5 Sino-Japanese Relations: Neither Confrontation Nor Partnership

5 Sino-Japanese Relations: Neither Confrontation Nor Partnership Throughout much of modern history, the way that China and Japan have related to one another has fundamentally shaped their respective regional roles and the contours of the East Asian international system. The Meiji Restoration, spawned by the Western intrusion, marked the beginning of Japan's effort to reconstruct a new national identity that was situated somewhere between Asia and the West. From the late Tokugawa period to the Meiji (1868-1912) and Taisho (1912-1926) periods through to the 1940s, the intellectual discourse centred upon how to reconstruct Japan's relationship with China and how Japan could emerge from the shadow of the crumbling Chinese empire. The critical issue for Japanese intellectuals was how to reconstruct China and Confucianism in a way that justified the devolution of regional leadership to Japan, 'the new possessor and authority of the spirit or essence of toyo' (East Asia). 1 During the Meiji period, China and the Chinese were described in the popular Japanese press as 'the epitome of weakness, selfishness, inefficiency, disorganization, and cowardice'.2 A pioneer of East Asian history (toyoshz), Shiratori Kurakichi, argued that China had 'fallen into decay because of historical circumstances'.3 A leading sinologist, Naito Konan, claimed that since 'the Way of the Sages in contemporary times should involve reform and reconstruction', the stagnant and decaying China could no longer claim to be the centre of Confucianism. Naito concluded that the classical culture of the Yellow River had 'crossed the China sea to Japan, where it found fertile soil in a setting that provided ancillary strengths of organ ization and direction'.4 This image of China set the stage for Fuku zawa Yukichi's Datsu-A-ron (casting-off Asia thesis), preparing Japan militarily to invade China and build its Sphere of Coprosperity in East Asia. The phenomenal 'Asian economic miracle' over the past three decades or so has started to shift the centre of gravity of the global political economy from the Atlantic to the Pacific, prompting many to 78 Y. Deng, Promoting Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation © Yong Deng 1997 Sino-Japanese Relations 79 predict the dawning of a 'Pacific century'. But for some the denoue ment of power rivalry between the Atlantic and the Pacific will be largely determined by how China and Japan work out their relation ship. According to James Kurth, If Japan and China should again come into conflict,.&thinsp .. the outcome of the tension between the Atlantic alliance and the Pacific Basin paradigm is likely to be a descent into chaos and a journey into the unknown, although, of course, not necessarily in a way like the Pacific War. Conversely, if Japan and China should come into cooperation, even more than they have in the past decade, the outcome of the tension between the Atlantic Alliance and the Pacific Basin paradigms is likely to be the gradual waning of the first and waxing of the second, the dialect of yin and yang. 5 Arthur Cotterell concurs with Kurth by asserting that 'ultimately relations between the Chinese and the Japanese are the factor which will determine the future of East Asia'. 6 This chapter examines the dyadic relationship in the context of efforts towards regional economic cooperation. Two premises under lie the analysis. First, the state of the Sino-Japanese relationship is a key factor in their respective stances on regional cooperation. Second, the pattern of their dyadic interaction greatly shapes the pace and structure of Asia-Pacific multilateral arrangements. FROM THE LATE 1960s TO THE LATE 1980s The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 prompted the United States to incorporate Japan into its Asian containment strategy against communist expansion. Despite protests by China, the latter was not involved in the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty which granted Japan freedom from US occupation. The US-Japan Security Treaty, signed on the same day (8 September 1951), was perceived by the Chinese as specifically directed against China. 7 But as Ogata Sadako wrote in 1965, 'Not many Japanese regard Commun ist China as a "cold war" enemy, nor do they accept the "China Communism-enemy" equation that is so widely held in the United States. '8 Archival research has revealed that Prime Minister Yoshida had wished to recognize China instead of Taiwan. According to Chalmers Johnson, 'The "Yoshida letter" of December 24, 1951, promising that Japan would recognize the Nationalist government 80 Promoting Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation on Taiwan, was written not by Yoshida but by Dulles [the chief American peace-treaty negotiator] and forced on the Japanese prime minister.'9 Nevertheless, under US pressure the Yoshida administra tion had to recognize the nationalist regime in Taiwan as the sole legitimate government of China. Private diplomacy, however, survived the early period of the Cold War despite the 'bamboo curtain' that fell between China and Japan. On 1 June 1952 the first postwar private trade accord was reached, with both sides agreeing that by the end of the year bilateral imports and exports should amount to £ 30 million sterling for each side. Nonetheless, in order to enforce economic sanctions on China the US and Japanese governments intervened to block the implementa tion of the agreement. As a result, even after the agreement was extended for another year only 5 per cent of the target trade volume was reached. 10 The difficulties of implementation notwithstanding, the agreement did open possibilities of private exchange. China allowed the Japanese Red Cross and the Japan-China Friendship Association to be involved in the return to Japan of the 30 000 Japanese who were still in China as late as 1952. Japan reciprocated by helping the Chinese in Japan return to their motherland. In October 1953 the second private trade agreement was signed. Again due to obstruction by the Japanese government only 38.8 per cent of the target volume was reached. In May 1955 the third private trade agreement was signed, again prescribing £30 million sterling of trade for each side. With increasing governmental acquiescence, 67 per cent of the target was reached. 11 Sino-Japanese trade increased drastically in the 1960s due to the growing strain in the Sino-Soviet alliance and its eventual rift. In 1965 Japan became China's leading trade partner and remained so for over two decades, until Hong Kong replaced it in 1987. During 1965-73 Japan's total trade with China ($7.67 billion) was close to its trade with Taiwan ($8.3 billion). 12 For much of the 1960s and early 1970s Japan was the only country to enjoy much freedom to conduct commerce with both the mainland China and Taiwan. But trade with China was still minuscule. Despite Japanese society's growing yearning for normal relations with China, Tokyo had to act in line with the US Cold War strategy of containing communism in Asia. Postwar Japan's first wave of interest in Pacific cooperation in the late 1960s led Kiyoshi Kojima to propose a Pacific Free Trade Area (PAFTA), the Pacific Trade and Development Conferences (PAF- Sino-Japanese Relations 81 TAD) and the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC). PAFTA, PBEC and PAFTAD all limited membership to the capitalist econom ies and Western industrialized countries. Economic rationale aside, all these proposals had an underlying strategic purpose, viz. to strengthen the regional social and economic basis against communism. It was not, therefore, without reason that China saw these proposals as part of US-Japanese strategy for regional dominance and an imperialist conspiracy against communist China. In light of China's deep displeasure with the idea of regional organ ization, Tokyo refrained from openly declaring its official endorse ment, and left initiatives to be taken at the private level. Moreover, after diplomatic normalization in 1972, bilateralism with China loomed large, topping Tokyo's foreign policy agenda. From 1975 to 1978 China and Japan were engaged in negotiating a peace and friendship treaty. The most controversial issue was Beijing's insistence on the inclusion of an antihegemony clause, which Tokyo feared might involve Japan in the Sino-Soviet confrontation. The priorities of the bilateral relationship at this stage were largely strategic and political, with a predominant concern over the Soviet threat. China's hostility towards attempts at regional cooperation put a significant brake on Japan's involvement and explains in great meas ure why the initial Japanese interest in a regional multilateral arrange ment subsided throughout much of the 1970s. However the gradual solidification of Sino-Japanese relations served as an effective cure for what Chalmers Johnson calls the postwar 'collective Japanese amnesia about Asia' .13 It removed an obstacle that for decades had con strained Japan's ability to take diplomatic initiatives, and was instru mental in Prime Minister Ohira's announcement of the Pacific community concept. Japan's renewed interest in regional cooperation and Ohira's diplo macy culminated in the formation of the tripartite Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC) in Australia in 1980, consisting of academics, business representatives and state officials. Japan's renewed interest in promoting a regional multilateral regime coincided with the start of China's 'reform and opening up' programme under Deng Xiaoping. By the late 1970s economic coop eration had begun to become the top priority in bilateral diplomacy. In May 1979 Japan decided to provide China with an energy loan of 420 billion yen to help jointly extract natural resources and energy. On his visit to Beijing in December 1979, Prime Minister Ohira committed Japan to providing China with a first package of official 82 Promoting Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation development assistance (ODA) from 1979-83, amounting to 330.9 billion yen (about US $1.5 billion).

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