Ombygging Av Relebasert Sikringsanlegg (NSI-63)

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Ombygging Av Relebasert Sikringsanlegg (NSI-63) Ombygging av relebasert Existing Relay-based sikringsanlegg (NSI-63) Interlocking System Upgrades (NSI-63) Entreprise UBF 42 / Contract UBF 42 Jostein Heimark – Project Manager Signalling Innhold Content • Introduksjon • Introduction • Entreprise UBF 42 • Contract UBF 42 ̶ Fremdrift ̶ Progress ̶ Arbeidsomfang ̶ Scope of Work ̶ Grensesnitt ̶ Interfaces • Utfordringer • Challenges • Oppsummering • Summary Introduksjon Introduction Introduksjon Introduction Prosjektet Bergen-Fløen skal bygge The Bergen-Fløen project will install a new sikringsanlegg for Bergen stasjon interlocking system for Bergen station • Dagens bestående sikringsanlegg er et • The existing interlocking system at the relebasert anlegg av type NSI-63 station today is the NSI-63 relay based system • Nytt sikringsanlegg planlegges som elektronisk anlegg klasse B • The new interlocking is planned as an electronic system class B • For å få gjennomført alle prosjektfaser kreves det en god del tilpasninger og • There will be a need for a number of endringer i bestående sikringsanlegg upgrades and changes to the existing NSI-63 system in the intermediate phases • Det elektroniske sikringsanlegget skal bygges basert på avrop på allerede • The contract for the electronic system will inngått rammeavtale. Dette er ikke en del be a call-off on an existing framework av UBF 42 entreprisen agreement and will not be a part of the UBF 42 contract. UBF 42 arbeidsomfang UBF 42 Scope of Work UBF 42 arbeidsomfang UBF 42 Scope of Work • Entreprisen sitt omfang er nødvendige • The scope of work for this contract is endringer og utskiftinger i det mainly installations and changes within eksisterende signalinfrastruktur existing signalling infrastructure ̶ Nye sporveksler ̶ New points ̶ Nye drivmaskiner ̶ New point machines ̶ Nye signalobjekter ̶ New signals ̶ Flytting/justering av signalobjekter ̶ Moving / Adjustments of signalling ̶ Endringer i forrigling og ATC objects ̶ Kabling ̶ Adjustments in interlocking and ATC ̶ Utskifting av spor og sporveksler ̶ Cables ̶ Nye hensettingsspor ̶ Track renewals ̶ Justering av sporfelt ̶ New stabling tracks ̶ Installasjonskontroll og ̶ Track circuits tuning funksjonskontroll ̶ Installation test / Functional test ̶ Midlertidig sikringsanlegg ̶ Temporary container interlocking system UBF 42 grensesnitt UBF 42 Interfaces • Sikringsanlegget har grensesnitt mot CTC • The interlocking interfaces a CTC system systemet Vicos som benyttes av running at the central control office at the togledelse for Bergen stasjon Bergen station • Neste stasjon på strekningen, Arna, har • The next station on the line is Arna også NSI-63 sikringsanlegg station, and this station is also running a NSI-63 based interlocking • I Ulriken tunnel er det en blokkpost basert på NSI-63 og FATC • The tunnel between the stations has a NSI-63 based block post • Deler av stasjonen er utenfor området til sikringsanlegget (uforriglet) og opereres • Some areas of the station are outside the med håndstilte sporveksler interlocking with manually-operated points Framdrift Progress Framdrift Progress • Framdrift for entreprisen vil følge framdrift • Progress for this contract is following the for UBF 33, 34 og 35. contracts UBF 33, 34 and 35. • Framdrift er definert ved jernbaneteknisk • Progress shall follow defined phases in faseplan der mål har vært å minimalisere order to minimise cargo and passenger forstyrrelser for gods og passasjertrafikk traffic interruptions • Foreløpig har planen mange faser der • Current plans have defined quite a few UBF 42 kontrakten er involvert phases involving the UBF 42 contract • Hovedaktiviteter vil være i definerte togfrie • The main work activities will usually be perioder og brudd på strekningen. scheduled in planned track work windows - defined periods when train services are replaced by buses. Framdrift Progress • Framdriftsplan som • The schedule as per indikert nå viser now indicates work arbeidsperioder fra Q3- periods from Q3-2017 to 2017 til tidlig i 2019 early 2019 Utfordringer Challenges Utfordringer Challenges • Arbeid i perioder og faser • Work in defined periods/phases • Koordinering på byggeplass mellom • Work requires on-site coordination entreprisene between contractors. • Krav til kompetanse for å koble • Strict competence requirements for signalkomponenter personnel connecting signal system components • Krav til sikkerhetskurs for arbeid i og ved spor • Mandatory safety courses for all personnel working in close proximity to or • Regulatoriske krav må følges for arbeid inside the railway line areas med jernbane og signal i Norge • General regulatory requirements for railway and signalling work in Norway Oppsummering Summary • UBF 42 – Arbeid i bestående • UBF 42 – Contract for work in sikringsanlegg i mellomfaser før nytt intermediate phases before new elektronisk signalanlegg installeres electronic system is installed • UBF 42 – Arbeid utføres i planlagte faser • UBF 42 – Work to be carried out og brudd according to a staged plan • UBF 42 – Arbeid starter Q3-2017 og vil • UBF 42 – Start Q3-2017 and finish early vare til tidlig 2019 2019 • UBF 42 – Arbeid må koordineres med • UBF 42 – Work needs to be coordinated andre pågående entrepriser with parallel ongoing activities • UBF 42 – Må følge norsk regelverk • UBF 42 – Rules and regulations for the Norwegian railway must be followed .
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