state is anathe- the very existence of the state. ma.41 Anthropologist Thomas Barfield has Whereas concessions to the combatants suggested that the attempt of the Afghan might resolve the other types of civil war, government to increase state capacity in the this last category diametrically contra- post–World War II decades, and to limit lo- dicts the current logic of organization es- cal prerogatives, precipitated the ensuing tablished by the Westphalian system. Me- decades of conflict.42 A large body of re- diation or relaxing the principle of uti pos- search suggests that external state-building sidetis might help resolve some civil wars, is ephemeral at best.43 For example, politi- but such policies are ineffective respons- cal scientist Ken Menkhaus has argued that, es to this type of conflict. in Somalia, one can only hope that warlords The ambitions of some Islamic groups to will step in as intermediate power brokers base political organization on the commu- and provide localized public goods. Some nity of the faithful, whether in the form of warlords in Africa might indeed already act a caliphate or other transnational compo- in this capacity.44 sition, have provided a dramatic contem- Because the interests of external ac- porary example of this type. In this they di- tors do not correspond with the inter- verge from other violent groups, such as the ests of domestic power brokers, external Irish Republican Army or the Basque sepa- state-building efforts in these circumstanc- ratist eta, whose objectives were state in- es are unlikely to produce substantial re- dependence. These latter groups objected sults. Warlords might appear to accom- to the existing state structure but not the modate settlements that aim to strength- concept of territorial statehood. en central authority, but they only appear Whether or not a specific Islamic group to do so. As Stephen Biddle shows, the in- can be reconciled with Westphalian legal formation asymmetries between external principles will depend on the group’s in- actors and local elites give the latter sub- terpretation of Islamic thought: specifi- stantial advantages.45 cally, whether Islamic law on the state, the

146 (4) Fall 2017 121 Civil Wars subcomponent of Sharia termed Siyar, can its, the Ottoman rulers came increasingly as Challenges be reconciled with a Law of Nations. to recognize European sovereigns as equals. to the Modern International Some scholars suggest that interpret- Correspondingly, Islamic legal doctrine and System ing Siyar as compatible with contempo- diplomacy went through a decisive trans- rary international law anachronistical- formation and rulers adjusted to the terri- ly applies modernist concepts to older Is- torial states’ system.49 lamic doctrine.47 Siyar has a monistic legal Various groups will thus have their own view that does not distinguish between do- interpretation of Islam that informs their mestic and international legal regimes. It logic of organization. For some, there is no lacks the concept of juridical territoriality, inherent tension between religious doctrine and thus has no conception of a legal or- and the current nation-state system. How- der between states. ever, other groups, particularly those who Traditional Islamic doctrine also pro- adhere to a fundamentalist view, such as hibited treaties with infidels. Temporary the restoration of the caliphate, seem par- armistices of ten years were permissible ticularly irreconcilable with the logic of the if warranted by material conditions, but Westphalian order. They resemble the early long-term treaties and the recognition of Ottoman ghazi warriors rather than the later other sovereigns as equals were forbidden. more-accommodative Ottomans.50 Other interpretations, however, suggest Combatants who seek to take over a ter- that Islamic views can be reconciled with ritorial state or who seek to form their own the Westphalian order.48 Admittedly, Is- state might be reconciled with the current lamic rulers, such as the Ottoman sultans, international community, even if some initially did not recognize sovereign equali- principles of the Westphalian order need ty. Moreover, these rulers did not sign long- to be relaxed. However, settling a civil war term treaties with non-Muslims, and they with protagonists who challenge the very did not permit any territorial delimitation principles of the international state sys- of their authority. In practice, though, from tem, such as isis, is an altogether differ- the mid-sixteenth century on, as the Otto- ent matter. man Empire expanded to its Western lim-

endnotes Author’s Note: I am indebted to Karl Eikenberry, Stephen Krasner, Stewart Patrick, and the participants at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences workshop for their comments. I also thank Maris Maeve O’Tierney for her superlative research assistance. 1 Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999), 9–25. See also Hendrik Spruyt, The Sovereign State and Its Competitors: An Analysis of Sys- tems Change (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994). 2 As articulated by Max Weber in his essay “Politics as Vocation.” See H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, trans. and eds., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 78. 3 Tanisha Fazal, State Death: The Politics and Geography of Conquest, Annexation, and Occupation (Prince- ton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007); and Mark Zacher, “The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force,” International Organization 55 (2) (2001): 215–250. 4 Raimo Väyrynen, The Waning of Major War: Theories and Debates (New York: Routledge, 2006).

122 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences 5 Stathis Kalyvas, “Civil Wars,” in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics, ed. Carles Boix and Hendrik Susan C. Stokes (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 416–434. Spruyt 6 The text of the Convention on Rights and Duties of States is accessible at http://www.oas .org/juridico/english/treaties/a-40.html. 7 Hendrik Spruyt, Ending Empire: Contested Sovereignty and Territorial Partition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cor- nell University Press, 2005). 8 Raymond F. Betts, Uncertain Dimensions (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985), 55. 9 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations (San Francisco: United Nations, 1945), chap. 1, art. 1, sec. 2. 10 James D. Fearon, “Civil War & the Current International System,” Dædalus 146 (4) (Fall 2017). 11 Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” in Bringing the State Back In, ed. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni- versity Press, 1985). 12 Eugene Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1979); Barry Posen, “Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Mil- itary Power,” International Security 18 (2) (1993): 80–124; and Francis Fukuyama, “The Last English Civil War,” Dædalus 147 (1) (Winter 2018). 13 Robert Jackson, “Quasi States, Dual Regimes, and Neo-Classical Theory: International Juris- prudence and the Third World,” International Organization 41 (4) (1987): 519–554. 14 For a discussion of how capstone governments function, see Ernest Gellner, Nations and Na- tionalism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983); and Patricia Crone, Pre-Industrial Soci- eties (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989). 15 For a genealogical and typological discussion of patterns of rule in Africa, see William Reno, Warfare in Independent Africa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 16 Jeffrey Herbst, “The Creation and Maintenance of National Boundaries in Africa,” Interna- tional Organization 43 (4) (1989): 673–692; Jeffrey Herbst, “War and the State in Africa,” In- ternational Security 14 (4) (1990): 117–139; and Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power in Africa (Prince- ton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000). 17 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1991). 18 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping (New York: United Nations, 1992), 17–19. 19 Indeed, as Jean-Marie Guéhenno notes, at the very formation of the United Nations, the United States opposed humanitarian justifications for external intervention. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, “The United Nations & Civil Wars,” Dædalus 147 (1) (Winter 2018). 20 Peter Radan, The Break-Up of Yugoslavia and International Law (London: Routledge, 2003), 121. Several months later, they reiterated that “they pledge themselves to respect frontiers as they existed when the States gained independence.” United Nations, 2nd Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement, Program for Peace and Interna- tional Cooperation (A/5763), September 10, 1964, Cairo, Egypt, sec. V.2, http://cns.miis.edu/ nam/documents/Official_Document/2nd_Summit_FD_Cairo_Declaration_1964.pdf. 21 International Court of Justice, Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders, Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali), Judgment of 22 December 1986, sec. 20, 565, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/69/6447.pdf. 22 The international community thus ended up recognizing the federal subcomponents of Yu- goslavia. Radan, The Break-Up of Yugoslavia, 4. See also Thomas Van Dervort, International Law and Organization (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1998), esp. chap. 11. Conversely, the oau re- fused to endorse the secession by Biafra during the Nigerian Civil War (1967–1970). Some

146 (4) Fall 2017 123 Civil Wars states that supported Biafra, such as France, did so on humanitarian grounds, but did not rec- as Challenges ognize Biafra as an independent state. to the Modern International 23 Tanja A. Börzel and Sonja Grimm, “Building Good (Enough) Governance in Postconflict So- System cieties & Areas of Limited Statehood: The European Union & Western Balkans,” Dædalus 147 (1) (Winter 2018). 24 United Nations, Reports of International Arbitral Awards, Alabama Claims of the United States of America against Great Britain, May 8, 1871, http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_XXIX/125-134.pdf. Following the arbitration panel’s decision, Britain agreed to pay $15 million to the United States in 1872. (More expansive demands by some U.S. politicians included acquisition of major parts of Canada, which went unfulfilled.) 25 Fearon, “Civil War & the Current International System.” 26 Barry R. Posen, “Civil Wars & the Structure of World Power,” Dædalus 146 (4) (Fall 2017). 27 Stephen Krasner and Carlos Pascual, “Addressing State Failure,” Foreign Affairs 84 (4) (2005): 153–163. 28 Bruce Jones, Carlos Pascual, and Stephen Stedman, Power and Responsibility (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2009). 29 This was arguably part of the rationale to call for ousting Muammar Gaddafi. Stephen Strom- berg, “Obama on Libya: Strong on Justification, Short on Strategy,” The Washington Post, March 28, 2011. 30 For an overview of the various strands in the literature on the democratic peace, see Miriam Elman, Paths to Peace: Is Democracy the Answer? (Cambridge, Mass.: The mit Press, 1997). 31 Robert Jervis, “Understanding the Bush Doctrine,” PSQ 118 (3) (2003): 365–388. 32 I thus see limited opportunities for successful external intervention in civil wars. 33 For an extensive discussion of efforts to detect and prevent civil wars, see Chuck Call and Su- sanna Campbell, “Is Prevention the Answer?” Dædalus 147 (1) (Winter 2018). 34 For a discussion of reflective equilibrium theory in legal reasoning, see Cass R. Sunstein, Le- gal Reasoning and Political Conflict (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). 35 See Paul H. Wise and Michele Barry, “Civil War & the Global Threat of Pandemics,” Dæda- lus 146 (4) (Fall 2017); Sarah Kenyon Lischer, “The Global Refugee Crisis: Regional Destabi- lization & Humanitarian Protection,” Dædalus 146 (4) (Fall 2017); and Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Organized Crime, Illicit Economies, Civil Violence & International Order: More Complex Than You Think” Dædalus 146 (4) (Fall 2017). 36 There is considerable evidence to suggest that external efforts at peace-building–actions un- dertaken to maintain the peace after the cessation of conflict–have been relatively successful. The conclusion of civil wars in Namibia, Mozambique, and El Salvador are some exam- ples. See Charles T. Call and Elizabeth M. Cousens, “Ending Wars and Building Peace: Inter- national Responses to War-Torn Societies,” International Studies Perspectives 9 (1) (2008): 1–21; and Fearon, “Civil War & the Current International System.” 37 On the argument for partition, see Chaim Kaufman, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,” International Security 20 (4) (Spring 1996): 136–175. For an example of the argument in an empirical case, see John J. Mearsheimer, “The Case for Partitioning Kosovo,” in NATO’s Empty Victory: A Postmortem on the Balkan War, ed. Ted Galen Carpenter (Washington, D.C.: cato Institute, 2000), 133–138. 38 Such solutions for divided societies are, for example, suggested by consociational theories. See Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977). 39 For a comparison of Sudan and Iraq, see Brendan O’Leary, “The Federalization of Iraq and the Break-up of Sudan,” Government and Opposition 47 (4) (2012): 481–516. Some politicians and analysts have suggested the partition of Syria; see James Stavridis, “It’s Time to Seriously

124 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences Consider Partitioning Syria,” Foreign Policy, March 9, 2016. Similarly, some argue that partition Hendrik could have been a solution to the conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi; see Makau Mutua, “The Spruyt Tutsi and Hutu Need a Partition,” The New York Times, August 30, 2000, http://www.nytimes .com/2000/08/30/opinion/the-tutsi-and-hutu-need-a-partition.html. 40 Felbab-Brown, “Organized Crime, Illicit Economies, Civil Violence & International Order”; and William Reno, “Fictional States and Atomized Public Spheres: A Non-Western Approach to Fragility,” Dædalus 146 (4) (Fall 2017). 41 Conrad Schetter, Rainer Glassner, and Masood Karokhail, “Beyond Warlordism: The Local Security Architecture in Afghanistan,” Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft 2 (2) (2007): 136– 152. See also Romain Malejacq, Neo-Chiefs in the International State System: Power Strategies and Au- thority in Afghanistan (Ph.D. diss., Northwestern University, 2013). 42 Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univer- sity Press, 2010). 43 Similarly, foreign intervention to affect durable regime change rarely leads to democracy. Alexander B. Downes and Jonathan Monten, “Forced to Be Free? Why Foreign-Imposed Re- gime Change Rarely Leads to Democratization,” International Security 37 (4) (2013): 90–131. See also David Edelstein, Occupational Hazards (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2008). 44 Ken Menkhaus, “Governance without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping,” International Security 31 (3) (Winter 2006/2007): 74–106; William Reno, Warlord Politics and African States (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1998); and Reno, Warfare in Independent Africa. 45 Stephen Biddle, “Building Security Forces & Stabilizing Nations: The Problem of Agency,” Dædalus 146 (4) (Fall 2017). 46 Tanisha M. Fazal, “Religionist Rebels & the Sovereignty of the Divine,” Dædalus 147 (1) (Win- ter 2018). 47 Anke I. Bouzenita, “The Siyar–An Islamic Law of Nations?” Asian Journal of Social Science 35 (1) (2007): 19–46. 48 Majid Khadduri, “Islam and the Modern Law of Nations,” The American Journal of Internation- al Law 50 (2) (1956): 358–372; Majid Khadduri, “The Islamic System: Its Competition and Co-Existence with Western Systems,” Proceedings of the American Society of International Law 53 (1959): 49–52; Majid Khadduri, “The Impact of International Law upon the Islamic World Order,” The American Journal of International Law 66 (4) (1972): 46–50; and James P. Piscatori, Islam in a World of Nation-States (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986). 49 Rifaat Abou-el Haj, “The Formal Closure of the Ottoman Frontier in Europe: 1699–1703,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 89 (3) (1969): 467–475. 50 The concept of a caliphate itself is open to multiple interpretations. “In the Sunni community there was no universally accepted doctrine of the ilâfa [caliphate]. . . . The ilâfa is that form of government which safeguards the ordinances of the Sharia. . . . So long as that principle is applied, there may be infinite diversity in the manner of its application.” H. A. R. Gibb, “Some Considerations on the Sunni Theory of the Caliphate,” in Archives d’Histoire du Droit Oriental, vol. 3 (Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1947), 409.

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