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Expert Analysis October 2013 The Oslo Accords, 1993 and 20 years on: Israeli and Palestinian dilemmas By Petter Bauck and Mohammed Omer Executive summary A number of different and somewhat contradictory motivations were behind the search of the Israeli and Palestinian leadership in 1993 for a secret back channel to negotiate an acceptable solution to the decade-long conflict. The consequences of the first intifada played a decisive role. Due to these contradictory motivations and emerging splits within the Palestinian polity (within Fatah and the Palestine Liberation Organisation and between Fatah and Hamas), the Oslo Accords did not give the Palestinians what they expected, i.e. a sovereign and independent state. Instead it contributed to a continuation of the occupation under a new cover. Twenty years later the parties to the Accords still face the same contradictory motivations. The splits in the Palestinian polity are more severe than ever, undermining a united struggle for independence. Future prospects for a viable and just solution seem bleak. For the Palestinians, nothing less than independence, the end of the occupation, and the right of return for millions of refugees is acceptable. For the Israelis the battle is between, on the one hand, continued occupation, unrest and resistance; a continuing role of prison warden; a Jewish state with a minority that will soon be a majority, but stripped of its national rights; and continued ethnic cleansing, or, on the other hand, a dignified future, either as two equal states or one state with two equal peoples. The Oslo Accords, signed between the state of Israel and tion in Iran, which until then had been the main Israeli the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) on Septem- supplier, Arafat expressed no objections, on one condition: ber 13th 1993, outlined a five-year process to reach an at a convenient time Norway should assist the PLO in agreement between the parties on future relations and setting up a secret back channel with the Israelis arrangements. Nothing was said about the final result and (al-Jazeera English, 2013). the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state. Nothing was also said about an end to Israeli settlement construc- tion in the occupied territories, the right of return for Setbacks for the PLO refugees or the future state of Jerusalem. The PLO recog- In the first Gulf War (1990) Arafat and the PLO supported nised Israel’s right to exist, while Israel recognised the PLO Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. As a result a number of Arab as the official representative of the Palestinians. This countries suspended their financial transfers to the uneven recognition said a great deal about the difference in organisation, while Palestinians were expelled from strength of the two parties and their ability to influence any a number of countries, resulting in remittances from these future dialogue. countries to the occupied territories falling dramatically. The PLO and the Palestinian population felt the severe The Palestinian leadership had worked towards a dialogue consequences of this and of the isolation forced on them. with Israel for many years. When Norwegian diplomats asked Yasir Arafat for his view on the U.S. requesting After the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in Norway to be Israel’s new supplier of oil after the revolu- 1967, important social and economic changes took place in NOREF Expert Analysis – October 2013 the occupied territories. A substantial number of people – For Israel, the vision of gaining control of all the land from more than 200,000 at their highest levels – joined the the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River had been in the workforce in Israel, moving from day labourers in local making since the birth of the state in 1948 (Pappé, 2013). agriculture to wage labourers in construction, agriculture Security, the economy, the region’s history and religion and services in Israel. This subsequently made a substantial were all elements affecting this desire. At the same time Israeli workforce available for the steadily growing military Israel felt that its isolation both in the region and interna- industry in that country. In parallel, universities were tionally resulting from the bad image that had increasingly established in the occupied territories. Youth from the emerged because of the occupation had to be changed. It villages and refugee camps were given the opportunity to had to develop alternative methods to control the territo- obtain a higher education, and a “home-grown” intelligent- ries and a rioting population, or the occupation had to end. sia was born. These major developments were important for An economy exposed to international fluctuations and the development of the first intifada, which broke out in 1987. sensitivities would easily experience setbacks. At a time A national leadership emerged in the occupied territories when the country was developing a military and security that focused on the end of the occupation and oppression. industry aimed at the international market, any unneces- This leadership took over the role of uniting and mobilising sary setbacks had to be avoided. the population, thus undermining the traditional role of the landed and urban elites (Bauck, 2013). At the same time, There was need for a rethink both in Tunisia and Tel Aviv, these changes initiated the emergence of new national elites and important questions had to be asked concerning how who would later take leading positions in institutions such as to get back to centre stage (by the PLO) and how to change municipalities and governorates. a poor image to allow continued control of the territories using different tools (by Israel). In the Madrid/Washington negotiations that started in 1991 under the auspices of U.S., the Palestinians were repre- sented in the Jordanian delegation by key figures from the Negotiations – a way out for both sides? occupied territories. Their main spokesperson, Dr Haidar Negotiations were in the air, given the ongoing Madrid/ Abdel Shafi from Gaza, reiterated the importance of a total Washington talks. A solution to the “Mother of All Con- cessation of all settlement constructions to coincide with flicts” was on the wish list in the West. For many years the any negotiations. This was not to the Israelis’ liking. Even if Palestinian leadership in exile had worked towards a secret there were frequent contacts with the PLO in Tunisia, these negotiation channel with Israel. Now this could be an representatives from the occupied territories hogged the option that would break the isolation, secure the economy limelight, while Arafat and the PLO remained outside the and allow the PLO to re-enter the driving seat in terms of talks. the liberation struggle. For Israel it became urgent to break its isolation and emerge internationally as a dignified state Arafat and the PLO, in exile in Tunisia, saw these develop- and an acceptable trading partner. To change the way the ments as threats. The PLO and its member organisations occupied territories and people were controlled opened the were present both in exile and in the occupied territories, possibility of remaining loyal to the policies laid down from but what emerged were diverging views regarding the focus 1948, retaining any conquered territory, and at the same on the struggle. The insiders focused on ending the time appearing on the world stage as being ready to find occupation and oppression, while the exiles saw recogni- solutions (Pappé, 2013). tion, visibility and symbols of statehood as key. Initial signs of serious splits within Fatah/the PLO emerged between The secret Oslo channel was to become the way out of an what scholars have named the “Old Guard” (those living in unwanted situation for two leaderships – the occupier and exile) and the “Young Guard” (those leading the intifada in the occupied. The Oslo Accords became the tool for Israel the occupied territories) (Shikaki, 2002). to continue its occupation, but with a Palestinian face. It even got the international community to pay for its occupa- tion through the former’s support for the Palestinians and Israel’s image under attack the Palestinian Authority that was to be established. With The first intifada had made the Palestinian struggle and the Oslo Accords the PLO in exile returned to the occupied suffering visible to the world, and Israel’s image was badly territories with “control” of Gaza and Jericho under the damaged. The occupied Palestinians won the image battle. agreement on Palestinian autonomy. The leadership of the When Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza in 1967 they first intifada was sidelined. There was no agreement inherited from the Ottoman Empire, the British Mandate, establishing a sovereign Palestinian state within the 1967 and the Jordanians and Egyptians a network among the borders, which were accepted as the “borders” of the urban and landed elites that they used to govern the occupied territories by most countries, apart from Israel. occupied population. This was to a great extent lost as There was no agreement to stop building and expanding a new informal leadership that was far less willing to Israeli settlements on occupied land. There were no co-operate with the occupier emerged during the intifada. assurances of the right of return of Palestinian refugees, who at the time totalled more than five million and were living under sometimes very miserable conditions in 2 NOREF Expert Analysis – October 2013 refugee camps in neighbouring countries. There was no auspices. Democracy lost credibility among Palestinians in agreement on how to divide water rights, implying that the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Fatah-controlled security Israel would continue to draw on major groundwater forces were used both to fight Hamas and strengthen resources beneath the West Bank. Israeli security; Palestinian security was not on the agenda.

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