President Eugene A. Colligan Collection, 1932-1939
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SURVEY of CURRENT BUSINESS September 1935
SEPTEMBER 1935 OF CURRENT BUSINE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE BUREAU OF FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC COMMERCE WASHINGTON VOLUME 15 NUMBER 9 Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis UNITED STATES BUREAU OF MINES MINERALS YEARBOOK 1935 The First Complete Official Record Issued in 1935 A LIBRARY OF CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MINERAL INDUSTRY (In One Volume) Survey of gold and silver mining and markets Detailed State mining reviews Current trends in coal and oil Analysis of the extent of business recovery for vari- ous mineral groups 75 Chapters ' 59 Contributors ' 129 Illustrations - about 1200 Pages THE STANDARD AUTHENTIC REFERENCE BOOK ON THE MINING INDUSTRY CO NT ENTS Part I—Survey of the mineral industries: Secondary metals Part m—Konmetals- Lime Review of the mineral industry Iron ore, pig iron, ferro'alloys, and steel Coal Clay Coke and byproducts Abrasive materials Statistical summary of mineral production Bauxite e,nd aluminum World production of minerals and economic Recent developments in coal preparation and Sulphur and pyrites Mercury utilization Salt, bromine, calcium chloride, and iodine aspects of international mineral policies Mangane.se and manganiferous ores Fuel briquets Phosphate rock Part 11—Metals: Molybdenum Peat Fuller's earth Gold and silver Crude petroleum and petroleum products Talc and ground soapstone Copper Tungsten Uses of petroleum fuels Fluorspar and cryolite Lead Tin Influences of petroleum technology upon com- Feldspar posite interest in oil Zinc ChroHHtt: Asbestos -
Records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1891-1957, Record Group 85 New Orleans, Louisiana Crew Lists of Vessels Arriving at New Orleans, LA, 1910-1945
Records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1891-1957, Record Group 85 New Orleans, Louisiana Crew Lists of Vessels Arriving at New Orleans, LA, 1910-1945. T939. 311 rolls. (~A complete list of rolls has been added.) Roll Volumes Dates 1 1-3 January-June, 1910 2 4-5 July-October, 1910 3 6-7 November, 1910-February, 1911 4 8-9 March-June, 1911 5 10-11 July-October, 1911 6 12-13 November, 1911-February, 1912 7 14-15 March-June, 1912 8 16-17 July-October, 1912 9 18-19 November, 1912-February, 1913 10 20-21 March-June, 1913 11 22-23 July-October, 1913 12 24-25 November, 1913-February, 1914 13 26 March-April, 1914 14 27 May-June, 1914 15 28-29 July-October, 1914 16 30-31 November, 1914-February, 1915 17 32 March-April, 1915 18 33 May-June, 1915 19 34-35 July-October, 1915 20 36-37 November, 1915-February, 1916 21 38-39 March-June, 1916 22 40-41 July-October, 1916 23 42-43 November, 1916-February, 1917 24 44 March-April, 1917 25 45 May-June, 1917 26 46 July-August, 1917 27 47 September-October, 1917 28 48 November-December, 1917 29 49-50 Jan. 1-Mar. 15, 1918 30 51-53 Mar. 16-Apr. 30, 1918 31 56-59 June 1-Aug. 15, 1918 32 60-64 Aug. 16-0ct. 31, 1918 33 65-69 Nov. 1', 1918-Jan. 15, 1919 34 70-73 Jan. 16-Mar. 31, 1919 35 74-77 April-May, 1919 36 78-79 June-July, 1919 37 80-81 August-September, 1919 38 82-83 October-November, 1919 39 84-85 December, 1919-January, 1920 40 86-87 February-March, 1920 41 88-89 April-May, 1920 42 90 June, 1920 43 91 July, 1920 44 92 August, 1920 45 93 September, 1920 46 94 October, 1920 47 95-96 November, 1920 48 97-98 December, 1920 49 99-100 Jan. -
SURVEY of CURRENT BUSINESS January 1936
JANUARY 1936 SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE BUREAU OF FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC COMMERCE WASHINGTON VOLUME 16 NUMBER 1 THE charts on pages 4 and 5 portray the trend of commodity prices from 1929 to date. The better balanced price structure at the end of 1935 as com pared with that of 3 years earlier is clearly Indicated. A. discussion of recent trends with particular emphasis on the relationship of the various price groups Is dis cussed In the special article on the pages noted above. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE DANIEL C. ROPER, Secretary BUREAU OF FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC COMMERCE N. H. ENGLE, Acting Director SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS Prepared in the DIVISION OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH ROY G. BLAKEY, Chief M. JOSEPH MEEHAN, Editor Volume 16 JANUARY 1936 Number 1 CONTENTS SUMMARIES AND CHARTS STATISTICAL DATA-continued Page Business indicators................................................ 2 Monthly business statistics: Page Business situation summarized. • • • . • . • . • . • . • . 3 Business indexes............................................... 18 Comparison of principal data, 1931-35.............................. 6 Commodity prices............................................. 19 Domestic trade. • . .. .. • . • . • . .. • . 7 Construction and real estate................................... 20 Employment. • . • . • . • . • . • . • . • . .. .. .. • . • . • . • . • 8 Domestic trade................................................ 21 Finance........................................................... 9 Employment -
Did Doubling Reserve Requirements Cause the Recession of 1937- 1938? a Microeconomic Approach
ECONOMIC RESEARCH FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS WORKING PAPER SERIES Did Doubling Reserve Requirements Cause the Recession of 1937- 1938? A Microeconomic Approach Authors Charles W. Calomiris, Joseph R. Mason, and David C. Wheelock Working Paper Number 2011-002A Creation Date January 2011 Citable Link https://doi.org/10.20955/wp.2011.002 Calomiris, C.W., Mason, J.R., Wheelock, D.C., 2011; Did Doubling Reserve Requirements Cause the Recession of 1937-1938? A Microeconomic Approach, Suggested Citation Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Paper 2011-002. URL https://doi.org/10.20955/wp.2011.002 Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Research Division, P.O. Box 442, St. Louis, MO 63166 The views expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Reserve System, the Board of Governors, or the regional Federal Reserve Banks. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Papers are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comment. Did Doubling Reserve Requirements Cause the Recession of 1937-1938? A Microeconomic Approach Charles W. Calomiris, Joseph R. Mason, and David C. Wheelock January 2011 Abstract In 1936-37, the Federal Reserve doubled the reserve requirements imposed on member banks. Ever since, the question of whether the doubling of reserve requirements increased reserve demand and produced a contraction of money and credit, and thereby helped to cause the recession of 1937-1938, has been a matter of controversy. Using microeconomic data to gauge the fundamental reserve demands of Fed member banks, we find that despite being doubled, reserve requirements were not binding on bank reserve demand in 1936 and 1937, and therefore could not have produced a significant contraction in the money multiplier. -
Economic Review
MONTHLY REVIEW o f Financial and Business Conditions F ifth R e s e r v e F e d e r a l D i s t r i c t Federal Reserve Bank, Richmond, Va. July 31, 1937 C HANGES in bank statements last month were partly tion in the United States was 8 per cent greater last seasonal. Needs of certain member banks for addi month than in June a year ago. Cotton textile mills in tional funds for early crop marketing and other agricul the Fifth district slightly increased cotton consumption tural loans raised discounts at the Federal Reserve Bank in June in comparison with May, and used 17 per cent of Richmond between June 15 and July 15. Circulation of more cotton than in June last year. Cotton prices showed Federal Reserve notes declined slightly, and member bank practically no net change between the middle of June and reserve deposits were also reduced as banks in rural sec the middle of July. The first cotton report of the year, tions found seasonal employment for additional funds. issued by the Department of Agriculture on July 8, Reporting member banks in the chief cities of the district showed a 10.4 per cent acreage increase this year over reduced outstanding loans last month, and their demand last year, but the increase was less than the trade had deposits decreased correspondingly. Investments in se expected and had already been discounted in cotton prices. curities also declined, and the reporting banks reduced The carry-over of cotton into the new crop year begin their aggregate reserve at the Reserve Bank, while their ning August 1 will be materially smaller than the carry cash in vaults rose moderately. -
Nazi Privatization in 1930S Germany1 by GERMÀ BEL
Economic History Review (2009) Against the mainstream: Nazi privatization in 1930s Germany1 By GERMÀ BEL Nationalization was particularly important in the early 1930s in Germany.The state took over a large industrial concern, large commercial banks, and other minor firms. In the mid-1930s, the Nazi regime transferred public ownership to the private sector. In doing so, they went against the mainstream trends in western capitalistic countries, none of which systematically reprivatized firms during the 1930s. Privatization was used as a political tool to enhance support for the government and for the Nazi Party. In addition, growing financial restrictions because of the cost of the rearmament programme provided additional motivations for privatization. rivatization of large parts of the public sector was one of the defining policies Pof the last quarter of the twentieth century. Most scholars have understood privatization as the transfer of government-owned firms and assets to the private sector,2 as well as the delegation to the private sector of the delivery of services previously delivered by the public sector.3 Other scholars have adopted a much broader meaning of privatization, including (besides transfer of public assets and delegation of public services) deregulation, as well as the private funding of services previously delivered without charging the users.4 In any case, modern privatization has been usually accompanied by the removal of state direction and a reliance on the free market. Thus, privatization and market liberalization have usually gone together. Privatizations in Chile and the UK, which began to be implemented in the 1970s and 1980s, are usually considered the first privatization policies in modern history.5 A few researchers have found earlier instances. -
Presentation Slides
Monetary Policy Alternatives at the Zero Bound: Lessons from the 1930s U.S. Christopher Hanes March 2013 Last resorts for monetary authorities in a liquidity trap: 1) Replace inflation target with target for price level or nominal GDP In standard NK models, credible announcement immediately boosts ∆p, lowers real interest rates while we are still trapped at zero bound. “Expected inflation channel” 2) “Quantitative easing” or Large-Scale Asset Purchases (LSAPs) Buy long-term bonds in exchange for bills or reserves to push down on term, risk or liquidity premiums through “portfolio effects” Can 1) work? Do portfolio effects exist? I look at 1930s, when U.S. in liquidity trap. 1) No clear evidence for expected-inflation channel 2) Yes: evidence of portfolio effects Expected-inflation channel: theory Lessons from the 1930s U.S. β New-Keynesian Phillips curve: ∆p ' E ∆p % (y&y n) t t t%1 γ t T β a distant horizon T ∆p ' E [∆p % (y&y n) ] t t t%T λ j t%τ τ'0 n To hit price-level or $AD target, authorities must boost future (y&y )t%τ For any given path of y in near future, while we are still in liquidity trap, that raises current ∆pt , reduces rt , raises yt , lifts us out of trap Why it might fail: - expectations not so forward-looking, rational - promise not credible Svensson’s “Foolproof Way” out of liquidity trap: peg to depreciated exchange rate “a conspicuous commitment to a higher price level in the future” Expected-inflation channel: 1930s experience Lessons from the 1930s U.S. -
The 1930S: a New Curriculum and Coeducation, by Mary Hull Mohr
The 1930s: A New Curriculum and Coeducation, by Mary Hull Mohr Two of Luther’s most transformative changes came in the early 1930s: the ending of the classical curriculum and the beginning of coeducation. Both decisions were in part driven by financial concerns. The enrollment of the college dropped from 345 in 1930-31 to 283 students in the 1931-32 school year, and the college had significant debt. President Olson had strongly supported the classical curriculum, but in the face of financial pressures and student and constituency challenges, he affirmed the faculty’s vote to adopt new curricular requirements starting in September of 1931. Christianity retained its 14 hour requirement, but students were no longer required to take Greek, Latin, German, Norwegian, history, and mathematics. A two- year requirement in the language of the student’s choice remained (one year if the student had taken two years in high school). History was folded into a social science requirement and mathematics into a science and math requirement. Since majors, minors, and electives were already options, Luther had finally adopted the pattern common in most of the colleges and universities in the United States. The day after the adoption of the new curriculum by the faculty, President Olson announced that he was advocating coeducation. A staunch supporter of Luther as a college for men, Olson must have believed that the financial crisis would be alleviated by the admission of women. Not everyone agreed. Some believed coeducation would require additional resources: new courses for women, female faculty, housing needs. And, indeed, it did. -
Hitler's American Model
Hitler’s American Model The United States and the Making of Nazi Race Law James Q. Whitman Princeton University Press Princeton and Oxford 1 Introduction This jurisprudence would suit us perfectly, with a single exception. Over there they have in mind, practically speaking, only coloreds and half-coloreds, which includes mestizos and mulattoes; but the Jews, who are also of interest to us, are not reckoned among the coloreds. —Roland Freisler, June 5, 1934 On June 5, 1934, about a year and a half after Adolf Hitler became Chancellor of the Reich, the leading lawyers of Nazi Germany gathered at a meeting to plan what would become the Nuremberg Laws, the notorious anti-Jewish legislation of the Nazi race regime. The meeting was chaired by Franz Gürtner, the Reich Minister of Justice, and attended by officials who in the coming years would play central roles in the persecution of Germany’s Jews. Among those present was Bernhard Lösener, one of the principal draftsmen of the Nuremberg Laws; and the terrifying Roland Freisler, later President of the Nazi People’s Court and a man whose name has endured as a byword for twentieth-century judicial savagery. The meeting was an important one, and a stenographer was present to record a verbatim transcript, to be preserved by the ever-diligent Nazi bureaucracy as a record of a crucial moment in the creation of the new race regime. That transcript reveals the startling fact that is my point of departure in this study: the meeting involved detailed and lengthy discussions of the law of the United States. -
Stagflation in the 1930S: Why Did the French New Deal Fail?
Stagflation in the 1930s: Why did the French New Deal Fail? Jeremie Cohen-Setton, Joshua K. Hausman, and Johannes F. Wieland∗ August 15, 2014 VERSION 1.0. VERY PRELIMINARY. DO NOT CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION. The latest version is available here. Abstract Most countries started to recover from the Great Depression when they left the Gold Stan- dard. France did not. In 1936, France both left the Gold Standard and enacted New- Deal-style policies, in particular wage increases and a 40-hour week law. The result was stagflation; prices rose rapidly from 1936 to 1938 while output stagnated. Using panel data on sectoral output, we show that the 40-hour week restriction had strong negative effects on production. Absent this law, France would likely have followed the usual pattern of rapid recovery after leaving the Gold Standard. We construct a model to show how supply-side policies could have prevented output growth despite excess capacity and a large real interest rate decline. ∗Cohen-Setton: University of California, Berkeley. 530 Evans Hall #3880, Berkeley, CA 94720. Email: [email protected]. Phone: (510) 277-6413. Hausman: Ford School of Public Policy, Uni- versity of Michigan. 735 S. State St. #3309, Ann Arbor, MI 48109. Email: [email protected]. Phone: (734) 763-3479. Wieland: Department of Economics, University of California, San Diego. 9500 Gilman Dr. #0508, La Jolla, CA 92093-0508. Email: [email protected]. Phone: (510) 388-2785. We thank Walid Badawi and Matthew Haarer for superb research assistance. “CABINETS, in France, may come and Cabinets may go, but the economic crisis seems to go on for ever.” - The Economist, 2/5/1938, p. -
The Floods of March 1936 Part 3
If 700 do not need this report after it has served your purpose, please retnrn ft to the Geological Survey, using the official mailing label at the end UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR* THE FLOODS OF MARCH 1936 PART 3. POTOMAC, JAMES, AND UPPER OHIO RIVERS Prepared in cooperation with the FEDERAL EMERGENCY ADMINISTRATION OF PUBLIC WORKS GEOLOGICAL SURVEY WATER-SUPPLY PAPER 800 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR Harold L. Ickes, Secretary GEOLOGICAL SURVEY W. C. Mendenhall, Director Water-Supply Paper 800 THE FLOODS OF MARCH 1936 PART 3. POTOMAC, JAMES, AND UPPER OHIO RIVERS NATHAN C. GROVER, Chief Hydraulic Engineer With a section on the WEATHER ASSOCIATED WITH THE FLOODS OF MARCH 1936 By STEPHEN LICHTBLAU, U. S. Weather Bureau Prepared in cooperation with the FEDERAL EMERGENCY ADMINISTRATION OF PUBLIC WORKS UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 1937 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D. C. -------- Price 45 cents CONTENTS Abstract............................................................ i Introduction........................................................ 2 Authorization....................................................... 5 Administration and personnel........................................ 5 Acknowledgments..................................................... 6 General features of the storms...................................... 8 Weather associated with the floods of March 1936, by Stephen Lichtblau......................................................... 12 Floods of the Potomac, -
The Olimpiada Popular: Barcelona 1936, Sport and Politics in an Age of War, Dictatorship and Revolution
Article The Olimpiada Popular: Barcelona 1936, Sport and Politics in an Age of War, Dictatorship and Revolution Physick, Ray Available at http://clok.uclan.ac.uk/19183/ Physick, Ray (2016) The Olimpiada Popular: Barcelona 1936, Sport and Politics in an Age of War, Dictatorship and Revolution. Sport in History, 37 (1). pp. 51-75. ISSN 1746-0263 It is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you intend to cite from the work. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17460263.2016.1246380 For more information about UCLan’s research in this area go to http://www.uclan.ac.uk/researchgroups/ and search for <name of research Group>. For information about Research generally at UCLan please go to http://www.uclan.ac.uk/research/ All outputs in CLoK are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, including Copyright law. Copyright, IPR and Moral Rights for the works on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Terms and conditions for use of this material are defined in the policies page. CLoK Central Lancashire online Knowledge www.clok.uclan.ac.uk The Olimpiada Popular: Barcelona 1936 Sport and Politics in an age of War, Dictatorship and Revolution In an attempt to undermine the IOC Games of 1936, organisations linked to the international worker sport movement responded to an invitation from the Comité Organizador de la Olimpiada Popular (COOP) to take part in an alternative Olympics, the Olimpiada Popular, in Barcelona in July 1936. It is estimated that some 10,000 athletes and 25,000 visitors were in Barcelona to celebrate the Olimpiada.