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Chinese Cultural Revolution “Politics is war without blood, while war is politics with blood.” —Mao Zedong Dear Delegates, My name is Charmine Osore and I am excited to be your director for the Chinese Cultural Revolution committee at WUMUNS 2018! I am currently a member of the Class of 2021 here at Washington University, studying Political Science and French. Joining MUN was one of the best experiences of my freshman year, so I am happy to continue contributing to the legacy of WUMUNS. This committee will span the reign of infamous dictator Mao Zedong during the Chinese Cultural Revolution. His absolute autonomy transformed China. Radical upheaval swept through world’s oldest continuous culture, and the tumultuous political climate of this changed Chinese history forever. You will take up the mantle of the PRC immediately after the movement’s infamous purges turned Chinese society on its head. Please note that while you will have a great deal of liberty with your crisis portfolio powers, the dais and I expect you to address these topics with maturity and discretion. Advocacy of genocide and racism will not be tolerated. As always, we encourage you to act with creativity and careful consideration during our limited time in committee. Delegates will find that they are most successful when they fully embrace their character and their office. Do not hesitate to push the boundaries of your portfolio powers and of standard Model UN actions. While we value presence in committee and back-room skill equally, the course of this committee will be flexible and responsive to the actions you take as a body and an individual. Endless opportunities await: it is your challenge to seize them. The revolution is now in your hands. Can you achieve the glorious socialist state, free from Western corruption, that was outlined by Mao? Can you manage domestic pressures and the tumult of international Cold War politics? Though loyalty and ambition, can you survive and thrive in the merciless world of communist China? If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me. I am excited to see where you all take this committee in the fall. Sincerely yours, Charmine Osore [email protected] Contents Committee Mandate……………….…………..……………………… 5 Historical Background…….……………………………...…………. 6 Establishment and Origin of the People’s Republic of China…..…………….………………………….………………………………. 6 The Great Leap Forward…………..…….…………….………….…….. 7 The Cultural Revolution: Early Efforts………………….………….. 9 Mobilization and the Purges….…….…….…..……………….......…. 10 Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party……………... 11 Topic A: Establishing a Post-Revolution Society …….. 12 Topic B: Ensuring Loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party................................................................. 13 Topic C: Building Chinese Industry………………………………………………………………………. 14 Topic D: Loyalty at Home and Spreading Maoism Abroad………………………………………………………………………… 15 Delegate Positions………………………………………………………. 16 Committee Mandate Image Credit: Wikimedia Commons Greetings, Comrades; It is with great pleasure I welcome your participation in the 9th Politburo of the Communist Party of the People’s Republic of China. It is my hope, as your founder and premier, that our collective effort will succeed in creating a dominant socialist state. The year is now 1969, the thirtieth year of Chinese Communism and the third year of the great Cultural Revolution in which we are now engaged. Peasants across the country rejoice at the defeat of the reactionary and bourgeois swine that corrupted every fold of Chinese society. You are tasked with seeing this project to its completion. Your efforts in your respective offices – and the party loyalty which unites you – make each of you vital in securing stability in a country that has just experienced a revolutionary wave like the world has never seen before. Each of you holds knowledge in a specific area of expertise that is crucial to our success. Given that you are the most influential body in China, collaborative efforts will direct all Chinese policy. It is your responsibility to uphold my Communist vision, all while facing China’s current economic and social conflicts. Let your loyalty to this great nation drive your decisions throughout the committee. Your individual voices will be best represented through strong crisis notes, speaking, and your ability to work with others. I have outlined your main goals, but I am putting a great deal of trust in this committee. Keep in mind that your efforts will be the leading influence in the coming years of the Revolution, so determine your plan of action wisely. Every public and private decision you make will have consequences. Remember that a strong yet flexible ambitions have the potential to influence the events of the entire revolution. Note that we do not exist in a vacuum; your connections to individuals outside the committee will prove crucial to our success. In any respect, the future is in your hands. Now is the time for a new dawn in the People’s Republic of China – together, we write the future of our people. Your trusted leader, Mao Zedong 5 Historical Background Establishment The twentieth century saw drastic change in Chinese politics. The tumult and Origin of began in 1911, when millennia of imperial rule ended with the establishment of a the People’s republic governed by the nationalist Kuomintang party (KMT). Grounded in Republic of military might, the KMT held the reigns of the country with a shaky grip that was soon challenged by Communist partisans. These groups were sponsored by the China Soviet effort to spread communism beyond the borders of the USSR, in accordance with the Bolshevik doctrine of workers around the world revolting against their oppressors. From farms and fields, the common men and women of China came, rallying behind a charismatic peasant from the sloping valleys of Hunan province. His name was Mao Zedong. As Mao’s communist movement gained momentum, the KMT began repressing farming communities with force. Tensions skyrocketed and open conflict began in 1927 after Image Credit: Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek Wikimedia Commons embraced openly violent persecution to suppress the Chinese peasantry. Guerilla warfare and violence dotted the rural provinces of China as the nationalists and communists waged a chaotic and deadly civil war. The ambushes, raids, and skirmishes that characterized this conflict continued until 1937, when the Japanese Empire launched a full-scale invasion of China. The Japanese, through industrialization, had become the dominant military force in East Asian– they had defeated the Russian Empire only 20 years earlier. Now, the power of the Emperor’s armies was unleashed upon a divided China. Realizing that the prosperity of their nation was threatened with subjugation, the KMT and the Communist Party declared a truce and pledged to ally with one another to fight the Japanese under the banner of the Second United Front. It was the hope of many that this united force could defend China from the Japanese Empire’s highly advanced and modernized military. In truth, this alliance was largely a facade; cooperation was minimal and partisan conflicts continued. Battles raged across China during the Second World War. Japanese forces burned and despoiled many Chinese cities, slaughtering the innocent and enslaving civilians into abusive roles. The most infamous case of such war crimes befell the Chinese city of Nanking, where thousands of homes were looted, countless women and children were assaulted, and approximately 300,000 civilians were massacred. The Second United Front attempted to combat the 6 Japanese Imperial Army through ambushes and open battles. Success was variable, but the financial and equipment-based support of the Allied power kept the forces fighting. Due to the fractured nature of the Second United Front and the organizational efficiency of the Japanese Army, the war in China was largely a stalemate for the duration of the war. The flames of civil war re-engulfed China as soon as the Japanese Empire lowered its flag in surrender in 1945. The once-united front splintered again into two forces - the KMT nationalists and Mao’s new wave of communist revolutionaries. Yet this time the stakes were higher; Western powers saw communism as a more serious threat against the backdrop of the Cold War. Subsequently, the KMT began receiving funding from the United States while the Soviet Union countered with support for Mao and the Chinese Red Army. 1 During this time, Mao Zedong centralized his position in Chinese politics. His involvement originated in the anti-imperialist May Fourth movement of 1919- 1921 and had steadily grown until he was the face of the communist party. Much of this momentum came through his status as a prominent military figure and was cemented by his dedication to the working class, intuitive understanding of strategy, and ambitious direction for China. Early days of the civil war saw hopes of successful negotiations between the American Truman administration and Chinese negotiator Zhou Enlai, but growing hostility between the Eastern and Western blocs soon made China the battleground of a full-fledged proxy war. Peasant support for the Communist cause multiplied rapidly. The confluence of peasant volunteer militias, Soviet arms, and Mao’s leadership proved too much for the fractured KMT. On October 1, 1949, following the KMT’s defeat, Mao ushered in a new era of government with the establishment of the People’s Republic of China. Inspired by his years of Marxist study, Mao knew the peasantry would be the most valuable resource for this new country. Land was immediately redistributed, breaking the system of land-owning elites oppressing tenant farmers that had existed in China for all its history. After the Communist victory, there was an increased sense of support among the rural peasants. This period established Mao’s reign and his status as the most prominent voice in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The Great One of Mao Zedong’s most ambitious projects prior to the Cultural Leap Revolution was an economic initiative known as the Great Leap Forward.
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