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UC San Diego UC San Diego Electronic Theses and Dissertations UC San Diego UC San Diego Electronic Theses and Dissertations Title Voting, fraud, and violence : political accountability in African elections Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2bs339cm Authors Long, James Dunaway Long, James Dunaway Publication Date 2012 Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO Voting, Fraud, and Violence: Political Accountability in African Elections A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science by James Dunaway Long IV Committee in charge: Professor Clark Gibson, Chair Professor Karen Ferree, Co-Chair Professor Stephan Haggard Professor David Lake Professor Craig McIntosh Professor Sam Popkin 2012 Copyright James Dunaway Long IV, 2012 All rights reserved. The Dissertation of James Dunaway Long IV is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm and electronically: Co-Chair Chair University of California, San Diego 2012 iii DEDICATION To Mom and Dad iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Signature Page ……………………………………………………………………… iii Dedication ………………………………………………………………………….. iv Table of Contents …………………………………………………………………... v List of Illustrations …………………………………………………………………. vii List of Figures ………………………………………………………………………. viii List of Tables ……………………………………………………………………….. x Acknowledgements …………………………………………………………………. xiii Vita ………………………………………………………………………………….. xvi Abstract ……………………………………………………………………………… xvii Chapter 1: Introduction ……………………………………………………………… 1 1.1……………………………………………………………………………….. 1 1.2 ..……………………………………………………………………………... 10 1.3 ………………………………………………………………………………. 15 1.4 ………………………………………………………………………………. 20 1.5 ……………………………………………………………………………… 34 Chapter 2: Voting Behavior and the Demand for Accountability in Kenya ………… 51 2.1 ………………………………………………………………………………. 51 2.2 ………………………………………………………………………………. 58 2.3 ………………………………………………………………………………. 69 2.4 ………………………………………………………………………………. 74 2.5 ………………………………………………………………………………. 92 2.6 ………………………………………………………………………………. 102 Chapter 3: Security, Fear, and the Determinants of Ethnic Voting …………………. 133 3.1 ………………………………………………………………………………. 133 3.2 ………………………………………………………………………………. 135 3.3 ………………………………………………………………………………. 147 3.4 ………………………………………………………………………………. 156 3.5 ………………………………………………………………………………. 159 Chapter 4: Electoral Fraud …………………………………………………………… 172 4.1 ……………………………………………………………………………….. 172 4.2 ……………………………………………………………………………….. 177 v 4.3 …………………………………………………………………………………. 183 4.4 …………………………………………………………………………………. 188 4.5 …………………………………………………………………………………. 190 4.6 …………………………………………………………………………………. 208 Chapter 5: Post-Election Violence ……………………………………………………. 230 5.1 …………………………………………………………………………………. 230 5.2 …………………………………………………………………………………. 236 5.3 …………………………………………………………………………………. 242 5.4 …………………………………………………………………………………. 256 5.5 …………………………………………………………………………………. 263 Chapter 6: Conclusion ………………………………………………………………... 277 6.1 ………………………………………………………………………………… 277 6.2 ………………………………………………………………………………… 280 6.3 ………………………………………………………………………………… 282 List of Works Cited ..…………………………………………………………………. 286 vi LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Map of Kenya………………………………………………………………………. 37 vii LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1.1: Total Number of African Elections: 1960-2006 ……………………... 38 Figure 1.2: First Multiparty Elections in Africa: 1960-2006 …………………….. 39 Figure 1.3: Opposition Participation in Elections in Africa: 1960-2006 ………… 40 Figure 1.4: Did the Incumbent Lose When Opposition Parties were Allowed to Compete? ………………………………………………………………………… 41 Figure 1.5: Were there Vote Gains for the Opposition with Poor Economic Growth? ………………………………………………………………………….. 42 Figure 1.6: Did the Incumbent Party Lose in Times of Poor Economic Growth? .. 43 Figure 1.7: Were there Vote Gains for the Opposition During Perceived Economic Crises? ……………………………………………………………………………. 44 Figure 1.8: Did the Incumbent Party lose During Perceived Economic Crises? …. 45 Figure 1.9: Proportion of African Elections with Concerns for Freedom and Fairness …………………………………………………………………………… 46 Figure 1.10: Proportion of Total African Elections with Occurrence of Significant Violence Involving Civilian Deaths ……………………………………………… 47 Figure 1.11: Occurrence of Riots of Protests After Elections in Africa: 1960-2006 48 Figure 1.12: Concerns for Free and Fair Elections with Significant Violence …… 49 Figure 1.13: Were there Riots and Protests following Elections with Allegations of Vote Fraud? ……………………………………………………………………. 50 Figure 2.1: Probability of Positive Evaluations of Kibaki’s Performance by Ethnic Group …………………………………………………………………………….. 115 Figure 2.2: Survey Experiment: Ethnicity vs. Performance ……………………… 124 Figure 2.3: Survey Experiment: Ethnicity vs. Performance ……………………… 125 Figure 2.4: Comparing the Correlates of Voting with the Survey Experiment: Likelihood of Supporting Kibaki/Kikuyu ………………………………………... 130 Figure 3.1: Ethnic Attachment …………………………………………………… 162 viii Figure 4.1: Closeness of Race …………………………………………………… 217 Figure 4.2: Average Presidential Turnouts for Central, Nyanza, and Eastern Province for 2007 and 2002 …………………………………………………….. 221 ix LIST OF TABLES Table 2.1: Presidential Vote Share by Ethnic Group …………………………… 105 Table 2.2: News Consumption in Kenya: “How often do you get news from the following media?” ………………………………………………………………. 106 Table 2.3: Presidential Vote by Ethnic Group, Performance, and Issues ………. 107 Table 2.4: Logit Model of Vote Choice for Incumbent President Kibaki ……… 109 Table 2.5: Logit Model of Vote Choice for Incumbent President Kibaki with Ethnic and Non Co-ethnic Controls ……………………………………………. 111 Table 2.6: Predicted Probabilities for Incumbent Vote Matching Co-ethnicity and Performance Variables …………………………………………………….. 113 Table 2.7: Performance Evaluations by Ethnic Group ………………………… 114 Table 2.8: Logit Model with Ethnicity and Performance Interactions ………… 116 Table 2.9: Predicted Probabilities of Kibaki’s Vote Choice by Ethnic Group … 118 Table 2.10: Multinomial Logit Prospective Issue Voting ……………………… 119 Table 2.11: Structure of Survey Experiment …………………………………… 121 Table 2.12: Balance Test of Experiment Randomization ……………………… 122 Table 2.13: Survey Experiment: Ethnicity vs. Performance …………………… 123 Table 2.14: Survey Experiment: Kikuyu Respondents Only …………………... 126 Table 2.15: Survey Experiment: Luo Respondents Only ………………………. 127 Table 2.16: Survey Experiment: Unaffiliated Respondents Only ……………… 128 Table 2.17: Logit Model Predicting Ethnic Voting ……………………………. 129 Table 3.1: Presidential Vote by Ethnic Group for Groups with a Co-ethnic Candidate ………………………………………………………………………. 161 Table 3.2: Survey Experiment …………………………………………………. 163 Table 3.3: Balance Test of Experiment Randomization ………………………. 164 x Table 3.4: Ethnic Fear …………………………………………………………. 165 Table 3.5: Ethnic Prejudice ……………………………………………………. 166 Table 3.6: Ethnic Favoritism ………………………………………………….. 167 Table 3.7: Logit Regression Predicting Ethnic Voting for Voters with a Co-ethnic ………………………………………………………………………. 168 Table 3.8: Logit Regression Predicting Ethnic Voting for All Voters ………… 169 Table 3.9: Experimental Results from Co-ethnics ……………………………... 170 Table 3.10: Experimental Results from Non Co-ethnics ………………………. 171 Table 4.1: Final Certified Results for the 2007 Presidential Election from the Electoral Commission of Kenya ……………………………………………….. 216 Table 4.2: ECK and Exit Poll Comparison of Odinga and Kibaki Results ……. 218 Table 4.3: 2002 Presidential Turnout …………………………………………... 219 Table 4.4: 2007 Presidential Turnout …………………………………………... 220 Table 4.5: Presidential Turnout ………………………………………………… 222 Table 4.6: 2002 Presidential Exceeds Parliamentary Turnout …………………. 223 Table 4.7: 2007 Presidential Exceeds Parliamentary Turnout …………………. 224 Table 4.8: 2007 Parliamentary Exceeds Presidential Turnout ………………….. 225 Table 4.9: Differences in Presidential and Parliamentary Turnout ……………… 226 Table (Appendix): 2007 Problem Constituencies Identified by the ECK and/or ODM …………………………………………………………………………….. 227 Table 5.1: Summary Statistics for Constituency Level Analysis of Post-Election Violence …………………………………………………………………………. 272 Table 5.2: The Effects of Fraud of Post-Election Violence ……………………… 273 Table 5.3: The Effects of Government Service Provision on Post-Election Violence ………………………………………………………………………….. 274 xi Table 5.4: The Effects of Ethnicity on Post-Election Violence …………………. 275 Table 5.5: The Combined Effects of Fraud, Services, and Ethnicity on Post-Election Violence …………………………………………………………… 276 xii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS In completing my dissertation, I have gained a large number of personal, professional, and intellectual debts. First, I thank my dissertation committee members for their support from the inception of this project to its completion. Karen Ferree, Clark Gibson, Steph Haggard, David Lake, Craig McIntosh, and Sam Popkin provided invaluable advice and guidance. In particular, this project would not have come to completion without the tireless efforts of Clark Gibson at all stages of my dissertation. All mistakes are my own. I recognize generous financial support from the National Science Foundation; Fulbright Foundation; United States Institute of Peace; Empirical Studies of Conflict Project; Institute for International, Comparative, and Area Studies (UCSD); and the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation at the University of California. None of my data collection would have been possible without assistance from hundreds
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