Expert Analysis
October 2013
The Oslo Accords, 1993 and 20 years on: Israeli and Palestinian dilemmas
By Petter Bauck and Mohammed Omer
Executive summary
A number of different and somewhat contradictory motivations were behind the search of the Israeli and Palestinian leadership in 1993 for a secret back channel to negotiate an acceptable solution to the decade-long conflict. The consequences of the first intifada played a decisive role. Due to these contradictory motivations and emerging splits within the Palestinian polity (within Fatah and the Palestine Liberation Organisation and between Fatah and Hamas), the Oslo Accords did not give the Palestinians what they expected, i.e. a sovereign and independent state. Instead it contributed to a continuation of the occupation under a new cover. Twenty years later the parties to the Accords still face the same contradictory motivations. The splits in the Palestinian polity are more severe than ever, undermining a united struggle for independence. Future prospects for a viable and just solution seem bleak. For the Palestinians, nothing less than independence, the end of the occupation, and the right of return for millions of refugees is acceptable. For the Israelis the battle is between, on the one hand, continued occupation, unrest and resistance; a continuing role of prison warden; a Jewish state with a minority that will soon be a majority, but stripped of its national rights; and continued ethnic cleansing, or, on the other hand, a dignified future, either as two equal states or one state with two equal peoples.
The Oslo Accords, signed between the state of Israel and tion in Iran, which until then had been the main Israeli the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) on Septem- supplier, Arafat expressed no objections, on one condition: ber 13th 1993, outlined a five-year process to reach an at a convenient time Norway should assist the PLO in agreement between the parties on future relations and setting up a secret back channel with the Israelis arrangements. Nothing was said about the final result and (al-Jazeera English, 2013). the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state. Nothing was also said about an end to Israeli settlement construc- tion in the occupied territories, the right of return for Setbacks for the PLO refugees or the future state of Jerusalem. The PLO recog- In the first Gulf War (1990) Arafat and the PLO supported nised Israel’s right to exist, while Israel recognised the PLO Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. As a result a number of Arab as the official representative of the Palestinians. This countries suspended their financial transfers to the uneven recognition said a great deal about the difference in organisation, while Palestinians were expelled from strength of the two parties and their ability to influence any a number of countries, resulting in remittances from these future dialogue. countries to the occupied territories falling dramatically. The PLO and the Palestinian population felt the severe The Palestinian leadership had worked towards a dialogue consequences of this and of the isolation forced on them. with Israel for many years. When Norwegian diplomats asked Yasir Arafat for his view on the U.S. requesting After the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in Norway to be Israel’s new supplier of oil after the revolu- 1967, important social and economic changes took place in Noref Expert Analysis – October 2013
the occupied territories. A substantial number of people – For Israel, the vision of gaining control of all the land from more than 200,000 at their highest levels – joined the the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River had been in the workforce in Israel, moving from day labourers in local making since the birth of the state in 1948 (Pappé, 2013). agriculture to wage labourers in construction, agriculture Security, the economy, the region’s history and religion and services in Israel. This subsequently made a substantial were all elements affecting this desire. At the same time Israeli workforce available for the steadily growing military Israel felt that its isolation both in the region and interna- industry in that country. In parallel, universities were tionally resulting from the bad image that had increasingly established in the occupied territories. Youth from the emerged because of the occupation had to be changed. It villages and refugee camps were given the opportunity to had to develop alternative methods to control the territo- obtain a higher education, and a “home-grown” intelligent- ries and a rioting population, or the occupation had to end. sia was born. These major developments were important for An economy exposed to international fluctuations and the development of the first intifada, which broke out in 1987. sensitivities would easily experience setbacks. At a time A national leadership emerged in the occupied territories when the country was developing a military and security that focused on the end of the occupation and oppression. industry aimed at the international market, any unneces- This leadership took over the role of uniting and mobilising sary setbacks had to be avoided. the population, thus undermining the traditional role of the landed and urban elites (Bauck, 2013). At the same time, There was need for a rethink both in Tunisia and Tel Aviv, these changes initiated the emergence of new national elites and important questions had to be asked concerning how who would later take leading positions in institutions such as to get back to centre stage (by the PLO) and how to change municipalities and governorates. a poor image to allow continued control of the territories using different tools (by Israel). In the Madrid/Washington negotiations that started in 1991 under the auspices of U.S., the Palestinians were repre- sented in the Jordanian delegation by key figures from the Negotiations – a way out for both sides? occupied territories. Their main spokesperson, Dr Haidar Negotiations were in the air, given the ongoing Madrid/ Abdel Shafi from Gaza, reiterated the importance of a total Washington talks. A solution to the “Mother of All Con- cessation of all settlement constructions to coincide with flicts” was on the wish list in the West. For many years the any negotiations. This was not to the Israelis’ liking. Even if Palestinian leadership in exile had worked towards a secret there were frequent contacts with the PLO in Tunisia, these negotiation channel with Israel. Now this could be an representatives from the occupied territories hogged the option that would break the isolation, secure the economy limelight, while Arafat and the PLO remained outside the and allow the PLO to re-enter the driving seat in terms of talks. the liberation struggle. For Israel it became urgent to break its isolation and emerge internationally as a dignified state Arafat and the PLO, in exile in Tunisia, saw these develop- and an acceptable trading partner. To change the way the ments as threats. The PLO and its member organisations occupied territories and people were controlled opened the were present both in exile and in the occupied territories, possibility of remaining loyal to the policies laid down from but what emerged were diverging views regarding the focus 1948, retaining any conquered territory, and at the same on the struggle. The insiders focused on ending the time appearing on the world stage as being ready to find occupation and oppression, while the exiles saw recogni- solutions (Pappé, 2013). tion, visibility and symbols of statehood as key. Initial signs of serious splits within Fatah/the PLO emerged between The secret Oslo channel was to become the way out of an what scholars have named the “Old Guard” (those living in unwanted situation for two leaderships – the occupier and exile) and the “Young Guard” (those leading the intifada in the occupied. The Oslo Accords became the tool for Israel the occupied territories) (Shikaki, 2002). to continue its occupation, but with a Palestinian face. It even got the international community to pay for its occupa- tion through the former’s support for the Palestinians and Israel’s image under attack the Palestinian Authority that was to be established. With The first intifada had made the Palestinian struggle and the Oslo Accords the PLO in exile returned to the occupied suffering visible to the world, and Israel’s image was badly territories with “control” of Gaza and Jericho under the damaged. The occupied Palestinians won the image battle. agreement on Palestinian autonomy. The leadership of the When Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza in 1967 they first intifada was sidelined. There was no agreement inherited from the Ottoman Empire, the British Mandate, establishing a sovereign Palestinian state within the 1967 and the Jordanians and Egyptians a network among the borders, which were accepted as the “borders” of the urban and landed elites that they used to govern the occupied territories by most countries, apart from Israel. occupied population. This was to a great extent lost as There was no agreement to stop building and expanding a new informal leadership that was far less willing to Israeli settlements on occupied land. There were no co-operate with the occupier emerged during the intifada. assurances of the right of return of Palestinian refugees, who at the time totalled more than five million and were living under sometimes very miserable conditions in
2 Noref Expert Analysis – October 2013 refugee camps in neighbouring countries. There was no auspices. Democracy lost credibility among Palestinians in agreement on how to divide water rights, implying that the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Fatah-controlled security Israel would continue to draw on major groundwater forces were used both to fight Hamas and strengthen resources beneath the West Bank. Israeli security; Palestinian security was not on the agenda. The PA’s legitimacy deteriorated even further. Of the Accords, the Palestinian-American linguistics professor Edward Said stated in 1993: “The PLO had reduced itself from a national liberation movement to Future prospects a small municipality” and “It [the Accords] is the decay of Ending the occupation, and attaining freedom and the right the PLO leadership against the cunning of Israel” to live as equal citizens of a sovereign state and to be (Shlaim, 2001; al-Jazeera English, 2013). stateless no longer, with freedom of movement and economic development, have been major concerns all along for the Palestinians. For them, any political solution Contradictory aspirations should include the millions of refugees spread around the With the signing of the Oslo Accords and the establishment world, while Jerusalem should be the capital of Palestine. of the Palestinian Authority (PA), which governed Gaza and Jericho with Israeli permission and under Israeli control, The leaders of the PLO engaged in dialogue with Israel both Israel and the PLO leadership started an uneven have been backed up against a wall for several years. They struggle through negotiations to define future prospects for are criticised by their own citizens for their willingness to the two peoples concerned. sell out vital Palestinian demands – al-Jazeera caused a scandal in the Middle East in 2011 when a number of For Israel it became more and more obvious that the documents were leaked that revealed how the PA was defence of the Jewish state with control over as much of giving away Palestinian rights and lands (al-Jazeera 2011). the territory between the Mediterranean and the Jordan When President Abbas announced some months ago in an River as possible played a crucial role in its thinking, in line interview with Israeli TV that he accepted he would not be with policies outlined in 1948. In light of this, the PA would able to return to Saffad, his village in Israel, refugees living play an active role in strengthening the security of the in Lebanon and elsewhere saw this as a signal that they Israeli population – both settlers and the inhabitants of would not be able to return home either, contrary to what Israel proper. the UN promised the Palestinian refugees in UN Resolution 194.1 This statement caused massive protests against the The PA struggled to prove to its citizens that the decisions PA leadership, resulting in the PLO’s legitimacy being it had taken at Oslo would benefit a future sovereign seriously weakened. With the internal splits in the PLO and Palestinian state. It struggled to defend itself against Fatah still present and the struggle for influence being accusations that it was willing to sell out major Palestinian waged with Hamas, Abbas today has minimal – if any – lev- concerns, like the right of return for the refugees, and erage to sell a serious compromise with the Israelis to his Jerusalem as the future capital of the Palestinian state. electorate. At the same time Abbas is forced to negotiate After six years, frustration over the lack of progress in without any assurances that settlement building will stop, attempts to end the occupation and protests against an but if he does not negotiate he faces the danger of losing increasingly corrupt and elitist administration resulted in major international support. Hamas sees the same the outbreak of the second intifada in September 2000. negotiations as futile talks that are aimed at cracking down on the Islamists in the West Bank and reinforcing the siege The growing unrest in the occupied territories gave the of Gaza. Israelis an excuse to re-enter the cities in Palestine that had earlier been transferred to Palestinian administration. In Israel, views have diverged. A key concern is to protect The limitations on the PA’s power were exposed to its the Jewish state, the only one in the world. Since 1948 citizens and the world. An election in 2006, due several there has been a strong aspiration to establish Eretz Israel years earlier, demonstrated the reduced support for the on all the land between the Mediterranean Sea and the PLO and Fatah. Palestinians were obviously demanding Jordan River. Proceeding with the settlement project and a much tougher stance against the occupation and the creating “facts on the ground” seem to be part of the Israeli occupier. With an intervention from the major Western strategy to reach these goals. In September 2013 Deputy powers, the winner of the election, Hamas, was isolated in Defence Minister Danny Danon recommended in the New Gaza, while the loser, Fatah, continued to receive interna- York Times that Israel should annul the Oslo Accords due to tional support and rule the West Bank under Israeli their meagre results, and that a three-state negotiation
1 The first formal move towards the recognition of a right of return was in UN General Assembly Resolution 194 passed on December 11th 1948, which in Article 11 stated:“Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible.” UN General Assembly Resolution 3236, passed on November 22nd 1974, declared the right of return to be an “inalienable right”. However, General Assembly resolutions are not binding in international law, and the Oslo Accords deliberately omit any mention of these resolutions (
3 Noref Expert Analysis – October 2013
involving Egypt and Jordan should be established to find international body should take the responsibility today to a solution to the Palestinian problem. Autonomy was the cater for a solution that pays equal respect to the legiti- most he could offer the Palestinians (Danon, 2013). mate rights of both the Palestinians and Israelis.
An underlying wish to move the Palestinian population across the borders to neighbouring countries cannot be The alternatives excluded as part of this solution. This resonates with Among Palestinians, further frustrations after 20 years of frequent statements by Israeli politicians down through hopes never being met and new postponements are not resent history. Because demographic developments would advisable. One cannot exclude the possibility that a third become unfavourable for the Jewish majority in Eretz Israel intifada might erupt if no move towards a cast-iron solution in the near future, the danger that “apartheid” could occurs (Amayreh, 2013). Any further concessions from replace “democratic” as a defining characteristic of the Palestinian leaders to Israeli demands will undoubtedly Israeli state haunts Israeli leaders. They have experienced erode what is left of the PA’s legitimacy. being a pariah internationally already, and do not wish to make this situation worse. Among the Israeli leadership there is obviously hope that, over time, foot dragging and keeping talking about Well aware of these demographic developments, the autonomy for the Palestinians will remove all challenges, Palestinian leadership is aware of the Israeli leaders’ or perhaps remove the Palestinians. To date Israelis have worries about Jews becoming a minority in a future been able to use legal tools combined with economic combined Israel and Palestine. Prime Minister Netanyahu sanctions and the use of military means to control the acknowledges this when he states that a two-state solution occupied territories. They have also managed to make is the only viable one for Israel. In recent years the vision of international law irrelevant. But their image has received a one-state solution has been brought to the table by some serious blows, not least from the war in 2008-09 and Palestinian leaders in an attempt to increase pressure on the attack on the Turkish aid flotilla on May 31st 2010. the Israelis. International leaders have warned that a one-state solution is a non-starter due to Israel’s fierce The Israeli attempt since 1993 to establish a Palestinian- stand regarding the Jewishness of the Israeli state. What is administered occupation has lost credibility. Israel is facing difficult to know for sure is what the threat of one state for the possibility that the cost of the occupation will be two people could cause the Israelis to do. They know that transferred back to the occupier. The readiness among international governance can be played with or ignored Western states to continue financing the Palestinian when you have powerful allies. Rather than the end of the administration is evaporating. Questions and concerns are Jewish state, we might see the end of important elements being raised among diplomats working in Palestine over of international law. how long they will continue to finance projects for Palestinian refugees that are being destroyed by Israel. It Commentators more and more frequently declare the might seem as if the only pressure they are ready to put on two-state solution to be dead. They focus on the facts on Israel in this situation is to leave them with the bill for the the ground that make a future Palestinian state fragmented occupation and the occupied population. and unsustainable. To dismantle major settlements in the West Bank would require strong political will from the For Israel, the occupation has also become an economic Israeli authorities and substantial international pressure asset. Its military and security industry has developed to on Israel, neither of which is likely to happen. the third largest in the world and can advertise that its equipment has been tested in real situations, i.e. the For the Palestinians there is no option apart from becom- occupied territories. This was shown on a number of ing citizens of an independent and sovereign state with full occasions when Israeli drones displayed in drone exhibi- national rights, security, freedom of movement and tions in Washington, DC were tested on Palestinians in prospects of economic development. Whether this can be Gaza. A recent Israeli film, The Lab, showed how the realised in a state for Palestinians or in one for Jews and occupation has become an important asset for the military Palestinians remains to be seen industry. If we add the consumer industry established to supply around 4.5 million Palestinians in Gaza and the West Regardless, a substantial change in attitude and readiness Bank, we see substantial economic interests supporting to act is needed, not least on the part of the U.S., Israel’s a continuing occupation. major ally, and the European Union, the country’s major trading partner. The legitimate right of the Palestinians to For the leaders of the PLO and Fatah who have to manage statehood and to live in a sovereign state as equal citizens the dialogue with Israel, keeping the negotiations alive has has to be granted, while Palestinian security should be become their life insurance, providing a certain assurance seen as being as important as Israeli security. Just as in that international funds will still be available to pay for the 1947 the UN through its General Assembly took the PA. In September 2009 former Palestinian prime minister responsibility to divide the British Mandate Palestine into Salam Fayyad launched his two-year programme to build two states – one for Jews and one for Arabs – so the institutions that would prove to the initernational commu-
4 Noref Expert Analysis – October 2013 nity that the Palestinians were capable of running a state. If References no state comes out of these efforts, the PA could be Al-Jazeera English. 2011. “The Palestine papers.” May. dissolved and Israel would be left with responsibility for the
5 The authorS
Petter Bauck holds an MA in violence, conflict and development from the School of Oriental and African Studies at the University of The Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre London. He served as deputy head of the Norwegian Representa- Norsk ressurssenter for fredsbygging tive Office to the Palestinian Authority from 2000 to 2003. He is a senior advisor on conflict-related issues at NORAD. He co-writes this expert analysis in his private capacity, as editor of the book on The Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF) is a resource centre integrating knowledge and experience to strengthen the Oslo Accords. peacebuilding policy and practice. Established in 2008, it collaborates and promotes collaboration with a wide network of researchers, Mohammed Omer is a Palestinian journalist from Gaza and a win- policymakers and practitioners in Norway and abroad. ner of the Martha Gellhorn Prize for Journalism. He has reported for numerous media outlets, including al-Jazeera, the Washington Read NOREF’s publications on Report on Middle East Affairs, The Nation, the Inter Press Service, www.peacebuilding.no and sign up for notifications. Free Speech Radio News, Morgenbladet, Dagsavisen, Dagens Nyheter and Arbetaren. Connect with NOREF on Facebook or @PeacebuildingNO on Twitter They jointly edited: The Oslo Accords 1993-2013: A Critical Assess- Email: [email protected] - Phone: +47 22 08 79 32 ment (American University Press, 2013).
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