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Leveraging the Past to Prepare for the Future of Air Force Intelligence Analysis

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Leveraging the Past to Prepare for the Future of Air Force Intelligence Analysis Leveraging the Past to Prepare for the Future of Air Force Intelligence Analysis Brien Alkire, Abbie Tingstad, Dale Benedetti, Amado Cordova, Irina Danescu, William Fry, D. Scott George, Lawrence M. Hanser, Lance Menthe, Erik Nemeth, David Ochmanek, Julia Pollak, Jessie Riposo, Timothy Smith, Alexander Stephenson C O R P O R A T I O N For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR1330 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-0-8330-9285-4 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2016 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. About the cover: Air Force intelligence analysis has been a key enabler to the application of air power in the past and will continue to be an enabler of future operations in the air, space, and cyberspace. The inset is a photo of a U.S. Army Air Forces (AAF) intelligence officer during World War II (U.S. Army Air Forces photo). The intelligence section of the AAF was one of the first organizations to bring in civilian experts to help analyze German industry. Allied bombing of the oil targets they identified helped to weaken the German war economy. The cover also includes a photo of Senior Airman Meaghan G. Holley at a modern analyst workstation (U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Justyn M. Freeman). She led a ten-member target analysis team that located and relayed the positions of more than 4,300 compounds to coalition forces, leading to the seizing of three weapon caches and more than $2 million in narcotics. She was named one of the 12 Outstanding Airmen of the Year in 2015. Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.html. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface Irregular warfare has been the primary focus of the U.S. military ever since the attacks of September 11, 2001. Given the recent focus on irregular warfare, the U.S. Air Force (USAF) Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance asked the RAND Corporation to conduct a project to help ensure that the USAF has the capability to provide intelligence analysis in support of a broader range of operations.1 The project identified lessons from past operations that either had direct implications for USAF intelligence analysis or USAF intelligence analysis could help to address. The project also identified the future challenges for USAF intelligence analysis. This report describes the findings of the project and recommends steps the USAF can take to address the lessons of the past and to prepare for the future. The research reported here was commissioned by Lt Gen Robert P. Otto, Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, Headquarters USAF, and conducted between October 2014 and July 2015 in the Force Modernization and Employment Program of RAND Project AIR FORCE as part of fiscal year 2015 project “Air Force ISR Enterprise: Leveraging the Past to Prepare for the Future.” The report should be of interest to intelligence professionals within the USAF, USAF personnel who depend on intelligence analysis to support USAF core missions, and the broader intelligence community. RAND Project AIR FORCE RAND Project AIR FORCE (PAF), a division of the RAND Corporation, is the U.S. Air Force’s federally funded research and development center for studies and analyses. PAF provides the U.S. Air Force with independent analyses of policy alternatives affecting the development, employment, combat readiness, and support of current and future air, space, and cyber forces. Research is conducted in four programs: Force Modernization and Employment; Manpower, Personnel, and Training; Resource Management; and Strategy and Doctrine. The research reported here was prepared under contract FA7014-06-C-0001. Additional information about PAF is available on our website: www.rand.org/paf/ This report documents work originally shared with the U.S. Air Force on August 18, 2015. The draft report, issued in September 2015, was reviewed by formal peer reviewers and U.S. Air Force subject-matter experts. 1 For purposes of this project, we define intelligence analysis as “a cognitive activity—both art and science— applying tools and methods to collected data and information to create and deliver intelligence knowledge with the goal of providing decision advantage to commanders and decisionmakers” (DCS for ISR, 2014, p. 5). iii Contents Preface ............................................................................................................................................ iii Figures............................................................................................................................................ ix Tables ............................................................................................................................................. xi Summary ...................................................................................................................................... xiii Acknowledgments ....................................................................................................................... xvii Abbreviations ............................................................................................................................... xix Chapter One. Introduction .............................................................................................................. 1 Background ............................................................................................................................................... 1 Research Objective and Questions ........................................................................................................... 2 What Is Intelligence Analysis? ................................................................................................................. 2 Constraints and Limitations of the Research ............................................................................................ 5 Methodology ............................................................................................................................................. 5 Outline ...................................................................................................................................................... 9 Additional Appendixes ........................................................................................................................... 10 Chapter Two. Lessons from Past Operations ................................................................................ 11 Definition of a Lesson ............................................................................................................................ 11 Overview of Methodology for Identifying Lessons ............................................................................... 11 How We Identified Relevant Lesson Inputs ....................................................................................... 12 How We Aggregated Relevant Inputs into Lessons ........................................................................... 16 Nine Lessons from Past Operations ........................................................................................................ 17 Lessons on Building Analytic Capabilities ........................................................................................ 18 Lessons About Partnerships ............................................................................................................... 22 Lessons About Development and Employment of Skills ................................................................... 27 Ensuring That Lessons Are “Learned” ................................................................................................... 30 Chapter Three. The Demands of Future Operations and Implications for U.S. Air Force Intelligence Analysis ............................................................................................................... 31 The Role of Scenarios ............................................................................................................................. 31 Projecting Power in the 21st Century ..................................................................................................... 33 Research Tasks for Scenario Evaluation ................................................................................................ 34 Focus Areas for U.S. Air Force Intelligence Analysis in Future Conventional Warfights ...................
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