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Ship Security Plan Ship Security Plan For (Name of Ship) Prepared by (Company Security Officer or Qualified Contractor) (Date) Revision No. The information contained herein is confidential and proprietary. Release of this information is prohibited without the express authorization of . Distribution is limited to those designated by . Control Copy Number of Copies Issued to: NOTE: 1. THIS NOTE AND ALL ITEMS IN GREY ARE TO BE OVERWRITTEN OR DELETED. 2. THE COMPANY AND SHIP’S SECURITY OFFICER ARE TO COMPLETE ALL OTHER FORMS FOUND IN THE APPENDIX AS NEEDED. CONFIDENTIAL – DO NOT DISTRIBUTE Record of Changes & History of Revision The table below is to be completed every time a revision is received and included. The discarded sections or pages are to be destroyed. Rev. Section Summary Date Security Administration No. No. Entered Officer’s approval Signature CONFIDENTIAL – DO NOT DISTRIBUTE Ship Security Plan – m/v Rev. 00 Page ii Table of Contents 1. Introduction ................................................................................................................. 1 2. Company Policy .......................................................................................................... 3 3. Ship Specific Information ............................................................................................. 5 4. Company Security Officer (CSO) ................................................................................ 9 4.1 Company Security Officer Duties: ...................................................................................................... 9 4.2 Company Security Officer’s contact information will be found in Appendix G: ................................... 9 5. Ship Security Officer (SSO) ....................................................................................... 10 5.1 Ship Security Officer’s Duties & Responsibilities ............................................................................. 10 5.2 Ship Security Officer ......................................................................................................................... 10 6. Security Plan Documentation and Overview ............................................................. 11 6.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 11 6.2 Security Organizational Structure ..................................................................................................... 12 6.3 Audit, Review & Reporting ................................................................................................................ 13 6.4 Records ............................................................................................................................................. 13 6.5 Plan Security ..................................................................................................................................... 14 7. Communication and Coordination ............................................................................. 15 7.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 15 7.2 Port ................................................................................................................................................... 15 7.3 Water Front Facility ........................................................................................................................... 15 7.4 Law Enforcement .............................................................................................................................. 15 7.5 Company, the CSO and the SSO ..................................................................................................... 16 7.6 Radio Procedures ............................................................................................................................. 16 7.7 Radio Watch keeping ........................................................................................................................ 17 7.8 Communication in Response to Threats .......................................................................................... 17 8. Ship Security Assessment (Survey) .......................................................................... 18 8.1 Survey Process ................................................................................................................................. 18 8.2 Security Survey is Confidential ......................................................................................................... 18 9. Establishing Security Levels ...................................................................................... 19 9.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 19 9.2 Security Levels Guidance ................................................................................................................. 20 9.3 Security Level 1 ................................................................................................................................ 20 9.4 Security Level 2 ................................................................................................................................ 20 9.5 Security Level 3 ................................................................................................................................ 21 9.6 Determining Security Level in port .................................................................................................... 22 9.7 Determining Security Level at Sea ................................................................................................... 23 10. Security Actions:...................................................................................................... 24 10.1 Piracy and Armed Attacks: ............................................................................................................. 24 10.1.1 Background ............................................................................................................................. 24 10.1.2 Piracy Security Measures in Port ............................................................................................ 25 10.1.3 Security Measures at Sea ....................................................................................................... 25 10.1.4 If Hijacked ................................................................................................................................ 26 10.2. Terrorism........................................................................................................................................ 26 10.3. Evacuation procedure .................................................................................................................... 27 11. Ensuring the Performance of All Ship Security Duties: ............................................ 28 11.1 Duties and responsibilities of watch standers: ................................................................................ 28 Position ................................................................................................................................................... 28 Position ................................................................................................................................................... 29 11.2 Communication: .............................................................................................................................. 30 11.3 Briefings .......................................................................................................................................... 30 12. Monitoring Restricted Areas to ensure authorized Persons Only: ........................... 31 CONFIDENTIAL – DO NOT DISTRIBUTE Ship Security Plan – m/v Rev. 00 Page iii 12.1 Procedures: .................................................................................................................................... 31 12.2 Establishment of Restricted areas: ................................................................................................. 32 12.3 Methods of Monitoring and restricting access: ............................................................................... 32 12.4 Intrusion detection Devices:............................................................................................................ 33 13. Controlling access to the ship: ................................................................................ 34 13.1 Procedures: .................................................................................................................................... 34 14. Monitoring of deck areas and areas surrounding the ship: ...................................... 35 14.1 Procedures: .................................................................................................................................... 35 14.2 Security patrol, Procedures: ........................................................................................................... 36 14.3 Surveillance: ................................................................................................................................... 36 14.4 Communication, Procedures: ......................................................................................................... 37 14.5 Lighting:
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