DOCSLIB.ORG

Political Conflict Resolution and Democratic Consolidation in Indonesia: the Role of the Constitutional Court

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Political Conflict Resolution and Democratic Consolidation in Indonesia: the Role of the Constitutional Court journal of East Asian Studies 10 (2010). 397-424 Political Conflict Resolution and Democratic Consolidation in Indonesia: The Role of the Constitutional Court Marcus Mietzner This article argues that Indonesia's Constitutional Court has played a signifi- cant role in that country's transformation from a violence-prone polity into Southeast Asia's most stable democracy. The Court has advanced institutional conflict resolution mechanisms and expanded democratic rights—two achieve- ments identified by Linz and Stepan as major indicators of a consolidating de- mocracy. Building on models developed by Ginsburg and Horowitz, my analy- sis also illustrates why the Court has been able to defend its autonomy and become an agent of democratization. While sharing Ginsburg's emphasis on high levels of power diffusion as a key reason for the Court's success, this ar- ticle moves beyond such an approach. Most importantly, it suggests that the judges' "judicial activism"—as expressed in a number of controversial but popular decision—increased Indonesian society's support for the Court to such an extent that is has now become largely invulnerable to attempts of external intervention. KEYWORDS: Indonesia, democratic consolidation, conflict resolution, constitu- tional court or much of the past decade, comparative scholars of democrati- F zation observed with some astonishment how post-Suharto In- donesia moved from a fragile and conflict-ridden transition into an early, but much more stable, phase of democratic consolidation. Dis- proving some gloomy predictions made for Indonesia at the time of Suharto's fall, the country has established a functioning electoral de- mocracy, stabilized its economy, ended a series of communal conflicts. 397 398 Political Conflict Resolution in Indonesia and even settled the decades-old separatist conflict in Aceh through po- litical negotiations. This development has been all the more surprising since it took place against the backdrop of a global democratic reces- sion (Diamond 2010), with the Southeast Asian region experiencing re- versals of democracy in the Philippines and Thailand. As of 2010, In- donesia is the only country in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) considered an electoral democracy and the only state in the region classified as "free" (Freedom House 2010). Both long-time Indonesia watchers and theorists of democracy have struggled to understand the reasons for the democratic progress of a country whose only experience with democracy prior to 1998 had been a short period of parliamentarism in the 1950s. In trying to explain Indonesia's success, authors have offered a wide variety of possible factors, ranging from the deescalation of religious and ethnic differences (Aspinall 2010), sound economic management (Hill and Manning 2009), and the modernization of the electoral landscape (Mujani and Liddle 2010), to the gradual marginalization of the military (Mietzner 2009). While all of these analyses are important contributions to the de- bate, one significant part of the puzzle has often been overlooked: the role of Indonesia's Constitutional Court.' This omission occurred de- spite obvious indications that the Court at least assisted in Indonesia's political stabilization, particularly in the areas of conflict resolution and the expansion of democratic rights. Most important, since the establish- ment of the Court as a judicial and political arbitrator in 2003, there has been no more large-scale violent conflict between Indonesia's major so- ciopolitical forces, and the country's score in political rights and civil liberties increased significantly in all relevant democracy indexes (Free- dom House 2010). That constitutional courts can play a positive role in the stabiliza- tion of transitional democracies is not a new theoretical insight, and it is certainly not limited to Indonesia. According to Donald L. Horowitz (2006, 128), constitutional courts have the potential to support "the transition to and consolidation of a stable democratic regime." How- ever, not all constitutional courts have advanced democracy. In 2005, more than 75 percent of all states had mechanisms for judicial review (i.e., a process for evaluating the constitutionality of legislation), exer- cised either through ordinary courts or separate constitutional courts. Among these states, there were "a good many countries with undemo- cratic regimes" (Horowitz 2006, 125), suggesting that there is no strin- gent causal link between the creation of a constitutional court and suc- cessful democratization. Marcus Mietzner 399 Accordingly, in recent years the scholarship on constitutional courts has focused on the factors that led some courts to become agents of democratization, while others failed or turned into instruments of au- tocratic regimes. Tom Ginsburg (2003), for example, bas emphasized that a court's ability to defend democratic rights in the face of vested political interests is to a large extent determined by its institutional de- sign (for instance, the level of general access to the court and the ap- pointment mechanism for the judges). Others, like Ruti Teitel (2007), have explained the divergent performance of courts by the different law traditions they use, and still others—such as Ran Hirschl (2004)—have identified elite attitudes as the most crucial determinant. This article analyzes the ways in which Indonesia's Constitutional Court has contributed to political conflict resolution and democratic consolidation. It argues that the institutional factors highlighted by Ginsburg are partly responsible for the Court's success, and it also shares Ginsburg's view that the diffusion of political power in particu- lar societies can increase the likelihood of elite support for constitutional courts and their rulings. But in one important aspect, the article goes be- yond Ginsburg and the mainstream literature on constitutional courts and it challenges some accounts of the Indonesian Court so far. Horowitz (2006, 132), for example, has warned that "involvement in major politi- cal controversies" can severely damage the court's credibility and in- tegrity. In Horowitz's opinion (2006, 131), courts should not try to "in- trude into politics," with the Hungarian Court providing a classic example for harmful politicization (Scheppele 1999). In the same vein, Simon Butt (2006) has criticized the Indonesian Court for its "activism," suggesting that it frequently oversteps the boundaries of its mandate in order to pursue its own agenda. In this article, however, I argue that it is precisely the corrective (and very aggressive) intervention in highly con- tentious political issues that has consolidated the moral stature of the Court in Indonesian society. These interventions have bolstered the Court's popularity, which in turn has offered its judges additional protec- tion from elite attempts to influence their decisions. I develop my arguments in six analytical steps. The discussion be- gins with an overview of the turbulent early phase of Indonesia's transi- tion, in which an unclear institutional framework triggered political con- flict and eventually led to the creation of a constitutional court in 2003. Second, the article illustrates the institutional design of the Court, con- firming Ginsburg's stress on judicial powers but also underlining the significance of administrative autonomy. The third section of the dis- cussion examines in detail selected verdicts in the field of political (and. 400 Political Conflict Resolution in Indonesia in particular, electoral) conflict resolution, demonstrating how the Court mitigated intra-elite tensions. Fourth, the article highlights the Court's contribution to the expansion of democratic rights, looking at important rulings that advanced civil liberties and granted Indonesian voters a greater say in elections. The fifth section offers explanations for the abil- ity of the Court to withstand external pressure and impose its verdicts against disgruntlement within the elite. With Ginsburg, the discussion points to the importance of political "diffusion" in establishing the judges' power, but it also introduces additional explanatory proposi- tions: the support and "coercion" exercised by civil society, the personal courage of judges, and the increasing popularity of the Court as the re- sult of high-profile interventions in political affairs. Finally, the article concludes by crediting the Court for its role in Indonesia's democratic consolidation but also warn that the Court's success has papered over the crisis of the country's other political and judicial institutions. Political Conflicts Before 2003: Mass Mobilization and Military intervention Most scholars agree that the introduction of constitutional courts (or other mechanisms of judicial review) generally occurs during political transitions or periods of major political and economic change (Gins- burg 2003; Hirschl 2004; Horowitz 2006; Hilbink 2006). In Ginsburg's view—which is shared by Horowitz—heightened political uncertainty tends to convince worried political elites that an independent court overseeing the constitutionality of laws and policies could offer them "protection against a day when their adversaries may act against them" (Horowitz 2006, 126). This model of constitutional courts as an "in- surance policy" against political upheaval and authoritarian majority rule is also applicable to the case of Indonesia, where the idea of creat- ing a constitutional court was bom out of a period marked by regula-
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Vice President's Power and Role in Indonesian Government Post Amendment 1945 Constitution
    Al WASATH Jurnal Ilmu Hukum Volume 1 No. 2 Oktober 2020: 61-78 VICE PRESIDENT'S POWER AND ROLE IN INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT POST AMENDMENT 1945 CONSTITUTION Roziqin Guanghua Law School, Zhejiang University, China Email: [email protected] Abstract Politicians are fighting over the position of Vice President. However, after becoming Vice President, they could not be active. The Vice President's role is only as a spare tire. Usually, he would only perform ceremonial acts. The exception was different when the Vice President was Mohammad Hata and Muhammad Jusuf Kalla. Therefore, this paper will question: What is the position of the President in the constitutional system? What is the position of the Vice President of Indonesia after the amendment of the 1945 Constitution? Furthermore, how is the role sharing between the President and Vice President of Indonesia? This research uses the library research method, using secondary data. This study uses qualitative data analysis methods in a prescriptive-analytical form. From the research, the writer found that the President is assisted by the Vice President and ministers in carrying out his duties. The President and the Vice President work in a team of a presidential institution. From time to time, the Indonesian Vice President's position has always been the same to assist the President. The Vice President will replace the President if the President is permanently unavailable or temporarily absent. With the Vice President's position who is directly elected by the people in a pair with the President, he/she is a partner, not subordinate to the President.
    [Show full text]
  • Amending the Constitution of Year 1945 (A Proposition to Strengthen the Power of DPD and Judiciary)
    The Idea of (Re)Amending the Constitution of Year 1945 (A Proposition to Strengthen the Power of DPD and Judiciary) Ni’matul Huda Fakultas Hukum UII Yogyakarta e-mail: [email protected] Abstract The urgency of re-amending the Constitution of Year 1945 is due to the idea of enhancing the previous amendment, that is, to attain better administrative governance in Indonesia. As it goes without saying that the Constitution of Year 1945 is sacred, the amendment itself should be a well thought-out process that requires thorough and deep considerations and certainly cannot be taken carelessly. Keywords: Amendment of The Constitution of Year 1945, The Regional Representatives Council (DPD), The Authority of Judiciary. Introduction At the beginning of year 2008, the Government and the House of Representatives agreed to set up the fifth amendment to the Constitution of Year 1945 by immediately formed a national committee. The agreement was made in the consultative meeting in the State Palace, Jakarta, Friday January 25, 2008. The new Constitution is expected to be used by the new government of 2009 general election. The President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s and the House of Representatives’ proposal to form a committee to set up the fifth amendment to the Constitution of Year 1945 created various reactions from the people. Some members of MPR and Constitution Forum disagree to the proposal saying that it is MPR who has the authority to establish such committee and it is really not within the presidential domain.1 On the other hand, some members of DPD and state administrations experts support the proposal.2 Normatively, it is MPR that has the authority to amend the Constitution of Year 1945, therefore it would deem more appropriate if MPR were to establish the national committee.
    [Show full text]
  • The Rise and Fall of Historic Chief Justices: Constitutional Politics and Judicial Leadership in Indonesia
    Washington International Law Journal Volume 25 Number 3 Asian Courts and the Constitutional Politics of the Twenty-First Century 6-1-2016 The Rise and Fall of Historic Chief Justices: Constitutional Politics and Judicial Leadership in Indonesia Stefanus Hendrianto Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, and the Judges Commons Recommended Citation Stefanus Hendrianto, The Rise and Fall of Historic Chief Justices: Constitutional Politics and Judicial Leadership in Indonesia, 25 Wash. L. Rev. 489 (2016). Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj/vol25/iss3/5 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington International Law Journal by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Compilation © 2016 Washington International Law Journal Association THE RISE AND FALL OF HISTORIC CHIEF JUSTICES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS AND JUDICIAL LEADERSHIP IN INDONESIA By Stefanus Hendrianto † Abstract : In the decade following its inception, the Indonesian Constitutional Court has marked a new chapter in Indonesian legal history, one in which a judicial institution can challenge the executive and legislative branches. This article argues that judicial leadership is the main contributing factor explaining the emergence of judicial power in Indonesia. This article posits that the newly established Indonesian Constitutional Court needed a strong and skilled Chief Justice to build the institution because it had insufficient support from political actors. As the Court lacked a well- established tradition of judicial review, it needed a visionary leader who could maximize the structural advantage of the Court.
    [Show full text]
  • Protecting Economic and Social Rights in a Constitutionally Strong Form of Judicial Review: the Case of Constitutional Review by the Indonesian Constitutional Court
    Protecting Economic and Social Rights in a Constitutionally Strong Form of Judicial Review: The Case of Constitutional Review by the Indonesian Constitutional Court Andy Omara A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Washington 2017 Reading Committee: Beth E. Rivin, Chair Hugh D. Spitzer, Co-Chair Walter J. Walsh Mark E. Cammack Program Authorized to Offer Degree: School of Law ©Copyright 2017 Andy Omara University of Washington Abstract Protecting Economic and Social Rights in a Constitutionally Strong form of Judicial Review: The Case of Constitutional Review by the Indonesian Constitutional Court Andy Omara Chair and Co-Chair of the Supervisory Committee Professor Beth E. Rivin and Professor Hugh D. Spitzer School of Law The 1999-2002 constitutional amendments to Indonesia’s Constitution inserted some important features of a modern constitution. These include the introduction of a comprehensive human rights provision and a new constitutional court. This dissertation focuses on these two features and aims to understand the roles of this new court in protecting economic and social rights (ES rights). It primarily analyzes (1) factors that explain the introduction of a constitutional court in Indonesia, (2) the Court’s approaches in conducting judicial review of ES rights cases, (3) Factors that were taken into account by the Court when it decided cases on ES rights, and (4) the lawmakers’ response toward the Court’s rulings on ES rights. This dissertation reveals that, first, the introduction of a constitutional court in Indonesia can be best explained by multiple contributing factors –not a single factor.
    [Show full text]
  • DEMOCRACY and CONSTITUTIONALISM in ASIA: the CASE in INDONESIA TODAY1 By: Prof
    DEMOCRACY AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ASIA: THE CASE IN INDONESIA TODAY1 By: Prof. Dr. Jimly Asshiddiqie, SH.2 INTRODUCTION Ladies and gentlemen, and distinguished guests. Thank you for the opportunity to address the conference today. Thank you to the organizers -- the University of Pennsylvania Institute for Advanced Study of India in New Delhi, in collaboration with the Center for Advanced Study of India, University of Pennsylvania, O.P. Jindal Global University, and the Ford Foundation – for your invitation to speak at this Colombo Conference on Comparative Constitutionalism in South Asia. I am very excited to join this conference. The honor of delivering the keynote address resonates deep within me as I meet so many knowledgeable and informed experts who have focused – as have I – on understanding the interplay of democracy and constitutionalism in Asia. I look forward to sharing with you my views on the situation in Indonesia as the country adjusts to competing visions of what constitutes a constitutional democracy. I will also look at recent political developments in Indonesia, where we have just conducted local elections across the country at the end of June, 2018. Ladies and gentlemen, we in Asia live in the most diverse, most populated societies on the planet. Common sense, logic, political theory, and just plain-old intuition all suggest that the institution of democracy is the best system of government to build general prosperity and social justice for all, while guarding the liberties of every individual citizen. When we look across the region, we see an interesting collection of countries demonstrating various degrees of democratic development and institutionalization, particularly in South and Southeast Asia.
    [Show full text]
  • Embedded Judicial Autonomy: How Ngos and Public Opinion Influence
    Embedded Judicial Autonomy: How NGOs and Public Opinion Influence Indonesia's Constitutional Court by Dominic J. Nardi, Jr. A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Political Science) in The University of Michigan 2018 Doctoral Committee: Professor Allen D. Hicken, Chair Associate Professor John D. Ciorciari Professor Thomas B. Ginsburg, University of Chicago Professor Walter R. Mebane, Jr. Dominic J. Nardi, Jr. [email protected] ORCID iD: 0000-0002-9414-2071 c Dominic J. Nardi, Jr. 2018 For the lawyers advocating on behalf of legal reform and social justice in Indonesia. ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Despite the popular stereotype of the lonely scholar toiling away in the Ivory Tower, throughout my time at the University of Michigan I found that great scholarship requires the support of a community. I benefitted from the academic insights, financial assistance, and emotional support of numerous people around the world during the past seven years. First and foremost, I would like to thank the members of my dissertation committee, who have guided and put up with me for almost half a decade. It has been a honor for me to work with such an extraordinary group of scholars. When I first arrived at the University of Michigan, several students told me that I was fortunate to focus on Southeast Asia because I would have the opportunity to work with Allen Hicken. Allen has been incredibly supportive over the years, both as a dissertation chairman and as a mentor. He helped me navigate the sometimes intimidating world of academia and made me feel I wasn't alone in this endeavor.
    [Show full text]
  • How the Constitutional Court Settled the 2014 Presidential Election Dispute?
    Scientific Research Journal (SCIRJ), Volume IV, Issue III, March 2016 8 ISSN 2201-2796 The Future of Indonesian Democracy: How the Constitutional Court Settled the 2014 Presidential Election Dispute? Dr. Andi Muhammad Asrun Head of Graduates Legal Study of University of Pakuan, Bogor, Indonesia [email protected]; [email protected] Abstract- The 2014 general election resulted Joko Widodo, or popularly known as Jokowi, elected as the country’s seventh I. INTRODUCTION president and Muhammad Jusuf Kalla, or shortly called as JK, Following the amendment of the 1945 Constitution,1 as the vice president was claimed by Prabowo Subianto and Indonesian people chose directly President and Vice President.2 Hatta Rajasa “full of fraud, intimidation, and money politics.” In fact some experts worry that Indonesia's endemic corruption Direct presidential elections are the fruit of political reforms could affect that decision. This paper based on literatures and after the fall of former dictator President Suharto in May other qualitative secondary data and information aims at 1998.The amendments of the 1945 Constitution has paved the discussing how the Constitutional Court settled the 2014 way people can directly choose the president. Political reforms Presidential Election dispute. It found that the Constitutional that generate four times the 1945 constitution changes have Court made a decision by the nine judges unanimously rejected brought new nuances in the state system of Indonesia.3 Another the lawsuit camp Subianto-Hatta at a hearing on August 21, important outcome of political reform post-Suharto 2014. The Constitutional Court argues Subianto-Rajasa cannot government is barring the post of president and vice president prove its claim in the trial.
    [Show full text]
  • A Critical Analysis of Judicial Appointment Process and Tenure of Constitutional Justice in Indonesia
    Hasanuddin Law Review Vol. 2 Issue 2, August (2016) Volume 2 Issue 2, August 2016: pp. 152-169. Copyright © 2015- 2016 HALREV. Faculty of Law, Hasanuddin University, Makassar, South Sulawesi, Indonesia. ISSN: 2442-9880 | e-ISSN: 2442-9899. HALREV Open Access at: http://pasca.unhas.ac.id/ojs/index.php/halrev Hasanuddin Law Review is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. A Critical Analysis of Judicial Appointment Process and Tenure of Constitutional Justice in Indonesia Pan Mohamad Faiz TC Beirne School of Law, the University of Queensland The University of Queensland, St. Lucia Campus, Australia Tel./Fax: +61-7-3365-2206 E-mail: [email protected] Submitted: May 26, 2016; Reviewed: Jul 14, 2016; Accepted: Jul 21, 2016 Abstract: The judicial appointment process is one of essential elements for maintaining judicial independence and public confidence of a court. This article analyses the practices of judicial appointment process exercised by three different main state institutions in selecting constitutional justice in Indonesia where the mechanism and process for selecting them have been implemented differently. It also examines the tenure of constitutional justice, which is a five-year term and can be renewed for one term only, that may lead to another problem concerning the reselection process of incumbent constitutional justices for their second term. The article concludes that the judicial appointment process and tenure of constitutional justice in Indonesia have to be improved. It suggests that if the proposing state institutions could not meet the principles of transparency, participation, objective and accountable required by the Constitutional Court Law, the judicial appointment process should be conducted by creating an independent Selection Committee or establishing a cooperation with the Judicial Commission.
    [Show full text]
  • Constitutional Retrogression in Indonesia Under President Joko Widodo’S Government: What Can the Constitutional Court Do?
    Constitutional Review, Volume 4, Number 2, December 2018 P-ISSN: 2460-0016 (print), E-ISSN: 2548-3870 (online) https://doi.org/10.31078/consrev425 Constitutional Retrogression in Indonesia Under President Joko Widodo’s Government: What Can the Constitutional Court Do? Abdurrachman Satrio* Center for State Policy Studies, Faculty of Law University of Padjadjaran Imam Bonjol No. 21, Bandung 40132 [email protected] Abstract This paper examines whether constitutional retrogression, the process through which democratically elected rulers use formal legal measures gradually to undermine democracy, has occurred in Indonesia, especially during the reign of President Joko Widodo. To this end, the paper analyzes the impact of the Widodo government’s policies on three fundamental requirements of a democratic state: a democratic electoral system, rights to speech and association, and the rule of law. The paper finds that Widodo’s government, in its efforts to contain the threat of Islamist populism, has indeed undermined all three of these elements to varying degrees. While Indonesia’s democracy may yet be saved by the Constitutional Court, an institution that Widodo’s government has until now failed to control, the Court cannot save democracy by itself. Its chances of doing so will depend on public support. Keywords: Constitutional Court, Constitutional Retrogression, Democracy, Joko Widodo, Indonesian. * Researcher at the Center for State Policy Studies, Faculty of Law Padjadjaran University. This article was previously presented at the 2nd Indonesian Constitutional Court International Symposium on the “Constitutional Court and Constitutionalism in Political Dynamics”, Yogyakarta, 1-3 October 2018. I wish to thank Theunis Roux, for his invaluable suggestions and corrections that have helped me to develop this article, and also Bjoern Dressel for his helpful comments.
    [Show full text]
  • The Rise and Fall of Historic Chief Justices: Constitutional Politics and Judicial Leadership in Indonesia
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by UW Law Digital Commons (University of Washington) Washington International Law Journal Volume 25 Number 3 Asian Courts and the Constitutional Politics of the Twenty-First Century 6-1-2016 The Rise and Fall of Historic Chief Justices: Constitutional Politics and Judicial Leadership in Indonesia Stefanus Hendrianto Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, and the Judges Commons Recommended Citation Stefanus Hendrianto, The Rise and Fall of Historic Chief Justices: Constitutional Politics and Judicial Leadership in Indonesia, 25 Wash. L. Rev. 489 (2016). Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj/vol25/iss3/5 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington International Law Journal by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Compilation © 2016 Washington International Law Journal Association THE RISE AND FALL OF HISTORIC CHIEF JUSTICES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS AND JUDICIAL LEADERSHIP IN INDONESIA By Stefanus Hendrianto † Abstract : In the decade following its inception, the Indonesian Constitutional Court has marked a new chapter in Indonesian legal history, one in which a judicial institution can challenge the executive and legislative branches. This article argues that judicial leadership is the main contributing factor explaining the emergence of judicial power in Indonesia. This article posits that the newly established Indonesian Constitutional Court needed a strong and skilled Chief Justice to build the institution because it had insufficient support from political actors.
    [Show full text]
  • Independence of the Indonesian Constitutional Court in Norms and Practices
    Independence of the Indonesian Constitutional Court in Norms and Practices Luthfi Widagdo Eddyono Researcher at the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia E-mail: [email protected] Abstract Article 24 (1) of the 1945 Constitution States after the third amendment, “the judicial power shall be independent in administering justice so as to uphold the law and equality.” The Indonesian Constitutional Court is one of the performers of the independent judicial power who plays a significant role in the enforcement of the constitution and the principle of the state based on the law by its authority and obligations as determined by the 1945 Constitution. This paper intends to study the Indonesian Constitutional Court to find out whether the Constitutional Court in exercising its constitutional authority can be independent. Also, this article will examine not just institutional independence but also judges independence to understand current issues related to the role of ethics and conduct of judges. The independence of the Indonesian Constitutional Court supported by the 1945 Constitution after the amendments from 1999 until 2002, and further stipulated in Law. However, it can be said that this institution has ups and downs of public trust due to corruption cases conducted by constitutional justices. Also, in several political instances showed efforts of political institutions to limit the authority of the Constitutional Court. In its experiences, the Constitutional Court succeeded in convincing the parties through its decisions and strengthening institutional independence against the influence that tried to destabilize its institutions. The Council of Ethics of Constitutional Judges that maintains the values and behavior of judges also continuously works and efficient enough in overseeing the ethics and conduct of judges.
    [Show full text]
  • Soeharto's New Order and Its Legacy: Essays in Honour of Harold Crouch
    Soeharto’s New Order and its Legacy Essays in honour of Harold Crouch Edited by Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy Soeharto’s New Order and its Legacy Essays in honour of Harold Crouch Edited by Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy ASIAN STUDIES SERIES MONOGRAPH 2 THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY E P R E S S E P R E S S Published by ANU E Press The Australian National University Canberra ACT 0200, Australia Email: [email protected] This title is also available online at: http://epress.anu.edu.au/soeharto_citation.html National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry Title: Soeharto’s new order and its legacy : essays in honour of Harold Crouch / edited by Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy. ISBN: 9781921666469 (pbk.) 9781921666476 (pdf) Notes: Includes bibliographical refeßrences. Subjects: Soeharto, 1921-2008 Festschriften--Australia. Indonesia--Politics and government--1966-1998. Indonesia--Economic conditions--1945-1966. Other Authors/Contributors: Aspinall, Edward. Fealy, Greg, 1957- Crouch, Harold, 1940- Dewey Number: 959.8037 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. Cover design and layout by ANU E Press Cover image: Photo taken by Edward Aspinall at the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) Congress, Bali, April 2010. Printed by Griffin Press This edition © 2010 ANU E Press Contents Acknowledgments. .vii Preface:.Honouring.Harold.Crouch.. ix Jamie Mackie, Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy Glossary.. xiii Contributors. xix Introduction:.Soeharto’s.New.Order.and.its.Legacy.
    [Show full text]