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B FM 34-1 IULY 1987 INTELLIGENCE and ELECTRONIC WARFARE

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B FM 34-1 IULY 1987 INTELLIGENCE and ELECTRONIC WARFARE b FM 34-1 IULY 1987 INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE OPERATIO HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited Panfcagon Library (ANR-FÙ ATnt Military Documanw^SectiOSt Room 1A518, Pentagon VVas^ingion, DC 20310-€050\ O-pvb FIELD MANUAL *FI\/I 34-1 NO. 34-1 HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY Washington, DC, 2 July 1987 INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE OPERATIONS Table of Contents Page Preface iv Chapter 1 — The Mission 1-1 Situation and Target Development A. 1-1 Electronic Warfare 1-3 Counterintelligence \ 1-4 Chapter 2 —The Intelligence and Electronic Warfare System . \ 2-1 Functional Structure 2-1 Coordination Structure 2-4 System Elements 2-20 Echelon Architecture 2-21 Chapters — Situation and Target Development 3-1 Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield 3-3 Collection Management 3-20 Processing 3-38 Dissemination 3-60 Chapter 4 — Counterintelligence 4-1 Support to Operations Security 4-1 Support to Rear Operations 4-10 Support to Deception 4-13 Support to Command, Control, and Communications Counter- measures 4-15 Chapter 5 — Electronic Warfare 5-1 Electronic Warfare Section 5-1 Electronic Countermeasures 5-2 Electronic Warfare Targets 5-7 Electronic Warfare Principles 5-9 Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. *This publication supersedes FM 34-1, 31 August 1984. ^ 20310-605q Electronic Warfare Planning 5-10 Electronic Warfare Tasking 5-14 Electronic Warfare Assessment 5-14 Chapter 6 — Organization for Combat 6-0 Command and Support Relationships 6-0 Principles of Organization 6-1 Task Organization 6-1 Communications 6-4 Chapter 7 — Offensive Operations 7-0 IEW Principles 7-0 Support to Offensive 7-1 River Crossing 7-7 Chapter 8 — Defensive Operations 8-0 IEW Principles 8-0 Deep Operations 8-2 Covering Force 8-3 Support to the Main Battle 8-7 Chapter 9 — Retrograde Operations 9-0 IEW Principles 9-0 Delaying 9-1 Withdrawal 9-4 River Crossings 9-6 Chapter 10 — Defense and Breakout of Encircled Forces 10-0 Defense 10-0 Breakout 10-2 Chapter 11 —Rear Operations 11-1 Air-Land Battle Tenets 11-1 Objectives 11-2 Threat 11-2 Command and Control 11-6 Intelligence Mission 11-14 Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Support 11-17 Chapter 12 — Special Operations and Environments 12-0 Special Operations 12-0 Special Environments 12-7 Chapter 13 — Joint and Combined Operations 13-0 Joint Operations 13-0 Contingency Operations 13-6 Combined Operations 13-6 Chapter 14 — Logistics 14-1 Supply 14-1 Maintenance, Repair, and Recovery 14-7 Ml Unit Maintenance 14-11 Replacement 14-11 ii Chapter 15 — NBC Survival and Reconstitution 15-0 Effects 15-0 Vulnerabilities 15-1 Survival 15-2 Reconstitution 15-4 Appendix A - The Analysis of the Battlefield Área A-1 Appendix B - The Intelligence Estimate B-1 Appendix C - The Intelligence Annex C-1 Appendix D - The Electronic Warfare Estimate D-1 Appendix E - The Electronic Warfare Annex E-1 Appendix F - Electronic Warfare Targeting Formats F-0 Appendix G - Dissemination Devices G-1 Appendix H - The Collection Plan H-1 Appendix I - Tactical Special Security Operations I-1 Glossary Glossary-0 References References-0 Index lndex-1 iii Preface Intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) is critical to the US Army's fundamental mission of winning air-land battles. During peacetime, the IEW system provides the intelligence and counterintelligence (CI) and defensive electronic warfare (EW) support essential to deterring war through vigilance and preparedness. During war, these mission areas and the addition of offensive EW, focus on supporting the winning of battles and campaigns. This IEW keystone manual expands doctrine contained in FM 100-5, and establishes the doctrinal foundation for IEW operations. It delineates the IEW mission on the modern battle- field, the IEW role in maximizing the combat power of the combined arms team, the princi- ples which govern tactical IEW operations, and the importance of sustaining IEW capabili- ties. The doctrine in this manual orients on principles and general procedures and is based on applicable Army of Excellence (AOE) tables of organization and equipment (TOE). More specific operational procedures are provided in doctrinal field manuals. This manual is designed for use by commanders, staffs, and trainers at all echelons. It is the foundation for Army service school IEW instruction and serves as the basis for IEW doc- trinal, training, and combat developments. Provisions of this manual are subject to international standardization agreements (STANAGs) 2008, 2014, 2022, and 3377. STANAG 2014 (Edition Five) is implemented by Appendixes C and E to this field manual. When amendment, revision, or cancellation of this publication affects or violates the international agreements concerned, the preparing agency will take appropriate reconciliation action through international standardization channels. The proponent of this publication is the United States Army Intelligence Center and School. Submit changes for improving this publication on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) and forward to Commander, US Army Intelli- gence Center and School, ATTN: ATSI-TD-PAL, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-7000. iv CHAPTER 1 The Mission Armies that maintain coherence and con- SITUATION AND TARGET fidence and can concentrate superior com- DEVELOPMENT bat power at decisive times and places are the winners of battles and campaigns. Situation development is the basic pro- While there are no simple formulas for win- cess by which intelligence is developed. ning, there are certain key factors for suc- Information is collected, then integrated cess on the air-land battlefield. One key fac- into an all-source product to provide an tor is the support provided to the combined estimate of the situation and a projection of arms team through IEW operations. enemy intentions in sufficient time to per- IEW operations, in both peace and war, mit the commander to select the most effec- support the winning of battles and tive friendly course of action. Situation campaigns—the focus of tactical doctrine development provides— described in FM 100-5. The mission of IEW □ Knowledge of the weather and terrain operations is to provide the maneuver throughout the areas of operations and commander with three key forms of sup- interest. port: intelligence, EW, and CI. □ Knowledge of the enemy to include History is full of examples of the vital role enemy organization, equipment, and intelligence plays in combat operations. tactics—how the enemy fights; the There have been many instances in which strengths and weaknesses of enemy forces with superior intelligence have been dispositions; the capabilities, limita- victorious over much larger opposing tions, and patterns of particular enemy armies. Commanders who have possessed units; the enemy's operational, techni- detailed knowledge of the enemy, weather, cal, and human weaknesses and per- and terrain and used that knowledge in sonalities; the enemy's intentions; and their application of fire and maneuver have the enemy's probable reactions. usually been the victors. General Washing- Weather and terrain have more impact on ton's surprise attack on Trenton and the 1942 American victory at Midway, the turn- the battle than any other physical factor, including weapons, equipment, or supplies. ing point in the battle for the Pacific, are shining examples of the value of accurate The terrain on which battles are fought presents opportunities to both sides. Most intelligence. More recent history has dem- battles have been won by the side that used onstrated the advantages of using EW and terrain to protect itself and to reinforce fires CI. EW, especially its use in the 1973 Arab- to destroy the enemy. Commanders must Israeli war, and in 1982 in the Bekaa Val- understand the nature, uses, and reinforce- ley, has proven itself a credible weapon for ment of terrain to be effective. both offensive and defensive purposes. The need for CI and its value as a principal con- IEW operations assist commanders in tributor to the security of the combat force selecting and understanding the battlefields were proven during Korea, Vietnam, and on which they choose to fight. Intelligence the intervening years of peace. These sup- preparation of the battlefield (IPB), a sys- port functions will be of equal or greater tematic approach to the analysis of enemy, value in the air-land battle of today. Suc- weather, and terrain, is the principal tool cessful execution of the IEW mission will be used. It clearly portrays what enemy forces critical on the air-land battlefield. can and cannot do on the battlefield and the probability of the adoption of a specific The combined application of these forms course of action. It also is used to clearly of support, the IEW mission, translates into show the effects of weather and terrain on four major tasks: situation development, target development, EW, and CI. 1-1 friendly forces and courses of action. IPB is provides the commander with timely and begun long before the battle and is updated accurate locations of enemy weapons sys- continually. tems, units, and activities which may impact on current or projected operations. To succeed in battle, commanders must Targeting data must be sufficiently timely avoid enemy strengths and exploit weak- and accurate to support effective attack by nesses. They must surprise enemy forces, fire, maneuver, or electronic means. catching them at a disadvantage as often as possible. IPB provides the basis for the Situation and target development provide situation and target development tasks commanders with the intelligence they need which make this possible. Situation devel- to fight the air-land battle. Both are distinct opment reduces battlefield uncertainty and tasks, yet they must be integrated totally to provides the confidence to generate superior provide an accurate picture of the battle- combat power.
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