Finland's foreign policy - Do not disturb!

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Author/Creator Soiri, Iina; Peltola, Pekka Publisher Nordiska Afrikainstitutet (Uppsala) Date 1999 Resource type Articles Language English Subject Coverage (spatial) Finland, Southern Africa (region) Source Nordiska Afrikainstitutet (Uppsala) Relation Soiri, Iina and Peltola, Pekka. Finland and national liberation in Southern Africa. Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1999. 67-102. Rights By kind permission of Nordiska Afrikainstitutet (The Nordic Africa Institute). Description Part of a study on National Liberation in Southern Africa: The Role of the Nordic Countries, hosted at the Nordic Africa Institute Format extent 37 page(s) (length/size)

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http://www.aluka.org Chapter 4

Chapter 4 Finland's Foreign Policy-Do Not Disturb! This kind of answer [not funding the student conference], which developed a lot of public discussion, actually hastened a reorientation in the policy. It was ambivalent there, and some people-Keijo Korhonen and a few other people, who were there, who were kind of hard-liners in this question-pushed it through, which finally backfired actually. It also reflects that in the political parties, there was a lot of support which the foreign office and the official decision-making could not resist in the long run if the civic society and political society were ready for that step. And we should also see that in the UN and elsewhere these questions became much more predominant. And because we co-ordinated our policy with the Nordic Countries, it was obvious that while the others had started [to support liberation movements], it was obvious that Finland could not keep its own line in these questions. There were many factors, but one factor definitely was that the liberation movements also made impressive gains, they became respected players in the international arena and they were granted status in different organtsations.18 In this chapter, we try to describe and analyse Finland's foreign policy and its basic principles before 1973, and the change that occurred thereafter. The year 1973 is chosen because it was the year when the most important decisions in regard to the liberation movements were taken by the Foreign Ministry. It was decided then that the liberation movements could be supported by the Government Before that, Finland was consistently and systematically refusing to directly support the liberation movements. It even went to great pains to discover new motives behind its status quo. In the background lay foreign policy doctrine, political realism, which was the leading principle amongst the foreign policy administration in particular. The political leadership initiated the change. The analysis is done on three different but interlinked levels: 1. The official foreign policy of Finland i.e. its bilateral relations with other countries and its national stand on international issues; 2. Finland's policy in the United Nations, i.e. at the multilateral level; and 3. The informal NGO level. The analysis endeavours to show how all these interacted with and influenced each other. According to Timo-Erkki Heino, the most important question in the foreign policy debate at the turn of the decade 1960s-70s-as well as in the sanctions question in the 1980s-was the question of decision-making, that is, who ultimately decided the foreign policy.169 We take his assumption as a guideline. We analyse how the internal and external influences of the civil society found their way into the decision-making structures-that is, into the political parties, 168 Interview with Mikko Lohikoski, 22.12.1995. 169. Heino, 1992:111.

Pekka Peltola and lina Soiri parliament and government as well as into the civil service. To have a real impact in a country like Finland, which was in such a special situation in the Cold War world, a new line had to have rather wide support including large sectors of society to push for policy change. In the question of supporting the liberation movements, that kind of a support did grow. While this chapter follows a chronological order, the different levels are analysed simultaneously. Because the previous chapters introduced the main activities and approaches at the NGO level, including the foreign policy discussion that the activists initiated at the turn of the decade, this chapter concentrates more on the policy and its formulation at the official level. Finland's policies in the multilateral forums and in the Nordic context, as well as at domestic level, are examined in relation to each other in order to analyse the causes and consequences of the different actions. Although the special emphasis is on the policy towards liberation movements, certain general policy questions must be introduced in order to understand the underlying foreign policy principles. The analysis concerning Finland's policy towards apartheid and South Africa is based mainly on the excellent study by Timo-Erkki Heino.170 Many conclusions drawn from the development of Finland's standing on South Africa are applicable to its policy towards liberation movements, because the questions of apartheid and colonialism were closely connected. Finland's official foreign policy thinking concerning the whole of Southern Africa was naturally a strong reflection of its policy toward South Africa, and its viewpoints were influenced by diplomatic connections with Pretoria. Heino argues that there have been two dominant approaches to foreign policy in Finland. The first one is a 'realist' approach, which was the primary approach adopted by the official foreign policy decision-makers. The 'realist' approach is based on the state-centred idea of the international order, where the dominant feature is the struggle for power, defence of the survival of the state, and pursuing of the national interest. The focus is on Finland's position in the Cold War and its requirements, especially national security in a narrow sense. The second approach is a moral consideration of the role of Finland in the world of injustices. This is based on the idealist principles of moralism and cooperation in the international society. Having its roots in the first decades of this century when it influenced the establishment of the League of Nations, the moral approach was dismissed in the aftermath of the Second World War as an over- optimistic view of international relations. Realism took over and was efficiently strengthened by the era of the Cold War and bloc politics. The moral approach did, however, made a significant comeback in the 1960s, this time dominating the thinking of the new radicals, who were imbued with ideas of solidarity, common responsibility and a new economic order. They demanded 170. Heino, 1992.

Finland's Foreign Policy-Do Not Disturb! that moral principles must be taken into account in foreign policy decisionmaking. 4.1. Finland formulating its position in the world after 1945 In general, the African question was not high on the foreign policy agenda before the 1960s. It was clearly a side issue. After Finland's independence, its foreign policy and diplomatic representation concentrated on Europe. Germany and Great Britain were important reference countries. With Africa still almost entirely under colonial rule at the time, Finnish diplomatic representation on the African continent was limited. By 1925, however, Finnish honorary consulates were established in five South African cities: Cape Town, Johannesburg, Durban, Port Elizabeth and East London. Trade was the connecting concern. 171 The Second World War had a profound impact on Finland's foreign policy thinking. The partial de facto alliance with Germany during the war against the Soviet Union had resulted in substantial areas of Finland being annexed to the territory of the Soviet Union. The seriously damaged Finnish economy had to recover quickly in order to pay the war compensations and accommodate half a million internal refugees from Karelia. Industrial development-which speeded up all over Europe-was the key to development as well as some structural adjustment from an agrarian economy to a modern one. New markets were sought all over the world. Since 1949, Finland had had a permanent diplomatic mission in Pretoria. Her exports to South Africa were mainly forest industry products, and she imported fruit from there. Prior to the 1950s, South Africa's racial policies did not in any way affect Finland's relations with the country. Finland's main interest was still in promoting trade. Her internal economic development was not to be harmed by any humanitarian violations. That was not even an issue. Only in 1955, when Finland became a member of the United Nations, could the Foreign Ministry no longer ignore the question of apartheid. UN membership forced Finland to deal with global issues and perspectives instead of the former inward oriented policy, which concentrated almost fully on the Soviet Union, Scandinavia and Europe. Joining the UN in 1955 was not a clear cut decision for Finland, either. It was feared that it would harm her precarious position. For that reason, Finland accepted in its UN policy in the 1950s a principle called 'Enckell's corset'.172 This meant not getting overly involved, but trying to further solutions which might gain support from all the superpowers and when this was not possible abstaining from taking a stand. Finland emphasised its strong policy of neutrality and endeavoured to remain outside 171 Heino, 1992:19-20. 172. After Ralph Enckell, the Finnish Ambassador to the UN.

Pekka Peltola and Iina Soiri East-West conflicts. Another important principle was to strive for a common Nordic policy. 173 When Finland, for the first time, spoke out on its view concerning apartheid, there was no ambiguity in regard to the question of racism and apartheid in the Finnish policy. In Finland's first official statement in the UN on apartheid in November 1959, Ambassador Max Jacobson stated that the equality of all, without regard to race, was deeply rooted in Finnish tradition, law and social practice. Racial discrimination violated the sense of justice of the Finnish people.174 Immediately after it joined the UN, Finland had been elected as one of the nine members of the Committee, which had the task of collecting information on the territory and conducting negotiations with South Africa over 's future.175 In 1958, Finnish delegates had for the first time participated in discussions on Namibia in the General Assembly, explaining that the relations between Finland and South Africa were most friendly and satisfactory. Finland agreed about the need to continue negotiations with South Africa, reflecting the pragmatic Finnish policy in the UN.176 The relations continued as usual, bearing in mind that the missionaries were operating in Namibian territory. Regardless of its anti-racial sentiments, Finland still did not want to get involved. Her problem was thus not the substance, but her interpretation of the rules and regulations of international law at that time. When the UN was discussing whether dealing with apartheid was within its competence, the Finnish delegation took the stand that apartheid was an internal question and should therefore not be dealt with. Finland held on to that principle for a long time, although the other Nordic countries had chosen the other side emphasising the human rights principle. Finland stressed that it did not favour the line of protest that the other Nordic countries had adopted.177 Finland's standpoint was a logical consequence of its relationship towards the Soviet Union. It wanted to stay behind the legal agreements accepted by the international community in order not to make any mistakes. When Finland formulated its policy on different issues--for example, whether to support this or that, here or there-it was not only the issue of that country. It was considered also whether that example could be used to pressurise Finland to take a stand in another situation, which could be seen as an analogical situation, to take a stand which it did not want to take. So it was always in mind that once the world was divided in this Cold War situation, that if we take this step, we are more vulnerable, for example, to pressure to take a stand on another issue, one which we 173. Heino, 1992:23-24. 174. ULA, 1959:116. 175. Saarela, 1980:184. 176 Ibid., p. 185. 177. Ibid., p. 187.

Finland's Foreign Policy-Do Not Disturb! would like to avoid. Therefore it's better to abstain from the first step, if it leads to another one which is undesirable.178 4.2. A medical doctor, not a judge This policy of neutrality was clearly spelled out by President Kekkonen, when at the General Assembly in 1961 he presented Finland rather as a medical doctor than a judge. "It is not for us to pass judgements, not to condemn. It is rather to diagnose and try to cure".179 For the first time since Enckell's corset Finland had formulated its UN policy. This speech served as a basic principle of Finland's stand in international affairs for years to come.180 During the first decade of Finland's membership of the UN, 1956-65, Finland's policy was cautious and reserved. Finland refrained from making initiatives to be discussed at the UN and did not even put forward its own candidates for important positions there. Its low profile was also reflected in the low number of speeches in the forums of UN.18tAttempts to act as bridge-builder became a reality towards the end of the decade, when the effects of the 1961 Berlin crisis and that of Cuba in 1962-63 had receded and a period of 'detente' began to emerge. According to a professor of political science, Jan Magnus Jansson, Finland lived through a period of confirmation of its neutrality.182 In regard to South Africa, after the Sharpeville massacre in 1961, Finland's attitude was only slightly reformulated. Finland voted in favour of the Resolution condemning apartheid. According to Heino, Finland's basic position on the South African question was not deeply affected by that resolution, but rather there was only a temporary policy shift.183 As proof of this, it abstained from voting for the part of the Resolution where apartheid was seen as a threat to international peace and security. According to its general guidelines, Finland supported peaceful means of ending apartheid, emphasising negotiations with the South African government and being sceptical towards sanctions. According to Finland's stand, the General Assembly did not have the mandate to de178 Interview with Mikko Lohikoski, 22.12.1995. 179 The 3rd Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly and the sixteenth session and its resumed session. Publications by the Foreign Ministry. 1962, p. 163. 180. "In Finnish foreign policy the old saying was that Finland is not a judge but rather a doctor. I think that type of an approach also within the UN stressed the importance of rather making a change in substance than just flying the Finnish flag. That's why it might seem that Finland didn't appear very much, although things did happen." Interview with Tauno Kadria 29.8.1995. He was serving as a coordinator for the Nationhood Programme 1980-83. According to him, the 'doctor' approach was still dominant in Finland's policy. He is presently Finland's Ambassador to Bangkok, Thailand. Ii1. MottOl8, 1984:292. 182 Saarela, 1980:187. 183. Heino, 1992:29.

Pekka Peltola and lina Soiri cide concerning security matters and sanctions, but rather that right was only held by the Security Council. Furthermore, Finland held on to the principle of universalism, according to which no country should be forced to resign from UN membership.184 UN membership also demanded that Finland take a stand on questions of colonialism. At the beginning of the 1960s, when many African states gained their independence and joined the UN structures, the remnants of colonialism were brought onto the agenda. There was a continuous debate in the UN concerning Rhodesia and Namibia as well as the Portuguese colonies. Finland's behaviour followed the general rule: always abstain when possible. It was reluctant to become involved. It preferred to maintain its trade relationships with Portugal and England. Finland's passive attitude towards Namibia at the beginning of the decade was not criticised even by the Missionary Society, which was the only other relevant reference point to Southern Africa. The society was still holding on to the status quo and securing its work in the area. Neither was the diplomatic representation pointing to any need for a change-on the contrary: the marketing effort had just begun to yield results.185 But Finnish civil society was awakening to the Southern African question. The young radicals and leftist politicians were calling attention to the colonial and apartheid problems. They wanted Finland to include human rights and moral questions on the foreign policy agenda. When the colonial and apartheid question began to gain more attention in the international community, the NGOs used its resolutions in their national campaigns. Taking the radical groups in the UN as a framework to urge for economic sanctions, some of the interest groups in Finland responded to the boycott calls. In October 1963, Kuljetusalan Ammattiliittojen Federatio (Federation of Transport Workers' Unions) and its major member union Merimies-Unioni (Finnish Seamen's Union) headed by its leader Niilo Wtillari, started a blockade of South African ships and goods in Finnish ports. The boycott was inspired by initiatives of the international trade union movement and SYL, the National Union of Finnish Students. This time the blockade was called off practically before it started. In the following year, the Boycott Committee of Finnish trade unions, under Wallari's leadership, sent a letter to the Government calling attention to the violations of human rights in South Africa and pressing for a decrease in the trade between Finland and South Africa.186 With the establishment of the South Africa Committee in 1965, the public action against South Africa was intensified. Together with the trade union boycott committee, it started a consumer boycott of imports from South Africa. This 'brandy boycott', named after one of the 184 Viemero, 1975:77-87. 185. Heino, 1992:27. 186. Letter to the Government of Finland, Niilo Wallari 30.12.1964. Foreign Ministry's Archives.

Finland's Foreign Policy-Do Not Disturb! most popular South African import products 'Kap Brandy', was especially directed towards the state-owned alcohol monopoly. During the boycott, the students organised public events, including a particularly successful teach-in in May 1966 at the University of Commerce in Helsinki, to heighten awareness of the South African situation. 187 This time, the boycott came into effect. The activities of the trade unions and the growing public protest were a clear warning to the importers and for the foreign policy decision-makers. The legation in Pretoria was not at all happy about the negative publicity that Finland received due to the boycott. Finland was worried about the trade possibilities. The Finnish Seamen's Union's import ban on alcohol is the first political act from Finland's side which has caused loss in Finnish exports. "All depends on the Finnish Trade Unions", said Mr Sole (director of the Foreign Trade Department in South Africa). "If they continue their boycott actions, the trade cooperation with Finland must be reassessed. Trade cannot be unilateral. There are enough partners to trade with. On the contrary, Finland's radical UN policy would not affect the trade relations".188 Until now, Finland had succeeded in not harming its good reputation in the eyes of South Africa, despite its protests-albeit rather mild-in the UN. Though South Africa was tolerant toward protests in the multilateral forums, there was a limit. Bilateral relations should continue unharmed, was their message. Generally speaking, talk and resolutions in the international forums were regarded as relatively harmless, ineffective as such. But influence grew out of concrete action, be it a small thing like an effective boycott in a small country of a single brand of imported alcohol. Fortunately for Finland's trade promoters, the boycott died down and it was business as usual. But the civil society had managed to show some of its strength, which was effectively exploited later. Meanwhile, the Finnish legation followed the events in South Africa through normal diplomatic channels. Their picture of the events was rather distorted, because of the views of the representatives. Contacts with the government were regular. The most worrying development was the security situation, which was getting more attention when the liberation movements' armed wings started their first, although quite modest, sabotage actions. The South African Government's new security arrangements were closely monitored and reported to the Foreign Ministry. In contrast, the understanding of the racial problem was very superficial, to say the least. The Government's segregation measures were praised as appropriate, and the black population's position was considered to be improved by moderate political reforms. The radical policy of the black organisations was not understood, but criticised. 187. Personal communication with Raimo Lintonen, a student activist of the time, now a senior researcher at the Institute of Foreign Policy in Helsinki. 188. Report from the Finnish Legation in Cape Town, Tauno Nevalainen 23.1.1967, on a meeting with the South African government representative. Foreign Ministry's Archives.

Pekka Peltola and Iina Soiri The racial question in South Africa will be solved by natural evolution in the course of time. This artificial urgency might mean a disaster for millions. Instead, constructive negotiations in the international forums, even threatening resolutions, might help to speed up the development. Effective sanctions or military intervention would mean that this still peaceful part of the world would be thrown into chaos and great disaster.189 4.3. The policy change in the UN after 1966 For Finland, among others, the year 1966 was a point of no return. The policy change came about through several factors. Some changes were made by the Foreign Ministry to its Southern African policy. It was no longer correct that South Africa should be highlighted as a trading partner; thus, as a consequence, the marketing efforts went underground.190 What was more important in 1966, was that the left-wing parties gained a clear election victory in the Finnish parliamentary elections. This naturally encouraged the radicals who were critical of the government. The victory led to the first ever left-wing majority in Parliament. It was followed by the formation of the Left and Centre party government called the 'popular front'. The critical Social Democrats were finally in power. This change of power was to become an important factor in Finnish policy towards Southern Africa in the coming years. Another important issue to have an impact on Finnish foreign policy the same year was the Namibian question. The International Court of Justice had abstained from deciding about the status of Namibia after Ethiopia and Liberia had appealed for an end to the South African mandate. Instead, the UN General Assembly decided by an overwhelming majority to end the mandate and to set up a legal administrative authority for the territory. The Nordic countries, including Finland, voted in favour of the Resolution and Finland's Ambassador Max Jacobson was elected as chairman of an ad hoc committee which was to deal with the South West African question. The Committee's work ran into problems when a common understanding on the Namibian question was not reached. Finland was pointing out the fact that the Committee's proposals had to be in line with the possibilities for their practical implementation.191 However, the majority in the General Assembly voted in favour of establishing a Namibia Council. But the superpowers blocked the Committee's proposal that the UN should take Namibia under its control. Finland abstained from voting. Furthermore, the incompetence of the International Court of Justice led to another, equally important development189. Report from the Finnish Legation in Pretoria, Tauno Nevalainen 1.10.1964. Foreign Ministry's Archives. 190. Letter to the Finnish Foreign Trade Association from the Foreign Ministry, Osmo Orkomies 31.10.1966. Foreign Ministry's Archives. According to the recommendations, the South African trade should no longer, in effect, be promoted in public. 191. Saarela, 1980:189.

Finland's Foreign Policy-Do Not Disturb! namely, that SWAPO started the liberation war against the colonial regime. Finland's line was consistent: she abstained from voting on most of the resolutions. Only when 37 SWAPO activists, including Toivo ya Toivo, were detained by the South African government, did Finland vote in favour of the Resolution which condemned the act. As a consequence of its membership of the Committee, Finland's policy in the UN was significantly activated for the first time. Her standpoint was secure, though, because the Namibian question was dealt with by a majority vote. When there was a risk of running into conflict between the superpowers, Finland abstained. Finland carefully conformed to the resolutions of the UN, which it followed by the book. For example, in the Rhodesian question, when the Security Council for the first time adopted mandatory sanctions against UDI (the Unilateral Declaration of Independence) in Rhodesia, Finland adapted its national legislation accordingly. It was easy, because there was no trade between Finland and Rhodesia. Despite all this, the motives for Finnish policy change could, however, be brought into question. Or what else could be indicated by the following letter from Risto Hyvarinen to the charge d'affaires in Pretoria? It is also important to realise the role of the South African question in present-day international politics. In my opinion it is not a moral question but expressly a question of expediency. Nevertheless, it might be expedient to occasionally behave as if we were morally concerned. It has to be remembered that the interests of our overall foreign policy surpass our relations with South Africa. In spite of that-and partly just because of that-I find it expedient to maintain relations, especially economic relations, with South Africa and even improve them. 192 Trade was the preference. It was not to be disrupted in any way. Pretense was used to cover it up, when necessary. But it had become politically unwise for Finland to be associated with the decreasing number of countries who refused to condemn apartheid by supporting UN resolutions. The South African question was a matter of image, not a true moral question for Finland. But the questions of realism and moral had already emerged within Finland's own decisionmaking structures. The young radicals had, with growing intensity, started a discussion on the values underlying the foreign policy. The election victory of the left encouraged more discussion in the national press and official forums. The Missionary Society was assessing its position in regard to the South African regime. Despite that, not even in the Namibian question did Finland's role really become further activated before 1970. Until then, she had followed the policy of the other Nordic and leading Western countries. Since the establishment of the Namibia Commission, Finland's position had been cautious. According to the Finnish UN representative, Max Jacobson, Namibia existed only as 'a state on paper', because South Africa was de facto controlling the territory. This deter192' Personal letter from Risto Hyvarinen, the head of the Political Department of the Foreign Ministry, to the charg6 d'affaires Tauno Nevalainen, 11.4.1968. Foreign Ministry's Archives.

Pekka Peltola and Iina Soiri mined Finland's policy on the question, because it epitomised the conflict between words and reality, a conflict which continuously weakened the credibility of the UN as a medium for international cooperation. Finland's priority to support the functionality of the UN had prevented her from playing a more active role in the process.193 The question rose in priority only when Finland was serving as a member of the Security Council in 1970-71.194 4.4. The foreign policy debate in Finland The change in Finland's national foreign policy had to be awaited for some time longer. Her policy in the UN did not affect the bilateral relations with the countries in question. In fact, one can argue that the UN had become another excuse not to act unilaterally. According to Kimmo Pulkkinen:195 The Government and Foreign Ministry saw the United Nations as a vehicle, as an instrument through which and by which Finland could materialise her policy and deliver political statements. In retrospect, without criticism, I may say as my personal opinion that perhaps we tried to ride with this kind of policy a little bit too long. We kept many issues only on the UN level avoiding direct contacts and not taking a national position on them. Questions relating to the Southern Africa and the liberation movements were these kinds of issues.196 The South African regime itself was, however, strengthening its position in the world. It was unashamedly refusing to comply with the demands of the international community and relying on its influence on bilateral levels. The Western powers were, after all, with their strong economic partners, effectively blocking in the UN Security Council strong measures against South Africa. But unilateral boycott actions spread around the world. A sign of intensified bilateral relations between Finland and South Africa-one of the countries still unsure of its position-was the establishment of a South African legation in Helsinki in 1967. Worried about the growing public protest against apartheid, the South African Government began to defend itself. The legation was effectively disseminating information, as well as sponsoring studies and trips to South Africa among its supporters in Finland.197 In general, as described above, the end of the 1960s became a period of active foreign policy in Finland. The concept of an active foreign policy was based on the view that neutrality and the endeavour to remain outside East-West conflicts were insufficient. The active phase brought with it 'the external tension' between national interests on the one hand and individual moral standards on 193 Jacobson, 1983:71. 194 Halinen, 1988:111. 195. A young official whose first tasks in the Foreign Ministry included dealing with the liberation movements' assistance in 1971. Before joining the Foreign Ministry, he was active in the UN Student Association. In 1973-74 he served at the Finnish Embassy in Dar es Salaam under Ambassador Ahtisaari, also being responsible for liberation movement contacts. Presently, he is the Finnish Ambassador to Mexico. 196 Interview with Kimmo Pulkkinen, 11.8.1995. 197 One product of a successful South African promotion is Heikki Brotherus' book: What is happening in South Africa? 1964.

Finland's Foreign Policy-Do Not Disturb! the other.198 Although there was quite a wide consensus on the foreign policy line being shaped by President Kekkonen, there were some disagreements around the relationship between neutrality and the obligations of the YYA-pact with the Soviet Union. The core question was, whether the active pursuing of neutrality could violate the YYA's security aspects. Another issue which was debated was the tension between 'idealism' and 'realism'. In one respect, it was a question of determinism versus voluntarism, i.e. whether Finland should actively promote changes in the international system or merely lean on its status quo role which had recently been confirmed in the East-West controversy. In practice, the question was about Finland's position in the Third World problematique and in global peace and development issues.199 The younger generation were the most active promoters of the 'idealistic' line of foreign policy. Especially students with language skills and training in international affairs were interested in global issues and wanted to move in the wide world beyond Finland. Thus, many of them had acquired experience of international affairs through NGO activities. They criticised the 'realist' line in foreign policy, which was based on the principle of national interest and practised by a hierarchical administration. Foreign policy was not exposed to democratic discussion outside expert groups inside parties and small papers and some books. Parliament's role in foreign policy decision-making was rather insignificant. And, more importantly, the foreign policy doctrine was based on a narrow concept of national interest. The younger generation forced foreign policy into public debate, whichaccording to Heino-was the most intense debate ever witnessed in Finland.200 This debate between the 'gang of doctors'201 (the Foreign Ministry's top officials, many of whom held centrist or conservative views) and their opponents in the 'lads' league'202 (who were leftist or social-democratically oriented young academics or politicians) was centred around the emphasis in foreign policy. The 'lads' league' had actually grown up around UNTA and Committee of 100. They demanded 'a new foreign policy' which would be open to discussion, well- planned, effective, and infused with fresh ideas and personnel, as well as leftist in its analysis and approaches.203 198. Heino, 1992:43. 199. MOttol8, 1993:65. 200. Heino, 1992:43. 201 Heino lists the central members of the 'gang of doctors' who were President Kekkonen's close foreign policy confidants and aides: Risto Hyvarinen, Aimo Pajunen, Keijo Korhonen and Max Jacobson. Heino, 1992:44. 202, Heino uses the translation 'little league' for the Finnish word 'nappulaliiga'. We found it more appropriate to translate it as 'lads' league'. Central figures in the 'lads' league' were: Jaakko Blomberg, Pertti Joenniemi, Jaakko Kalela, Paavo Lipponen and Osmo Apunen. However, there were many others who are mentioned elsewhere in this study. 203. Lip ponen, 1966a and b.

Pekka Peltola and lina Soiri It was a question of bringing new moral values into the sphere of foreign relations. The debate circled around the question, whether foreign policies should be concerned solely with the national interests as narrowly defined or whether there were other values of broader dimension, which Finland should promote in her foreign relations. This was the fundamental issue, in my opinion; not only the national liberation as such, but the question whether we should take responsibility for wider international issues than just the issues of our dose neighbourhood.204 The 'lads' league' not only discussed, but also worked in other ways. The growing NGO sphere and its international connections provided an opportunity for the young radicals to create their own foreign relations, independently of the attitude of the official circles. The Southern African liberation struggle and policy toward the liberation movements was only one-but an importantquestion where these two lines, the 'realist' and the 'idealist', came into conflict.205 Former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Finnish Ambassador to UN, Dr. Keijo Korhonen has recently defined some arguments in the debate.206 204. Interview with Ilkka RistimAki 19.8.1995. Living next door to Nickey Iyambo at Domus Academica student dormitory in 1965, he translated into Finnish Nickey's story of his escape from Namibia across the African continent. Ristinaki was secretary and chairman of Helsinki UN Student Association in 1965-67 and later joined the Bureau for Development Assistance in 1970. He served as an adviser to the Tanzanian Ministry of Finance and Planning, before joining 's staff at the Office of the UN Commissioner for Namibia in New York in 1977. He is presently Finland's permanent representative at OECD in Paris. 205 Other questions were mainly in the field of security policy and relations with the Soviet Union. The debate hovered around the role of military force vs. international cooperative structures, and their relative weight. From today's perspective, it seems that the co-operative attitude got the upper hand and clearly dominates the Finnish approach. This is, of course, due to the profound changes in international society. On the other hand, it is not surprising, because its early proponents now hold power over the foreign policy of Finland. One example of the debate is Blomberg & Joenniemi, 1972. 206. Korhonen, 1989. Korhonen works presently as a university professor in Arizona, USA.

Finland's Foreign Policy-Do Not Disturb! 4.5. Support from the official ranks 4.5.1. Finland's development aid becomes established Although the official foreign policy decision-making apparatus was mainly in the hands of the 'realist' civil servants, there was a small sector inside the administration, that was more sympathetic toward the 'lads' league'. A Bureau for Development Assistance207 was established in 1965. The department proved to be an important communication channel between the NGOs and the official administration. Finland had already started multilateral development assistance at the end of the previous decade. The activity expanded to a common Nordic assistance in the form of a joint project in . According to the recommendations of the Government's committee for international development aid, Finland ought to give development aid like other countries having high technology and a good economy.208 Development aid was more or less an image question, but also an important political vehicle. But at that time, however, this political dimension was not debated publicly. No selfish motives were publicly connected with the development aid. Having experienced several changes in its more than 30 years of existence, the Finnish development policy is once again under public scrutiny. During this process, interesting issues have been brought out, which also throw light on the motives behind that policy during the early years of its existence. Especially the relationship that development aid has to the general foreign policy line is interesting from the point of view of this study. This led, according to Korhonen, to overestimating foreign policy, and populism: Finland's relations with South Africa have, in fact, ceased to be foreign policy in the strict sense of the term. They instead have added a new dimension to domestic and party politics while becoming an important instrument of self-congratulation in the realm of foreign policy. ... Central principles of the policy of neutrality and UNpolicy weighted less than populist satisfaction.209 For Korhonen, the essence of foreign policy is enlightened self-interest and the primary means for guarding it is security policy. He did not want Finland to become too deeply involved in world affairs, especially not in economic terms. According to Korhonen the generations that became politically active in the 1960s had no experience of the fear, deprivation and insecurity of the Second World War. They took peace and security for granted. In Korhonen's "rude" characterisation they were the "spoiled heirs of a tolerant society". This genera207. The Bureau was later called the Office for Development Cooperation. 208 Kansainvalisen Kehitysavun komitea. (Committee for International Development Assistance). Helsinki 1963. 209. Korhonen, 1989:93.

Pekka Peltola and lina Soiri lion looked for international arenas where they would participate in the "awakening and salvation of the proletarian masses of the South".210 According to Jaakko Iloniemi211-the first director of the Bureau and the author of the one-man committee report on Finnish development aid in 1995the political position was a relevant element in the thinking of those responsible for development aid and foreign policy.212 Development aid, being clearly in the area of foreign relations-even when directed toward territories with which previous contacts had been few-was to follow the line of the general foreign policy. And in fact, it was to be ensured that it was justified by several motives, in order to avoid its being connected with either East or West. The growing international activity, which development aid entailed, was to open more channels for Finland to the world community away from the shadow of the Soviet Union. The Bureau for Development Assistance employed notable figures in its ranks. Iloniemi, who was himself a former secretary general of the National Union of Finnish Students, was joined by Martti Ahtisaari, director of YKA (Students' International Assistance), who had gained experience of development aid in Pakistan while employed by the Swedes, and Kari Karanko.213 The Bureau was first operated from the premises of Finland's UN Association, one of the participants in the development policy discussion. Martti Ahtisaari's familiarity with Swedish development aid and its administration, SIDA, was regarded as an important asset. According to him, Finnish development aid was a response to the global challenge of how to solve the problem of poverty. It was supported from very different starting points: on the one hand, the leftist ideas of solidarity and support for liberation movements; and on the other, the liberal cosmopolitan thinking represented by the Swedish minority in Finland. Equally important was the basic Christian world view of common responsibility. Politically, Finland wanted to belong to the progressive Nordic framework.214 Finland's social structures, cultural framing and political opportunities connect it in a permanent way with , Norway and Denmark. The multiple justifications were regarded as important in order to secure the widest possible acceptance for the activity. From a modest start, the development aid grew steadily. In 1972, the Bureau for Development Assistance became a department of the Foreign Ministry to 210. Korhonen, 1989:86, translation by P. Peltola. 211 He served for years in Finland's diplomatic corps in Washington and elsewhere. Although working in the private sector nowadays, Jaakko Iloniemi is still regarded as an important background figure in Finland's foreign policy design. 212. Iloniemi, 1995. 213 An officer of development aid for 25 years, presently the head of evaluation and planning. He was working in Dar es Salaam from 1971, and thereafter in Lusaka as a development aid officer, being in constant contact with the liberation movements. 214. Ahtisaari, 1994:59-60.

Finland's Foreign Policy-Do Not Disturb! practise development aid in the form of projects, technical aid and staff recruitment. The development aid budget had increased rapidly: the funds multiplied fivefold between 1968 and 1972.215 NOOs' influence in increasing development endeavours was significant. The 'development idealism' of the popular movements had mobilised support to increase development assistance. Finland was activated into global cooperation, pursuing a reformist development strategy, i.e. one that aimed to promote negotiated solutions to the conflicting interests between the industrialised and the developing countries. Solidarity toward the UN system became more evident. In development cooperation, Finland preferred social programmes. Justifications were drawn from the ethical and social democratic standpoints.216 Nevertheless, the hidden agenda also influenced the development aid. According to one researcher, Lauri Siitonen, the strongest justification in Finnish development policy has been the political dimension: neutrality and support for multilateral institutions with the aim of securing world peace.217 Development policy has been a vehicle for practising the basic foreign policy doctrine. For that reason, the political authority has remained in the political department. We have had very strict borderlines between the aid and career diplomats. This has been a very significant characteristic of Finnish foreign aid throughout these years. There has been a division between the career diplomats and the aid officials. These things have been somehow mixed during the years, but there is still this basic sort of main line there, that the aid officers are not supposed to touch upon the politically sensitive areas although they seem to know much more about the content of that.218 According to Karanko, the divisions between the political and aid departments have caused situations where decisions were made separately, not in unison. What is clear, though, is that the development aid was used as a foreign policy tool. Development aid was an area where Finland, while restricted by its geopolitical position, was able to manoeuvre to a certain extent.219 When choosing partners, the East-West dimension was a crucial background factor. In the beginning, Finland was determined to avoid those partners who were strongly labelled as belonging either to the Eastern or the Western camp. This changed at the end of the 1960s, when strong political pressure groups and the example of Sweden led to a reassessment of the policy in the direction of showing solidarity toward those who had chosen the socialist path of development. This was due to the NGO pressure groups, which attracted sympathy, and their advice was listened to in the development aid department. 215. Siitonen, 1981:65-66. 216. Siitonen, 1981:82. 217. Ibid. 218 Interview with Kari Karanko, 25.8.1995. 219. Iloniemi, 1995:13.

Pekka Peltola and lina Soiri Accordingly, the African liberation struggle was followed and understood in the department, although it was not in a position to offer any financial or political assistance. The political department, on the other hand, was not always pleased with the new tendencies in its own ranks. A former charg6 d'affaires to Pretoria, Tauno Nevalainen, and others, expressed worry about Finland's economic relations with the developing countries. He criticised the way in which the administration of development aid was organised or, rather, not organised. The development aid department was getting far too many resources to deal with rather unimportant matters, while the resources for economic relations with very important neighbouring countries were not allocated in a sufficient amount. Besides the younger political elite did not understand the African situation deeply enough, and was too hasty in looking for solutions. According to Mr Nevalainen's understanding, the leaders of Africa only needed economic and technical help.220 Nevalainen, surely, was not alone in his views, although similar viewpoints were not openly expressed. Rather, they materialised in an indifferent attitude.221 As a result, the development assistance did not actually live up to its promises. Although it increased rapidly money-wise, its share of the GDP did not reach the goal of 0.7 per cent until the late 1980s. And content-wise, Finland's development aid policy was two-faced: radical global reforms were supported in the multilateral forums, but bilateral assistance remained modest compared with other Nordic countries.222 4.5.2. Children's parties allow communication with the top This did not bother the NGO activists for long, however. Meanwhile another, even more influential path to the inner circles of foreign policy decision-making opened for the radicals right from the top. As early as 1968-when the radical students occupied their own Old Student House in Helsinki to protest against the elitist policy of the Student Union-President Kekkonen, whose visit to the Old Student House was prevented by the occupation, showed sympathy toward the radicals. His policy was to integrate rather than alienate. He, too, needed support for his new openings in foreign policy. This strategy, which proved to be right, enabled the young radicals to present their policies directly to the President at special 'children's parties', a derogatory but popular term for the regular receptions at the presidential residence in 1968-71. From now on, discussion especially on Third World questions reached the whole population through all the media. Researchers studying radicalism in Finland have been convinced that this integration strategy pre220. Memorandum, Tauno Nevalainen 17.9.1971. Foreign Ministry's Archives. 221 E.g. Mikko Lohikoski told how the Foreign Ministry was not at all interested in his travel reports on the liberated areas. Interview with Mikko Lohikoski, 22.12.1995. 222. Siitonen, 1981:135.

Finland's Foreign Policy-Do Not Disturb! vented further frustration and radicalisation of the youth movement,223 unlike in other European countries e.g. in West Germany and Norway, at that time. It was important to create structures through which the youth leaders could express their aspirations. The impact was not only one-sided, however. It is not always understood or known that President Kekkonen was not only clever, but sincerely interested and sympathetic. According to Juhani Suomi, a prominent historian with a virtual monopoly over President Kekkonen's personal diaries, the late president was often more radical in his foreign policy than was his own government or foreign policy administration. He showed interest in development in Southern Africa and the points of view of the liberation movements and events on the fronts.224 The travels of Mikko Lohikoski and his colleagues were presented to and discussed with the President Kekkonen, and he was regularly informed about the news from the field. A sign of his sympathy was the ease with which the appointment with Amflcar Cabral was arranged. "So he [President Kekkonenl had a great readiness for certain decisions of his own. He could follow his advisers, but he could also do exactly what he wanted," says Bbrje Mattsson, one of the organisers.225 Ilkka Ristimaki, an activist of that time remembers: In regard to the President and his position vis-a-vis youth organisations, the visit of the Shah of Persia to Finland [in 1969] created an interesting situation. This visit led to major demonstrations by the youth, perhaps the most violent demonstrations I can remember from the sixties in Helsinki. They were aimed against the Shah, but indirectly, of course, they turned against the President, who had invited the Shah and who was now hosting him. For the youth organisation behind the demonstrators, this was a curious situation. As far as I can remember, in the minds of the demonstrators, it was somewhat difficult to understand, why Kekkoner, who was such a hero for these youth as the leader of the policy of neutrality and good neighbourliness towards the Soviet Union, was here rolling out the red carpet for the Shah of Iran. This revealed another dimension of Kekkonen, which was confusing for the youth activists. One can now ask, whether there was some kind of Freudian aspect in relations to Kekkonen, who was such a strong father figure and was always trusted as a kind of good guy. Now how could this father deceive his chil223 See, for example, von Bonsdorff, 1986. A journalist, Tapani Suominen, has recently written a doctoral dissertation (University of Oslo, 1996) on the far left political movements in Finland during the 1970s. By studying press articles concerning the radical movements, he concluded that the movements' access to the public discussion prevented their radicalisation and rnarginalisation. The political leaders of the time also effectively exploited the idea of the radical movement and integrated its activists. (ltaSanomat, evening press, December 1996). A book based on the dissertation has been published (in Finnish) by Tammi: Ehcd teloitammejonkun. Helsinki 1997. 224 Interview with Juhani Suomi, 17.10.1996. 225. Interview with BoiJe Mattsson, 29.2.1996.

Pekka Peltola and Iina Soiri dren by inviting into his house somebody who was so strange to the ideals of the children?226 As Ristimaki mentions, the improving relations with the Soviet Union were greeted with satisfaction among the young radicals. In addition, many of them had by now joined the far-left organisations, where friendly relations with the country they regarded as a model were placed on a pedestal. President Kekkonen, as a leader of the foreign policy was given the praise. And support did not only come from the far left, but also from among other political groupings, even from the conservative Kokoomus, liberal Swedish People's Party and the Centre party- which, as the party of Kekkonen, was very outspoken in its Soviet support. 4.6. The 'rebel' civil servants President Kekkonen's apparent sympathy did not, however, materialise in any concrete political changes concerning the Southern African policy, let alone the Namibian question. Other foreign policy events closer home kept him fully occupied. After all, the core of Finnish foreign policy remained in European affairs. Finland decided to conclude a free trade pact with the European Community. 'Detente' in the superpower relations resulted in intensive activity in global affairs. The German question and European Security arrangements allowed Finland to play a role in between the blocs. Bilaterally, the Soviet Union and Finland went through an active phase. In the UN context, Finland became a member of the Security Council in 1970, and Finland's candidate was a serious contender for the post of UN Secretary General. Under the mainstream development, what was more important than immediate practical changes was the general atmosphere of President Kekkonen's sympathy, which allowed the NGO activists to present openly hardening criticism toward the foreign policy line. And the criticism did not remain outside the official structures, but became a debated matter in Parliament. In 1970, the proportion of parliamentary questions concerning developing countries out of all the foreign political questions increased threefold from the previous year (from 8 to 25 per cent). The two following years were even more active in that respect: in 1971 and 1972, development questions constituted 44 per cent and 47 per cent of all the questions. South Africa and the liberation movements were on the agenda several times.227 The Government's and Foreign Ministry officials' incapability to respond to the changing international circumstances was under criticism. The Foreign Ministry had started a training course for future diplomats known as KAVAKU. In 1970, for the first time, NGO activists had an opportu226 Interview with Ilkka Ristiraki, 19.8.1995. 227. Tuomi, 1976:241.

Finland's Foreign Policy-Do Not Disturb! nity via this channel to apply for recruitment inside the Foreign Ministry. Formerly known as a fortress of Centre and Conservative party officials, the Ministry now allowed NGO, student and leftists activists to participate in the training course. This 'rebel KAVAKU' shook the old habits and traditions of the Foreign Ministry. And what was more, many of the candidates were accepted for a diplomatic career.228 A new generation had entered the decision-making structures of Finland's foreign policy. What we remember about President Kekkonen's policy and his way of action in general those years was that he gave the younger people a certain freedom and certain areas to take care of. This understanding might have been so informal that probably the practice was never even introduced to the President. Therefore most likely it is not recorded anywhere. Africa must have been one of those issues that the President left to young activists. At least he did not prevent us from speaking about those issues. The President may have considered Africa as a 'secondary issue' and thought that it does no harm if the boys play a little with it. This openedup for us the freedom and opportunity to seek support for African issues.229 The young officials were now bound by foreign policy doctrine and bureaucratic procedures. Definitely, everyone in the Foreign Ministry down to the youngest attach6 knew what issues are such that they must be submitted to superiors in the line of command. Surely, if President Kekkonen would have considered African issues somehow dangerous or would have been afraid that Finland might burn her fingers in playing with the Africans, he could have prevented it simply by saying: stop it. But he didn't. On the other hand, I remember how Kekkonen often bypassed normal bureaucracy and gave certain issues to student groups or political activists as if thinking: let them talk about it, let them prepare the ground for it. The question of the liberation movement might have been one of these issues.230 According to some critics, the recruitment of the radicals was simply a 'sellout', a strategy to silence some of the criticism.231 But the decision-making apparatus, for its part, probably started to change as well, because now the new thinking made more inroads into the system. The Ministry also represented the composition of Finnish society more widely. The fact that a new generation of people was entering the Foreign Ministry meant that the debate which had been going on in the Finnish society-among the public and in the media-since the mid-60s, was now brought to within the walls of the 228 There were 30 participants in the course, of whom 16 were admitted to the diplomatic service. Among them were, for example, Kirsti Lintonen, (Finland's first Ambassador to independent Namibia in 1990-95, later first female under- secretary of state in the Foreign Ministry (Department for Development Cooperation), Kimmo Pulkkinen and Rauno Viemer. Mikko Pyhala entered the Foreign Ministry through the next KAVAKU. 229. Interview with Kimmo Pulkkinen 11.8.1995. 230 Ibid. 231. Lipponen, 1985, quoted in Heino, 1992:44.

Pekka Peltola and lina Soiri Ministry. Not that we would have lobbied or demonstrated or anything, as was suggested from some directions. Every official in the Foreign Ministry has and had also in the past always his or her political views as a private citizen. This was not normally affecting the way he acted in his capacity as a civil servant. It was the same in our case. The new blood flowing into the Ministry was not different in that respect. They had their views the same way as the old guys had their views. The difference was that now the composition of the staff at the Foreign Ministry was perhaps better reflecting the overall spread of opinions in the society than before.232 4.7. Finland as a member of the UN Security Council In 1969, Finland was elected as a member of the Security Council for the first time, for the period 1970-71. Finland had activated its UN policy and was looking forward to another possibility of making known its policy of active neutrality, introduced by President Kekkonen at the turn of the decade. Finland adopted the role of an active mediator, trying to discover and propose compromise solutions between the conflicting parties. It was fully according to the role that Kekkonen had formulated for Finland. This was a big disappointment to radical NGO circles in Finland, who would have rather seen Finland more as an initiator. Fortunately, though, in the Namibian question Finland saw some room for manoeuvring. It clearly activated its Namibian policy, adopting a policy of 'serving' neutrality.233 Finland allied with African and Asian states in order to establish a special committee to deal with the Namibian question. In consultations with the African states Finland proposed that the Namibian question should once again be referred to the International Court of Justice. This time, the answer of the ICJ was rapid and positive: the South African occupation of Namibia was ruled illegal in 1971. In the same context, Finland made a proposal that a special Namibia Trust Fund should be established, which would seek pledges from member countries to be used in Namibian development. The emergency programme for financial and technical assistance-started in 1968as well as training, would then be financed by the Fund. An additional element would be a scholarship programme for Namibians. The Fund was established and became operational in 1972. Some of Finland's activity in the Namibian question was a result of the influence of the Missionary Society. As described in the previous chapter, the Foreign Ministry started to get a better understanding of the Namibian situation through its contacts with the missionaries, who themselves had-at least for the most part- changed their minds about the South African policies in the region. That did not, however, indicate that Finland recognised SWAPO or other libera232 Interview with Ilkka Ristirnaki, 19.8.1995. 233. Halnen, 1988:117.

Finland's Foreign Policy-Do Not Disturb! ion movements. Its opinion was as before: no support should be given for violent movements. Instead, the international community should do its utmost to assist the constantly increasing number of refugees who had fled outside Namibian territory. The Namibian question did get attention, especially because the Court's opinion opened a new phase in the conflict. Finland could more freely vote in favour of firm resolutions condemning South Africa. Yet, it did not support any type of sanctions unless accepted by the UN Security Council.234 On the domestic front, the liberation movements were not accorded any understanding at the Foreign Office, as the denial of funds for the SYL students' conference indicated. The active phase in the UN culminated in the contest for the post of the Secretary General, in which Finland was seriously putting forward its own candidate, Ambassador Max Jacobson. In this respect, all diplomatic relations were used to support the candidacy. Mr Jacobson's activities in African affairs were reinforced. That naturally increased Finland's readiness for new openings in the African question. This corresponded well with attempts by the African countries to seek more support for issues that they considered important-that is, the colonial question. 4.8. Outside influence intensifies 4.8.1. The OAU visit to Finland in 1971 Pressure to change the policy orientation also increased from outside. Finland had always regarded the Nordic frame of reference as important in its global policy. The other Nordic countries had for some time had closer cooperation with the liberation movements. Their governments' policy in the UN was more radical. Sweden, especially, had a longer (social democratic) tradition of solidarity work, developed through building up the welfare state and not hampered by the devastation of war. Sweden was also not subject to restrictions due to foreign alignments or affiliations, and thus was able to express rather unreserved support for the liberation struggle-in contrast to Nato members Denmark and Norway, as well as Finland with its particular neutrality. All the other Nordic countries had more often voted together in favour of the radical resolutions, where Finland had preferred to abstain. Though Finland continuously stated that it wanted to act in accordance with the other Nordic countries, in actual fact it followed a few steps behind. At their respective national levels, the other Nordic countries had already established bilateral relations with many liberation movements. Sweden started to support the liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies in 1969. The Institute was already given governmental assistance in 1964. Norway decided to support the Institute as well as MPLA in 1969. Denmark 234. Ibid. pp. 87-88.

Pekka Peltola and lina Soiri was reassessing its bilateral relations with South Africa, and was about to start assisting the liberation movements. Its first assistance programme was launched in the fiscal year 1972-73. This naturally concerned Finland, which wanted to maintain its policy in cohesion with the other Nordic countries, but was not yet ready for any real changes in its national foreign policy. The independent African countries and their cooperation body, the Organisation of African Unity, OAU, had started to take the struggle against colonialism and apartheid more seriously-especially after the UN, at its 25th Session in 1970 had passed a strong resolution to end colonialism. The OAU was looking for more political and financial support from overseas. It had established a special Liberation Committee and a Fund to assist the movements. In this connection, Finland received a delegation from the OAU in October 1971. The preparation for this visit had started in the previous year, when the initiative came from OAU Secretary General Diallo Telli. He made it known that he wished to pay a visit to the Nordic countries in order to express his appreciation of their activity in the African question. In Finland's case, the OAU Secretary General was referring to Finland's policy in the Security Council and to Max Jacobson. In this respect, Finland became concerned because it was preparing to put forward its own candidate for the vacancy of UN Secretary General.235 A positive attitude was taken towards the visit, and a special contribution for the liberation movements was planned. The Luthuli Foundation, which had been set up in Addis Abeba the previous year, was identified as a suitable beneficiary. Sweden had been the founding member of the Foundation and had donated a sum equivalent to 160,000 FIM for its scholarship programmes.236 Finland decided to contribute 50,000 FIM and to publicise the donation in connection with the OAU visit. In the end, Mr Telli's visit in the spring had to be cancelled due to other commitments. Instead, a large and high-ranking delegation led by the then OAU President, the President of Mauritania, Ould-Daddah, was planning to make a tour in the Nordic countries. The visit was to be made at a high level. It would take place right after the UN Special Session on Namibia, which was expected to react according to the decision of the International Court of Justice concerning Namibia's legal status. The delegation was welcome in Finland, and the preparation of the programme was given special attention. The OAU made it known that they wanted especially to discuss the Nordic trade with South Africa. For Finland, which was actively pursuing its trade with South Africa, that was not an easy subject. The national daily Helsingin Sanomat had already commented on the coming 235 Letter from the Ambassador in Addis Abeba, Joel Pekuri, to the Foreign Ministry 21.1.1971. Foreign Ministry's Archives. 236 "P.M. Suomen tul" Luthuli-sddtibtIe", (Memorandum on Finnish Support to the Luthuli Foundation), Jussi A. Muttonen, 19.1.1971. Foreign Ministry's Archives.

Finland's Foreign Policy-Do Not Disturb! visit in September, saying that the Foreign Ministry was handling the visit 'with a long stick', i.e. carefully, because the discussion on the South African situation would not be pleasant.237 But the visit was instrumental for Finland in connection with the Secretary General contest.2'3 It was important to indicate that Finland's candidate would be supportive to the African cause.239 This being so, Finland was able to swallow somewhat sharper criticism than usual. However, stronger forces were mobilised against Finland's dream of a Secretary General. As far as we know, Mr Jacobson's candidacy was stopped by the Soviet Union at an early stage. In a Cold War world, there was no room for Finland to increase its role beyond certain limits. Anyway, the OAU visit materialised and produced other important results. During the visit, the delegation held talks with President Kekkonen and the Foreign Minister, Vainb Leskinen. The African situation, the Namibian question, and sports and trade boycott against South Africa were brought up. The delegation expressed its satisfaction with Finland's activity in the Namibian question, and asked for more support for the decolonisation process in Africa. President Kekkonen reminded them of Finland's well-known policy of neutrality and support for decolonialism. He reaffirmed his country's non-acceptance of violence as a means of solving international conflicts, and welcomed the proposal for a dialogue inside South Africa. At the meeting with the Foreign Minister Leskinen, Finland's policy of not directly supporting movements which used violent means was reaffirmed. Instead, he claimed, Finland channelled its support though UN funds. However, Leskinen informed the OAU delegation that Finland would consider channelling assistance to the OAU Liberation Fund for humanitarian purposes. Furthermore the delegation thanked the private organisations which had supported the liberation struggle.240 As a result, in the following year, 1972, Finland decided to include the OAU fund among its humanitarian aid channels and a first contribution of 24,000 USD was made.241 Finland was the first Western country to contribute to that fund. The decision was remarkable also in the sense that Sweden had decided not to channel funds via the liberation fund-the reason being simply that it preferred to support the movements directly, even though it was supporting the work of the liberation committee itself. So far, Sweden's example in choosing the appropriate channels had always been crucial to Finland, so in that re237. Helsingin Sanomat, national daily, 12.9.1971. 238. Saarela, 1980:194. 239. Jacobson, 1983:329. 240 "P.M. Aftikan yhtenfisyysjdrjest6n OAU:n valtuuskunnan ierailu Suomessa 68.10.1971" (Memorandum on the OAU visit to Finland), Matti Kahiluoto, 25.11.1971. Foreign Ministry's Archives. 241 Memorandum, Embassy of Finland, Dar es Salaam, 11.1.1973. Foreign Ministry's Archives.

Pekka Peltola and lina Soiri spect Finland's unilateral contribution to the fund was quite unique. On the other hand, though, Finland clearly preferred an international fund to individual movements as the recipient of its contribution, thus keeping at a distance from the liberation movements. 4.8.2. Liberation movements approach the Finnish Government Meanwhile, the liberation movements had increased their influence in the Nordic countries. Until then, only SWAPO had had a permanent representative in Finland. Alongside his studies, Nickey Iyambo was mobilising Finns on behalf of Namibia. He tells here about his gradual strategy to mobilise Finnish society: Slowly but surely we expanded the horizon from the student organisation to the mass organisations of Finnish society, particularly the trade unions and indeed the political organisations. And in those days, it was the political organisations of the left of the political spectrum that were more forthcoming than those of the right political spectrum. Now after that, it was the time to expand this to the academics. And soon we found Africa and African affairs discussed in seminars, seminar papers prepared, and that people even introduced some texts where African history, Africa politics, African sociological perspectives and information were discussed. And because of that, I realised quickly that indeed, soon or later, we would get to involve governments of those countries as well. By the time we talked to governments, we then had assistance from the citizens of those countries, students in particular, members of political parties of the left political spectrum, and soon thereafter academics. They were not many people that came up in the beginning. But soon thereafter, a few African research papers were produced. That is how the interest was developed.242 As we have seen, the presence of Nickey Iyambo was an inspiration to many activists and a source of information. Nickey Iyambo's work was occasionally supported by a visiting delegation from SWAPO. For instance, visited at the invitation of the Africa Committee in 1969. When Mr Iyambo started to study medicine, in 1971, SWAPO assigned a representative to Stockholm. Janet Mondlane was the main organiser for Mozambique. No other FRELIMO representatives were needed in Finland, because in connection with the Operation Day's Work campaign, Taksvdirkki, a lot of information on Portuguese colonies and the struggle was disseminated. And my job was to mobilise and dynamise these Nordic governments to understand what this struggle meant for the independence of Mozambique. That was really my job. FRELIMO didn't get into it until later on. I began in Sweden in 1965, and worked very hard almost up to independence, really up to independence.243 In 1970, MPLA from Angola opened an office in Stockholm. The representative, Antonio Neto, visited Helsinki from time to time. The Angolan situation got a lot of publicity after Bdrje Mattsson's and Mikko Lohikoski's visit to the liberated areas. Discussion centred around the question of which liberation move242 Interview with Nickey Iyambo, 20.8.1996. 243. Interview with Janet Mondlane, 18.7.1996.

Finland's Foreign Policy-Do Not Disturb! ment was the 'true' popular movement. The far left organisations were strongly promoting MPLA, mainly because it was the closest ally to the Soviet Union. On the diplomatic front, on the other hand, FNLA was being monitored. Other liberation movements like ZAPU, ZANU and ANC visited Finland during special events at the invitation of different organisations. The representatives of the liberation movements had learned their lessons on foreign policy well. They approached the Government of Finland with great care, aware of Finland's delicate international position. Finland was very traumatised and neurotic by the fact that it had this border with the Soviet Union. And it seemed to determine a lot of Finnish policy. At least this is what I was told at the time. At the same time, they were walking the tight-rope with their Western allies. But really I sympathise with Finland, and I think it made the political life a bit difficult. I felt there was a lot of resentment about the Soviet Union-about what had to be done and what positions could be taken. But one must say that if they had to work with or please or be careful with the Soviet Union, the liberation movement wouldn't have disturbed that at all, because the Soviet Union was involved with liberation movements. Like at that time the whole Eastern bloc. But it was very difficult for the so-called Western bloc to be allied or seem to be talking with these revolutionary movements ... I remember Erkki Liikanen explaining to me the complications of the foreign policy. It was something that I could understand and take into account, because Icame froma society with a much wider way of looking at the world-I wasn't confined to the Mozambican viewpoint. So it was easier to cultivate the Nordic countries.244 The Mozambique Institute never applied for or received any funds directly from the Finnish Government. The MI was satisfied with the cooperation with students. When Janet Mondlane met the government representatives, she lobbied support for the struggle in general, that is for FRELIMO. For the representatives of the liberation movement, it became clear that the good relationship with the Soviet Union was an insufficient, if rather necessary, asset for seeking support from Finland. Finland was not another satellite of the Soviet Union, although influenced by it. In the world of Realpolitik, even though it was easier for Finland to support movements which were on good terms with its big neighbour, Finland also had to be careful to earn the acceptance of the Western world. Thus it always wanted to emphasise the humanitarian aspect in its policy, and as a result preferred international humanitarian channels for expressing its support. Even though some NGOs used as a model the Soviet Union's policy of supporting the liberation struggle through all means, this approach could be turned upside-down when Finland's foreign policy officials were approached. One had to bear in mind the other side of Finnish foreign policy: it was also important to minimise the influence of the Soviet Union. This paradox was well known by SWAPO representative Nickey Iyambo, who was introduced to Finnish society and Finnish political thinking right from the bottom. He came, after all, to study political science. 244. Ibid.

Pekka Peltola and lina Soiri What we were told those days was that Finland also had a very delicate political situation of its own. Being a country sandwiched between East and West means that although Finland has been for a long time a Western country, it had the then Soviet Union as a neighbour under a different political system than Finland's. It was cleverly balancing its own position between the East and West, Finland of course being a Western country. So I think because of its policy of neutrality there was sometimes, should I say, a disinterest as far as remote issues were concerned, in this case Namibia. It was a question whether Finland had something to gain if it takes an active participation and side in African politics. Because those countries that did colonise Africa, of course, had all the monopoly of information that was spread all over the world. You had a trade between Finland and South Africa. And Finland, unfortunately, had to balance between what it was getting in trade with South Africa and to compare it with the simple word and statement of Nickey lyambo, who was a student of Finland.245 In the Namibian and South African cases, as Mr Iyambo rightly points out, the South African trade aspect played a significant role. SWAPO, which was heavily supported by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, was carefully evaluating the benefits it could obtain from Finland, among other Western countries.246 In that regard, it had to respect Finland's more delicate international position as compared to Sweden's, for example. Finland recognised that she was a neutral country, but with a superpower border. Because of that neutrality Finland was unlike Sweden, which had what you want to call an active neutral policy in terms of speaking out. Sweden was neutral but always ready to speak out openly. Finland chose the road of quiet diplomacy, so to speak. This is maybe the difference between Finland and Sweden. Open vocal, neutral policy approach for Sweden and quiet diplomacy kind of an approach for Finland. And when Finland realises that most probably she would be involved in the humanitarian causes, I think that was an even more comfortable position for Finland. And of course we also were quite realistic, because it was obvious.247 SWAPO used a strategy that was adapted to the country in question and pragmatic in its approach, in order to secure the widest possible international support. 245. Interview with Nickey Iyambo, 20.8.1996 246 Very little research has in fact been done so far on the relations between the different liberation movements and the Soviet Union. Although it is common knowledge that the movements were heavily supported militarily and economically by the Soviet Union, which considered them as ideological allies, the scope and various forms of the aid as well as the interaction in policy-making between the movements and the Soviet Union has not yet been documented and analysed. Vladimir Shubin, a former official of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, is presently engaged in research on ANCSoviet relations at the University of Western Cape, South Africa. In his paper (Shubin, 1994) he argues that the Soviet Union was never actually directing the movements politically, but relied on the movements' own analysis of the Southern African situation and provided support at their request (p. 9). The Soviet Union kept up a direct link with ANC from 1963, in addition to the South African Communist Party, SACP, which was ANC's ally. He points out that since 1963, the Soviet Union had been willing and in a position to render assistance in several fields when not many countries were ready to do so (p. 2). South Africa, however, always wanted to prove that both ANC and SACP were taking orders from the Soviet Union. 247. Interview with Nickey Iyambo, 20.8.1996.

Finland's Foreign Policy-Do Not Disturb! We knew it would have been pointless, it was not even a measure to discuss, to request or ask arms from any Western countries. It was clear. So we made therefore the distinction that when it comes to education, we can ask help from anybody including the socialist countries. But in addition to education, from the socialist countries we can ask arms. When it came to the West, we knew the question of requesting arms was out, but we could ask for scholarships and financial assistance. So we then said if that continues, we get scholarships and arms from the socialist countries, scholarships and financial assistance and other political support from both of them, wherever possible depending now what is the issue at stake. We were really comfortable with that. ... Of course we condemned, we did condemn any relationships that there were between the West and our colonisers, we did condemn when those relationships were economic relationships, or military relationships or perhaps financial relationships in terms of trade. Those were condemned by us, but they did not go so far that, for instance, as cutting off the contact with them. There were always ways and means of continuing talking to these people.248 Nickey Iyambo met often with his colleagues in the Soviet Union, where many were studying and undergoing military training. But as to mobilisation in Finland, his expertise was superior. "I was a Master of Finnish politics and Finnish international relations. There wasn't anything that they could tell me."249 Iyambo felt he recognised the Finns' need to mirror themselves through the Soviet Union. And exactly for that reason, he preferred to apply an independent strategy in terms of Finland, not treat it as a satellite. 4.9. Winds of change from the field 4.9.1. Chargg d'affaires to Pretoria dismissed While the Foreign Ministry was still holding firmly onto the status quo in its foreign policy toward the Southern African question, it started to receive different messages even among its own ranks. First of all, a new charg6 d'affaires, Jaakko Lyytinen, was assigned to Pretoria in 1969. His style differed fundamentally from that of his predecessor, whose one-sided view he criticised more or less openly.250 Lyytinen's reports on the events in his station country bypassed the official rhetoric and tried to present the reality behind the facade. In 1971, for instance, he reported the difficulties which occurred among the missionaries when the World Council of Churches made an about turn in its opinion on South African apartheid and condemned the South African policy. Many priests were expelled from the territory by means of false accusations.251 Lyytinen also 248. Ibid. 249. Ibid. 250' "A few years ago the legation seemed to report that there are no dissatisfied blacks in this country. The view of the undersigned is exactly the opposite." Report to the Foreign Ministry, Legation in Pretoria, Jaakko Lyytinen, 19.10.1970. Foreign Ministry's Archives. 251. Report to the Foreign Ministry, Legation in Pretoria, Jaakko Lyytinen, 24.3.1971. Foreign Ministry's Archives.

Pekka Peltola and lina Soiri paid a lot of attention to the liberation movements, as well as political trials and prisoners-such cases were steadily increasing. Lyytinen's opinions on the South African situation did not please many. In the decision-making apparatus, heavily influenced by the trade community, his messages raised concern. According to them, humanitarian questions were internal matters, not to be bothered with at all. This was indicated in the same context as when the new department of development aid was criticised. When he proposed that the status of the diplomatic representation should be lowered to a consulate, he simply went too far. Lyytinen was called back from Pretoria. In the end, he was dismissed from the Ministry in 1973. This incident soon became an object of public debate. In Finland it is normal practice that nobody is dismissed from public service without serious misconduct. The Swedish press reported his case and claimed that Finland was seriously considering breaking off diplomatic relations with South Africa.252 The Government was asked about the reason for his dismissal. This even prompted debate in Parliament on Finland's South African policy line. Any connection between his dismissal and his proposal on the diplomatic representation was, however, denied. He himself considered it certain that his views were not liked by the trading companies, and that he was being harassed.253 No official explanation for his dismissal was given. Diplomatic relations and trade connections continued as usual. The documents concerning Lyytinen's case are not open to public investigation. Lyytinen himself is no longer here to tell his story. His case, again, refuelled the public discussion on Finland's Southern African policy, hastening its demise some time later. Finland's missionary work had been another reason for the diplomatic mission to behave well in the eyes of South Africa. Despite the flourishing trade relations and passive diplomacy, the missionary work in Namibia had in fact run into serious trouble. That was because the church itself no longer wanted to be a passive bystander as regards the events in the area. The church's critical attitude toward the illegal administration in Namibia had grown side by side with the debate in the international forums. In 1971, the church leaders had openly handed a letter to the South African Prime Minister to demand South African withdrawal from Namibia. The printing press of the church was bombed. Finally, in October 1972, the best-known advocate of SWAPO in the Finnish Missionary Society, Mikko Ihamaki, was denied entry to Namibia when he intended to return to his duty in that country. When in Finland, among church members there, Rev. Ihamaki started to use his expertise in mobilising understanding and support for the Namibian people, becoming rather successful. In the conservative church circles, the Finnish government's position of not expressing clearer support for the people of Namibia was becoming a target of criticism. 252 Dagens Nyheter, Swedish daily newspaper, 18.11.1973. 253. Kansan Uutiset, Finnish daily newspaper, 19.11.1973.

Finland's Foreign Policy-Do Not Disturb! All this also worried the diplomatic mission, although Ovamboland was not under its surveillance. The consulate in Walvis Bay had been closed down when the UN had terminated the mandate and assumed responsibility for governing the area. However, Finland's host country in Pretoria, South Africa, was the de facto government of the area and did not want to let go. Finland's image was in danger, once again, because of the critical missionaries. Finland went to great pains in order to accommodate the double pressure, because ending the diplomatic relations was totally out of the question. 4.9.2. Active Finnish community in Dares Salaam In Dar es Salaam, the Finnish community came into close contact with the liberation movements. Dar es Salaam was host to most of them and the OAU liberation committee was situated there, so it was natural to communicate with the movements' activists. Tanzania promoted their cause, and this support was personified in President Nyerere's vocal support. Also in connection with the Taksvtrkki Campaign, the links of the Embassy and the Finnish expatriate community with the Mozambique Institute and FREUMO increased. As a matter of fact, the members of the expatriate community assisted the movements in their spare time. The community of the Finnish expatriates and their spouses in Dar es Salaam was very active. A few months after I had arrived with my wife, we spontaneously organised a study group of those members of the community, who were interested in development and liberation issues. That must have been sometime in February or March 1974. It was called the Action Group Jumatatu after the Swahili name of the day of the first meeting. We were especially involved with FRELIMO, as the organisation had its headquarters in Dar es Salaam. We had many contacts with the FRELIMO camp, they came to address our study circle and we donated blood and did volunteer work for the organisation. There was an accountant among us who helped them to keep their accounts. This was very pragmatic and practical support to FRELIMO civilian headquarters.254 Finland had found it expedient to recruit people with practical experience of developing countries to its new missions in developing countries. In 1973, Martti Ahtisaari from the Department of Development Cooperation was nominated as Ambassador to Tanzania. He was assisted by the young attach6 Kimmo Pulkkinen, who had entered the Foreign Ministry through KAVAKU and dealt with the African question as one of his first tasks. They continued strengthening the links which Kari Karanko--the development aid officer of the Embassy since 1971-and missionaries Marja-Liisa and Lloyd Swantz255 had already built with SWAPO and other liberation movements in the 1960s. 254. Interview with Ilkka Ristimaki, 19.8.1995. 255' Lloyd Swantz represented the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America (ECLA) in Dar es Salaam as a pastor of the Azania Front Church 1960-1975. He has continued his work under the auspices of the church after finishing his PhD in anthropology. Dr

Pekka Peltola and Iina Soiri SWAPO's activists had found their way to Tanzania (then Tanganyika) at the beginning of the 1960s. The Old Location demonstrations in and the growing protest among the contract workers in Cape Town and inside Namibia became too much for the regime to tolerate. Small numbers of activists left for exile. The first Namibian ones came from Cape Town, ending up in Tanganyika, considered a friendly country. American missionary Lloyd Swantz, who was assigned to Dar es Salaam to organise religious and humanitarian work among the refugees, actually accommodated Sam Nujoma when he first came as a refugee from South West Africa in 1960. Dr Swantz and his wife, Marja-Liisa, helped for quite some time with clothes, bread and later even with a house and an office for the approximately 100 so-called 'students' in the early days of SWAPO in Dar es Salaam.256 Mikko Juva, familiar with the Namibian situation and SWAPO, visited Dar es Salaam a few times in the context of his duties in the international Christian organisations. Their personal understanding of and sympathy toward the still rather modest SWAPO organisation had a strong influence on the diplomatic representatives later posted in Dar es Salaam. According to Martti Ahtisaari, the atmosphere in Dar es Salaam was characterised by development optimism and trust in the future.257 While the Ministry in Helsinki was still thinking of opening links with the liberation movements, its staff members in Dar es Salaam were already doing it in practice. They had several times passed requests from different liberation movements over to the Foreign Ministry and inquired if the Ministry would take a stand on the matter. According to them, assisting the liberation movements would not do any harm. But their hands were tied, and their actions limited to only personal and voluntary assistance. In any case, their open communication with the liberation movement representatives helped the Foreign Ministry to start considering the movements as partners. 4.10. NGO letter to the Foreign Ministry The train kept moving rather fast in the NGO sector. After the Taksvirkki Campaign, the Students' Conference and Cabral's visit, it had become evident that political parties were ready to increase support to the liberation movements. The Social Democrats, still a leading party and the holder of the Foreign Minister's portfolio, had for a long time indicated a change in their attitude. The Maija-Liisa Swantz did her PhD in anthropology and worked at the University of Dares Salaam. In 1982, she became Director of the Institute of Development Studies, with which she had been involved from its beginning. Presently she works as a visiting professor of WIDER, the United Nations Research Institute in Helsinki. Their closest colleagues in Dar es Salaam included Barbro Johansson, a Swede, Otto Immonen, a Finn, and the American Edward A. Hawley. 256 Interview with Lloyd Swantz, 25.3.1997. 257. Ahtisaari, 1994:60-61

Finland's Foreign Policy-Do Not Disturb! movements themselves had gained considerable victories in the international arena and earned more recognition. The Namibian question faced a new phase with the court ruling in 1971. Only the Foreign Ministry administration was firm in its policy. The NGOs' own financial and material support to the liberation movements increased steadily in scope and extent. After its conference, the National Union of Students, SYL, continued its collection of funds for PAIGC and included also MPLA, FRELIMO and SWAPO. The International Solidarity Foundation donated funds to MPLA, FRELIMO, PAIGC, SWAPO and ZANU. The Africa Committee, together with the Emmaus Association, started to collect clothes for MPLA. The students of medicine planned to co-operate in collecting medicines for Angola. Financially, these were small fish, compared with the need for resources demanded by the liberation struggle. It was evident that state funds were needed to secure continuous and largescale financial support for the movements. Discussions centred around the method whereby this support would materialise. Liberation movement representatives Janet Mondlane from the MI and a delegation from ZAPU, among others) visited Finland and met officers in the Ministry, presenting repeated demands for aid with no results. But in fact, in the Foreign Ministry some preparations were already under way. The Ministry gave general guidelines to its diplomatic missions on its policy toward revolutionary and independence movements. The Finnish diplomatic representatives should treat the liberation movements recognised by the UN Resolutions in a flexible and sympathetic way.-58 The four-page guidelines were very detailed, and had understandably required a lot of work from the political department to determine what was the difference between a rebel group and a 'seriously regarded' liberation movement! However, for the first time ever, it was preparing to take the movements seriously. The NGO activists were quite well aware of the events in the Ministry. Kalevi Sorsa, who had been the chairperson of the Cabral Reception Committee, became Foreign Minister in 1972. He had been a strong advocate of the liberation movements, criticising his colleague, the former Foreign Minister Leskinen, for employing double standards.259 But he lacked the courage to push for change in the policy on liberation movements on his own initiative. But if there was a clear proposal and pressure from outside, it would be regarded in a positive light, he advised. Based on that, the Africa Committee made a proposal, that all political parties and the relevant NGOs should prepare and sign a memo on the liberation movements to petition the Finnish government to recognise those movements and channel aid to them. The Cabral Reception Committee was set up again, 258 Administrative Circular Letter No. 15, Helsinki 4.5.1971. Foreign Ministry's Archives. 259. See Chapter 2, note 116.

Pekka Peltola and lina Soiri and a comprehensive memo was written by Mattsson, Pyhala, Marianne Tarkka and Kristina Vanajas. Pyhblb soon joined the civil service, and abstained from his NGO activities. In the Ministry, however, he was given the tasks of assessing and reporting on the events on the liberation front.260 The petition letter was handed to the Foreign Ministry on 23 August 1972.261 Referring to the UN 25th Session on Colonialism, it demanded that Finland should clarify its stand on liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies and start giving bilateral humanitarian development assistance to FRELIMO, PAIGC and MPLA. Finland should also make preparations for the next General Assembly in the spirit of the UN Resolution. Portuguese colonies were chosen as the focal point, because there the struggle was most advanced. The petition was signed by the political parties from right to left, as well as the church and a few of the most important NGOs-in practice, all important representatives of the civil and political society. After a few days, Minister Sorsa gave a mandate to his ministry to review the situation. In the Foreign Ministry, several reports had already been made concerning, for instance, the position of the liberation movements in the eyes of international law262 and the international organisations, as well as their foreign assistance. A Working Group was set up in January 1973, simply to write up a positive recommendation on aid, according to the chairperson of the group Matti Kahiluoto.263 The composition of the group was extraordinary, because its members represented political parties from right to left, not only the state administration. This was done to secure the largest possible political support and smooth implementation of the recommendations. Around the same time, on 9 January 1973, the Foreign Affairs Committee of Parliament had recommended that the development cooperation should also include humanitarian and social support for the liberation movements recognised by the UN.264 Ilkka Ristimaki, who joined the office for development assistance in 1970 and was the secretary of the working group, says: During that period the Foreign Ministry set up a working group to determine guidelines regarding possible Finnish assistance through bilateral or multilateral channels to the various liberation movements of Southern Africa. The working 260 P.M. Ulkomainen tuki Afrikan vapautusliikkeille (Memorandum on Foreign Support for the African Liberation Movements), Mikko Pyhala, 15.1.1973, Foreign Ministry's Archive. 261. A letter to the Foreign Ministry from the Africa Committee and undersigned NGOs. 23.8.1972. Foreign Ministry's Archives. 262 Memorandum on the position of the liberation movements in international law, Henrik Raiha, 21.6.1971. Legal department of the Foreign Ministry. Foreign Ministry's Archives. 263 Interview with Matti Kahiluoto, 24.8.1995. 264 Foreign Affairs Committee of Parliament, Letter to the Government 9.1.1973, personal archives of Mikko Pyhala.

Finland's Foreign Policy-Do Not Disturb! group was led by Matti Kahiluoto of the Political Department and I was appointed as its secretary. The working group did not actually do much work. Its essential role was to provide a wide political backing and consensus among the parties for a new policy, which I quickly formulated into a text. From now on Finland was going to provide humanitarian assistance to the economic, social and educational activities of the liberation movements. Essential elements of the consensus were that on the one hand Finland was not promoting or supporting the use of violence and on the other hand the Finnish humanitarian assistance was not to be interpreted by anybody as support to or approval of the use of violence. That was the crux. The text was short, but the change was crucial. Through this advice by the working group the "battle of aid or not" had been concluded. It was now politically legitimate for the Finnish Government to support the liberation struggle in Africa.265 4.11. Foreign political justifications behind the policy change As Ilkka Ristimaki describes, one of the first starting-points for Finland in dealing with the liberation movements was still to avoid supporting violence. It was one of the leading principles in Finnish foreign policy and it had to be worked into any policy reformulation as well. How could a government support a rebel movement which was waging a war against a legitimate member of the international community? In this respect, it surely helped that the international community had clearly decided about the self-determination of the people in the colonies and created ways of channelling humanitarian assistance to the movements of these people. Still, it was an extraordinary decision, because it implied channelling money directly to these movements, not to an international body able to control the flow of funds. The decision becomes more extraordinary when taking into consideration the fact that although the Southern African struggle was relatively unimportant in relation to Finland's international priorities, it needed to be dealt with in the context of the Finnish foreign policy doctrine, which had not been designed to be applied to a situation of that kind. It was not something different from the general policy line, maybe on the contrary. We tried to see and tried to tackle, treat this particular issue of liberation movements in Southern Africa with the same principles and along the same lines as the foreign policy in general at that time. We have to remember that these were the years also when we struggled and kept neutrality as a main and really leading guideline in any and all foreign policy issues. And in that sense, because neutrality was developed of course first and foremost for the, what we now call, near-area politics for Finnish relations with our neighbours and superpower conflicts. When trying to apply those principles to a far away issue and problem like liberation movements in Southern Africa, it again now, saying it in retrospect, it was not so easy to fit into the picture. And through this process, it became obvious that we have to diversify that general neutrality approach and identify a more direct approach to particular issues like the liberation movement. And in that I think the humanitarian assistance came in very handy.266 265 Interview with Ilkka Ristiraki, 19.8.1995. 266. Interview with Kimrnmo Pulkkinen, 11.8.1995.

Pekka Peltola and Iina Soiri Humanitarian assistance became a tool to deal with the liberation movements. In other words, to include the Southern African struggle in Finnish foreign policy, new ways of international action had to be developed. Finland decided to render internationally accepted humanitarian assistance to the people under colonial rule. The very act of channelling the assistance directly to the movements implied recognition of them or at least an acceptance of their demands for self- determination as justified. And the process of selecting the movements which were supported was a decision determined by political calculations, as we will see in the next chapter. Moreover, the political sensitivity of the liberation movement aid was also highlighted by the fact that all decisions above the level of technical administration of aid were made at the political department of the Foreign Ministry. Coming back to the questions put forward at the beginning of this chapterthat is, how Finland's policy change came about-we shall try to come to a conclusion. We have shown the process by which the public opinion developed to become more favourable to the liberation movements. It had not been enough that the young radicals in the universities and their respective NGOs had pushed for the policy change and a new foreign policy. Neither had it been sufficient that the liberation struggle was getting more and more understanding and support in the multilateral forums. Finland's national policy had held firm, and the UN had served conveniently as a forum for rhetoric but also for important contacts and as an outlet of multilateral efforts. Changes in the field, in Finland's diplomatic missions, had played a part as well, but critics had to be careful. Trade relations had actively worked against bringing any other values into the foreign policy by promoting economic cooperation above all. The liberation movements themselves, who adapted their strategy in awareness of Finland's delicate international position, were suffering to some extent from their alliance with the Soviet Union. Finland did not want at any cost to be seen as one of the satellites. The Finnish mission in Ovamboland and its mother church gradually became important advocates of the black Namibian people and their organisations, especially SWAPO. But they alone could not have brought about the change. The Nordic countries served as one reference group, but all of them- with different international affiliations-had in the end created their own line, Finland notwithstanding. Finland continuously stated that racism, colonialism and apartheid were foreign to its people. The equality of all and the right of all peoples to selfdetermination were leading principles in building the modern Finnish welfare state. But it seemed to be difficult to enter these moral questions in the foreign policy agenda. Realist thinking was so justified in the Cold War situation that no deed was allowed to contradict its demands. In conclusion, as regards the Finnish foreign policy principles-neutrality and good neighbour relations with the Soviet Union, as well as compliance with international declarations, such as those of the UN and an attempt to be one of the Western countries in the Cold War years-it became clear that any policy

Finland's Foreign Policy-Do Not Disturb! change should be justified by the largest possible section of the international community and, more importantly, by both superpowers. That acceptance was reached in the UN, where a growing majority of the democratic countries were voting against colonialism and in favour of the people's self-determination. Agreement on the moral principles behind the liberation struggle was reached in the international forums. That gave Finland a basis for a policy reformulation. However, problems remained of how to implement these policies in concrete situations. For the realists, it could have been enough that Finland directed its support via multinational channels, not to the movements directly. The movements were, after all, seen as being on the side of the East; because of the heavy military support flowing from the Soviet Union and its allies and because of the movements' ideological basis. Thus, additionally, changing the national foreign policy to be favourable to the direct support of the movements, was linked to the international power game, which had its impact in the divided political system in Finland. In the Cold War years, even internal political questions were subject to international power relations. This was especially true of the Africa Committee, which played a significant role in mobilising support for the liberation movements. Overall, most of the Africa solidarity movement was inspired by the socialist ideologies. Exactly for that reason, the reformulation of Finland's policy to be supportive of the liberation movements demanded pressure from all sectors of Finnish society, an alliance from right to left. This would ensure that left-leaning liberation movements were regarded first and foremost as morally legitimate protest channels of the oppressed. This succeeded. It was both the right and the left, the church and the leftist parties, the political and apolitical, the young and the old, that lobbied for support. Not to forget the Centre, which was the leading party in defining Finnish foreign policy in relation to the Soviet Union. It was not overly interested in supporting the movements, but with the leadership of President Kekkonen and a number of other leaders, it did not totally reject the idea. Thus, in order to avoid a situation where a policy of supporting the movements would be associated with any of the camps, it was to be carefully justified by all. This alliance which was formed was to perform an even more important role in the South African sanction question, as we will see in Chapter 6. It also ensured increasing financial assistance to SWAPO and later ANC. As to the decision-making question that Timo-Erkki Heino put forward, we can conclude the following. We have seen that in order to have an impact on Finnish foreign policy-making-which rests so heavily in the hands of the President, and the Government, and its foreign policy administration, and where Parliament's role is small-there had to be powerful public pressure which would not be neutralised by any excuses. The changing political power relations in Finland played their role in the first place, allowing the radical views to be formed as elements of the political parties' programmes of action.

102 Pekka Peltola and lina Soiri The change was especially significant in the Social Democratic party, which became the largest party in Finland and, as a consequence, was able to formulate the government policy. It did help, too, that the President himself was interested in this particular question. He allowed the change to happen, because there was broad support. Furthermore, the humanitarian support for the African liberation struggle became quite a new asset of foreign policy. It gave Finland a chance to play a significant role in African affairs, which further strengthened her policy of active neutrality at the beginning of the 1970s, when the period of 'd~tente' provided Finland with more space to manoeuvre in international affairs, at least regarding the Third World. This resulted in Finland's particularly important role in Namibian affairs, as we will see in the next chapter.

Cover: Adriaan Honcoop Language checking: Christine Mann-Ldfblom and Elaine Alm6n © Iina Soiri, Pekka Peltola and Nordiska Afrikainstitutet 1999 ISBN 91-7106-431-1 Printed in Sweden by Elanders Gotab, Stockholm 1999 Indexing terms: Foreign relations National liberation movements Student movements ANC SWAPO Finland Namibia South Africa