i;AM DEPARTMENT OF STATE • ., . r o. , .. DATE REeD, -c one ACTION INFO , ,,,,1.i TO AJD/W TOAID A- 3312 x .... /L, tl~ .: /: j1J 3 ;'..12 30 "; ' 0 -%\Q'E dIENT­ /" FROM. BANGKOK SUBJECT • Won-Capital Project Paper. (PROP) Civil Police Administration REFERENCE * Country: Thailanc Project No. 493-11-710-119 ,.; j Submission bate: July Ila 1969 Original X . .! Project Title: Civil Police Administration .j--V, S. Obligation Span: FY 1957- FY 1973 ..,/ hysical Implementation Spwn: FY 1956 - FY 1973 , , Gross Life of Project Financial Reqnirements: ($000's) .... U.S. Dollars $980445 U.S. Owned Local Currency Cooperating Country Cash Contribution 50.499 Total $148. 944 D)econtrol following July 11, 1972 PAGE I PAGES __ _1 OF OfAFED UY FFICE PHONE NO DATE )kr am, AD'/ 7/11/69 A.He BoM11m,,,' A Iij ra .emn ,PIP 224 AAsst Dir. for Program AID AN:D OTHER CLEARANCES V. AD/PS:PDBatson! " .ur-. ­ . ADDs LAO ADIP. AD/PS, PS/P:C.MolfettotD SA/d, SAIMCZ ICR CLASSIFICATIONS, MA NGAMQF TOAIL.Z .- /. .. ,2 21 CIVIL POLICE ADMINISTRATION I. bUMMv1AR Y D.SCRIPTION, INCLUDINg3 TABULATION OF 1',..ANNED INPUTS Withini the context of United States' interests in Southeast Asia is t|1hc cancc.:'i that Thailand remain free from direct or indirect Gonm.-unist ta:cover by force. To guard against this contingency it . eseential th.t Thailand have the means to successfully resist and c-rit r"1 all ifrrr." nf Communist insurgent activity. In thit, regar!, the Thailand National Police Department (TNPD) is the pri:nary agency of the Royal Thai Government (P.TG) responsible for ir'tcctin, Olhe country from internal subversion and aggression. This responsibility is discharged through specific activities directed toward the naintenance )f law and order. USOMvi assistance is provided to assist the TNPD to improve and empnd these activities, especially in those areas of the country where: both covert and 3vert subversion are particularly manifest. II. '1TTING OR ENVIRONMENT Backgrnund USOM assistance to the TNPD began in FY 1957, "to imrove law enforcement canabilities at the National, Provincial, and Miunici'al levels" (See ProAg, FY 1959. Ori4inal. page 2). In general, there efforts were directed to-ward improving the TNPD "orarizational structure, administrative system, operational methods, comn'-,nications facilities, records systems, and training (facilities)." The activities were undertaken in the belief that "improved internal security and an orderly society are requisites for rapid econi.mic development. " During FY 1n64 and FY 1965, Thailand along with Vietnam and Laos, began to experience increased Communist pressure from 'he Northern areas of Mainland Asia: insurgents, especially in Best Available Document P60 Iz a2 Pzjct !13g Civil 1ice Aationmti i No. MRSU. ~~ev No.-6 hwCn + i A! M. Jota Ca c Pilo, Act. 7169 M a (97", ( ,646,2 3 4 Q0,6 o 40M Oper. I 70 EA a 12,95 (82I%sq4 * 85 355 9,920 2771 idg. NA a 1~995 (7" l'o= - M5 300 Tip%* 7173 4K 8,250 C(5 p2a o - 5o 250 6,150 773 a a 5,000 (30)1,o00 - 300 amo 3,W 3+3 An Bube. 0 . Lie 9,IASOPOWUm 234 7,015 2,699 77*175 Ox /N~o~ (noimft) colimn z Tabl . Pmject No. Po2 of2 Sze ate1 *a0 93-U-6001049 AWColtmofll ou"oz "Ghz Other Vrd b2at. C, E9L... Contribution 06sm DoInor Metric Value H aft oun a -o- URYFn To=t7~ 1.Fieot MS.-e M3 bdv. ) (6oo1 (*oxl tooW Idrw Act. FT 69 2690o'332 IT70 60800 BLI6. I71 6jo0 B4 ST 72 5,300 PT 73 \ BYf71 - 'All Bubs. 1- ue 492174 1,325 Trust Fund ad Project Account UM Regular Bufet Funds for Air z lent4,smne Coatzct ,=\ NGKOK TOAID A-/ .,/*.1. 6 21 Northeast Thailand, began increasingly to assassinate government officers, disrupt lines of communication, and appropriate food and other supplies from villagere. Moreover, they expanded the level and intensity of armed propaganda and recruiting activities, and began to beam increased numbers of propaganda radio broadcasts at rural areas criticizing the RTG. The strategy was to alienate the people from the government and disrupt progress on beginnirr efforts by the R TG to eevelop the more remote areas (see Country Field Subu.Ission FY 1971 for additional information). Realizing that developmental activities can only succeed within the framework of effective governmental organization and regulation, the RTG requested the USOM to provide additional assistance to the TNPD to help increase and expand their efforts to maintain law and order; especially in those areas of the country experiencing an increasing level of disruption and violence. Accordingly, USOM amcistance to selected elements of the TNPD, especially the Proviacial Police (PP) and Border Patrol Police (BPP), began to increase during FY 1966. and beyond. (In addition, TNPD efforts to expand their activities received increased emphasis. For example, the Provincial Police expanded in size from approximately 26. 000 men In FY 1966. to about 41. 000 men in FY 1969). Political and Administrative Environment In g-eneral, because of the delicate political balance between the Police and the Royal Thai Army (RTA) it has been difficult for the TNPD to receive Bureau of the Budget approval for increased personnel levels needed to meet the insurgent threat. In addition, this same political balance creates problems in coordination between the TNPD and RTA in areas under martial law (Regions 4. 5. 7, and parts of Regions 3 and 8). Improved coordination, however, is difficult for the TNPD to achieve unilaterally because such coor-dination is primarily the responsibility of the RTA. But encouraging signs have been seen in the field -- perhaps the most significant area for coordination -­ where, because of the personalities involved, RTA and TNPD elements have worked closely together. However, an apparatus does exist - the Civil-Police-Military (CPM) coordinating group under the changwat governor. This/with a varying diegree of effectiveness throughout the functions k3.'.NGh01% W.MEuiw: V ( 6. 7 country. But )r.bems still remain, especially in Bangkok. In regard to TNPD administrative practices there is a continuing nesed to improve police management; particularly personnal administration, budgeting, and training administration. lilowever, the. police have achieved a degree of success regarding redistribution of personnel, ininimizing duplication of efforts, and implementation of a data processing system. But many aspects of TNPD administration, particularly procedures for expending budgeted funds, are regulated by somewhat outmoded RTG procedures, and the TNPD is limited in the kinde of innovations which it can institute. .Mdjor Obstacles The lack of sufficient numbers of trained peesonnel to adequately staff and train all elements of an expanding and increasingly professional police force has been a chronic problem in regard to the police project. In atten-Ating to ameliorate this situation the TNPD has increased the capacity if its training facilities, improved methods of instruction, provided better training equipment, and increased retraining of personnel. However, it has yeL to assign a permanent training cadre to the Police Academy or to provide training facilities for an adequate supply of qualified "qfficersor NCO's, notably for the BPP. Secondly, there is a need to improve intelligence collection capabilitits :ind machinery for rapid vertical and horizontal dissemination of tactlcal information includin- its collation and use at the field level. Orno rtunities Compared with the police of most developing countries, the TNPD is a relatively experienced, professional organization able to perform its assigned mission of maintaining law and order and helping meet insurgency threats. In this regar, the TNPD is a permantint, stable organization which has been tested n "firefights" in all regions of the Kingdom and has achieved reasonable success. And it is encouraging that TNPD officials are increasingly recogniring problem areas within the organization and have begun to initiate corrective measures, including the movement of trained units to meet specific problems. 1UA.NGKOK TOAM A- /,;'/A.'k 7 In general, the TNPD recognizes the importance of providing law and order for those areas of Um country experiencing increased insurgent and criminal disruptions. and is engaged in various selected activities to bring this about, M. STRATEGY ~ethads to Achieve Objectives To achieve the objectives of the Public Safety project, USOM will place increased emphasis on improving the quality of the police function, both in terms of the organizatlz and individual performance. as follows: First, Public Safety technicians will assist the TNPD to review present personnel practices and policies, especially as they relate to recruiting, selection, assignpzwas. deployment, promotion, and employee benefits. Second, a review of trainibg practices and training facUties will be conducted and recommendations made related to new recruits, cadet training, and in-eervice training. In this regard persuasion of advisors will be directed at establishing appropriate training facilities not presently so endowed. This is particularly needed at the Sampran Cadet Academy and within the Provincial Police headquarters staff. Third, USOM technicians will aseist the TNPD to improve its administrative management and information retrieval systems, and further, will make recommendations along organizational lines. Fouwth, emphasis will be placed ori the need for the TNPD to coordinate its activities with other agencies of government. However, it should be kept in miad that the primary function of the police is operational in nature and, therefore, does not lend itself well to the role of a coordinating agency. This role is vested n the Governors at the Provincial level, through the CPM, and to the IiTA in those areas under martial law. Fifth, the TNPD, supported by USOM, is expected to stress, primarily to BOB, the need for additional manpower with which to -1 BANGKOK TOAID A-// . 8 21 bring imp.-rtant elements of the TNPD up to required strength.