Economic Bulletin Number 24, January 2005 Economic Bulletin Ñ BANK of GREECE

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Economic Bulletin Number 24, January 2005 Economic Bulletin Ñ BANK of GREECE BANK OF GREECE Economic Bulletin Number 24, January 2005 Economic Bulletin ñ BANK OF GREECE Number 24, January 2005 BANK OF GREECE Economic Bulletin Number 24, January 2005 BANK OF GREECE 21, E. Venizelos Avenue 102 50 Athens www.bankofgreece.gr Economic Research Department - Secretariat Tel.+30210 320 2392 Fax +30210 323 3025 Printed in Athens, Greece at the Bank of Greece Printing Works ISSN 1105 - 9729 Contents Greek banking profitability: recent developments Heather D. Gibson 7 The effect of merger and acquisition announcement on Greek bank stock returns Panagiotis Athanasoglou Ioannis Asimakopoulos Evangelia Georgiou 27 The redistributional impact of inflation in Greece Theodore Mitrakos Stavros Zografakis 45 Socio-economic differences in the job satisfaction of high-paid and low-paid workers in Greece Ioannis Theodossiou Konstantinos Pouliakas 83 Working Papers 117 Monetary policy and financial system supervision measures 127 Decisions of the Bank of Greece 129 Statistical section 135 Articles published in previous issues of the Economic Bulletin 159 6 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 24 1/05 Greek banking In an article co-authored with Barry Eichengreen for the Bank of Greece – Brookings conference on profitability: recent the Greek economy back in December 2000, we developments* argued that the Greek banking system was being driven by three main forces: catch-up, competi- tion and privatisation. We focused on the impact of these forces on various characteristics of the banking sector, including, in particular, its prof- itability (Eichengreen and Gibson, 2001).1 Since writing the article, a number of papers have been published on the Greek banking sector. Heather D. Gibson These focus on issues of efficiency and the related Economic Research Department question of whether Greek banks enjoy econo- mies of scale (Christopoulos and Tsionas, 2001, Christopoulos et al., 2002, Tsionas et al,. 2003, Kamberoglou et al., 2004), the existence of excess capacity (Kapopoulos, 2001) and the impact of mergers and acquisitions (Athanasoglou and Bris- simis, 2004). Mamatzakis and Remoundos (2003) and Athanasoglou et al. (2004) focus explicitly on the issue of profitability using data from 1989- 2000 and 1985-2001, respectively, and a similar framework to that found in Eichengreen and Gibson (2001). The results of the Mamatzakis-Remoundos paper suggest that profitability is strongly influ- enced by both bank and market characteristics, although they find little support for the Structure, Conduct and Performance hypothesis.2 Athanasoglou * The views expressed in this article are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of Greece. The author would like to thank Vassilis Droukopoulos and Isaak Sabethai for their helpful comments on an earlier version. 1 The paper "Greek Banking at the Dawn of the New Millenium" was first presented at the conference "Greece’s Economic Performance and Prospects" organised by the Bank of Greece and the Brookings Institution in December 2000 and subsequently published in the edited volume from the conference. 2 The Structure, Conduct, Performance hypothesis states that profitability is positively related to the degree of concentration in the banking sector and banks with market power will use that power to extract higher profits. ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 24 1/05 7 et al. focus (2004) explicitly on the impact of the iour and characteristics. Section 2 re-estimates macroeconomic environment on bank profitabil- the profitability equations using data from 1993 ity and conclude that bank profits move procycli- to 2003 instead of to 1998 and re-examines the cally with a tendency to rise more quickly during various hypotheses put forward in the original expansions than they contract during recessions. article.3 The results suggest that the period of rapid structural change is perhaps coming to an The purpose of the present paper is to provide end with the banking sector settling down to an update of developments in the sector using more normal behaviour of profits. There is also data up to 2003 rather than 1998 as in the orig- evidence that banks with stronger market inal paper. We argue that the period since 1998 power earn higher profits. Finally, the impact of has largely been one of consolidation with the size on profitability is much weaker than in the result that the downward trend in the degree of earlier period; to the extent that size is signifi- concentration in the banking sector which had cant, the results indicate that growing bigger begun in 1985 has been reversed somewhat. did not help banks in the period examined to This might suggest a decline in the degree of increase profitability, something which is sug- competition. However, two factors have been gestive of the fact that economies of scale may countering the rise in concentration. First, the have been limited for the larger Greek banks. sector has moved further away from being dom- inated by one leader; instead a number of banks are now of sufficient size to compete with each 1. Banking sector structure and characteristics other for market share. Second, another wave of new entrants has occurred since 1998. At the Table 1 provides a first impression of the extent same time, the profitability of Greek banks has of structural change in the sector over the period exhibited rather erratic behaviour. To a great from 1993 to 2003. Of the banks in independent extent, this reflects the huge surge in profitabil- existence in 1993, the majority had disappeared ity provided during the years of the stock mar- by 2003, having been acquired by other banks in ket boom (1998-2000); more recently, prof- the system. Both in 2000 and again in 2003, itability has returned to more ‘normal’ levels there were a lot of new entrants, with the result and indications of a long-term downward trend that there are around 10 banks with market in profitability are evident from the beginning of shares of less than 1.5%. Table 1 also gives the liberalisation (towards the end of the 1980s) reader a picture of the banks in our sample and onwards. it should be clear from a cursory glance at the table that the majority of banks in the banking The remainder of the article is organised as fol- system are included. lows: In the next section, we provide some descriptive statistics for the banking sector, focusing, as in the original article (Eichengreen 3 Our dataset runs from 1980 to 2003 and is collected from and Gibson, 2001), on the impact of size and banks’ published accounts. From 1980 to 1993 we have only the major aggregates. From 1993 we have full sets of accounts which ownership on various aspects of bank behav- we use in the econometric analysis that follows. 8 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 24 1/05 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 24 Table 1 Market shares of individual banks at selected dates (based on total assets) (Shares in percentage points) 1980 1993 1998 2000 2003 1/05 Rank % Rank % Rank % Rank % Rank % National Bank of Greece 1 41.6 1 42.3 1 36.0 1 30.3 1 29.3 Agricultural Bank of Greece 2 16.6 2 12.2 2 13.1 4 10.9 4 10.6 Commercial Bank of Greece (Emporiki Bank) 3 12.0 3 10.5 4 9.8 3 10.9 5 9.9 National Mortgage Bank 4 8.1 4 7.0 –––––– Ionian Bank 5 5.3 7 4.6 5 5.6 –––– ∂∆µ∞ 6 4.7 6 5.6 10 1.8 7 2.1 –– Alpha Bank 7 4.6 5 6.2 3 12.5 2 19.8 2 17.6 General Bank 8 2.0 9 1.4 11 1.6 8 1.5 7 2.0 ∂∆∂µ∞ 9 1.6 13 0.6 14 1.0 11 0.9 –– Ergobank 10 1.0 8 3.1 6 5.2 –––– Investment Bank 11 0.6 –––––––– Bank of Crete 12 0.6 10 1.3 13 1.2 –––– Bank of Athens 13 0.3 20 0.3 –––––– Bank of Piraeus (including Piraeus Prime) 14 0.3 17 0.4 8 2.0 6 7.9 6 8.3 Bank of Macedonia-Thrace 15 0.3 11 1.0 9 1.9 –––– National Housing Bank of Greece 16 0.2 19 0.3 –––––– Bank of Attica 17 0.2 21 0.3 17 0.6 12 0.9 9 1.2 Bank of Central Greece 18 0.03 15 0.4 18 0.5 –––– Greek banking profitability: recent developments Eurobank ––12 0.6 7 3.8 5 10.8 3 15.6 Xiosbank ––14 0.5 12 1.5 –––– Interbank ––16 0.4 –––––– Credit Lyonnais Gréce ––18 0.4 NA NA –––– Egnatia Bank ––22 0.2 15 0.8 9 1.2 8 1.5 Dorian Bank ––23 0.2 20 0.3 14 0.6 –– European and Popular Bank ––24 0.1 16 0.6 13 0.8 10 1.2 Aspis Bank ––25 0.1 19 0.3 15 0.4 11 1.1 Novabank ––––––10 0.9 NA NA Investment Bank of Greece ––––––16 0.1 NA NA Unitbank ––––––17 0.02 NA NA Probank ––––––18 0.02 12 0.5 Omega Bank ––––––––13 0.5 First Business Bank ––––––––14 0.4 Panellinia Bank ––––––––15 0.1 Note: NA: data not available. – : bank not in existence as independent entity. Source: Own calculations using sample collected (see text). 9 Charts 1-3 provide a graphical representation of —OBS— activity) suggests that the downward the structure of the banking sector. The trend in concentration halted in the mid-to-late Herfindahl-Hirschman index (based either on 1990s; subsequently, concentration levels have total assets or total assets plus off-balance sheet been rising, without, however, reaching anything 10 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 24 1/05 Greek banking profitability: recent developments like the levels witnessed in the 1980s.4 A qualita- Agricultural Bank and the Commercial Bank, which tively similar picture is drawn in Chart 2, which have had a roughly constant market share of around graphs three and four-firm concentration ratios.
Recommended publications
  • The Euro and Currency Unions October 2011 2 the Euro and Currency Unions | October 2011
    GLOBAL LAW INTELLIGENCE UNIT The euro and currency unions October 2011 www.allenovery.com 2 The euro and currency unions | October 2011 Key map of jurisdictions © Allen & Overy LLP 2011 3 Contents Introduction 4 Map of world currencies 4 Currency unions 5 Break-up of currency unions 6 Break-up of federations 6 How could the eurozone break up? 6 Rights of withdrawal from the eurozone 7 Legal rights against a member withdrawing from the eurozone unilaterally 7 What would a currency law say? 8 Currency of debtors' obligations to creditors 8 Role of the lex monetae if the old currency (euro) is still in existence 9 Creditors' rights of action against debtors for currency depreciation 10 Why would a eurozone member want to leave? - the advantages 10 Why would a eurozone member want to leave? - the disadvantages 11 History of expulsions 12 What do you need for a currency union? 12 Bailing out bankrupt member states 13 European fire-power 14 Are new clauses needed to deal with a change of currency? 14 Related contractual terms 18 Neutering of protective clauses by currency law 18 Other impacts of a currency change 18 Reaction of markets 19 Conclusion 20 Contacts 21 www.allenovery.com 4 The euro and currency unions | October 2011 Allen & Overy Global Law Intelligence Unit The euro and currency unions October 2011 Introduction The views of the executive of the Intelligence Unit as to whether or not breakup of the eurozone currency union This paper reviews the role of the euro in the context of would be a bad idea will appear in the course of this paper.
    [Show full text]
  • 2021: a Defining Moment for the Interest Rates Reform City Week 2020 – London
    21 September 2020 ESMA80-187-627 2021: A Defining Moment for The Interest Rates Reform City Week 2020 – London Steven Maijoor Chair European Securities and Markets Authority Introduction Good morning Ladies and Gentlemen, It is my great pleasure to participate today in the City Week 2020 forum. The interest rates reform is one of the key challenges that the global financial system is currently facing. Therefore, I would like to thank City & Financial Global and the other institutions involved in the organisation of this forum for inviting me and for including in the agenda a panel discussion on this very important matter. Today, before participating in the panel discussion, I would like to speak about recent and expected developments of the global interest rates reform and the crucial role that the cooperation between public authorities and the financial industry is playing in this process. €STR: the new risk-free rate for the euro area As Chair of a European Authority, please allow me to start with an overview of interest rates transition in the euro area and the challenges that lie ahead of us. ESMA • 201-203 rue de Bercy • CS 80910 • 75589 Paris Cedex 12 • France • Tel. +33 (0) 1 58 36 43 21 • www.esma.europa.eu We are soon approaching the first-year anniversary of the Euro Short-Term Rate, or €STR1, which has been published by the ECB since 2nd October 2019. This rate is arguably the core element of the interest rate reform in the euro area, and I will try to explain why this is the case.
    [Show full text]
  • FTSE Currency FRB Index Series Ground Rules Developed with Record Currency Management V2.8
    Ground Rules FTSE Currency FRB Index Series Ground Rules Developed with Record Currency Management v2.8 ftserussell.com An LSEG Business April 2021 Contents 1.0 Introduction .................................................................... 3 1.0 Overview ........................................................................................... 3 1.9 FTSE Russell .................................................................................... 4 2.0 Management Responsibilities ....................................... 5 2.0 FTSE International Limited (FTSE) ................................................ 5 2.3 Amendments to These Ground Rules ........................................... 5 3.0 FTSE Russell Index Policies ......................................... 6 3.1 Queries and Complaints ................................................................. 6 3.4 FTSE Russell Policy for Benchmark Methodology Changes ...... 6 4.0 Eligible Currencies ....................................................... 7 5.0 Periodic Review of Currencies ..................................... 8 5.1 Review Dates .................................................................................... 8 5.2 Calculation of Spot and Forward Mid Rates ................................. 8 6.0 Index Calculation ......................................................... 11 Interest rates used in the calculations .................................................... 13 Historic interest rates and sources ......................................................... 13 Current
    [Show full text]
  • John Hurley: the Monetary Policy and Operational Framework of the Eurosystem
    John Hurley: The monetary policy and operational framework of the Eurosystem Address by Mr John Hurley, Governor of the Central Bank of Ireland, to ACI Ireland (Financial Market Association), Dublin, 12 February 2003. * * * Introduction I welcome the opportunity to address you here tonight. The ACI plays an important role in representing the interest of financial markets and in actively promoting the educational interests of its members. This raises the level of professionalism of the members and contributes to the smooth and orderly operation of financial markets. I would like to concentrate this evening on the ECB dimension of the work of the Bank. I will begin by talking about the work of the Governing Council, and then go on to focus on monetary policy. Finally, I will talk about monetary policy implementation and the role that Ireland has played in the process. Since I became a member of the Governing Council, I have been struck by two things in particular. The first is the breadth of its activities. Admittedly what are described as its basic tasks go well beyond the primary functions of the ECB. Still the range and depth of discussion in such areas as payment and settlement systems, foreign reserve management, production and issue of bank notes, statistics and so on was quite surprising; and this was following lengthy and detailed preparatory work by the Executive Board and by the twelve committees that work to the Governing Council. Secondly, there is the democratic way in which the Governing Council goes about its business. In a sense one should not be surprised by this; the Statute of the ESCB provides for each member to have one vote and specifically restricts weighted voting to financial matters, and Treaty Article 107 is designed to ensure that Governors are not influenced by national considerations.
    [Show full text]
  • Dr. Theodoros G. Stamatiou1,2,3
    DR.THEODOROS G. STAMATIOU1,2,3 Business: Division of Economic Analysis & Financial Markets Research, (+30)214 4059708 Eurobank Ergasias SA [email protected] 8 Othonos st., Athens, 105 57, Greece [email protected] Current Employment • Eurobank-Ergasias SA, Division of Economic Analysis & Financial Markets Research— – Senior Economist, April 2015 to present – Voting Member & Ambassador for Greece, Working Group for Euro Risk-Free Rates (jointly organised by the ECB, the FSMA, the ESMA and the EC, with the task of identifying and recommending alternative risk-free rates), January 2018 to present4 Academic Appointment • Dpt. of Banking and Financial Management, University of Piraeus—July 2013 to present – Research Fellow Previous Employment • Ministry of Finance, Hellenic Republic—September 2014 to March 2015 – Member, Council of Economic Advisors • Eurobank-Ergasias SA, Division of Economic Research & Forecasting—October 2009 to September 2014 – Research Economist Education • Dpt. of Banking and Financial Management, University of Piraeus—2004 to 20095 – PhD Thesis: Essays in Market Microstructure Supervisor: Professor Gikas A. Hardouvelis • Athens PhD Program in Economics, Joint PhD Program organized by the Dpt. of Economics, Uni- versity of Athens & Dpt. of Economics, Athens University of Economics and Business—2000-2002 – MSc in Economic Analysis • Cardiff Business School,University of Wales—1999-2000 – MSc in International Economics, Banking & Finance – MSc Dissertation: Purchasing Power Parity and the Greek Drachma: A Cointegration Analysis Supervisor: Professor David Peel • Dpt. of Economics, University of Athens—1994-1999 – BA in Economics 1Linkedin Profile: http://www.linkedin.com/pub/theodoros-stamatiou/35/9ab/883. 2Fullfiled military service: Hellenic Navy (February 2008 – February 2009). 3I can provide references.
    [Show full text]
  • Sovereign Debt Crisis in Portugal and Spain
    A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Afonso, António; Verdial, Nuno Working Paper Sovereign Debt Crisis in Portugal and Spain EconPol Working Paper, No. 40 Provided in Cooperation with: EconPol Europe – European Network for Economic and Fiscal Policy Research Suggested Citation: Afonso, António; Verdial, Nuno (2020) : Sovereign Debt Crisis in Portugal and Spain, EconPol Working Paper, No. 40, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, Munich This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/219502 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence
    [Show full text]
  • Payment Systems in Switzerland
    Payment systems in Switzerland Switzerland Table of contents List of abbreviations............................................................................................................................. 369 Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 371 1. Institutional aspects ................................................................................................................... 371 1.1 The general framework ................................................................................................... 371 1.2 The role of the Swiss National Bank ............................................................................... 371 1.3 The role of other private and public institutions .............................................................. 373 2. Payment media used by non-banks.......................................................................................... 374 2.1 Cash payments ............................................................................................................... 374 2.2 Non-cash payments ........................................................................................................ 374 2.3 Recent developments ..................................................................................................... 377 3. Interbank exchange and settlement systems............................................................................ 377 3.1 General overview ...........................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Emu Protocol (Greece)
    ISDAÒ International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc. EMU PROTOCOL (GREECE) published on 10th October, 2000 by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc. The International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc. ("ISDA") has published this EMU Protocol (Greece) (this "Protocol") to enable the parties to an ISDA Interest Rate and Currency Exchange Agreement or an ISDA Master Agreement (Multicurrency—Cross Border) (each an "ISDA Master Agreement") to amend that ISDA Master Agreement to confirm their intentions in respect of certain matters arising in connection with Greece's participation in European Economic and Monetary Union. Accordingly, a party to an ISDA Master Agreement may adhere to this Protocol and be bound by its terms by completing and delivering a letter substantially in the form of Exhibit 1 to this Protocol (an "Adherence Letter") to ISDA, as agent, as set forth below. 1. Amendments (a) By adhering to this Protocol in the manner set forth in Section 2 below, a party (an "Adhering Party") to an ISDA Master Agreement may effect one or more amendments to each ISDA Master Agreement between it and any other Adhering Party, in each case on the terms and subject to the conditions set forth in this Protocol and the relevant Adherence Letter. (b) The amendments provided for in this Protocol are set forth in Annexes 1 to 6, and each Adhering Party may specify in its Adherence Letter its preference that one or more of these Annexes are applicable. (c) In respect of any ISDA Master Agreement between two Adhering Parties, where at least one Adhering Party has specified a preference that less than all the Annexes are applicable, that ISDA Master Agreement will be modified only by those amendments contained in the Annexes that both parties have specified.
    [Show full text]
  • The Euro's Three Crises
    JAY C. SHAMBAUGH Georgetown University The Euro’s Three Crises ABSTRACT The euro area faces three interlocking crises that together chal- lenge the viability of the currency union. There is a banking crisis: banks are undercapitalized and have faced liquidity problems. There is a sovereign debt crisis: a number of countries have faced rising bond yields and challenges fund- ing themselves. Lastly, there is a growth crisis: economic growth is slow in the euro area overall and unequally distributed across countries. These crises con- nect with one another in several ways: the problems of weak banks and high sov- ereign debt are mutually reinforcing, and both are exacerbated by weak growth but also in turn constrain growth. This paper details the three crises, their inter- connections, and possible policy solutions. Policy responses that fail to take into account the interdependent nature of the problems will likely be incom- plete or even counterproductive. A broader point also becomes clear: a currency union may not need a fiscal union, but it does likely need both a financial union and some way to adjust for unbalanced economic conditions across countries. onsidered almost unthinkable just a few years ago, a breakup of the Ceuro area is today viewed as possible. Prices on the online betting market Intrade in March 2012 suggested that the probability that at least one country currently using the euro would leave the euro area by the end of 2013 was roughly 40 percent; these odds peaked at over 65 percent as recently as November 2011 (figure 1). The head of the European Central Bank (ECB), Mario Draghi, has acknowledged the possibility of countries ceasing to use the euro.
    [Show full text]
  • EURIBOR Reform
    10th September 2019 Important Disclaimer: The following is provided for information purposes only. It does not constitute advice (including legal, tax, accounting or regulatory advice). No representation is made as to its completeness, accuracy or suitability for any purpose. Recipients should take such professional advice in relation to the matters discussed as they deem appropriate to their circumstances. Frequently Asked Questions: EURIBOR reform This Frequently Asked Questions (“FAQ”) document, which may be updated from time to time, contains information regarding the EURIBOR benchmark reforms. 1. What is EURIBOR? The Euro Interbank Offered Rate (EURIBOR) is a daily reference rate published by the European Money Markets Institute (EMMI). 2. What is happening to the EURIBOR benchmark methodology? EMMI is reforming the EURIBOR benchmark by moving to a ‘hybrid’ methodology and reformulating the EURIBOR specification. The hybrid EURIBOR methodology is currently being gradually implemented (see Question 10 for further information). In Q18 of the EMMI - EURIBOR questions and answers, EMMI describes the hybrid methodology (described further in Q6 below) as a, “robust evolution of the current quote-based methodology”. EMMI has reformulated the EURIBOR specification, separating the Underlying Interest from the benchmark methodology, in order to clarify the former. EURIBOR's “Underlying Interest” is: “the rate at which wholesale funds in euro could be obtained by credit institutions in the EU and EFTA countries in the unsecured money market.” (https://www.emmi-benchmarks.eu/euribor- org/about-euribor.html)”. In Q18 of the EMMI - EURIBOR questions and answers, EMMI states that EURIBOR reform “does not change EURIBOR’s Underlying Interest, which has always been seeking to measure banks’ costs of borrowing in unsecured money markets”.
    [Show full text]
  • ICE LIBOR Feedback Statement on Consultation on Potential Cessation
    ICE LIBOR® Feedback Statement on Consultation on Potential Cessation 5 March 2021 © Copyright 2021 ICE Benchmark Administration Limited ICE LIBOR® Feedback Statement on Consultation on Potential Cessation 1 Contents Executive Summary 3 Introduction 6 Consultation Feedback 7 Addressing Feedback and Next Steps 15 List of Non-confidential Responses 19 Glossary 20 Disclaimers 21 © Copyright 2021 ICE Benchmark Administration Limited ICE LIBOR® Feedback Statement on Consultation on Potential Cessation 2 Executive summary In July 2017, the UK Financial Conduct Authority (the FCA) announced its intention that it would no longer be necessary to persuade, or compel, banks to submit to LIBOR® after December 31, 2021. Since then, the FCA and other official sector bodies have strongly advised end-users of the need to transition from LIBOR by this date. ICE Benchmark Administration Limited (IBA), the authorized and regulated administrator of LIBOR, has engaged with end-users, panel banks, the FCA and other official sector bodies regarding the potential for continuing certain widely-used LIBOR settings after December 31, 2021. On December 4, 2020, following discussions with the FCA and other official sector bodies, IBA published a consultation on its intention to cease publication of: • the following LIBOR settings, to take effect after the publication of LIBOR on Friday, December 31, 2021: o EUR LIBOR - all tenors (Overnight, 1 Week, 1, 2, 3, 6 and 12 Months); o CHF LIBOR - all tenors (Spot Next, 1 Week, 1, 2, 3, 6 and 12 Months); o JPY LIBOR - all tenors (Spot Next, 1 Week, 1, 2, 3, 6 and 12 Months); o GBP LIBOR - all tenors (Overnight, 1 Week, 1, 2, 3, 6 and 12 Months); o USD LIBOR - 1 Week and 2 Months; and • the following LIBOR settings, to take effect after the publication of LIBOR on Friday, June 30, 2023: o USD LIBOR - Overnight and 1, 3, 6 and 12 Months, subject to any rights of the FCA to compel IBA to continue publication.
    [Show full text]
  • Euro Risk-Free Rates
    Q&A by the working group on euro risk-free rates Frequently Asked Questions Update March 2020 Contents 1 General benchmark rate questions 4 1.1 What are benchmark rates? 4 1.2 Why are benchmark rates important? 4 1.3 Why are benchmark rates undergoing reforms and what exactly does this entail? 5 1.4 What are the most widely used European benchmark rates? 5 2 Questions on the euro short-term rate (€STR) 7 2.1 What is the €STR? 7 2.2 What makes the €STR robust? 7 2.3 When did publication of the €STR start? 7 2.4 Why is the €STR only published the next day? What are the constraints preventing earli er publicati on of the rate? 8 2.5 What measures are being taken by the ECB to ensure the timely publication of the rate and to ensure that certain trades, which may potentially be erroneous, do not influence the €STR? 8 2.6 How is the €STR identified? Does it have an ISIN? 8 2.7 Why is the €STR based on unsecured market transactions, while the secured market may have provided a broader base? 8 2.8 What is the main reason for extending the scope of the €STR beyond the interbank market? 9 2.9 Isn’t there a risk that, with a broad scope, the €STR may not be able to adequately capture changes in market rates, especially if the €STR is based on transactions executed with entities outside the euro area and with no access to the Eurosystem monetary policy operations?9 2.10 Why are transactions with non-euro area counterparties not excluded from the calculation of the €STR? 10 2.11 Why are only money market deposits used for the calculation of the €STR, while there may be significant turnover in other instruments, e.g.
    [Show full text]