THE CHINESE TRADITION OF RIGHTEOUS WAR AND CHINA’S DECISIONS FOR WAR BETWEEN 1950 AND1979 by CHENG-YUN CHANG B.A., Soochow University, Taiwan, 2001 M.A., Tamkang University, Taiwan, 2004 AN ABSTRACT OF A DISSERTATION submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Security Studies Program College of Arts and Sciences KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY Manhattan, Kansas 2013 Abstract This dissertation engages the question of what role the Chinese Righteous War Tradition (CRWT) played in the process of Chinese decision-making regarding the decisions to go to war during the period from 1950 to 1979. It asks whether, in their decision-making, the Chinese leaders identified “just cause” through a frame of reference provided by the CRWT; it asks further under what circumstances the identified “just cause” may have exerted influence upon their decision for war. This dissertation presents the first empirical study exploring the application and influence of the traditional Chinese concept of righteous war to China’s modern history. The CRWT is my label for a set of ideas found in the ancient Chinese classics. These ideas suggest that two major standards, righteousness-based justifications and competent authority, were a frame of reference for the Chinese leaders in their assessment of the legitimacy of a decision for war. The justifications of stopping violence, punishing a disobedient state, helping a weaker state against a stronger state’s invasion, and self-defense are regularly defined in the CRWT as righteous causes for going to war. The identification of competent authority is often related to the perception of moral standing, in which a war can be justified by confronting an opponent who is morally inferior to oneself. This dissertation employs the methods of most similar systems and process tracing to explore the role that the CRWT played in successive Chinese leaders’ decision to use force in six cases – the Korean War, the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, the Sino-Indian War, the Vietnam War between 1964 and 1965, the Sino-Soviet Border Conflict, and the Sino-Vietnamese War. This dissertation also examines the pattern of the Chinese government’s use of wording, presented in the People’s Daily, morally condemning its opponents, which provides supplementary evidence to explore China’s presentation of its own righteous legitimacy. The findings of this research suggest that when the decision for war has been justified within this frame of reference, the Chinese are prone to put that legitimized decision into action. The Chinese concept of righteous war may play a more important role in the decision for war when Chinese leaders encounter an impasse in which two opposite courses of action are suggested by their calculations based on Realpolitik. A sense of the righteous legitimacy of their decision may encourage Chinese leaders to enter a war even when the likely consequence may not appear to favor the Chinese. Furthermore, these findings may well enrich Johnson and Tierney’s theory about the shift of actors’ mind-sets in decision-making because the CRWT may function as a catalyst for the shift. This research also reveals that the CRWT had limited influence when Chinese leaders faced the danger of a possible invasion by a superior opponent or that of nuclear attack. When the need for a decision for war was not open to debate, then, they were not influenced by the consideration of just cause when making their decision. THE CHINESE TRADITION OF RIGHTEOUS WAR AND CHINA’S DECISIONS FOR WAR BETWEEN 1950 AND1979 by CHENG-YUN CHANG B.A., Soochow University, Taiwan, 2001 M.A., Tamkang University, Taiwan, 2004 A DISSERTATION submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Security Studies Program College of Arts and Sciences KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY Manhattan, Kansas 2013 Approved by: Major Professor David Graff Copyright CHENG-YUN CHANG 2013 Abstract This dissertation engages the question of what role the Chinese Righteous War Tradition (CRWT) played in the process of Chinese decision-making regarding the decisions to go to war during the period from 1950 to 1979. It asks whether, in their decision-making, the Chinese leaders identified “just cause” through a frame of reference provided by the CRWT; it asks further under what circumstances the identified “just cause” may have exerted influence upon their decision for war. This dissertation presents the first empirical study exploring the application and influence of the traditional Chinese concept of righteous war to China’s modern history. The CRWT is my label for a set of ideas found in the ancient Chinese classics. These ideas suggest that two major standards, righteousness-based justifications and competent authority, were a frame of reference for the Chinese leaders in their assessment of the legitimacy of a decision for war. The justifications of stopping violence, punishing a disobedient state, helping a weaker state against a stronger state’s invasion, and self-defense are regularly defined in the CRWT as righteous causes for going to war. The identification of competent authority is often related to the perception of moral standing, in which a war can be justified by confronting an opponent who is morally inferior to oneself. This dissertation employs the methods of most similar systems and process tracing to explore the role that the CRWT played in successive Chinese leaders’ decision to use force in six cases – the Korean War, the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, the Sino-Indian War, the Vietnam War between 1964 and 1965, the Sino-Soviet Border Conflict, and the Sino-Vietnamese War. This dissertation also examines the pattern of the Chinese government’s use of wording, presented in the People’s Daily, morally condemning its opponents, which provides supplementary evidence to explore China’s presentation of its own righteous legitimacy. The findings of this research suggest that when the decision for war has been justified within this frame of reference, the Chinese are prone to put that legitimized decision into action. The Chinese concept of righteous war may play a more important role in the decision for war when Chinese leaders encounter an impasse in which two opposite courses of action are suggested by their calculations based on Realpolitik. A sense of the righteous legitimacy of their decision may encourage Chinese leaders to enter a war even when the likely consequence may not appear to favor the Chinese. Furthermore, these findings may well enrich Johnson and Tierney’s theory about the shift of actors’ mind-sets in decision-making because the CRWT may function as a catalyst for the shift. This research also reveals that the CRWT had limited influence when Chinese leaders faced the danger of a possible invasion by a superior opponent or that of nuclear attack. When the need for a decision for war was not open to debate, then, they were not influenced by the consideration of just cause when making their decision. Table of Contents List of Tables ................................................................................................................................. ix Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................................... x Chapter 1 - Introduction .................................................................................................................. 1 Chapter 2 - Chinese Tradition of Righteous War ......................................................................... 10 Chapter 3 - The Korean War ......................................................................................................... 37 Chapter 4 - The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis................................................................................ 61 Chapter 5 - The Sino-Indian War .................................................................................................. 94 Chapter 6 - China’s Response to U.S. Escalation in Vietnam, 1964-1965 ................................. 116 Chapter 7 - The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict, 1969 ................................................................... 142 Chapter 8 - The Sino-Vietnamese War ....................................................................................... 164 Chapter 9 - Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 193 Bibliography ............................................................................................................................... 199 Appendix A……………………………………………………………………………………..212 viii List of Tables Table 2.1 The Early Chinese Classics Cited in the Modern Scholarship on the CRWT .............. 12 Table 9-1 Results from the Cases ............................................................................................... 194 ix Acknowledgements This dissertation would not have been possible without the enormous help and support from many individuals in the Security Studies Program at Kansas State University. First and foremost, I would like to thank the members of my dissertation committee, Professors David Graff, Donald Mrozek, David Stone, and Jeffrey Pickering. No words can express my deepest gratitude to Professor David Graff, my major advisor, who patiently and unselfishly supervised this project. Professor Graff always generously helped to refine my argument and warmly encourage me when I encountered difficulties in this project. Professor