DOCSLIB.ORG

Type Paper's Title

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Type Paper's Title China Papers No. 18 | 2009 China’s Evolving Institutional Exclusion: The Hukou System and Its Transformation Fei-Ling Wang China Papers ABSTRACT This chapter discusses the evolving institutional exclusion in the People’s Republic of China by analysing the function and transformation of the hukou (household registration) system. An omnipresent system established nationally in the 1950s based on where one is, the hukou system has functioned in four important ways to organize the Chinese people through institutional division and exclusion. The thirty-year reform and opening since the late 1970s has brought to the hukou system significant adjustments, modernization, and adaptations; but the system’s fundamentals essentially remain intact, sustaining China’s peculiar political stability, economic development and social and spatial stratifications. After a decade of officially declared but repeatedly delayed and largely localized and commercialized reform efforts that are often cosmetic in nature, the hukou system now still entails and foretells China’s institutional nature. China Papers Introduction The Chinese civilization has had many distinctive institutional and cultural peculiarities in its long history. The tianxia (all under the heaven) conceptualization of a centralized, hierarchical sociopolitical order for the whole known world first implemented by the Qin Dynasty (221-207 BCE) and the rubiao fali (Legalism coated with Confucianism) imperial governance since the Western Han Dynasty (202 BCE-9 CE) are just two leading examples. To anchor the Chinese sociopolitical order and sustain the Qin-Han style institutional framework, Chinese rulers have relied on a highly unique and very profound way to manage the people, a peculiar institutional exclusion that has served as the foundation to identify, segment, organize, and control the massive and ever growing population. This Chinese institutional exclusion is featured with the key role of the hukou (household registration) system, which has been used from the Qin Empire basically all the way to the PRC (People’s Republic of China) today. Much of China’s imperial and contemporary history and many features of the Chinese social, economic and political development have been crucially conditioned and affected by this hukou system, which has thus become a key indicator demonstrating the institutional continuity in China. The hukou system has been dividing and organizing people, regulating internal migration and resource flow, and shaping people’s spatial, social, and cultural stratification and identity. Much of China’s profound rural-urban and regional gaps and the remarkable stability and strength of an authoritarian government in a vibrant market economy, for examples, is either directly created and maintained or crucially supported by the hukou system. Despite repeated efforts to reform the hukou system in the past three decades, it remains a foundational institution that helps to define politics, social life, and economic development in China. (Chan 2009; Wang 2005:32-60; Solinger 1999; Davin 1999; Cheng & Selden 1994; Dutton 1992) The effects of the hukou system are extensive and contradictory. It undoubtedly creates and perpetuates some of the most rigid and unfair sociopolitical and economic discrimination and injustice in the world through administratively excluding the majority of the Chinese people from vibrant and prosperous urban centers. It also seems to have contributed to a rapid, albeit highly uneven, economic growth and minimized the development of urban slums. The hukou system powerfully brews social tensions and political grievances and significantly exacerbates ethical problems of inequality and inequity for a Chinese government that now aspires to create a “harmonious society” and achieve a “peaceful rise,” while crucially serving Beijing’s fundamental interest of political stability, population control, and regime survival. Solidifying and reinforcing the rural-urban and Page 1 of 28 China Papers interregional gaps for generations, the hukou system has been a key floodgate that is now under increasing strain, whose renovation has given reasons for hopes and hypes about narrowing and even erasing China’s rural-urban gap. A removal or crumbling of this legal Great Wall would certainly reshape China’s political landscape and the nation’s future but could also lead to the drowning of thriving Chinese cities and Beijing’s dream of a quick ascendance in the global power ranking. (Wang 2005 85-124) Being an easy target of criticisms, the hukou system is recognized by Beijing and its critics as an indispensable pillar of sociopolitical stability and economic development. Influential Chinese scholars have concluded that the “secret” of the PRC economic boom is the deprivation of human rights, civil rights and fair pay of the millions of laborers, to which the hukou system clearly plays a key role. (Qin 2009) In an attempt to shed some light on the institutional dynamics and transformation of China, this Chapter discusses China’s evolving institutional exclusion through analyzing the function and transformation of the hukou system. I will first briefly describe the notion of institutional exclusion and outline its presence in China. Then I will report the basics and the four functions of the hukou system in today’s PRC—four important ways to organize the Chinese people through institutional division and exclusion. The thirty-year old reform and opening since the late 1970s has brought to the hukou system significant adjustments and adaptations; but the system’s fundamentals have remained. In the last decade, there have been great needs and tremendous pressure for renovating the hukou system so as to preserve this extremely important instrument of social control for Beijing while reducing its political costs through pacifying the increasingly mobile and still largely excluded rural and non-local population. There are powerful reasons for urban centers, especially the privileged major cities, to resist real changes that would be needed to genuinely transform the hukou system and the peculiar Chinese institutional exclusion it supports. So far, however, the excluded population still has very little resources and almost no political power, other than unorganized violent protests, to really accomplish much.Therefore, thus far the reform of the hukou system has been slow, heavily localized and regionalized, frequently cosmetic and expedient, utterly incomplete, and often distorted and reversed, reflecting both the enormity and the complexity of the task itself and the overall reality of the Chinese political system, which, under the authoritarian regime of the CCP (Chinese Communist Party), has structurally favored the minority of the population living in urban centers. Some of the changes may have actually further enlarged the rural-urban gap by creating powerful internal brain drains and capital drains. Localized barriers of “entry conditions” may have actually made “permanent migration of the peasants to the cities harder than before.” (Cahn & Buckingham 2008) Beijing still retains the final say about the system, and Page 2 of 28 China Papers there is tight control over words and acts involving hukou reforms. Barring major, tectonic shifts of political power inside the CCP and real political reforms, the PRC hukou system is likely to remain as a great floodgate, however crumbling while being renovated, separating and dividing the Chinese people, chiefly along the fault-line of rural versus urban. The hukou system remains to entail and foretell China’s institutional nature. 1. A Note on Institutional Exclusion Institutionalized divisive and exclusive barriers or institutional exclusions are some of the most fundamental rules, regulations, and behavioural norms and codes that define, stratify, and constrain people’s movements and access rights as well as their interaction. Institutional exclusions are part and parcel of any nation's organized domestic structure-the nation’s internal institutional nature. They divide and organize people, manage and allocate resources including labor with priorities and purposes, and enable political and social control. All economically and politically stratified classes and all culturally and socially separated groups and associations are sub-units of this inclusion-exclusion divide to varied extent. (Wang 2005: 1-15) Historically, we have four identifiable types of institutional exclusion that constitute a crucial part of a country’s internal institutional make at various times and in different cultural settings and external environments. Of course, the four types listed below often overlap with one another and in reality create hybrid variations. Indeed, few nations have only one type of institutional exclusion. (Wang 2005:10). Type One institutional exclusion is in which people are divided and excluded because of who they are in terms of their race and ethnicity, linguistic, sexual, religious and/or other personal differences. Type Two institutional exclusion divides and excludes people based on what they have regarding their resource and property-ownership, wealth, and skills. Type Three institutional exclusion divides and excludes people based on where they are in regard to their legally recognized family associations and their physical location or birthplace, such as citizenship and legal residence. Type Four divides and excludes people based what they did/do or their individual work, profession, and conduct. Page 3 of 28 China
Load more

Recommended publications
  • 28. Rights Defense and New Citizen's Movement
    JOBNAME: EE10 Biddulph PAGE: 1 SESS: 3 OUTPUT: Fri May 10 14:09:18 2019 28. Rights defense and new citizen’s movement Teng Biao 28.1 THE RISE OF THE RIGHTS DEFENSE MOVEMENT The ‘Rights Defense Movement’ (weiquan yundong) emerged in the early 2000s as a new focus of the Chinese democracy movement, succeeding the Xidan Democracy Wall movement of the late 1970s and the Tiananmen Democracy movement of 1989. It is a social movement ‘involving all social strata throughout the country and covering every aspect of human rights’ (Feng Chongyi 2009, p. 151), one in which Chinese citizens assert their constitutional and legal rights through lawful means and within the legal framework of the country. As Benney (2013, p. 12) notes, the term ‘weiquan’is used by different people to refer to different things in different contexts. Although Chinese rights defense lawyers have played a key role in defining and providing leadership to this emerging weiquan movement (Carnes 2006; Pils 2016), numerous non-lawyer activists and organizations are also involved in it. The discourse and activities of ‘rights defense’ (weiquan) originated in the 1990s, when some citizens began using the law to defend consumer rights. The 1990s also saw the early development of rural anti-tax movements, labor rights campaigns, women’s rights campaigns and an environmental movement. However, in a narrow sense as well as from a historical perspective, the term weiquan movement only refers to the rights campaigns that emerged after the Sun Zhigang incident in 2003 (Zhu Han 2016, pp. 55, 60). The Sun Zhigang incident not only marks the beginning of the rights defense movement; it also can be seen as one of its few successes.
    [Show full text]
  • Resolving Constitutional Disputes in Contemporary China
    Resolving Constitutional Disputes in Contemporary China Keith Hand* Beginning in 1999, a series of events generated speculation that the Chinese Party-state might be prepared to breathe new life into the country’s long dormant constitution. In recent years, as the Party-state has strictly limited constitutional adjudication and moved aggressively to contain some citizen constitutional activism, this early speculation has turned to pessimism about China’s constitutional trajectory. Such pessimism obscures recognition of alternative or hybrid pathways for resolving constitutional disputes in China. Despite recent developments, Chinese citizens have continued to constitutionalize a broad range of political-legal disputes and advance constitutional arguments in a variety of forums. This article argues that by shifting focus from the individual legal to the collective political dimension of constitutional law, a dimension dominant in China’s transitional one-party state, we can better understand the significance of the constitution in China and identify patterns of bargaining, consultation, and mediation across a range of both intrastate and citizen-state constitutional disputes. Administrative reconciliation and “grand mediation,” dispute resolution models at the core of recent political-legal shifts in China, emphasize such consultative practices. This zone of convergence reveals a potential transitional path * Associate Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. Former Beijing Director and Senior Fellow, The China Law Center, Yale Law School (2005–2008) and Senior Counsel, U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China (2002–2005). The author thanks Donald Clarke, Michael Dowdle, Bruce Hand, Nicholas Howson, Hilary Josephs, Chimène Keitner, Tom Kellogg, Evan Lee, Benjamin Liebman, Lin Xifen, Carl Minzner, Randall Peerenboom, Zhang Qianfan, colleagues at the UC Hastings Junior Faculty Workshop, and members of the Chinalaw List for their thoughtful comments and feedback on drafts of the article.
    [Show full text]
  • Citizens Engage the Constitution: the Sun Zhigang Incident and Constitutional Review Proposals in the People's Republic Of
    CHAPTER THIRTEEN Citizens Engage the Constitution: The Sun Zhigang Incident and Constitutional Review Proposals in the People’s Republic of China Keith J. Hand I. Introduction Shortly after assuming leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the fall of 2002, Hu Jintao proclaimed that China’s “broad masses” should view the Constitution as a “legal weapon for safeguarding citizen rights” (Zhongguo xinwen wang 2002). In recent years, citizen activists have tested the limits of this rhetoric by advancing constitutional claims in different legal fora. Some of these efforts have focused on the people’s courts (see Pils, this volume). But as noted throughout this volume, neither the government nor the courts recognize the Constitution as being justiciable (see, e.g., Supreme People’s Court 2008). Other citizens have focused on an alternative legal mechanism that the government has explicitly recognized as a legitimate forum for con- stitutional complaints: the constitutional review procedure established under Article 90(2) of China’s Law on Legislation (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Lifa Fa 2000). This provision grants Chinese citizens the right to propose ( jianyi) that the National People’s Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) review administrative regulations and local laws that they deem to be inconsistent with national law or the Constitution. (This citizen proposal right should be contrasted with the right granted to state organs such as the State Council, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, and provincial people congresses in S. Balme et al. (eds.), Building Constitutionalism in China © Stéphanie Balme and Michael W. Dowdle 2009 Keith J. Hand222 Article 90(1) of the same law to demand (yaoqiu) NPCSC review of such legal conflicts.) Subsequent National People’s Congress (NPC) procedures clari- fied that the scope of review also includes Supreme People’s Court judicial interpretations (Xinjing bao 2005).
    [Show full text]
  • And the Rule of Administrative Law in China
    ADMINISTRATIVE “SELF-REGULATION” AND THE RULE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN CHINA Shen Kui* From a historical perspective, the formation and evolution of administrative law in many countries and regions have relied upon the important role and contribution of the judiciary. China is no exception in this respect. Over the past roughly thirty years, since the promulgation of the Administrative Litigation Law in 1989, Chinese courts have worked hard to secure the compliance of administrative actions with laws and regulations, and have acted as disguised lawmakers in fashioning new norms in regulating administrative agencies. The development of administrative law in China has also been propelled by legislation. The National People’s Congress (NPC) and its Standing Committee have promulgated several laws regulating particular types of administrative action, such as administrative punishment, administrative licensing, and administrative compulsion, among others. Moreover, the NPC has passed many laws regulating specific areas of public administration, including but not limited to environmental protection, land administration, taxation, insurance, banking, and securities. In addition to making laws to regulate public administration, the legislature also monitors agencies’ statutory compliance through its “law enforcement inspection” power.1 * Professor, Peking University School of Law. I am very grateful to Neysun Mahboubi for his kind and helpful comments and edits on an earlier draft. I also am indebted to the comments from the participants of the 9th Administrative Law Discussion Forum at the Institutum Iurisprudentiae, Academia Sinica in Taipei on June 10-11, 2014, as well as the participants of the roundtable discussion centered on this special issue of the University of Pennsylvania Asia Law Review held at Peking University Law School in Beijing on June 21, 2014.
    [Show full text]
  • Annual Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in China (2009) April 26, 2010
    Annual Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in China (2009) April 26, 2010 维权网 Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD) 中文 Web: www.chrdnet.org (English) and www.crd-net.org ( ) Email: [email protected] Promoting human rights and empowering grassroots activis m in China Annual Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in China (2009) Executive Summary During 2009, the environment in China grew increasingly hostile towards human rights defenders. Highlighted by the harassment of a number of well-known, relatively independent nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) focusing on human rights, and the closure of one—the Open Constitution Initiative (Gongmeng)—the already limited space for civil society was restricted even further in 2009. Human rights lawyers, an important force in the rights defense ( weiquan ) movement, were put under unprecedented pressure by the authorities, and CHRD documented eight lawyers who were unable to renew their licenses to practice law. While the government paid lip service to human rights abroad and at home, by taking part in the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review and issuing its first National Human Rights Action Plan, it continued to detain, harass, and intimidate human rights defenders across the country. This report uses the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders as a framework for assessing the Chinese government’s actions during the past year, and finds that the government has fallen woefully short of its obligations as outlined by that document. The government was particularly active in its efforts to disrupt the work of human rights defenders in the past year. Activists affiliated with CHRD believe that more human rights defenders were summoned by police for questioning in 2009 than in any year since 1989.
    [Show full text]
  • Initial Assessment of Xi Jinping's Work Report at 19Th Party Congress
    21 October 2017 ‘INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF XI JINPING’S WORK REPORT AT 19TH PARTY CONGRESS’ By JAYADEVA RANADE The crucial 19th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) opened in Beijing on October 18, 2017, amidst stringent security restrictions in Beijing and other major cities in China. Nearly a thousand foreign reporters from 130 countries are reported to be covering the Congress. The Congress was preceded by other important meetings, namely the 7th and last Plenum of the 18th CCP Central Committee (CC), and of the Party’s powerful anti-corruption body the Central Discipline Inspection Commission (CDIC) chaired by Xi Jinping’s close associate and Politburo Standing Committee member, Wang Qishan. CCP CC General Secretary Xi Jinping, who holds fourteen formal positions -- more than any other CCP leader so far -- is poised to emerge stronger from this Congress. His sustained anti-corruption campaign has eliminated opposition in the Party and military and drastically reduced the influence wielded by his predecessor once removed, Jiang Zemin. In September 2017, China’s official media publicised that more than 176 CCP cadres equivalent to the rank of central Vice Minister and above had been dismissed and arrested for corruption and that more than 14,000 officers of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had been similarly dismissed, including more than 86 officers of and above the rank of Major General. Just weeks before the Congress, Xi Jinping publicly demonstrated his authority by arresting two top Generals, appointing 20 Generals to command thirteen new Group Armies and promoting close associates to head the PLA Army (ground forces) and PLA Air Force.
    [Show full text]
  • The United States and China: Mutual Public Perceptions
    Kissinger Institute on China and the United States The UniTed STaTeS and China: Mutual PUbliC PerCeptionS EditEd by Douglas G. Spelman Kissinger Institute on China and the United States The UniTed STaTeS and China: Mutual PUbliC PerCeptionS ESSAyS BY Terry Lautz Zhang Chuanjie Li Cheng Jiang Changjian, Shen Min, Ju Hong James Fallows Zhou Qingan Robert Daly Jerome A. Cohen Wang Zhenmin Xu Yihua Richard Madsen Liu Jianfei Jamie P. Horsley Sun Zhe Ellen L. Frost Tao Wenzhao EditEd by Douglas G. Spelman ©2011 Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C. www.wilsoncenter.org This publication is a collaborative effort between the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars’ Kissinger Institute on China and the United States and Tsinghua University’s Center for U.S.-China Relations. http://www.wilsoncenter.org/program/kissinger-institute-china-and-the-united-states http://www.chinausa.org.cn/en/ Available from : Kissinger Institute on China and the United States Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars One Woodrow Wilson Plaza 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington, DC 20004-3027 ISBN 1-933549-62-9 The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, established by Congress in 1968 and headquartered in Washington, D.C., is a living national memorial to President Wilson. The Center’s mission is to commemorate the ideals and concerns of Woodrow Wilson by provid- ing a link between the worlds of ideas and policy, while fostering research, study, discussion, and collaboration among a broad spectrum of individuals concerned with policy and scholarship in national and international affairs. Supported by public and private funds, the Center is a nonpartisan institu- tion engaged in the study of national and world affairs.
    [Show full text]
  • “Walking on Thin Ice” RIGHTS Control, Intimidation and Harassment of Lawyers in China WATCH
    China HUMAN “Walking on Thin Ice” RIGHTS Control, intimidation and harassment of lawyers in China WATCH “Walking on Thin Ice” Control, Intimidation and Harassment of Lawyers in China Copyright © 2008 Human Rights Watch All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America ISBN: 1-56432-311-0 Cover design by Rafael Jimenez Human Rights Watch 350 Fifth Avenue, 34th floor New York, NY 10118-3299 USA Tel: +1 212 290 4700, Fax: +1 212 736 1300 [email protected] Poststraße 4-5 10178 Berlin, Germany Tel: +49 30 2593 06-10, Fax: +49 30 2593 0629 [email protected] Avenue des Gaulois, 7 1040 Brussels, Belgium Tel: + 32 (2) 732 2009, Fax: + 32 (2) 732 0471 [email protected] 64-66 Rue de Lausanne 1202 Geneva, Switzerland Tel: +41 22 738 0481, Fax: +41 22 738 1791 [email protected] 2-12 Pentonville Road, 2nd Floor London N1 9HF, UK Tel: +44 20 7713 1995, Fax: +44 20 7713 1800 [email protected] 6 rue des Graviers 92200 Neuilly sur Seine, France Tel: +33 (0) 1 41 92 07 34, Fax: +33 (0) 1 47 22 08 61 [email protected] 1630 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 500 Washington, DC 20009 USA Tel: +1 202 612 4321, Fax: +1 202 612 4333 [email protected] Web Site Address: http://www.hrw.org April 2008 1-56432-311-0 “Walking on Thin Ice” Control, Intimidation and Harassment of Lawyers in China Map of China............................................................................................................ 1 I. Summary...............................................................................................................2 Key recommendations........................................................................................ 6 Methodology.......................................................................................................7 II. International Standards for Lawyers.....................................................................9 III.
    [Show full text]
  • Bandurski (In Changing Media Changing China)
    CHANGING MEDIA, CHANGING CHINA Edited by Susan L. Shirk OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 20II But the implications of these changes have also, like Lord Ye's dragon, caused alarm and consternation among leaders who strongly believe that controlling the public agenda is critical to maintaining social stability and the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP's) hold on power. While actively encouraging the media to operate on market principles instead of relying on government subsidies, the CCP resists a redefinition of the role of media, which it still regards first and foremost as promoters of the party's agenda. 2 Since the fllassacre of demonstrators at Tiananmen Square in 1989, "guid­ ance of public opinion," the most common euphemism for agenda control, has been the centerpiece of propaganda work! Nevertheless, media com­ China's Emerging Public Sphere: mercialization, developing norms of journalistic professionalism, and the growth of new media are combining to erode the CCP's monopoly over the The Impact of Media public agenda and to open a limited public sphere. The resulting tension between control and commercialization has Commercialization, altered the relationship between the CCP and the media, prompting the CCP to adopt new control tactics to uphold its influence on news and pro­ Professionalism, and the Internet paga nda. Despite the fact that the CCP continues to punish editors who step over the line and the media remain formally a part of the party-state in an Era of Transition apparatus, China's leaders are beginning to treat the media and Internet as Qian Gang and David Bandurski rhe voice of the public and to respond to it accordingly.
    [Show full text]
  • About the ASEAN-China Centre
    ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ASEAN-CHINA CENTRE 2019 About the ASEAN-China Centre About the ASEAN-China Centre The ASEAN-China Centre (ACC) is an inter-governmental organization which was co-founded by governments of 10 ASEAN Member States and China. Since its inception on 18 November 2011, the Centre has actively played its role as a one-stop information and activities centre to promote practical cooperation between ASEAN and China in the areas of trade, investment, tourism, education, culture as well as information and media. The ACC Secretariat is located in Beijing. The current Secretary-General is H.E. Mr. Chen Dehai. ACC is governed by three bodies ACC is governed by three bodies, with the Joint Council as the policy-making body, the Joint Executive Board as the advisory body, and the Secretariat as the executing body. The Joint Council comprises the members of the ASEAN-China Joint Cooperation Committee. The Joint Executive Board consists of the ASEAN Committee in Beijing (ACB) and the China Council, which was established to include representatives from Chinese agencies involved in trade, investment, tourism, educational and cultural matters. The Secretariat consists of a Secretary-General as its chief executive and four divisions, including General Affairs and Coordination Division, Trade and Investment Division, Education, Culture and Tourism Division, and Information and Public Relations Division. 1 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ASEAN-CHINA CENTRE 2019 Executive Summary Executive Summary The year 2019 marks the 16th anniversary of ASEAN-China strategic partnership and the ASEAN-China Year of Media Exchanges. ASEAN-China relations have entered a new phase of all-around development, and both sides are ushering in broader space for cooperation.
    [Show full text]
  • Chinese Women and the Cyberspace Publications Series Chinese Editedwomen Volumes 2 Chinese Women And
    Chinese Women and the Cyberspace Chinese Women Publications Series Chinese WomenEdited Volumes 2 Chinese Women and In a rapidly changing time-space compressed global environment, women in general and Chinese women in particular are in tune with digital innovations and Chinese Women the use of various forms of mass communication and and the Cyberspaceinformation technology including the web, internet the Cyberspace and mobile phone has become embodied as a way of Khun Eng Kuah-Pearce (ed.) and the Cyberspace life. Chinese women in Mainland China and the Chinese Diaspora too widely use the advancement of information technology to empower themselves with information and knowledge for their personal and social uses. Yet this technology also oppresses them. Chinese Women and the Cyberspace argues that the cyberspace could thus be viewed as four significant platforms namely Edited by as an alternative channel and an agency for foraging Khun Eng Kuah-Pearce of information, as a platform for self-expression, as a repressive platform that continues to exploit women, and as a social capital that facilitates cyber- communication and the formation of social networks. Khun Eng Kuah-Pearce is Associate Professor and Head of the Department of Sociology and Honorary Academic Director of the Centre for Anthropological Research at the University of Hong Kong. www.aup.nl ISBN 978 90 5356 751 7 Chinese Women and the Cyberspace Publications Series General Editor Paul van der Velde Editorial Board Jennifer Holdaway (Social Science Research Council) Christopher A. Reed (Ohio State Faculty) Anand A. Yang (Director of the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies and Chair of International Studies at the University of Washington) Guobin Yang (Barnard College, Columbia University) Wim Boot (Leiden University) The ICAS Publications Series consists of Monographs, Edited Volumes and Pro- ceedings of ICAS.
    [Show full text]
  • Read Ira Belkin's Chapter
    8 Justice in the PRC How the Chinese Communist Party Has Struggled with Managing Public Opinion and the Administration of Criminal Justice in the Internet Age ira belkin ‘Nothing short of the death [of the defendant] will appease the public outrage’. ‘Agreed. But just this once’. Ren Jianxin, then Secretary of the Central Political-Legal Commission, endorsing a subordinate’s recommendation to approve the death sentence of a hit-and-run drunk driver in January 1998 (Chen 2013). Introduction During the summer of 2009, Tian Wenchang, the Chair of the Special Committee for Criminal Defense of the All China Lawyer’s Association and a leading Chinese criminal defence lawyer, addressed a class of Chinese law students with a provocative question: ‘How should guilt or innocence be determined in a criminal case – why don’t we just take a public opinion poll on the Internet and let the masses decide’? This question was particularly poignant for lawyer Tian. In 2003, for a brief moment, it appeared that he had saved his client, Liu Yong, from a death sentence. Tian had convinced the Liaoning Provincial High Court to suspend his client’s death sentence on the ground that his client’s confession was coerced. What Tian had not counted on was the over- whelmingly negative reaction of the Chinese public. The public This chapter benefitted greatly from the research assistance of USALI research scholars Heather Han, Amy Gao, Eli Blood-Patterson and 2014 USALI summer scholars, Jacob Clark and Jason Zhu. I am also grateful to Sue Trevaskes, Sarah Biddulph, Flora Sapio and Elisa Nesossi for organising a workshop at Griffith University, Australia, in July 2014, where a draft of this paper was presented and where they and other contributors to this volume provided valuable comments and suggestions.
    [Show full text]