The House Rules? is the final output of a two-year Constitution Unit research project inves- tigating who runs, and who should run, the House of Commons. In a year in which the Prime and both major parties have expressed concern about government dominance of , this report seeks to inform the debate by looking at how much autonomy the Commons has over its own affairs – in particular its agenda, its committee system, and its procedures. The authors draw ideas from the of , Ger- many, New Zealand and Australia to set out a programme of reform that would strengthen the control exercised by backbench MPs and committees over their own institution. Rules? House The

The report asks: Should MPs and committees have more influence over the parliamentary agenda?

Would a ‘business committee’ of the kind existing in other be a good idea? International lessons for enhancing the autonomy of the House of Commons of House the of autonomy the enhancing for lessons International Could the power of the or others to ‘speak for parliament’ be enhanced? Could the way that committee members are chosen be improved?

The report calls for a new logic of parliamentary control and makes 60 recommendations for change. But it also argues that there is much to celebrate at Westminster compared to other parliaments, so future reforms must build upon rather than undermine the healthier aspects of British parliamentary democracy.

Dr Meg Russell is Senior Research Fellow at the Constitution Unit, and author of numerous reports and articles on parliament and its reform. In 2000 she published Reforming the : Lessons from Overseas ( University Press). From 2001-03 she was seconded as a full-time adviser to in his role as Leader of the House of Commons.

Akash Paun leads the Constitution Unit’s work on devolution as well as conducting research in the area of parliamentary reform. He manages the Devolution Monitoring Programme and edits the Unit’s regular newsletter, The Monitor.

The Constitution Unit in the School of Public Policy, UCL, is the UK's foremost research body on constitutional reform and comparative constitutional studies. It is independent and non-partisan, and the centre of a wide network of national and international experts.

This research project was funded by The Nuffield Foundation. The House Rules?

Meg Russell and Akash Paun Akash and Russell Meg

SCHOOL of PUBLIC POLICY International lessons for UNIVERSITY COLLEGE 29–30 Tavistock Square enhancing the autonomy of London WC1H 9QU the House of Commons

Phone: 020 7679 4977 www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit Meg Russell and Akash Paun

The Constitution Unit

Price: £10 The Constitution Unit ISBN 1-903903-01-7

October 2007 October 2007 This report is dedicatedtoRobin Cook,afriend andadviser to this project until his untimelydeath in August 2005, andadedicateddefenderofparliament. ISBN 1-903903-01-7

PublishedbyThe Constitution Unit Department of Political Science UCL (UniversityCollege London) 29–30Tavistock Square London WC1H 9QU Tel: 02076794977Fax:020 7679 4978 Email: [email protected] Web: www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/ ©The Constitution Unit,UCL 2007 Table of Contents

List of Tables ...... 4 Acknowledgements...... 5 Introduction...... 7 Summary of recommendations ...... 9 Controlofthe Commons: Thekey issues ...... 13 Theplenary timetable...... 15 Theworkofcommittees...... 20 Changing therules ...... 24 Whospeaksfor parliament?Individuals...... 25 Whospeaksfor parliament?Co-ordinating bodies...... 28 Experienceinother parliaments...... 30 Theplenary timetable...... 31 Theworkofcommittees...... 44 Changing therules ...... 50 Whospeaksfor parliament?Individuals...... 54 Whospeaksfor parliament?Co-ordinating bodies...... 60 Conclusions...... 65 Reasons to be cheerful...... 65 Anew logic of parliamentarycontrol...... 67 Specificoptions forchange...... 69 Theplenarytimetable ...... 70 Appointments to committees...... 77 Changing therules...... 79 Whospeaksfor parliament? Individuals...... 80 Whospeaksfor parliament? Co-ordinatingbodies...... 81 References...... 84 Appendices...... 90 Appendix A: Standing OrderNo. 14...... 90 Appendix B: Non-government timebysession (% of total)...... 92 Appendix C: Representation of Labour rebels on standing committees...... 93

3 ListofTables Table 1: Distribution of HouseofCommons agenda time –inhours(%oftotal)...... 16 Table 2: Keyfeatures of thefivecomparatorparliaments...... 30 Table 3: Basics of theplenary timetable in comparator parliaments ...... 32 Table 4: Allocation of time fordifferent purposes...... 36 Table 5: Controlofthe parliamentary timetable...... 42 Table 6: Basicinformation about committees (July 2007)...... 44 Table 7: Parliamentary committees...... 48 Table 8: Controlofparliamentary rulesand procedure...... 53 Table 9: Therole of parliamentary presiding officers...... 56 Table 10:Other keyindividuals...... 59 Table 11:Collectiveand coordinating bodieswithin parliament ...... 62

4 Acknowledgements This reportwas made possiblebythe generous support, co-operation andadvice of many individuals,aswellasbyits funder. Theauthors warmlyacknowledgeall thoseinvolved in this collectiveeffort, whilst taking full responsibility forany shortcomingsinits finalproduct.

We aregratefultothe NuffieldFoundation forprovidingthe funding forthe project,and fortheir thoughtfulsupportwhichwentfar beyond thebarelyfinancial. Ourthankstothe trustees andthe staffofthe Foundation, andparticularlytoSharonWitherspoon.

Theproject benefitedfromthe wisdom of an advisory committee, comprisingUKand overseas experts. TheUKmembers of thecommittee wereall interviewed at an early stageofthe project, attendedmeetingsand gave advice on various publications. Thesemembers includedRtHon Robin Cook MP (until August 2005), Paul Evans, Oonagh Gay, Andrew Kennon, Greg Power, Lord (Paul) Tyler, Barry Winetrobe,DrTony Wright MP (fromOctober2005) andRtHon Sir George Young MP.Other UK figuresinterviewed forthe project includedSir Alan Hazelhurst, Robert Rogers, Paul Seaward andLord(Bernard) Weatherill.Someofthese,aswellasour formal advisers,kindly read andcommentedonthis report. We thankofall of them fortheir support.

Theoverseas advisers forthe project gave help in understanding theirinstitutions,and also in providing contacts. They wereProfessor John Uhr(Australia),ProfessorElizabeth McLeay (New Zealand) andUwe Leonardy(Germany).Invaluable help with setting up of interviews in the comparatorparliaments was providedbyAnthony Marinacand KayWalsh (Australia), Carol Rankin(NewZealand),Janet Seaton (Scotland) andFrank Sobolewski (Germany).

Alot of otherbusypeoplekindly gave up theirtime to be interviewed forthe project,thereby helping us understand not only theformalrulesofthe comparatorparliaments,but cruciallyalso theirpolitical norms andculture. In Australiathese includedSenator Andrew Bartlett, Barbara Belcher, SenatorPaulCalvert,Cleaver Elliot, HarryEvans,Senator John Faulkner, IanHarris, SenatorJohn Hogg, Tony Levy,Senator JoeLudwig, AnthonyMarinac, Gerard Martin,Peter Mason, DarylMelhamMP, Don Morris, SenatorAndrew Murray, SenatorKerry Nettle,Roger PriceMP, RichardPye, Margaret Reid,Joanne Towner,Senator Amanda Vanstone,Robyn Webberand BernardWright. In Germanytheyincluded Martina Krogmann,MdB,Uwe Küster, MdB, ChristianMajewski,UlrichMaurer, MdB, Wolfgang Müller,UlrichSchöler, Frank Sobolewski,ThomasStrobl,MdB andJörgvan Essen, MdB. In NewZealandtheyincluded Debbie Angus, TimBarnett MP,Hon Dr MichaelCullen MP,TeUruroaFlavell MP,JoelGeorge, Mary Harris, RodneyHideMP, Hon Doug Kidd, John Martin,David McGee, Rt Hon Sir GeoffreyPalmer, FayPaterson, Amanda Powell,LouiseSparrer, Lindsay Tischand Hon Margaret Wilson MP.InScotlandtheyincluded Mark BallardMSP,Lee Bridges,PatriciaFergusonMSP, Phil Gallie MSP, Donald GorrieMSP,Ken Hughes, DavidMcGill, DesMcNultyMSP,Andrew Mylne,NoraRadcliffe MSP, George Reid MSP, John ScottMSP,Janet Seaton, John SwinneyMSP, Thomson, MurrayToshMSP andElizabeth Watson.

At an early stageofthe project we published an ‘Issuesand Questions’paper,and we aregrateful to allofthosewho took thetime to respond. Theseincluded severalMPs,clerksofthe Houseof Commons, andothers. Some of theirresponses arequoted in thetext.

Last but not least, we benefitedfromthe help of various internsbased at theConstitution Unit. Research help was providedbyMarkGlover,RenéHolbach,Vilhelm Öbergand MaxShapiro. Significanthelpinpreparing this reportfor publication was providedbyOrlaBerry.

5 6 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons

Introduction This reportisthe finaloutput of atwo-year Constitution Unit research project on ‘The GovernanceofParliament’,fundedbythe NuffieldFoundation. Thepurpose of theproject was to look in detail at theinternal organisation of theHouseofCommons with aviewtomaking proposalsfor strengtheningits ability to controlits ownbusiness.

Theprincipalresearch question addressedishow muchautonomythe Commonshas,and how muchitshould have,overits ownaffairs. That is,its agenda,its internal appointments processes, andits rulesand procedures.Concerns about theseissueshavelong been shared by parliamentary reformersinside andoutside parliament. In recentyearsanumberofrelevantcontroversies–most notably overcommittee appointmentsand thepower to recallparliamentduring recess–have brought theseissuestobroader public andpoliticalattention. Thesehavehelpedfeed agrowing sensethatparliamentisindecline, with insufficientinfluenceoverthe governance of thecountry (see, forinstance, Power Commission 2006).

Thecurrent frustrations can be explainedbyreference to Anthony King’s seminalarticle on the different ‘modes’ of executive-legislative relations (1976).The mostvisibleaspect of Westminster parliamentary democracy is theconfrontation between government andopposition –as symbolisedinthe weekly sparring matchofPrime Minister’s .But this ‘opposition mode’ofexecutive-legislative relations is only oneofseveral that could exist. Thereisalsoan intra-partymode,where government ministersare kept in check (largely behind closed doors) by theirown .WhatKing found farless evidence of was the‘cross-party’ mode, in whichMPs from acrossthe Houseworktogether, in particulartocallgovernment to account. This mightbeexpected to form theheartofexecutive-legislative relations,but was found by King to be weak.Thirty yearson, in today’sBritain, the‘opposition mode’looks increasingly outdated. We have seen declining partyloyalties outside parliament (Dalton 2002;Webb2002),and arisein backbenchindependence at Westminster(Cowley 2002,2005),fed to some extent by thegrowth of expert select committees (Natzlerand Hutton 2005;Seawardand Silk 2003). Arebalancing of parliamentary democracy fromthe ‘opposition’tothe ‘cross-party’ modeofactivity would thereforechime with both thetenor of current political debate andrecenttrends at Westminster.

Allthree major partieshavenow respondedtothis disquiet. Acentral themeofthe Conservative Party’sDemocracy Taskforcehas been to ‘to restoreand enhancethe role of theHouseof Commonsinour political life’(2007:1), whilearecentLiberalDemocratpolicy papersought ‘to empower Parliament …[and] reinforce thedependenceofthe government on Parliament forits authority andlegitimacy’(LiberalDemocrats 2007:2). Most significantly, in July 2007,Gordon Brownindicated theimportancethatheattaches to this issueinhis firstprime ministerial statementtothe Commons, on constitutionalreform. 1 In presenting this packageone of the government’sstatedintentions was to ‘rebalance power between Parliament andGovernment’ (Ministry of Justice2007: 11). Many of theproposals in its Green Paperclearly do this –for example by giving parliament the righttovote on sending troops to war,toratifyinternational treaties, andtorecalland dissolveitself. Butthere arealsomanyother important stepsthatcould be takeninorder to give greater controlofparliamenttoits members.Our proposalsare therefore consistent with thedirection in whichall partieshaveindicatedthattheywanttogo, andoffer detailed suggestions forfurther reformsinthis direction.

1 HouseofCommons ,3July2007, Cols.815-820.

7 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons

Themethodologyusedinthis research project beganwith detailed study of theprocedures and structures of theHouseofCommons,supplemented by interviewing keyindividuals within Westminsterand reviewing therecenthistory of parliamentary reform debates. We also undertook aconsultation exercise on themainthemesofthe project,inviting responses to abrief ‘Issues and Questions Paper’ (Russell &Paun2006a), some of whichare integrated below. However thekey elementofthe project wasits internationalcomparative research.Welookedtofiveparliamentary chambers fromacrossthe worldfor lessons as to how theCommons might be organised differently andbetter. TheScottish Parliament was chosen because it was designed as a‘Parliament with apurpose’(Winetrobe 2001), intendedtoimprove upon theWestminstersystembyfostering anon-partisan andmoreinclusiveformofpolitics.The NewZealandHouseofRepresentatives was formerly regarded as ‘moreWestminsterthanWestminster’ due to its history of overwhelming executive dominanceand stable single-party government. Butfollowing ashifttoproportional representation in 1996 it underwentaradical setoforganisationaland procedural changesthat mightofferinspiration forthe UK.Alsointhe Westminstertradition,welookedtothe Australian Commonwealth Parliament,where themajoritarian HouseofRepresentatives hasmuchin commonwith our House of Commons, whilethe Senate hasdevelopedmanyprocedural innovations sinceits switchtoaproportionalelectoral system in 1948.And finally, we turned to an example fromthe continental European tradition,the German ,whichisofsimilar size to theHouseofCommons, is electedbyahighly proportionalsystem, but usuallydeliversstable (coalition) majority government. In each caseweconducteddeskresearch,followed by study visits during whichinterviews wereconductedwith parliamentarians, parliamentary staff, andother local experts.

Thestructure of therestofthe reportreflectsthis methodology. It starts with an analysis of how theHouseofCommonsworks at presentinterms of controlofits timetable,its committeesystem (includingthe appointmentsprocess),and itsprocedures andrules. We also considerthe rolesof various individuals andbodieswho might embody theCommons as acollective, andcould thereforeplayanimportant role in ‘speakingfor’the chamberasawhole.This is followed by the comparative sections,which explorethe operation of our five comparatorchambers in each of thesefields respectively, in search of lessons forthe UK.The concludingsections of thereport then look at lessons that canbedrawn fromour comparative work.Herewestart by highlighting a numberofways in whichWestminsterrepresentsapositiveratherthannegativemodelof parliamentary autonomy.Wediscuss how anew logic of parliamentary control–giving greater autonomytomembers –might replace thestatusquo. Finally, we concentrateindetailonthose areas whereimprovementstothe Commonsare bothdesirable andfeasible, setting out our recommendations forchange. Theseare summarisedbelow,beforethe main body of thereport.

8 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons

Summaryofrecommendations Afull discussion of our recommendations is includedinthe last section of thereport. The following is asummary of thekey points.

The plenarytimetable

Scheduling non-government time 1. Theradical option would be to turn thecurrent logic of standing orderno. 14 on its head,by limiting government timeonthe agenda to specified periods,and giving precedenceto‘House Business’instead.This is thelogic used in theAustralianSenate, andwould return the Commons to asituation similartothatbeforeBalfour’s reformsof1902. 2. An alternativeistospecify further categoriesofbusiness whichhaveguaranteed time, including committeebusinessand procedural matters. 3. Thebestsolution maybetoestablish afar clearerdichotomybetween ‘government time’and time for‘HouseBusiness’or‘backbenchbusiness’,with thelatterguaranteed alargerand more regularblockofagendatime. 4. Areconsolidation of existing time (without thelossofprivate members’ Fridays or members’ adjournmentdebates)should result in at leasthalfaday, anduptoafull day, perweek being givenovertoHouseBusiness. This should be on TuesdayorWednesday to ensure that it is in ‘prime time’. 5. It is an important principlethatmembers should be able to forcevotesonHouseBusiness. This would enable committees to forcedecisions on theirreports,and theHouse to expressits view collectivelyonissuesofcurrent publicimportance. 6. Standing orders should continue to setout,astheydonow,aminimumallocation of time for privatemembers’bills andfor debating committeereports. 7. Crucially, if thereisanewcategoryofHouseBusiness, theresponsibility forallocating time between different items of business on this part of theagenda should no longerrestwith the ‘usual channels’, whichgiveprimary controltothe government ChiefWhip. 8. Anew committeemadeupofbackbenchers (the‘BackbenchBusiness Committee’)should be established to determine thetimetable of HouseBusiness. 9. TheBackbenchBusiness Committeeshould have responsibility forscheduling different items in theregular HouseBusiness slot, within theconfines setout in standing orders.Itmight also be givensome controloverprogramming on privatemembers’ Fridays. 10.Toensurethatmembers’and committeebusiness is clearly separate,and freed fromthe controlofthe whips,the newBackbenchBusiness Committeeshould have no role in timetabling government business. 11.Whilewedonot proposethatopposition days should be consideredHouseBusiness, opposition partiesshould have aright to demand ahalf-daydebatebescheduledwithin five days,asrecommended by theConservative Democracy Taskforce, andtoexchangesome of theirdays forgovernment statements on specified topicsasrecommended by theHansard Society in 2001. 12.The BackbenchBusiness Committeeshould have broadrepresentation fromacrossthe House, andbewhollymadeupofbackbenchmembers.Itmight comprise, say, tenmembers drawn proportionately fromacrossthe House,who could be electedintheir partygroups.The chair of theLiaison Committee, andpossiblythe chairofthe ProcedureCommittee, should sitas ex-officiomembers.The committeeshould be chairedbyone of theDeputySpeakers. 13.Itisextremely important that drawing up adraft scheduledoesnot fall,defacto, into the hands of thewhips (ashas occurredwith respect to business committees elsewhere).

9 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons

Administration of thecommittee should liefirmlywith officialsreporting to theDeputy Speaker. Time forcommittees 14.There should be a30minuteslot everyweekfor theannouncementofany newcommittee reports,with acapacity forthe chairofthe committee to introducethe reportand forashort government reply.But,buildingonthe recentAustralianmodel, we believethatthis initial debate should be in plenary,and if members indicatethattheywantmoretimefor debate on a particularreportthere should then be atime setaside each week in WestminsterHallfor this to happen. 15.The 30 minute plenary slot would take place on HouseBusiness dayifone is created. Alternativelyitmight replace one of thecurrent twoten-minute rule billslots,whichoccurin prime time. 16.‘Estimatesdays’should be formally renamed‘committeedays’with allocation determined, as at present, by theLiaison Committee. 17.IfaBackbenchBusiness Committeeiscreated we do not suggest an increaseonthe minimum threedays forcommitteeseach session, but wouldinpracticeexpect additionaltime to be made available forconsideration of committeereports on House Business days. 18.IfnoBackbenchBusiness Committeeand HouseBusiness slot is created we would support theproposal made by theLiaison Committeeand others,thatcommittees should be entitledto aminimumofsix days of debate in theCommons chamberper session,with allocation between committees decidedbythe LiaisonCommittee. 19.Committees should,asinScotland, themselves decide theformofdebates on theirreports, including thepossibility of debatesonasubstantivemotion. 20.Committees should be entitledtoproposetheir ownbills,asinScotland, andthese should be givenspecial priority. 21.One option would be to provide afast-track fortwo committeebills in each session to be givenpriority overother non-government legislation. Thesecould be selected eitherthrough theLiaison Committeeoronthe basisofthe number of signatories–with aminimumcross- partyrequirement. Othertimefor members 22.The example of Germany, wheregroups of members have rights of accesstothe agenda could usefullybefollowed. 23.Groups of backbenchers should be able to propose bills,and thereshould be ameansfor thesetogainpriority,especially when thesegroups arecross-party. 24.Facilitiesfor privatemembers’bills,based on aballot, should continue to form part of the packageofnon-government timeand we do not proposeany change,atleast in theshortterm, to the arrangements forFridays. 25.Weproposethatthe BackbenchBusiness Committeeshould be able to timetable highpriority non-government billsinthe HouseBusiness slot forwhichitisresponsible, ensuring that privatemembers’bills would notbewhollydependent on winning government timeifthey come low downthe ballot. 26.Members’motions shouldbereinstated, againwithparticularpriority formotions with cross- partysupport. Theseshould also be programmedbythe BackbenchBusiness Committee, and would enable members to initiatedebates on topicsoftheir choice. Agreeingthe main weeklytimetable 27.Ifthe move to aHouseBusiness slot is not made,orisnot made immediately, we believethat thepresent system of debating theBusiness Statement on aweekly basiscould be significantly improvedbylearning fromthe . 28.The weekly Business Statement should be published in advanceofbeing debated.

10 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons

29.There should be an ability to table amendments to theStatement. 30.Amendments should only be ruledinorder if they specify whichbusiness should be omitted or curtailedtomaketime forany additional business. 31.Toberuledinorder amendments should have to demonstrate significantsupport, anda mechanismmight also be included to prioritiseamendments with clear cross-partysupportfor debate. 32.The Business Statement,and anyqualifying amendments to it, should be votedupon before being agreed. 33.All partiesshould committoastrong convention that such divisions areconsidered procedural andare takenonafreevote.

Appointments to committees 34.The CommitteeofSelection should includebackbenchmembers fromeach of themain parties, andits membershipceasetobedominatedbywhips. 35.The appointment of thecommittee should be timetabledduring HouseBusinessatthe startof theparliament. 36.Motions forthe appointment of select committees should be tabledinaHouseBusiness slot early in theparliament. 37.The motion to approve select committeememberships should be movedbythe chairofthe CommitteeofSelection, not by awhip or otherminister,and s/he should respond to any objections. 38.The chairofthe Committee of Selection should be asenior backbencherelected specifically forthe purpose by theHouse in asecret ballot, along thelines previously recommended by the LiaisonCommittee. 39.Selectcommittees should electtheir ownchairsinsecret ballots, followinganin-principle agreementastowhichparty should hold thechair. 40.The division of chairs between partiesshould be approvedbythe chamberatthe same timeas theoverall membership of select committees is approved, as is thecaseinthe Scottish Parliament. 41.Standing orders should statethatthe chairs of select committees will be shared broadly proportionately between theparties. 42.The same procedureasapplies to select committees should be used forapproving listsof publicbillcommittee members, with thechair of theCommittee of Selectionmoving such proposals. 43.The expectation should be that thecomposition of billcommittees reflects thebalance of opinion in theHouseratherthansimple partybalance.

Changing therules 44.Ifcommittees have moretime on theagendaand can proposereports on substantivemotions, andprivate members’motions can also be used to proposeprocedural change,wesee no need forthe continuation of theModernisation Committee. This should be merged with the ProcedureCommittee, underastrong backbenchchair. 45.Weare attracted to thesysteminScotlandwhere allstanding orderchanges must be proposed by theProcedures Committee, andministerscannot proposechanges to thechamberdirectly. This should be kept underreview. However,onbalance we believethatgreater pluralism– wherebyeitherbackbenchers or have achancetoproposeprocedural change – is preferable to giving thecommittee such arigid gatekeeping role. 46.However,procedural changesproposed by government should be movedingovernment time.

11 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons

Who speaksfor parliament? Individuals 47.Caremustbetaken in theestablishment of anynew procedures that theneutralityofthe Speaker,and theSpeaker’s office,isnot put underthreat. 48.The Speaker could playamoreassertiverole in defending theCommons,and therightsofits members. 49.Whenelecting its next Speaker theHouseshould considerthe benefits of choosing someone prepared to be an outspokenpublicdefenderofparliament. 50.Various proposalsmadeinthis reportwould strengthen thevisibility of otheractorsinthe House, including thefirst Deputy Speaker,who would probably chairthe BackbenchBusiness Committee, andthe chairofthe CommitteeofSelection. Theseindividuals might therefore come to be seen as greater defenders of parliament over time. 51.Ifthe Commonscontinueswith a‘usualchannels’systemwhere whips areresponsiblefor key decisions overtimetabling andappointmentsthis could be significantlyimprovedbywhips being elected, as in Germanyand NewZealand. 52.Weare not attracted to themerging of theLeader of theHouseand ChiefWhip, but if in the future theSpeaker develops as agreater champion forparliament, andparticularlyifthe Chief wereelected,this mightbecome asensiblestep.

Who speaksfor parliament? Co-ordinating bodies 53.Onbalance we do not believethata‘business committee’ forthe House of Commonswould tackle theperceivedproblemsofparliamentary control, andconcludethatother changesset out above will prove more effective. Indeed,ifbuiltonthe model of our comparator parliaments abusiness committeecould in some ways make things worse, by handing greater controltoparty leadersand whips. 54.One option would be to tryand constructaunique UK parliament model of abusiness committee, with backbenchrepresentation andbetteraccountability.However,webelieve that this would be unlikely to succeed. 55.Furthermore, thereare concerns that if theSpeaker chairedabusiness committees/he could be drawn into politicalarguments.Wedonot believethatthis would necessarily happen, but it is arisk. Agreater risk maybethatthe Speaker would losestatusifs/he chairedsucha committeewithout playing afull part in its discussions.This is thepattern we have seen in otherparliaments. 56.Weconclude that thekey question is ‘ownership’oftime:ifthe government continuestoown mostagenda time,thanks to standing orderno. 14,itwillcontinue to be dominant in negotiations,with or withoutabusiness committee. 57.Webelieve that theestablishment of amorelimitedBackbenchBusiness Committee to manage HouseBusiness would be amorerealisticand morefruitful place to start. Over time, if this mechanismprovedasuccess, abusiness committeewith broaderfunction might develop fromit. 58.The chairofthe LiaisonCommittee could, like thechair of theCommittee of Selection, be electedbythe whole House at thestart of each parliament. 59.Overtime theremay be adesiretocreateamoreunifiedcollectivevoice forthe backbenches. Amoreunitedbodycould work with theSpeaker on outreach activity,and review general parliamentary developments, andmight meet onlyoccasionally. Itsmembership could be drawn fromthe existing co-ordinating bodies, along with thenew BackbenchBusiness Committee. 60.Ifcertain procedural changesare introduced in thefuture, such as establishment of specialist legislation committees,the casefor establishing ageneral purposebusiness committeemay grow,and othernew options forcreating co-ordinating bodiesdevelop.

12 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons

Controlofthe Commons:The keyissues At one levelthe question of how theHouseofCommonsruns itself is adry andobscure one,of interest only to thosefew specialists whoconcernthemselveswith parliamentaryprocedure. Butin fact it addressesfundamentalquestions about theway in whichweare governed.This is reflected in thesignificantpublicinterestthatissometimesgenerated when thesystemisseen not to be working. Forexampleinrecentyears we have seen twomajor controversiesoverthe recalling of parliament during thesummerrecess–oncein2002, in therun up to theIraqwar,and anotherin 2006 overthe Lebanon crisis.These highlightedhow even amajority of MPshad no automatic righttoforce ameeting of theirown institution. This will be resolved following ’s announcementinJuly 2007 that therecallarrangements will be changed.2 Butthere areother examples. In 2001 MPsvoted,againstthe advice of thewhips,toreinstate twomembers whohad been removed fromthe select committees that they chaired. This againreceived widespread media attention. TheIraqcrisisalsobrought to widerpublicattention thefact that even when debatesare scheduled on controversialissues, it is forgovernment alone to decide whetherthe motion before theHouseisasubstantiveone or merely ‘onthe adjournment’,with theexception of debateson ‘opposition days’.3 Suchdifficultiespotentially undermine parliament’s authorityasanindependent body,bothinfact andinpublicperception. This,and numerous otherissues about parliamentary ownership discussedinthe following sections,remains thesubject of unresolved tensions.

Thekey question that this reportaddressesiswho does, andwho should,decide how theHouse of Commonsruns itself.The Commonsliesatthe heartofthe nation’s democracy, bringing together representativesfromall geographical areastodetermine whogoverns,toamend and approve legislation andtoparticipate in aforum forpolitical debate.The image of Westminsteris recognisable as symbolicofdemocracy not only in Britain but also farwiderafield. Nonetheless at its heartliesaninherent tension –thatthe Commonsmustbothsustain government andatthe same timehold it to account.The system ‘fuses’executive andlegislative power in away that many other systems(particularlypresidentialsystems such as that of theUS) do not. Ministersare drawn fromparliamentand continuetoworkasactivevoting members, andparliamentremains formally ‘sovereign’.The only independent powersofthe executive arethosethatderivefromthe royal prerogative.4

Thetasks of government andparliamentare thereforeinextricably interwoven.Inorder to pass its legislation, andimplement its manifestoprogramme,government relies on parliament to expedite its business reasonably swiftly. Parliament also providesaforuminwhichministers expect to (and indeed areexpectedto) make regularstatementsabout important matters of policy. Much of the business of parliament is concernedwith thescrutiny of government, forexamplethrough question time andthe work of select committees.Indeed so strong is thelinkthataminister

2 This proposes that recall canbebrought aboutbyamajority of MPspetitioning theSpeaker,although theSpeaker will retain discretion (MinistryofJustice 2007:21).Recall wasone of ouroriginaltopicsofstudy on theproject,but hasbeen omittedfromthisreportdue to thegovernment’s announcement. We foundthatthe AustralianSenate operates asimilarsystemtothatproposedfor theUKHouse of Commons,while theGermanBundestagcan be recalledonthe request of one thirdofMPs (seeTable 5). 3 In theevent,the government permittedasubstantive vote on theinvasionofIraq in March2003–famously suffering itslargesteverbackbench rebellion(Cook 2004). It hassubsequentlycommittedtorepeating this precedent priortoany future armed conflicts (Ministry of Justice 2007:15). 4 Thegovernment’sstatement of July2007alsogaveacommitment to divest many of thesepowers (for exampleover thecivil serviceand thesigning of treaties)and give them to parliament.Itshouldalsobenoted that thereare important powers held by theUSPresident–forexample to bills –which are no longer held by thepolitical executive in Britain. So forexample waspowerless to blockthe banonhunting oncethe Commons had approved it,despite hisown reservations.

13 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons responds to almostevery debate,includingadjournmentdebates andthose on privatemembers’ bills.This can be seen as an asset, demonstrating that theexecutive must take seriously points raised in parliament (in Australia, forexample, thereisnoministerialresponseinadjournment debates).However,the interweavingofexecutive andparliamentary business also raises questions about how autonomous parliament really is.This is particularlythe case in theHouseofCommons, wherethe governing partyunderusual circumstancesholds amajority of seats.

As ademocraticand sovereignassemblythe HouseofCommons formally controls its own business. In reality, however,muchofthis responsibility is delegatedtothe executive.There are threeprincipalreasons whythis situation hasbecome established.One is thedevelopment of the modernparty system,which itselfgrewfromthe division of theCommons into supporters and opponentsofthe government alreadyestablished by the18 th century.The logic of Westminster hastherefore long benefitedthe single majority that sustains thegovernment, rather than relying on thekindof ad hoc coalitions that would be necessary if theparties didn’t exist. Thesecond reason is thecementing of privilegefor thegoverning majority in standingorders, whichtook place particularly fromthe late 19th centuryonwards.Atthis time thegovernment faced difficulties in achieving its business thanks to procedural tacticsusedbyIrish nationalist MPs, andthis was followed by rule changeswhichgaveministerssignificantlygreater power. 5 The19 th century also sawalong tusslebetween government andprivate membersovertheir respectiveshare of agenda time.Government timewas limitedtotwo days perweek until Balfour’s procedural reformsof 1902 –whichcreated thecurrent situation wherethe default is government ownership of time (Lees-Smith 1924). In bothcases theseexplanations lielong ago, but theireffectspersist forathird reason. This is that achamberofover600 members such as theHouseofCommons hasdifficulty taking collectivedecisions when not guided by thedivisions of party. As Tony Wright (2004: 874) hassuggested,weshould be waryofstating that ‘parliament’ should insistonhavingmorecontrol as ‘there is no parliament, in that collectivesense,toinsistonanything. Thereare simply Members of Parliament whohavepreoccupations andinhabitacareer structureinwhichattention to the sustainedstrengthening of theinstitution is not acentral priority’.

Thelackofcollectivewillinthe Commonsisobviously amajor obstacletoparliamentbecoming moreautonomous fromthe executive.But so is thelackofvisiblealternatives.The long traditions at Westminster, whichset us apartfromother parliamentary systemsinEurope, mean that we can be surprisingly short-sightedand assume thatthere is only one wayinwhichaparliament can be run. Butour comparative study showsusthatthere areother ways in whichpolitical institutions can be organised.Inthis study we have drawn in particularfromother parliaments originallybased on theWestminstermodel,whichhavedevelopedprocedures in different ways.Wealsodraw fromEuropean experience in thecaseofthe German Bundestag.These examplesofferus alternativemodels,aspectsofwhichmight usefullybeimportedtothe Commons.Bypresenting concrete examplesofother systemsinoperation, we hope to help overcomethe collectiveaction problem, andinspireMembers of Parliament to introducechangeinto theirown institution. In a period when thePrime Minister hasstatedanintention to give greater power to parliament, we hope that theseexamples mayofferinspiration to thosewishing to put that pledgeinto effect.

Thereare four keyareas in whichgreater controlcould be handedtothe House of Commonsover its ownaffairs. Theseare theplenary timetable,the work of committees,changing therules, and theability to ‘speak forparliament’.This last role,whichasalreadyindicatedisdifficult, could be carried out morestrongly eitherbyanindividualorbysome kind of collectivebody.The perceivedproblems in each of theseareas arediscussedinthe remainderofthis section. Therest

5 Forexample,following obstructionist tacticsbythe IrishPartyoverthe Criminal LawAmendment (Ireland)Bill 1887,the first‘guillotinemotion’ in itsmodernformwas passed on 11 June1887after 35 days of debate(Houseof Commons Information Office2004: 5).

14 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons of thereportthenanalyseshow thesematters aredealtwith in our comparatorparliaments,and what lessons we mightlearn fromthemfor therunningofthe HouseofCommons.

The plenarytimetable Oneofthe commonestcomplaints about theorganisation of parliament is ‘the extent to whichthe government dominatesthe agenda of theHouseofCommons’(Rush 2005:137). This statement, however,requires ‘unpacking’, as government dominancecould refertoanumberofdifferent things.

Oneinterpretation is thetime allocated on thefloor of theHouseofCommons to government business, as opposed to otherkinds of business.AsshowninTable 1, over 50%oftime in the chamberisdevotedtogovernment business, whichisabout five timesasmuchtime as the opposition partieshaveattheir disposal.However,this is not necessarily adisproportionate amount of time –given that scrutinising government andits legislation is among parliament’s absolutely core roles. Indeed,asBlackburnand Kennon point out, one mightevenargue that debatesongovernment legislation should be categorised as non-government business as it is opposition andbackbenchMPs that desire theopportunity to subject bills to detailed scrutiny whereas ‘ministerswould usuallybehappy to seetheir bills passedwith littleornodebate’ (2003: 1-024).

Of greater concernthanthe overall shareoftime is how time comestobeallocated between these different formsofbusiness.The principles forthis arelaiddowninHouseofCommons standing ordernumber14(whichisreproduced in AppendixA). This specifies that therewillbecertain minimumallocations made to different kinds of non-government business.Inparticular20days (a limitednumberofwhichmay be takenashalf-days)are allocatedtoopposition partieseach session. 6 Seventeen of thesegotothe main opposition partyand theother threetothe thirdparty, with occasionalallocation of slots to theminor parties. In addition 13 Fridays areset aside for discussion of privatemembers’bills (PMBs).AsTable 1reveals, theshare of time devotedtothese matterscan vary significantlybetween sessions,astheyare assigned aprecise numberofdays per session rather than,for example,aregularslot everyweek or month. In longsessions following spring generalelections (suchas2005-06), theseallocations thereforefallinterms of the proportion of time they represent. Whereas in shortsessions preceding elections thenumberof days fallsshortbecause government chooses to prioritiseits legislativeorother business in the lead-uptodissolution (see Appendix Bfor full figures).Other standing orders specify thefixed nature of otherbusiness –for example arrangements fororalquestions areincluded in standing orderno. 21,and foradjournmentdebates in standing orderno. 9. Standing orderno. 10(13) guarantees select committees sixdays of debate in WestminsterHall(thoughinpractice committees areallocated significantlymoreslots than this 7 )and by convention theLiaison Committee, made up of select committeechairs, also decidesthe topic forthree days of debatesin themainchamberonthe estimatesineach session.There are, therefore, various protections for

6 In practice opposition partiesgainadditional controloverthe agenda throughrarely-grantedurgentdebates under standingorder no.24(onlytwo grantedsince 1997), throughUrgentQuestions(of which14weregrantedbythe Speakerinthe 2005-06 Session, with atotal of sevenand ahalfhours spentdiscussing them), andbyconvention throughsetting thetopic forpart of theannual debates on theBudgetand theQueen’sSpeech.The firstofthese is shown as opposition time in Table1,but theothersare not. 7 In thelong2005-06Session,for instance, 22 outof44available Thursdays in WestminsterHallweredevoted to debateofselect committeereports (Liaison Committee2007: para 53). This is significantlymorethanthe mandatory number of committeeslots provided forinstandingorders, butlessthanthe two-thirds of availableThursdays recommended by theModernisation Committee(2000b: para 40)and reemphasisedbythe Liaison Committee(2007: para 56).

15 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons non-government business in standing orders,whichare supplemented in places by convention. Thereisalsoadditional time forthis business in WestminsterHall, as showninTable 1.

Table 1: Distribution of HouseofCommons agenda time –inhours(%oftotal)

Commons chamber WestminsterHall 2003-04 2005-06 2003-04 2005-06 ‘normal’ session long session ‘normal’ session long session Government legislation 388.4(32.0)631.5 (40.2) 0.0(0.0) 0.0(0.0) Government statements97.0(8.0) 120.1(7.6) 0.0(0.0) 0.0(0.0) Government adjournment debates99.2(8.2) 103.0(6.6) 19.4 (4.7) 44.8 (8.4) Government motionsand otherbusiness*58.8(4.8) 63.2 (4.0)0.0 (0.0)0.0 (0.0) Governmentbusinesstotal 643.4(52.9)917.7 (58.4) 19.4 (4.7)44.8(8.4) Private members’ bills63.0(5.2) 58.0(3.7) 0.0(0.0) 0.0(0.0) Dailyadjournmentdebates79.0(6.5) 107.0(6.8) 307.4(75.1)398.7 (74.9) Lastday before recess debates14.5(1.2) 25.1 (1.6)0.0 (0.0)0.0 (0.0) Othermembers’business**36.3(3.0) 34.4 (2.2)0.0 (0.0)0.0 (0.0) Members’ businesstotal 192.8(15.9)224.5 (14.3) 307.4(75.1)398.7 (74.9) Opposition day debates131.4 (10.8) 130.0(8.3) 0.0(0.0) 0.0(0.0) Urgent debate underSO24*** 0.0(0.0) 3.3(0.2) 0.0(0.0) 0.0(0.0) Opposition motionsingovernmenttime9.9 (0.8)0.0 (0.0)0.0 (0.0)0.0 (0.0) Opposition businesstotal 141.3(11.6) 133.2(8.5) 0.0(0.0) 0.0(0.0) Estimatesdebatesonctteereports 12.2 (1.0)15.7(1.0) 64.3 (15.7) 65.7 (12.3) Debatesonctteereports in govnttime****22.0(1.8) 20.6 (1.3)0.0 (0.0)0.0 (0.0) Committeebusinesstotal 34.2 (2.8)36.3(2.3) 64.3 (15.7) 65.7 (12.3)

Questionstoministers 131.0(10.8)176.7 (11.2) 0.0(0.0) 0.0(0.0) Urgent Questions 6.3(0.5) 7.6(0.5) 0.0(0.0) 0.0(0.0) Questionstotal 137.3(11.3) 184.3(11.7) 0.0(0.0) 0.0(0.0)

Queen’s Speech debate 37.4 (3.1)40.8(2.6) 0.0(0.0) 0.0(0.0) Miscellaneousbusiness*****29.0(2.4) 35.3 (2.2)18.1(4.4) 23.1 (4.3) TOTAL1215.31572.1409.2 532.2

*Not includinggovernmentmotions on committeereports andEUdocuments (see committeebusinessbelow). ** Includes petitions, points of order andprivate members’ motions. ***Although backbenchers canalsoapplyfor urgentdebates,the sole successful applicationinthese twosessionswas by aLiberalDemocrat shadow minister. **** Includes time provided by thegovernmentfor debates on reports of thePublicAccounts, Procedure, Privileges, Modernisation and‘domestic’ committees,and on EU documentsrecommended by theEUScrutinyCommittee. *****Includes suspensions of proceedingsofthe Houseand prayers. Sources: HouseofCommons Sessional Returns, at: www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm/cmsesret.htm and original researchincluding approximations of time spentondifferent activitiesbased on details in Hansard.The data presentedherediffers from Sessional Returns(andthe figuresinAppendix B) theinthatdebates on committee reports in government time have been deducted from thegovernmentmotions category.The varioussub-categories of time have also been regroupedtoshowmoreclearlythe divisionbetween government,opposition, committeeand members’ business.

Thebasic logic of ownership of time is however setdowninthe opening line of standing order number14that‘Save as providedinthis order, government business shallhaveprecedence at everysitting’. Thesewords date to theBalfour reformsof1902, andweredescribedbyone respondent to our Issues andQuestions paperas‘aratherbrutalencapsulation of theUK’s

16 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons political system’. This generalprovision in SO14 leadstoaslightlypeculiar situation, wheresome non-government timeisclearly protected in standing orders,and providing time forother non- government business is essentiallyleftatthe discretion of thegovernment.So‘government business’ includesvariousmatters,suchasadjournment debates(amounting to 7-8% of total Commonstime,asshowninTable 1), whichare of generalinterest in thechamberand maybe tabledasaresult of pressure fromnon-government forces.These sometimes follow aselect committeereportonthe subject at hand. 8 Similarlydebates on theestablishment of new committees,onthe appointment of members to existing select committees,and on the recommendations of bodiessuchasthe Modernisation Committeeand ProcedureCommittee (discussedfurther below)are also takenin‘government time’.This actuallymakes thegovernment appear moredominant than it is in termsofthe shareofagenda time.Wehavetried to capture a truerversion of thesituation in theallocation of time to categoriesinTable 1.

Arelated but separate aspect of government controlofthe plenary agenda is,however,equally important.This is how time on theagenda is shared out week-by-week within theframework set out in standing orders.Unlike many otherparliaments,the House of Commonsdoesnot have an all-party‘business committee’ to carry out this task.Instead thetimetabling of bills now generally takesplace through‘programme motions’ whichare agreed by thechamberonawhippedvote. This procedure, established by theModernisationCommittee post-1997,has been highly controversial. 9 Theweekly programme forthe Commons chamberisnegotiatedinformally throughthe ‘usual channels’. Thesecomprisethe government andopposition ChiefWhips,and moremarginallythe Leader of theHouseand minor partywhips.Decisions on theprogramme take place in aweekly series of privatebilateral meetingsbetween theseactors,10 andinclude:  when plenary stages of government billswilltakeplace (clearly government business);  how muchtime will be given, andwhen, to generaldebates (whichtakeplace in government timebut areoffar widerinterest in theHouse);  thetopicsfor thesedebates andtheir basis–whethertaken ‘onthe adjournment’ or on a substantivemotion asking thechambertotakeameaningfuldecision (a choicewhichlargely restswith government, butarguably should rest with members);  thetiming of opposition daydebates –thoughnot thetopics, whichare left to thediscretion of theopposition parties(with thenumberofdays persession fixedinSO14);  thetiming of privatemembers’Fridays (similarly within theconstraints setout in SO14);  thetiming of thethree estimatesdays in practice allocated to debating committeereports (thoughthis is notprotected formally in standing orders), andthe availability andtiming of any otherdebates on committeereports.

Thegovernment hassignificantinfluenceoverall of thesematters,thanks to thenatureofusual channels discussions.Thisispartlyaresult of thebilateral basisofthese discussions,whichallows thegovernment ChiefWhip potentially to ‘divideand rule’. Butitalsoflowsfromboththe government’smajority (usually)and theresources availabletothe ChiefWhip. In particularthe PrivateSecretary to theChiefWhip is apowerfulfigure, whoin2000had astaff of 19,and conducts much of thenegotiation (Rushand Ettinghausen 2002).11 Theabilityofother groups to

8 Forinstance, in sixofthe 26 adjournment debates in government time in the2005-06 session (aslistedin Modernisation Committee2007: para 80), theorder paper‘tagged’ acommitteereportorevidence session. 9 TheCommitteeitself hasconceded that ‘concernaboutthe volume of legislationwhich passes undebated [as aresult of programming]isentirelylegitimate’(Modernisation Committee(2003:para 19). SeealsoProcedureCommittee (2004a)and Brazier(ed.)(2004:chapter 3). 10 Foradetailedanalysisofthe ‘usual channels’systemsee Rush andEttinghausen (2002). 11 Thepowerofthisfigure haslongbeen noted. As Leader of theHouse of Commons in 1967 Richard Crossman said of FreddieWarren,thenholder of this position,that‘themoreIseeofhim themoreastonishingIfind theinfluence he exerts’ (Crossman1976: 625).

17 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons influencethe timetable is thereforelimited. Opposition partiesselectthe topicsfor theirown debates, although when they occurisdecidedbythe usualchannels.The LiaisonCommittee decidesthe topicsfor debate on ‘estimatesdays’, thetiming of whichissubject to similar negotiation. Theprecedence of PMBs within theagreed Fridays is primarily decidedbythe ballot that takesplace at thestart of each parliamentarysession. Butmanykey decisions,evenovernon- government business, areout of thereach of members entirely.Asone MP suggested in their responsetoour Issuesand Questions paper‘theusual channels arecompletely opaqueand take no account of backbenchinterests’. As ProfessorMichael Rush suggested in his response ‘whatis needed is not morebackbenchtime (WestminsterHallhas providedthat), but agreater backbench sayoverthe controlofparliamentary time’.

Thechamberofthe House of Commonshas oversight of theweekly timetable,but no decision- making power.Byconvention theLeader of theHouse makesastatementevery Thursday setting out theagenda forthe following week,and adraft agenda forthe week afterthat. This formally responds to an Urgent Question by theShadow Leader of theHouse. TheShadow Leader then responds,and questions areallowed frommembers foruptoanhour.These arelargely phrased as requestsfor additional time to debate topics–whichrange fromsubstantialdemands to provide moretime to debate keylegislation, or to hold adebateonacurrent crisis,tointerventions driven by moreparochialconstituencyconcerns.The Leader of theHousegenerally responds politely, but thereisnoopportunitytochangethe timetable that hasalreadybeenproposed.

Thereare various frustrations containedwithin thecurrent system –interms of theallocation of time to different formsofbusiness, government’scontroloveressentiallynon-government time, andhow thetimetable is negotiated andagreed.But thereare also some elements notably missing. Forexample, thoughindividual members mayintroducebills (throughthe ballot process, ‘ten- minute rule bills’or‘presentation bills’),theyhavelimitedability to move motions.Adjournment debatesatthe endofthe dayand in WestminsterHallare not takenonasubstantivemotion, Early DayMotions arenot debated, andother motionsmay appear on theOrder Paperunder ‘Remaining Orders’,but will in practicenever be reached.The ability of members to forceavote on an issueistherefore limited–totheir ownbills,oramendments to billsorgovernment motions. Select committees have even morelimitedability to forcedecisions –theyhaveno capacity to introducebills or movemotions as acollectivegroup, andcannot decide theformthat thelimiteddebates on theirreports will take.Theycannot thereforeforce decisions on their recommendations.All of this clearly contributestothe HouseofCommons’noted weakness in ‘cross-party’ mode(whichmight instinctively be expected to be its primary mode),where the chamberasawhole holds thegovernment in check (King 1976). Instead theCommons chamber is principallythe site fordebatein‘opposition mode’, with thetwo main partiesare ranged against each other, whilethe partyback room is thesite of negotiation in ‘intra-party’ mode. Increasingly in recentyears intra-partynegotiation hasspilledoverinto thechamberitself, whichisasign of theincreasing independence of backbenchers (Cowley2002, 2005). In atime when theimportance of parliamentary committees hassignificantlyincreased,alongside declining partycohesion, and declining adherencetopolitical partiesoutside parliament, the fact that members have such difficulty gaining accesstothe agenda on across-partybasis looksincreasingly out of step.

Theorganisation of theparliamentary timetablehas regularlybeen thetargetofparliamentary reformers. Seriousattempts weremadefromthe mid-1980sonwards to inject agreater degree of predictability andcross-partyagreementinto thetimetabling of business, andespecially government legislation12 leading eventually to theintroduction of formal programme motionsas part of thepost-1997 ‘modernisation’ agenda. 13 In recentyearsanumberofauthoritative reports

12 ProcedureCommittee(1985)and (1986);Jopling Committee(1992); (1992). 13 SeeModernisation Committee(1997 and2004).

18 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons have addressedthese issues,makingrecommendations that we will reflectupon –and in some cases endorse –inthe lattersections of this report.

Aparticularobjectiveofmanyreformefforts hasbeen to enhancethe opportunitiesfor backbenchers to initiatebusiness. Severalreports have calledfor alessrestrictive approach to granting time fortopical or Urgent Questionsand debates,14 with some prescribing aset number of signatoriesthatshould triggeradebate on aspecificissue. 15 Proposalshavealsobeen made to increasethe amount of time available forprivate members’ legislation, including in ahigherprofile slot on aTuesday or Wednesdayevening, in WestminsterHall, or throughtakingReportStage in a committeeoff thefloor of theHouse.16 Otherreports have highlightedthe need forprocedural reform to enable some members’bills to pass ‘without theneed forgovernment supportor[being] subject to hijackingbyminority opponents’, 17 andtorestore theright of backbenchers to move substantivemotions. 18

Many of thesamereports have also recommended greater opportunitiesfor committees to instigatebusiness in theHouse. Almost30yearsago,the ProcedureCommittee calledfor eight days peryear to be designated committeedays, with committeechairsable to move substantive motions(1978:paras 6.2-6.13). This proposal was rejected but theissue hascome back ontothe agenda in recentyears. TheLiaison Committeehas proposeddoubling thenumberofestimates days (onwhichcommittee reports aredebated)tosix,and floatedthe ideaofholding aweekly30- minute slot on arecentcommittee report(2000a: paras39-40 and2001: paras31-35). Similar recommendations have been made subsequently by anumberofbodies.19 Tworecentreports have also touchedupon this issue. TheConservative Democracy Taskforce(2007:4)proposed that committeechairsshould be able to make statements andtakequestions on newreports (with a quotaofperhaps 12 such sessions peryear)and to move substantivemotions on theirreports when thegovernment hasfailedtogiveasatisfactoryresponse.The Modernisation Committee (2007: para 91)suggested aweekly half-hour opportunity foraminister to respond to arecent reportinWestminsterHall, againwith theLiaison Committeeselecting thesubject.

Therehas been less attention paid to opposition access to theagenda –possiblybecause theusual channels offerthe main opposition partiesregularopportunitiesdeniedtobackbenchers to state theircasetothe government about theorganisation of business. Also because opposition days are held on asubstantivemotion. An exception to this pattern was made by theHansard Society (2001: para 4.32), whichsuggested that opposition partiesbeable ‘totrade some of their Opposition Days forthe chance to call forastatementonatopical issue’.Not surprisingly,the opposition partieshavealsotaken an interest in this issue. TheConservative Democracy Taskforce recommended that theoppositionbegiven agreater sayoverwhenitcan useits allocation of days andthatithavethe righttotrade thesedebates fortopical questions (2007: 5), andthe Liberal Democrats have recentlyadvocated enhanced opportunitiesfor non-government parties‘to force votes on contentious issues’(2007:para5.3).

14 SeeNortonCommission (2000: 27-28); Hansard Society(2001:paras 4.30-34); Parliament First(2003:64);Hansard Society(2005:para 4.78); Conservative DemocracyTaskforce (2007: 5-7);Modernisation Committee(2007). 15 Forinstance, theHansard SocietyCommission on Parliamentary Scrutiny recommended that a‘public interest’ debatebescheduled whenbackedby150 or 200members drawnproportionally from across theHouse (Hansard Society2001: para 4.34)and the ProcedureCommitteesuggested that long debates in WestminsterHallbescheduled on EarlyDay Motionsthatattractover200 signatoriesfromatleast three parties(2003:para 36). 16 SeeHansard Society(2003:6); Conservative DemocracyTaskforce (2007: 6). 17 Parliament First(2003:62). 18 Seefor exampleProcedureCommittee(2007:para 82); Modernisation Committee(2007:para 114).Thisright was lost as part of thepost-Joplingtimetablingreforms in 1994 (Sear2002: 25). 19 SeeNortonCommission (2000: 28-29); Hansard Society(2001:para 3.46); andParliament First(2003:68).

19 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons

In recentyearsinterest hasgrown in theestablishment of some kind of body representative of the chamberasawhole whichwould be responsiblefor agreeing theprogramme of business. More than 20 yearsago theProcedureCommittee (1985: para 36)suggested theestablishment of a LegislativeBusiness Committeewhichwould considerthe timetable forgovernment bills. A similar proposal was made by theHansard Society reporton Making theLaw (1992: 518) andbythe Norton Commission (2000: 42). Sincethenthe rangeoffunctions proposed to be giventosucha committeehas broadened. TheHansard Society Commission on Parliamentary Scrutiny proposed that thereshould be amoregeneral business committeewith responsibility fororganising parliamentary business (2001: paras2.47-2.49). Thedemandfor morecross-party consultation overthe programme was acknowledged by theModernisation Committee(2002b) underRobin Cook but not substantiallyacted upon. Subsequent publications have echoedthe calls foran inclusive, cross-partybusiness committeeto‘bringagreater certainty to theparliamentary timetable andinvolvethe main political partiesinthe management of business’ (Brazier,Flinders &McHugh2005: 80). 20 Thegovernment, however,remains sceptical,havingtold theLords (2005:para40) that it ‘doesnot believe[thecreation of abusiness committee] would offersignificantadvantageovercurrent arrangements’. Questions:  How could members of theCommons be givenmorecontroloverits weekly timetable?  Arethere examplesoverseas of committees having betteraccesstothe plenary timetable than they do in theHouseofCommons?  Arethere examplesofmembers,individuallyorcollectively, having greater accesstothe plenary agenda?  Could thedivision betweengovernment andnon-government business be made morefairly andtransparently?

The work of committees Many of thefrustrationsabout controlinthe Commonsrelatetothe plenary agenda,but thereare also perceivedproblems about theorganisation of committees.Asalreadymentioned, one of the biggest controversiesabout parliament’s ability to runits ownaffairsinrecentyearsconcernedthe appointment of select committeemembers.This appeared to show up some weaknessesinthe system.After the2001general election, alistofselect committeemembers was presentedtothe Commonsfor approvalwhichomittedthe namesoftwo established committeechairs–Gwyneth Dunwoody andDonald Anderson –fromtheir respectivecommittees. 21 Thechamberrejectedthe proposed lists, andthese twomembers wereultimately reinstated. Therehad alreadybeen demandsfor reform of theprocessfor appointing select committeemembers, as discussedbelow. Following this controversythere was an attempttointroducereform, basedonareportofthe Modernisation Committee, but theserecommendations wererejectedbythe Houseby209 votes to 195inMay 2002.

Thepower to make recommendations forappointment andremovalofselectcommittee members formally restswith theCommittee of Selection. This committeehas nine members,mostofwhom arewhips,thoughits chairisnormallyabackbenchmember.22 Thecommittee obviously hastobe

20 SeealsoParliament First(2003:69);Conservative DemocracyTaskforce (2007: 6-7);Liberal Democrats(2007:para 5.3). 21 SeeKelso (2003).Notethatthisgovernmentwas notthe firsttotry andforce select committeechairsout.In1992 theConservativessought, successfully,toremoveNicholas Wintertonfromthe Health committee(seeTomkins 2003). 22 In July2007the membersofthe committeewere: Rosemary McKenna(Labourbackbencher,chair of committee), NickBrown (Labour, deputychief whip),Liz Blackman(Labour, whip),Simon Burns(Conservative,assistantchief whip),AlanCampbell(Labour, whip),Tony Cunningham (Labour, assistant whip), Andrew Robathan (Conservative, deputychief whip),AdrianSanders(Liberal Democrat,deputywhip),Sir George Young(Conservative ).

20 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons established at thestart of asession, before theselect committees themselves.Its membership is agreed throughthe usualchannels andthenmovedasprivate business not to be debated.23 (Its status as privatebusiness is acuriosityresulting fromthe history of thecommittee, whichwas originallycreated in 1839 to deal with such business.)Inmodern timesthe committeehas come underregularcriticismfor in effect just‘rubberstamping’the decisions on committeemembership takenbythe whips. 24 Thereisthusconcernthatmembers can be ‘keptoff committees,or removed fromthem, on account of theirviews’, andthatdisloyal membersmay thereforebe excluded(LiaisonCommittee2000a:para12).

Standing orders with respect to thenomination of select committeemembers areminimal. By convention theparty balanceoncommittees is broadly proportionaltothatinthe House(so the governing partynormallyhas amajority on allcommittees)but this is not prescribedinthe rules. Thedetailofmembershipisnegotiatedinitially by thewhips throughthe usualchannels,before being referredtothe Committee of Selection.Inthis processthere maybesome hagglingoverthe partybalance,but thewhips fromone partyare unlikely to question thenames of individuals nominatedbyanother. Once theCommittee of Selection hasagreed thelists they areproposed to theHousefor approval, in amotion in thenameofamemberofthe Committee. Thedebateon establishing committees hasoften been ledbythe chairofthe CommitteeofSelection though in July 2005 –following the2001controversy–theLeaderofthe Houseplayedthis role. 25 Twodays noticemustbegiven to theHouse, so that members have theopportunity to moveamendments before thelists areapproved(or rejected). In 2001 thecontroversystarted inside theParliamentary Labour Party(PLP), wheremembers complainedthattheyhad not been adequately consultedon theLabour namesput forwardbythe ChiefWhip. Theonly reform that hasoccurredsincethen hasbeen within thePLP rules. Thesewereamended to make clear that thePLP would voteonthe list of namesbeforeitwas put to thechamber, andcould make amendments.Inaddition the Parliamentary Committeeofthe PLP now hasaformal role in theprocess, alongside theChief Whip. Equivalentprocessesdonot existwithin theother parties.

Select committeechairsare formally chosen by theircommittees.Hereagain thereislittlein standing orders.Informalnegotiations take place throughthe usualchannels,and abroadly proportional shareofchairsisgiven to theopposition party, andmorerecentlytothe Liberal Democrats. 26 When committee members arenominatedthis is obviously done with due consideration as to whowillbechair.The hand of thewhips in selecting chairs can be quite visible, as on 25 July 2007,whenthe Leader of theHouse controversiallybypassedthe Committeeof Selection andmoved at shortnoticeamotion adding former minister KeithVaz to theHome AffairsCommittee in orderthathecould be electedchair before thesummerrecess(as he duly was). 27 When thecommittees areestablished at thestart of theparliamentmembers will be informedbytheir whips whothe ‘agreed’ chairis, andthere areallegations that members arekept offcommittees if they arethought likely to votefor adifferent person, or even seek to become the chairthemselves. Nonetheless, as Margaret Becketttold theLiaison Committeein2000‘it has

23 Seefor exampleHouse of Commons Hansard 13 June2005, Col. 1, andHouse of Commons Hansard 3July2001, Col. 125. 24 Theroleofthe CommitteeofSelectioninnominatingcommitteemembers wasaproposalofthe reportthat originally ledtothe creation of thenew select committees (ProcedureCommittee1978: para 6.19). This wasseen as an improvement on theprevious situationwhereby allselect committeeappointmentswereproposeddirectlybya government whip. Butthe hand of thewhips in theoperationofthe committeewas suspected from earlyon(see Norton 1980:352). 25 HouseofCommons Hansard,13July2005, Cols.840-929. 26 In July2007, of 32 select committeechairs(the31members of theLiaison Committeeplusthe chairofthe Modernisation Committee) Labour held 19 (59%), theConservatives10(31%) andthe Liberal Democrats3(9%).The threepartiesrespectively held 55%, 31%and 10%ofseats in theHouse. 27 HouseofCommons Hansard,25July2007, Cols.916-36.

21 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons been known for[aselect committee] to elect thewrong person’(LiaisonCommittee2000b:para 21). 28 This explains whythe whips decidedtoremove Dunwoody andAnderson fromtheir committees altogetherratherthansimply to seek alternativechairs.

Thereare thereforeanumberofconcerns about thecontrolbythe whips overselectcommittee membership, andthe meansbywhichmembers whoare not felt to be sufficiently‘reliable’may be kept offthese committees.However,the behaviourofthe Housein2001showed that thewhips do not in fact have ultimatecontrol. An alternativeviewofthis eventwas that it demonstrated how thechecksinthe system can work effectively. Butinthe caseofpublicbillcommittees (formerlystanding committees)the position is very different.For thesecommittees,one of which is established foreach government bill,the appointmentsare made by theCommittee of Selection with no oversightbythe chamber. In otherwords,these members areessentiallychosen by the whips.This situation clearlyraisesgreater concerns about theability to keep ‘unreliable’members offcommittees,and theavailable evidence suggests that that this is agenuine problem. For example therehavebeenten government billssince1997that20ormoreLabour backbenchers have opposed at second . 29 On averagethese rebellions involved 9.6% of allLabour members,but in virtuallyall cases theLabour dissenterswereunderrepresentedonthe committees established to considerthese bills.Inhalfofthe cases wherebills wenttostanding committeeno rebels at allwereselectedfor membership of thecommittee. Thefull figuresare giveninAppendix C.

Appointmentstobillcommittees have rarely been on theagenda of parliamentary reformers largelybecause thecommittee stageofthe legislativeprocesshas been widely considered ineffectual. In thewords of theHansard Society,standing committees (astheywerethencalled) ‘failtodeliver genuine andanalyticalscrutiny of theprovisions involved,their political functions areneutered, dominatedalmostexclusivelybygovernment…and they do not adequately utilise theevidenceofexperts or interested parties’ (Modernisation Committee2006: Ev 108). Now that thebillcommittee processhas been changedtoincludeevidencetakingthere maybegreater scope formembers to influencelegislation throughthese committees,putting morepressure on the accountabilityoftheir appointment.

As well as themembership of committees,there aresome concerns aboutthe ability of select committees to influencedebategiven theirlackofaccesstothe plenary agenda.Asoutlinedabove, theselectcommittees do have accesstoalimitednumberof‘slots’onthe plenary agenda,and a moregenerous numberinWestminsterHall. Theallocation of thesebetween committees is controlled by theLiaison Committeeofselectcommittee chairs.But thereremains aproblemwith thetimeliness of debate on reports,particularlyinthe chamberitself, as here theLiaison Committeeremains reliantonthe usualchannels to make thetime available.There is also a connected problemabout theability to debate committeereports on asubstantivemotion. As no votes aretaken in WestminsterHallthere arenosubstantivemotions used in thesedebates,and debatesonthe estimatesare also essentiallyona‘takenote’ basis. Theonly opportunity forthe chambertovote on therecommendations in acommittee reportistherefore if government makes time available andmovesasubstantivemotion.Thishappens rarely,exceptfor recommendations made by committees dealingwith internal procedural matters.

28 This apparently occurredwhenNicholasWinterton waselected chairofthe Health Committeein1987indefiance of theConservative whips. As noted above, following the1992electionWinterton wasremoved from thecommittee to preventthishappening again. 29 Either on thesecond readingvoteitself or on a‘reasonedamendment’. In onecase–theHealthand Social Care Bill –there were twoseparaterebellions of over 20 MPs.

22 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons

Theselectcommittees do controltheir ownagendas.Theyhavesignificantfreedom to decide what inquiries to pursueand to publish theirown reports.However,theydonot have anyspecific righttointroducelegislation –arightwhichisreservedfor thegovernment or privatemembers. This againlimits committees’ability to forcedecisions on theirrecommendations.Inrecentyears thePublicAdministration Committeehas published adraft CivilService Bill,and this didsucceed in encouragingthe government to publishits ownproposals. 30 Butthe committeecould not formally introduceits bill, unless this was done throughthe normalPMB processbyone of its members.Itwould have hadnomorechanceofsuccessthanany otherPMB,unless itssponsor happenedtodowellinthe ballot at thestart of theparliamentary session. Meanwhile, in this case, thegovernment’sown draftbillhas not been proceededwith to date.

Thedepartmental select committeesystemestablished in 1979 is generallyseen as asuccess story in termsofthe autonomy thecommittees enjoy over theirown agendasand theuse they have made of theirpowerstoscrutinise theexecutive.Reformefforts have focussedonareas where theirindependencefromthe government is morequestionable,notably –asjustdiscussed–on theissue of appointmentsofmembers andchairs, andaccesstothe agenda.

Sevenyears agothe LiaisonCommittee (2000a)published adetailedset of proposalsastohow ‘the House’ could take back power over committeeappointments. It suggested theestablishment of anew postofChairmanofCommittees who, along with twodeputies, would be electedbythe chamberatthe startofeach parliament to recommendthe membership of allcommittees.These threefigures –plus thechairsofindividualcommittees onceelected –would form aSelect CommitteePanel whichwould recommend changestocommittee membership during the parliament as wellastakingonthe functions of theLiaison Committee. Theseproposalswere backed by theNortonCommission (2000:29) butrejectedbythe Houseitself.31 Revisiting the issue, theLiaison Committee setout arange of options forreformincluding broadening the membership of theCommittee of Selection, involving committeechairsfromthe previous parliament in thenominations process, andusing asecret ballot to appoint members.32 Following theDunwoody andAnderson affair,the Modernisation Committee(2002a: paras15-17)madeits ownset of proposals, recommending thecreation of anew CommitteeofNomination consisting of senior backbenchers only.But this toowas defeated in theHouse–in part due to behind-the- scenes organisation by bothgovernment andopposition whips. 33 More recently, theConservative Democracy Taskforcecalledfor themembership of theCommittee of Selection to be amended (with only one whip fromeach partypermittedtoserve)and also raised thepossibility of secret ballotsfor appointing committeemembers (2007: 3-5).

Although theinfluenceofwhips in selecting committeechairshas also oftenbeen criticised,there have been fewer specificproposalsmadeastohow this mightbeprevented.ParliamentFirst suggested that theHouseasawhole should elect committeechairsinsecret ballots(2003:50) and this was endorsedmorerecentlybythe Conservative Democracy Taskforce(2007:3). The distribution of chairs amongthe partieshas generallybeen seen as operating satisfactorily.

Thedebateabout standing committees hasbeen rather different,inthatthe chiefareaofconcern hasbeen thelimitedpowersthattheyenjoy –particularlyinregardtotakingevidence.34 Another

30 SeePublic AdministrationSelect Committee(2004)and Office(2004). 31 HouseofCommons Hansard,12February 2001,Cols80-128. 32 Liaison Committee(2001:para 14). Thesecret ballotoptionwas laterendorsedbythe Parliament Firstgroup (2003: 50). 33 HouseofCommons Hansard,14May 2002,Cols648-721. SeeKelso (2003) foradiscussion. 34 Forexample Modernisation Committee(2006:paras 62-65); ProcedureCommittee(1978:paras 2.19-2.20); ProcedureCommittee(1985:para 13); Hansard Society(1992:para 349);Modernisation Committee(1997:para 95); Parliament First(2003:60);Lords Constitution Committee(2004:para 145).

23 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons recurring setofsuggestions hassought to increasethe role of subject-specificselectcommittees in legislativescrutiny. 35 Otherrecommendations relating to thecomposition of standing or publicbill committees include that nominations be made by theLiaison Committee rather than the CommitteeofSelection (Norton Commission 2000: 41)and that therebeaformal processby whichbackbenchers can indicatetheir interest in servingonaparticularbillcommittee to the CommitteeofSelection (Conservative Democracy Taskforce2007: 4). Questions:  Could thechamber as awhole be givengreater controlofwho sits on publicbilland select committees?  Arethere moreinclusiveways of choosing select committeechairs?  Do comparatorparliaments offerany examplesofhow theCommittee of Selection couldbe improved?

Changing therules Oneofthe mostbasic questions when thinking aboutparliament’scontroloverits ownbusiness is whoisresponsiblefor setting therules. Formally,the HouseofCommons decidesits own procedures.Any change to standing orders must be agreed by avote in theHouse, andthese are conventionallyfreevotes.Inthis respect members indeed have control. However,the opportunity forprocedural changestoreach theagendainthe firstplace is limited, placing constraints on the ability of members to initiatechange.

Thereare twomaincommittees in theHousedealing with procedural issues.The firstisthe ProcedureCommittee, whichisaselect committee on thenormalmodeland comprises backbenchmembers. It wasfirst established in 1945 andhas existedinall parliaments since1983 (thoughitwas only made permanentin1997).The committeehas 13 membersand is currently chairedbyaConservative.The second committeeisthe Modernisation Committee, whichwas established in 1997.Ithas been re-established in each parliament since, although it stilldoesnot have permanentstatus. TheModernisation Committee has15members,and is unique amongst theselectcommittees in that its chairisagovernment minister.Itischaired by theLeader of the Houseand thetwo main opposition partiesalsoappoint one frontbenchertothe committee(in practicethe Shadow Leaders).

TheProcedureand Modernisation Committees operate in similar ways andhavesimilar termsof reference(thoughthe Modernisation termsofreference arebroader). Each conducts inquiries and publishesreports with recommendations,mostofwhichrelatetoHouseofCommons procedural change.Inrecentyearsfor example theProcedureCommittee hasreportedonpublicpetitions andEDMs(2007), programming of legislation (2004a), publicpetitions(2004b), sitting hours (2004c), andprocedures fordebates,private members’ bills andthe powersofthe Speaker (2003), andthe Modernisation Committeehas reportedonselectcommittees (2002a), sitting hours (2002b, 2005), ‘reconnecting’parliamentand thepublic (2004),the legislativeprocess(2006)and therole of thebackbencher(2007).

Thefact that theModernisation Committeeischaired by agovernment minister hasbeen controversialeversinceitwas established.However it doeshavesome advantages.Inparticularit ensuresthatthe committee’sproposalscan winparliamentary time,given theextenttowhichthis is controlled by thegovernment. As discussed above,selectcommittees have no way of forcing a

35 Seefor exampleProcedureCommittee(1978:para 2.17); Hansard Society(2001:para 3.50); Parliament First(2003: 61); Norton Commission (2000: 41); LordsConstitution Committee(2004:para 145);Modernisation Committee (2006: para 35).

24 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons decision on theirrecommendations,and have onlylimitedaccesstothe agenda fordebateoftheir reports.The ProcedureCommittee finds itself in this position,asdid theLiaison Committeewhen it made recommendations about reform of theselectcommittees.Asprocedural motionsmoved by non-ministershavenoprospect of reaching theagenda,these committees have to lobby for government time, andfor aminister (theLeader of theHouse) to move amotion accepting their recommendations.Inpractice, mostrecentreports of theProcedureCommittee have been debatedor‘tagged’toother business, but whetherspecificrecommendations of thecommittee are put to theHouseisatthe discretion of government. As theLeaderofthe Housechairsthe Modernisation Committeeits recommendations arefar morelikelytowin debating time andtobe decidedupon. However,tosignuptothe committee’sconclusions theLeader of theHousemust ensure that they areacceptable to thegovernment. 36 This can easilybeseen as in conflict with the principlethatthe Housecontrols itsown procedures.Althoughother members have no real ability to getprocedural motionsontothe agenda,government ministersmay also movemotions on otherprocedural matterswhichhavenot been consideredbythe ProcedureorModernisation Committees.This applies,for example,tomotions to approve newCommons (and Joint) select committees.

With ahandful of exceptions,controlofthe procedures of theHouse hasnot registered on the radarofmanyprevious reform projects. Tworeports have suggested that in addition to setting the parliamentary timetable across-partybusiness committeecould ‘ensurethatthe Commons determinedits ownStanding Orders’(Parliament First2003: 69;and Brazier, Flinders &McHugh 2005:80),but notwhatthis might mean in practice. TherecentConservative Democracy Taskforcereportdevelopedamoredetailedset of proposalsincludingamergerofthe Procedure andModernisation Committees underabackbench(opposition) chairwith thegovernment strippedofits majority on thecommittee (2007: 6-7). Brazier, Flinders &McHughalsoexpressed concernabout aminister chairing theModernisationCommittee,but concluded that thebestway forwardwould be to appoint thechair of theProcedureCommittee as permanentdeputychair of Modernisation (2005: 81). Questions:  How can theHouseofCommons winmoregenuine controlofits ownprocedures,interms of ability to change theparliamentary rules?  How do procedurecommittees work in otherparliaments?How do procedural reformsreach theagenda,and how aretheydecidedupon?

Who speaksfor parliament? Individuals As alreadydiscussed, theHouseofCommons hasdifficulty acting as acollective body.Ithas over 600members,who aredivided on mostmatters along partisan lines. Thefusion of executive and legislaturecan make it difficult forthe Commonstospeak with its ownvoice.However,there are some keyindividuals whomay seek to do this –notably theSpeaker andthe Leader of theHouse. In orderfor theCommonstogainmoreautonomy, one option is to ensure that theseindividuals or others arestrengthenedintheir ability to speak forthe chamberasawhole.Anotherisfor collectivebodiesrepresenting theHousetobestrengthened–whichisconsideredinthe next section.

TheLeader of theHouseisacabinetminister,and thereforeappointedbythe Prime Minister.The position is non-statutory, but becameestablished in themid-19 th century (Limon andMcKay 1997).

36 When RobinCookwas Leader of theHouse andpursued astrongreforming agenda,ministerial colleaguessought to exertincreasingdegrees of controloverthe Modernisation Committee’sdecisions, culminatinginthe creation of a Cabinet Committeetosignoff itsrecommendations in advance. SeePower(2007).

25 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons

It was originallyheldbythe Prime Minister,whenthatpersonwas amemberofthe Commons, andbyanothersenior figure in thegoverning partyduring periods when thePrime Minister satin theHouseofLords.The Leader of theHouse balances being avoice forthe government in parliament with being avoicefor parliament around thecabinettable.S/he is responsiblefor the government’slegislative programme (and chairs theLegislative Programme committeeofCabinet), announces theforwardbusiness to theHouseevery Thursday, andmoves mostprocedural motionsonbehalfofthe government. TheLeader of theHouseworks closelywith theChief Whip (who is also agovernment minister)but hasarather morebipartisan,and afar morepublic, role.The ChiefWhip primarilynegotiatesmatters throughthe usualchannels withwhips from otherparties,whilethe resulting agreements areoften presentedbythe Leader of theHouse. This slightlymorebipartisan approach meansthatthe Leader of theHousecan,tosome extent,speak ‘for parliament’ outside –arole whichmay be boostedbybeing chairofthe Modernisation Committee. Theway theLeader of theHousebehaves,and theextenttowhichs/he is a champion forparliamentorsimply aloyal servantofthe executive,ishighlydependent on that individual’s personaltraits. Both approaches have been takenbydifferent individuals in recent years.37 In political scienceterms the relationshipsbetween theLeader of theHouse, ChiefWhip andother keyplayerssuchasthe Prime Minister could be characterised by a‘resource dependency’ model of asimilar kind to that whichhas been used to describe therelationships inside the‘core executive’(Smith 1999). Thereisnoveryclear division of responsibilities between thefirst twoactors, andone or theother maybemorepowerfuldepending on factorssuchas theirpopularity in theparty in thecountry, theirparliamentary experience andthe point that they areatintheir career. ALeader of theHousewhosepolitical capital is high, andwho wishes to do so,may be an effectivedefenderofparliament. Butnomatterhow good aparliamentarian the holderofthis office is,s/heis, at theend of theday,alwaysagovernment minister.

Theother individualbetterplacedtospeak forparliamentisthe HouseofCommons Speaker. This individualhas twocrucial characteristicsnot shared by theLeader of theHouse. First, s/he is electedbythe whole House.Second, upon taking office theSpeaker renounces political partyand actsinawholly neutral,bipartisan way. Thecurrent system forelecting theSpeaker,which uses a secret eliminating ballot,was introduced only in 2001 andithas not yet actuallybeen used.Itwas introduced following frustration with theprevious system when MichaelMartinwas electedin 2000 fromafieldof12candidates. In thepastthe election of Speaker hadoften been uncontested, andindeed thepostwentbyconvention to arepresentativeofthe governing party.38 However that convention was brokenwhenBetty Boothroyd(aLabour member) was electedin1992. The previously informalsystem, whereaSpeaker proposed fromthe governing partywas generally electedbyacclaim, hastherefore been replacedbyamoreformalsystem. However,there hasbeen no change to thetraditions of neutrality of theSpeaker,whichhavelong existed. Not only does theSpeaker act neutrally in proceedingsinthe House, but postholders also cutthemselvesoff fromany partypoliticalactivity –fighting subsequent elections as ‘Speaker’ratherthana representative of aparty,and on retirement conventionallysitting on theCrossbenches in the HouseofLords. 39 TheSpeaker only votesinthe circumstances of atie,and ‘thenonly in accordance with ruleswhichpreclude an expression of opinion upon themerits of thequestion’ (Limon andMcKay 1997:190). Underthe newprocedurefor electing theSpeaker,candidates must be nominatedby12-15 members,atleastthree of whom arefromparties otherthantheir own.

37 SinceLabourcametopower theholdersofthisoffice have been AnnTaylor(1997-98),MargaretBeckett(1998- 2001), RobinCook(2001-03),John Reid (2003),Peter Hain (2003-05), GeoffHoon(2005-06),JackStraw (2006-07) andHarrietHarman (2007-date). 38 SeeBlackburn andKennon(2003). 39 Themainpartiesgenerally do not contestthe electioninthe Speaker’sseat, though that convention hasnot always been observed. See, forexample,Livingston(1958).

26 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons

TheSpeaker hassignificantpowersinthe conductofthe House. Forexample, selecting amendments fordebateand deciding on theadmissibility of Urgent Questions. S/he calls speakers in debate (thepre-publication of speakers’ listshas been firmly resisted), keepsorder in the chamberand rulesonpoints of order. On allofthese matters theparty whips,and particularlythe ChiefWhip, will take akeeninterest.However,althoughsome former Speakershavecomplained of attempts by senior figuresinthe government to interfere in theirdecisions,the Speaker’s independenceisstrongly defended.40 Theholderofthis position also hasakeyrole in theHouse administration, includingchairing theHouseofCommonsCommission.

TheSpeaker’s independencemeans that he or sheiswellplaced to be adefenderofthe Houseof Commons. This individualisgenuinely able to speakfor thechamberasawhole,and doeshavea formal role of representing parliament to the outside world. At times, andoncertain issues,the Speaker hasbeenquiteoutspoken. ForexampleBetty Boothroydfrequently complainedabout the government’shabit of making announcements to themedia rather than in parliament. However, interventions by theSpeaker risk being seen as ‘party political’ifheorshe toofrequently clashes with thegovernment. Therefore, ironically,inorder to protect theindependenceofthe role s/he maytendnot to defend parliament too vigorously.Particularlyinrecentyears,the Speaker has been criticised fortakingtoo cautious an approach.

TheSpeaker is supportedbyasmall staff, appointeddirectlytothe office andindependent of the otherstaff of theHouseofCommons.There arealsothree Deputy Speakers, whoare officially the‘Chairman of Ways andMeans’ andhis or hertwo deputies.41 TheDeputySpeakerssupport theSpeaker in chairing plenary proceedings, andsimilarly act neutrally andabstain fromparty activity andvoting (thoughcontinue to standfor election as partycandidates).Inrecentyearsthe firstDeputySpeaker hasmadesome relatively outspokeninterventions in procedural debates, such as that about theprogramming of legislation (e.g.Modernisation Committee2002b). Formerly theDeputySpeakers, like theSpeaker,weredrawn fromthe governing party, but this convention broke downfromthe 1940s.42 Thereisnow an expectation of partybalance amongst thefour positions–thecurrent Speaker was formerly Labour,aswas one deputy,whilethe other twodeputieswereformerlyConservative.The appointment of Deputy Speakersremains relatively informal. Following consultation throughthe usualchannels amotion to appoint theseindividuals is moved, usuallyonthe dayofthe Queen’s speech.Inthese circumstances therecan be no notice as thereisnoorder paper. Themotion canbeopposed andisdebatable,thoughnosuchmotion hasbeen opposed since1968(ProcedureCommittee 2002).

It is very common forthe Speaker to be chosen fromamongstthe Deputy Speakers, andthis has been thecasewith allfour occupantsofthe position since1976.43 With this in mind,and given that theelectionofSpeaker hadbeen reformed,the ProcedureCommittee consideredin2002 whetherthe same should be done forthe election of Deputy Speakers. However thecommittee concluded that thewhips do ‘makeagenuineeffort to ensure that thenames to be put forward have broadsupportwithintheir partiesand across thewhole House’ (ProcedureCommittee 2002: para 44). Although they concluded that thereweresome tensionsaround theappointment of these positions they did not recommend achangetothe election system,with theexception that there should be noticeofthe namesproposed.The government gave this proposal acautious endorsement in its response.The committeealsonoted that theappointment of Deputy Speakers,

40 Forallegationsofinterferencesee thememoirs of theformerSpeaker George Thomas (1985). 41 TheWaysand Meanscommitteewas formally abolishedin1966-7,along with theCommitteeofSupply, having previously been responsiblefor debatingthe raising of revenue(Seawardand Silk 2003). 42 SeeLivingston(1958); ProcedureCommittee(2002). 43 SeeLivingston(1958); Blackburn andKennon(2003).

27 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons many of whom in turn have previously served on theChairmen’sPanel (see below), providesthe opportunity foranon-partisan career structurethroughthe House, with theSpeaker at the pinnacleofthis structure.

Oneofthe recommendations oftenmadetoalterthe role or powersofthe Speaker is that s/he – andthe threeDeputies–should playagreater role in managing thebusiness of theHouse. In particular, twoinfluentialreports calling forabusiness committeeofsome kind suggested the chairofthe newbodybetaken by theSpeaker (Hansard Society 1992:Annex B) or firstDeputy Speaker (Norton Commission 2000:42).Othershaveproposed that theSpeaker be granted greater discretion in deciding when to recallthe House(ProcedureCommittee 2003:para58) though, as noted,the government nowfavoursgiving this rightto50% of MPs(Ministry of Justice 2007:21).The HansardSociety’s Puttnam Commission, meanwhile, suggested that theSpeaker’s role should be refocussedfromthe administration of theHousetobeing thepublicfaceof parliament (Hansard Society 2005:paras 6.5-6.7). Therole of Leader of theHousehas not been a central concernofrecentreformers. Questions  Whichindividual,ifanybody,speaksfor parliament in otherparliamentary systems?  Is theremorethatcould be done to enable existing individuals,orevendifferent individuals,to take astrong andindependentlineindefending theHouseofCommons?  Arethere otherrolesorresponsibilities whichshould be giventothe Speaker,asthe neutral arbiterinthe HouseofCommons?

Who speaksfor parliament? Co-ordinating bodies It could be argued that no individualcan speak with real authority forthe HouseofCommons, giventhe diversity within theinstitution. It mightbemorerealistic to expect some collectivebody, morerepresentativeofthe Houseasawhole,tobeable to take this role.Itissuggested by some that‘business committees’havesuchafunction in otherparliaments,whichisone argument used forcreating one in theCommons.

Thereare severalcollectivebodiesinthe Commonsalreadywhichhavesome claimtobe representative andtodefendthe autonomous interestsofthe institution. However,these areall limited, at best,intheir reach.

Thebody whichhas gone furthestinacting as avoicefor parliament is theLiaison Committee, comprising thechairsofthe select committees.Thishas growninprofile andimportanceinrecent years. As well as its traditional role in agreeing committeevisits,itnow selectsreports to be debatedinWestminsterHall, haspublished aseriesofinfluentialreports on procedural matters (Liaison Committee2000a,2000b,2001, 2002)and submitted evidence to inquiries by the Modernisation Committee. It also (since2003) holds regularquestion sessions with thePrime Minister.Ittherefore hassome claimtospeak forthe Commonsasawhole,and hasbeen quitean outspokendefenderofthe institution. Butasone MP stated in aresponsetoour Issuesand Questions paper‘theLiaison Committeedoesnot representbackbenchers,itco-ordinatesselect committees’. Andthe select committees do not include allmembers of theHouse. Themembers of theLiaison Committee(many of themnonethelessoutspokenand independent)are also to some extent dependent on thewhips fortheir positions.Its chairman is addedtothe membership of thecommittee specifically on agovernment motion,and is theonly membernot to chaira select committee.

TheHouseofCommons Commission is apowerfulbody whichexistsinstatute.Itischaired by theSpeaker andincludesthe Leader of theHouse, amemberrepresenting theLeader of the

28 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons

Opposition (generally theShadow Leader of theHouse) andthree othermembers.These three members in practicerepresent thethree main parties. They areagreed throughthe usualchannels, but subject to theagreement of the House. TheCommission’s responsibilities arelargely administrative,but some of these –suchasbudget setting andemployment of staff–can have important political implications.Ithas no role in thematters discussedabove, such as timetabling business or making appointmentstocommittees,and is internally rather than externally focused. A representative of theCommission answersquestions in theHouseonceevery four weeks, andits minutesare published online.

Twoother,lower profilebodiesalsohavesome claimtorepresent theCommons as awhole.The CommitteeofSelection, whichrecommends namesofmembers to serveonselectcommitteesand agrees membership of publicbillcommittees,has alreadybeen mentioned. It fillssome of the rolestaken by ‘business committees’inother parliaments butisgenerally seen as simply being a rubberstamp forthe whips.The Chairmen’s Panelcomprises thosesenior members whochair publicbillcommittees. Thesemembers are, unusually, nominatedbythe Speaker–thewhips have no power overtheir selection.The threeDeputySpeakersare also members of theChairmen’s Panel. This group thereforehas thepotential to take aLiaison Committeetyperole,but hasnot sought to do so.Itdid submit proposalsonreformofthe legislativeprocessin1997tothe Modernisation Committee(Blackburnand Kennon 2003), but this was an unusualoccasion. It has no profileoutside theHouse, andeveninside is largelyinvisibleasacollective body.

Proposalsrelating to collective parliamentary bodies eithercallfor theestablishment of newbodies or forchanges to therole of thosebodiesthatalreadyexist.Falling into theformercategoryare proposalsfor a‘business committee’ with powerstodetermine the timetable forsome or all categoriesofparliamentary business, andcalls foranewbody tasked with making nominations to select and/or billcommittees:bothdiscussedabove.Mostsuchinitiatives have sought to create moreinclusive decision-makingarrangements,takingpower away fromwhips andother frontbenchactors. Thus of themanyproposals forabusiness committeeofsome sort,some have specified that such abody should includebackbenchers, 44 whileothershavebeenmoreconcerned with inclusivity in termsofensuring that allparties have avoice in theagenda-setting process.45 Attempts to createanewbody to oversee committee appointmentshavealsofocussedonthe need forbroad membership and, in particular,the inclusionofsenior backbenchers. 46 As also discussedabove,there have been various proposalstostrengthenthe powersand/or the independenceofexisting bodiessuchasthe CommitteeofSelection andthe LiaisonCommittee. Finally, aproposal hasalsobeen made to strengthen theHouseofCommons Commission by electing its members by secret ballot of theHouse.47 Questions  Arethere collectivebodiesinother parliaments whichrepresent theinterestsofthe chambera as awhole?Inparticular, do business committees perform this function?  Arethere ways in whichthe current collectivebodiesinthe HouseofCommonscould be strengthened and/or rationalised?

44 Hansard Society(1992:AnnexB); Norton Commission (2000: 42); Conservative DemocracyTaskforce (2007: 6-7). 45 Hansard Society(2001:para 2.49); Liberal Democrats(2007:para 5.3). 46 Modernisation Committee(2002a: paras 15-17); LiaisonCommittee(2002:para 1);Liberal Democrats(2007:para 5.1.5). 47 Hansard Society(2005:para 6.6).

29 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons

Experience in otherparliaments Thepurpose of this reportistoconsiderhow experience fromother parliamentscan inform debatesabout reform in theUK. Forthis purposedeskresearch andstudy visits werecarried out with respect to five otherparliamentary chambers:the Scottish Parliament, theGermanBundestag (lower house),the NewZealandparliament, andthe twochambers of parliament in Australia(the HouseofRepresentatives andthe Senate). Four of thesefivechambers aredescendedinone way or anotherfromthe Westminstersystem, whilethe fifth is achamberofasimilar size to the HouseofCommons,drawing fromdifferent European traditions. In this senseall sharesome attributeswith theCommons,but allalsohavedistinctdifferences as well.Some of thekey features of thefivechambers areillustrated in Table 2.

Table 2: Keyfeatures of thefivecomparatorparliaments

Name Type Relationship Date Size Electoral Normal Current with Estd. System* Pattern of Party Government Party Control Control Australian Lower Confidence 1901 150 AV Single party Liberal- Houseof house relationship. majority National Representatives Most ministers hasclear aremembers. majority ** Australian Upper No confidence 1901 76 STVHung Liberal- Senate house relationship. chamber National Some ministers one-seat aremembers. majority since2005 German Lower Confidence 1949 598†MMP Coalition Grand Bundestag house relationship. majority coalition Some ministers has73% of aremembers. seats NewZealand Uni- Confidence 1854 120†MMP Minority Labour- Houseof cameral relationship. and/or Progressive Representatives Allministers coalition coalition aremembers. govnt minority Scottish Uni- Confidence 1999 129 MMPMinority SNP Parliament cameral relationship. and/or minority Allministers coalition administ- aremembers. govnt ration

*AV: Alternative Vote;STV:SingleTransferable Vote;MMP:MixedMemberProportional, also known as the AdditionalMemberSystem. ** TheLiberal andNationalpartiesoperateeffectively as asinglepartywithapermanentelectoral pact. †Minimum size.Due to electoral ‘overhangs’the Bundestagand theNew Zealandparliament currently have 615and 121members respectively.

TheAustralianand NewZealandHouseofRepresentatives werebothclosely modelledonthe HouseofCommons.InAustralia thelower housecontinuestobeelected by amajoritarian system (thealternativevote)based on single memberconstituencies. In NewZealand thedecision was takenin1993tochangethe electoralsystem, andsince1996the parliament hasbeen electedusing the‘mixed memberproportional’ system,similar to that used forthe Scottish Parliament and WelshAssembly. This resultedinachange fromatwo-partyparliamenttoamulti-party parliament,

30 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons andsome important procedural changes. TheScottish Parliament obviously also learnedfrom Westminster, but sought to avoidsome of its morenegativeattributesand to modelitselfinpart on othermodern parliaments, particularlyinEurope. Amongst European parliaments oneofthe moresimilar to Westminsteristhe German parliament,whichisbicameral andhas alower house of asimilar size whichisseen as an influentialinstitution. It tooiselected using amixed member system,leading to coalitiongovernments.Finallythe was also originallybased on theWestminstersystem, but hasdivergedsignificantlyparticularlysincethe introduction of proportionalrepresentationfor Senate elections in the1940s.Itoffers an interesting contrast not only to theHouseofCommons,but also to theAustralianlower house.

In this part of thereportwelook at thepracticeineach of thesefiveparliamentary chambers with respect to thefour main issues identifiedearlier:controlofthe plenary agenda,the work of committees,changingthe rules, andwho speaksfor parliament –bothinterms of individuals and collectivebodies.

The plenarytimetable Thewidest andmostimportant issues of parliamentary controlinthe Commonsrelatetocontrol overthe plenary timetable. As outlinedabove thereare concerns about this at twolevels. First, the availability of time fornon-government business in theCommons,and second, controloverthe allocation of time on aweek-by-week basis. Theseissuesare related, as thedefault position that time belongstothe government hasled to thegovernment business managers having significant controloverthe setting of theweekly timetable.

In this section of thereportweset out thebasic pattern of sittingsfor each of our comparator parliamentary chambers,and theforms of time available fornon-government business.Wethen turn to how thetimetable is agreed. Allocationoftime Table 3showsthe standard sitting pattern foreach of thechambers,within whichbusiness must be programmed. This demonstratessignificantvariation. As is wellknown,the Houseof Commonsspends acomparatively largeamount of timeinplenary session, sitting everyweek exceptfor thethree majorrecessesand threehalfterms,and devoting many hoursper dayto plenary meetings.Incontrast theAustralianparliamentmeetsfor fewer than 20 weeks peryear,in part because of theenormous distances that members must travel forparliamentary sittings. The German Bundestag meetsfor moreweeks, but within each sitting week onlyone full dayisspent in plenary (plus roughly twohalf-days), because theremainderoftime is devotedtoparty meetings andcommittee work.Asimilar system exists in theScottish Parliament.

Within thesediffering patterns allthe chambers setaside some timeinstanding orders fornon- government business. However,there is obviously morepressure in some settingsthanothers. For example in theAustralianparliament, whereoverall sitting time is short, thereisgreat pressure for government to pass its legislation. This is less so in theHouseofCommons andsome of theother comparators.

An important starting point is theprinciplebywhich time in thechamberisdistributed. This is summarisedinTable 4(page 36), along with otherinformation about thedistribution of time for different purposes.Three of thefivecomparatorchambers essentiallyfollow thesameprincipleas Westminster, with an assumption thattime will be devoted to government business unless standing orders explicitly stateotherwise.This is true in theAustralianHouseofRepresentatives andthe NewZealandparliament. In theScottish Parliament the principlehas been disputed,with some claiming that theoriginalvision of devolution’sarchitectswas that alltimeshould belong to

31 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons theParliament(seeWinetrobe 2001,2006).There is no explicitreference in standing orders to a default position (asthere is in standing orderno. 14 forthe House of Commons), thoughstanding order5.6.1astatesthat‘On 12 half sitting days in each parliamentary year thebusiness of committees is givenpriority overthe business of theScottish Executive at themeetingsofthe Parliament’ –whichseemstosuggest that theremainderoftime restswith theExecutive itself. Unsurprisingly,this is theway that theExecutive haschosen to interpretthe situation.

Table 3: Basics of theplenary timetable in comparator parliaments

ChamberStandardweeklytimetable Approx. Otherplenary sitting forums weeksper year UK HouseofCommons Mon: 2.30-10.30 35 WestminsterHall Tues:2.30-10.30 Weds:11.30-7.30 Thurs: 10.30-6.30 Fri: 9.30-3.00* Australian Houseof Mon: 12.30-9.30 18 Main Committee Representatives Tues:2.00-9.30 Weds:9.00-9.00 Thurs: 9.00-5.00 Australian Senate Mon: 12.30-6.30,7.30-10.30 15 None Tues:12.30-evening Weds:9.30-8.00 Thurs: 9.30-8.40 German Bundestag Weds:1.30-2.30 22 None Thurs: 9.00-evening Fri: 9.00-early afternoon NewZealand Houseof Tues:2.00-6.00, 7.30-10.00 30 None Representatives Weds:2.00-6.00, 7.30-10.00 Thurs: 2.00-6.00 Scottish Parliament Weds:2.30-6.00 35 None Thurs: 9.15-6.00

*13Fridays peryearfor private members’ bills. OtherFridaysittingsare rare.

In theAustralianSenateand theGermanBundestag very different principles forcontroloftime apply.Standing orders of theAustralianSenate, whichunlike theHouseofRepresentatives normallyhas no government majority,recognisethree main typesofbusiness: government business, ‘general business’ and‘business of theSenate’.Itisbusiness of theSenatethattakes precedence over bothother kinds by default.Business of theSenateincludespresentation of committeereports,establishment of newcommitteesormotions to refermatters to committees, as wellasmotions to blockstatutory instruments.Ifsuchbusiness is moved,government business mayhavetowait. Government business then takesprecedence overgeneral (i.e.other non- government) business during allbut onesession of the week.Eventhis organisation is more familiar fromaBritishperspective, however,thanthatinthe German Bundestag.Hereastrict proportionality rule applies,with each of themainparty groups being entitledtoashareofagenda time in proportion to theirshare of seatsinthe House. Each group mayessentiallyuse this time as they wish.The government, whichisusually acoalition of parties, thereforehas to rely on time being made available fromthe allocation forits partygroups.This meansthatthe governing

32 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons coalition generallyhas around 60%ofplenary time (but over70% at themoment,due to the ‘grand coalition’).Opposition partieshaveaproportionate shareoftime,whichmay be used for anypurpose including moving bills.The same privilegeapplies to minority groups,solong as they comprise5%ofmembers of theBundestag (i.e.atleast31members), including ad hoc cross-party groups.Amajor differencebetween theGermanand UK systems–discussedfurther below –is that thereare virtually no privileges forindividualmembers. Time fornon-government actors TheHouseofCommons givesclear rights to opposition partiestocontrol20debatedays peryear (and various otheropportunitiesbyconvention), as discussedabove.InGermany opposition time is an immediate consequenceofthe generalprinciple of proportionalsharing of agenda time,and this proportionality is appliedonaweekly basis. This allows theopposition andminor partiesto regularlyinitiatedebates,and also to move bills.Opposition partybills are, like government bills, sent straight to committee, andmay be programmedtoreturntothe chamberinopposition party time.Opposition time also exists in Scotland, modelledverymuchupon theHouseofCommons arrangements.Hereopposition partiesare entitledto16half-days of debate peryear,which are shared proportionately between them.The timing of thesedebates is managedbythe Parliamentary Bureau (business committee),whichmay offersome advantages overthe usual channels system.Wereturntothis matterindetailbelow.Our othertwo comparatorcountries (Australia andNew Zealand) offernoformalplenary time to theopposition.Thishas a detrimental effect on themanagementofmembers’ business, to whichwewillnow turn.

Thereare various opportunitiesavailable fornon-government actorsother than opposition parties to initiatebusiness in theHouseofCommons.Wediscuss committeebusiness in thenextsection andherelimit ourselves to privatemembers’ business. This can be further dividedinto debates– such as Commonsadjournmentdebates in thechamberand in WestminsterHall–andbills.In addition, questions to government allowmembers to setthe agenda to asignificantextent. We thereforediscuss thecomparators foreach of theseinturn.

In theparliaments descendedfromWestminsterthere aresimilar arrangements foradjournment debatestothoseexisting in theHouseofCommons.Inparticularbothchambers in Australia, and theScottish Parliament, have an adjournmentdebateatthe endofevery day. In Australia, however, this is not so much adebateasanunfocussedseriesof15minute speeches whichmay be on a rangeoftopics, andwith no government reply.But thereare also otheropportunitiesherefor member-initiated debates. In bothHouses each daythere is facility foradebate on a‘Matterof PublicImportance’ whichwilllastfor around an hour.Suchdebates must be sponsored by four members,and in practicetakeplace dailyinthe HouseofRepresentatives but less ofteninthe Senate.Inthe Senate thereisalsoanopportunity at 12.45each Wednesdaytodebate‘Matters of PublicInterest’,but this againsimply allows five Senators to make 15 minute speeches,the contents of whichmay be completelydisconnected.None of thesemechanisms allowavote to be forced.These features of theAustraliansystemtherefore do not offermuchinspiration forthe HouseofCommons.This is even morethe casewhenitisconsideredhow they aredistributed, andconventionally howtheyare used.Inpracticeall thesespeakingopportunitiesare dividedup among theparties,and oncethis hashappenedthe normisfor them to be shared out inside the partiesbythe whips. 48 Matters of PublicImportance by convention arealmostinvariably sponsored by opposition frontbenchers,and neverbythe government side.Eveninadjournment debatesthe opposition whips seek to sponsor andco-ordinate speeches to raisetopicsofgreatest concerntothem. Theseare bothpractices thewhipshaveseemingly been driven to by thelackof formal opposition time.Meanwhilegovernment backbenchers have fewopportunitiesto

48 As discussedlater in thereport, thewhips in Australia are elected, which createsadifferent dynamic to where they are appointed by partyleaders.However, this still meansthatall opportunities are filtered via parties.

33 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons contribute,and interventions by members acting independently on eithersideare rarely seen.In contrast in Scotland adjournmentdebates aremoregenuinely controlled by members andare more focussed, but here toothere is arigid proportionalsharing of slotsbetween theparties,with individualslots in practiceallocated by partywhips.This is something thatthe Houseof Commonshas escaped,inpartthroughthe tradition of balloting forsuchdebates.

In NewZealandthere is no dailyslot foradjournmentdebates,assitting hoursare so short. There is a‘generaldebate’ foranhour each Wednesday,but like theAustraliandebates theseare made up of unconnected speeches on different subjects. They aregenerally dominatedbyopposition parties seekingtoraise pointssalient forthe media,which is in part aresult of thelackofformal opposition time.

It would be wrong to concludehowever that thereisnothing to learnfromNew Zealandand Australiaabout thescheduling of members’ business. Both do have amoreextendedperiod set aside regularlyfor non-government business. In thetwo Australian chambers this comprises one afternoon persitting week (Mondayinthe House, Thursday in theSenate),and in NewZealandit comprises one dayper sitting fortnight.Inthese slots aseriesofforms of business maybetaken, including motionsand bills.Inpracticethe prioritiesare different,with theAustralianchambers focussing primarily on motions andthe NewZealandparliamentprimarily on bills.InNew Zealandmembers’ motionsare rarely reached (whichisdisadvantageous forcommitteesasthis is theonly opportunity fordiscussion of theirreports). In practicethese slots on theagendainboth countries arealsomonopolisedbythe parties, giventhe lack of opposition time.However their existenceoffers apotential model whichthe Commonsmight follow.This is particularlythe case with respect to theAustralianHouseofRepresentatives,where (asdiscussed below)the orderof business fornon-government Mondaysessionsisorganised collectivelyby, in effect,anon- government business committee.

Theexception with respecttomembers’debates is Germany, wherethere arefew rights grantedin standing orders to membersindividually. Theproportionality rule that applies in thechambertakes into account only groups of at least31members (5%ofthe total). This many members is thereforeneeded to initiateadebateorabill. In practice, as in Australiaand NewZealand, these rights tend to be used only by theparties,thoughthere have been some examplesofcross-party initiatives.These generallyoccuron‘conscience’ type issues.For example abillproposing the banning of smoking in publicplaces hasbeen promoted severaltimes(as yetunsuccessfully) by such groups in theBundestag.

In Germany, therefore, thereisnoright forindividualmembers to proposebills.Inthe other comparatorparliaments thereissucharight, though theirchances of successare limited. In Scotland an early aspiration was forittobeless difficult than at Westminstertopassnon- executive legislation. Sincethen, however,the Parliament hasfound it hard to deal with the volumeoflegislation proposed by members (any membercan in principlepromote abill, and thereisnoballotprocedure)and hassought different meanstoprioritise.49 To limitdemand, bills arenow required to have supportfrom18members,drawn fromatleasthalfofthe main parties in theParliament. Proposersmustalsobeable to demonstrate that they have consultedthe public on thecontentoftheir bills. Thereisnotime setaside fordebateofthese bills,and theymust compete with otherbusinessfor prioritisation by theParliamentary Bureau.Nonetheless, several members’bills have been successful, including theinfluentialProtection of Wild Mammals Bill (banning hunting)and Abolition of Poindingsand Warrant SalesBill.

49 Seefor exampleScottish Parliament Procedures Committee(2004).

34 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons

In Australiaand NewZealand, as alreadyindicated,members’ bills mustcompete fortime in the regularnon-government business slot. In NewZealandbills aregiven priorityovermotions, 50 and severalhavesucceeded in recentyears. Forexamplein2004fivesuchbills wereagreed,in comparisontothe threethatsucceeded in the40yearsto1985(McGee2005).This appearsto indicatethatthe non-government business slot, andthe committeesystemwhere bills are scrutinised, is workingwell. In Australiaincontrast members’ bills arerarelypassed. Only seven privateSenators’ bills passedbetween 1901 and2003, as did around thesamenumbermovedby members of theHouseofRepresentatives. 51 Thedifferenceinsuccessratebetween thetwo countries maybeaccounted forlargely by partisan factors. TheAustralianHouseof Representativesisdominatedbythe governing party, whichcan blockbackbenchbills fromeither chamber. In contrast minority or coalition governments in NewZealandmay find it more necessary to compromise.Infact in bothcountriesthe treatment of such legislation is highly partisan.Inneithercase(andnot in Scotland either)isthere aconvention, as appliesinthe Commons, that members’bills aretaken on afreevote.Inneithercaseisthere aballotfor introducing bills,and many members’ bills aresponsored by opposition parties–members are expected to clearwith theirwhips anybilltheyseektopropose. Theonlyexception to bothof thesepractices is overconsciencematters.Sofor example in AustraliainDecember2006abill promoted by abackbenchgovernment Senatoronembryo research managedtopass, despite the opposition of bothmainparty leaders. This,however,was averyunusualevent.

Thefinalopportunity that members have to setthe parliamentary agenda is viaquestionsto government. This is not contentious in theUK, andtherefore doesnot need much discussion.52 However thereare some practices fromthe overseas chambers that areworthyofnote. First, in Germanyquestions arethe only real opportunity forindividualmembers to getitems onto the plenary agenda,asthere arenoprivate members’ debatesorbills.Second, in NewZealandand Australiaparliamentary questions arecompletely monopolised by thewhips.Unlike in theUK thereis, again, no ballot foraskingquestions.Again,their allocation is proportionalbyparty,and againthe selection of participating members within each partyisinpracticedelegated to thewhips. Thetopicsfor questionsare thus discussedateach party’sdaily whips’meeting.Onthe government side questions areprovidedbyministers, andgiven out to reliable backbenchers. Thereisnoopportunity formembers to buckthis system,asitiswellestablished that thelists of whowillask questions arehandedtothe Speaker by thewhips.Thisisanotherareawhere backbenchindependenceisseverelycompromised in our comparatorparliaments,toadegree that would be consideredintolerable in theHouseofCommons.

50 This is setout in standingorder 69. 51 SeeEvans (2004: 651) forAustralianSenateand Harris, Wright andFowler(2005:570)for theHouse of Representatives. 52 Questionsare oftenconsidered to be ‘private members’ time’(see, forexample,Blackburn &Kennon2003: 1-024). In Table1we classified them separately, as they are initiatedbymembers butclearlyrelatetogovernmentbusiness andholding theexecutive in check.

35 Table 4: Allocation of time fordifferent purposes

UK Houseof Australian Australian Senate GermanBundestag NewZealand Scottish Parliament Commons Houseof Houseof Representatives Representatives

Principle by Alltime is Government ‘Business of the Time is divided Government This is disputed,but whichtime is government time, business takes Senate’, including strictly proportion- business takes in practicethe divided exceptwhere precedence except some committee atelybyparty group. precedence except Commons’ tradition standing orders state formostofeach business,takes Government busi- foronevery other hasbeen adheredto. otherwise. Monday sitting. precedence over ness is programmed Wednesday. government and in theseparties’time. generalbusiness. Oppositionparty Oppositionparties No dedicated No dedicated Oppositionparties No dedicated Oppositionparties business allocated20days per oppositiontime oppositiontime getproportionate oppositiontime allocated16half-days year.Theyhave distinctfromnon- distinctfromnon- shareofagenda time distinctfromnon- peryear,allocated autonomy in how to government business government business according to shareof government business proportionately usethistime,but not (see below). (see below). seatsinthe chamber. (see below). between them.They overwhenitis This is oftenusedto mayuse theirdaysas programmed. move bills. they wish.Timing decidedbyBureau. Committee accesstothe See Table 7 agenda Other non- Adjournment Adjournmentdebate Adjournmentdebate Minority groups of at Unfocussed ‘general Thereisamembers’ government debates, held at the at endofeach day. at endofeach day. least5%ofmembers debate’for onehour debate at theend of debates endofeach dayin ‘MatterofPublic ‘Matters of Public can winpropor- each Wednesday. each sitting. In theCommons andin Importance’debate Interest’ debate tionateaccessto Members’ business practicethese oppor- Westminster Hall,are Tues-Thurs.Non- weekly.‘Matterof agenda.Noaccess takesprecedence on tunitiesare allocated allocatedbyballot. government business Public Importance’ forindividual alternateWednesdays by theparty whips. slot Monday debate up to daily. members. andismostlydevoted afternoons.All these Non-government to bills. in practiceare business slot allocatedbywhips. Thursday afternoons. Allbut thefirst are used by partygroups.

36 Other non- 13 Fridays forprivate Private members’ Senators can propose Debate time (above) Members’ billsare Members’ billsneed government bills members’ bills bills aredebated in bills but these can be used by debatedinmembers’ 18 supporters. There allocatedbyballot, non-government competefor thenon- minority groupsto time (above). They is no dedicated plus twoten-minute time (above). In government business move bills.Norights areballotedfor,but plenary time forthese rule bill slotsper practiceverylittle slot andinpractice forindividual in practicetopicsare –itisatdiscretionof week in prime time. time is made available arerarelyreached. members. agreed with the theBureau. andfew succeed. whips. QuestionsOpportunitiesto Opportunitiesto Opportunitiesto Asking questions Opportunitiesto Opportunitiesto pose oral questions pose oral questions pose oral questions (weekly)isthe only pose oral questions participate in the (daily)are allocated (daily)are wholly (daily)are wholly individual agenda- (daily)are wholly weekly generaland by ballot. controlledbyparty controlledbyparty setting opportunity controlledbyparty ‘themed’question whips. whips. formembers. whips. timesare allocatedby ballot.Presiding Officer selectsFirst Minister’sQuestions –oppositionleaders getpriority.

37 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons

Negotiatingthe timetable In allchambers standing orders setout some fixeditems of business, but in allthere is also business to be programmed on aweek-by-week basis–not leastthe business of thegovernment, whichisthe largestsingleelement everywhere.

In theHouseofCommonsitisthe usualchannels,led by thegovernment ChiefWhip, which agreethe timetablefor theweek.These discussions take place on abilateral basisand in private. Theagreed programme is then announced to thechamberbythe Leader of theHouseinthe business statement. At this point members can raiseobjections or proposealternative arrangements,but no changescan be made.This processleadstosome frustrations andcalls fora moretransparent procedure, possiblyinvolving some kind of ‘business committee’ which represents theHouse as awhole.Suchacommittee mightalsobegiven some responsibility for programming legislation, andother relatedmatters.Three of our comparatorchambers have business committees whichdeal with allweekly business, so mayofferusefullessons forthe UK. Thearrangements forall of thecomparatorchambersare summarisedinTable 5.

First, it is worthnoting that thereare examplesoflesstransparent processes–in Australiathere is no announcementofthe weekly orderofbusiness anditremains flexibleonaday-by-day (oreven hour-by-hour)basis.This givesmembers littleopportunity to planand does not aidthe status of thechamber. Thegovernment publishesaweekly programme,but thereisnoconsultation andno debate.Inany casethis programme is neveradheredto. Thereisadailyprogramme publishedat midnightoneach precedingday, but even this is subject to change.Inthe Senate thereismore negotiation behind thescenesthaninthe HouseofRepresentatives,thanks to thegovernment’s (usual)lackofmajority,but also theprocedural factorswhichmakeiteasierfor business in the Senate to be disrupted.There is also aSelection of BillsCommittee that decideswhichbillwillbe sent to whichcommittee, andagrees theappropriate timetable.Inbothcontexts thekey figure is theopposition ChiefWhip, whoisinfluentialwhengovernment lacksamajority.This situation maybepreferable to that in theHouseofRepresentatives,but stillislargely opaquetothosenot involved,including interest groups andthe publicwho have littleideawhenparticularitems of interest will be discussed.Unsurprisingly,the ProcedureCommittee in theHouse of Representativeshas looked into how members could be moreinvolved in setting theagenda.In doing so they have sought inspiration fromoverseas,includingthe Scottish Parliament. 53

Theother threecomparatorchambers have some kind of ‘business committee’ whichdraws up theweekly programme –the Parliamentary Bureau in Scotland, theCouncil of Elders in Germany, andthe Business CommitteeinNew Zealand. Membership of thebodiesisdescribedingreater detail on pp. 60-61and in Table 11 below.Theyformallyrepresent thewholechamber, andensure that business is not decidedunilaterally by government,orbilaterally with theirshadows. However in allcases thesebodiesare eitherwhollymadeupofparty whips,oratleastdominatedentirelyby them.Theyprovide greater transparency, but in otherrespectsdifferlessfromour usualchannels system than it mightonthe face appear. 54

In Scotland thearchitectsofthe newParliamentsought to break themould of Westminster politics by creating abusiness committeebased on theEuropean model.Theybelievedthatsucha committee’s‘absenceisakeytothe government’s excessive controlofthe HouseinWestminster’ (Crick &Millar, quoted in Winetrobe 2001:39). Undertheir originalproposalsthere would have been one representative on thebusiness committee electedfromeach partygroup, plus one

53 HouseofRepresentativesStandingCommitteeonProcedure(2006). 54 An earlieroutputfromthisproject wasabriefing on business committees,which includes more detailonsome aspectsofthe subject than this report. SeeRussell &Paun (2006b).

38 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons representing independent members andtwo representing theFirst Minister.Inthe wordsofthe Consultative Steering Group, abusiness committeewould ensure that decision making was more ‘inclusive’ andthatthe Parliament’sprogramme of business could be developed ‘inatransparent, and, insofar as is possible, consensual,way’(1998:Section 2, paras6-7).

Themembership of thecommittee established was rather different to that originallyenvisaged, as describedlater in thereport. Theway thecommittee hasgone about its task hasalsodiffered. It hadbeen hopedthatits establishment would take controlout of thehands of the whips andhand it to theParliamentasawhole.However,not onlydoesthe committeecompriseonly whips,but theExecutive is very influential.This stemsinpartfromthe system of weighted votes,which meansthatanExecutive with amajority in theParliamentalsohas amajorityonthe committee. Thecommittee’smethod of workinghas also,inpractice, become executive dominated.55

Although thecommittee hasits ownsecretariat, this is not responsiblefor drawing up thebusiness programme.This mayhavebeen theinitial intention, but in thewords of one official,the responsibility was ‘grabbed’ (orinthe wordsofaminister,‘acquired’) at an early stagebythe Minister forParliamentary Business.AsatWestminsterthe programme is drawnupbythe Private Secretarytothis Minister,who is in effect acombination of HouseLeader andChiefWhip. As at Westminsterthere is some consultation on thepreparation of theprogramme with otherparties, thoughthe extent of this is disputed.The programmethengoestothe Parliamentary Bureau for discussion andapproval, in minutedmeetings, providing transparency. However in practice informalmeetingshavegrown up, offthe record.Inthe early yearsofthe Parliament allmembers of theBureau save forthe Presiding Officermet,inadvance, to agreebusiness. As an official reportedtous‘it was convenient to have thesemeetingsunminuted’. ThePresiding Officersees thepapersonly around half an hour before theBureau meetsand its meetings areusually short anduncontroversial(thoughformaldivisions on theBureau arenot unknown 56). It is unclear to what extent theinformalpre-meetingshavecontinued, andhow thepracticewillbechanged by theadvent of minority government. However,the Scottish experience demonstratesthatthe existenceofaformal body cannot stop informaltrading between whips in private, if this proves morepolitically efficient. In consequenceevensympathetic assessments have concluded that ‘[t]he Parliamentary Bureau hasprovedtobelessanopen, transparentand inclusivebusiness committee model,and moreaformalisation of Westminster-“usualchannels”practice’ (Winetrobe 2001: 2).

Theway therole of Scotland’sbusiness committeehas developedwith respect to timetabling of business seemsfairlytypical.InGermany the tradition of asenior body representing allBundestag members,and with responsibility fortimetabling business, goes back to at leastthe nineteenth century (Loewenberg 2003). Therethe Council of Elders ( Ältestenrat)plays asimilar role to the Parliamentary Bureau in Scotland. It draws up theweekly programme of business foragreement by theplenary.However,again it is ameeting primarily of whips,and againmostformalbusiness is done outside themeeting.The draftprogramme is drawn up by thesecretariatofthe largest party, rather than of thebusiness committee, andisagreed in informalpre-meetings. In particular thereisanestablished meeting of allthe partywhips on Wednesdays,beforethe Council of Elders (whichisagain chairedbythe presiding officer) meetsonThursdays. This meeting is knownasthe

55 Thesecommentsare basedonthe operationofthe committeeuntil May2007, whenthere wasamajority executive. This maychangeunder theminoritySNP administration. Butits operationinthe 1999-2007 period is more representative of howsuch acommitteemight normally run at Westminster. 56 In thefirst session of theParliament (1999-2003)atotalof26formaldivisions on theBureau were recorded. In the second session(2003-07), however, therewereonlytwo divisions,despite theexpansion of theBureau to includethe Greens, Scottish Socialists andIndependents. No divisionswererecorded in thefirst threemonthsofthe 2007-11 session.

39 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons

InterfraktionelleRunde .Sosureare members that its decisions arefinalthatthe agreed programme is announced to theparty groupslater on Wednesday before theCouncilofElders hasmet.Asin Scotland, themeetingsofthe formal body areshort. Theselastnomorethan45minutes, with the main time beingtaken up by ‘a very good lunch’,inthe wordsofone participant.The discussion of theweekly agenda itselftakes no morethan‘afew minutes’.Consequently Loewenberg (2003: 23-24) states that ‘The Council formulatesaproposal about thelengthofdebateoneachitem, and thenumberofspeakers. Butinareal senseitmerelyformaliseswhatthe FloorLeaders[i.e. whips] have decided’.This is achangefromits originalrole, andpoliticians with longmemoriesnotethat 20-30yearsago it was agenuine discussion forum. Butitprovedunwieldy as adecision making body,soits role was graduallyusurped by informalmeetingsbetween thewhips.

In NewZealand theBusiness Committeewas,asinScotland, an attempttomove away from established practice. Itscreation datesto1995, when anew setofstanding orders was agreed in anticipation of thefirst parliament to be electedunderthe mixed memberproportional(MMP) system.Prior to this,whenthe parliament waselected by firstpastthe post,itusedausual channels system similar to that at Westminster. Thestanding orders review sought to createa moreplural system of decision making,importing practices fromcountriessuchasGermany, Denmark andNorway. Standing order76statesthatthe Business Committeeisnow formally responsiblefor agreeing theorder of business, time spentoneach item, andallocation of time to speakersofdifferent parties. Standing order75statesthatitwilltakeits decisions by ‘near unanimity’,which should mean that allmajor partiesconsenttoits decisions.Yet standing order 65 specifies that ‘The Government decidesthe orderinwhich Government orders of theday are arranged on theOrder Paper’.AsinScotland, it is thegovernment business manager(in this case theLeader of theHouse) whodraws up theprogramme,and thereisnoconsultation exceptwith coalition partners (orother partieswith whichthe main partyhas ‘confidenceand supply’ agreements). Themainopposition partyisunlikely to be consulted, andthere is no input from backbenchers. Thepresentation to theBusiness Committeeis, in thewords of asenior clerk‘for information, notapproval’. This does‘introducemorecertainty’but notgiveany greater leverage to non-government actors. In particular, oppositionparties complainthatitems of business are scheduled on days when theirrelevantspokespeopleare on overseas trips, andthatbusiness is frequently changedbygovernment business managers on theday, withoutconsultation.During thestudy visitfor this project one of theauthors attendedameeting of theBusiness Committee. This lasted afull 12 minutes, with alldiscussion focussed on othermatters. Theweekly programme was passedoverwithout comment –areflection of thefact that,evenpost-MMP, programming is consideredtobeamatter forgovernment alone.Astwo respected NewZealand commentatorshavenoted ‘The Business Committee in practicehas not been such apowerful influenceonwhatoccurs in theHouseasmanythoughtitwould be’(Palmer &Palmer2004: 160). Clearly, despite thepresenceofthe committee, thesystemfor setting thetimetable in New Zealandisactuallylessconsultative than theusual channels in theUK.

Aseparateissue is theextenttowhichthe weeklyprogramme is subject to oversight andapproval by thechamberitself. In Australiathere is no such oversight,and thesameessentiallyapplies in NewZealand. Theprogramme is announced to thechamberbythe Leader of theHousebut there is no debate andnorequirement forapproval. In this respect responsibility hasbeen delegated fromthe chambertothe Business Committee. In Germanyand Scotland, however,the situation is rather different.There theprogramme is subject to formal approvalbythe chamberitself. This is because thebusiness committee is not formally adecision-makingbody,but remains subordinate to thechamber. This actslargely as asafetynet,and providesthe political contextwithin which agreements arereached in thebusiness committee. In Germanythere arehardly ever challenges to theagreed programme,asthe partysystemisstrongand agreementbetween thewhips (which must give even minorparties proportionate time in theBundestag)isgenerally uncontroversial. In

40 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons

Scotland, also,challengestothe agreed programmeare theexception rather than therule.Asin theHouseofCommons thereisaweekly statementabout theforthcoming business, made by the Minister forParliamentary Business, buthereaccompanied by awritten motion.This maybe challenged,and amendments that arebacked by at least10members can be movedand voted upon. In theParliament’sshorthistory such disagreements have happenedroughly 5-10 timesper year.Challengestendtohappenwhenamatter hasbeen raised,often severaltimes, in theBureau withoutbeing adequately resolved.Ifapartyrepresentativeisdissatisfiedtheywillexpress their intention to raiseobjections on thefloor andpushthe programme to avote. If someonedoes challengethentheycan make afiveminute speech againstthe motion,followed by afiveminute responsefromthe Minister,and avote. 57 No other members mayspeak to themotion, though additional speakingopportunitiesmay ariseifmorethanone amendmentistaken. 58 Examplesof issues raised include lack of time fordebating keyreports,lackoftime fordebating thefinalstage of important bills,and failureofthe Executive to make statements or provide debatesoncertain topical issues. 59

To date no such votes have been lost, in part becausethe main partieswillvote together when they have alreadyreached agreementinthe Bureau,and in Scotland thereisnoconvention of taking such business on afreevote.However,some amendments have been moved by government backbenchers,and therehavebeen rebels in such votes on thegovernment side. Oftenassurances will be giventhatdebatewillbebrought forwardonafuture occasion, or the issuebelooked at again, to placatethe critics. This mechanismdoestherefore seem to act as areal check on Executive (and,moregenerally,frontbench) controlofthe agenda.

Finally, it is worthreturning to Australia, whereconsultation on themainprogramme of government business maybenonexistent, but thereisaninteresting mechanismfor agreeing the useofnon-government time. In theHouseofRepresentatives thereisnobusiness committeein theconventionalsense,but thereisacommittee, called theSelection Committee, whichagrees the programme fordebates in non-government timeonMondayafternoons.This committeewas established following arecommendation fromthe HouseofRepresentatives Standing Committee on Procedure(1986)tobettermanagenon-government time. It has11members,and is chairedby theDeputySpeaker of thechamber.Inpractice, like otherbusiness committees,mostofits members arewhips –thoughjunior whips areelected in theirparty groups,and it includes two otherbackbenchers.Atits weekly meetingsitprioritises different elements of non-government business, including committeereports,members’ motions andmembers’bills,thatare competing fortime.Inpracticedecisions aretaken by consensus. In certain respectsthis offers apossible model forthe UK,interms of having aforum to agreethe prioritiesfor theuse of non- government time. In otherrespectsthe way it operatesinpracticeisnot an attractivemodel. As with allother business in Australia(as discussedabove), slots of non-government business are allocated by thewhips,soitisappropriate forthemtobethe onesbrought together on this committeetoreach agreement. In theUKsuchacommitteewould be expected to be genuinely runbybackbenchmembers,given that it is responsiblefor schedulingbackbenchbusiness. We return to this question laterinthe report.

57 Standing order 8.11. 58 This occurredon23November2005, whenthree highly similaramendmentsmoved by oppositionmembers were debated. 59 Forexamplessee Scottish Parliament proceedings26January, 13 April, 25 May, 15 Juneand 6September 2005.

41 Table 5: Controlofthe parliamentary timetable

UK Houseof Australian Australian Senate GermanBundestag NewZealand Scottish Parliament Commons Houseof Houseof Representatives Representatives

Howisthe Informal negotiations Government controls Throughnegotiations Council of Elders* Business Committee* Parliamentary detailed weekly throughthe usual thetimetablefor its between whips.It (mostlywhips) agrees (ofwhips) approves Bureau*(of whips) parliamentary channels of Leader of ownbusiness. It remains relatively thetimetable thetimetable as agrees thetimetable timetable agreed? theHouse,Chief remains relatively flexible throughout following informal proposed by the following informal Whip andshadows. flexible throughout theweek. pre-meetings HouseLeader pre-meetings theweek. between major party following agreement between major party whips. with coalition parties. whips. Special None.Non-government None formally, None.None. None. arrangementsfor business on Mondays though in practice non-government is timetabled in the non-government business (aside Selection Committee business on fromwhatis (mainly whips). Thursdays is fixed in standing negotiated between orders) non-government whips. What role does It is announced to None.Itisnot even None.Itisnot even It is announced to Business Committee TheBureau’s theplenary have theHouse in a announced to the announced to the theplenary which reportsare presented proposals areput to in agreeing the business statement, chamber. chamber. mayamend or reject to theHouse;there is theplenary in a weekly whichMPs can it. no debate or vote. motion,which timetable? debate but not memberscan debate, amendorreject. amendorreject. Whodecidesthe Programme motions Thegovernment.Selection of Bills TheCouncil of Plenarystagesfixed Business motions timetable for arediscussed by the Committeedecides Elders,thougha in standing orders movedonbehalfof each bill? whips andvoted on howlongin framework is (max.2hours each). theParliamentary in plenary.Inpractice committee. Greater includedinstanding Committeetimetable Bureau setout the thegovernment informalinter-party orders. recommendedby timetable forbills. majorityprevails. negotiation over bill’s proposer, plenary time than in agreed by House– Houseof Business Committee Representatives. can extend.

42 Whodecides Notanissuefor most Billsonlyveryrarely TheSelection of Bills Anycommitteethat Thememberin TheParliamentary whichbill goes bills as committees go to committees. Committeemakes wishes to maylookat charge of thebill Bureau makesa to which areadhoc.For draft recommendation to abill.There is one nominatesa recommendation in a committee? bills select comm- theSenate. Senate lead committee committee. The motion.The ittees maydecide to hasthe finalsay. whichco-ordinates Househas thefinal Parliament hasthe considerthembut in responses. This is say. finalsay practiceneed notice decidedbythe fromChiefWhip. Council of Elders. Whohas the Speaker can only Formally theSpeaker If requestedbyan Thepresiding officer ThePrime Minister Presiding Officer has power to recall recallifasked to do mayconvene the absolute majority of mustrecallthe decideswhether to right‘to convene the parliament in so by ministers. Housebut by Senators, the Bundestag if the recallthe Houseand Parliament on other recess? Formally s/he could convention s/he acts presiding officer government or 1/3 theSpeaker mustact datesoratother refuse if didn’tagree on theadviceofthe mustrecall the of MPsrequest it. on this decision. timesinan it was in thepublic Prime Minister. Senate. emergency’ (standing interest. Gordon order2.2.10) Brownhas promised change to give initiative to 50%of members

*See Table11for furtherdetails of thesebodies.

43 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons

The work of committees Thebasic informationabout committees in each of thefivecomparator chambers is shownin Table 6. This demonstrates(as is widely known) that theHouse of Commonsisunusual in splitting thelegislative fromthe executive scrutiny function.InScotland, Germany, NewZealand andthe Australian Senate thereisasingle setofsubject-specificcommittees shadowing government departments andcombining thetwo functions. 60 TheAustralianHouseof Representatives, in contrast,can be seen as less developedthanthe Commons, in that the committeestage of mostbills continuestobetaken on thefloor of theHouse, so committees deal largelywithexecutive scrutiny.All thechambers have thefacility to setupadhoc investigative committees,and allalsohavedomestic committees.Here, in theinterestsofbrevity,we concentrateonly on thepermanent policy committees.

Table 6: Basicinformation about committees (July 2007)

Permanentsubjector Othercommittees*Principalfunctions of departmental permanentsubject committees committees Australian Houseof 13 ‘Standing 5other permanent, plus Inquiries.Committee Representatives Committees’. occasionaladhoc stageofmostbillsis investigatory cttees. takenonthe floor. Australian Senate 8‘Legislativeand 7other permanent, plus Legislation andinquiries. GeneralPurpose’ occasionaladhoc committees. investigatory cttees. German Bundestag Circa20permanent 3other permanent, plus Legislation andsome committees. occasionaladhoc executiveoversight. Committees of Inquiry. NewZealandHouse of 13 ‘Select Committees’. 5other permanent, plus Legislation andinquiries. Representatives occasionaladhoc investigatory cttees. Scottish Parliament 9subject committees (2 6other permanent, plus Legislation andinquiries. of whichare specified in occasionaladhoc standing orders). investigatory cttees.

*The ‘other permanent’ committees listedinclude procedural,privileges, interests,petitions,delegated legislation, administrative andtimetablingcommittees.

Theconcerns in theCommonsabout committees relate to threeareas –the appointment of members,the election of chairs,and theability forcommittees to getitems onto theplenary agenda.Starting with thefirst twoofthese,the concernisthatthe whips have toomuchpower, theCommittee of Selectionistoo weak,and that thereistherefore insufficientaccountabilityto thechamber. Various past reports have suggested that some newbody morerepresentativeofthe chamberbegiven moregenuine oversight overcommitteeappointments, andeventhatcommittee chairs should be electedbythe chamberasawhole.

In looking at practiceinother parliaments,assummarisedinTable 7, we areforced to conclude that thearrangements in theHouseofCommons arequitenormal, or even good, in comparison

60 Obviously ourcomparatorsprovideonlyasmallsample.However, Mattsonand Strøm(1995)findthatthe UK is theonlycountry in Europe withoutspecialistlegislative committees.Itshouldbenoted that theAustralianSenate changedits system only in 2006,and previously hadseparatelegislative andinvestigative committees shadowingeach department,withoverlapping memberships. Thereformwhich ended this situationisdiscussedinthe sectionon Changing theRules,below.

44 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons to thealternatives.Nowhere do we find that committeemembers arechosenbyacross-party panelwith backbenchrepresentation as was proposed,for example,bythe LiaisonCommittee, andnowhere is thechamberresponsiblefor electing committeechairsaswas proposed by the Conservative Democracy Taskforce. In allcases thechoiceofcommittee members is delegatedto theparties in one way or another, andquestions of democracy thereforebecome internal party matters.

In allcases except theUKthe partybalance between members on committeesisspecified in standing orders.InAustralia theprecise makeup of each committeeisfixed,but in othercases thereisarequirementtobeproportionaltothe balanceinthe chamber. Theapplication of proportionality is generallydependent on adefined formula –e.g.Scotlandusesthe d’Hondt formula,and Germanythe Saint Laguë/Schepers method. Butthere is generallysome negotiation, particularlyoverwhichcommittees will include minorparty representation. This takesplace in the relevant business committee, but in allcases is in practicenegotiatedbythe whips beforehand. In Scotland andNew Zealandthe business committeealsohas formal responsibility for recommending individualmembers of committees.These areall-party bodies, but areevenmore whip-dominatedthanthe CommitteeofSelection in theCommons.Inbothcountriesthere is a clear convention that therepresentatives of oneparty do not interfereinthe committee nominations fromanother. Each partytherefore remains responsiblefor selecting its own committeemembers. 61 Meanwhileinthe othertwo comparatorcountriesthisrealityisactually enshrinedinthe rules. In Germanyrule 57.2 of theBundestag states that theparty groups ‘shall appoint committeemembers andtheir substitutes’.The business committeehas no oversight at all of thesenominations.InAustralia standing order25.5ofthe Senate places responsibility for appointing committeemembers on partyleaders, stating that ‘The committees shallconsistof8 senators,4nominatedbythe Leader of theGovernment in theSenate, 3nominatedbythe Leader of theOpposition in theSenateand one nominated by minority groups andindependent senators’.

It thereforeappearsthatevenwhere thereare cross-partybodieswhichcould take responsibility forappointing committeemembers,and even where(as in Germany) theseincludebackbench representation, in practicethere is littlecross-party involvementinmakingthese appointments. Thefact that debatesabout this aretakingplace in theUKisawelcome sign that committee membership is seen as relatively non-partisan –members arenot seen as solely representativesof theirparties.But our overseas comparators can offerusnoway forward. Thereisaquestion to resolveoverwhether it is desirable to wrestcontrolofcommittee memberships fromthe parties andhandittoparliamentasawhole.But theseexamples show that ‘parliamentasawhole’is difficult to find personified. Thereisaseparate question about whetherparty appointmentsshould lieinthe hands of thewhips,orbesubject to greaterdemocracy.For example in Australiathe Labor Partymay hold internal elections forplaces on committees.But clearly such elections arean internal question forparties andfalloutside thescope of standing orders.

In theUK‘parliament as awhole’ is involved in agreeing committeeappointmentsdirectly,as select committeeappointmentsmustbeapprovedbyamotion in thechamber.This same pattern is found in some other parliaments –for example in Australiaand in Scotland. 62 However,itisnot always thecasethatthe chamberhas oversight of committeememberships.For example in New

61 Ourcomparator parliamentsare not unusual here.The same is probably thecaseofmostparliamentsindeveloped democracies.For exampleHegevi(2000)notes that in theNordiccountries membership of committees is controlled to asignificant extent by partyleaders. 62 In Scotland one interesting differencefromthe rules at Westminsteristhatonceappointed, amemberofa committeecan onlyberemoved if s/he resigns, or else on amotionfromthe committeeitself,which givesmembers a degreeofautonomyfromtheir whips.Atleast onemember, DorothyGrace-Elder of theSNP,has been suspended from herpartygroup forrefusingordersfromher whips to stepdown from acommittee–in this case the Health and Care CommitteeinMay 2002 (Shepherd 2002:10).

45 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons

Zealandthe standing orderreviewin1995thatcreated thebusiness committee brought an endto this practice. TheBusiness Committeeisofficially delegatedthe responsibility forappointing committeechairsonbehalfofthe chamber, as it formally represents allparties.However as alreadydiscusseditonly represents theparty front benches, so here an important elementof accountabilityhas actuallybeen lost.

Practicevariesinour comparatorparliaments regarding how committeechairsare chosen.In Scotland andGermany chairs aresharedbetween theparties strictly proportionately, 63 andwhich partychairswhichcommittee will be negotiated by thewhips (formallythroughthe business committee).Eachparty will specify whichcommittees it mostwants to chairand if thereisa contestthatcannot be resolved aformula will be applied so that partieschooseinaproportional manner. 64 TheNew Zealandsystemismoresimilar to that at Westminster, in that theshare between theparties is left to convention, but it is only in recentyears that non-government parties have wonany committeechairs. In Australiathe governing partysimply takesall subject committeechairs.

Theofficial choiceofchair in allcases is left to thecommittee in question, however this follows thenegotiations about partyshares, whichare adheredto. As in theUK, thechoiceofindividual to chaireach committeeistherefore in practicedecidedinthe parties, andindeed by theparty whips.Nowhere arecommittee chairs elected even in theirparty groups,let alone in thechamber as awhole.However therecan be upsetstothese arrangements.Inthe Australian Houseof Representativescommitteeselect chairs by secret ballot,and in 2004 one committeefailedtoelect thecandidate preordainedbythe whips.This must have resultedfromsomegovernment party members ‘rebelling’, but theculpritscould not be found as this was asecret vote.

Aseparateissue of concerninthe UK is theabilityofcommittees to gain accesstothe plenary agenda.Ifcommittees areconducting detailed inquiriesitcan be frustrating fortheir members, andothers, if thereports that they produceare neverdebated.Evidencefromour comparator parliaments on thisissue is extremelymixed.Atone endare theGermanand NewZealand parliaments.Inthe Bundestag subject committees in practicedonot conductinquiriesand producereports whichcompete forplenary time (aside fromroutine reports on bills). Ad hoc inquirycommittee reports maybedebated,but thesehavebeen established in response to a request fromthe chamberinthe firstplace, so areunlikely to have difficulty getting time.InNew Zealandcommittees do producereports on theirown initiative, but have no automatic opportunity to have them debated. Plenarytime in NewZealand is extremelylimited, andthere is no time setaside forcommittees (and no parallel debating chamberasinthe UK andAustralia). Committeereports can be put on theOrder Paperfor non-government timebut areplaced below members’bills andinpracticeare neverreached.

At theother endofthe spectrumare theparliaments in Australiaand Scotland, whichoffer potential lessons forthe UK HouseofCommons.Inthe Scottish Parliament standing orders specify that therewillbe12half-days in plenary peryear devotedto‘thebusinessofcommittees’.65 Theallocation of theseisinpracticedecidedbythe ‘Conveners’Group’ (thecommittee of committeechairsequivalenttothe CommonsLiaison Committee),which makesrecomm- endations to thebusiness committeethatare generallyaccepted. Committeedebates areallocated

63 Therequirementfor committeechairstobeallocatedproportionately is codified in Scottish Parliament standing order 12.15and Bundestagruleofprocedure12respectively. 64 Forexample applying thed’Hondtformula thelargestpartymight be entitled to thefirst andthird choices of which committeetochair,but thesecond andfourthchoice mightgotothe second largestpartywiththe thirdpartygetting fifthchoice, etc. 65 Standing order 5.6.

46 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons fairly evenly throughout theyear, andinterestingly do not have to be on committees’reports.For example on one occasion theHealth Committeecommissionedsomeresearch andthis research reportwas selected fordiscussion in theplenary.

In Australiapracticediffers morestarkly fromthatatWestminster, andistherefore even more interesting.Inthe Senate,asindicatedabove, presentation of committeereports fallsunder ‘Business of theSenate’ andtherefore officially takesprecedence overgovernment business. In practicethere is also up to an hour available in theregulartimetableonWednesdays and Thursdays to debate committeereports.Atother timesifamember movesdiscussion of a committeereportthis will usuallybegranted by theSenate, anddebatewilllastfor half an hour. This allfollowsthe cultureinthe Senate wherethe government generallydoesnot have amajority, andthe chambertherefore genuinely controls its owntime.Inthe HouseofRepresentatives the government doeshaveamajority,and committeeactivity is morelimited. Nonetheless thereisa slot on theplenary agenda each Mondaywhenpublication of anynew committee reports is noted. At this point thechair anddeputychair of thecommittee can each speak forfiveminutes. If there is demand frommembers therewillthenbeafuller debate scheduled in theMainCommittee (the equivalentofWestminsterHall),usually on that same day. This is scheduled by theCommittee of Selection whichtimetables non-government business, butthere is afixed slot each Mondayfrom 4-6pm forthese debates. This is arecentinnovation established by theProcedureCommittee. 66 Previously,asatWestminster, debate of acommittee reportoften hadtowaitseveral weeksafter its publication. It must be noted however that committees in theAustralianparliamenthavefar less controlovertheir ownagendas than committees at Westminster. In most cases acommittee must receive a‘reference’ fromthe chamberrequesting it to look into asubject before it can start an inquiry.Inrecentyearsreferences on controversialsubjectshavebeen farmoreforthcoming in theSenatethaninthe HouseofRepresentatives,due to thegovernment’s lack of amajority. Accordingly,the numberofcontroversialSenateinquirieshas markedly declined sincethe government gainedamajority in thechamberin2005.

Afinalfeatureofthe Scottish system whichisofparticularinterest when considering possible changesfor theHouseofCommons is theability of committees to move theirown bills.Itisthe only one of our comparatorsthatallowsthis.Committees areentitledtoproposebills within their ownareas of policy, andstanding order9.15.6providesthatwhentheydo‘atime shallbe appointedinthe business programme forconsideration of theproposal by theParliament’. Following this agreementthe committeemay then go ahead anddraft thebill. Therehavebeen relatively fewsuchbills,ascommittees have found theirpreparation averyburdensometask (althoughtheycan draw on thesameresources available to privatemembers viathe Non- Executive BillsUnit).However in thefirst session of theParliamentalone (1999-2003)three committeebills reached thestatute book, alongside eightmembers’ bills and50executive bills. Successful committeebills include theProtection fromAbuse(Scotland)Act 2001 andthe Scottish Parliamentary StandardsCommissionerAct 2002.

66 SeeHouse of RepresentativesStandingCommitteeonProcedure(2005:para 2.49).

47 Table 7: Parliamentary committees

UK HouseofCommons Australian Australian Senate German NewZealand Scottish Houseof Bundestag Houseof Parliament Representatives Representatives

Name of main Select Public Bill Standing Legislativeand Permanent Select Committees Subject committees Committees Committees Committees are GeneralPurpose Committees with combined Committees to shadow and forscrutiny of generalpurpose Committees shadow govern- legislative, shadow Exec scrutinisegovt legislation. andshadow depts. shadow depts. ment departments. investigatory and departmentsand depts. scrutinyfunctions. scrutinisebills. Party balanceon SOs statethatpublicbill SOs specify the SOs specify that Rulesrequire party SOs requireparty SOs requireparty committees committees should ‘haveregard precise party government party balanceon balanceon balanceon to…the composition of the makeup of each memberstakehalf proportional basis. proportional basis. proportional basis. House’. No such requirement committee, giving thepositionson appliestoselect committees but thegovernment a subject committees. in practiceproportionality majority on all applies to allcommittees. policycommittees. Whoformally CommitteeofSelection In practicewhips. SOs statethatthis SOs statethatthis Business Parliamentary nominates (principally comprising whips). is donebyparty is doneby Committee(made Bureau (madeup members? Oneparty does notquestion leaders. parliamentaryparty up of whips). One of whips). One another’s nominations. groups(fraktionen). partydoesnot partydoesnot question another’s question another’s nominations. nominations. Approvalbythe Yes.No. Yes.Yes.No. No.Yes. chamber? Whoformally Each n/a,Speaker Each committee. Each committee. Each committee. Each committee. Each committee. electschairsof committee. appoints. committees? Howisparty of Throughthe From Government takes Government takes Allocated Government takes Allocated chairs usual Chairmen’s allchairs. allchairs. proportionately– most chairs. proportionately, determined? channels.In Panel. negotiated by the negotiated by practice Speaker’s whips formally whips through proportionate. decision. throughCouncil of Business Cttee. Elders. Plenaryvote.

48 Powers over Extensive: can Limited: set Limited: in general Greater than Most work of Extensiveintheory Extensive: ownagenda launch up to consider committees only Housecommittees: permanent but thedemandsof committees can inquiriesonall specificbill. considerbusiness have generalremit committees is on scrutinising bills launchinquirieson matters within May(since referredbythe to inquireinto‘the bills. andestimateslimit allmatters within remit,callfor 2006) question Houseora performance of thescope for remit,but also deal evidence, witnesses. minister(andrarely departmentsand investigatory with business summon consider agencies allocated inquiries. referredtothem witnessesand legislation). to them’aswellas such as bills. publish considering reports. referredmatters. Ability to get Three n/a Publication of cttee Presentationof Committeereports Committeereports Committees are reportsdiscussed ‘estimates reportsisnotedin reportsofficially areonlydebated in arerarelydebated. collectivelyentitled days’per year chamberweekly, takesprecedence plenary when they to twelve half-days aregenerally with 10 minutes overgovt business. relate to matters peryear. allotted to each fordebate. If Twoweekly slots referredtothe Conveners’ Group consideration requested, further of up to an hour committeebythe decideson of committee debate takesplace fordebatingcttee Bundestag. allocation. reportsasare in theparallelMain reports. At other many Committeewhere timesreports can Westminster thereis2hours be debatedbyleave Hall debates. providedfor the of theSenate. This purpose weekly. is usuallygranted. Can committees No.n/a No.No. No.No. Yes. proposebills?

49 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons

Changing therules OneconcernatWestminsteriswhether members of theHouseofCommons have sufficient controlofthe rulesoftheir ownchamber. Thereisnodirectroute forbackbenchers to force decisions on rule changes, andinpracticemakingthese depends on motionsmovedbyministers in government time. TheProcedureCommittee, made up of backbenchers,cannot forcedecisions on its reports andmay not even gain agenda time to have them debated. TheModernisation Committee, whichconsiderssome similar issues,has causedcontroversythanks to being chaired by theLeaderofthe House, but hashad moresuccessinrecentyears in getting its recommendations accepted.

Thekey points with respect to changing therulesinour five comparator chambers are summarisedinTable 8. What we find is that thereare essentiallytwo kinds of parliamentary committeewhichmay considerprocedural matters. Thefirst,likeour ProcedureCommittee, is a committeeofbackbenchers whichoperatesmuchlikeother committees in thechamber, taking evidence andpublishingreports with recommendations.The second is amoretightly controlled but informalarrangementwhere procedureisconsidered by agroup of senior members whoare mostly whips andfrontbenchers,and whichmay meet less frequently andrarelypublish reports. Each comparatorhas only one committee, alwaysonorthe othermodel. TheHouseofCommons clearly hastwo,and theModernisation Committee–including amongst its members theLeader of theHouseand thetwo Shadow Leaders–hassomeelements of the second model. However in otherrespectsitoperatesverylikeother parliamentary committees,somay be consideredahybrid of thetwo models.

Tightlycontrolled informalcommittees existinGermany,New Zealand andthe Australian Senate. In allcases theseare dominatedbywhips andfrontbenchers; in NewZealandthe committeeis chairedbythe Speaker andinAustralia by theDeputyPresident of theSenate. Theseare senior members whodonot have time (and possiblyinclination) forconducting openinquiriesand taking evidence.Instead thecommittees areforumsinwhichdealscan be done between some of the mostpowerfulfigures in thechamber. In allcases they meet on afairlyadhoc basis, andissue fewreports.InNew Zealand theStanding Orders Committeeconducts an annual review of standing orders,whichwas amajor undertakinginthe 1990swhenthe parliament switchedto MMP fromfirst past thepost. However,normallystanding orders areverystable,and the committeemeetsrarely. SimilarlyinAustralia theSenateStanding CommitteeonProcedurehad a majortaskin2006, when theincoming government announced its intention to reform the committeesystem(discussed in moredetailbelow). It issued areportrecommending how the change could be brought into effect.However,reports fromthe committeeare otherwiserare, and even on this occasion its main role was to facilitate trading between theparties.InGermany the role of theCommittee forthe Scrutiny of Elections,Immunity andthe RulesofProcedureiseven moreshadowy. It is responsiblefor resolving questions of procedure(in theway that theHouseof CommonsSpeaker woulddo) as wellasrecommending anychanges.However its real political function is to facilitate trading between theparty whips.

Forums such as theseseem quitealien fromaWestminsterperspective. Whereas in theCommons it is difficult formembers to forcedecisions on procedural changestheymay favour,there is at leastanopendiscussion about theseissuesand atransparent processfor considering them.There arealsogroups (suchasthe Constitution Unit or HansardSociety)who mayfeed ideas into these deliberations.Inthe threechambers justdiscussedthis levelofopenness is simply missing.Itis acceptedthatprocedureisamatter forwhips,who tradeonbehalfoftheir parties. Abackbench member, or group of members,musttherefore lobby within theirparty group if they wanta change to be considered, andencouragetheir whip to take it up. This makescross-party

50 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons backbenchworking,ofthe kind this reportseeks to promote, difficult if not impossible. 67 Westminstercan be grateful that it at leasthas an open system,evenifthis is frustrating.

Theother twochambersconsideredinthis study have moretransparent arrangements,closer to thoseinthe HouseofCommons.Itisinteresting that theStanding Committee on Procedurein theAustralianHouseofRepresentatives is averydifferent body to its counterpartinthe Senate. Thetwo used to be similar,but thelower housecommitteewas changedin1985. It is now wholly made up of backbenchers andoperatesverymuchlikeother committees of theHouse. In comparisontothe othercommittees it hasrelativefreedom to initiateits owninquiries, as unlike them it hasa‘running reference’ fromthe chambertoconsiderprocedure, rather than relying on thechambertorefer questions to it.68 In this respect it is very similar to theCommons Procedure Committee, andlikewiseholds evidence sessions andpublishes reports,often informedbypractice by otherparliaments overseas.Some major changeshavecome about as aresult of its recommendations,notably theestablishment of theMainCommittee (parallelchamber) andthe Selection Committee(forprogramming non-government business) andmorerecentlythe establishment of automaticdebating time on newcommittee reports (asdescribedinthe previous section).

Themostinteresting example amongst our comparators is theProcedures Committeeofthe Scottish Parliament. This is againabackbenchcommittee, whichoperatesinavery similar way to theequivalentcommitteesatWestminster. Thekey differencecomes with respect to the committee’spowers. Whereas in othersettingsoutside actorsmay put procedural change on the plenary agenda fordecision (and in theCommons this is done by theexecutive)inScotlandall recommendations forchanges to standing orders must go throughthe committee.69 This means that if theExecutive wants to seeachange to standing orders theMinister forParliamentary Business must write to thecommittee asking them to look at it. To date proposalstothe committeehavecome fromthe Minister directly,aswellasfromthe Bureau,the Presiding Officer, andother members.However,itremains at thecommittee’sabsolute discretion whethertopursue inquiries andwhatrecommendations to make.There have been occasions when theMinister,or theBureau,has askedfor changesand thecommittee hasreplied that no such change is necessary. This clearly putsitinafarstronger position that theProcedureCommitteeinthe Houseof Commons, andensures that controloverprocedure doestoavery largeextentrestwith the Parliament itself. This is boostedbythe fact that standing order17.1specifies that procedural changesrequireanabsolute majority in plenary to be passed.Interms of finding time forthe committee’srecommendations to be debated, it must seek ashare of thecommittee time that is allocated by theConveners’ Group(LiaisonCommitteeequivalent). Recently therehas been discussion about whetherthis is adequate,orwhether theProcedures Committeeshould have ring fenced time or guaranteed accesstothe agenda (Scottish Parliament Procedures Committee2006: para 91).

Although accesstothe agenda to move procedural change in theHouseofCommons is very much controlled by thegovernment, there is astrong convention that important standing order changesare decidedonafreevote.InScotland, it is less clear whetherthis applies,asthere have

67 In theAustralianSenatethere is one alternative meansfor memberstoget procedural changesonthe agenda.This is asomewhatarcaneprocedurecalled‘Discovery of Formal Business’, forwhich thereisaslot on theagendaevery day. This allows memberstotable proposalsfor decisionwithoutdebate. It is oftenusedbyoppositionpartiesto forcethe government to take apositiononanissuebyforcing avote. Butithas also been used by memberstopress procedural changesfor whichtheyhavemanaged to gather sufficientsupport. Thereare several standing ordersthat have originated in this way. 68 Seeprevious sectionfor details of thelimitations on Australiancommittees. 69 This requirement is setout in standingorder 17.1 on ‘Amending Standing Orders’ whichstatesthat‘TheParliament may, on amotionofthe Procedures Committee, amendthese standingorders.’

51 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons been fewcontroversialchanges pushedtoavote: mosthavebeen agreed by consensus. Butinall theother chambers it is clear that procedural changesare decided, like othermatters,onwhipped votes.This is in line with thesituation whereprocedural changesare negotiated between the whips. 70 Again, we should considerourselves lucky in this respect forthe bipartisan nature of such discussionsinthe HouseofCommons.

Themostglaring example of this different culturewith respect to procedural change in recent yearsisthe change to thecommittee system in theAustralianSenate. TheHowardgovernment electedin2004decidedtotakeadvantageofits newmajority in theSenatetoreformthe chamber’sassertivesystemofcommittees.For theprevious 25 yearsnogovernment hada majority in theSenate, andastrong setofcommittees haddeveloped. In each subject area there was apairofcommittees –alegislativecommittee anda‘general purposes committee’ to carry out inquiries. Thelegislative committees wereall chairedbygovernment Senators andthe general purposecommittees werechaired by non-government Senators.Asthere wasabalancebetween government andnon-government members,and thechair hadacasting vote,this gave effective controlofall inquiry committees to non-government parties. Although theHowardgovernment hadamajority of only onevote in theSenate, it sawanopportunity to change this situation to make life easierfor government. Henceitproposed amerging of legislativeand generalpurposes committees so therewas justone committeeineachpolicy area,with allchaired by government Senators.This causeduproaramongstnon-government parties, but thematterwas referredtothe Standing CommitteeonProcedure. Although this was chairedbyanon-government Senator, it produced areportspecifying how thegovernment’sproposalscould be put into effect.The committee’schair reportedtoone of theauthors that this was done on thebasis that the government ‘had thenumbers’toget itsreformthrough, so opposition was pointless. Sureenough, when thequestion of reform was put to thechamber, thegovernment’s proposalspassedona whippedvote,with no dissent on thegovernment side.Itisdifficult (thankfully) to imagine anything of this kind happening in theUK.

70 IndeedinNew Zealandcoalitionagreements and‘cooperationagreements’ between themaingoverning partyand others currently includethe words that thejuniorpartywill ‘votewiththe government on procedural motionsinthe House’.

52 Table 8: Controlofparliamentary rulesand procedure

UK HouseofCommons Australian Australian German NewZealand Scottish HouseofReps Senate Bundestag HouseofReps Parliament Name of Modernisation Procedure Standing Standing Committeefor the Standing Orders Procedures relevant Committee. Committee. Committeeon Committeeon ScrutinyofElec- Committee. Committee. committee Procedure. Procedure. tions, Immunity andthe Rulesof Procedure. Composition of 15 MPsincl. 13 backbench- 7backbenchers.10members inclu- Size varies Speaker plus 10 Currently 7 committee Leader of the ers. ding Senate Presid- (currently 13). othermembers, backbenchers with Houseand entand Deputies Includes whipsof including House Executivein shadows. andgovt andoppn allparties. Leader andwhips. minority.* Senate leaders. No govt majority.* Committeechair Leader of the No rule.Last Agovernment DeputyPresident No convention or TheSpeaker by No convention or Houseby twochairs partymember of theSenate rule.Current chair convention. rule.Current convention. from (specified in SOs). (specified in SOs). is from thelargest convener is from opposition. party. Executiveparty. Committee’s Both committees have standard Has‘running refe- Hasnoformal Considers changes Haspower to Haspower to powersand committeepowerstoset own rence’ to consider inquirypowersand to procedure, and inquireintoSOs on inquireintoSOs on method of work agenda,takeevidenceand SOs andalsohas dealswith business also interpretsthe owninitiative and owninitiative and publish reports. business referredto referredbythe rules. Worksin also hasbusiness also hasbusiness it by theHouse. Senate or Senate privateand by referredtoitbythe referredtoitbythe Initiatesenquiries, President.Operates consensus. Houseorothers. Houseorother takesevidenceand by consensusand However,meets bodies. publishes reports. reportsonly rarely. andreports rarely. Whocan move In practice, only government Committee, Committee, Committee, party In practiceall SO Only the procedural proposalswillget agenda time. government or government or groupsorother changesgothrough Procedures amendments? members. members. groupsofatleast thecommittee. Committee. 5% of members. Arethese taken Yes.No. No.No. No.Not yet clear, as on afreevote? most to date agreed without avote.

*Thislackofmajorityreflectsthe government’s lack of majority in theHouse.

53 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons

Who speaksfor parliament? Individuals If we wantparliamenttodevelop aclearer independent voice thereare twoplaces we can look: eithertoindividuals whocan speak forthe chamberasawhole,ortocollectivebodies. In the HouseofCommons thetwo individuals whocomeclosesttofulfilling this role arethe Speaker andthe Leader of theHouse.This pattern is largelyreplicated in our comparatorchambers.

Thekey factsabout Speakers(or,moregenerically,presiding officers)are summarisedinTable 9. Although in allcases thepresiding officerisprobably themostvisiblerepresentativeofthe chamber, nowhere did we find amoreactivedefenderofthe institutionthanthe Houseof CommonsSpeaker.This is because in allbut onecasethe presiding officerisafarmorepartisan figure than at Westminster, andtherefore less trustedoutside theirown partyand less able to speak forthe chamberasawhole.

In allcases thepresiding officerisformallyelected by thechamberasawhole,but with the exception of Scotland thereisaconvention that he or sheisdrawn fromthe government party. This used to be thecaseinthe UK,until theconvention was brokenbythe election of Betty Boothroydin1992. However even then UK practicedifferedsignificantlyfromthatinour comparatorchambers.First,the Speaker was elected in theirown right, andwas not expected to step downifagovernment of an opposing partywas elected. Second, theSpeaker renounced party allegiance altogetherand actedinastrictly non-partisan way.

In Germany, NewZealand andAustralia theelectionofthe presiding officerislargely aformality. Although officially it is done by thechamberinfactthe individual to be electedispredetermined by thegoverning party. In thefirst twocountriesthisputsitinthe gift of thehead of government, whoappoints asenior figure.InAustralia,anelectionisactuallyheldinthe parliamentary group of thegoverning partytodetermine whothe candidate will be (theincumbent President of theSenate was thus deposed in 2002 by acoup in herown party, anddid not subsequently standfor the election in thechamberitself). Thereisasecret ballot in thechamber, butapartisan voteis expected,and at leastone partyoperatesa‘show andtell’ policy wherebymembers areexpected to show theircompletedballotpaper to awhip. This is clearly displays averydifferent attitudetothat in theHouseofCommons.

Once elected, thepresiding officerinthese threecountriesmay continue to act in apartisan fashion to agreater or lesserextent. Nowhereisthe Westminsterpracticefollowed wherethe Speaker fights subsequent elections as an independent.InGermany,New Zealandand the Australian Senate,the presiding officercontinuestovote with theirparty as an activemember. In allcases thereisanexpectation of non-partisan chairing of debates, though in theAustralian HouseofRepresentatives in particularthere arewellestablished complaints about partisan behaviour of theSpeaker fromthe chair. To an extent thesameapplies in NewZealand. In both countries presiding officers have continuedtobeactiveintheir parties. ForexampleformerNew ZealandSpeaker Jonathan Hunt (1999-2005)routinely attendedparty meetings, andat timesdeputised forthe Prime Minister.The current incumbent (MargaretWilson) attends party conferences andmeetsthe government ChiefWhipevery day. In Australiathe Senate President now hasanoffice whollystaffedbypolitical appointees,whilethe Deputy President is the Secretaryofhis partycaucus. In theGermanCDU the Bundestag President hasanautomatic seat on theparty’s nationalexecutive committee.

This degree of partisanship significantlyweakensthe presiding officerasavoicefor parliament as awhole.Suchfigures areclearly not trustedbyopposition partiestoact impartially,whichresults in practiceinpower leaching to thewhips.Trading between thewhips overspeakersand time

54 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons

(often employing strictly proportionalformulae) becomesasubstitute forimpartial rulingsfrom thechair.Hence in allthree countries thepresiding officerinpracticecalls speakersindebatefrom listsprovidedinadvancebythe whips,and hasvirtually no discretion overother political matters such as theselection of amendments, as detailed in thetable.Inthe parliamentsofAustralia and NewZealandatleast, theweakand partisan nature of theinstitution of presiding officerisdeeply rooted,tothe extent that themajority partymay openly defy apresiding officerwho seekstotake an even-handedapproach. 71 Instead of playing an active role in managing business, thesepresiding officers mostly concernthemselveswith administrative matterstodowith therunning of the parliament –equivalenttoour Speaker’s role in theHouseofCommons Commission.

As aconsequenceinnone of thesecountriescan thepresiding officerbeseen to be astrong voice forparliament. Allofficially have such arole,but areseen to alarge extent as senior partisan figures(perhapsmoreakintoour Leader of theHouse).Only in Scotland is theconvention of neutralitymaintained,and thePresiding Officerseenasmorerepresentativeofthe parliament as a whole.There conventionsare continuing to be established,but thePresiding Officerhas largely renounced partypolitics on election, andthere is no expectation that they come fromthe governing party. Thefirst Presiding Officer(DavidSteel)was drawn fromLabour’s coalition partner, theLiberalDemocrats.His successor, George Reid, wasfromthe opposition SNP.The newPresiding Officerelected in 2007,AlexFergusson, is aConservative.Any convention of neutralityisinsome ways weaker in theScottish Parliament thaninthe HouseofCommons.For example no Presiding Officerhas yet sought re-election by standing as an independent:thoughin fact theincumbentsinboth2003and 2007 retiredratherthanseekingre-election at all. Thereis also not yet anyconvention that on retirement former Presiding Officers areappointedtothe HouseofLords as . Indeed,David Steel satinthe LordswhilePresiding Officeras avoting LiberalDemocratmember, andhas remained so sinceretiring fromHolyrood. Thefact that Steel wasasomewhat partisan figure mayhelpexplain,for example, whyhewas excluded frominformalpre-meetings of thewhips on theParliamentary Bureau (asdiscussedonp.82).Itis clear that thethoroughlyneutral position of theHouseofCommons Speaker significantly strengthensthe office,and is something to be carefullyprotected. 72

TheLeader of theHouseofCommons also hascounterpartsinour comparatorparliaments.The position regarding this figure,and theChiefWhip equivalentissummarisedinTable 10.Inall cases theHouseLeader is aclearly partisan figure,and in mostcases is appointedbythe Prime Minister.InNew Zealandand Australiathe HouseLeader plays afar moreactiverole in setting theprogramme of business than doesour Leader,takingmoreofthe role that is takenherebythe ChiefWhip.But if anything,this is done in alessconsultative way than in theHouseofCommons.

71 Afamousexample of this occurredin1975inthe AustralianHouse of Representatives, when theSpeaker sought to call agovernmentministertoorder.The ministerretorted‘Idon’tgive adamnwhatyou say’ andthe Housethen rejected theSpeaker’s motion to censure theminister. Hisauthorityundermined, SpeakerCope resigned (Laundy1984: 152). 72 Foradiscussion of thepowersand partisanship of presidingofficersaroundEurope seeJenny andMüller(1995). This suggested that theHouse of CommonsSpeaker is highly non-partisan andmoderatelypowerful,thoughsomeof themeasurementsappliedmay be questioned.

55 Table 9: Therole of parliamentary presiding officers

UK Houseof Australian Australian SenateGerman NewZealand Scottish Commons HouseofReps Bundestag HouseofReps Parliament Title of presiding Speaker (plus three Speaker (plus two President (plusone President (and Speaker (plus one Presiding officer(s) Deputies). Deputies). Deputy). currently sixVice- Deputyand two Officer (plus two Presidents). Assistants). Deputies).

Method of Secret ballot of all Secret ballot of all Secret ballot of all Secret ballot of all Open ballot of all Secret ballot of all selection of members(since membersbut,in membersbut,in membersbut,in membersbut,in members. presiding officer 2001). practice, predeter- practice, predeter- practice, predeter- practice, predeter- mined. mined. mined. mined. Party of Previouslyby By convention, By convention, By convention, By convention, Fromeither govern- presiding officer convention from governing party. governing party. largestgoverning governing party. An ing or opposition governing party. party. exception occurred parties. Twoof3 Nowmay be either. when government POshavecomefrom majoritywas tight. opposition. Party of deputy Previouslyall from By convention one By convention Allparties getatleast Previouslyoften TheScotlandAct presiding officers governing partyby Deputy(themore Deputycomes from oneVice-President. camefromgoverning mandatesthatthe convention.There is junior)comes from opposition. SPDcurrently has party. Present PO andtwo deputies nowbalance between theopposition. two. incumbent is from cannotall come from govt andoppn opposition. oneparty.Inpractice parties. thethree positions have been shared between threeparties Neutralityof Abandons party Retains party Retains party Retains party Retains party Abandons party presiding officer affiliation once affiliation andmay be affiliation andmay be affiliation andmay be affiliation andmay be affiliation in elected andisstrictly activeinparty activeinparty politics activeinparty politics activeinparty Parliament once neutralinoffice. politics. Can actina but is seen as less but is strictly neutral politics. Can actinan elected andisstrictly partisan fashion partisan than House as chair. openly partisan neutralinoffice. including from chair. Speaker. fashion. Does presiding Only to break ties.Only to break ties.Yes,with party. Yes,with party. Yes,with party. Only to break ties. officer vote in divisions?

56 Keypolitical Selecting speakers in Calling speakers Calling speakers Calling speakers Calling speakers Selecting speakers in rolesofthe debates, selecting preselected by the preselected by the preselected by the preselected by the debates, selecting presiding officer amendments,ruling whips.Selecting a whips.(Matters of whips.Chairsthe whips.Chairsthe amendments.Chairs on Urgent Questions, ‘MatterofPublic Public Importance business committee. business committee. thebusiness interpreting Importance’for aredecidedby committee. procedure. debate if more than drawing from ahat). oneissubmitted. Keyadmin- Significant Significantadmin- Significantadmin- Significantadmin- Significant Significant istrativerolesof administrativerole, istrativerole,much istrativerole,much istrativerole administrativerole administrativerole thepresiding including chairing of it jointly with of it jointly with including chairing the including chairing the including chairing the officer HouseofCommons Senate President. HouseSpeaker. Presidium. ParliamentaryService Scottish Commission. Chairs theStanding Commission, Parliamentary Committeeon negotiating the CorporateBody. Appropriationsand budget. Staffing.

57 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons

In theUKyou could notsay that theChiefWhipspeaksfor parliament (indeed one of thekey features of theChiefWhipisthats/he rarely speaksatall). Thesameistrueinother parliaments. However,insome cases it could be said that theChiefWhip moregenuinely speaksfor the backbencheswithin theirown partiesthanisgenerally thecasehere. In NewZealandand Germanywhips areelected within theirparty groups rather than being appointedbythe party leader.The same is true in theLabor Partyinthe Australian HouseofRepresentatives.This clearly creates averydifferent setofrelationships to that in theHouseofCommons.Ratherthan principallyrepresenting theviews of theparty leaderstotheir members,these whips principally representthe views of members to theirleaders. So whileinall countries thewhips have significantcontrol–over matterssuchasnegotiating theagendaand allocating membersto committees,theyare morelikelytoberesponsivetobackbenchconcerns than in theUK. Indeed in theGermanSPD, thewhips areelected only forafixedtermoftwo years,somustface re- election halfway throughthe parliament. This mechanismisspecifically designed to keep them responsivetothe views of members within thecaucus.

Nowhere,then, have we found averystrong voice forparliamentamongstthe individuals whoare members of our five comparatorchambers.Infact,the strongestindividual defenderof parliament found during this study was not amemberatall,but amemberofstaff. In Australiathe Clerkofthe Senate,Harry Evans, hasachievedahigh profileasadefenderofparliamentagainst theexecutive,and of properrespect forparliamentary traditions andrules.These views are expressedthroughlectures, newspaperand journalarticles, andregular comments to journalists. In June 2005 forinstance, following mediacontroversyoverthe tendencyofgovernment to ignore parliamentary committeeinquiries, Evanswas quoted likening Prime Minister John Howardtoan ‘electivemonarch’, able to ‘rule allhesurveys’. Describedinone newspaperheadline as the‘Senate Boss’, he wentontoargue that ‘Wenolonger have parliamentarygovernment in anymeaningful senseofthe term’. 73 In atalktothe Australasian Study of Parliament Groupshortlyafter government hadtaken amajority in theSenateEvans (2006) reflectedonwhether this would be ‘a nail in thecoffinofresponsiblegovernment’, concludingthat‘thebrief answer is that the government majority undoubtedly ledtoadeclineinaccountability’.

In asimilar but milderway theClerk of theNew Zealandparliament, David McGee, is also an established publicfigure. Both menhavebeen in postfor along time –Evans since1988and McGeesince1985–so have builtupsignificantexpertise andrespect in thepolitical community. In some ways they have filled avacuum created by thelackofoutspokenchampions of parliament fromamongstthe politiciansthemselves. Butthisisaprecarious position to be in as amemberof staff, anditisnot guaranteed to continue when they retire.Harry Evansinparticularhas made himselfunpopularwith awhole generation of governing partypoliticians whofind his opinions inconvenient.In1999anewParliamentary ServiceAct waspassed, to regulate staffing in parliament, anditset down that theClerk of theSenatemustserve atermofnomorethan10 years. This was not applied retrospectively, but it wasagreed that Evansmustretirein2009. There is an openquestion as to whetherthe government,whenthe time comestoreplace theClerk,will seek to make this apartisanappointment. Shouldthis happenitisnot at allclear who, if anyone, would fill thevoid.

73 Gerard Ryle,LisaPryor andMark Metherell, ‘SenatebossblastsPM’s monarchy’, Sydney MorningHerald ,21June 2005,at: www.smh.com.au/news/national/king-john-under-fire/2005/06/20/1119250927991.html

58 Table 10:Other keyindividuals

UK Houseof Australian Australian Senate GermanBundestag NewZealand Scottish Parliament Commons HouseofReps HouseofReps Leader of the Leader of theHouse HouseLeader (also Government Leader No real equivalent. Leader of theHouse Ministerfor Housefigureand appointed by the knownasManager of (similar to Leader of Each partyhas an appointed by the Parliamentary howchosen Prime Minister. Business)appointed theHouse of Lords). elected parliamentary Prime Minister. Business appointed by Prime Minister. Elected in Laborbut chair. by theFirst Minister. appointed in National Party. Leader of the Frontsweekly Draws up orderof Main government n/a Draws up orderof Draws up orderof Houserole(s) business programme, business for spokesperson (asin business and business andalsoacts frontsprocedural chamber. HouseofLords). negotiates committee as ChiefWhip. debates, co-ordinates chairs. legislativeprogr- amme andchairs Modernisation Committee. ChiefWhip ChiefWhip ChiefWhip elected in Whip (alsoknown as Whip or ‘Floor Senior Whip elected No separate position figure andhow appointed by the LaborParty, ManagerofBusiness) Leader’ in both main parties. to that above, only chosen Prime Minister. appointed in Liberal appointed in both ( Geschäftsfuhrer)) junior whips Party. main parties. elected in allparties. (appointed). ChiefWhip Leadsusual channels Draws up orderof Frontsprocedural Draws up orderof Choosescommittee n/a (but junior whips role(s) negotiations on business forMain debates. Draws up business,negotiates membersand ensures ensure membersturn programme, Committeeonly. orderofbusiness. committeechairs, membersturnupand up andvote). committee Otherwise ensures Juniorwhipsmay choosescommittee vote. memberships,etc. membersturnupand ensure attendance membersand ensures vote,and coordinates andvoting. membersturnupand speakers lists. vote. Senior An almostentirely Hassomevisibility, Ahighly visible and An almostentirely Hasrelativelyhigh Hassomevisibility, parliamentary invisible figure to but is notoutspoken. outspokenfigure, invisible figure to visibility andhas but is notoutspoken. official/Clerk thoseoutside whoregularly thoseoutside made some Westminster. comments in the parliament. outspoken media andmakes comments. speeches.

59 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons

Who speaksfor parliament? Co-ordinating bodies It is inevitably difficult forany single individualtospeak forparliamentasawhole.Itmay be more realistictoexpect acollectivebody to do so.Agroup of members clearly haspotential to represent arange of views within thechamber, anditisfor this reason that calls forestablishment of a ‘business committee’ have become morecommon in recentyearsbythose seekingamore independent voice forthe HouseofCommons.Atpresent theCommons hasnosuchbody, thoughitdoeshaveother bodieswith generalrepresentativeroles. TheCommitteeofSelection carries out some functionssimilar to thoseofbusiness committees in termsofcommittee appointments; theHouseofCommons Commissionhas an administrative oversight role;and the LiaisonCommittee of select committeechairshas become moreassertiveinrecentyears.The hope of some reformersisthatanewbody could improve on thefunctions of theseexisting groups.

In our comparatorparliaments thereare similarly threetypes of bodies: business committeetype organisations,administrative oversight bodies,and groups representing committeechairs. The arrangements in each parliament aresummarisedinTable 11.

As discussedabove with respect to themanagementofplenary time andappointmentsto committees,three of ourfivecomparatorchambers have generalbusiness committees but none of theseliveuptothe expectations of Westminsterreformers.The attemptinthe Scottish Parliament to break away fromthe ‘usual channels’systembycreating theParliamentary Bureau hashad only limitedsuccess. Rather than,asoriginallyenvisaged, including backbenchers among itsmembers this group is whollymadeupofparty whips (plusthe Presiding Officerinthe chair).Its members aretherefore appointedbyparty leaders. Itsexistence doesensureagreater leveloftransparencyin political management, andaswas particularlythe caseinthe period of ‘rainbow parliament’ from 2003-07, its membership is broad.74 However thereisnobackbenchrepresentation, andthe rules provide that in thecaseofadivision thewhips castweightedvotesaccordingtothe size of their partygroups.This leaves littlescope forcross-party backbenchcoalitionstoexert influence. Consequently it would be inaccurate to describe theBureau hasa‘voice forparliament’.Indeed one Executive partybackbencherinterviewed forthe project,who complainedthatatleastsome members on theBureau should be elected, suggested that withoutthis thearrangementof business is a‘typical powers-that-bestitchup’.Helamentedthat, despite theambitionsofthose whopressedfor devolution, ‘the Parliament itselfhas no voice’.

ThedynamicsinNew Zealandand Germanyare similar. In NewZealandthe Business Committee similarly includesonly whips andfrontbenchers.Itischaired by theSpeaker,whoserole it is to determine whether‘near unanimity’ in decision-makinghas been achieved, butthe application of this is necessarily limited. As discussed above,the ‘near unanimity’ rule is overriddeninpracticeby thestanding orderwhichgives thegovernment controloverthe plenary agenda.Thosedecisions whichthe committeedoestakeare thereforelimitedtogenerally less politically-important issues such as theannualcalendarand overseas trips.Agreementonthe committeeisagreementbetween whips,althoughitmustbenoted that in NewZealandthe whips areelected by theirparty groups. In Germanythere is some non-whiprepresentation on theCouncil of Elders but these representativesare excluded fromthe pre-meetingswhere thekey decisions aretaken.However whips are, again, electedinparty groups.The Council of Elders hasthe capacity to setup subcommittees andhas several, covering administrative matterssuchasallocation of rooms and

74 Apartyorgroup must comprise at leastfive MSPs to be awarded aseatonthe Bureau. At itslargest, it included representativesofthe four majorparties(Labour, SNP, Conservativesand Liberal Democrats) plus theGreens, Scottish Socialists andanIndependents group.

60 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons informationtechnology. It is here that ‘ordinary’members mayplayarole,althoughthere is a fuzzy line between thesefunctions andthoseofthe Presidium (see below). Thefact that thewhips areelected in theirparty groups is an important consideration when seekingtounderstand the dynamics of theCouncil of Elders.But this supportsand reinforces theculture of theGerman Bundestag,whichiswhollydominatedbytrading between the(internally democratic)party groups, andwhere thekindofcross-party workingwhichmanywould like to encourageinthe UK is largelyalien.

In Australiathere aretwo bodieswhichfulfil some of the rolesofabusiness committee, but which aremuchmorelimitedinscope.Bothhavealreadybeen mentioned.Inthe Senate theSelection of BillsCommittee hasresponsibility fordeciding whethereach bill should be referredtoa committeefor consideration, andifsowhichcommittee, andtowhattimetable (roughly 35%of bills arereferredtoacommittee).The Selection of BillsCommittee is made up of whips,and its meetingsare brief. Butunder normalcircumstances,whenthere is no government majority in the Senate,itisanimportant site forinter-partynegotiation. Sincethe government gainedasmall majority in theSenateits role hasbecome farmoreformalistic,and it is principallygovernment that makesthese decisions.Inthe House of Representativesthe Selection Committee, whichhas responsibility fortimetabling non-government business, hasalreadybeen discussedabove.Ithas 11 members andischaired by theDeputySpeaker.Likethe otherbodies discussed here,its membership is dominatedbywhips.However it is againnotable that junior whips in theHouseof Representatives(andthe ChiefWhip in theALP) areelected by theparty .Sothis body could be said to be trulyrepresentative of theHouse, but it doeslittletofostercross-party relations at thebackbenchlevel.Instead it reinforcesthe culturewhereby parliamentary business is atrade betweenparty blocs.

Thesenior administrative bodiesinour comparatorparliaments areinmanyways similar to the HouseofCommonsCommission. In allfourcases wherethese existtheyare chairedbythe presiding officer, andinclude abroad representation of parties. Forexamplethe Scottish Parliamentary CorporateBody (SPCB),whichclearly was influencedbythe modelofthe Houseof CommonsCommission, includes four members plus thePresiding Officer, andmeetsfortnightly. Itsmembers areelected by thechamberasawhole,thoughitisclear that thereisinter-party agreementtosupportarepresentativegroup, andeachmemberisfromadifferent party. In at least one partythere areregular reports to theparty group and, as one memberput it, thoseonthe SPCB representtheir parties‘obliquely’.But theissuesdiscussedare largelynon partypolitical, covering matters such as staffing,security,and –importantlyinthe firstfew yearsofthe body’s operation –the logistics of creating anew Parliament building.

Administrative bodiesinthe othercomparatorparliaments aresimilar.The Presidium in Germany, comprising thePresident andVicePresidentsofthe Bundestag,concerns itself with employment matters andparliamentary outreach,but thedivisionofresponsibility between it andthe Council of Elders hasbecome somewhat unclear.InNew Zealand theParliamentary ServiceCommission comprises largelywhips (orinthe caseofsmall parties, leaders).Itformerlyhad adirecting role, but following theParliamentary ServiceAct 2000 it nowonly ‘advises’ theSpeaker,and in practice it hasnocontroloverthe budget.InAustralia theHouseofRepresentatives hasnoequivalent body at all, thoughthe Standing CommitteeonAppropriations andStaffing in theSenatewas established in the1970s.Aswellasdealingwith budgetaryand staffing issues in theSenateitself, this body also hassome oversight overthe joint administrative departments in theAustralian parliament.

61 Table 11:Collectiveand coordinating bodieswithin parliament

UK Houseof Australian Australian Senate GermanBundestag NewZealand Scottish Parliament Commons HouseofReps HouseofReps Bodieswith None.Isdone None (except None.Council of Elders.Business Committee. Parliamentary generalpolitical informallythrough Selection Ctteefor Bureau. co-ordination usualchannels. non-government role business). Membership n/a n/a n/a Circa30members Speaker plus one Presiding Officer distributed proport- representative of plus onerepresent- ionately and each party(in ativeofeach partyof including allVice practice, whips and 5MSPsormore(in Presidentsand whips. Leader of the practice, whips). House). Chairn/a n/a n/a President of the Speaker.Presiding Officer. Bundestag. Howdecisions n/a n/a n/a TheCouncil is nota On thebasis of Usuallybyconsensus aretaken decision-making unanimityor‘near but by weightedparty body as such.If unanimity’ as judged voting in caseof consensusisnot by theSpeaker. disagreement. reached,the issueis Otherwise,the decidedinplenary. majoritymay revert to closuremotionsto getits business. Role in agreeing n/a n/a n/a Recommends weekly Rubberstamps Recommends weekly business programmeand weekly programme, programme. annual calendar. in practicedecidedby Proportionalformula government.Agrees appliestoshare of annual calendar. slotsand speaking Formally agrees share between parties. of speaking time but proportional formula applies.

62 Role in n/a (although n/a n/a (although Recommends share Agrees shareof Recommends share managing Committeeof Selection of Bills of chairs between chairs between of chairs between committees Selection plays some Committee parties, though a partiesand agrees partiesand rolessimilar to other determineswhether proportionality individual members. recommends business bills arereferredto formulaapplies. Both aregoverned by individual members. committees). ctteeand sets a Membersare chosen astrictproportion- Both aregoverned by timetable). directly by the alityformula. astrictproportion- parties. alityformula. Body chiefly HouseofCommons None.Standing Committee Presidium.Parliamentary Service Scottish responsible for Commission. on Appropriations Commission. Parliamentary parliamentary andStaffing. CorporateBody. administration Membership Speaker (who chairs) n/a Senate President President (who Speaker (who chairs) Presiding Officer plus HouseLeader (who chairs)plus chairs)and allVice- plus HouseLeader, (who chairs)plus andone leadersof Presidentsofthe oppositionleader and four elected members representative of government and Bundestag. onefromeach party. (byemerging con- each party. oppositionand six vention,one from others. each main party). Body LiaisonCommittee, CommitteeofChairs, Chairs’Committee None.Chairs’ Forum, an Conveners’ Group. representing whichexistsinSOs an informalgrouping whichexistsinSOs informalforum Startedinformally committeechairs andhas become whereall members but haslow profile. created around 2004, but nowexistson assertive. Since2003 arefromthe nowchaired by the SOs.Chaired by the hasregularly governing party Speaker. Presiding Officer or questioned thePrime (though non- Deputy. Minister. government Deputy Chairs can attend).

63 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons

Noneofthese administrative bodiescould be said to ‘speak for’ parliament in apolitical sense. As at Westminsterthe greatestpotential maytherefore liewith thecommittee comprising committee chairs,where one exists.Herethe HouseofCommons LiaisonCommittee hasprovedtobea model forother parliaments.InScotlandthe Conveners’ Groupwas establishedin1999initially on an informalbasis,thoughthis was put into standing orders in 2002.The committeeisofficially chairedbythe Presiding Officer, thoughinpracticethe Deputy Presiding Officertakes thechair. TheGroup was created at theinstigation of then Deputy Presiding OfficerGeorgeReid, himselfa former MP,and clearlybuilt on Westminsterpractice. Itsestablishment ledtosome turf warswith theBureau andSPCBoversuchmatters as overseas committeevisits,but it hasnow found arole whichincludes recommending committeereports to theBureau fordebateinplenary andsharing knowledgeoverscrutiny techniques.Members of theConveners’Group agreethatithas the potential to take on higherprofile representing theParliamentovertime,particularlygiven the centralityofthe Scottish Parliament’scommittees.However,ironically,the Group’smoreformal status post-2002creates some limitations,asstanding orders statethatitmustconcernitselfwith committeebusiness. Previously theunwritten nature of itsexistence gave theGroup greater freedom to roam.Since taking on therole of FirstMinister Alex Salmond hasindicated that he would be prepared to answer questions fromthe Conveners’Group, as theUKPrime Minister doeswith theLiaison Committee, thoughprocedural changeswould be needed before this could happen. 75 At themoment theConveners’Group is also limitedbythe fact that it doesnot have formal status as acommittee.

This is,however,far moreadvanced than thesituation in theother comparatorparliaments.In NewZealandaChairs’Forum was established threeyearsago by theClerk,David McGee, who hadbeen impressedbythe LiaisonCommittee model.This remains an informalforum, thoughits status was upgradedlastyear when it was established that theSpeaker would take thechair.Given theseeming inability of theBusiness Committeetospeak forparliament, alongside therespected role of thecommittees in NewZealand, this body hasthe potential to grow in power and influence. However it is,atthe very least, in theearly stages of its development.Similarly in Australiathere areequivalentbodiesbut thesehavealimitedrole.Inthe House of Representatives theCommittee of Chairs meetsonly around everysix months,and largelydealswith administrative matters. Butasall committees arechaired by government partymembers a CommitteeofChairscould at some timebecome an important lobbyfromthe government backbench. In theSenatethe Chairs’Committee has, if anything,anevenlower profile.

75 ‘Salmond offers to undergo public grillingbycommitteeconveners’, TheHerald ,26June2007, at: www.theherald.co.uk/politics/news/display.var.1497172.0.0.php

64 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons

Conclusions

Reasons to be cheerful This research was spurredbyconcerns about theway theHouseofCommons is run, and particularlythe controlthatits ownmembers have overits timetable andprocedures.Itis informedbystudy of five otherparliamentary chambers –inScotland, Germany, Australiaand NewZealand –whichfeeds into therecommendations forchangeset out below.However,we wereequallystruckbysomeofthe ways in whichthese parliaments were worse rather than better than theHouseofCommons in certain keyrespects. Uncovering this was notthe intention of the research –weset out to study comparable parliamentsthatmight have something to offer. But whilst thereare many positive lessons to be learnt,one of our keyconclusions is that theUKhas a lot to be grateful for. Rather than focussing whollyonthe negative,and on reform proposals, it thereforeseemsusefultoreflect on 10 ‘reasons to be cheerful’ about theinternal democracy of the HouseofCommons:

1. TheSpeaker is genuinely neutral. In theUKparliamentwegotogreat lengthstoensure that our Speaker is genuinelyneutral.S/hewithdrawsfromparty politics completely, including not voting in theHouse(exceptinthe caseofatie) andissupportedbywhollynon-partisan officials. This is in starkcontrast to what we sawinGermany,Australia,and NewZealand. Whileinthe UK theSpeaker used to by convention come fromthe governing party, but go on to act independently,all thesecountrieselect speakersfromthe governing partywho remain to some extent connected to partypolitics.InNew Zealandthe last Speaker forexample routinely attendedmeetings of hisparty caucus, whileinAustralia thePresident of theSenate hasanoffice entirely staffedbypolitical appointees. 2. TheSpeaker hassignificant discretion over matterswhich wouldotherwise rest with the whips. Aconnected fact is that morepartisanpresiding officers arenot trustedwith much responsibility andend up concentrating on largelyadministrative matters. Real political power leaches to thewhips.And when presiding officers seek to operate in astrictlynon-partisan manner they mayfind themselves being reined in by theirown side –unthinkable in theHouse of Commons. Consequently,inGermany,Australia,and NewZealandthe presiding officer hasvirtually no discretion even over whoiscalledindebates –itisopenlyacceptedthats/he will stickrigidlytospeakers’ listsprovidedbythe whips.InAustralia theselists aresocertain that they aremadepubliclyavailable in advance. Remarkable as thesesuggestions mayseem fromaUK perspectivetheyare not ‘allegations’but openly acceptedfactinthe countriesin question. 3. Members have fair access to the agenda on many matterswhich areelsewhere controlled by the whips. We complaininthe UK that members lack access to theagenda, andatthe endofthe reportweproposesome remediestothis perceivedproblem. Butin some respectsthe problemisfar moresignificantelsewhere. Forexampleinour Houseof Commonsprivate members’ bills andquestions areballotedfor.InNew Zealandand Australia theseare whollyinthe gift of thewhips.Questions arediscussedatdaily whips’ meetings, and on thegoverning side aredrafted by ministerialoffices. If abackbencherwants to aska question s/he mustfirst submit it to thewhips,whichleaveslittlescope forindependent questioning.InNew Zealandnot only questions butevensupplementaries arecalledbythe Speaker according to apredeterminedparty rota andlists providedbythe whips.Private members’bills aresimilarly controlled,and in Germanysingle members cannotproposebills at all. Even in Scotland, whichdraws morefromthe Westminstertradition,adjournmentdebates

65 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons

areallocated by thewhips.But in some systemsthere arenosuchmember-initiateddebates:in NewZealandmembers arelimitedtocontributing to afortnightly ‘general debate’madeupof unconnected speeches on different topics. 4. Thereisaclear distinction betweenmembers’and parties’ time. Onereason that members’business hasnot been monopolised by thewhips in thesameway in Britain is the existenceofseparateopposition time.OnHouseofCommons opposition days theother party frontbenchescan pickthe topic fordebate. In Australiaand NewZealand theseopportunities do not existfor opposition parties, so they have no choicebut to encroach on members’ time. 5. Voting is nowherenearascontrolled as it could be. People in Britain tend to describe the HouseofCommons as highly cohesive along partylines,and oftentocomplain about that ‘fact’–thoughrecentresearch hashad some successateroding this image (Cowley2002, 2005). Ourresearch provides clear illustration of how votescould be agreat deal more controlled than they are. Themostextreme caseisNew Zealand, wheresince 1996 thewhips have been able to castblockvotesonbehalfoftheir members,who need not even attend the chamberfor divisions.All members areassumedtowishtovote as part of theblock. In Australiathere is an expectation that memberswillbeexpelledfromtheir partygroup if they voteagainstitevenonce. In addition allthe otherparliaments were farmorecontrolled on particularissuesthanisthe UK.Inall cases privatemembers’bills (where they existatall)were takenonwhippedvotesunless they concernedclear conscience matters. In contrast allPMBs in theHouseofCommons aretaken on afreevote.Crucially,althoughthere is agenda control in termsofministersmovingamendments to standing orders,inthe HouseofCommons theseissuesare also conventionallytaken on freevotes.There was no such tradition in anyof our comparatorcountries, meaning that thegoverning partyhad thecapacity to getits way on procedure(thoughinScotlandconvention is not yetestablished,and procedural changeshave tendedtobebyconsensus). 6. Thechamberhas at leastsomeoversightoverthe weekly agenda. TheBusiness Statement maybeaninadequate form of accountability,and we proposesomemajor changes in this area below.But at leastitexists, andallowsmembers to debate thetimetable forthe week foruptoanhour.InAustralia thereisnoannouncementofthe timetable in thechamber, andindeed this remains subject to renegotiation by whips on an almosthourly basis. In New Zealandthe announcementofthe timetable proposedbythe government through thebusiness committeemay be followed by no morethanafewbrief interventions. 7. Thechamberhas oversight over committee appointments. Committeeappointments have been controversialinthe UK in recentyears, following therejection of thewhips’listof select committeemembers by thechamberin2001. Butatleastthis opportunity exists,since thechamberhas thefinalsay. In NewZealand, forexample, thereisnooversight whatsoever of thelists drawn up by thebusiness committee–whichineffect meansdrawn up by the whips.Had this system existedinthe UK,members would have been completelypowerless to reinstate GwynethDunwoody andDonald Anderson. 8. Opposition partiesholdarelatively fair proportion of committeechairs. In the Commonsthere is no rigidrule about theshare of committeechairs, but by convention the opposition partieshold afairlyproportionalnumberofchairs. In theAustralianHouseof Representatives–andsince 2006 theSenatetoo –all departmentalcommittee chairs are simply held by thegoverning party. 9. Committees have significantcontrol over their ownaffairs. Commonsselectcommittees can settheir ownagendasand reporttotheir owntimetables. This is also in contrast to many othercountries. In Germanypermanent committees carry out littleinvestigativework. In

66 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons

Australiacommittees in bothchambers do hold inquiries, but thetopicsfor thesemustfirst be agreed by thechamber. If atopic is uncomfortable forgovernment it simply uses its majority to blockthe inquiryfromgoing ahead. Thechamberalsosetsdownstricttime limits for committees to reportto. 10. Thereisatleast some spaceonthe agenda fordebatingcommitteereports. It could be said that thereisaserious lack of time on theagendainthe HouseofCommons fordebating thereports of select committees,and we make suggestions to remedy this below.But it should be rememberedthatinbothGermany andNew Zealandpermanent committees have no guaranteed accesstothe agenda at all. Finally, this project at theoutsetplannedtoalsoinvestigatebudgeting arrangements,and the extent to whichthe House of Commonscontrols its ownbudget.Inthe UK this processisset within astatutory framework andmanaged by theHouseofCommons Commission. We have not reportedonthis aspect at all, as we found no superior arrangements elsewhere. Indeed comparative work by aformerparliamentary official in Australiajudged theUKHouseof Commonstohavebyfar thebestsystemfor managing its budget (Verrier 2007).InNew Zealand theSpeaker must bid alongside otherministersfor parliamentary funds in theannualbudget round, but cannot discuss thedetails with members as s/he is sworntobudget confidentiality.The likely successofthese negotiations is said to depend on thewarmth of the relationship between the Speaker andthe Treasuryminister.The distribution of thebudget is also connected to thegeneral issueofwhips’controlovermembers.BritishMPs areentitledtoallowances direct fromthe parliamentary authoritiesand have virtuallynofinancial dependenceontheir parliamentary party groups.Avery different arrangementexistsinmanyother parliaments.InbothNew Zealandand Germanymembers areheavily dependent on theirparty groups forresearch support(in Germany thelarge partygroups employ around 250staff),whichcreates potential for‘disloyal’members to be deniedresources.

Anew logicofparliamentarycontrol Thecentral question in this reportiswho does, andwho should,takedecisions about how the HouseofCommons runs itselfand chooses to useits time.Inprincipleparliamentisademocratic institution, andthese decisions belong to its members. In practicethis principleisdifficult to adhere to,given thesizeand diversity of interestsinthe HouseofCommons. Acombination of this andpolitical pressureshavecausedthe principletobegraduallyweakened overtime. Democracy inside theCommons hasbeen interpretedasmajority rule,but with rights for individuals to gain accesstothe agenda.This is whollyreasonable.But arrangements have developedsothatone majority –the government –isprivilegedinparticular, andthere arefew opportunitiesfor othermajoritiestobeinfluential. In particular backbenchers,and cross-party groups such as committees,havelittleinfluenceoverthe agenda,and find it nearly impossibleto pressmatters to decisions.

Whileitiseasytosee howthis situation cameabout,wesuggest that it is no longer fitting for moderntimes. Sincethe 1970sselectcommittees have become increasingly important andwell respected,backbenchers have become moreindependent,and among theelectoratetribal adherencetopoliticalparties is on thedecline. An environment wheregovernment controls the agenda (evenfollowing behind-the-scenes consultation with theopposition front bench) now seemsavery outdatedand limitedinterpretation of democraticpractice. In particular, whileitis obviously important that parliament spends significanttime scrutinising thegovernment andits legislation, thegovernment hasanunjustified levelofcontroloverthe nature andtiming of other (non-government) business in thechamber.

67 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons

As discussed above,our study of otherparliaments showsthatBritain is very lucky in many respects. Theindependenceofthe Speaker,coupledwith aculturewhere informalcross-party backbenchworkand even ‘cross voting’are common,isnot found amongst anyofthe comparators we looked at.UKbackbenchers have awhole raft of freedoms not availabletotheir counterpartsinNew Zealand andAustralia,for example.But whilethis is healthy it also createsa significantpressure forchange–to find anew logic of parliamentary controlmoresuited to our current circumstances.

Thesysteminthe House of Commonscontinuestocentreonrightsfor theindividualmember, whichinachamberofover600 creates severe co-ordination problems.This is one of thereasons that government hasbeenable to gain so much de factocontrol, mostclearly reflectedinthe rules by standing orderno. 14.The logic of individualmembercontroltherefore doesnot in itselfgive power overdecision making to thecollectivity of members.Our comparators, however,donot by andlarge offerusattractivealternatives.InAustralia,New Zealandand Germanyrightsfor individualmembers have graduallybeencolonisedbythe parties, to thepointwhere thereare few opportunitiesinparliamentwhichare not controlled by thewhips.The division of time in the chamber, thedivision of committeechairsand members, andeventhe divisionofsuchmatters as parliamentary questions andadjournmentdebates,havebecome matters whichare traded between partyblocs–generallytothe exclusion of backbenchmembers.Business committees,where they exist, actuallyhelpfacilitate this trade. Thefact that such completecolonisation by theparties has not occurredatWestminstersuggeststhatwehaveamorerobustcultureofparliamentary independence, but theseexamples should also act as cautionary tales. Onealternative to thelogic of individualmemberrightsbalanced by government rights is agreater drifttowards de facto party rights,with independent backbenchers restricted to voicing doubts behind closed doorsinthe partyroom. Although this could be mitigated if greater democratic rights were grantedwithin the parties(as,for example,inGermany), we do not believethatthis is an attractive route. Indeed it is quite contrary to theobjectiveset at thestart of this reporttoempower parliamentarians perse ,and particularlytoencourageand give vent to cross-partybackbenchwork. We believeanimportant consideration in deciding anychanges to procedureisthatthese should strive to avoid inadvertentlycreating greaterparty control.

Thereare,however,some examplesfromthe comparator parliaments thatwebelieve can be built on. Theseact to give more rights to memberstoinfluencethe agenda on acollective basis. One keyexampleisthatofGermany,where thereare protected minority rights forgroups comprising at least5%ofthe chamber. This model providesanintermediate option between majority control andindividualmemberrights, withoutnecessarily privileging parties(thoughinthe party- dominatedenvironment of theBundestag it happenstobeparties that generallyexercisethese minority rights). At Westminstercurrently,for example,private members’ bills struggletogain prominenceinthe shadow of government bills. In contrast bills backed by groups of members,as existinGermany,might standabetterchance, andcould be formally privileged in therules. With careitshould be possibletoenshrineminority rights in ways whichdonot simply advantage opposition parties. Themostobvious example of cross-partybackbenchworking is that of committees,and lessons canbelearnt fromour comparators about boosting theirstrengthinthe chamber. Forexampleinthe Scottish Parliament committees can movebills,and in Australiathey areguaranteed almostimmediate debating time fortheir reports.

Oneresult of the‘winnertakes all’ cultureofthe HouseofCommons is theextenttowhich government influences thepattern of theagenda, even on non-government business. Clearly government must be able to govern,whichincludeshavingadequatetime forconsideration of its legislativeproposals. Parliament would also be failinginits duty of checkinggovernment if it did

68 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons notdebategovernment legislation andstatements, andquestion ministers, formuchofthe time. Butshifting greater controltoparliamentneed not be thesamething as denying government adequate time.The examplesofAustralia andNew Zealand, wherethere is ring-fenced time set aside fornon-government business, whichinAustralia is programmedbyaspecial committee, also show that thereisamiddleground betweenempowering isolatedindividualsonthe one hand and partyblocks or government on the other.

This is one way in whichwesuggest that thelogic of controlinthe HouseofCommons should change.But thereare also otherways, andother examples fromcomparatorparliaments whichcan offerinspiration. In particularoperating ademocraticprincipleinside theHouseofCommons should not mean that onemajority,the governing party, is necessarily privileged to theexclusion of othermajoritiesthatcould be formed.This is particularlythe casewith respect to matters such as agreeing theweeklyagenda.Herewecan learnfromthe Scottish andGermanparliaments, wherethe chambernot only hearsabout theproposedagenda forthe coming week,but also has an opportunity to voteonit. Similarly we believethatMPs should have greater collectivecontrol of theveryrulesbywhichtheyoperate,with theproposal of procedural changestaken out of the de facto exclusivecontrolofthe government.

When proposing procedural change thereare some principles or lessons whichare familiar from theUK, but whichare reinforced by study of thecomparatorparliaments.These have influenced our approach in making thespecificproposalsbelow.One is that thereisatrade-offbetween formalisation of rulesand establishment of cultural habits or conventions.For example,inour comparatorparliaments it was normalfor standing orders to specify theparty balanceon committees (oratleastthatsuchbalance should be proportionate to shareofseatsinthe chamber). At Westminsterthisisnot stated explicitly,but is in practiceadheredto. Onebyproductof formalised rulesinthe otherparliaments is that proportionality formulasare rigidlyappliedin ordertoavoid petty squabbles(effectively, or even literally, litigation) betweenparties overseats. ThemoreinformalsystematWestminsterisbased on trusttoamoresignificantextent, in line with a‘political’ratherthan‘legal’ constitution (Griffith 1979). Thereare some advantages in this. In particularnew formalised rulesmay themselves change cultureand behaviour,and in amodern party-dominatedparliamentthere is ariskthatchanges mayfeed thegeneral drifttowards greater partycontrol. Asecond generallessonisthatthe mostimportant issueisnot necessarily how decisions aretaken,but canbewhatsanctions existifthose decisions prove unacceptable to the widergroup. So forexampleinthe HouseofCommons,the agreementbetween theusual channels overthe business programme exists ‘inthe shadow’ofthe Business Statement,where members of theHousecan raiseobjections.This is afairlysoftsanction, but holds thethreat of embarrassment, not only in front of MPsbut also anymedia representativespresent.Incontrast, thereare no real sanctionsinthe NewZealandparliament, wherethe decision takenbythe Business Committeeisnot debated. In Scotland, in contrast,there is a‘hard’sanction in that the chambercan amendand vote on theprogramme.But it is rarely necessary to usethis sanction because it will be takeninto account by thoseonthe ParliamentaryBureau drawing up the programme.The Scottish system thereforeoffers greater parliamentarycontrol overthe agenda than doesthe HouseofCommons system,whilethe NewZealand arrangements do not.

Specificoptions forchange In this finalsection of thereportweset out our specific proposalsfor changestoprocedureinthe HouseofCommons.For clarity we adopt thesamestructure as earlier in thereport, thoughthere aresome obvious links between thedifferent issues.Manyofour proposalsbuildonexperiencein theother comparatorparliaments,and wherethis is thecasethe detail canbefound in theearlier corresponding section of thereport.

69 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons

Although theseproposalsare designed to be coherent andconsistent,theydonot comprisea closed packageofreform. Instead we presentthemasfar as possibleasamenu of options,from whichdifferent recommendations maybechosen independently.Webelieve that anyofthese individualreforms could result in improvements,irrespectiveofadoption of theothers. In some places we suggest alternativeways forward, eitherofwhichcould be beneficial.

The plenarytimetable Acentral objectiveofthe research project hasbeen to find ways of restructuringthe parliamentary timetable so as to transfer some of the government’s agenda-setting power to otheractorswithin theHouseofCommons,but withoutdenying government adequate time to ‘get its business’. Indeed,aswenoted earlier,restricting theavailable time forscrutiny of government legislation (thesingle largestcategoryofbusiness in termsoftime in plenary spent) wouldbeneitherpopular with, nor in theinterestsof, opposition partiesorbackbenchers.Nonetheless, we believethat government controlofthe agenda is excessive andextends to areasofactivity that aremore properlyconsideredbusinessofthe Houseasawhole.This categoryofbusiness includessuch items as topical adjournmentdebates,debates on theestablishment of select committees,other procedural motions, anddebates on committeereports.Whileitisastrength of theBritish parliamentary system that time is regularlyprovidedfor theseactivities, we do not believeitshould be forgovernment whips to determine whether, when,for how long andonwhatterms such business is conducted. This formsthe contextfor thefollowing discussion. Scheduling non-government time Keytothe presentallocation of time in thechamberisstanding orderno. 14,whichspecifies the time available foropposition days andprivate members’ bills.The basisofgovernment’s ‘ownership’ofmuchparliamentary time is theopening statementofSO14 that ‘Saveasprovided in this order, government business shallhaveprecedence at everysitting’. This makesmembers dependent on government to,for example,movestanding orderchanges or allocation of seatson select committees.Itisthe root,therefore,ofmanyofthe difficultiesoutlinedinthis report. There aretwo basicalternatives to deal with this.One is to reversethe logic of SO14.The otheristo specify different,and wider, exceptions to thegeneral assumption of government time.

Theradical option wouldbetoturnthe current logic of standing orderno. 14 on itshead, by limiting governmenttimeonthe agenda to specifiedperiods,and giving precedence to HouseBusinessinstead.Thisisthe logic used in the Australian Senate, and wouldreturn the Commons to asituation similar to thatbeforeBalfour’sreforms of 1902. In Australia Senate business includesprocedural matters, andpresentation of committeereports,for example, with government business required to fitaround them.This is aneater solution to that triedin Scotland, wherethere is no formal presumption of government ownership of time,but this seems to have creptintothe system by default.Adoptingsuchasolution is possible, but it would be a major change to current practicesowould requirecareful anddetailedconsideration. In particular thedefinition of HouseBusiness would need careful thought,asthis doesn’t currently existinthe UK system.Ifspecifictime wereset aside forgovernment thiswould need to be extensive, and could even result in less flexibility than thecurrent system.

An alternative is to specifyfurther categories of businesswhich have guaranteed time, including committee business andprocedural matters. This is amorepragmatic approach moreinlinewith Britishtradition.However,itcouldresult in asomewhat long andunwieldy list. It would also do nothing to addressthe fact that government controls thetiming of many non- government matters. Therefore the best solution maybetoestablish afar clearer dichotomy between‘governmenttime’ andtimefor HouseBusinessor‘backbenchbusiness’,with the latterguaranteedalargerand more regular blockofagendatime. This is asimilar logic

70 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons to that applied in Australiaand NewZealand. HouseBusiness would include debateson committeereports,backbenchbills andmotions,and procedural matters(seeBox 1). We do not proposethatthis form of business includes‘opposition days’, andwereturntothese below.

Box1:Forms of HouseBusiness

 Debatesonselectcommittee reports  Debatesonselectcommittee bills (see below)  Debatesonprivate members’ motions  Debatesonestablishment of select committees  Debatesonprocedural changesproposed by theProcedureCommittee  Generaldebates on matters of interest to members  Occasionaldebates on (selected) privatemembers’ bills

If this approach is adopted theallocation between government andnon-government timecould be basedonthe roughshare between thesematters at present. This was illustrated earlier in Table 1. We do not proposethattime should be takenfromthe current slotsonthe agenda made available to individualmembers viathe ballot process: i.e. oral questions,adjournmentdebates at theend of theday, andprivate members’ bills on Fridays.However thereare aseriesofother formsoftime whichcould sensiblybebundled together as House Business. Thefigures in Table 1show that thereare sufficientother items whichare not genuine government business to constructatleast half aday’s time each week fornon-government business. Giving overacompleteTuesday each week (with theexception of question time andthe endofthe dayadjournmentdebate) to House Business would have required 19.3%oftime in the2003-04 session, and16.1% in the2005-06 session.

Committeebusiness in thechambertakes up 2.8% of time on thebasis of 2003-04figures (1%on estimatesdays and1.8%ondiscussing committeereports in government time).The ritualpre- recessdebates comprise1.2%oftime,and othermiscellaneous members’ business 3% of time. Together theseitems alone comprise7%ofannualtime.Itwould be reasonable to addtothis at leasthalfthe time spentonadjournmentdebates in government time(8.2%), bringing thetotal to 11.1%. Theseitems areclearly morethansufficienttocreateahalfday’s HouseBusiness slot each week,ifdistributedfairlythroughout theyear.However thereare also otheritems whichcould be included.Ifgovernment is giving up some of its time (albeit on matters whichare not strictly government business) it could be argued that theopposition should also give up asmall portion of its time.Forfeiting twoopposition days peryearwould provide afurther 1.1% of time.Additional time mightbefound in trimming thetime spentindebating theQueen’s speech andthe Business Statement slightly, whilethere arevarious otheritems of business from within government time, such as debatesonestablishment of newcommittees, whichare not shownseparatelyinTable 1. Thesefigures show that at astretch it mightevenbepossibletocreateawhole dayofHouse Business in each sitting week –thatisapproximately 35 half-days,or35days,ofHouseBusiness everyyear. It would have theadvantagethatthe shareofgovernment andnon-government time would be evenly distributedthroughout theyear andacrosssessions of differing lengths–which Appendix Bdemonstrates is not currently thecase. Areconsolidation of existingtime(without the lossofprivate members’Fridays or members’adjournmentdebates)shouldresultinat least half aday,and up to afullday,per week beinggiven over to HouseBusiness. This should be on TuesdayorWednesday to ensure thatitisin‘primetime’.Ithas been suggested at various timesinrecentyearsthatprivate members’ bills should be movedfroma

71 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons

Fridaytoaweekdayevening. 76 Although we do not specifically proposethis,itwould be possible to createanevenlonger period of continuousnon-government business on Tuesdays if ‘House’ business werefollowed by rescheduled privatemembers bills.

At presentone of thegreatestfrustrations in thesystemisthatmostopportunitiesmembers have to getissuesontothe agenda do not allowthemtoforce decisions.Evenwhere government does provide time fordebates on matters of widespread interest,these aregenerally taken‘on the adjournment’. It is an importantprinciple thatmembers should be able to forcevotes on HouseBusiness. This wouldenablecommitteestoforce decisionsontheir reports, and the Housetoexpress itsviewcollectively on issues of current public importance.

This leaves thequestion of how time is allocated andprioritised between different items of House Business,and againthere areseveral options. Standingordersshouldcontinue to setout, as theydonow,aminimumallocation of time forprivate members’ billsand fordebating committee reports. But crucially,ifthere is anew categoryofHouse Business,the responsibility forallocating time betweendifferent itemsofbusinessonthispartofthe agenda should no longer rest with the usualchannels,which giveprimary control to the governmentChief Whip. Thecreation of afixed slot forHouseBusiness should end government input into when privatemembers’ business andcommittee business is scheduled.It should also endthe government’sdominanceoverprocedural change (asfurther discussedbelow). Ourviewisthat anew committee made up of backbenchers (the ‘Backbench Business Committee’)shouldbeestablished to determinethe timetableofHouse Business. This builds on experience in Australia, wheregovernment business is organised by thewhips througha usualchannels arrangement, but non-government business is organised by aseparate‘Selection Committee’. 77 In Australiathis is runbywhips,but thewhips areelected in partygroups.Inorder to creategenuine member controlinthe Westminstersystem, membersofsuchacommittee should be backbenchers. TheBackbench Business Committeeshouldhaveresponsibilityfor scheduling different itemsinthe regularHouse Business slot,withinthe confinesset out in standing orders.Itmightalsobegiven some control over programmingonprivate members’Fridays.

Oneoption we discuss laterinthe reportiswhether thetimetabling of allbusiness should be determinedbya‘business committee’,and we expressourselves not convinced. To ensure that members’and committee businessisclearly separate,and freedfromthe control of the whips, the newBackbench Business Committeeshouldhavenorole in timetabling governmentbusiness ,whichwould continue to be determinedvia theusual channels,and principallybythe government whips.

We have givencareful consideration to whetheropposition days should be consideredHouse Business.Thishas some attractions,but thecosts in our view outweigh thebenefits.Itwould be hard to justify excluding opposition whips from acommittee whichwas schedulingopposition business, andwould thereforebepolitically impractical to createagenuineBackbenchBusiness Committeeifopposition days wereincluded.Hence we conclude that thetiming of opposition days should not be included in theremit of thenew committeeand should continue to be agreed throughfrontbenchnegotiation as at present. Butwedobelieve that theopposition should be givenmorecontroloverthe timing of how its allocation is taken. Therefore, whilewedonot proposethatopposition days should be consideredHouse Business,opposition parties

76 Forexample Hansard Society(2003:6); Conservative DemocracyTaskforce (2007: 6) 77 It also buildsonproposals that have been made in thepastfor acommitteetomanagetimetablingofprivate members’ bills (Marshcited in Hansard Society(2003:6); Hansard Society(2003:6); Dismore in Procedure Committee(2003:Ev71).

72 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons should have arighttodemandahalf-day debate be scheduled withinfivedays, as recommended by the ConservativeDemocracy Taskforce, andtoexchange some of their days forgovernmentstatementsonspecified topics as recommended by theHansard Societyin2001 .Inbothcases such time would be deductedfromthe overall allocation for opposition time.Itwouldsupplement the existing provision forurgentdebates understanding order24asawayofpreventing thegovernment from avoiding debate on controversialtopical issues.

TheBackbench Business Committeeshouldhavebroad representationfromacrossthe House, andbewholly made up of backbenchmembers.Itmight comprise, say, ten members drawnproportionately from across the House, whocould be elected in their party groups.The chair of the Liaison Committee, andpossiblythe chairofthe Procedure Committee, should sitasex-officio members.The committeeshouldbechaired by oneof the Deputy Speakers. Thecoretaskofthe committeewould be scheduling non-government time, within theframework setbystanding orders andfollowing theitems tabledbydifferent eligiblegroups. It is extremely importantthatdrawing up adraft schedule does notfall, de facto, into the handsofthe whips(as hasoccurredwithrespect to business committees elsewhere). Administration of the committeeshouldlie firmlywithofficials reporting to the Deputy Speaker. Time forcommittees Theestablishment of aweekly HouseBusiness slot on theplenary agenda,with aBackbench Business Committeeincontrolofthe allocation of time within it, wouldend many of the frustrations with respect to committees’ability to gettheir reports debated. In particular, the BackbenchBusiness Committeewould be able to make debatesvotable,and would include representation fromthe LiaisonCommittee. However thereare otherchanges whichcould be implemented separately,oralongside this reform.

We proposethatthere should remain ring-fenced time fordiscussion of committeebusiness. At presentthe LiaisonCommitteecontrols sixThursdays annuallyinWestminsterHall, andin practicethree days for‘consideration of estimates’ in theCommons chamber. Therehas been some expansion in recentyears, but this fallsfar shortofarrangements in some of our comparator countries.Weare particularlyimpressedbythe example of theAustralianHouseof Representatives, whichislinkedtotheir ‘MainCommittee’ on whichour WestminsterHallwas based. Here thepublicationofeachnew committee reportisannounced in thechamber, andat this point thereisanopportunity formembers to request adebate, whichtakes place on thesame dayinthe parallel chamber. We believethatthis example could be usefullycombinedwith the proposalswhichhaveemerged fromvarious bodiesinrecentyears.Weagree with the Modernisation Committeethat there should be a30minute slot everyweekfor the announcementofany newcommitteereports,withacapacity forthe chair of the committee to introducethe reportand forashortgovernmentreply. But, buildingonthe recent Australian model, we believethatthisinitialdebateshouldbeinplenary, and if members indicate thattheywantmoretimefor debate on aparticular reportthere should thenbeatime setaside each week in WestminsterHall forthistohappen. In practice requestsfor debatesmight become routine,but announcementofreports in theCommons chamberwould improve theirvisibility on thepublicrecord.These arrangements would replace thecurrent standing orderwith respect to committeedebates in WestminsterHall. The30minute plenaryslot wouldtakeplaceonHouse Business dayifone is created. Alternatively it might replaceone of thecurrent twoten-minuterulebillslots, whichoccur in primetime.

Whatever arrangementismadefor HouseBusiness we believethatcommitteesshould have clear guaranteed accesstothe plenary agenda to have theirreports debatedinatimely manner.In

73 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons

Scotland standing orders explicitly setaside 12 half-days persession forcommittee business, which areallocated by theLiaison Committeeequivalent. We suggest that asimilar clarification is needed in theCommons,bothinorder to guaranteetime to committees andalsotoimprove public understanding.Therefore ‘estimatesdays’ should be formally renamed‘committeedays’ with allocation determined,asatpresent,bythe Liaison Committee .This leadstothe question of how much time should be setaside forcommittee business.Atpresent extra opportunitiesfor debatesoncommittee reports areprovidedbygovernment (and in government time) on an ad hoc basis. It is tempting to suggest that moretime should be guaranteed to committees fordebateontheir reports.However if our proposalstocreateaBackbenchBusiness Committeeimplemented it also seemsdesirable that that committeeshould have afairamount of discretion overwhatistimetabledinthe HouseBusiness slot. Therefore if aBackbench Business Committeeiscreated we do notsuggestanincreaseonthe minimumthree days forcommitteeseachsession,but wouldinpracticeexpectadditionaltimetobemade available forconsideration of committee reports on HouseBusinessdays in responseto demand fromcommittees andmembers.

Thesituation is rather different if ourmainproposalfor aBackbenchBusinessCommittee is not acted upon. In this caseastronger guaranteeoftime forcommittee business seemsdesirable. If no BackbenchBusinessCommittee andHouse Business slot is createdwewould therefore support the proposal made by the LiaisonCommittee andothers,thatcommittees should be entitled to aminimum of sixdaysofdebateinthe Commons chamberper session, with allocation betweencommitteesdecided by theLiaison Committee. Whetherornot the proposal of anew HouseBusiness slot is implemented, committees should, as in Scotland, themselves decide the form of debatesontheir reports,including the possibility of debates on asubstantivemotion. This would ensure that particularlyimportant committee recommendations could be put to thechamber,and therebyprovidesasafety valve. However in Scotland committees generallychoosevoluntarily to presenttheir reports on ‘takenote’ motions.

Finally, we suggest that, Committees should be entitled to proposetheir ownbills,asin Scotland,and thatthese should be givenspecial priority. Some committees have published bills,but have no formal meanstoget theseontothe agenda unless they aretaken up by individual members (who might,obviously,bemembers of thecommittee). This is one of theclearest exampleswhere theCommons’privileging of individuals andofgovernment leaves an important gap. Select committees buildupsubstantialexpertise in atopic andshould have theability to move legislativeproposalsintheir subject area as acollectiveshould they wish.These would by definition be cross-partyproposals. We suggest below that othergroups of members should also be able to move legislativeproposals, but thoseput forwardbycommittees should have apriority. One option wouldbetoprovide afast-trackfor twocommitteebills in each session to be given priority over othernon-government legislation. Thesecould be selected either through theLiaison Committee or on the basisofthe numberofsignatories–with a minimumcross-partyrequirement. Othertimefor members Committees,ofcourse,donot have amonopoly on expertiseinthe chamber. Thereare many individualmembers whobuildupeffectivecampaigns on issues.However,their opportunitiesfor formal outlets on theseare limited. Individuallymembers can sponsoradjournmentdebates,which have low profile, or privatemembers’bills,whichhavelimitedchanceofsuccess, as wellasasking questions to ministers. Collectively, theoptions aresignificantlymorelimited: Early DayMotions maygainlarge numbers of supporters,and members can addtheir namestoeach others’ bills.But whilelarge numbersofnames on legislativeamendments mayhelpensurethattheyare selected, weightofsupportmakes no differencetothe priority giventomotions or bills. EDMs arenever debated, andthe ranking of PMBs is literallyalottery. As our comparators show,there is much to

74 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons be said forrandom selection, andEDMsalsohavetheir uses as a‘soft’formofinfluence, but thereremains agap with respect to members’ ability to put theirproposalsonthe agenda.

We believethat the example of Germany,where groups of members have rightsofaccessto the agenda could usefully be followed. TheGermansystemisbased on alogic of proportionality,whichsaysthatminority groupsshould be entitledtoafair shareofagenda time. In theUKwehaveother ways of ensuring time forminorities–throughopposition days,and individualmemberrights–bothofwhichare valuable andshould be retained. Butwecould add to thesebyallowing greater group rights,particularlyfor backbenchand cross-partygroups. Groups of backbenchers should be able to proposebills,and there should be ameans for these to gain priority, especially when these groupsare cross-party. This also builds on the experience in Scotland, wherePMBsmusthavethe supportof18members,drawn fromseveral parties.

We believethat facilities forprivate members’bills,based on aballot,shouldcontinue to form part of thepackage of non-government time andwedonot proposeany change,at least in the shortterm, to the arrangements forFridays. In particularthe UK’sballot arrangements avoidbills falling completelyinto thehands of thewhips as happens in some comparatorcountries. However,there should also be opportunitiesfor committees andother groups of members. We proposethatthe BackbenchBusinessCommittee should be able to timetablehighprioritynon-governmentbills in the HouseBusinessslot forwhich it is responsible, ensuring that privatemembers’bills wouldnot be whollydependent on winning government time if theycomelow down the ballot (time whichinrecentyearshas only very rarely been given).Suchbills could also compete forthe time on theagenda controlled by theBackbenchBusiness Committee. In particular, theBackbenchBusiness Committeeshould be able to prioritisebills that come fromcommittees, or have otherwisedemonstrated widespread support. This would help ensure that thewhips cannot whollycolonise PMBtime throughthe use of ‘handout’bills.

In addition,agenda time should not be restricted to thosebringing forwardlegislative proposals. Members’motions should be reinstated,againwithparticular priorityfor motionswith cross-party support.These should alsobeprogrammedbythe BackbenchBusiness Committee, andwould enable members to initiate debatesontopicsoftheir choice. If no BackbenchBusiness Committeeiscreated,and thereisnocreation of aHouse Business slot, we would supportthe recentrecommendation of theModernisation Committee (2007) that such motionsshould be eligiblefor debate on Fridays.However this would be very much asecond-class option. An alternativewould be to learnfromthe HouseofLords,where one Thursday permonth is givenovertotwo backbenchdebates,whichare balloted foramongstbackbenchers and Crossbenchersonly. 78 Agreeingthe main weeklytimetable Theproposalsabove,ifimplemented, would give members of theHouseofCommons significantlymorecontroloverthe timetable of theirown institution. They would carve out anew part of theagenda not falling underusual channels control, andprovide agreater ability for individuals andgroups of members to put items ontothe agenda.Theywould addressmanyofthe concerns that have been raised about parliamentarycontrolinrecentyears. However we realise that thesewould amount to asignificantchange. If the move to aHouse Business slot is not made,orisnot made immediately,webelievethatthe presentsystemofdebatingthe Business Statement on aweeklybasis could be significantlyimprovedbylearningfrom the Scottish Parliament.

78 SeeHouse of Lords(2007:para. 5.51).

75 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons

At presentthe timetable forthe week is presentedtothe Houseinthe Business Statement on a Thursday, following negotiation throughthe usualchannels. Members mayrespond by raising pointsand calling fortimetobeallocated differently,but thesepleas arelargely symbolicasno change can be forced.There aretwo aspectsofthis processwhichcould potentially be reformed. Thefirst is theway in whichthe timetable is drawn up, andthe second is how it is presentedtothe House.

With respect to thefirst of these, many groups have recentlyproposed theestablishment of some kind of general‘business committee’.Based on our study of such institutions in otherparliaments, we arenot convinced that an overarching business committeewould addressthe keyquestion of parliamentary controloverthe agenda,asfurther discussedbelow.But insufficientfocus in recent debateshas been giventothe second question. We believethatchanges here could be important in ordertogivegreater controlofthe agenda to members. That is,whatoversight role the chamberasawholeshould have onceadraftofthe timetable hasbeen drawnup.

Here theexisting Business Statement offers afoundation on whichtobuild. Theannouncementis transparentand allows objections to be voiced,which can create politicalpressure on thewhips to respond to thedemands of theHouse.The difficulty is that if thewhips aredeterminedtoresist such pressure,theyultimately can. An increased formalisation of theBusiness Statement could thereforeoffergreater parliamentary (and particularly backbench) control. 79 Ourcomparator parliaments –particularlyinScotlandand Germany–offerusefulmodels to follow.

An increased formalisationofthe Business Statement would involvetwo changes. First, the weekly Business Statementshouldbepublishedinadvance of beingdebated.Assuming that thetiming of thestatement is not changed, it would be published late on Tuesdayorearly on Wednesday. Publication in advancewould mean that there should be an abilitytotable amendments to the Statement. This would act as asafetyvalve forbothbackbenchers and opposition partiestoobject to thesubstanceortiming of theagenda –for example if members felt that insufficienttime was being allowed forthe remaining stages of an important bill. To help avoidfrivolous claims forextra time (ofwhichthere aremanyatthe presentBusiness Statement), amendments should only be ruled in orderiftheyspecify whichbusinessshouldbe omittedorcurtailed to make time forany additional business .

Thepublication of amendments fordebatewould place an additional burdenonthe Speaker if thereweremanytabledfromwhichs/he hadtoselect. In theScottish Parliament, whichoperates asimilar system,amendments arerelativelyrare. However,the HouseofCommonsisfar bigger, andmight develop adifferent (and more‘freefor all’)culturebased on existing practice. To avoid this processdescending into ritualistic oppositionalism, to be ruled in orderamendments should have to demonstratesignificantsupport. This mightbeset at,say, 30 signatories, but be subject to review afterapilot period. Amechanismmightalsobeincludedtoprioritise amendments with clear cross-party supportfor debate. On the basisofexperienceinother parliaments,partisanamendments mayberelativelyrare, giventhe presence of opposition whips in theusual channels.These should really only occuronly when thegovernment hadignored opposition voices,orwhenthe whips on one side or theother hadnot respondedtothe viewsof theirbackbenchers.However giventhe established adversarialcultureinthe HouseofCommons, it would be sensibletobuildinsome safeguards.

79 This is in line with therecentrecommendationofthe Modernisation Committee(2007:32) that ‘there is acasefor formalisingbusinessquestionsinStandingOrders’,thoughthe committeedid notspecify howitwould seek to do this.

76 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons

Thesecond elementofchangewould be that the Business Statement,and anyqualifying amendments to it,shouldbevoted uponbeforebeingagreed. This wouldemphasisethatthe chamber’sagenda belongstoall its members.Itwould also provide areal sanction to thechamber when voices of members hadbeen overlooked.AsinScotlandand Germany, thesemembers would be able to change theorder of business if they could muster amajority.Again,inother parliaments such votes arerelativelyrare, but thethreat of them helps ensure that thewhips are responsivetothe chamber. Wherethere was no significantopposition to theBusiness Statement it could then be agreed afterashorterdebatethanthe full hour as at present. Time forthis could come outofgovernment time, providing an incentive forthe government to ensure widespread supportfor its programme before it is presentedtothe House, or be addedtoHouseBusiness.

Finally, all partiesshouldcommittoastrong convention that such divisionsare considered procedural andare takenonafree vote. In practiceparties mightbelikelytovote fairly cohesively mostofthe time,particularlyasgovernment members will tend to supportthe government’sprogramme.But votes forchangebygovernment backbenchers should not be consideredas‘rebellions’. In fact,sincethe usualchannels would have agreed thetimetable in advanceitislikelythatmostopposition members would supportthe Statement,and that divisions would be rare.This is theexperienceinScotland. Butwhere thereisclear backbenchunrest, or whereusual channels negotiations have failed,the chamberwould have thefinalsay.

Appointments to committees Aside fromthe controloftime in thechamber, appointment to committees is theissue whichhas raised mostconcerns recentlyover‘ownership’ofHouseofCommons decisions.There have been various proposalsput forwardfor reform of appointmentstoselectcommittees,inparticular, and twofailedattempts to introducereform. Thekey concernhas been thecontrolofcommittee appointmentsbythe whips.

Ourstudy of otherparliaments hasfound no obvious solution to this perceivedproblem. In all cases appointment to committees lies in thehands of theparties,and in practicelargely in the hands of partywhips.There is abasic question about whethercommittee memberships belong to theparties,ortothe Houseasawhole.Inall our comparatorparliaments,itisthe former that prevails.Eveninthoseparliaments with ‘business committees’thatformallymakenominations to committees thewhips fromone partywillnot interfere with nominations by whips fromother parties. As thesebodieshavenoother real backbenchrepresentation, this meanswhips’ nominations go unchallenged. Indeed in some cases,suchasNew Zealand, thereisnorole forthe chamberinapproving thebusiness committee’srecommendations,sothe system is farmoreparty controlled than in theUK. In addition,whenasked in our Issuesand Questions paperwhether committeemembership should be amatterfor parties, or be decidedonacross-partybasis,all respondentsfeltthatitwas inevitable(andinseveral cases desirable) forparties to retain control.

We have not found anothersystemwhere greater cross-partyinvolvementisformalisedinthe choiceofcommittee members.Inthe Commons, rejection of listsbythe chamberisalast resort, whichin2001was showntowork. Sincethenthe Labour Partyhas significantlydemocratisedits internal arrangements forchoosing committeemembers.Althoughparallelchanges have not occurredinthe otherparties it is difficult to seehow thesecould be imposed.Itwould breakwith precedent, andbeextremely controversialand probably undesirable,for Houserulestoset down mechanisms forparty groupactivities.

Thereare ways,however,inwhichthe presentsystemfor choosing select committeemembers could be improved, andthis processbedistanced from thewhips. TheCommittee of Selection should include backbenchmembers from each of the main parties, andits membership

77 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons ceasetobedominated by whips. We favourthe recommendation of theConservative Democracy Taskforcethatonly one whip of eachofthe threemainparties should sitonthe committee. Underthe current arrangements theCommittee of Selection’s membership is approvedbythe House, but this tends to be low key. Theappointment of the committee should be timetabledduringHouse Business at the startofthe parliament. Indeed it might be debatedatthe same time as theestablishment of theBackbenchBusiness Committee, if one is established.Aswith othercommittees its appointment would normally be non-controversial, if the whips have respondedtomembers andcreated abalanced membership.

Afterthe appointment of theSelection Committee, motionsfor the appointmentofselect committeesshouldbetabled in aHouse Business slot earlyinthe parliament. This is a similar practicetonow,but would have itstiming underthe controlofthe BackbenchBusiness Committee. In addition, as was thecaseprior to 2005, the motion to approveselect committee memberships should be movedbythe chairofthe CommitteeofSelection, notbyawhip or otherminister, ands/he should respondtoany objections. This putsownership of appointmentsclearly in thehands of thecommittee,makes its chairresponsiblefor defending its decisions,and in so doing elevates theimportanceofthe chair. Whilewedid not find any examplesofthe whole Houseelecting committeechairs, as was recommended by theConservative Democracy Taskforce, we believethat the chair of the CommitteeofSelection should be a senior backbencherelected specifically forthe purpose by the Houseinasecret ballot, alongthe linespreviouslyrecommended by theLiaison Committee .These changeswould creates amoretransparent,and clearlynon-government, framework forthe appointment of committees.

Therehas been particularconcernabout theappointment of chairs of select committees.Again, our comparative research found no example of very different mechanisms to copy,asinall cases committees areresponsiblefor selecting theirown chairs.However,the procedurefollowed in Australiawould be asmall improvement on current practice. We thereforerecommendthat select committeesshouldelect their ownchairsinsecretballots, followinganin-principle agreementastowhich party should hold the chair. This would particularlymakeadifference if therewerelesswhip controloverwho gets on committees.The sharing of chairs should be agreed throughthe usualchannels,asnow,with only members of theappropriateparty entitledto standfor election. However, the division of chairsbetween partiesshouldbeapprovedby the chamberatthe same time as the overall membershipofselect committees is approved, as is the case in the Scottish Parliament. This would provide aclear forumfor grievances to be resolved if usualchannels agreements broke down. Anysuchdecision shouldtakeplace within a clear framework setdowninstanding orders,sothatthe majority partycould not vote itselfall of thechairs. We thereforesuggest that standing orders should statethatthe chairsofselect committeeswillbesharedbroadly proportionately betweenthe parties. This would enshrine current practiceinthe rules.

Although attention hasfocussedonappointmentstoselectcommittees,appointmentstopublic billcommittees (formerlystanding committees)isfar less transparent. Here againwefind no obvious comparators,asall othercountriescombine thelegislative andinvestigativefunctions in specialistcommittees (ortakethe committeestage of bills in plenary). However,wesee no clear reason whythe transparency applying to select committees should not be extendedtobill committees.Wetherefore recommend that thesameprocedureasapplies to select committeesshouldbeusedfor approvinglists of public bill committeemembers,withthe chair of the CommitteeofSelectionmovingsuchproposals. This should normallybea formality, but if it seemed that aparticularmemberhad been excludedunfairly, or opinion on a billcommittee not be suitably balanced (e.g.bythe exclusion of leading rebels), amendments to

78 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons thelistcould be movedand agreed.Inthe lightofevidencepresented above that rebels areoften excludedfromorunder-representedonbillcommittees, the expectation should be thatthe composition of bill committeesreflects the balanceof opinion in theHouse ratherthan simple party balance .This solution was supportedbythe HansardSociety in its responsetoour Issuesand Questions paper.

Changing therules Afurther frustration is theextenttowhichrule changesinthe Commonsdependonthe initiative of government. Although theProcedureCommittee (orLiaison Committee, or others)can make recommendations,inpracticestanding orderchanges will only getdebatingtime if tabledbya minister.Aconnected issueisthe chairing of theModernisation Committeebythe Leader of the House. This hasthe advantageoffocussing theLeader on reform issues,and improving the chances of committeerecommendations winning parliamentary time,but runs counter to the principlethatparliament’srulesbelong to its members, rather than to government.

We found some very different examplesofhow rule changesare agreed in our comparator parliaments.There arebroadly twotypes of procedurecommittees –one dominatedbyleaders andwhips,and theother runbybackbenchers.The firsttendtobeveryclosed, andthe second muchmoreopenand transparent. Theestablishment of the Modernisation Committeetook a smallstepinthe direction of thefirst kind of committee, thoughits work remains largelyopen.

Theproposalsthatwehavemadeabove have implications forthe way that procedural changesare agreed.The establishment of HouseBusiness time,during whichmembers’motions could be taken, would provide an opportunity forindividualmembers (orgroups)toproposeprocedural change.Moretime to debate committeereports,and allowing committees to proposethese on substantivemotions,would provide moreopportunitiesfor theProcedureCommittee. Allofthis, we believe, is desirable.

However,there aresome otherspecificchanges that could be made. If committeeshavemore time on the agenda andcan proposereports on substantivemotions,and private members’motionscan alsobeusedtopropose procedural change,wesee no need forthe continuationofthe Modernisation Committee.Thisshouldbemergedwiththe Procedure Committee, underastrong backbenchchair. Oneofthe keyarguments forhavingthe Leader of theHouse chairthe Modernisation Committeeistoensureitaccesstothe agenda,but this should no longer be adifficulty underour proposals. This doessomewhat diminish therole of the Leader of theHouseand could overtime, alongwith otherdevelopments, lead to thedemiseof this position.

Thereisaremaining problemthatgovernment regularlybringsforwardprocedural changes. This would be diminished by thechanges above, but notnecessarily eliminated. We areattracted to the system in Scotlandwhere all standing orderchangesmustbeproposedbythe Procedures Committee,and ministerscannotpropose changestothe chamberdirectly. This should be kept underreview. However, on balancewebelievethatgreater pluralism –whereby eitherbackbenchersorfrontbenchers have achancetopropose procedural change –ispreferabletogivingthe committeesucharigid gatekeeping role. It would appear unfairtoallow backbenchers but not ministers(who, afterall,are MPs) to putprocedural change on theagenda. However, procedural changesproposedbygovernmentshouldbe movedingovernmenttime. A‘thirdway’would be saythatnostanding orderchanges could be put to theHouseuntil they hadbeen consideredand reportedupon by theProcedureCommittee, although that committeewould not specifically have hadtoproposethem.

79 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons

Whospeaks forparliament? Individuals Thereare anumberofindividualswho hold keypositions whichrequirethemtorepresent the Commonsasawhole,and/or playamajor part in how it runs.These arethe Speaker andDeputy Speakers, theLeader of the Houseand theChiefWhip. Thereare some fuzzy linesbetween the responsibilities of thesedifferent actors, particularlywith respect to theextentthatthe two government members representthe government or the House. Therole of ‘champion’ of the Commonsisdividedbetween theSpeaker andLeaderofthe House, whilethe role of managing government business is dividedbetween theLeaderofthe Houseand ChiefWhip. It is the ‘champion’ role that could be carried out moreeffectivelythanitisnow.

Ouroverseas comparators offerlittleinspiration as to how to betterfillthisrole.The presiding officerrole in allthe overseas parliaments was farmorepartisan, demonstrating that we have alot to be grateful forinour tradition of aneutral Speaker.Indeed, care must be taken in the establishmentofany newprocedures thatthe neutralityofthe Speaker, andthe Speaker’s office, is notput underthreat. Shouldthis tradition be lostitwould be difficult to regain. However, the Speakercould play amoreassertive role in defendingthe Commons,and the rightsofits members. Thestrongestdefenderofparliamentthatwecameacrossinthis study was not apresiding officer, but theClerk of theAustralianSenate. To alesserextentthe Clerkof theNew Zealandparliamentplays asimilar role.These officers arefilling avoid left by thelackof astrongly neutral presiding officer. Butthe way they go about theirroles–publishing articles and speakingateventsinorder to explainand defend theprinciplesofparliamentary democracy – could provide an inspirationtoafuture Speaker in theUK. When electingits next Speakerthe Houseshouldconsiderthe benefitsofchoosingsomeonepreparedtobeanoutspoken public defender of parliament.

Theway theSpeaker is electedhas been reformed in recentyears, thoughthese arrangements have not yet actuallybeenused. Thenew system promises to be more satisfactorythanthatwhich preceded it, anduntil it is tested thereiscertainlynoneed to recommend change.Indeed asimilar system was put into effect in theHouseofLords,where theLordSpeaker electedin2006was a clear choice, andseemstobedeveloping arole as aconfident champion of theHouse.

Theelection of theDeputySpeakersislesstransparent,and forthese positions theHouse normallyapprovesnominations agreed between thewhips.Moretransparencyseemsdesirable in theappointment of theDeputySpeakers, but as theProcedureCommittee (2002) haspointedout this is not straightforward. Anyreformwould have to protect theconvention that thereisaparty balanceinthese positions.Asaresult, this mayhavetoremain(at least de facto )amatter forthe partygroups.However,ifreformwas considerednecessary in this area one solution would be that allthree Deputy Speakerscould be electedsimultaneously by secret ballot with arule that no more than one of thoseelected must be fromthe same partyasthe Speaker.This would createasimilar situation to that whichexistsinScotland. Variousproposals made in thisreportwould strengthenthe visibility of otheractorsinthe House, including the firstDeputy Speaker, whowould probably chair the BackbenchBusinessCommittee, andthe chair of the CommitteeofSelection. Theseindividuals might therefore cometobeseenasgreater defendersofparliamentovertime.

Thechoiceofthe Leader of theHouseand ChiefWhip bothlie with thePrime Minister.This may seem automatic, but in fact our comparatorcountriesshow that it need not necessarily be thecase. In bothGermany andNew Zealandthe whips areelected within theirparty groups.This puts a rather different complexion on usualchannels negotiations.Inall cases thewhips tread abalance between representing partyleaderstomembers andthe otherway around. Election by members tiltsresponsibility andaccountability towards them. If the Commons continueswithausual

80 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons channels system wherewhips areresponsible forkey decisionsovertimetabling and appointments thiscould be significantlyimprovedbywhips beingelected,asinGermany andNew Zealand. Thedivision of thetimetable into government andHouseBusiness,with whips’controllimitedtothe former,plus greater transparency forthe CommitteeofSelection, might justify maintaining thecurrent arrangements forthe appointment of whips.Ifthese changes arenot made,electingwhips would be an alternativeroute.Ifageneralpurpose business committeewerecreated in thefuture, it should be notedthatthis would notbeasrepresentativeas thoseinGermany andNew Zealandunless thewhips wereelected in theirparties.

Aproposal that hasbeen floatedfromtime to time is amergerofthe rolesofLeader of theHouse andChief Whip. This would result in amoregeneral ‘Minister forParliamentary Business’ as exists in Scotland (inother countriesthe dutiescarried out by our Leader andChief Whip aresharedout in avariety of ways). However,onbalance we arenot attracted to this idea, at leastatthe moment, anditfound no supportamongstthe respondentstoour Issuesand Questions paper. TheLeader of theHouseisafargreater champion forthe Commonsthanisthe ChiefWhip, andifthe positions weremergeditwould be likely to be thewhip role whichbecamedominant.Inthe absenceofother parliamentarychampions,this would be aloss. We arenot attractedtothe mergingofthe Leader of the Houseand ChiefWhip, but if in the future the Speaker developsasagreaterchampion forparliament, andparticularly if theChief Whip were elected,thismightbecomeasensiblestep.

Whospeaks forparliament? Co-ordinating bodies It seemsthatone of thereasons whyparliamentary controlhas been lost is that theCommons doesnot speak with one ‘voice’,asthe government is able to do. Just as thereisnosingle actor, thereisnosingle body that speaksfor theCommons as awhole.The HouseofCommons Commission exists in statuteand is made up of senior members,but hasalargelyadministrative role.The LiaisonCommittee hasachievedpolitical prominence, but is avoice forselect committees rather than thewhole House. TheChairmen’s Panelalsocomprisessenior members on across-partybasis but is now low keyand hasanevennarrower role.

Aperception hasgrown that one thingwhichmight provide agreater voice forparliament, anda moregeneral co-ordinating role,would be thecreation of ageneral ‘business committee’.These arecommon in otherparliaments,and take arole in managing thetimetable, appointing committee members,and allocating billstocommittees.Suchbodiesexist in one form or anotherinall of our comparatorparliaments,and theirrole was describedearlier in this reportand in greater detail in an earlier publication (Russell andPaun2006b). However, on balancewedonot believethata ‘businesscommittee’ forthe HouseofCommons wouldtacklethe perceivedproblemsof parliamentarycontrol, andconclude thatother changesset outabove will provemore effective. Indeed,ifbuilt on the modelofour comparator parliamentsabusiness committee could in some ways make thingsworse,byhanding greater control to party leaders andwhips. In our comparatorparliaments we found that business committees are effectivelyinstitutionalisations of theusual channels,whichallow brokering between partywhips, but provide no leverage forother backbenchers andparticularlyfor cross-party groups.Insome ways theexistence of thesecommittees (particularlyinNew Zealand) meansthatthere is less accountabilitytothe chamberitselffor decisions than is currently thecaseinthe Houseof Commons. Thedynamic of thesebodies, andtheir accountability to othermembers in the chamber, cruciallydepends on how thewhips whosit on them areselected: in cases wherethe whips areelected in partygroups this accountability is clearly stronger.Without such achangeat Westminsterabusiness committeemadeupofwhips would be largelyunaccountable.But even if this change didhappen, abusiness committeeonthis modelwould reinforce bargaining between

81 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons partyblocsratherthanpromoting the kind of cross-partyworkthatmanynow feel should be strengthened.

One option wouldbetotry andconstruct aunique UK parliament modelofabusiness committee,withbackbench representation andbetteraccountability.However,webelieve thatthiswould be unlikely to succeed. Acommittee could be constructed, forexample, including backbenchmembers electedfromeachofthe partygroups,and otherkey individuals such as thechair of theLiaison Committee. It mightbechaired by theSpeaker or Deputy Speaker (asoccurs in mostother parliaments). However,our research showsthatitiseasyfor such individuals to be shut out of discussions,whichinpracticecontinuetogoonbetween thewhips behind thescenes.InScotlandsuchwhips’meetingsexcludedthe Presiding OfficerunderDavid Steel,and in Germanypre-meetingsare held between senior whips excluding both thePresiding Officerand othermembers.Inall cases,muchlikeour much-maligned CommitteeofSelection, meetingsare extremelybrief andlargely rubber-stamp whips’decisions.The exception maybe Scotland underSNP minority rule,but this is aspecial case, andstill facilitatesdealsbetween whips rather involving backbenchers. Furthermore,there areconcernsthatifthe Speakerchaired a businesscommittees/hecould be drawninto politicalarguments. 80 We do notbelievethat thiswould necessarilyhappen, but it is arisk. Agreater risk maybethatthe Speaker wouldlosestatus if s/he chaired such acommittee without playingafullpartinits discussions. This is the patternwehaveseeninotherparliaments.

We conclude thatthe keyquestion is ‘ownership’ of time:ifthe government continues to ownmostagendatime, thanks to standing orderno. 14,itwillcontinue to be dominant in negotiations,withorwithout abusinesscommittee. Hencewehaveset out proposals above to createaregularHouseBusiness slot, includingmostofthe non-government items currently takeningovernment time. Alongside this we suggestedestablishment of aBackbenchBusiness Committeetodrawupthe timetable forthe House Business slot. Suchacommitteewould be drawn whollyfromthe backbenches, andbechaired by theDeputySpeaker.Asitwould have no role in timetabling government billsitwould be of farmorelimitedinterest to thewhips,but enable backbenchers –includingcommittees–to bargainoverhow non-government timeis allocated. We believethatthe establishmentofamore limitedBackbench Business Committeetomanage HouseBusinesswould be amorerealistic andmorefruitful place to start. Over time,ifthismechanism proved asuccess,abusinesscommitteewith broaderfunction mightdevelop from it. This approach hasthe advantagethatacross-party culturewith meaningful backbenchinvolvementwould develop in theinitial stages,and therefore mighthaveabetterchanceoftransferring to amoregeneral business committeeatalaterstage. However,evenatalaterstage it would probably be sensibletokeepcommittees managing government andnon-government business separate,perhaps with some overlapinmembership.

In addition to this importantchange, thereare some morelimitedchanges that mightusefullybe made to existing chamber-wide bodies. Theselectionofthe chairofthe LiaisonCommittee has been thesubject of some recentdebate, andthe mechanismfor choosing this individualcould be improved. TheLiaison Committeeitselfsuggested that this postshould be combinedwith that of chairofthe CommitteeofSelection (2000a).Given thepotential ‘closed shop’ that this creates,we arenot drawn to this suggestion. However, the chairofthe Liaison Committeecould,like the chair of the CommitteeofSelection, be electedbythe whole Houseatthe startofeach parliament.

80 This concernwas raisedbyseveral of therespondents to ourIssues andQuestionspaper.

82 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons

Theestablishment of aBackbenchBusiness Committeetomanagenon-government timewould mean that forthe firsttime therewould be asingle body to representand provide avoice forthe backbenches. This newcommittee would be likely to develop astronger such arole overtime.The LiaisonCommittee currently takesonpartofthe role,and members on otherbodiessuchasthe HouseofCommons Commission andthe ProcedureCommittee (particularlyifappointment to thesebodiesismademoretransparent)share therole on specifictopics. This mayprove perfectly sufficient. However, over time there maybeadesiretocreateamoreunified collective voice forthe backbenches. Amoreunitedbodycould work with theSpeaker on outreach activity, andreviewgeneral parliamentarydevelopments, andmightmeetonlyoccasionally.Its membershipcould be drawnfromthe existing co-ordinating bodies,alongwiththe new BackbenchBusinessCommittee. That is,the Commission, Chairmen’s Paneland Liaison Committee. At aminimumone representative of each of thesefour bodiesmight starttomeet together on aquarterly basiswith theSpeaker.

Depending on otherchanges in future,itmay be necessary to revisitthese proposals. Forexample if specialistlegislation committees wereestablished,questions could ariseabout which committee/sshould considerwhichbills. 81 This problemarisesatthe momenttosome extent with respect to draftbills.Similarly,ifsuchcommittees wereestablished therewould be anew set of expert committeechairsinplace of theChairmen’s Panel, whowould be acloser parallel to the LiaisonCommittee. This mightcallfor greater joint working, andcreatenew opportunitiesfor development of acollectivebackbenchvoice. If certain procedural changesare introduced in the future,suchasestablishment of specialistlegislation committees, the case for establishing ageneral purpose businesscommitteemay grow,and othernew optionsfor creating co-ordinating bodies develop.

81 Although this issuehas not been addressedinthisreport, theauthorsare broadlysympathetic to theidea of committing bills to subject-specificcommittees.However, it shouldbenoted that in Scotland concerns have been expressedthatsomecommittees have faced such aheavy workload in termsoflegislative scrutinythattheyhavehad littletime to undertake otherinquiries (Scottish Parliament Conveners’ Group2007: 1).Amore attractive model is that which operated in theAustralianSenateuntil theHowardgovernmentreforms in 2006,withtwo committees with overlapping membershipsworkingineachpolicyarea, one dealingwithlegislation andthe otherwithinquiries. Such an arrangement in theHouse of Commonswould also create newseats forthosewho do not currently siton select committees.

83 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons

References Arter, D. (2004). TheScottish Parliament:AScandinavian-Style Assembly .London: FrankCass. Australian Government (1999). Legislation Handbook.Canberra:Department of thePrime Minister andCabinet. Blackburn, R. andKennon, A. (2003). Parliament:Functions,Practice andProcedures.London: Sweet andMaxwell. Brazier, A. (2004) (ed.). Parliament,Politics andLaw Making:Issues &Developmentsinthe Legislative Process.London: HansardSociety. Brazier, A.,Flinders,M.and McHugh, D. (2005). New Politics,New Parliament?AReview of ParliamentaryModernisationSince 1997.London: HansardSociety. Bundestag (2003). Rules of Procedureofthe German Bundestag.(Translated by theLanguageService of theGermanBundestag).Berlin: Administration of theGermanBundestag. CabinetOffice (2004). ADraft CivilService Bill:AConsultationDocument ,Cm6373. London: HMSO. Conservative Democracy Taskforce(2007). Powertothe People: Rebuilding Parliament. London: The Conservative Party. Consultative Steering Grouponthe Scottish Parliament (1998). ShapingScotland’s Parliament. Edinburgh:The Scottish Office. www.scotland.gov.uk/library/documents-w5/rcsg-00.htm Cook, R. (2004). ThePoint of Departure:Diaries fromthe FrontBench.London: Pocket Books. Cowley,P.(2002). Revolts andRebels: ParliamentaryVotingUnderBlair.London: Politico’s. Cowley,P.(2005). TheRebels: HowBlair Mislaid hisMajority.London: Politico’s. Cowley,P.and Stuart,M.(2006). ‘Putting theEducation Bill Rebellion into Perspective’,Briefing Paperpublished by revolts.co.uk at: www.revolts.co.uk/Previous%20Labour%20second%20reading%20revolts.pdf Crossman,R.(1976). TheDiaries of aCabinet Minister: Volume Two, Lord Presidentofthe Council and Leaderofthe HouseofCommons. Worcester: Trinity Press. Dalton,R.(2002). ‘The DeclineofParty Identifications’, in R. Dalton andM.Wattenberg (eds.), Parties withoutPartisans.Oxford: Oxford University Press. Döring,H.(1995). ‘Time as aScarce Resource: Government Controlofthe Agenda’, in H. Döring (ed.), Parliamentsand Majority Rule in Western Europe .New York:StMartin’s Press. www.uni-potsdam.de/u/ls_vergleich/Publikationen/Parliaments/PMR-W-Europe.pdf Döring,H.(2001). ‘Parliamentary Agenda Controland LegislativeOutcomesinWestern Europe’, Legislative Studies Quarterly ,26(1): 145-65. Evans, H. (2004) (ed.). Odgers’AustralianSenatePractice (11thEdition). Canberra:Department of the Senate. www.aph.gov.au/senate/pubs/odgers/index.htm Evans, H. (2006). TheGovernment Majority in theSenate: ANailinthe Coffin of ResponsibleGovernment? , Speech to Australasian Study of Parliament GroupVictorian Chapter. www.aph.gov.au/senate/pubs/evans/031006/031006.htm Flinders,M.(2002). ‘Shiftingthe Balance? Parliament, the Executive andthe BritishConstitution’, PoliticalStudies, 50(1): 23-42. Griffith, J.A.G. (1979).‘ThePolitical Constitution’, TheModern LawReview,42(1): 1-21. HansardSociety (1992). Making theLaw,Reportofthe HansardSociety Commission on the LegislativeProcess[theRippon Commission]. London: A.L. Publishing. HansardSociety (2001). TheChallengefor Parliament:MakingGovernment Accountable ,Reportofthe HansardSociety Commission on Parliamentary Scrutiny [the Newton Commission]. London: Vacher Dod Publishing. HansardSociety (2003). Issues in LawMaking1:Private Members’ Bills .Hansard Society Briefing Paper. London: HansardSociety.

84 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons

HansardSociety (2005). Members Only? Parliament in thePublicEye,Reportofthe HansardSociety Commission on theCommunication of Parliamentary Democracy [the Puttnam Commission]. London: Dod’sParliamentary Communications. Harris, I. C.,Wright, B. C. andFowler, P. E. (2005) (eds.). Australian HouseofRepresentatives Practice (5th Edition). Canberra:Department of theHouseofRepresentatives. www.aph.gov.au/house/pubs/PRACTICE/index.htm Hegevi,M.(2000). ‘Nordic LightonCommittee Assignments’, in P. Esaiassonand K. Heidar (eds.), Beyond Westminsterand Congress: theNordicExperience .Columbus:Ohio StateUniversity Press. Helms,L.(2004). ‘Germany: andthe Bundestag’, JournalofLegislativeStudies,10(2/3): 98-108. HouseofCommons (2005). StandingOrders of theHouse of Commons (October2005).London: The Stationery Office. www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmstords/416/416.pdf HouseofCommons Information Office (1997-2005). Sessional InformationDigests .London: House of Commons. HouseofCommonsInformation Office (1997-2006). Sessional Returns .London: Houseof Commons. HouseofCommons Information Office (2004). Programming of Government Bills ,Factsheet P10 ProcedureSeries. London: HouseofCommons. HouseofLords (2007). Companiontothe StandingOrders andGuide to theProceedingsofthe Houseof Lords .London: TheStationery Office. www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld/ldcomp/compso.pdf HouseofRepresentatives (2005). GuidetoProcedures (2nd Edition). Canberra:Department of the HouseofRepresentatives. HouseofRepresentatives (2006). Standingand Sessional Orders (March 2006) .Canberra:Department of theHouseofRepresentatives. http://wopared.parl.net/house/pubs/standos/pdf/sosmar2006.pdf HouseofRepresentatives Standing CommitteeonProcedure(1986). Days andHours of Sitting and theEffectiveUse of theTimeofthe House ,Parliamentary PaperNo. 108/86.Canberra:The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia. HouseofRepresentatives Standing CommitteeonProcedure(2005). Procedures RelatingtoHouse Committees ,Parliamentary PaperNo. 451/2005.Canberra:The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia. www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/proc/committees/report/fullreport.pdf HouseofRepresentatives Standing CommitteeonProcedure(2006). Learning from OtherParliaments: Study Programme 2006, Parliamentary PaperNo. 179/2006.Canberra:The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia. www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/proc/studyprogram/report/fullreport.pdf Ismayr,W.(1992). DerDeutscheBundestag.Funktionen, Willensbildung,Reformansätze .Opladen: Leske andBudrich. Jenny,M.and Müller,W.C.(1995). ‘PresidentsofParliament: NeutralChairmenorAssetofthe Majority?’,inH.Döring (ed.), Parliamentsand Majority Rule in Western Europe.New York:St Martin’s Press. www.uni-potsdam.de/u/ls_vergleich/Publikationen/PMR.htm Jopling Committee(1992). Report of theSelect Committee on Sittingsofthe House .Session 1991-2, HC 20. London: TheStationery Office. Kelso, A. (2003).‘Wherewerethe MassedRanks of Parliamentary Reformers? –“Attitudinal” and “Contextual”Approaches to Parliamentary Reform’, JournalofLegislativeStudies,9(1): 57-76. King,A.(1976). ‘ModesofExecutive-LegislativeRelations:Great Britain,France, andWest Germany’, Legislative Studies Quarterly ,1(1): 11-36. Laundy,P.(1960). ‘The Speaker of theHouseofCommons’, ParliamentaryAffairs,14(1): 72-9. Laundy,P.(1984). TheOfficeofSpeaker in theParliaments of theCommonwealth. London: QuillerPress.

85 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons

Lees-Smith, H. B. (1924).‘TheTime-Table of theHouseofCommons’, Economica,11: 140-62. LiaisonCommittee (2000a). Shiftingthe Balance: SelectCommitteesand theExecutive ,First Reportof Session 1999-2000, HC 300. London: HouseofCommons. LiaisonCommittee (2000b). IndependenceorControl?,Second ReportofSession 1999-2000, HC 748. London: HouseofCommons. LiaisonCommittee (2001). Shiftingthe Balance: Unfinished Business,First ReportofSession 2000-01, HC 321. London: HouseofCommons. LiaisonCommittee (2002). SelectCommittees: ModernisationProposals.Second ReportofSession 2001- 02,HC692.London: HouseofCommons. LiaisonCommittee (2007). AnnualReportfor 2005–06,First ReportofSession 2006–07,HC406. London: HouseofCommons. LiberalDemocrats (2007). Forthe People, By thePeople ,Policy Paper83. www.libdems.org.uk/media/documents/policies/PP83_constitutional_Sep07.pdf Limon, D. andMcKay, W. R. (1997). Erskine May: ParliamentaryPractice (22ndEdition) .London: Butterworths. Livingston, W. S. (1958).‘TheSecurityofTenureofthe Speaker of theHouseofCommons’, ParliamentaryAffairs,11(4):484-504. Loewenberg,G.(2003). ‘Agenda-setting in theGermanBundestag:Origins andConsequences of PartyDominance’, JournalofLegislative Studies.9(3): 17-32. LordsConstitution Committee(2003). Devolution: Inter-InstitutionalRelations in theUnited Kingdom , Session 2002-03, HL 28.London: TheStationery Office. LordsConstitution Committee(2004). Parliament andthe Legislative Process,14 th ReportofSession 2003-04, HL 173. London: HouseofLords. LordsConstitution Committee(2005). Parliament andthe Legislative Process: TheGovernment’s Response, 6 th ReportofSession 2004-05, HL 114. London: HouseofLords. Marsh, D. andRead,M.(1985). BritishPrivate Members’ Balloted Bills: ALottery with Few Winners, Small Prizes,but HighAdministrative Costs, EssexPapersinPolitics and Government.University of Essex. Martin, J. E. (2004). TheHouse: New Zealand’sHouse of Representatives 1854-2004.PalmerstonNorth: Dunmore Press. Martin, J. E. (2006).‘AShifting Balance: Parliament, the Executive andthe Evolution of Politics in NewZealand’, Australasian ParliamentaryReview,21(2): 113-131. Mattson, I. andStrøm, K. (1995).‘Parliamentary Committees’, in H. Döring (ed.), Parliamentsand Majority Rule in Western Europe.New York:StMartin’s Press. www.uni-potsdam.de/u/ls_vergleich/Publikationen/PMR.htm McGee, D. (1994). ParliamentaryPractice in New Zealand (2nd edition). Wellington: GP Publications. McGee, D. (2005). ParliamentaryPractice in New Zealand (3rd edition) . Wellington: GP Publications. Ministry of Justice(2007). TheGovernance of Britain,CM7170. London: HMSO. Mitchell,J.(2000). ‘New Parliament, NewPolitics in Scotland’, ParliamentaryAffairs 53:605-21. Modernisation Committee(1997). TheLegislativeProcess .First ReportofSession 1997-98, HC 190. London: HouseofCommons. Modernisation Committee(2000a). Programming of Legislation andTimingofVotes: Report and Proceedings of theCommittee.Second ReportofSession 1999-2000, HC 589. London: House of Commons. Modernisation Committee(2000b). SittingsinWestminsterHall .Fourth ReportofSession 1999-2000, HC 906. London: HouseofCommons. Modernisation Committee(2002a). SelectCommittees .First ReportofSession 2001-02, HC 224-I andII. London: HouseofCommons. Modernisation Committee(2002b). Modernisationofthe HouseofCommons:AReform Programme. Second ReportofSession 2001-02, HC 1168-I andII. London: HouseofCommons.

86 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons

Modernisation Committee(2003). Modernisationofthe HouseofCommons:Programming of Bills .First ReportofSession 2002-03, HC 1222.London: HouseofCommons. Modernisation Committee(2004). ConnectingParliamentwith thePublic .First ReportofSession2003- 04,HC368.London: HouseofCommons. ModernisationCommittee (2005). Sitting Hours .First ReportofSession 2004-05, HC 88.London: HouseofCommons. Modernisation Committee(2006). TheLegislativeProcess .First ReportofSession 2005-06, HC 1097. London: HouseofCommons. Modernisation Committee(2007). Revitalising theChamber: TheRoleofthe BackbenchMember .First ReportofSession 2006-07, HC 337. London: HouseofCommons. Natzler, D. andHutton, M. (2005).‘Select committees:Scrutiny àlaCarte?’,inP.Giddings, The Future of Parliament:Issues foraNew Century .Basingstoke:Palgrave. NewZealandHouseofRepresentatives (2005). StandingOrders of theHouse of Representatives. Wellington: HouseofRepresentatives. NewZealandHouseofRepresentatives StandingOrdersCommittee (1995). Review of Standing Orders: Report of theStandingOrders Committee.Wellington: HouseofRepresentatives. Norton,P.(1980). ‘The Changing Face of theBritishHouseofCommons in the1970s’, Legislative Studies Quarterly ,5(3): 333-357. Norton,P.(2005). Parliament in British Politics.Basingstoke:PalgraveMacmillan. Norton Commission (2000).[Commission to StrengthenParliament]. Strengthening Parliament:The reportofthe CommissiontoStrengthenParliament. London: TheConservative Party. Palmer, G. andPalmer, M. (2004) Bridled Power: NewZealand’s Constitutionand Government,Auckland: Oxford University Press. Parliament First(2003). Parliament’s Last Chance. London: Parliament First. Power,G.(2007). ‘The Politics of Parliamentary Reform:Lessons fromthe HouseofCommons (2001-2005)’, ParliamentaryAffairs,60(3): 492-509. Power Commission (2006). Power to thePeople. TheReportofPower:AnIndependent Inquiry into Britain’s Democracy.York: ThePower Inquiry. ProcedureCommittee (1978). First Report.Session 1977-78,HC588.London: HouseofCommons. ProcedureCommittee (1985). Public Bill Procedure .Second ReportofSession1984-85,HC49. London: HouseofCommons. ProcedureCommittee (1986). AllocationofTimetoGovernment BillsinStandingCommittees .Second ReportofSession 1985-86, HC 324. London: HouseofCommons. ProcedureCommittee (2002). AppointmentofDeputySpeakers.Second ReportofSession 2001-02, HC 770. London: HouseofCommons. ProcedureCommittee (2003). Procedures forDebates, Private Members’ Billsand thePowers of theSpeaker, Fourth ReportofSession 2002-3,HC333.London: HouseofCommons. ProcedureCommittee (2004a). Programming of Legislation.Fourth ReportofSession 2003-04, HC 325. London: HouseofCommons. ProcedureCommittee (2004b). Public Petitions .Fifth ReportofSession 2003-04, HC 1248.London: HouseofCommons. ProcedureCommittee (2004c). Results of Sitting HoursQuestionnaire .Second ReportofSession 2003- 04,HC491.London: HouseofCommons. ProcedureCommittee (2007). Public Petitionsand EarlyDay Motions.First ReportofSession 2006-07, HC 513. London: HouseofCommons. PublicAdministration Select Committee(2004). ADraft CivilService Bill:Completing theReform,First ReportofSession 2003-04, HC 128-I. London: HouseofCommons. Redlich,J.(1908). TheProcedureofthe HouseofCommons.Astudyofits Historyand PresentForm. Translated by A.E. Steinthal. London: Archibald andCo. Rush,M.(2005). Parliament Today,: Manchester University Press. Rush,M.and Ettinghausen,C.(2002). OpeningUpthe Usual Channels.London: HansardSociety.

87 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons

Russell,M.and Paun, A. (2006a). Howthe HouseofCommons GovernsItself: An Issues andQuestions Paper .London: TheConstitution Unit. www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/research/parliament/Issues_and_Questions_Paper.pdf Russell,M.and Paun, A. (2006b). Managing Parliament Better? ABusiness Committee forthe Houseof Commons.London: TheConstitution Unit. Saalfeld, T. (2003).‘Bureaucratisation, Coordination andCompetition:Parliamentary PartyGroups in theGermanBundestag’, in K. Heidarand R. Koole (eds.), ParliamentaryParty Groups in EuropeanDemocracies.London: Routledge. Schick, R. andSchreiner, H. J. (2004). TheGerman Bundestag:Functions andProcedures (15 th Edition). Rheinbreitbach:NDV. Schick, R. andZeh,W.(1997). TheGerman Bundestag:Functions andProcedures (13th Edition). Rheinbreitbach:NDV. Schüttemeyer,S.S.(1994). ‘Hierarchy andEfficiency in theBundestag:The German Answer for Institutionalizing Parliament’, in G. W. Copeland andS.Patterson (eds.), Parliamentsinthe Modern World: Changing Institutions.Ann Arbor:University of Michigan Press. Scottish ConstitutionalConvention (1995) Scotland’s Parliament,Scotland’s Right .Edinburgh: Convention of Scottish Local Authorities. www.almac.co.uk/business_park/scc/scc-rep.htm Scottish Parliament (2006). StandingOrders of theScottish Parliament (2nd Edition.) Edinburgh:Scottish Parliament. Scottish Parliament Conveners’ Group(2007). Legacy Paper–Second Session.Edinburgh:Scottish Parliament. www.scottish.parliament.uk/s3/committees/committeeConvenersGroup/docs/LegacyPa perSession2.pdf Scottish Parliament Procedures Committee(2003). TheFoundingPrinciples of theScottish Parliament: TheApplicationofAccessand Participation, EqualOpportunities, Accountability andPower Sharingin theWorkofthe Parliament,SPPaper 818. Edinburgh:The Scottish Parliament. Scottish Parliament Procedures Committee(2004). ANew Procedurefor Members’ Bills ,SPPaper 193. Edinburgh:Scottish Parliament. Scottish Parliament Procedures Committee(2006). Review of ParliamentaryTime ,SPPaper 699. Edinburgh:Scottish Parliament. Sear,C.(2002). Modernisationofthe HouseofCommons:Sitting Hours ,Research Paper02/41.London: HouseofCommons Library. Seaward, P. andSilk, P. (2003).‘TheHouseofCommons’, in V. Bogdanor (ed.), TheBritish Constitutioninthe Twentieth Century ,Oxford: Oxford University Press. Selection Committee(2002). GeneralPrinciples Relatingtothe SelectionofPrivate Members’ Business. Canberra:HouseofRepresentatives. Shepherd,M.(2002).‘Parliament’ in J. Mitchell (ed.), Scotland DevolutionMonitoring Report:May 2002. London: TheConstitutionUnit. www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/monrep/scotland/scotland_may_2002.pdf. Sieberer,U.(2006). ‘Agenda Setting in theGermanBundestag:AWeak Government in a ConsensusDemocracy’, German Politics, 15(1): 49–72. Smith, M. (1999). TheCoreExecutiveinBritain.Basingstoke:PalgraveMacmillan. Thomas, G. (1985). Mr Speaker.London: GuildPublishing. Tomkins, A. (2003).‘What is Parliament For?’,inN.Bamforth andP.Leyland(eds.), Public Lawin aMulti-Layered Constitution .Oxford: Hart. Various (1999-2007) Scotland DevolutionMonitoring Reports .London: TheConstitution Unit. www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/publications/devolution-monitoring-reports/index.html Verrier,J.(2007). ‘BenchmarkingParliamentary Administration: TheUnitedKingdom,Canada, NewZealand andAustralia’, Australasian ParliamentaryReview, 22:45-75.

88 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons

Webb, P. (2002).‘Political PartiesinBritain: SecularDeclineorAdaptiveResilience?’, in P. Webb, D. Farrell andI.Holliday(eds.), PoliticalParties in Advanced IndustrialDemocracies.Oxford: Oxford University Press. Winetrobe,B.(1998). ‘The Autonomy of Parliament’, in D. Oliverand G. Drewry(eds.). TheLaw andParliament .London: Butterworths. Winetrobe,B.(2001). Realisingthe Vision: AParliamentwith aPurpose. An Auditofthe First Year of the Scottish Parliament.London:Constitution Unit. Winetrobe,B.(2004). ‘Scottish Devolution:Aspirations andReality in Multi-Layer Governance’,in Jowell&Oliver (eds), TheChangingConstitution .Oxford: Oxford University Press. Winetrobe,B.(2006). Submission to theProcedures Committee. 11th Report, SP Paper699, Volume 2. www.scottish.parliament.uk/business/committees/procedures/reports-06/prr06-11- Vol02-00.htm#5 Wright,T.(2004). ‘Prospects forParliamentary Reform’, ParliamentaryAffairs,57(4): 867-76.

89 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons

Appendices

AppendixA:Standing OrderNo. 14

Arrangementand Timing of Public andPrivate Business

14. —(1) Save as providedinthis order, government business shallhaveprecedence at everysitting. (2)Twenty days shallbeallottedineach session forproceedingsonoppositionbusiness, seventeen of whichshall be at thedisposal of theLeader of theOpposition andthree of whichshall be at the disposal of theleader of thesecond largestopposition party; andmatters selected on thosedays shallhaveprecedence over government business providedthat— (a) twoFridaysittingsshall be deemed equivalent to asingle sitting on anyother day; (b) on anyday otherthanaFriday, not morethantwo of thedays at thedisposal of the Leader of theOpposition maybetaken in theformoffour half days,and oneofthe days at thedisposal of theleader of thesecond largestopposition partymay be takeninthe form of twohalfdays;and (c) on anysuchhalfday, proceedingsunderthis paragraphshall either— (i)lapse at seveno’clockonMondayorTuesday, four o’clockonWednesday or threeo’clockonThursday if not previously concluded,or (ii) be setdownfor consideration at thehour specified in sub-paragraph(i) above and, except on days on whichprivate business hasbeen setdownfor consideration underthe provisions of paragraph(5) of Standing OrderNo. 20 (Time fortaking privatebusiness),shall be enteredupon at that time:Providedthatondayson whichbusiness stands over until seveno’clock, four o’clockorthree o’clockunder theprovisions of StandingOrder No. 24 (Adjournmentonspecificand important matterthatshould have urgent consideration) proceedingsunderthis subparagraph shallnot be enteredupon until such business hasbeen disposed of,and maythen be proceeded with forthree hours, notwithstanding theprovisionsofStanding OrderNo. 9(Sittingsofthe House). (3)For thepurposesofthis order‘thesecond largestopposition party’ shallbethatparty,ofthose not representedinHer Majesty’sGovernment, whichhas thesecond largestnumberofMembers electedtothe Houseasmembers of that party. (4)Private Members’bills shallhaveprecedence over government business on thirteen Fridays in each session to be appointedbythe House. (5)Onand afterthe eighth Fridayonwhichprivate Members’ bills have precedence,suchbills shallbearranged on theorder paperinthe following order— consideration of Lordsamendments, thirdreadings, consideration of reports not alreadyentered upon, adjournedproceedings on consideration, bills in progress in committee, bills appointedfor committee, andsecond readings. (6)The ballot forprivate Members’ bills shallbeheldonthe second Thursday on whichthe Houseshall sitduring thesession underarrangements to be made by theSpeaker,and each bill shallbepresented by theMemberwho hasgiven noticeofpresentation or by anotherMember namedbyhim in writing to theClerksatthe Table,atthe commencementofpublicbusiness on thefifth Wednesday on whichthe Houseshall sitduring thesession.

90 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons

(7)Until afterthe fifth Wednesday on whichthe Houseshall sitduring thesession, no private Membershall— (a) give noticeofamotion forleavetobring in abillunderStanding OrderNo. 23 (Motions forleavetobring in bills andnomination of select committees at commencementofpublicbusiness);or (b) give noticefor presenting abillunderStanding OrderNo. 57 (Presentation andfirst reading); or (c) informthe Clerks at theTable of his intention to take charge of abillwhichhas been brought fromthe Lords. (8)AprivateMember’sbilltowhichthe provisions of paragraphs (2)to(6) of Standing OrderNo. 97 (Scottish GrandCommittee (bills in relation to theirprinciple))haveapplied,and whichhas been consideredbyaScottish publicbillcommittee, shallnot be setdownfor consideration on reportsoastohaveprecedence overany privateMember’sbillsoset down whichwas read a second time on aday preceding that on whichthe billwas reportedfromthe Scottish Grand Committeeunderparagraph (3)ofthatStanding Order. (9)Anorder appointing aday forthe second readingofaprivateMember’sbillshall lapseatthe rising of theHouseonthe preceding sitting dayifatthattime thebillhas notbeen printedand deliveredtothe Vote Office,and theHouseshall make no further orderappointing aday forthe second reading of thebilluntil it hasbeen printed.

91 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons

AppendixB:Non-governmenttimebysession (% of total)

Session Type Opposition Private Estimates Total Days* Member Bills Days 2005-06Long 8.3% 3.7% 1.0% 13.0% (17½ months) 2004-05 Short 6.1% 3.7% 1.3% 11.1% (4½months) 2003-04Normal 11.6%5.2% 1.0% 17.8% (12months) 2002-03Normal 10.6%4.9% 1.2% 16.7% (12months) 2001-02Long 9.0% 4.1% 0.9% 14.1% (18months) 2000-01Short 7.0% 5.6% 1.1% 13.7% (6 months) 1999- Normal 9.0% 4.9% 0.8% 14.6% 2000 (12½ months) 1998-99Normal 9.7% 4.4% 0.6% 14.6% (12months) 1997-98Long 6.4% 3.0% 0.5% 9.9% (18months) Average long 7.7% 3.5% 0.8% 12.1%

Average short 6.6% 4.8% 1.2% 12.6%

Average normal 10.1% 4.8% 0.9% 15.8%

Average all 8.7% 4.3% 0.9% 13.8%

*Figures differslightlyfromthose presentedinTable 1, as here we show only thetime spentonactivitiesfor which a specified number of days is setaside (oppositiondays, private members’ bill Fridays,and estimatesdays). Source:House of CommonsSessional Returns, at: www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm/cmsesret.htm

92 TheHouse Rules?Internationallessons forenhancingthe autonomyofthe HouseofCommons

AppendixC:Representation of Labour rebels on standing committees Therebellions showninthis table arethe tenlargest second reading rebellions between 1997 and 2007 in termsofthe numberofLabour members voting againstagovernment bill eitheronthe second reading vote itselforona‘reasonedamendment’.

Labour rebels at Labour rebels on Labour rebels on Title of Bill second reading – standing committee – notional proportional (dateofsecond reading) N(%ofPLP*) N(%ofLabour committee committeemembers) HigherEducation Bill 72 (17) 1(6) 2.8 (27.01.04) Health andSocialCareBill 65 (16) 1(6) 2.8 (07.05.03)** Education andInspections 52 (15) 01.9 Bill (15.03.06) Prevention of TerrorismBill 32 (8)*** - (23.02.05) Gambling Bill 30 (7)0 1.0 (01.11.04) CriminalJustice (Mode of 29 (7)0 0.8 Trial) (No.2) Bill (07.03.00) OffenderManagementBill 27 (8)1(9)0.8 (11.12.06) Fire Services Bill 27 (7)*** - (08.05.03) Asylum andImmigration 25 (6)1(8)0.8 (Treatment of Claimantsetc) Bill (17.12.03) Identity Cards Bill 20 (6)0 0.6 (28.06.05) Average 37.9(9.6) 0.5(3.6) 1.4

*Based on number of LabourMPs elected at start of theparliament (1997= 418, 2001=412,2005= 356). ** In thecaseofthe Health andSocialCareBill 65 LabourMPs backed a‘reasonedamendment’, and31ofthese rebels then also opposedthe second readingmotion. Theone rebelselected forthe standingcommittee(Stephen Pound) rebelledonthe reasoned amendmentvotebut backed thegovernmentinthe second readingmotion. ***Committeestage takeninCommittees of WholeHouse.

Source:Thistable is adapted(andupdated) from Cowley andStuart (2006: Table4)using data from www.publicwhip.org.uk

93 The House Rules? is the final output of a two-year Constitution Unit research project inves- tigating who runs, and who should run, the House of Commons. In a year in which the Prime Minister and both major opposition parties have expressed concern about government dominance of parliament, this report seeks to inform the debate by looking at how much autonomy the Commons has over its own affairs – in particular its agenda, its committee system, and its procedures. The authors draw ideas from the legislatures of Scotland, Ger- many, New Zealand and Australia to set out a programme of reform that would strengthen the control exercised by backbench MPs and committees over their own institution. Rules? House The

The report asks: Should MPs and committees have more influence over the parliamentary agenda?

Would a ‘business committee’ of the kind existing in other parliaments be a good idea? International lessons for enhancing the autonomy of the House of Commons of House the of autonomy the enhancing for lessons International Could the power of the Speaker or others to ‘speak for parliament’ be enhanced? Could the way that committee members are chosen be improved?

The report calls for a new logic of parliamentary control and makes 60 recommendations for change. But it also argues that there is much to celebrate at Westminster compared to other parliaments, so future reforms must build upon rather than undermine the healthier aspects of British parliamentary democracy.

Dr Meg Russell is Senior Research Fellow at the Constitution Unit, and author of numerous reports and articles on parliament and its reform. In 2000 she published Reforming the House of Lords: Lessons from Overseas (Oxford University Press). From 2001-03 she was seconded as a full-time adviser to Robin Cook in his role as Leader of the House of Commons.

Akash Paun leads the Constitution Unit’s work on devolution as well as conducting research in the area of parliamentary reform. He manages the Devolution Monitoring Programme and edits the Unit’s regular newsletter, The Monitor.

The Constitution Unit in the School of Public Policy, UCL, is the UK's foremost research body on constitutional reform and comparative constitutional studies. It is independent and non-partisan, and the centre of a wide network of national and international experts.

This research project was funded by The Nuffield Foundation. The House Rules?

Meg Russell and Akash Paun Akash and Russell Meg

SCHOOL of PUBLIC POLICY International lessons for UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON 29–30 Tavistock Square enhancing the autonomy of London WC1H 9QU the House of Commons

Phone: 020 7679 4977 www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit Meg Russell and Akash Paun

The Constitution Unit

Price: £10 The Constitution Unit ISBN 1-903903-01-7

October 2007 October 2007