Yukio Hatoyama

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Yukio Hatoyama Yukio Hatoyama Japón, Primer ministro (2009-2010) Duración del mandato: 16 de Septiembre de 2009 - de de Nacimiento: Tokyo, región de Kanto, 11 de Febrero de 1947 Partido político: Partido Democrático (Minshuto) Profesión : Ingeniero Resumen La histórica mudanza que las elecciones de 2009 trajeron a Japón lanzó al estrellato a Yukio Hatoyama, líder del centroizquierdista Partido Democrático y ex miembro del mismo partido conservador, el Liberal Demócrata, que la debacle electoral desalojó del poder tras disfrutarlo durante 53 años. Un político no especialmente carismático y sin apenas experiencia de gobierno, Hatoyama focalizó las esperanzas de cambio y renovación en un país afligido por la crisis económica, el paro y la deflación. Su difícil apuesta por el consumo y las políticas sociales sin subir los impuestos o emitir deuda soberana apuntaba a un nuevo modelo de crecimiento, generador de empleo y menos dependiente de las exportaciones. Tras asumir, Hatoyama renegó de algunas de sus promesas fiscales bajo la presión del déficit y la deuda públicos, se vio envuelto en un escándalo de donaciones irregulares y aceptó mantener la presencia militar estadounidense en Okinawa contra el deseo de los isleños. El clamoroso derrumbe de su popularidad y la ruptura de la coalición con los socialdemócratas precipitaron su compungida dimisión en junio de 2010, tras menos de nueve meses en el cargo. (Texto actualizado hasta junio 2010) http://www.cidob.org 1 of 15 Biografía 1. Cuarta generación de un linaje de políticos conservadores 2. Abandono del Jiminto, escisión del Sakigake y creación del Minshuto 3. Los vaivenes en el mando del principal partido de la oposición nipona 4. Histórica victoria electoral y llegada al Gobierno en 2009: el mensaje del cambio 5. Presiones económicas y promesas incumplidas 6. El derrumbe de un liderazgo cuestionado: aceptación de la base estadounidense en Okinawa y dimisión en 2010 1. Cuarta generación de un linaje de políticos conservadores Orientaciones políticas actuales aparte, el sexagésimo primer ministro de Japón compartió con todos los colegas institucionales que le antecedieron en la década anterior a su llegada al Gobierno la pertenencia a una estirpe de aristócratas de la política con larga tradición en el poder. Al igual que sus tres inmediatos predecesores en el cargo, Yukio Hatoyama es descendiente en línea directa de otro primer ministro de la posguerra; en su caso, es nieto de Ichiro Hatoyama (1883-1959), potentado tokyota que encabezó tres veces el Gobierno entre 1954 y 1956, cuando Yukio era niño, y quien a su vez era hijo de Kazuo Hatoyama, presidente de la Cámara de Representantes de la Dieta imperial en las postrimerías del siglo XIX, en la era Meiji, y el fundador de esta dinastía de cuatro generaciones. El segundo de los Hatoyama condujo la restauración en 1956 de las relaciones diplomáticas con la URSS, paso que desbloqueó el ingreso de Japón en la ONU y que debía preparar la adopción de un tratado de paz entre los dos países, pendiente desde el final de la Segunda Guerra Mundial (y que a día de hoy sigue sin firmarse). Como líder partidista, el historial de Ichiro fue aún más decisivo: en noviembre de 1945, recién producida la rendición de Japón, el abuelo paterno figuró entre los fundadores del Partido Liberal (Jiyuto), del que fue primer presidente; en 1953 abandonó el Jiyuto y un año más tarde, semanas antes de convertirse en primer ministro, puso en marcha el también conservador Partido Democrático de Japón (Nihon Minshuto); finalmente, en noviembre de 1955, fusionó su formación con el Jiyuto, que entonces comandaba Shigeru Yoshida, dando lugar al Partido Liberal Democrático (Jiminto). Hasta su baja en el Gobierno en diciembre de 1956, Hatoyama fue el primer presidente del Jiminto. Por parte de la madre, Yukio tenía como abuelo a Shojiro Ishibashi (1889-1976), magnate de la industria del caucho y fundador del gigante de los neumáticos Bridgestone. En cuanto al padre, Iichiro Hatoyama (1918-1993), primogénito de Ichiro, tras servir en la Armada Imperial ingresó en el aparato burocrático del Gobierno y se colocó bajo el patrocinio de Takeo Fukuda, uno de los más prominentes capitostes del partido y desde 1962 cabeza de la facción Seiwa, que era la heredera directa del grupo demócrata del mayor de los Hatoyama, luego comandado por Nobusuke Kishi. A la vera de Fukuda, Iichiro tomó la antorcha de su padre y emprendió una carrera política de altos vuelos. Yukio estudió en la Universidad de Tokyo, al igual que su hermano un año más joven, Kunio. Pero mientras que éste, siguiendo los pasos del padre y el abuelo, se matriculó en la Escuela de Derecho, él se decantó por la carrera de Ingeniería. En 1969 terminó la licenciatura y en 1976, el año en que su progenitor se convirtió en el ministro de Asuntos Exteriores del Gabinete Fukuda, se sacó el doctorado en Ingeniería Industrial por la californiana Universidad de Stanford, de donde se trajo además un fluido inglés. Siendo doctorando en San Francisco, Hatoyama conoció a una compatriota, Miyuki, que había estudiado arte dramático y había trabajado como actriz en una compañía de teatro. La pareja se enamoró y ella, cuatro años mayor y casada, no dudó en divorciarse de su primer marido para casarse con Yukio. Los Hatoyama contrajeron matrimonio en 1975 y tuvieron un hijo, Kiichiro. De regreso a Japón, Hatoyama trabajó como auxiliar de investigación en el Instituto de Tecnología de Tokyo (Tokodai) y en 1981 obtuvo una plaza de profesor asociado en la Universidad Senshu de la capital nipona. Sin embargo, la docencia fue vencida por el gusanillo de la política y en 1983 se dispuso a añadir un capítulo propio a la saga del Jiminto que http://www.cidob.org 2 of 15 llevaba su apellido. Su hermano Kunio ya llevaba un lustro ganándose la vida como político profesional: en 1976 había ganado un escaño en la Cámara de Representantes como miembro del Nuevo Club Liberal, una pequeña escisión del Jiminto impulsada por Yohei Kono, aunque una vez convertido en legislador, el menor de los Hatoyama regresó al redil del partido de la familia. Yukio se puso al servicio de su padre, entonces miembro de la Cámara de Consejeros de la Dieta, en calidad de secretario privado. Tres años después, Iichiro, con 67 años, al tiempo que lanzaba su campaña de reelección en la Cámara alta, impulsó la candidatura de su hijo a la diputación por el 38º Distrito de la prefectura de Hokkaido, la isla más septentrional del archipiélago japonés, donde la familia tenía importantes propiedades. Las elecciones generales fueron el 6 de julio de 1986 y Hatoyama, próximo a estrenar la cuarentena, ganó su primer mandato de representante nacional en las filas del Jiminto. En los cuatro años siguientes, Hatoyama se adiestró en las lides políticas como diputado del oficialismo liberaldemócrata, que tuvo sucesivamente como jefes de Gobierno y del partido a Yasuhiro Nakasone, Noboru Takeshita, Sosuke Uno y Toshiki Kaifu. La legislatura se vio estremecida por el mayor escándalo de corrupción de la época, el Recruit-Cosmos, una trama de intercambio de favores políticos y empresariales alimentada por unas lucrativas especulaciones bursátiles, que costó sus puestos gubernamentales y partidistas a varios pesos pesados del Jiminto. Las muestras de oscurantismo y deshonestidad en los más altos estratos de su partido empujaron al diputado a poner en marcha un Grupo de Estudios de Política Utópica, especie de gabinete de reflexión interna que adoptó como propia la filosofía de la "fraternidad" (yuai), divulgada por Ichiro Hatoyama antes de ser primer ministro y de fundar el Jiminto. Así, en 1953 el abuelo de Yukio había expuesto la necesidad de que en Japón floreciera una "revolución fraterna" que, con ecuanimidad y rectitud, se impusiera sobre el izquierdismo socialista o comunista y a la vez sobre el extremismo de derechas. 2. Abandono del Jiminto, escisión del Sakigake y creación del Minshuto Hatoyama vio revalidado su escaño en las elecciones del 18 de febrero de 1990, que, como todas las habidas ?once- desde la creación del partido 35 años atrás, fueron ganadas por el Jiminto con una mayoría tal que le permitió seguir gobernando con comodidad. La continuación de los escándalos político-corporativos, que ponían de manifiesto las perniciosas colusiones entre un partido de gobierno esclerotizado y venal, la burocracia estatal y los emporios empresariales y financieros del sector privado, agudizaron en el diputado por Hokkaido el sentimiento de desilusión y la actitud crítica frente a los turbios tejemanejes de los provectos barones que sujetaban las riendas de la formación. Las expectativas de renovación interna quedaron decepcionadas en noviembre de 1991 con la elección como presidente del partido y primer ministro, sustituyendo a Kaifu, del septuagenario Kiichi Miyazawa, un maniobrero cabeza de facción que a finales de 1988, seis meses antes de correr la misma suerte el primer ministro Takeshita, había tenido que dimitir como ministro de Finanzas por su implicación en el escándalo Recruit. Miyazawa se rodeó de varios antiguos colaboradores en el nuevo Gabinete, donde tomó asiento asimismo, como responsable de Educación, Kunio Hatoyama. El desencanto de Yukio por los derroteros del partido era extensible a otros muchos dirigentes medios (e incluso altos) y cargos electos. Todo este clima de descontento cristalizó en 1992, cuando se puso en marcha una ola de deserciones y escisiones que colocó a la todavía formación hegemónica de Japón contra las cuerdas. Kunio, aunque estaba en el Gobierno,
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