B FM 34-1 IULY 1987 INTELLIGENCE and ELECTRONIC WARFARE

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FM 34-1 IULY 1987

INTELLIGENCE AND

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

OPERATIO

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

Panfcagon Library (ANR-FÙ ATnt Military Documanw^SectiOSt Room 1A518, Pentagon VVas^ingion, DC 20310-€050\

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FIELD MANUAL *FI\/I 34-1 NO. 34-1 HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY Washington, DC, 2 July 1987

INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE OPERATIONS

Table of Contents

Page Preface iv Chapter 1 — The Mission 1-1 Situation and Target Development A. 1-1 Electronic Warfare 1-3 Counterintelligence \ 1-4 Chapter 2 —The Intelligence and Electronic Warfare System . \ 2-1 Functional Structure 2-1 Coordination Structure 2-4 System Elements 2-20 Echelon Architecture 2-21 Chapters — Situation and Target Development 3-1 Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield 3-3 Collection Management 3-20 Processing 3-38 Dissemination 3-60 Chapter 4 — Counterintelligence 4-1 Support to Operations Security 4-1 Support to Rear Operations 4-10 Support to Deception 4-13 Support to Command, Control, and Communications Counter- measures 4-15 Chapter 5 — Electronic Warfare 5-1 Electronic Warfare Section 5-1 Electronic Countermeasures 5-2 Electronic Warfare Targets 5-7 Electronic Warfare Principles 5-9

Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

*This publication supersedes FM 34-1, 31 August 1984.

^ 20310-605q Electronic Warfare Planning 5-10 Electronic Warfare Tasking 5-14 Electronic Warfare Assessment 5-14 Chapter 6 — Organization for Combat 6-0 Command and Support Relationships 6-0 Principles of Organization 6-1 Task Organization 6-1 Communications 6-4 Chapter 7 — Offensive Operations 7-0 IEW Principles 7-0 Support to Offensive 7-1 River Crossing 7-7 Chapter 8 — Defensive Operations 8-0 IEW Principles 8-0 Deep Operations 8-2 Covering Force 8-3 Support to the Main Battle 8-7 Chapter 9 — Retrograde Operations 9-0 IEW Principles 9-0 Delaying 9-1 Withdrawal 9-4 River Crossings 9-6 Chapter 10 — Defense and Breakout of Encircled Forces 10-0 Defense 10-0 Breakout 10-2 Chapter 11 —Rear Operations 11-1 Air-Land Battle Tenets 11-1 Objectives 11-2 Threat 11-2 Command and Control 11-6 Intelligence Mission 11-14 Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Support 11-17 Chapter 12 — Special Operations and Environments 12-0 Special Operations 12-0 Special Environments 12-7 Chapter 13 — Joint and Combined Operations 13-0 Joint Operations 13-0 Contingency Operations 13-6 Combined Operations 13-6 Chapter 14 — Logistics 14-1 Supply 14-1 Maintenance, Repair, and Recovery 14-7 Ml Unit Maintenance 14-11 Replacement 14-11

ii Chapter 15 — NBC Survival and Reconstitution 15-0 Effects 15-0 Vulnerabilities 15-1 Survival 15-2 Reconstitution 15-4 Appendix A - The Analysis of the Battlefield Área A-1 Appendix B - The Intelligence Estimate B-1 Appendix C - The Intelligence Annex C-1 Appendix D - The Electronic Warfare Estimate D-1 Appendix E - The Electronic Warfare Annex E-1 Appendix F - Electronic Warfare Targeting Formats F-0 Appendix G - Dissemination Devices G-1 Appendix H - The Collection Plan H-1 Appendix I - Tactical Special Security Operations I-1 Glossary Glossary-0 References References-0 Index lndex-1

iii Preface

Intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) is critical to the US Army's fundamental mission of winning air-land battles. During peacetime, the IEW system provides the intelligence and counterintelligence (CI) and defensive electronic warfare (EW) support essential to deterring war through vigilance and preparedness. During war, these mission areas and the addition of offensive EW, focus on supporting the winning of battles and campaigns. This IEW keystone manual expands doctrine contained in FM 100-5, and establishes the doctrinal foundation for IEW operations. It delineates the IEW mission on the modern battlefield, the IEW role in maximizing the combat power of the combined arms team, the principles which govern tactical IEW operations, and the importance of sustaining IEW capabilities. The doctrine in this manual orients on principles and general procedures and is based on applicable Army of Excellence (AOE) tables of organization and equipment (TOE). More specific operational procedures are provided in doctrinal field manuals. This manual is designed for use by commanders, staffs, and trainers at all echelons. It is the foundation for Army service school IEW instruction and serves as the basis for IEW doctrinal, training, and combat developments. Provisions of this manual are subject to international standardization agreements (STANAGs) 2008, 2014, 2022, and 3377. STANAG 2014 (Edition Five) is implemented by Appendixes C and E to this field manual. When amendment, revision, or cancellation of this publication affects or violates the international agreements concerned, the preparing agency will take appropriate reconciliation action through international standardization channels. The proponent of this publication is the United States Army Intelligence Center and School. Submit changes for improving this publication on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) and forward to Commander, US Army Intelli- gence Center and School, ATTN: ATSI-TD-PAL, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-7000.

iv CHAPTER 1

The Mission

Armies that maintain coherence and con- SITUATION AND TARGET fidence and can concentrate superior com- DEVELOPMENT bat power at decisive times and places are the winners of battles and campaigns. Situation development is the basic pro- While there are no simple formulas for win- cess by which intelligence is developed. ning, there are certain key factors for suc- Information is collected, then integrated cess on the air-land battlefield. One key fac- into an all-source product to provide an tor is the support provided to the combined estimate of the situation and a projection of arms team through IEW operations. enemy intentions in sufficient time to per- IEW operations, in both peace and war, mit the commander to select the most effec- support the winning of battles and tive friendly course of action. Situation campaigns—the focus of tactical doctrine development provides— described in FM 100-5. The mission of IEW □ Knowledge of the weather and terrain operations is to provide the maneuver throughout the areas of operations and commander with three key forms of sup- interest. port: intelligence, EW, and CI. □ Knowledge of the enemy to include History is full of examples of the vital role enemy organization, equipment, and intelligence plays in combat operations. tactics—how the enemy fights; the There have been many instances in which strengths and weaknesses of enemy forces with superior intelligence have been dispositions; the capabilities, limita- victorious over much larger opposing tions, and patterns of particular enemy armies. Commanders who have possessed units; the enemy's operational, techni- detailed knowledge of the enemy, weather, cal, and human weaknesses and per- and terrain and used that knowledge in sonalities; the enemy's intentions; and their application of fire and maneuver have the enemy's probable reactions. usually been the victors. General Washing- Weather and terrain have more impact on ton's surprise attack on Trenton and the 1942 American victory at Midway, the turn- the battle than any other physical factor, including weapons, equipment, or supplies. ing point in the battle for the Pacific, are shining examples of the value of accurate The terrain on which battles are fought presents opportunities to both sides. Most intelligence. More recent history has dem- battles have been won by the side that used onstrated the advantages of using EW and terrain to protect itself and to reinforce fires CI. EW, especially its use in the 1973 Arab- to destroy the enemy. Commanders must Israeli war, and in 1982 in the Bekaa Val- understand the nature, uses, and reinforce- ley, has proven itself a credible weapon for ment of terrain to be effective. both offensive and defensive purposes. The need for CI and its value as a principal con- IEW operations assist commanders in tributor to the security of the combat force selecting and understanding the battlefields were proven during Korea, Vietnam, and on which they choose to fight. Intelligence the intervening years of peace. These sup- preparation of the battlefield (IPB), a sys- port functions will be of equal or greater tematic approach to the analysis of enemy, value in the air-land battle of today. Suc- weather, and terrain, is the principal tool cessful execution of the IEW mission will be used. It clearly portrays what enemy forces critical on the air-land battlefield. can and cannot do on the battlefield and the probability of the adoption of a specific The combined application of these forms course of action. It also is used to clearly of support, the IEW mission, translates into show the effects of weather and terrain on four major tasks: situation development, target development, EW, and CI.

1-1 friendly forces and courses of action. IPB is provides the commander with timely and begun long before the battle and is updated accurate locations of enemy weapons sys- continually. tems, units, and activities which may impact on current or projected operations. To succeed in battle, commanders must Targeting data must be sufficiently timely avoid enemy strengths and exploit weak- and accurate to support effective attack by nesses. They must surprise enemy forces, fire, maneuver, or electronic means. catching them at a disadvantage as often as possible. IPB provides the basis for the Situation and target development provide situation and target development tasks commanders with the intelligence they need which make this possible. Situation devel- to fight the air-land battle. Both are distinct opment reduces battlefield uncertainty and tasks, yet they must be integrated totally to provides the confidence to generate superior provide an accurate picture of the battle- combat power. field and to assist in successful accomplishment of the friendly commander's Target development, based on situation intent. Both tasks focus the areas of opera- development, is the process of providing tions and interest. direct combat information, targeting data, and correlated targeting information to The battlefield is comprised of the area of commanders and fire support means. It operations (AO), and the area of interest. Commanders and staffs view these areas in terms of width, depth, airspace, and time.

BATTLEFIELD AREAS

/ ^ S I AREA OF INTEREST

\ I t I f I I \ I X X I AREA X ■ X I I OF I \ OPERATIONS 1 XX

1-2 The AO is defined in JCS Pub. 1 as "that countermeasures (C3CM). C:tCM is the inte- portion of an area of conflict necessary for grated use of operations security (OPSEC), military operations." The AO is a geograph- military deception, jamming, and physical ical area, assigned by a higher commander, destruction to disrupt enemy C2. C !CM pro- for which a commander has responsiblity tects friendly command, control, and com- and in which he has authority to conduct munications (C1); influences, degrades, or military operations. Higher commanders destroys enemy O' capabilities; and denies consider the factors of mission, enemy, ter- the enemy information of intelligence value rain, troops, and time available (METT-T) when assigning AOs. PROTECT COMMAND, CONTROL, The area of interest is defined in JCS AND COMMUNICATIONS Pub. 1 as "that of concern to the commander, including the area of operations, Electronic counter-countermeasures areas adjacent thereto, and extending into (ECCM), or defensive EW, are the responsi- enemy territory to the objectives of current bility of all soldiers who use or who super- or planned operations. This area also vise the use of communications-electronics includes areas occupied by enemy forces (C-E) equipment. ECCM are passive in which could jeopardize the accomplishment nature and are used to protect friendly C3 of the mission." The area of interest over- systems against enemy radioelectronic laps those of adjacent and higher units, to combat (REC) activities. Passive ECCM include areas to the rear of the AO. include both anti-intercept and locate (for example, emission control, terrain masking, AOs and area of interest help to focus the information requirements of commanders and avoidance) procedures and antijam or kill (for example, C-E equipment design) from battalion to echelons above corps features. ECCM also include the immediate (EAC). Specific information requirements identification and reporting of meaconing, are dependent on the mission and the tacti- intrusion, jamming, and interference (MUI) cal situation. Usually, in conventional bat- on a friendly C3 facility. tles, information requirements are based on the one-up-and-two-down formula. Com- Electronic warfare support measures manders require detailed information about (ESM) can provide commanders the capa- enemy forces at their equivalent levels of bility to intercept, identify, and locate command as well as at one level above and enemy emitters. They represent a source of two levels below their own. For example, information required for jamming, decep- brigade commanders need information tion, ECCM, targeting, and other tactical about enemy regiments (equivalent level), employment of combat forces. ESM support enemy divisions (one up), and enemy battal- the destruction and jamming of enemy C3 ions and companies (two down). Generally, systems through acquisition and reporting the enemy forces of concern to each com- of targeting data. ESM also support the mander are found within the command's commander's efforts to counter enemy AO and area of interest. OPSEC and deception. In extreme situations, electronic counter- ELECTRONIC WARFARE measures (ECM) can be used to protect friendly C3. Jamming systems may be used EW exploits, disrupts, and deceives the as high-powered radios to transmit a key enemy command and control (C2) system message through enemy jamming. Addi- while protecting friendly use of communica- tionally, jammers may protect friendly tions and noncommunications systems. It is communications by using directional a significant force multiplier when inte- antennas to jam known enemy signals grated and employed with fire and intelligence (SIGINT) systems on the same maneuver. frequency as key friendly communications to screen and prevent enemy intercept. This EW represents a significant contributor to option takes multiple jammers to cover the command, control, and communications

1-3 deployed enemy collectors, and can place force. Through CI, IEW operations support our jammers at great risk. Expandable actions which— jammers (EXJAMs) may also be used to □ Counter the hostile intelligence threat. screen friendly communications if their □ Safeguard the command from surprise. emplacement near enemy SIGINT sites is feasible. □ Deceive the enemy commander. □ Counter enemy sabotage, subversion, COUNTER-COMMAND, CONTROL, and terrorism. AND COMMUNICATIONS The need for commanders to know the The offensive components of EW, passive enemy is not restricted to friendly force ESM and active ECM, provide commanders. Enemy commanders, to suc- commanders— ceed against us, must employ all-source □ Intelligence to plan, direct, coordinate, intelligence systems to collect information support, and conduct their deep and about our forces. Depriving enemy com- close operations. manders of this information is important, even crucial to friendly force success on the □ Combat information and targeting battlefield. CI supports the OPSEC of the data to maneuver their forces and command to achieve this objective. target their weapons systems. Safeguarding the command from surprise □ ECM nonlethal attack capability to includes two elements of IEW support. The systematically disrupt the 0'' systems first is intelligence which enables the com- of enemy first- and second-echelon mander to know the enemy's activities and units. intentions. The second is CI support to OPSEC which helps to deprive the enemy CRITICAL TASKS commander of the intelligence he needs to Command and control warfare in air-land create situations in which the friendly force combat operations is complex when viewed can be taken by surprise. as a maze of intangible electronic signals Deception is supported by intelligence criss-crossing above and over the battle- which is critical to establishing a credible field. Command and control warfare, how- deception scenario and in assessing the ever, can be reduced to the most simple effectiveness of deception operations. Elec- terms of reference and understanding. It is tronic deception is supported and, to a composed of both tangibles and intangibles. limited degree, executed by the IEW system. The tangibles are the C3 "nodes" which present visual signatures for commanders IEW contributes significantly to the pro- to see and shoot. The intangibles are the tection of the force by CI operations against "information links" between the nodes sabotage, subversion, and terrorism. These which can be intercepted, identified, and operations prevent hostile actions which jammed. There are also nodes which can be disrupt the sustainment of combat opera- intercepted, identified, and jammed. There tions and undermine morale, cohesion, and are also nodes and links which must be discipline. seen and monitored, but neither shot nor Each of the major tasks derived from the jammed. Put simply, we jam and kill the IEW mission is essential to success on the fighters and sustainers, and collect infor- battlefield. How IEW operations fulfill the mation from the planners and coordinators. requirements of each task, IEW employ- COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ment for specific operations, and the critical functions of sustaining operations is IEW operations must include specific explained in general terms in the chapters actions which support the protection of the which follow. The doctrine presented is based on, and requires an understanding of, the air-land battle doctrine of FM 100-5.

1-4 CHAPTER 2

The Intelligence and Electronic Warfare System

This chapter describes the IEW system. It Force commanders play a significant role begins with the design philosophy of the in the design philosophy of the IEW system. system, describes its functional structure, Their requirements must be satisfied, their then shows how the functional resources direction moves the system to respond, and are welded into an interlocking organiza- their personal involvement keeps the sys- tion at each level of command to provide tem on track. the intelligence, EW, and CI support so critical to the commander's success. This chap- The coordinators are the G2 or S2 and G3 ter describes the structure of the system in or S3. They have staff responsibility for coordinating the IEW effort. They respond two ways: first, in terms of its functional to the commander as the functional experts structure, and second, in terms of its archi- in IEW, supervise and direct the operations tecture by echelon. of producers, and coordinate the efforts of the command's executors with support from FUNCTIONAL STRUCTURE higher, lower, and adjacent commands. The IEW system design philosophy is The G2 and S2 are the commanders' prin- embedded in a common IEW structure at cipal advisors for intelligence and CI opera- each level of command. Each command has tions and security policy. They plan and directors, coordinators, producers, and manage operations in each of these func- executors who perform critical IEW functional areas. tions. The figure on page 2-2 illustrates the common IEW system structure.

2-1 COMMON IEW STRUCTURE

DIRECTOR FORCE COMMANDER

COORDINATORS EXECUTORS

PRODUCERS

G2AND S2 Collection Management COMMANDERS Intelligence Prepare collection plans Ml CI Manage collection activities Cavalry Security Analysis Artillery IPB Maneuver Processing Engineer Intelligence analysis All Others Enemy, weather, and terrain data bases

ESM Technical data base support

OPSEC OPSEC data base support Vulnerability analysis Countermeasure recommendation G3AND S3 COMMAND Operations Dissemination Direct and control organic assets to EW Reports satisfy require- OPSEC Briefings ments Deception Estimates

The director, coordinators, producers, and executors are common elements of the IEW structure at each command level. The level of detail for each function varies by echelon.

2-2 The G2 and S2 coordinate the intelligence □ Develops document and personnel effort. They identify intelligence require- security policy for the command. ments based on the commanders' guidance □ Supervises the command's special and concept of the operation. They manage security officer (SSO). the collection effort, supervise all-source analysis, and ensure rapid dissemination of □ Supervises and directs the efforts of needed intelligence and combat informa- the engineer terrain team under his tion. They, through the division and corps operational control (OPCON) and tactical operations center (TOC) support coordinates support from other teams. elements, or brigade and battalion battlefield information coordination centers □ Exercises staff supervision of the staff weather officer (SWO). (BICC), task military intelligence (MI) organizations and other elements of the □ Supervises and coordinates predictions command with collection missions. The G2 of fallout from enemy-employed and S2 request support and receive intelli- nuclear weapons and chemical gence from higher echelons, adjacent units, dispersion. other services, allies, and national sources. □ Disseminates combat information and They integrate intelligence from all sources intelligence. to meet the commanders' information and operational needs. □ Provides information and intelligence to other staff sections. The G2 and S2 are responsible for information regarding the enemy, weather, and □ Assesses enemy intelligence capabili- terrain. They use their expertise to reduce ties and procedures, their vulnerability battlefield uncertainties, providing com- to deception, and the effectiveness of manders with estimates and other critical friendly deception operations. intelligence in support of unit operations. □ Provides CI support to OPSEC. They think like enemy commanders and view the battlefield from an enemy point of □ Prepares intelligence estimates and view. They direct the intelligence effort to annexes. view the patterns of enemy activity that FM 101-5 provides a detailed description serve as indicators, focusing on specific of the responsibilities and functions of the rather than general requirements. Their G2 or S2. direction gives meaning to seemingly insignificant bits of information, and intel- The G3 and S3 have staff responsibility ligence products of value to commanders for planning and directing the OPSEC, are developed. deception, and EW operations of the command. They advise and assist other staff Generally, the responsibilities of the intel- officers on the operations and training ligence officer are similar at each level of aspects which impact on their respective command. The G2 or S2— areas of responsibility. The G3 or S3— □ Recommends intelligence requirements □ Plans and coordinates EW operations. and priorities. □ Directs electronic countermeasures □ Prepares plans, orders, and requests (ECM) actions needed to support for intelligence, ESM, and CI. planned and ongoing operations. □ Supervises and coordinates the com- □ Identifies, in coordination with the G2 mand's intelligence collection, ESM, or S2, as appropriate, ESM require- and CI activities to support situation ments to support EW. development and target development. □ Processes information from all available sources to produce intelligence. □ Assesses enemy intentions.

2-3 □ Coordinates with the C-E officer to limited role in EW and OPSEC. BICCs not establish ECCM to protect friendly C-E only expand the capabilities of the S2 sec- operations. tions, but free the S2 from routine tasks so □ Prepares the EW annex to operations he can better manage the overall intelli- plans (OPLAN) and orders. gence effort. □ Identifies and recommends essential The executors are the doers. They com- elements of friendly information mand the units which provide IEW support (EEFI). and direct and control them to satisfy assigned IEW missions. They deploy, main- □ Implements OPSEC measures to frus- tain, train, aiid sustain their units to carry trate the enemy intelligence collection out assigned missions. Executors include effort. the commanders of MI, cavalry, artillery, □ Plans and coordinates deception opera- and maneuver units, and all other organi- tions to support the commanders' zations capable of executing IEW opera- scheme of fire and maneuver. tions. MI unit commanders are the command's primary IEW executors. FM 101-5 provides a detailed description of the responsibilities and functions of the G3 or S3. COORDINATION STRUCTURE The producers support the coordinators at each echelon. They perform collection man- The key players in fusing IEW into the agement, information processing and dis- overall tactical concept are the intelligence semination, CI analysis, and EW manage- and operations staffs. Their mission is to ment. At corps and division the producers serve the commander and assist subordi- consist of the TOC support elements. At nate commanders. lower echelons, they are the BICCs. The senior intelligence and operations The BICCs assigned to various combat, officers must think like the commander in combat support, and combat service support order to anticipate requirements. Both (CSS) units, give the unit S2 the capability require a solid foundation in tactics to to effectively manage his part of the IEW accomplish their missions. Their functions system. They are not a separate element, are reciprocal; both should be able to do the but an integral part of the S2 section. other's job. Their functions are complemen- BICCs provide the detailed control and tary, requiring very close cooperation and coordination of intelligence collection, pro- coordination. Common perspectives enable duction, and dissemination. They play a them to communicate with precision. The senior intelligence and operations officers of the command, assist in the development and training of subordinate unit intelligence and operations staffs. In coordinating the air-land battle, commanders demand complementing capabilities from their G2 and G3 as shown in the following illustration. The G2, G3, and the MI commander comprise the IEW team. The staff officers plan, organize, direct, coordinate, and control while the MI commanders execute the directives. The IEW team is held together by the force commander who gives the team leadership, motivation, focused perspective, and direction.

2-4 DEVELOPING AIR-LAND BATTLE CAPABILITIES

G2 G3

Disrupt, delay, destroy early. See deep.

Safeguard command from surprise.

Reduce battlefield uncertainty. Move fast, fix assault echelons.

Situation and target Strike assault echelon quickly.. development. deny objective.

Vulnerability identification.

Intelligence support to Finish fast before follow-on EW, OPSEC, deception echelon joins fight.

Prepare the battlefield for the next battle.

The G2, as the command intelligence assets to accomplish assigned IEW mis- officer, provides overall management and sions. They exercise C2 over all organic and supervision of intelligence operations. attached MI elements and OPCON over Based on the commander's requirements he supporting MI assets. develops intelligence collection missions and tasks subordinate elements, including To fulfill the commander's requirements, organic and supporting MI units, to the G2 and G3 must do the staff manage- accomplish these missions. The G2 staff is ment necessary to translate capabilities augmented by the TOC support element, into plans and orders for the combined less the electronic warfare section (EWS) arms team. Some of the specific staff func- and OPSEC staff element. The G3 orches- tions associated with coordinating the bat- trates EW and OPSEC operations. He tle are summarized in the following chart. develops EW and OPSEC missions based on requirements and tasks subordinate elements to carry them out. The G3 is augmented by the EWS and OPSEC staff element. MI unit commanders manage MI

2-5 HOW G2s AND G3s ORCHESTRATE IEW OPERATIONS

PLANNING ORGANIZING DIRECTING CONTROLLING COORDINATING

Oatermln* currant Determine require- Determina extent Determine extent, Promote cooperation and future need*. ments to support of direction type, and method of and mutual under- Study situation and mission. necessary. control necessary to standing. limitations. Establish work Issue timely accomplish mission. Cross-train Make reasonable breakdown structure instructions and Establish criteria supervisors and keep assumptions. of tasks/subtasks. mission tasking and for measuring results. Ihem informed. Perform detailed Establish organiza- ensure they are Establish minimum Encourage lateral planning. tional relation- understood. variance from criteria and vertical com- Determine time and ships. that is acceptable. munication through- resource require- Select/assign re- Take corrective action. out the organization. ments to support sources to Supervise execution. Synchronize require- plan. accomplish mission. Monitor resource per- ments with external Ascertain require- Assign mission formance and activities. ment/resource responsibilities. sustainabitity. balance. Emphasize essential- Adjust plan if ity, balance, cohesion necessary. flexibility, and Develop alternate efficiency. plans. Establish policies/ procedures to support plan. Use SOPs to speed communications and promote understanding.

Each member of the IEW team has a full array of vital responsibilities. All of these responsibilities must be integrated, mutually supporting, and focused on the commander's concept for accomplishing the mission. Close and continuous coordination among all members of the team is essential. The following chart provides a graphic illustration of responsibilities and the coordination required to assure a fully integrated IEW operation.

2-6 JEW STAFF RESPONSIBILITIES STAFF FUNCTIONS RESPONSIBILITY COORDINATION

INTELLIGENCE G2 G3/FSE IPB G2 G3/FSE Collection Management G2 G3 Situation Development G2 G3 Target Development G2 G3/FSE

ELECTRONIC WARFARE G3 G2/FSE/C-E OFFICER ESM G2 G3 ECM G3 G2/FSE ECCM G3 G2/FSE/C-E OFFICER

OPSEC G3 G2 CI Support G2 G3

3 C CM G3 G2/FSE Intelligence Support G2 G3/FSE/ALO EW Support G3 G2/FSE OPSEC G3 G2 Targeting G3 G2/FSE/ALO

As depicted in the chart, the fire support some information about first-echelon enemy element (FSE) is a key user of intelligence battalions and regiments. It also depends and plays an important role in EW plan- on corps and EAC for information about ning. He is responsible for the integration second-echelon divisions. The interdepen- of all lethal and non-lethal means of attack dencies between echelons create the need for the G3, which requires close coordina- for detailed interfaces. Such interfaces exist tion with the all-source production section between the coordinators at successive (ASPS) and EWS in the division tactical echelons, between producers at division and operations center (DTOC). higher levels, and between executors at division and higher levels. Additional inter- No single level of command is capable of faces are established laterally and, at EAC meeting all of its requirements with organic and corps, with other services, national resources. Each is dependent on higher, agencies, and allied forces. lower, and adjacent commands to complete the intelligence picture of the battlefield, to meet EW requirements, or to support the INTELLIGENCE security needs of the command. Therefore, Battle success depends on the force com- commanders at each echelon must ensure mander's ability to see the battlefield. The that their resources are integrated into the enemy must be surprised and caught at a overall IEW effort. For example, division' disadvantage as often as possible. Their depends on brigades and battalions for

2-7 strengths must be avoided and their weak- nations or of areas of operations and nesses exploited. To do this, commanders which is immediately or potentially must know their battlefield area, the condi- significant to military planning and tions in which they will fight, and the operations. nature, capabilities, and activities of their Intelligence is the responsibility of all enemy. commanders. Every unit must be prepared Intelligence: The product resulting to conduct intelligence operations with from the collection, evaluation, analy- every means at its disposal, with or without sis, integration, and interpretation of specific orders. all available information which con- Intelligence is developed through a pro- cerns one or more aspects of foreign cess known as the intelligence cycle. The cycle, shown below, consists of four phases:

THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE

and SUPE,,,

DIRECTING

DISSEMINATING MISSION AND USING COLLECTING

PROCESSING X

P¿>,/WV/NG

2-8 directing, collecting, processing, and dis- national interest and international context. seminating. It is a continuous process, and The strategic intelligence community will even though each phase is conducted in collect, analyze, and disseminate intelli- sequence, all phases are conducted concur- gence which satisfies the constantly- rently. While new information is being col- changing requirements of national-level lected, the staff plans and redirects efforts decision makers. As the imperatives of to meet new demands, and previously col- American foreign and defense policy lected information is processed and dissem- change, so too does the focus of the stra- inated. All phases of the cycle focus on the tegic intelligence community. commander's mission. (See the preceding The establishment of theater(s) of war or illustration.) unified commands (assigned distinct geo- Intelligence is categorized as strategic, graphical areas of operation) reflects the operational level of war, and tactical. The imperatives of American foreign and focus and definition of each are tailored to defense policy. While the intelligence the echelon and type of decision maker to be requirements of the NCA are global, the supported. (See illustration.) Strategic intel- intelligence requirements of the theater or ligence is defined as that intelligence unified commander in chief (CINC) will required by national and allied decision reflect the peculiar peacetime and wartime makers for the formulation of national for- responsibilities assigned to that theater in eign and defense policy. The intelligence the context of the Joint Strategic Capabili- requirements of the National Command ties Plan. The military strategy, force struc- Authority (NCA) are global, reflecting the ture, and intelligence requirements of each complexities of a continuously-evolving theater of war are distinct. The nature of

USE OF TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE

NATIONAL

OPERATIONAL-LEVEL UNIFIED COMMAND OF WAR THEATER ÁRMY s § INTELLIGENCE ARMY GROUP Si s ^BC O R P S EB DIVISION BRIGADE \ BATTALION / A COMPANY / TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE

2-9 alliances, adversary military capabilities, Within a theater of war, joint and com- and political and military objectives are dif- bined military forces are employed to real- ferent within each theater of war. A theater ize the political objectives set forth by the commander may require access to the NCA. Realization of political objectives assets of the strategic intelligence commu- within theater requires the(defeat>of those nity to support peacetime or wartime cam- strategic and operational centersoi gravity paign planning. However, the immediate which permit an adversary alliance to focus of the NCA may be toward political maintain the momentum of a campaign and military developments in another effort and necessary political support. Iden- theater of war. tification, targeting, and defeat of these centers of gravity is contingent upon an An operational level of war intelligence IEW perspective and system which takes perspective is necessary if the peacetime account of the peacetime and wartime and wartime campaign planning objectives planning imperatives of an operational- of the operational-level commander are to level CINC. Certainly the demands on the be realized. This is due to the demands on strategic intelligence community in a time the strategic intelligence community and of war will limit the ability of theater staffs the focus of tactical intelligence. Opera- to access these systems. If the focus of operational level of war intelligence is defined as tional responsibility is a theater command, that intelligence which is required for the the EAC MI brigade will generally provide planning and conduct of campaigns within intelligence support to that command. a theater of war. At the operational level of Access to national-level systems will be war, intelligence concentrates on the collec- maintained by the EAC intelligence center tion, identification, location, and analysis (EACIC). However, the bulk of the all- of strategic and operational centers of grav- source intelligence analysis—and the per- ity. If successfully attacked, they will formance of operational-level IPB achieve friendly political and military- functions—to satisfy the requirements of strategic objectives within a theater of war. theater staffs and commanders, will be performed by the theater J2 with the support of Operational level of war intelligence the J2 staff and the EACIC. And because of focuses on the intelligence requirements of the focus of intelligence at the tactical level theater, army group, field army, or corps of war—evolving battles and engagements commanders. The echelon focus at the and the rapid dissemination and exploita- operational level is situationally dependent. tion of combat information and tactical It reflects the nature of the theater of war intelligence—intelligence produced at this itself. It shows the political and military level, if not properly screened, could well objectives of the combatants. The echelon overwhelm theater and subordinate staffs focus also reflects the types of military and distract them from their necessary forces which can or may be employed. The operational-level perspective. planning considerations of the tactical commander will be principally "military" in Five IEW tasks are performed at the nature. However, the campaign-planning operational level of war^situation develop- considerations of the operational-level ment garget developmentVelectronic war- commander will incorporate political, eco- fares Security and deceptiunl and indica- nomic, psychological, geographical, and tions and warning (I&W). Situation military factors on a grand scale. development or IPB at the operational level of war involves four functions: theater area evaluation, analysis of the characteristics of the theater AO (geographical, political, economic, industrial, communications, analysis of the entire theater of war to discern the operational impact of significant

2-10

/ regional features on the conduct of both the The purpose of tactical intelligence opera- friendly and adversary campaign effort), tions is to obtain and provide decision mak- threat evaluation, and threat integration. ers reliable information about the enemy, The theater J2 will discern the political and weather, and terrain as quickly and com- military designs of the adversary and spe- pletely as possible. The results are an essen- cific objectives within theater. He will tial basis for estimating enemy capabilities, determine the time required to realize these courses of action and intentions, and for objectives and target areas of interest planning friendly operations. Intelligence (TAIs) keyed to strategic and operational seeks to discover the type, strength, loca- centers of gravity. The J2 follows this tion, organization, and behavior of enemy enemy activity by continuously developing forces; their direction and speed of move- and refining situation, event, and decision- ment; and their intentions. It includes support templates. information about the weather and terrain within the operational area and their effects Target development at the operational on friendly and enemy operations. level involves the identification of those high-payoff targets (HPTs) as part of the Order of battle (OB) is an integral part of theater C3CM strategy or operational intelligence concerning the enemy. OB is engagement scenario that, if attacked, will the identification, strength, command lead to the defeat of centers of gravity. EW structure, and disposition of personnel, or joint and combined EW at the opera- units, and equipment of a military force. tional level will interface with other joint Complete OB data is seldom provided com- and combined destructive systems in the manders. Instead, commanders are pro- context of the theater C3CM strategy. vided estimates and analyses based on col- OPSEC measures and the theater deception lected OB information and other strategy will be incorporated in the theater intelligence data. OB is significant at both campaign plan. strategic and tactical levels. At the tactical level, it is used to determine enemy capabili- The fifth IEW task, I&W, involves the ties, weaknesses, courses of action, and continuous development and refinement of intentions. Weather and terrain informa- regional or theater-based indicator lists. tion and intelligence are vital to making These allow operational-level intelligence these determinations. staffs to determine changes in the political, military, economic, and diplomatic behav- Weather intelligence results from the ior of an adversary. This allows the theater analysis of the effects of weather on both commander to better anticipate and under- friendly and enemy operations. It is used by stand NCA actions which may lead to the almost every element of a combat force. decision for military involvement. Commanders must be prepared to exploit favorable weather conditions and minimize Theater-based all-source intelligence the adverse effects. analysis is necessary for a theater commander and the NCA to avoid strategic Terrain intelligence results from an anal- surprise. The Worldwide Indications and ysis of the effects of the terrain on friendly Monitoring System makes this possible. and enemy operations. It orients on the capability to move, shoot, and communi- High-intensity conflict in a theater of war cate. The terrain is analyzed in terms of its follows when the powers involved fail to military aspects. adhere to long-standing rules of behavior. A theater J2 staff learns the adversary's politi- Terrain conditions have a profound effect cal designs. The information is gleaned dur- on both friendly and enemy operations. The ing the performance of the second and third terrain within specific battlefield areas is functions of operational level of war IPB analyzed in terms of the military signifi- (analysis of the nature of the theater of war cance. Terrain analysis is performed to and threat evaluation). This yields a broad determine the specific terrain conditions, picture of how an adversary alliance could based on current and projected weather be expected to fight, and for what conditions, under which enemy and friendly objectives.

2-11 forces must move, shoot, and communicate. there should be a clear priority among Information about the enemy, weather, and them. terrain, once processed and reported, is IR provide intelligence which is less criti- intelligence. Intelligence is used at all levels cal to the commander's tactical decisions, of command—strategic, operational, and as well as information to support the needs tactical echelons—to plan major campaigns of other functional areas and subordinate and battles. units of the command. The commander, through the G2 or S2, Collection is the process of gathering directs the intelligence effort. Based on information from all sources. Collection knowledge of the enemy, weather, and ter- operations are guided by the commander's rain, the G2 or S2 develops intelligence requirements and are facilitated by use of requirements to support the commander's the collection plan and the IPB data base. concept of operations. He establishes priority intelligence requirements (PIR) or infor- Processing is the phase of the intelligence mation requirements (IR). The PIR and IR, cycle whereby information becomes intelli- shown below, are the basis for intelligence gence. Information from all sources is evalu- collection and production. ated, correlated, and analyzed to produce an all-source product. PIR are the highest-priority intelligence requirements, and must be personally approved by the commander. Normally, PIR are enemy capabilities, enemy courses of action, or characteristics of the battlefield which could decisively impact on the commander's tactical decisions. There is no prescribed limit to the number of PIR, but

INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

PRIORITY INTELLI- Those intelligence requirements for which a commander has GENCE REQUIRE- an anticipated and stated priority in his task of planning and MENTS decision making.

INFORMATION Those items of information regarding the enemy and his envi- REQUIREMENTS ronment which need to be collected and processed in order to meet the intelligence requirements of a commander.

2-12 Dissemination and use of intelligence is patrols and observation posts (OP), liaison the last and most vital phase of the intelli- with local military or paramilitary forces gence cycle. Usable information and intelli- and the local populace, and, most impor- gence are rapidly disseminated to those tantly, reports from friendly troops. who need it without waiting for additional HUMINT has the potential to discover information or further processing. the most guarded secrets to include enemy Most information is used in the develop- intentions. It generally has an advantage ment of intelligence. Much of this informa- in the collection of less precise and quanti- tion, however, can be used immediately for fiable information requiring qualitative and fire, maneuver, or ECM. If raw data can be value judgments. Examples of the most lu- used for fire, maneuver, or ECM as received, crative HUMINT targets are those which with no interpretation or integration with involve plans and intentions, deliberations other data, it is called combat information. and decisions, research and development, Targeting data is a subset of combat infor- doctrine, leadership, training, and morale. mation. Dissemination of combat informa- HUMINT sometimes suffers in timeliness tion must be expedited and, at some echel- of information. However, much overt tacti- ons, a separate channel for routing combat cal HUMINT is immediately exploitable as information is established. combat information. The ideal HUMINT Combat Information: Unevaluated sources are privy to decisions and inten- data, gathered by or provided directly tions before they are widely communicated to the tactical commander which, due or acted upon—a requirement most other to its highly perishable nature or the sources cannot meet. criticality of the situation, cannot be processed into tactical intelligence in SIGINT is the product resulting from the time to satisfy the user's tactical intel- collection, evaluation, analysis, integration, ligence requirements. and interpretation of information derived from intercepted electromagnetic emissions. Once raw data is validated, integrated, It is divided into communications intelli- compared, and analyzed, it becomes intelligence (COMINT), electronic intelligence gence. In other words, the distinction (ELINT), and foreign instrumentation sig- between intelligence and combat informa- nals intelligence (FISINT). COMINT and tion is in how the information is handled ELINT are used at all levels. COMINT con- and used. If information must be processed sists of information derived from intercept- and analyzed, especially if integration with ing, monitoring, and locating the enemy's other data is required to produce usable communications systems. ELINT is data, it is intelligence and not combat obtained by intercepting and studying the information. Information may be both enemy's noncommunications signals, such combat information and intelligence, but in as radar, and locating these emitters. sequence. FISINT is the technical information and intelligence information derived from inter- Intelligence generally falls within specific cept of electromagnetic emissions, such as categories. These categories include— telemetry, associated with the testing and □ Human intelligence (HUMINT). operational deployment of foreign aerospace surface and subsurface instrumenta- □ SIGINT tion. By analyzing each signal, information □ Imagery intelligence (IMINT). is developed about the emitter and its user. Integration of this information with that Scientific and technical intelligence □ from other resources provides accurate tar- (S&T intelligence). geting data and a basis for determining HUMINT includes all information enemy intentions. derived through human sources. Tactically, it is represented by interrogation of enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) and civilian detainees, translation of captured enemy documents, long-range surveillance operations,

2-13 IMINT is derived from radar, photogra- vulnerabilities, and confirm reported infor- phic, infrared, and electro-optic imagery. mation with another source whenever This imagery is analyzed by imagery ana- possible. lysts (IAs) to identify and locate enemy S&T intelligence is that intelligence con- activity, installations, and equipment. Side- cerning foreign technological developments looking airborne radar (SLAR) has the capa- and the performance and operational capability to detect vehicle movement over large bilities of foreign materiel which now or areas, has a stand-off capability of consid- eventually may have a practical application erable distance, and has the capability to be for military purposes. Although principally digitally downlinked to the ground for in- a function of EAC and department-level MI depth analysis. Photographic imagery units, S&T intelligence contributes signifi- analysis is very accurate and is susceptible cantly to fulfilling the intelligence require- only to more sophisticated camouflage, con- ments of tactical units. Typical S&T intelli- cealment, and deception techniques. Posi- gence targets at tactical levels include tive identification of equipment can be enemy equipment and facilities. Tactical made from photographic imagery in most units must rapidly evacuate captured cases. Infrared needs no light to image and equipment and personnel of S&T intelli- best results are obtained at night. The sys- gence value to S&T intelligence units, who tem has the capability to detect individual exploit them in support of tactical and stra- thermal images and may have applications tegic requirements. in a low-intensity conflict (LIC). Electro- optic systems are similar to photographic Combat information and intelligence may systems but differ in that the image is a result from actions taken within any of the digital recording which can be manipulated categories previously described. For exam- to obtain optimum results. ple, SIGINT may provide a key element of intelligence that tells the commander when The disadvantages of IMINT depend on the enemy will attack. IMINT may provide the limitations of the various sensors. the strength of the attacking force. Weather is a factor to some extent for all of HUMINT may provide knowledge of where the sensors. Radar, since it is an emitter, is the enemy will strike. Taken separately or susceptible to jamming. Photography is in isolated increments, it is unlikely that a limited, for all practical purposes, to day- complete picture of the battlefield can be light hours and has no near-real time capa- developed. However, the integration of bility. Time sensitive requirements may be these bits of intelligence with other infor- missed due to the time required for aircraft mation provides a composite that allows the return and film downloading and process- commander to "see" the battlefield. The ing. Infrared sensors require the aircraft to composite picture of the battlefield is the fly at low altitude (less than 3,000 feet) and result of intelligence from all sources. directly over the target. Electro-optic sys- Intelligence can never be complete. tems suffer most of the limitations photog- Limited time and resources, battlefield con- raphy does, though not to the same extent. fusion, and enemy deception all work to Some correction can be made to the image degrade the quality and quantity of intelli- by digital enhancement. gence. To provide the best intelligence pos- There are systems considered to be sible, intelligence collectors are concen- IMINT systems that do not produce a hard trated on the most valuable indicators of copy image, nor are they utilized by IAs. enemy intentions and targets of the highest These are ground surveillance radars value. (GSRs) and night observation devices. In order to plan intelligence collection Each of these intelligence disciplines is and decide which collector to task, the vulnerable to enemy deception, human targets for intelligence collection are error, and equipment malfunction. Intelli- divided into categories. These categories gence producers must be aware of these allow us to match the activity (such as movement along a section of road) with the collector capable of detecting it (such as SLAR). Most enemy units simultaneously

2-14 fall into more than one category, but it is Shooters include all direct- and indirect- the activity as a specific type of target that fire weapons and missile systems. Gener- will answer a specific intelligence need. The ally, shooters are located through their pro- four categories of targets are— jectiles after they are fired or launched. However, missile systems, due to their □ Movers: Moving elements of the enemy nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) force. capability, must be located and destroyed □ Emitters: Communications and non- as movers, emitters, or sitters before they communications systems. can be fired. □ Shooters: Weapons and weapons Sitters are fixed or semi-fixed targets such systems. as enemy command posts (CPs) and service □ Sitters: Stationary targets. support facilities. They may include other, more mobile targets which have stopped and are not shooting or emitting. Such The detection, location, and tracking of targets may include forces in an assembly movers are important in identifying enemy area, weapons in ready or firing positions patterns of activity. Movement patterns but not firing, and other such targets. Sit- help locate enemy concentrations of combat ters can be. critical to enemy operations, and power, defensive positions, lines of com- their destruction can severely degrade munication (LOC), key installations, and enemy combat power over the long term. movement of reserves. By tracking movers Identification and location of sitters may in the area of interest, precise times and provide indicators of enemy intentions. locations for attacking HPTs may be determined. Movers are often lucrative Information collected against each of targets themselves. these targets may be used as combat information, as direct targeting data, and as Since virtually every unit on the battle- intelligence. field uses communications and noncommunications emitters, electromagnetic The resources available to each com- emissions are especially lucrative sources of mander for use against the four target cate- information and intelligence. Analysis of gories are listed in the following table. electromagnetic emissions provides— Additionally, an enemy unit may be an emitter-shooter-sitter or emitter-mover □ Targeting data for fire support, offen- target at the same time. Therefore, more sive air support, and jamming than one resource may be employed against systems. the same target. □ Intelligence collected through the interception of enemy communications. □ Intelligence derived from traffic analysis and cryptanalysis. □ The identification and location of weapons, units, and systems through the detection and location of both communications and noncommunications emitters.

2-15 COLLECTION RESOURCES

MOVERS EMITTERS SHOOTERS SITTERS Interrogators X X Controlled Sources X X Counterintelllgence X X Reconnaissance X X X Troops X X X HF/VHF Intercept X VHF/UHF Intercept X Multichannel Intercept X NONCOM Intercept X SLAR X Photo X X X Infrared X X X X Airborne Radar (USAF) X X GSR X Weapons Locating Radar X Technical Intelligence Units X X X Special Operating Forces X X X X Fire Support Team (FIST) X X X Combat Aviation X X X Battlefield Surveillance X (Artillery) Radar X Air Defense Radar X

ELECTRONIC WARFARE EW is an essential element of combat power. Its contribution lies in exploiting enemy weakness, protecting friendly freedom of action, and reducing security and communication vulnerabilities. A modern military force depends on electronics for command and control of forces and employment of weapon systems. Because of this dependence on electronic devices, both friendly and enemy forces are vulnerable to action which can reduce the effectiveness of these devices or gain intelligence from them. EW functions are shown below.

2-16 ELECTRONIC WARFARE FUNCTIONS

ELECTRONIC WARFARE Military action involving the use of electromagnetic energy to determine, exploit, reduce, or prevent hostile use of the electromagnetic spectrum and action that retains friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum.

ELECTRONIC ELECTRONIC COUNTER- ELECTRONIC WARFARE COUNTERMEASURES SUPPORT MEASURES COUNTERMEASURES The part of EW involving The part of EW involving That part of EW involving actions actions taken to prevent taken (under direct control of actions taken to retain effective or reduce effective use of friendly use of the electromag- operational commander) to search the electromagnetic netic spectrum. for. intercept, locate, and identify spectrum by hostile sources of radiated electromag- force. netic energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition. Thus. ESM provides a source of X 1 information required for actions ANTI-ESM I ANTI-ECM involving ECM. ECCM. avoidance, targeting, and other tactical employment of forces. —I "H

EMISSION AVOIDANCE SYSTEM SYSTEM CONTROL DESIGN DEPLOYMENT. (EMCON) FREQUENCY CONTROL. OPERATOR TRAINING

ELECTRONIC JAMMING ELECTRONIC DECEPTION The deliberate radiation, reradiation or The deliberate radiation, reradiation, alteration, absorp- reflection of electromagnetic energy with tion. enhancement, or reflection of electromagnetic the object of degrading the effectiveness energy in a manner intended to mislead hostile forces in of electronic devices, equipment, or sys- the interpretation or use of information received by their tems being used by a hostile force electronic system

T SIMULATIVE ELECTRONIC MANIPULATIVE ELECTRONIC IMITATIVE DECEPTION (SED) DECEPTION (MED) ELECTRONIC The creation of electromagnetic The alteration of friendly electromag- DECEPTION (IED) emissions to represent friendly netic emission characteristics, patterns The introduction of notional or actual capabilities to or procedures to eliminate revealing or radiations into mislead hostile forces convey misleading, telltale indicators unfriendly channels that may be used by hostile forces. that imitate hostile emissions.

2-17 Defensive EW cannot physically destroy well controlled if it is to be effective. The a target. It can, however, when integrated objective of electronic deception is to into the overall concept of the operation, deceive enemy forces through their elec- confuse, deceive, delay, disorganize, and tronic systems. target the enemy. When other considera- Defensive EW are those actions taken to tions are equal, victory may go to the force ensure friendly effective use of the electro- that uses EW most effectively. EW is a magnetic spectrum. Commanders rely on command responsibility. It is a combat electronic emitters for C2 and for many power element having two facets—offensive other critical battlefield functions. The first and defensive. priority of defensive EW is to protect these Offensive EW is the employment of EW to emitters from enemy detection, location, disrupt or deny the enemy's effective use of and identification. CPs or weapon systems their electronic systems. It consists of ESM cannot survivè on the modern battlefield if and ECM. An understanding of its func- they can be located through their electronic tions is essential for planning, managing, emissions. Friendly use of the electromag- and directing the employment of EW. netic spectrum and the location of critical installations and systems are protected ESM include essentially the same func- through ECCM. tions as SIGINT but are focused on the more immediate requirements of the tactical ECCM are protective in nature and are commander. The relationship of ESM to planned around the commander's mission SIGINT is similar to the relationship of and concept of the operation. Planning be- combat information to intelligence. Tactical gins with the identification of essential resources performing SIGINT may perform friendly emitters and sensitive communica- ESM simultaneously with, or as part of, tions that must be protected. Friendly elec- SIGINT missions. The primary difference tronic emitters, signatures, and profiles are between ESM and SIGINT is how the evaluated based on their vulnerability to information is used. Generally, ESM is a enemy REC and SIGINT capabilities. producer of combat information that can be ECCM are then planned to overcome these used for ECM, fire, maneuver, or threat vulnerabilities. avoidance with little systematic analysis or ECCM are closely related to SIGSEC. The processing. SIGINT, however, requires primary difference lies in the type of infor- separate processing to produce the desired mation that is protected from enemy collec- product. ESM and SIGINT are mutually tion. ECCM protect friendly emitters from supporting. Information collected through enemy detection, location, and identifica- ESM may be processed to produce SIGINT. tion. ECCM conceal electromagnetic signa- SIGINT is essential to support EW. tures or deceive the enemy as to the location and identification of the emitter. SIGSEC, ECM includes electronic jamming and on the other hand, protects the information deception. One function of jamming is to that is transmitted through friendly C-E degrade the enemy's combat power by deny- systems from enemy exploitation. Many ing effective operations in the electromag- operator techniques may serve as both netic spectrum. Another function of jam- ECCM and SIGSEC measures. ming is to reduce the signal security (SIGSEC) of enemy operators and thereby ECCM, under the direction of the C-E gain information through ESM. Jamming officer, begin with training and are exe- may be subtle and difficult to detect, or it cuted by every element of the combat force may be overt and obvious. It can be that uses or is responsible for the use of accomplished from both ground and aerial electronic emitters. The responsibility for platforms. ECCM starts with commanders and extends to supervisors and operators at all Electronic deception is integrated with levels. Techniques for reducing friendly and extends and reinforces tactical decep- vulnerabilities to enemy REC efforts are tion operations. It requires unique and spe- directed through the Communications- cific training and planning and must be Electronics Operating Instructions (CEOI),

2-18 Communications-Electronics Standing Deception operations must be fully coordi- Instructions, standing operating procedures nated with affected friendly forces (adjacent (SOPs), and other instructions. and echelons above and below). Extreme The effectiveness of defensive EW is con- caution must be exercised to prevent com- tinually assessed to validate existing promising the deception plan during ECCM and to determine the necessity for coordination. additional measures. Defensive EW is fully CI plays a vital role in both deception described in FM 24-33. planning and operations. CI support to deception falls under three basic areas; COUNTERINTELLIGENCE □ Determination of enemy intelligence CI is that activity intended to detect, capabilities or efforts that may be sus- evaluate, counteract, or prevent hostile ceptible to deception. intelligence collection, subversion, sabo- □ Production of deception tage, international terrorism, or assassina- recommendations. tion conducted by or on behalf of any foreign power, organization, or person operat- □ Confirmation of the effectiveness of ing to the detriment of the US Army. It deception operations. includes the identification of the hostile With their knowledge of the enemy's mul- multidiscipline intelligence collection tidisciplined intelligence threat, CI person- threat, the determination of friendly vulne- nel of corps- and division-level battlefield rabilities to that threat, and the recommen- deception (BAT-D) cells are in a position to dation and evaluation of security measures. recommend offensive deception techniques CI operations are conducted to support to mislead the enemy. Once a deception OPSEC, deception, and the rear operations. operation is initiated, its effectiveness is evaluated through CI analysis and offen- Support to OPSEC sive tactical CI operations. CI personnel, in OPSEC is the process of denying adver- coordination with intelligence and decep- saries information about friendly capabili- tion analysts, monitor the effectiveness of ties and intentions by identifying, control- deception operations through the screening ling, and protecting indicators associated and interrogation of EPWs, line crossers, with planning and conducting military and refugees. They also analyze combat operations and other activities. CI supports information and all-source intelligence OPSEC by focusing on the hostile intelli- reports. gence threat and assisting in developing Support to Rear Operations methods of defeating that threat. In coordination with the operations staff, CI person- The threat to the rear area is a key con- nel help to compare friendly force profiles sideration when planning or conducting against enemy collection capabilities. The tactical operations. Both division and corps comparison results in the identification of rear areas are highly vulnerable to intelli- friendly vulnerabilities that must be pro- gence collection and combat operations tected; OPSEC measures are then developed conducted by conventional and unconven- to counter the enemy HUMINT, SIGINT, tional enemy forces. CI operations, con- and IMINT threat at each level. ducted in these areas, provide the intelligence needed to plan rear operations in Support to Deception order to preserve our freedom of action. Deception complements OPSEC and is, CI supports rear operations by determin- therefore, of significant interest to CI opera- ing the enemy's intelligence capability tions. Deception operations are conducted to against rear operations and recommending mislead the enemy as to our intentions and countermeasures to those vulnerabilities. CI capabilities, thereby causing a reaction that also identifies, exploits, and neutralizes rear assists us in achieving our objective. Battle- area threats, such as agents, saboteurs, field deception is deliberate action to enemy sympathizers, and special purpose achieve surprise on the battlefield. It is forces. CI support to rear operations begins directed against enemy commanders and intelligence and target acquisition systems.

2-19 before hostilities. Peacetime operations field artillery capability to collect, analyze, identify potential agents and sympathizers and disseminate targeting data. Organic that pose a threat to rear area security. IPB target acquisition resources provide infor- is used to determine most likely avenues of mation concerning the enemy through— approach to rear area targets. OPSEC mea- Visual observation. sures are developed to protect or minimize □ the threat to the target. During hostilities, □ Combat observation lasing teams. CI elements continue to assess the vulnera- □ Moving-target-locating radars. bilities of rear area bases and base clusters and to recommend countermeasures. They □ Weapon-locating radars. provide early warning of threats to rear □ Aerial observers. area operations and assist with the neutralization of such threats. Artillery fire support teams (FIST) operating with maneuver units are a major source of targeting and other combat information. SYSTEM ELEMENTS Combat information and targeting data The IEW system includes combat, combat are exchanged constantly between opera- support, and CSS elements. While MI units tions and intelligence staffs and the field provide dedicated IEW support, all units in artillery TOC. This exchange takes place the combat force, by virtue of their mission, through the FSEs at each tactical echelon. capabilities, and AOs, have an implied mis- FM 6-121 describes field artillery target sion of collecting and reporting informa- acquisition. tion. The IEW mission is accomplished Cavalry is a combined arms combat through the integrated efforts of all ele- maneuver force mounted in ground and ments of the force. In turn, every element aerial vehicles. It constitutes the primary relies on support from the IEW system to reconnaissance capability at corps and divi- accomplish its mission. sion. It is uniquely organized, equipped, and Maneuver units are among the best eyes trained to find the enemy and prevent the and ears of the command. Individual sol- friendly main body from being engaged diers and leaders provide a great deal of under adverse circumstances. Conducting real-time targeting and combat informa- these tasks, cavalry elements provide the tion. Maneuver units conduct patrols, cap- IEW system information about terrain, ture prisoners and documents, operate CPs, effects of weather on the terrain, and the and observe enemy forces with whom they presence or absence of the enemy. In turn, are in contact. They report information cavalry relies heavily on the IEW system about the activity of enemy first-echelon for support to plan and accomplish its mis- forces, patrols, and reconnaissance sion. FM 17-95 describes cavalry operations. elements. Air defense artillery (ADA) elements, Combat information and targeting data equipped with target acquisition radars, collected by maneuver units are normally provide surveillance information to the used by the collecting units to engage the commander. In addition to organic target enemy. Pertinent information is introduced acquisition radar, ADA elements have into the IEW system by the S2 or G2 of the direct access to and utilize long-range Air collecting unit. By collecting and reporting Force assets. They provide information information, maneuver units support the about air routes into the friendly area and IEW effort. They, in turn, receive intelli- enemy air activity throughout the area of gence, EW, and CI support from other ele- interest. ADA also provides statistical data ments of the system. about the destruction of enemy aircraft. FM Field artillery units provide the IEW sys- 44-1 describes ADA operations. tem with valuable information about enemy Engineers routinely conduct route, activity. The tactical fire direction system stream, bridge, obstacle, air landing facili- (TACFIRE) has markedly enhanced the ty, and support area reconnaissance. Units operating with forward-deployed forces

2-20 provide intelligence, combat information, Resulting information is processed and and other terrain data of value to the com- entered in the intelligence data base. Signal mander. Terrain teams at division, corps, elements provide specific support to EW and EAC provide terrain and trafficability operations by processing and reporting studies and route overlays. Given sufficient enemy MUI reports. FM 24-1 describes time, overprinted maps may be produced by combat communications. the corps cartographic company. FM 5-30 Civil affairs elements deal with people, describes engineer reconnaissance, while equipment, and documents which are prime FMs 5-146 and 21-32 describe engineer units sources of valuable information. They sig- and operations. nificantly aid intelligence and CI opera- Army aviation resources, which range tions by— over the entire battlefield, have unique □ Detecting and warning of sabotage capabilities to observe both friendly and activity. enemy activities. All aviation elements □ Detecting and reporting the transmis- have the mission to observe the battlefield sion of information and supplies to and report what they see. They provide enemy forces in the rear area, combat information and intelligence about unfriendly partisans, and guerrillas. enemy locations, equipment, and movement. They also provide weather observa- □ Locating and securing various records, tions and information about the terrain. periodical files, local publications, offi- Aviation elements are particularly well cial documents, technical equipment, suited to support OPSEC by detecting weak- blueprints, plans, or other information nesses in friendly camouflage and light dis- of interest to intelligence analysts. cipline. USAF assets flying close air support (CAS) missions have a similar Psychological operations (PSYOP) units capability and may be contacted through use intelligence as the basis for all opera- the air liaison officer (ALO). FM 1-100 de- tions. The objective of PSYOP is to modify scribes Army aviation operations. the behavior and decrease the combat effec- Military police (MP) are responsible for tiveness of enemy soldiers and units. good order and discipline and the collection, PSYOP intelligence personnel collect movement, and control of EPW. Alert and information on the attitudes, susceptibili- well-trained MP personnel can provide valu- ties, and vulnerabilities of enemy forces. able information on prisoner behavior, rear PSYOP units provide intelligence and in area activities, and terrorism. FM 19-1 de- turn depend on the IEW system for intelli- scribes MP operations. gence to support their operations. FM 33-1 describes psychological operations in a Combat service support (CSS) units make combat environment. extensive use of road networks and provide valuable information about lines of communication, guerrilla activity, and weather ECHELON ARCHITECTURE and terrain conditions. The IEW architecture includes the direc- CSS and MP provide information useful tors, coordinators, producers, and executors in resource and refugee control and rear at each echelon of command. The following operations. FMs 100-10 and 55-40 describe pages describe that architecture at each supply and transportation operations. echelon from company to national level. It Signal, ordnance, medical, and chemical describes the capabilities for collecting and units provide assistance in their technical processing all-source information at each areas of expertise by evaluating captured echelon against enemy mover, emitter, enemy materiel. Medical units provide intel- shooter, and sitter targets. ligence by evaluating captured enemy medical materiel and also by providing information concerning the state of health of the enemy by medically evaluating selected EPWs, refugees, defectors, and escapees.

2-21 MANEUVER COMPANIES company intelligence operations. They direct and coordinate company resources to Maneuver companies (and troops) form satisfy company IEW requirements and the broad base of the IEW system and are those levied by the battalion. They request the reason for the existence of much of the additional support from the battalion when system. Companies close with and destroy required. the enemy and, through direct contact, collect significant quantities of timely, accu- Company commanders need, almost rate information of value to themselves and exclusively, combat information which higher echelons. They, in turn, are sup- requires no processing or analysis. Any ported by their parent battalions, brigades, analysis required is done as a mental pro- divisions, and higher echelons. cess by the commanders and subordinate leaders. More detailed processing require- Many of the information needs at this ments are satisfied by battalion and higher level are satisfied by resources assigned to echelon staffs. the companies. Company commanders are concerned most about the enemy, weather, Company commanders direct the opera- and terrain in their immediate areas—most tions of company elements to satisfy IEW of which they obtain through visual recon- requirements. They direct the placement of naissance performed personally or by their organic sensors and those attached to, or subordinates. Targets are acquired and placed in direct support (DS) of, their units. immediately attacked. If an enemy moves These organic sensors include low-level to the right or left, it is noted, and higher intrusion detection systems, while GSR and adjacent units are notified. may be attached to the company. Compa- nies deploy patrols and OPs and task sub- In the course of collecting information for ordinate platoons to collect the information their own use, companies also collect infor- needed. Company EW requirements are mation and capture exploitable sources of very limited and are usually satisfied by information of significant value to higher higher echelons. However, the company commands. This information may include may be tasked to orchèstrate the use of indications of enemy morale, training, and company electronic emitters to support the combat effectiveness; the appearance of deception operations of higher echelons. CI new weapons; and changes in tactics. Such support to company OPSEC is provided as information is passed to battalion for use part of the support provided to the brigade and for processing and reporting to higher and battalion. echelons. Captured enemy soldiers, equipment, and documents are evacuated for The fire support team (FIST) located with exploitation. The results of such actions the company is a critical collector of infor- may prove to be of significant value as mation of intelligence value. As they either tactical or strategic intelligence. observe the battlefield and develop targeting data, this information is forwarded and Company commanders are the directors, analyzed to produce intelligence. coordinators, producers, and executors of The resources available to the company commander for the execution of IEW requirements are depicted in the following illustration.

2-22 COMPANY RESOURCES

RESOURCES $ NOMINAL RANGE 3 km 5 km 10 km I ' _J ORGANIC RESOURCES Troops Patrols

SUPPORTING RESOURCES / Vehicles GSR Personnel REMS FIST

COMPANY BATTLE

* CSD ? S

1^1

v: 3^: ZT FIRST ECHELON SECOND ECHELON

(X) NOTE. Range Approximateö

2-23 BATTALIONS other plans as necessary. It uses the maneuver companies, scout platoon, FIST, The battalion, like the company, relies GSR teams, and other available and sup- primarily on combat information for the porting units to collect information needed execution of the battle. However, its intelli- by the battalion. It forwards requests for gence requirements exceed those of compa- information and support that are beyond nies. The battalion receives information the capability of battalion assets to the bri- from the companies and other available col- gade or adjacent battalion BICCs. lection resources which must be processed to a limited degree and passed to the battal- The BICC provides the battalion with a ion commander and brigade S2. The battal- limited analysis capability. It maintains a ion, in turn, provides support to its subordi- small intelligence data base and analyzes nate companies. For these reasons, the bat- and integrates information to produce talion is provided a larger IEW capability target data and intelligence. It promptly than the companies. disseminates combat information to the battalion staff and to higher, lower, and Coordinators adjacent units. The coordinators of battalion IEW opera- The battalion BICC is a key link in the tions are the battalion S2 and S3 supported intelligence system. It is the first processing by their respective staff sections and the element to receive front-line information BICC. As previously described, the S2 has about the enemy. It is a key element in staff responsibility for intelligence to expediting the flow of that information. include combat information, security, and CI. The S3 is responsible for EW and EW functions are completed as necessary OPSEC. by the S3 staff supported by the S2 section. At battalion level, the S2 is concerned Executors primarily with coordinating combat information and reconnaissance and surveil- The executors at battalion level are the lance operations. He plans and coordinates commanders of the companies and other the operations of resources organic to the units organic to, or supporting, the battal- battalion and to the MI battalion and field ion. Tasking for reconnaissance patrols, artillery resources supporting the battalion. GSR or remotely employed sensors (REMS) Requirements which exceed the capabilities requirements, and observation missions are of these resources are passed to the brigade passed to the companies, scout platoon, or S2. FIST. MI resources attached to, or supporting, the battalion may be allocated to the The battalion S3's responsibilities for companies or held under battalion control. EW, especially offensive EW, and OPSEC Those held at battalion are tasked directly are relatively limited. Jamming and CI by the S2 and S3. requirements are normally submitted to, and satisfied by, the brigade or higher Of the organic resources listed above, of headquarters. primary importance to the S2 is the scout platoon. Although the S3 has the responsi- Producers blity for planning and directing the overall operations of the scout platoon, the S2 must The battalion BICC is the primary pro- recommend aggressive reconnaissance mis- ducer of intelligence. It consists of one sions for it. Additionally, when the scout officer and one enlisted analyst. Under the platoon is in a screening or security role, control and supervision of the S2, the BICC the S2 must ensure that collection missions prepares the reconnaissance and surveil- are integrated into the operations of the lance plan, an informal collection plan, and scout platoon. These require constant active coordination with the S3 and the scout platoon leader. The resources of the battalion are depicted in the following illustration.

2-24 BATTALION RESOURCES

NOMINAL RANGE'

RESOURCES 3km 5km 10km 20km i

BATTALION HHC SCOUT PLT FIST LINE COMPANIES FRONT LINE TROOPS

ATTACHED Ml ASSETS GSR TROOPS' VEHICLES' REMS3

SUPPORTING AVIATION VISUAL OBSERVATION BATTALION BATTLE

■III*

$8$

■HIT; V.

FIRST ECHELON SECOND ECHELON

(X) NOTE: Range Approximated 1 - range is 1.5 km in light division 2 - range is 3 km in light division 3 - currently in airborne division only 4 - range for initial planning. Actual range depends on weather, terrain, enemy deployment, and location of enemy sensors.

2-25 BRIGADES As at battalion, the S2 is responsible for intelligence, security, and CI. Although CI Divisional brigades have no organic IEW requirements at brigade are limited, they do resources other than the staff sections and exceed those of the battalion and must be the brigade BICC. Still, the scope of brigade satisfied. Generally, the S2 identifies CI IEW operations is much greater than that requirements and requests support through of the battalion. To meet requirements, the the IEW support element (IEWSE). The S2 brigade commander relies on subordinate is also responsible for supervising the bri- battalions and support provided by ele- gade's BICC and for staff supervision of ments attached from the division MI battal- intelligence and CI operations supporting ion and other division elements in the bri- the brigade. gade's area. These normally include a field artillery (FA) battalion, an ADA unit, and Brigade S3 responsibilities for EW far combat engineers. MI support will normally outweigh those at the battalion level. The include an IEW support element (IEWSE) to brigade normally has EW resources provide liaison between the brigade and the deployed in its area. Therefore, the brigade MI battalion. MI support will also include S2 and S3, supported by the IEWSE and the IEW assets deemed appropriate; these may BICC, identify the requirements and coor- be attached (such as a surveillance squad), dinate actions to satisfy them. Most impor- placed in direct support (such as CI or inter- tantly, the S3 integrates EW with fire and rogation teams), or task organized into an maneuver to maximize its effectiveness. IEW company team (such as collection and Producers jamming assets). An IEW company team may be DS to the brigade or GS to the divi- The producers at brigade include the sion and deployed forward in the brigade BICC, the IEWSE, and the transcription sector. METT-T drives the stated command and analysis (T&A) team of the supporting or support relationship. C&J platoon, if one is part of an MI team operating in DS of the brigade. The IEW requirements of the brigade still The functions of the brigade BICC are emphasize combat information; however, similar to those of the battalion. However, the need for intelligence, EW, and CI sup- intelligence requirements, particularly port is of nearly equal importance. Combat analysis and production, are greater than information is required for the operation in those of the battalion. The brigade BICC progress. Intelligence is required for plan- coordinates closely with the IEW support ning operations for the next 12 to 24 hours. element to ensure the intelligence effort ECM is essential to reinforce fire and between organic collection assets and sup- maneuver in disrupting the C2 of enemy porting MI assets are effectively coordi- first- and second-echelon regiments. Addi- nated. The brigade BICC— tionally, the brigade is the focal point for CI support for itself and its subordinate □ Develops and coordinates the collec- battalions. tion plan. Coordinators □ Prepares and transmits tasking messages and requests for information to The S2 and S3 are the coordinators of satisfy collection requirements. IEW operations at brigade level. Working closely, these two staff officers identify the □ Develops data for the brigade S2's IEW requirements and coordinate actions to informal intelligence estimate. satisfy them. □ Develops and maintains the intelligence data base. □ Processes intelligence. □ Disseminates combat information and intelligence. □ Provides intelligence support to EW and OPSEC.

2-26 y

The IEWSE is provided to the brigade by The battalions perform reconnaissance, the divisional MI battalion to coordinate surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) the operations of MI elements operating in operations, and report information to the the brigade area. An IEWSE is deployed brigade. These operations may be a result of with each brigade, regardless of whether normal battalion operations or specific there are MI assets directly supporting the tasking from the brigade. The resources brigade or only GS MI assets in the brigade used have been previously described in this area. It acts as the primary link between chapter. the brigade TOC and the MI battalion. It provides the S2 and S3 information from The nonorganic resources operating in MI elements, advice and assistance in support of the brigade, such as artillery, air planning the use of MI assets, and is the defense (AD), and engineer units, also per- channel for passing brigade requirements form RSTA activities as they conduct their to MI elements. It assists the S2 and S3 in operations. Artillery radar locates enemy identifying and requesting additional sup- indirect fire systems, while their forward port from division, and if a company team observers collect information on enemy is not formed, it coordinates the CSS needed units close to the FLOT. AD elements by MI elements deployed in the brigade observe enemy aircraft and report informa- area. tion on their routes, numbers, and tactics. Engineer units observe the condition of ter- The T&A team is part of the C&J platoon rain and obstacles, as well as enemy (voice collection platoon in light division) activities. and is deployed as part of the platoon's headquarters. It performs selective scan- When diverse MI resources are deployed ning and gisting of voice intercepts to support a brigade, the MI battalion recorded by collection teams. When neces- commander may organize them into a DS sary, extracts or complete translations of IEW company team. This is done to sim- voice intercepts may be made. The team plify the C2 and sustainment of these performs very limited analysis. It reports resources. When this type of IEW company acquired combat information to the IEWSE team is formed, the team commander exer- and passes all intercepted information and cises C2 of all MI battalion resources in the technical data to the MI battalion's techni- company team. The IEW company team is cal control and analysis element (TCAE). further described in Chapter 6. The combined actions of the producers result in coordinated IEW support respon- The light division has organic interroga- sive to the brigade commander's needs. The tion teams which may be placed in DS of a BICC assists the S2 and S3 in planning and brigade (as will the heavy division, if teams coordinating intelligence collection, EW, are attached from corps). A type interroga- and CI support, and performs limited anal- tion team has five members. In DS at bri- ysis for the production of intelligence. The gade, this team will concentrate on screen- analysis function, to include IPB, is limited ing as many EPWs or detainees as possible. at the brigade level. Brigade relies on divi- Those EPWs or detainees found to be sion for IPB products and detailed all- knowledgeable and cooperative during the source intelligence analysis. screenings will be given brief interrogations. All combat information obtained from these EPWs or detainees will be Executors reported as rapidly as possible. The interrogation team can also translate documents and act as interpreters, but such activities The executors at brigade level include the are not their primary mission. The interro- battalions subordinate to the brigade, the gation team is tasked by and reports to the DS FA battalion, air defense and engineer brigade S2. elements, and attached or DS MI elements.

2-27 Ad hoc OPSEC evaluation teams, formed The platoon headquarters provides direc- by the division G3, assist the brigade com- tion and control of the platoon. It is the mander in evaluating OPSEC posture. focal point for tasking and reporting asso- These teams normally consist of unit per- ciated with platoon operations. It provides sonnel with expertise in the areas to be the necessary interface between the TCAE, monitored and CI personnel. The teams the IEWSE, and the teams assigned to the advise of possible compromises and recom- platoon. mend adjustments to current OPSEC mea- The T&A team and its functions were sures. They identify weaknesses and risks described earlier. by examining unit and CP communications signatures and tactical deployment, deter- The voice collection team intercepts and mine vulnerabilities to enemy collection summarizes high frequency (HF) and VHF systems, and identify compromises of voice communications. It also has a capa- EEFI. bility to provide line of bearing (LOB) information for intercepted transmissions. The surveillance squad is organic to the Recordings, intercept summaries, and LOB divisional MI battalion. It is task organized data are sent to the T&A team for further processing and dissemination.

COLLECTION AND JAMMING PLATOON. Ml BATTALION (HEAVY DIVISION)

C&J PLT

T&A TM VOICE COLL TM

HF/VHF VHF ECM TM ECM TM by the MI battalion in response to division The platoon is capable of jamming HF tasking to meet brigade requirements. and VHF communications in close opera- Normally, the GSR squad is attached to the tions. In extreme situations, the orientation brigade. The brigade may further attach the of team operations may be switched from assets of the squad to maneuver battalions. attacking enemy communications to assist- The brigade may hold some teams under its ing friendly communications and deception control to support such missions as flank operations. If critical communications are security. The squad leader is the executor blocked by enemy jammers, the teams' for brigade taskings to teams held under high-powered equipment can be used to brigade control, and also performs coordi- pass emergency messages despite enemy nation, support, and supervision for parent jamming signals. unit responsibilities for teams further at- In the light division, the C&J platoon is tached to battalions. replaced by a voice collection platoon. This As part of a DS IEW company team, a platoon may be deployed as part of an IEW C&J platoon may also be tasked to support company team in DS of a brigade, and con- the brigade. See the illustration above for sists of a T&A team, a voice collection team, the C&J platoon organization. and two low-level voice intercept (LLVI) teams. The T&A and voice collection teams

2-28 BRIGADE RESOURCES

NOMINAL RANGE' RESOURCES 10km 20km 30km 40km & T T Organic Battalions Front Line Troops Patrols/Scouts DS Artillery Battalion i Visual Observation CM/CB Radar ADA Company Visual Observation Radar Ml Company Team2 Interrogators2 Counterintelligence2 GSR Vehicles' / Personnel HF/VHF Intercept HF/VHF Jamming' Engineers Visual Observation Combat Aviation Visual Observation H BRIGADE BATTLE ■ XX. >1 " OH ISI cz> II

IS m ISI

iMi

•XX- NOTE: Range Approximated v: FIRST ECHELON SECOND ECHELON 1. Range for planning. Actual range depends on terrain, weather, enemy deployment, and location of friendly sensors. 2. Usually deployed in brigade area. May be GS to division or DS to brigade. 3. Range indefinite. Based on information obtained through exploitation of HUMINT sources. 4. GSR range is 1.5km for personnel and 3km for vehicles in light division. 5. No ground-based jamming in light division.

2-29 teams are structured as described above. The There is no standard method for organiz- LLVI teams are equipped with manpacked ing the division intelligence and operations ESM systems and are deployed on foot to staffs. Each division staff is organized augment the voice collection capability in according to its own unique missions, the brigade area. threat, AO, and resources. A type organiza- Further details on brigade and battalion tion for the division intelligence staff is IEW assets and operations are located in illustrated below. FM 34-80. Within the DTOC, the intelligence staff The resources available to the brigade, functionally integrates with sections of the and their general capabilities, are depicted DTOC support element. G2 section in the illustration on page 2-29. branches coordinate closely with their counterparts in the DTOC support element to ensure that the intelligence effort is coor- DIVISIONS dinated and satisfies the commander's Resources available at division include a requirements. substantial coordinating staff; a multidisci- The G2 operations branch, based on G2 plined MI battalion; and various troop guidance, directs and coordinates intelli- units, such as FA, ADA, engineer, and avia- gence, CI, division SSO, staff weather team, tion. MI resource are allocated to the bri- and the engineer terrain team operations. It gades and lower levels, data bases are coordinates the daily operations of the G2 maintained for complete intelligence analy- staff within the DTOC, providing intelli- sis, and technical control is provided for gence to the division commander, the other ESM and ECM operations. coordinating staff, and the special staff. It ensures that intelligence requirements to Coordinators support current operations are satisfied, to include the dissemination of intelligence The coordinators at division are the G2 and combat information. It coordinates and G3, supported by their respective staffs. closely with the G3 operations branch and The G2 has staff responsibility for identify- FSE to ensure that intelligence and CI ing requirements and planning and coordi- operations are integrated with and support nating intelligence and CI operations. For- the commander's scheme of maneuver and mulation of division document and the fire support targeting effort. personnel security policy is also a G2 function. The G3 performs similar functions for The G2 plans and exercises branch for- EW and OPSEC. mulates and coordinates intelligence and CI for future and contingency operations by close coordination with intelligence personnel assigned to the G3 plans branch. The G2 directs the DTOC support element to

DIVISION INTELLIGENCE STAFF

I 1 OPERATIONS TERRAIN PLANS & SECURITY SSO WEA BRANCH TEAM (DS) EXERCISE BRANCH TEAM BRANCH

DTOC SUPPORT ELEMENT (DTOCSE) NOTE: 1. DTOC support element personnel perform duty in G2 and G3 staff branches. 2. Special staff element under staff supervision of ACofS, G2.

2-30 ensure that intelligence support to planning branches, close coordination between them is provided, to include IPB and target value is mandatory. The EWS, or personnel from analysis (TVA). the EWS, may be integrated within, or collocated with, the FSE to ensure that EW is The security branch develops division integrated with lethal fire support. Ulti- security policies and assesses the security mately, the EW effort must complement the status of the command. It coordinates with fire support operations in the same manner the CI analysis section of the DTOC sup- as do close air operations or naval gunfire port element for security assistance and CI operations. This integration of EW and fire support to OPSEC. support will provide the commander with a The G2 DTOC and tactical and rear CP total effort to support combined arms elements may be staffed as separate operations. branches or the necessary resources may be The BAT-D cell of the MI battalion is also drawn from other G2 branches. The G2 a coordinator. It augments the G3 staff and element at the tactical CP provides the divi- coordinates with other elements with the sion commander and staff with the intelli- DTOC, adjacent units, and higher and gence support required to conduct close lower echelons, to ensure that deception operations. The element must be small and operations are synchronized with division capable of continuous operations. The G2 operations and plans. The overall deception tactical CP element coordinates closely with plan developed by the corps BAT-D cell is the G2 operations branch and DTOC sup- integrated into the division operation by the port element at the division main CP to division's BAT-D cell. The various "signa- ensure that it is aware of current deep and ture" teams of the cell then deploy within rear operations as well as intelligence plans the division's AO to execute limited decep- for future operations. tion events. In this sense, the BAT-D cell is The organizational branches of the divi- also an executor. sion G3 section operate in much the same manner as the branches of the G2 section. Producers There are, however, several additional branches that are involved with IEW opera- The DTOC support element is the pro- tions that deserve comment. ducer at division level. The sections com- prising the DTOC support element are The EWS and OPSEC staff element aug- shown in the following organization chart. ment the G3 for the management of divi- The supporting weather and terrain teams sion EW and OPSEC operations. The and the field artillery intelligence officer OPSEC staff element helps the G3 develop (FAIO), while not part of the DTOC support the command OPSEC program and super- element, collocate with, and function as, vise its implementation. essential elements of the DTOC. The EWS operates closely with the G3 The DTOC support element augments the operations and plans branches. This G2 and G3 staff sections for IEW operations ensures that offensive EW is accurately in field and garrison situations. It supports coordinated into the division's operations, the coordinating staff functions of estimat- is compatible with the commander's PIR ing, recommending, planning, ordering, and IR, and supports his concept of opera- and supervising the execution of plans and tion. The EWS must ensure that EW opera- orders. Generally, the G3 has staff supervi- tions are compatible with the fire support sion only of the EWS and OPSEC staff ele- element (FSE) of the division staff. This ment which are collocated with the G3 sec- functional integration between the FSE and tion. The remaining sections are under the the EWS is a continuous process and staff supervision of the G2. Formal tasking ensures that the efforts of these branches of sections is through the DTOC support are not committed piecemeal to the battle. While security considerations may preclude a physical collocation of these two

2-31 DTOC SUPPORT ELEMENT

DTOC SPT ELM CHIEF

ALL-SOURCE OPSEC MGT CM&D PROCESSING & ANALYSIS EWS SECTION SECTION SECTION

I 1 FIELD OPSEC 1 1 USAF 1 TERRAIN 1 ARTILLERY STAFF 1 WEA TM TEAM I INTELLIGENCE ELEMENT I I I I OFFICER • I I I

Supporting element ! ! ! J

element chief; however, direct daily contact, MI battalion TOC. Missions for non-MI to include informal tasking and direction assets are passed to the G3 for tasking. The between G2 staff elements and the DTOC division CM&D forwards requests to the support element sections, is essential. corps CM&D when they cannot be collected by division assets. The section disseminates In field operations, the DTOC support combat information and intelligence element normally deploys as a single entity throughout the command and to higher and and is physically collocated with the DTOC. adjacent commands. The collection management and dissemination (CM&D) section performs collection The ASPS performs the division's IPB management for intelligence operations. and brings together information from all Through collection planning it translates sources to be analyzed, processed, corre- the commander's intelligence requirements lated, and integrated into products to meet into collection missions. Missions to be the commander's needs. It develops and accomplished by MI assets are tasked to the maintains an extensive intelligence data base to include IPB and OB data and data

2-32 on enemy intelligence collection and air ion TOC for action. The section's functions defense capabilities. It identifies gaps in the include— intelligence effort and cues the CM&D section for adjustments in the collection plan. □ Evaluating the vulnerability of enemy The ASPS receives national intelligence communications to ECM. products and sensitive compartmented information (SCI) from corps. This reliance □ Developing EW target lists which on SCI requires close coordination with the recommend targets for ECM to support SSO. current and planned operations. The CI analysis section, under the staff □ Recommending priority of effort for supervision of the G2, provides CI analysis division jamming operations. support to OPSEC, rear operations, and Preparing EW estimates and annexes deception. It supports the command's □ to operations orders (OPORDs). OPSEC program by working with the OPSEC staff element in the comparison of □ Coordinating ECM controls. enemy collection capabilities with divi- □ Assisting the G3 in evaluating the sional profiles to identify vulnerabilities effectiveness of jamming and elec- and OPSEC measures. It supports the rear tronic deception and recommending operations mission by identifying and changes. recommending taking action to neutralize level I and II threats. It supports deception □ Evaluating enemy REC efforts and planning by recommending deception tech- recommending appropriate ECCM. niques as an OPSEC measure or in support The FAIO, assigned to the FSE, operates of battlefield deception operations. with the ASPS in the DTOC. The FAIO The OPSEC staff element helps the G3 to assists in identifying targeting and target fulfill OPSEC responsibilities. Working development requirements, and evaluates closely with the CI analysis section, it per- incoming reports to identify pertinent tar- forms the OPSEC management functions geting data and facilitates its transmission necessary for development and implemen- to the FSE. tation of the command's OPSEC program. A terrain team from the EAC engineer In addition to these management tasks, the topographic battalion is provided for DS element's specific duties are to— terrain analysis to each division and corps. □ Assist the G3 develop EEFI. The teams normally collocate with the ASPS and also provide general support □ Prepare the command's OPSEC plans (GS) to subordinate units of the supported and annexes. headquarters. They support the ASPS in its □ Provide input to and review deception IPB function by providing a range of ter- plans and related publications and rain products, to include IPB graphics. The documents. teams maintain a close relationship with the parent EAC battalion for additional □ Prepare and maintain the command support beyond their capabilities. OPSEC SOP. The USAF weather team provides opera- Develop, implement, and supervise □ tional weather support to the division. Per- command OPSEC training and educa- sonnel from the supporting USAF Air tion programs. Weather Service (AWS) unit staff this section. Common equipment, such as vehicles, The EWS plans and coordinates EW generators, and communications gear is operations to ensure that they are inte- supplied and maintained by the division grated with, and support, fire and headquarters, headquarters company. Spe- maneuver. A primary function of the EWS cialized equipment is provided by the AWS. is the management of ECM operations. It The chief of the weather team, the SWO, is coordinates closely with the FSE to ensure a division special staff officer. The weather that ECM and fires are fully integrated. team works closely with the ASPS and ter- ECM missions are passed to the MI battal- rain team in the DTOC.

2-33 Executors The C&J, EW, and intelligence and sur- The principal executor at division level is veillance companies (MI) and the long- the commander of the divisional MI battal- range surveillance detachment (LRSD) pro- ion. He normally controls and directs the vide dedicated IEW resources to execute operations of all MI assets assigned, at- assigned IEW missions. The C&J company tached, or in support of the division. Other consists of three C&J platoons and com- executors include all major elements of the munications assets. The C&J platoons were division. Included are the commanders of described earlier under brigade, since the brigades; armored cavalry squadron; they are often part of an IEW company division artillery; engineer, ADA, and avia- team placed in DS of brigades. The com- tion units; as well as all other combat sup- munications assets provide radio teletype- port and CSS units assigned to, or support- writer (RATT) systems which connect the ing, the division. C&J platoons to the TCAE. The EW company consists of communications assets Within the MI battalion, the battalion and a SIGINT-processing platoon. The TOC provides centralized management of SIGINT-processing platoon includes the organic and supporting MI assets. It oper- communications emitter locating system ates under the direct supervision of the MI (TRAILBLAZER) and noncommunications battalion S3, responding to IEW mission intercept teams. These assets are normally requirements received from the G2 and G3. employed in GS of the division. The SIGINT-processing platoon also contains The battalion TOC consists of the S2 and an analysis team to provide limited process- S3 sections and the TCAE. The S3 section ing of intercepted signals. provides staff support to the S3 and manages and tasks intelligence and surveillance The intelligence and surveillance com- assets. The MI battalion S2 section main- pany provides CI, interrogation, and sur- tains the current enemy situation and pro- veillance support to the division. It is vides advice to the S3 to support tasking of organized with an operations support ele- all non-SIGINT EW assets. ment and a GSR platoon. The operations support element consists of CI and interrogation assets which provide GS to the divi- The TCAE provides technical control of sion. If CI and interrogation augmentation SIGINT and EW assets in response to task- is received from corps, some elements may ing from the MI battalion S3. It maintains be placed in DS of a brigade. The surveil- the enemy electronic order of battle (EOB), lance platoon provides GSR support to the including SIGINT or REC threat and tech- division. A surveillance squad normally nical data bases. It analyzes and correlates supports each brigade. GSR assets may be ESM and SIGINT data from all sources to placed in support of maneuver battalions update the technical data base and produce and companies. SIGINT. SIGINT data is passed to the ASPS for correlation with other informa- The LRSD provides collection in the divi- tion and intelligence. Data on enemy sion's areas of operations and interest. It SIGINT and REC is posted to the CI analy- performs passive surveillance to observe, sis and OPSEC staff elements for use by evaluate, and report enemy dispositions, counter-SIGINT and deception personnel. facilities, and activities. It also reports on The following chart shows the MI battalion terrain and weather conditions. Specifi- (CEWI) (heavy division) organization. cally, the detachment— □ Conducts long-range intelligence collection through reconnaissance and surveillance. □ Determines and reports the location, strength, equipment, disposition, organization, and movement of enemy forces and determines the location of high value targets (HVTs).

2-34 H l i > SO Ml < BN H —T" • • • m HQ & HQ C&J INTEL LONG SURVL EW RANGE SVC CO CO CO CO o SURVL m i z r o BATTLE- OPS SIGINT C&J RADIO RADIO BASE m FIELD BN HQ TCAE (3 SPT PROC PLT SEC SEC STATIONS (2) a DEC CELL ELM PLT > H -H FOOD VOICE CI ANAL LRS > SVC COLL TM (2) SEC TM (6)

COMM VHF INTG (2) O PLT ECM TM MCS (2) m £ MECH HF/ GSR MAINT VHF OUT PLT STATION (3) m TM ECM > < < GSR o T&A (3) NONCOM (3) SQD TM < ÔÔ 5

CO to ac The ECM and intercept platoons have □ Conducts damage assessments and similar capabilities to those of the divi- NBC monitoring. sional MI battalion. The active component □ Emplaces and uses unattended sensors (AC) MI battalion (tactical exploitation and electronics intelligence, target (TE)) at corps can provide voice and acquisition, and designation noncommunications intercept and VHF equipment. ECM resources. When mobilized, the reserve component (RC) MI battalion (TE) □ Employs photographic and night provides voice and noncommunications image enhancement devices. intercept and HF and VHF ECM assets. □ Obtains information on possible drop Their augmentation expands the capacity zones (DZs) and landing zones (LZs) to fulfill the division's SIGINT and EW for airborne and air assault operations. mission. The MI battalion exercises OPCON over Interrogation and CI teams from the the QUICKFIX flight platoon, a GS asset, corps MI brigade may be placed in DS of which is organic to the GS aviation com- the division or may be placed in a GS rein- pany, combat support aviation battalion, forcing role at the division main EPW col- aviation brigade. The QUICKFIX flight lection point. These teams are provided by platoon provides three airborne COMINT both the active and reserve components MI and EW (QUICKFIX) systems to provide battalions (TE). aerial communications intercept, locating, The MI battalions of the light, airborne, and jamming support. and air assault divisions have different structures, company titles, missions, and In addition to organic resources, divisions equipment. Details of their organizations may be supported by ECM and intercept and capabilities are explained in Chapter 2, platoons and CI and interrogation teams FM 34-10. from corps. Each of these reinforces the organic capabilities of (and are controlled A detailed description of division IEW by) the MI battalion. assets and operations is also provided in FM 34-10. The major resources of the division, to include their general capabilities, are summarized in the following illustration.

DIVISION RESOURCES

NOMINAL RANGE1 RESOURCE 10km 20km 30km 40km 50km 60km

BRIGADES/BATTALIONS Front Line Troops Recon Patrols --- H COMBAT AVIATION BRIGADE Ground Recon -H Aerial Recon j Aerial COMINT2 , Aerial Jamming2 H DIVARTY Visual Observation -H MTI Radar i CM/CB Radar , FA Aerial Observers H

2-36 DIVISION RESOURCES (continued)

10km 20km 40km 50km 60km ADA BATTALION i i 30)< m ■ Visual Observation I NOMINAL RANGE1 Radar

ENGINEER BATTALION Within visual line-of-sight of assigned elements MP COMPANY Within visual line-of-sight of assigned elements

DISCOM Within visual line-of-sight of assigned elements

Ml BATTALION Interrogation3 CP LRS Detachment COMINT H ELINT • i Jamming ■ \ Ground Survl Radar ...... - Vehicles — — - H - Personnel — —| 1 Range for initial planning. Actual range depends on terrain, weather, enemy deployment, and location of friendly sensor. 2 Employed under OPCON of Ml battalion. 3 Range indefinite; based on information obtained through exploitation of HUMINT sources.

DIVISION BATTLE XXXX i

IM ( )

M M XX-

( > xx M m s M M ■ i a XX-

M ' *

M M -.XXXX— yJ v_ y FIRST ECHELON SECOND ECHELON

2-37 ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT Coordinators AND SEPARATE BRIGADES The ACR and separate brigade coordina- The armored cavalry regiment (ACR) and tors of IEW operations are the S2 and S3; separate brigade requirements are, to a however, their responsibilities are expanded degree, similar to those of the division. In over those of their counterparts in the divi- fact, the multidisciplined MI company sional brigades. In fact, the responsibilities assigned at these levels is a miniature divi- and functions of the S2 and S3 of the ACR sional MI battalion. Still, there are signifi- and separate brigade are very similar to cant differences in the way the ACR and those of the division G2 and G3. The major separate brigades are employed and in their difference is that the scope changes with respective MI companies. the size of the unit and the mission assigned.

Ml BATTALION (HEAVY DIVISION) - Ml COMPANY (ACR) COMPARISON

Ml BATTALION Ml COMPANY

Ml BATTALION TOC Ml COMPANY TOC TCAE TCAE C&J COMPANY C&J PLATOONS (2) EW COMPANY CI TEAMS (l&S CO) CI TEAM (OPS SPT PLT) INTO TEAMS (l&S CO) INTO TEAM (OPS SPT PLT) SURVL PLT (l&S CO) SURVL PLT COMM PLT (HHSC) COMM PLT MECH PLT(HHSC) SVC PLT

DTOC SPT ELEMENT1 RTOC SPT ELEMENT2 QUICKFIX FLT PLT3 (OPCON) QUICKFIX FLT PLT" (OPCON)

1. In division HHC 2. In regiment HHT 3. In GS AVN Co, AVN Bde 4. In CBT AVN Sqn

2-38 Producers The surveillance platoon provides GSR for battlefield surveillance and early warn- The ACR and separate brigade coordinating. The platoon is composed of three sur- ing staffs are provided a TOC support ele- veillance squads, each equipped with two ment from their headquarters troop or com- radar sets. Normally, one squad is attached pany. The TOC support element reinforces to each squadron. The platoon deploys them the S2 and S3 by providing collection man- for early warning, combat surveillance, or agement, all-source production, and EW target acquisition. planning and mission management. The TCAE carries out the SIGINT/EW man- The C&J platoons are identical to the MI agement functions similar to the division's battalion's C&J platoons. The platoons TCAE. OPSEC and CI support planning is provide voice collection and HF and VHF carried out by the CI team of the operations jamming. A T&A team is assigned to each support section. The CI team also conducts to perform limited transcription and analy- CI surveys. The modified table of organiza- sis. In the separate brigade's MI company, tion and equipment of the ACR does not there are only voice collection assets—no provide for an SSO. This duty position must jammers. be resourced by available personnel assets. The operations support platoon provides Executors interrogation and CI support. Both resources are used in GS of the ACR. The executors of IEW operations in the ACR and separate brigade include the The QUICKFIX flight platoon (OPCON) commanders of the MI companies, the sub- provides airborne communications inter- ordinate squadrons or battalions, and the cept, direction finding (DF), and jamming combat support and CSS units. The MI support. The platoon has its own mainte- company commanders direct and control nance personnel to ensure continued, relia- the operations of all IEW resources ble operation of the aircraft and related sys- assigned, attached, or OPCON to the com- tems. This platoon is available only in the mand. This section will deal primarily with ACR, not the separate brigade. Further the MI company (ACR), as the structure for detail on ACR IEW assets and operations is RC MI companies to support the AC sepa- in FM 34-35. The resources assigned to the rate brigades has not been finalized. ACR and separate brigade and their general capabilities are as illustrated on follow- The illustration on page 2-38 compares ing page. the MI battalion organization with that of the MI company. The subordinate platoons and sections of the company perform functions very much like those of their counterparts in the divisional MI battalion. The service platoon provides essential supply, food service, and maintenance support to the company. The communications platoon provides personnel and equipment to operate the company's telecommunications and radio teletypewriter (RATT) facilities. The platoon also provides RATT support to the USAF weather team. The regimental tactical operations center (RTOC) support element is the nerve center for IEW support to the ACR.

2-39 ACR/SEPARATE BRIGADE RESOURCES

NOMINAL RANGE1 RESOURCES 20km 40km 60km 100km I i » SQUADRONS/BATTALIONS Front Line Troops Scouts/Reconnaissance FA Observers FA CM/CB Radar2

Ground Surveillance Radar3 Personnel Vehicles AVIATION SQUADRON Visual Observation HF/VHF Intercept4 VHF Jamming/DF4

Ml COMPANY HF/VHF Intercept VHF Jamming3 Interrogation6 Counterintelligence6

ACR/SEPARATE BRIGADE BATTLE — X X

CD M M

p^ï -Ul_

x Xr y FIRST ECHELON SECOND ECHELON 1 Range for initial planning. Actual range depends on terrain, weather, enemy deployment, and location of friendly sensor. 2 TPQ-36 in FA battery organic to each squadron of ACR. 3 Attached to squadrons or battalions from Ml company. 4 Employed under OPCON of Ml company. Is in ACR only. 5 In ACR only. 6 Range indefinite. Based on information obtained through exploitation of HUMINT sources.

2-40 CORPS USAF tactical reconnaissance squadron supporting corps. The CM&D and ASPS at The corps commander directs, coordi- corps differ from those at division only in nates, and supports the operations of divi- size and scope of activities. The MI brigade sions against the enemy first-echelon divi- also provides a BAT-D cell to the corps G3, sions and simultaneously directs the corps similar to the cell at division. It differs from battle against enemy second-echelon divi- that at division in that it consists only of sions and armies. Although the corps needs planners and lacks the signature teams some combat information, the primary found at division. requirements are for situation and target development. Corps EW requirements fall The EW section reinforces the G3 by primarily within the realm of ESM. CI planning and coordinating EW operations, requirements are much greater than at assuring that they are integrated with fire lower echelons. and maneuver. EW support of deep operations and C3CM is vital to corps operations. The MI brigade (CEWI) provides dedi- The EW section works closely with the FSE cated IEW support to the corps and its sub- to ensure ECM is integrated with long ordinate units. Most of the ground-based, range fire in support of deep operations. and therefore short-range resources of the corps, are allocated in support of the divi- The CI analysis section reinforces the G2 sions, ACR, and separate brigade. This with CI analysis support of OPSEC. A sig- includes the corps ECM resources which nificant responsibility is to provide CI provide the capability to strike enemy analysis support to the corps deception, forces in and just beyond close operations. C3CM, and rear operations. The section also The aerial assets comprise the source of supports the divisions as required. most of the intelligence, target develop- The OPSEC staff element reinforces the ment, and poststrike assessment data gen- G3 by providing OPSEC planning and erated at corps level. However, even these management support. Its duties are the resources are unable to meet all corps same as the element at division. requirements. The corps relies heavily on EAC, other services, and national agencies Executors to supplement its collection capabilities. The corps has an assigned multidisci- Coordinators plined MI brigade under the C2 of the corps commander. The MI brigade TOC, consist- As at division, the corps G2 and corps G3 ing of the S2 and S3 sections and TCAE, are the coordinators of corps IEW opera- provides centralized control of MI resources tions. Although the scope of their responsi- in support of the corps. It is reinforced by bilities is greater because of the corps mis- the IEW operations of other corps elements. sion, their functions, organization, and responsibilities are similar to those of the The TCAE interfaces with the TCAE of division G2 and G3. the divisions and the TCAE of the ACR to exchange technical control data. It also interfaces with the Army TCAE at EAC Producers and with national systems tö complete the The MI brigade provides a corps TOC vertical integration of technical data gener- support element to reinforce the G2 and G3. ated by tactical units with that produced by Its basic organization and functions are the National Security Agency (NSA). similar to those of the DTOC support element with the addition of an IA section. The MI brigade is organized as shown in The IA section provides imagery exploita- the following illustration. tion, advice, and assistance to the other sections of the corps tactical operations center (CTOC) support element. It also reinforces the capabilities of the IA section within the MI battalion (aerial exploitation). An additional IA section may be attached to the

2-41 Ml BRIGADE ORGANIZATION

Ml BRIGADE

HHD Ml BN Ml BN Ml BN (OP) (TE) (AE)

Ml BN (RC) (TE)

The MI battalion (operations) provides surveillance assets. These assets provide the corps TOC support element to augment support to corps rear operations, and also the corps G2 and G3, and the corps TCAE augment the division and ACR and sepa- to provide technical control of corps rate brigade capabilities. Its VHF ECM, SIGINT/EW assets. The corps TCAE also voice collection, and noncommunications exchanges technical data with divisional intercept platoons contain relatively TCAEs and the ACR TCAE. This battalion short-range systems, and must be deployed also provides the RATT assets for this far forward in the division areas. The bat- TCAE to TCAE communications and also talion's CI and interrogation company pro- for corps CM&D to division CM&D vides a corps interrogation section and communications. corps CI operations section which operate in GS of the corps. Its nine CI teams and The active component MI battalion (TE) eight interrogation teams may augment the has ground-based voice collection ECM, limited assets that are organic to the divi- ELINT, CI, interrogation and long-range sions, as well as meeting corps needs. The battalion's long-range surveillance company is similar to the detachment at division. Its assets conduct passive surveillance operations in the corps area of interest.

2-42 Their capabilities are thé same as those of The EW company (ÈCM) is organized ' the long-range surveillance detiachment with VHP and HF/VHF ECM platoons^ described under division. These jammers must bè deployed forward in the division areas due to range constraints, The MI battalion (aerial exploitation and will normally be attached to the MI (AE)) performs aerial surveillance and battalions in the divisions. The noncom- SIGINT. Its aviation company (AS) has munications and voice collection systems in OV-1D aircraft with SLAR and photograph- the EW company (collection) similarly will ic sensors. The aviation company (EW) has be deployed forward, attached to divisional GUARDRAIL and QUICKLOOK aircraft MI battalions. which perform COMINT and ELINT collection. The resources of this battalion are The training for the reserve MI battalion normally GS to the corps, but priority of (TE) will require careful planning and coor- effort can be weighted to one division or the dination with the AGs of the MI brigade ACR. and the corps. To ensure common procedures and effective integration of the reserve unit, the periods of active duty Reserve Component training of the reserve MI battalion (TE) The reserve component MI battalion (TE) are closely coordinated with exercises and will be assigned to the MI brigade and other training of active elements. deployed with the active components of the MI brigade for training and upon mobiliza- Corps IEW assets and operations will be tion. The mission of the reserve battalion is described in more detail in FM 34-25. Corps to augment MI brigade capabilities in sup- resources are shown in the following port of the corps and subordinate units. The illustration. operational companies of the reserve battalion are described in the following paragraphs. The operations and analysis company augments the active operations battalion. It provides sections to augment the CTOC support element headquarters, CM&D, and the CI analysis and OPSEC sections; analysis teams to augment both the CTOC and subordinate DTOC support elements; and augmentation to the corps TCAE. The CI and interrogation company provides teams of both CI and interrogation personnel to perform missions in the corps rear or for attachment to the corps' subordinate divisions.

2-43 CORPS RESOURCES

1 RESOURCES NOMINAL RANGE 40km 60km 100km 200km I I i MI BRIGADE Aerial HF/VHF/UHF Intercept Aerial Noncommunications Intercept SLAR Aerial Photo Long-Range Surveillance Ground Based Noncommunication Intercept2 Ground Based HF/VHF Intercept2 Ground Based VHF Jamming2 Interrogation2 Counterintelligence2 DIVISION & ACR See previous figures SUPPORTING EAC/AIR FORCE Communications Intercept/DF Communications Jamming RADAR Intercept RADAR Jamming Imagery HUMINT2 CORPS BATTLE XXXX

.—xx— M X

XXX M t > .—XXXX— & m, HI t >

S X XXXX 7 y FIRST ECHELON SECOND ECHELON

1 Range for initial planning. Actual range depends on terrain, weather, and location of friendly sensor. 2 Normally attached to division or ACR Ml units. 3 Range indefinite. Based on information obtained through exploitation of HUMINT sources..

2-44 ECHELONS ABOVE CORPS Some Army IEW units will operate at EAC because of decisions at the Joint Commands at EAC may include allied Chiefs of Staff and Headquarters, Depart- army groups with operational command of ment of the Army levels; because an Army US Army forces, allied regional commands, component commander wánts them; or a US unified command, and separate US because a JTF commander requests them. Army units assigned to NATO. They also Still others may be established because the may be a joint task force (JTF) headquar- DOD and national intelligence agencies ters in a contingency operation. assign missions to the Army. The IEW The Army IEW structure above corps organizational structure must be suffi- supports US combat units, support units, ciently flexible to accommodate changes in and national agencies, and provides intelli- war plans and missions assigned to the gence for usé by joint and combined com- IEW command and adjustments in US and mands. It operates as an integral part of the allied forces involved. US intelligence system and is capable of The design and. structure of IEW organi- interfacing arid functioning with allied mili- zations also require coordination with the tary forces and host nations. IEW organiza- other US military service departments and tions and operating arrangements are tai- intelligence agencies. In some areas, one lored to fit the special needs of the service may perform an IEW mission for commands involved. IEW support at EAC all. In other areas, the collection responsi- is keyed to providing support that is beyond bilities, CI mission, communications data the capabilities of corps and below MI links, analytic support, and product report- units. ing must be clearly understood in order to IEW operations at EAC are ongoing and structure the Army IE W force. conducted generally in the same way dur- The diverse nature of EAC organizations, ing peacetime as they would be in war. IEW missions, and C2 relationships create differ- organizations at EAC are organized for ences in assigned and supporting IEW war. They may be modified for peacetime resources. The resources that would nor- missions but are prepared for a rapid, tran- mally be assigned to, and in support of, an sition from peace to war. EAC command are illustrated as follows. An MI brigade or similar unit provides IEW support to EAC. These MI commands are regionally and functionally tailored to provide multidisciplined IEW support to each theater or contingency force. These units are tailored to fit the mission. They may be an MI brigade as in Korea, an MI brigade as is being formed in Europe, or an MI detachment for some contingencies. Other contingencies may have war plans calling for an EAC MI unit in a reinforcing role to augment a corps MI brigade.

2-45 ECHELONS ABOVE CORPS RESOURCES

EAC BATTLE RESOURCES ~~50km 100km 500km 1000km _J I I MI BRIGADE (EAC) HF Intercept HF Jamming Interrogators Controlled Collection~~

~~Technical Intelligence Counterintelligence~~

~~SUPPORTING RESOURCES National Systems + USAF Systems • + Special Operations Forces~~

~~XXXXX XX~~

~~XXX m -XX—. —XX m m xxxx r—XXXX—i xxxx » XXX ■xx- s~~

~~-XXXXX NOTE: Ranges approximated Range indefinite + Range exceeds that noted on chart~~

2-46 Subordinate units and elements of the and supported commands are such that lit- IEW command at EAC could be placed in tle change need occur in a transition from support of the corps and other US units peace to war. and, in some cases, allied and combined The following illustration identifies commands. echelons of command, their fusion centers, The support relationships in peacetime and organic IEW resources. Interfaces are parallel as closely as possible those support shown by arrows between centers in the relationships needed in war. This is done in second column. The allocated support accordance with the reality of the situation, column lists those resources provided as in coordination with the commands support from the next higher echelon. For involved, and includes direction from the instance, the corps line shows CI, TI, and national intelligence agencies. Organiza- interrogation resources organic to EAC but tional structures, operating arrangements, normally assigned to support corps IEW and interfaces between the IEW elements operations. The last column on the right lists those supporting organizations or echelons from which each echelon in the left column requests support.

2-47 IEW SYSTEM ALLOCATED ECHELON PRODUCERS ORGANIC RESOURCES SUPPORT REQUESTS SPT FROM Ml Bde (EAC) Intgs S&T Intel USAF/USN/USMC EAC EACIC HUMINT National CI Allies SIGINT HF ECM \ Ml Bde i Intg CI Spt Voice Coll (VHF) EAC CI Spt croc Aerial Noncom Intcp CORPS Tech Intel USAF/USN/USMC SPT ELM Aerial Comm Intcp Intgs National VHF ECM (Grd) Allies Noncom Intcp (Grd) SLAR, Photo IA Long-Range Survl

Ml Bn GSR Voice Coll Aerial Comm Intcp/DF/ECM \ (VHF) (OPCON) VHF ECM 1 CI Spt DIV DTOC (Grd) CORPS Voice Coll (VHF/HF/ECM) (HEAVY) SPT ELM Noncom Intcp USAF HF/VHF ECM Noncom Intcp/DF (Grd) INT Cl Spt Intgs Long-Range Survl

~~IEW Spt Elm2 \ Survl Sqd BDE S2/BICC No Resources2 IEW Co Tm DIv C&J Pit Cl Spt4 Intg4~~

~~Scout Pit BN S2/BICC Troops GSR Tms BDE Patrols~~

NOTES: 1 ACR/separate brigade organic Ml company provides support similar to divisional Ml battalion adjusted to scale based on the mission. 2 Some resources are further allocated to the battalion. 3 IEW support element provides interface between Ml assets and brigade S2/S3. 4 When corps augmentation Is available.

2-48 DEPARTMENTAL and foreign countries. It is the focal point for SIGINT operations within the Army. Numerous Army organizations at the The DCSOPS is the functional program departmental level perform intelligence manager for tactical intelligence and missions or provide support to the Army's related activities. tactical IEW operations. The principal staff The chart which follows provides an elements at this level are the Assistant overview of the intelligence organizations Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI) and at departmental level. the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS). The Commander, Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), is the primary executor at departmental level. The ACSI is responsible for the direction, coordination, and development of policy for Army intelligence operations. The office of the ACSI is the policy point of contact for intelligence matters with national level agencies as well as coordination with allied

~~2-49 DEPARTMENTAL RESOURCES Organization/ Activity Assigned To Function~~

~~Intelligence and Army Intelli- General Intelligence Threat Analysis gence Agency Production and Center Threat Analysis~~

~~Missile and Space Army Intelli- Scientific and Intelligence Center gence Agency Technical Intelli- gence Production~~

~~Foreign Science and Army Intelli- Scientific and Technology gence Agency Technical Intelli- Center gence Production~~

~~Armed Forced Medical Surgeon General Specialized Scien- Intelligence Center and ACSI tific and Technical Intelligence~~

~~US Army Intelligence TRADOC Doctrinal and Combat Center and School Developments and Training~~

~~US Army Intelligence USAICS, TRADOC Test and Evaluation and Security Board on Developmental SIGINT and EW Systems~~

NATIONAL The national intelligence structure orients on satisfying strategic intelligence requirements in support of national objectives. Still, much of the strategic intelligence collected and produced at this level is of value to tactical levels and is disseminated for use. The actual structure includes all previous resources described as well as those agencies working at the national level and outside DOD.

~~2-50 CHAPTER 3~~

~~Situation and Target Development~~

Situation and target development are the processing, and disseminating of informa- processes that provide commanders the tion. This chapter describes how the collec- intelligence and targeting data they need to tion management, processing, and dissemi- plan and fight the air-land battle. Both pro- nation functions are performed at ECB to cesses, conducted simultaneously, incorpo- support situation and target development. rate IPB and the intelligence cycle func- It focuses on collection management proce- tions. Both are continuous and are dures; the recording, evaluation, and inter- performed by commanders and intelligence pretation of information; and dissemination staffs at all echelons. Begun in peacetime, requirements and means. they become the essence of intelligence production during hostilities. IPB, in addition to being an information processing function, provides a basis for Situation development enables com- accomplishing situation and target devel- manders to see and understand the battle- opment. IPB orients the mission planning, field in sufficient time and detail to employ collection, processing, and dissemination their forces and weapons systems effectively. In situation development, the G2 or efforts of situation and target development. S2 uses IPB to produce a description of Because of its important role, IPB is described first so that the other functions in enemy force disposition on the battlefield in this chapter can be better understood. terms of location, size, type, direction and rate of movement, and activity. This por- Mission planning is the initial step in trayal is based on an analysis of intelli- preparing for war or for future operations gence holdings which are continuously during war. Mission planning guides the updated through the collection and process- IPB process by focusing on unit contin- ing of information. Situation development gency areas. It draws together, in priority, consists of— the information needed to build the IPB data base. □ Directing. Upon receipt of a mission, commanders □ Collecting. analyze it to determine its key elements. □ Processing. They complete the analysis based on the □ Disseminating. analysis of the battlefield area presented by the G2 and available information provided Target development is the process of pro- by other staff members. After completing viding timely and accurate locations of mission analysis, commanders restate the enemy movers, emitters, shooters, and sit- mission and issue planning guidance. ters that may impact on current and future Planning guidance results in the prepara- operations. Effective target development is tion of staff estimates. The intelligence based on situation development and is estimates along with other staff estimates accomplished throughout the commander's are presented to commanders for use in area of operations and interest. It provides determining what actions must be taken to commanders the targeting data they need accomplish the mission. Using these esti- to effectively attack targets with fire, mates commanders decide on a course of maneuver, or EW means. action and announce their concept of the Situation and target development repre- operation. sent the essence, or final goal, of the intelli- The commander's guidance and concept gence production process at the tactical of the operation are the basis for action by level. Bóth are dependent on the collecting,

3-1 his staff. From these and individual ana- The G3's IEW planning requirements are lyses of the mission, team members deter- in the areas of targeting, EW, deception, mine what IEW requirements must be satis- and OPSEC to support maneuver, C3CM, fied to prepare and execute the mission and and rear operations. Generally the G3 plan build the IPB data base. for—

The staff mission analysis is the first step □ Integration of jamming and deception in determining planning requirements. with fire and maneuver. Each staff member analyzes the command- □ Protection of the combat force during er's restated mission to determine the spe- the planning period, movement, and cific tasks to be performed. They consider after arrival in the area of operations. the effects of individual requirements on the planning of their own and other staff sec- In addition to information to support fire tions and subordinate units. and maneuver, the G3 needs information to support ECM, deception, and OPSEC plan- Once the staff has determined its planning. To support these functions, the G2 ning requirements, a great deal of informa- provides the commander and G3 information will be required for the IPB effort and tion about the— the analysis of the battlefield area. In most cases, the G2 will be responsible for acquir- □ Enemy situation. ing all the needed information. Each staff □ Weather conditions. member identifies individual requirements □ Terrain. of the command ánd identifies the probable sources of the data. □ Long-range operational requirements. The G2 staff focuses planning require- □ IEW needs and special requirements in ments on answering questions about the the area of interest. enemy, weather, and terrain. Generally, the □ Enemy EOB. G2 staff plans for— □ Enemy EW capability. □ Acquisition of current intelligence for initial command and staff planning. □ Enemy intelligence capability. □ Dissemination of intelligence. □ Reliability of local nationals. □ Acquisition of intelligence during □ Enemy vulnerability to deception. movement. Most of the information needs of the □ Collection, processing, and dissemina- command are obtained from the G2's cur- tion of information after deployment. rent intelligence holdings and from supporting agencies. □ CI support before, during, and after the operation. Procedures for intelligence acquisition are outlined in the ACSI, DA, "Army Plan for The G2 needs information to satisfy indi- Crisis Intelligence Support to CONUS vidual planning needs and provide other Army Units." (This plan applies only to staff elements (G3, G4, engineer, aviation, time-critical crisis situations short of gen- and so forth) and subordinate units the eral war. It is available from major Army information they need. Information needed commands (MACOMs) or the originator.) includes— The Defense Intelligence Estimate (DIE) □ Composition, disposition, equipment, and Special Defense Intelligence Estimate and effectiveness of enemy forces in (SDIE) prepared by the Defense Intelligence the mission area. Agency (DIA) and the National Intelligence □ Terrain, trafficability, ground and air Estimate (NIE) and Special NIE prepared avenues of approach, barriers, obsta- by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) cles, line of sight (LOS), and climatic can supply some of the initial intelligence conditions. required by the commander and the IEW staff.

3-2 Units tasked by the Joint Chiefs of Staff The IPB process is continuous. It concen- may submit requests directly to DIA in trates on building the IPB data base prior time-critical crisis situations. Any unit to hostilities and outlines its applicability requesting DIA or other national assistance in support of tactical operations. This directly must keep the chain of command results in an intelligence estimate and informed, including the appropriate unified analysis of the battlefield area which shows command. The Intelligence and Threat probable enemy courses of action and inten- Analysis Center (ITAC) of the Army intel- tions. Mission planning sets the IPB pro- ligence Agency provides additional intelli- cess in motion. gence as well as support for routine or less Graphics are basic to IPB analysis. Most time-critical requirements. Requests are intelligence can be communicated with pic- forwarded by message. In most cases, tures. Annotated military maps, multi- higher headquarters will authorize direct layered overlays, gridded photomaps, coordination with other intelligence microfilm, and large-scale map substitutes, agencies. all capable of computer-assisted cathode Additionally, information may be ray tube display, are used in the IPB pro- obtained from— cess. These graphics become the basis for □ Gazetteers, catalogs, and maps from intelligence and operational planning. The the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA), analysis of the battlefield area and the US Coast and Geodetic Survey, intelligence estimate are not replaced by National Aeronautics and Space graphics, but are merely converted to them Administration (NASA), and the CIA. where possible. Currency is maintained through graphic renewal or update. □ Country studies available through DA publication channels (DA Pam 550- IPB provides a basis for collection man- Series), Superintendent of Documents; agement planning before the battle and US Government Printing Office; State guides the effective employment of collec- Department; CIA; DIA; and United tion resources during the battle. The States Information Agency (USIA). graphic data bases developed and maintained through IPB, coupled with conven- □ Threat analysis, S&T intelligence, OB, tional data bases, provide a foundation for and EOB data available from ITAC, situation and target development. They Foreign Science and Technology Cen- provide a means for projecting significant ter (FSTC) of the Army Intelligence battlefield events and enemy activities and Agency, US State Department, NSA, for predicting enemy intentions. By com- CIA, DIA, Joint EW Center, the USAF paring them with actual events and activi- Electronic Security Command, Naval ties as they occur, the G2 can provide the Intelligence, Air Force Intelligence, commander with timely, complete, and USAREUR, and EUCOM. accurate intelligence. □ Imagery and analysis of imagery available from the National Photo ORGANIZATION Interpretation Center (NPIC). IPB requires the dedicated efforts of the entire IEW staff as well as the support of INTELLIGENCE numerous other elements of the command. PREPARATION OF THE IPB is routinely performed at all echelons, battalion through corps, in combat, combat BATTLEFIELD support, and CSS units. Detailed IPB pro- IPB is a systematic and continuous products (overlays and doctrinal templates) are cess of analyzing the enemy, weather, and prepared at corps and division, which pro- terrain in a specific geographic area. This vide needed products to brigades and bat- approach integrates enemy doctrine with talions to assist their IPB by compensating the weather and terrain, the mission, and for their lack of time and personnel re- the specific battlefield environment. IPB sources. Below brigade, the IPB process is helps to systematically determine and eval- less formal, producing detailed products uate enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities. only when time and resources permit.

3-3 The G2 serves as the coordinator of the PROCESS IPB effort. He is assisted by the integrated efforts of OB technicians and intelligence IPB orients on the AO, the area of inter- analysts of the ASPS, the engineer detach- est, and the enemy forces that are expected ment (terrain team), and the Air Force to be operating in those areas. The follow- weather team. The G2 ensures that IPB ing illustration shows the five-function focuses on the intelligence needs of the cycle IPB process: battlefield area evalua- command. The ASPS assembles the threat tion, terrain analysis, weather analysis, data base, converts it to graphics where threat evaluation, and threat integration. possible, and integrates it with the weather The illustration on page 3-5 outlines the and terrain information. It develops the IPB roles and responsibilities and high- IPB products that are used to support com- lights the IPB function where each is most bat operations. The engineer detachment important. analyzes terrain and weather data to Templates are vital to the IPB process. A determine their integrated impact on template, normally drawn to scale, is a friendly and enemy tactical and logistical graphic illustration of enemy force struc- operations. The engineer detachment, sup- ture, deployment, or capabilities. It provides ported by its EAC engineer topographic a means for seeing the battlefield and a battalion, provides special terrain and map sound basis for command judgments and products. The weather team provides cli- decisions affecting resource allocation. It is mate and weather data to support the IPB used as a comparative data base to inte- effort. grate what we know about the enemy with specific weather and terrain information. Templates enable us to visualize enemy capabilities, predict likely courses of action

~~IPB PROCESS~~

~~ANALYSIS~~

~~BATTLEFIELD THREAT AREA EVALUATION EVALUATION~~

~~THREAT INTEGRATION~~

~~WEATHER TERRAIN ANALYSIS ANALYSIS~~

~~EVALUATION~~

~~3-4 KPB ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES IPB FUNCTION ELEMENTS ROLE/RESPONSIBILITY (see text)~~

~~Uses decision support 5 Force Cdr templating.~~

~~G2 Overall coordinating All~~

~~Assists in event and G3 decision support templating. 5 Formulates requirements.~~

~~Threat analysis. Integrates 1, 4, and 5 ASPS threat, weather, and terrain information.~~

~~Engineer Detachment Terrain and'weather analysis. 2 and 3 (Terrain)~~

~~Provides weather data and Weather Tm associated technical 3 analysis support.~~

before the battle, and confirm or refute of operations and interest are applied to the them during combat. Templates also pro- battlefield, the analyst's attention is vide a means for continuous identification focused on a specific geographical area for and assessment of enemy capabilities and enemy, terrain, and weather effects vulnerabilities. Information graphically analysis. displayed on templates can be added to, The limits of the command's area of opera- changed, or deleted as the situation tions (fire, EW, and maneuver) are pre- changes. scribed by higher headquarters. There is no The following chart describes the four limit to a unit's area of interest; it is principal types of templates developed dur- recommended by the G2 or S2, based on ing the IPB process and explains how and METT-T, and approved by the commander. when each should be used. The dimensions of the areas of operations and interest are in terms of width, depth, Function 1 airspace, and time. The first function of the IPB process is battlefield area evaluation. When the areas

~~3-5 INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD TEMPLATES~~

~~WHEN TEMPLATE DESCRIPTION PURPOSE PREPARED~~

Doctrinal Enemy doctrinal deployment for Provides the basis Threat various types of operations for integrating Evaluation without constraints imposed by enemy doctrine with weather and terrain. Composi- terrain and weather tion, formation, frontages, doctrine. In depths, equipment numbers and processing, informa- ratios, and high value tar- tion used to estab- gets are types of information lish probable loca- displayed. tions of unlocated units.

Situation Depicts how the enemy might de- Used to identify Threat ploy and operate within the critical enemy ac- Integration constraints imposed by the tivities and loca- weather, terrain, and cur- tions. Provides a rent strength. basis for situation and target development and HVT analysis.

Event Depicts locations where criti- Used to predict Threat cal events and activities are time-related events Integration expected to occur and where within critical HVT will appear. areas. Provides a basis for collection operations, predicting and confirming enemy intentions, and locating HVT.

Decision Depicts decision points and Graphically estab- Threat Support target areas of interest lishes a decision Integration keyed to significant events to time/space re- and activities. The intel- lationship. Used ligence estimate in graphic to prepare com- form. manders to make tactical decisions relative to battlefield events. As- sist the commander/ staff in synchronizing the battle.

3-6 In addition to METT-T and the com- Obstacles. Obstacles are natural and arti- mander's concept of the operation, the G2 or ficial terrain features that stop, canalize, S2 must consider several other factors when . impede, or divert military movement. Their recommending the unit's area of interest. direct influence on mobility makes them Foremost is the security of the command. one of the most important considerations in The area of interest must extend (in as terrain analysis. irregular a shape and as far as needed) in Key Terrain. Key terrain is any feature or all directions to safeguard the command area of which, the seizure, retention, or con- from surprise. The area of interest must trol will affort a marked advantage in the also be deep enough to support planning for conduct of operations to either combatant. future operations. But the limits of the area The determination of key terrain is depen- of interest are forwarded to the next higher dent on the echelon of the command, the echelon to guide their support of unit collec- mission, the enemy and the situation. tion requirements. Therefore, the area of 1 interest must not be so large that incoming The commander may designate certain information from higher echelons over- key terrain as decisive terrain if it will have whelms the unit's analytic and processing an extraordinary impact on the mission. To capabilities. designate terrain as decisive is to recognize that the mission depends on seizing or Function 2 retaining it. The second function of the IPB process is Avenues of Approach. Avenues of terrain analysis. This function is focused on approach are air or ground routes by which the military aspects of the terrain and their a force may reach an objective or key ter- effects on friendly and enemy capabilities rain. They are evaluated in terms of their— to move, shoot, and communicate. This includes the following five factors (short □ Potential to support maneuver. title: OCOKA): □ Access to the terrain and adjacent □ Observation and fields of fire. avenues. □ Concealment and cover. □ Degree of canalization. □ Obstacles. □ Concealment and cover. □ Key terrain. □ Observation and fields of fire. □ Avenues of approach and mobility □ Obstacles. corridors. The terrain analysis process emphasizes Observation and Fields of Fire. Obser- the use of graphics to portray the effects of vation relates to the impact terrain has on trafficability and intervisibility on opera- the capability of battlefield systems. In the tions. A terrain factor matrix and a series of IPB context, it refers primarily to visual overlays are prepared to develop a terrain and electronic LOS determined through graphic data base to facilitate threat inte- LOS analysis. gration (function 5). Many battlefield systems require LOS to Several steps are followed to organize and function effectively. These systems include refine the information heeded to accurately radios, radars, ESM systems and direction analyze a specific piece of terrain. The fol- finders, jammers, direct fire weapons, and lowing illustration depicts those steps. human vision. The terrain factor matrix guides the selec- Concealment and Cover. Concealment is tion of terrain and weather factor overlays protection from observation. Cover is pro- needed to analyze the terrain. Engineer ter- tection from the effects of fire. Concealment rain analysis begins with a detailed review is vital to OPSEC and deception. Conceal- of the terrain data base to identify informa- ment and cover offered by the terrain to tion gaps. The illustration on page 3-8 is an example of a terrain factor matrix. both friendly and enemy forces is determined through IPB.

~~3-7 TERRAIN ANALYSIS PROCESS~~

DEVELOP DEVELOP DEVELOP DEVELOP TERRAIN TERRAIN TERRAIN COMBINED DATA FACTOR FACTOR OBSTACLE BASE MATRIX OVERLAYS OVERLAYS * DEVELOP ANALYZE PERFORM IDENTIFY AVENUE OF AVENUES LINE-OF- AVENUES APPROACH OF SIGHT OF OVERLAYS APPROACH ANALYSIS APPROACH

~~TERRAIN FACTOR MATRIX~~

~~FACTORS~~

FUNCTIONS Surface Configuration (Slope) Surface Materials (Soils) Vegetation Weather Effects on T errain Transpor- tation Obstacle (Linear) Built-up Surface Drainage Areas (Hydrology) Observation and FofF X X X X X Concealment and Cover X X X X Assembly X Areas X X X X Key Terrain X X X X Ground Aves of Approach X X X X X X X X Air Aves of Approach X X X X X X Weapon Sites X X X X X X X X DZ and LZ X X X X X X X X Maneuver X X X X X X X X

~~LOC and MSR X X X X Barriers and Fortifications X X X X X X X X~~

~~LOS X X X X X X Comm Sites X X X X X X X~~

EW Sites X X X X X X Terrain factor overlays graphically por- further describes terrain analysis and its tray the military aspects of terrain (types importance to tactical operations. and spacing of vegetation, soil, and climate conditions and variations) in the AO. Function 3 The final step of thé terrain analysis pro- Weather has a significant impact on both cess selects the avenue of approach that. friendly and enemy capabilities. Analyzing supports friendly and enemy capabilities to the weather in detail to determine how it move, shoot, and communicate. FM 100-5' affects friendly and enemy capabilities to

~~WEATHER FACTOR ANALYSIS MATRIX~~

~~INTELLIGENCE USES/~~

~~APPLICATIONS Temperature' Humidity' Surface W inds Snow/Ice C over Intervisibility Precipitation Winds A loft Cloud D ata Light D ata Severe W eather Fog~~

~~Observation and FofF X X X X X X X X~~

~~Artillery Emplacements X X X X X X~~

~~Concealment X X X X X X X X~~

~~Camouflage X X X X X X X X X~~

~~Ground Avenues of Approach X X X X X X~~

~~Air Avenues of Approach X X X X X X X X X X X~~

~~Cross-Country Movement X X X X X X X~~

~~Fording Sites X X X X X X X X~~

~~Air Drop Zones X X X X X X X X X X Helicopter and STOL/VTOl LZ/PZ X X X X X X X X X X X LOCsandMSRs X X X X X X~~

~~NBC Operations X X X X X X X X~~

~~Line-of-Sight (Radio/Radar) X X X~~

~~REMS Emplacement X X X X X~~

~~Infiltration Routes X X X X X X 1 Density altitude quality affects helicopter lift capacity.~~

3-9 move, shoot, and communicate is critical to The effects of precipitation can be graphi- this function of IPB. Because the weather cally illustrated as follows. hâs a tremendous effect on terrain, terrain The illustration shows riverbanks and and weather analysis are inseparable fac- swamps that have swollen, rendering ford- tors of intelligence. ing and hasty river crossings more difficult. Weather and engineer terrain teams work A combined obstacle overlay combines all together during much of the analysis pro- terrain- and weather-induced obstacles cess. The weather team analyzes climatic resulting from this analysis. It focuses on data to determine the characteristics of significant terrain areas. Next, avenues of weather in the battlefield area. The terrain approach and mobility corridors (MCs) are team analyzes the effects of weather on tac- identified. Avenues of approach are identi- tical operations and integrates climatic and fied for friendly or enemy forces at the same current weather data with terrain analysis. echelon and one below, and MC for forces This information is integrated into a three- two echelons below. Once the most viable step operation known as the weather analy- avenues of approach and MCs have been sis process. This process incorporates selected, overlays are prepared depicting developing a weather data base, a weather each. Analysis enables the development of factor analysis matrix, and weather factor LOS for weapons, communications, target overlays to determine the impact of weather acquisition, intelligence collection, and on terrain and operations. ECM systems for each option. During peacetime, historic weather conditions for at least five years past are used to determine significant weather parameters Function 4 in the area of operations. The weather team The fourth function of the IPB process is focuses on specific periods within each sea- threat evaluation. It consists of a detailed son that may deviate from the seasonal study of-fenemy forces, their composition norm. The weather data base is continually and organization, tactical doctrine, weap- updated and is used as the foundation for ons and equipment, and supporting battle- analyzing the effects of weather on tactical field functional systems. The thrust of this operations. function is to determine enemy capabilities The weather factor analysis matrix helps and how they operate as prescribed by their to determine what weather effects overlays doctrine and training. will be required. It identifies the weather Threat evaluation also includes an eval- factors that are militarily significant and uation of HVTs and doctrinal rates of correlates their effects with specific intelli- movement. HVTs and movement rates are gence uses and tactical applications. The reevaluated during threat integration (func- previous' illustration is an example of a tion 5) within the constraints imposed by weather factor analysis matrix. Detailed the terrain and weather. Threat evaluation data on the effects of weather on friendly is a continuing process as new capabilities and enemy forces can be found in FM 34-81. to wage war develop, and as doctrine As in terrain analysis, maximum use of changes. Threat evaluation follows a multi- graphics is instrumental in analyzing the step process. effects of weather on combat operations. Development of a detailed threat OB data Through weather effects overlays, weather base by the ASPS is vital to threat evalua- data is converted into graphic displays. tion. A current, accurate, and comprehen- Various weather effects will have signifi- sive data base on potential enemy forces cant impact on tactical operations. Cloud facilitates a thorough evaluation of their cover at low levels will have a significant doctrine and capabilities. To develop the impact on low level attack helicopters, CAS, threat data base, a review of the mission aerial visual observation, and some aerial and area of interest is required. Through surveillance systems. this review, identification and isolation of threat forces significant to the mission are accomplished. As information about the

3-10 enemy is assembled, gaps are identified and Requirements for doctrinal templates of information requirements fed to the CM&D battlefield functional systems are also iden- section. tified. Those battlefield functional systems which tell the most about enemy operátions When the threat data base has beerf devel- are templated. This matrix allows rapid oped and evaluated, the G2 and the ASPS analysis of the relationship between battle- must determine what doctrinal templates field systems and the operations supported are required. Determining which enemy by those systems. It helps the analyst con- echelons should be the focal point of atten- duct TVA and determine additional needs tion is the first step. Generally, the "one up and requirements. and two down" formula is used so that attention is concentrated on those enemy echelons that pose the greatest threat.

~~WEATHER EFFECTS OVERLAY (RAIN)~~

~~|^\ / / i ■ j~~

~~NVv-->\ —'~~

~~Swamps expand~~

~~fTUnassisted Ll points destroyed J BUILT-UP AREAS/LOC/ HYDROLOGY AND WET AREAS~~

~~Autobahn River banks widen, -- ' i velocity and depth ct; — Trunk Road \ ^^^k^^^icreases Secondary Rd~~

~~HUnn Railroad * m Built-up Area~~

~~\ ''I \ m\X i V m , ^~~

~~3-11 DOCTRINAL TEMPLATE SYSTEMS MATRIX~~

~~TYPES OF COMBAT ACTIONS~~

~~TYPES OF BATTLEFIELD MARCH MEETING ENGAGEMENT ENEMY HASTY DEFENSE DEFENSE SYSTEMS RIVER CROSSING ATTACK A GAINST A D EFENDING PURSUIT PREPARED~~

~~TACTICAL ROCKETS AND ARTILLERY X X X X X X X~~

~~AIR DEFENSE X X X X X X~~

~~COMMUNICATIONS X X X X X~~

~~REC X X X X X X~~

~~ATOM X X X X~~

~~RECONNAISSANCE X X X X X~~

~~REAR SERVICES X X X X~~

~~C2 OF MRD X X X X X X X~~

~~2 C OF MRR X X X X X X X~~

~~ENGINEERS X X X X X~~

Doctrinal templates convert enemy OB They portray various echelons and types of factors into graphic portrayals. They are units for various capabilities and schemes models of how the enemy might look of maneuver. They also graphically portray according to doctrine and training if not the composition and disposition, frontages constrained by the weather and terrain. and depths, and spacing and signatures of

3-12 these echelons and "units. The following the unit being templated. They may be illustrations provide examples of doctrinal further refined into doctrinal template templates. subsets. These subsets might include battlefield functional systems or weapons and The final step in determining doctrinal equipment deployments. Such templates, template needs is to compare current especially those depicting weapons and requirements to previously prepared tem- equipment deployments, are very useful in plates. If additional templates are needed, identifying types of enemy units and spe- the analyst must request or prepare new cific formations. Subsets may be equally ones. useful in determining enemy intentions. Doctrinal templates may include a portrayal of higher echelon supporting elements or elements normally deployed with

~~MOTORIZED RIFLE BATTALION (BMP)~~

~~DEFENSE REGIMENTAL SLICE SCALE 1:50,000 7.5km ——~~

~~I I J—L -LJu~~

~~Í ■ 2 km- [Ml 122 mm 1.25 km~~

~~t i 1.55 krkm ZSy-23-4 4 km 120 mm 1 ±1~~

~~m 6; TTTTü 3 km 2.5 km 2 25 km t 2 km~~

~~<£> ^ ■.x ® 2.5 km ( ) I.T 2.5 km1 -I-dJ~~

~~3-13 MRR PREBATTLE FORMATION (REVERSE WEDGE)~~

~~2-3 km~~

~~m m~~

~~(-) DIRECTION 3-5 km m (-\ OF MOVEMENT Ll 25-50 km~~

~~3-5 km J~~

~~■ ■ 3-5 km 10-25 km Li~~

~~Í Em 5 km i!i± SI L IMl M 3-5 km 2-4 km J f 5-10 km~~

~~l<+)~~

3-14 Function 5 Activity in NAI 1 would indicate whether MC alpha or bravo was being adopted as The nucleus of theTPB process is the the route of advance. Forward movement of integration of enemy doctrine with weather enemy bridging elements as the force and terrain data. The objective of threat approached a destroyed bridge at NAI 5 integration is to determine how the enemy would be an indication that a river crossing will fight as influenced by weather and ter- would be attempted rather than a move to rain. Threat integration, a sequential pro- NAI 6 where river crossing would be less cess, is accomplished through the develop- difficult. Other NAIs in the example repre- ment of situation, event, and decision sent intermediate points for collection support templates. planning purposes or tracking for target Situation Template. A situation template development purposes. An example of how depicts enemy dispositions for a specific one leg of an MC might be represented is instant in time. Thus, several situation shown in the event analysis matrix shown templates or situation "snapshots" may be on page 3-17. created to show how the enemy may change The matrix enables the analyst to more his disposition during the conduct of an precisely correlate what event or activity is operation. expected within the geographical location Event Template. Once the analyst has and at what time the event is expected to hypothesized the probable enemy course of take place. The event analysis matrix is action, he creates an event template to test normally prepared at divisions and above. his hypothesis. The event template provides This capability, along with doctrinal and the information needed to project what situation templates, provides the basis for events will most likely have to occur rela- critical node or HVT analysis. The esti- tive to enemy courses of action. As an mated times between NAIs within an MC enemy force moves along an MC, it will be are derived by determining the effects of required to do certain things at certain terrain and normal seasonal conditions times and places which are dictated by ter- (derived from earlier functions) on doctrinal rain, weather, and tactics. Based on this, rates of advance (opposed or unopposed, as the analyst selects named areas of interest appropriate). The event template and event (NAIs) where he expects to see certain analysis matrix allow for the initiation of activities or events which have tactical sig- precise collection requirements, maximizing nificance. The analyst projects a sequence the use of limited collection assets against and timing of events based on an analysis the vast array of potential targets on the of the relationship of NAIs to one another future battlefield. By knowing in advance and to specific available courses of actions. what the enemy can do and comparing it Activity, or the lack thereof, confirms or with what he is doing, the analyst has the denies the enemy course of action. In the basis for predicting what the enemy intends following illustration, which is an example to do next. Such information provides the of an event template, NAIs 1 through 9 are basis for cuing, intelligence collection and areas where particular types of activity constructing decision support templates would provide indications of intent. The (DSTs). event template is particularly useful to guide intelligence collection management.

NAIs, are points or areas along a particular avenue of approach or MC where activity, or lack of it, will help to confirm or deny a particular enemy course of action. NAIs are only plotted on the event template.

~~3-15 EVENT TEMPLATE~~

~~H+ H+ H+~~

~~Q NAI AAi MC~~

~~Cb OBJ MC~~

~~NAI~~

~~0 NAI~~

~~H+ H+ MC H+~~

H+ - Time Line: Time lines are developed on doctrinal Avenues of Point NAI rates of movements as.affected by terrain and q; approach,'mobility MC 1 weather. Time lines are modified based on actual Area NAI corridor by rates of movement. priority

~~3-16 EVENT ANALYSIS MATRIX~~

~~COORDINATES FM: NB 606330-NB 650333 AVENUE OF APPROACH II TO: NB 462181-NB 494132~~

~~MOBILITY CORRIDOR #1íl - TO:FM: NB 466156670300~~

NAMED AREA ESTIMATED OBSERVED DISTANCE EVENT/ACTIVITY OF INTEREST TIME TIME NAI #1 A. RECON ELM 1500 NB 649266 2.5KM 9 MIN B. ADV GUARD 1510 RD JUNCTION C. NAI #4A A. RECON ELM 1508 NB 647264 6.5KM 25 MIN B. ADV GUARD 1520 CHOKE POINT C. NAI #4 A. RECON ELM 1533 NB 601222 4.0KM 17 MIN B. ADV GUARD 1545 EST RD JUNCTION C. NAI #3 A. RECON ELM 1544 EST NB 561220 8.5KM 30 MIN B. ADV GUARD 1556 EST BRIDGE C.

~~NAI #7 A. NB 460160 B. RD JUNCTION C.~~

3-17 Event and decision support templates, the template construction tasks that have pre- most important products of the IPB process, ceded them into an analysis of the battle- represent a reduction of all the analysis and field area and an intelligence estimate. The following illustration shows an example of a DST.

~~DECISION SUPPORT TEMPLATE~~

~~H + 5 H + 4 H + 3 Hour AA1~~

~~DP MC DP DP N TAI DP 4A~~

~~PROBABLE H Hour ENEMY MC \ OBJECTIVE DP~~

~~★ DP DP~~

~~TAI~~

~~MC S3~~

~~H + 5 H + 4 H + 3 H + 2 H + 1 DP 10~~

LEGEND H+ - Time Line: Time lines are developed on doctrinal . Decision Points 1 - Point TAI rates of movements as affected by terrain and op weather. Time lines are modified based on actual I rates of movement. 1 1 • Decision Line Avenue of approach I mobility corridor DP MC 1 by priority

3-18 Decision Support Template. The ulti- change an attack option. DPs are developed mate objective of threat integration is to by the G3 based on friendly actions/rates of provide options for the commander to defeat movement or in coordination with the G2 the enemy. The DST is developed specifi- based on enemy actions/enemy rates of cally to aid the commander in decision movement. making. The DST does not dictate decisions A time-phase line (TPL) is drawn across to the commander, but indicates points an avenue of approach or MC to illustrate where tactical decisions are required. potential enemy advance at his doctrinal The DST relates events, activities, and rates, as modified by terrain and weather. targets of the event template to the com- TPLs project for the commander the point mander's decision requirements. It is basi- at which the enemy plans to be at any cally a graphic intelligence estimate and given time. TPLs do not show the effects of operations plan combined. The commander, friendly action, except insofar as light or G2, G3, FSE, and EWS develop the DST by heavy opposition is built into enemy doc- overlaying the event template, war gaming trinal rates of advance. enemy courses of action, and then placing decision points (DPs) and TAIs to cue friendly courses of action. DPs are placed DPs shown in the illustration represent on the template at those points where the areas chosen because of time and distance friendly commander must decide which factors from TAIs. If a decision is not made planned courses of action to employ either by the commander before an enemy force to effect an enemy course of action or to reaches or passes a DP, a set of options change a friendly course of action. which had existed may be negated. For example, DP 1 is associated with an option A TAI is an area or point, usually along to route the enemy force to MC 1 by blowing an MC, or is an engagement area where the bridge at TAI 5 before the enemy interdiction of enemy forces by maneuver, reaches the first road junction. If the force fires, and jamming will eliminate or reduce has moved too far toward MC 2 before the a particular enemy capability. It can also bridge is blown, the enemy may decide to cause the enemy to abandon a particular use that route anyway and attempt a river course of action, or require the use of unus- crossing operation rather than backtrack to ual support to continue operations. (In the MC 2. Thus, the placement of DP 1 must latter case, the TAI is chosen based on ter- include enough time for the blown bridge to rain to inhibit or deny movement.) TAIs are be reported back to the enemy commander. developed by the G3 based on the com- The decision to blow the bridge at TAI 5, if mander's intentions and in coordination the option is to delay, will have to be made with the G2, FSE, and EWS. by the time the enemy reaches DP 5 or there A decision point is a point or line usually may not be time to destroy the bridge before along an MC where presence of an enemy the enemy crosses. or friendly unit cues the commander to make a decision. DPs may be independent DPs may also be used to trigger attacks of, or associated with, a TAI. In the latter on TAIs by fires, maneuver, and EW, or to case, the DP is that point where the com- trigger friendly maneuver options. For some mander must decide whether or not to cue TAIs, a definite attack option will have an engagement option in order to have the been specified. DPs for these TAIs need to desired effect on the enemy at the asso- be located so that the time needed to report ciated TAI. DPs, independent of TAIs, are the enemy presence and execute the attack used to cue some other form of action. For is equal to or less than the time the enemy example, when the enemy gets to a certain force will take to move from the DP to the point on the battlefield, the commander TAI. For other TAIs, a series of options may have to decide to displace the TOC or may be available. In that case, several DPs shift unit positions. In another example, will be designated, reflecting the response when a friendly unit gets to a certain point times of the different options. Such a series on the battlefield, the commander may have of DPs related to one TAI is called a DP to decide to move supporting artillery or cluster. DP clusters are used to synchronize

3-19 several attack options. Regardless of loca- and IR from the G2. They place each tion, DPs and TAIs should be under surveil- requirement in priority order, based on G2 lance. DPs can also be used to support the guidance, and plan how to satisfy each. operational plan by alerting the com- Specifically they— mander to the satisfaction of predetermined □ Assess collection and reporting impli- conditions for maneuver options such as cations of each new requirement and exploitation or counterattack. These options plan collection operations. will be developed as the commander, G2, and G3 war game the operation before the □ Develop multidisciplined tasking that battle. This will speed the decision making exploits the capabilities of intelligence process so the commander can seize the resources, reflects established priori- initiative. ties, and detects enemy deception attempts. Also depicted in the graphic are potential MCs with the indication that MC 1 would □ Identify and task collection units or best support the main attack. TPLs and key agencies. terrain (cross hatched areas) may also be □ Maintain a constant awareness of the shown as in the example. Other informa- operational status of collection tion, such as combat force ratios and a resources. situational depiction of how the enemy might have to deploy within each avenue, is □ Evaluate requirement satisfaction, added as required. provide requester feedback, and adjust collection plans. In addition to supporting the develop- Specific collection planning steps and ment of intelligence for the commander, considerations that optimize collection threat integration supports the intelligence results include— collection effort. Situation templates and event analysis matrices are used to estab- □ Checking with the ASPS first to see if lish collection priorities based on those a request for intelligence information courses of action the enemy is most likely to (RII) can be answered with data adopt. Movers and emitters, the primary already available. indicators of events and activities, can be □ Keeping current with the event tem- framed in time and location allowing the plate and the changing terrain, collection manager to determine the opti- weather, and enemy situation data mum mix of collection resources. Of the available to the ASPS. many NAIs plotted by the analysts, threat integration guides the collection manager □ Developing a collection plan that in deciding which NAI to cover at any par- results in the collection and reporting ticular time. of information in a logical and orderly manner. COLLECTION MANAGEMENT □ Considering collector status, capabili- Collection management is performed by ties, and limitations for each situation. the CM&D section supported by the ASPS. It is the timely, efficient process of formu- □ Maximizing multi-disciplined opera- lating detailed collection requirements and tions and emphasizing cuing, expan- tasking collection agencies for required sion, and verification. information. The overriding purpose of col- □ Providing continuity of operations. lection management is to use the limited resources available to answer the com- □ Ensuring that collection units or agen- mander's priority intelligence requirements. cies are given specific orders and requests. COLLECTION MANAGERS □ Asking higher headquarters for infor- The G2 or S2 is the principal collection mation and verification. manager, assisted by collection managers in the CM&D section. Collection managers □ Ensuring that collection requirements in the CM&D section receive approved PIR are assigned priorities and are current.

3-20 □ Ensuring that timely feedback on supervising the collection effort and main- request status is provided. taining continuity between shifts in the Each of these considerations impacts on TOC. the collection planning performed at each The collection plan is not prepared in any echelon. The results of the application of set format. It can be prepared as a simple these considerations and the functions of fragmentary worksheet, a long, detailed the CM&D section is a collection plan. plan, or a mental plan. Although a collection manager can formulate a collection plan mentally, the planning of the collec- COLLECTION PLAN tion effort is facilitated and is less subject to The collection plan is a dynamic tool used error when a written plan is used. A written to coordinate and integrate the efforts of all plan, however informal, facilitates conti- collection units and agencies. Since the col- nuity of operations and is always lection effort involves continuous planning, recommended. an entirely new collection plan is seldom The type and makeup of the collection prepared except when a unit first enters plan will depend on the size of the unit, the combat or enters a new operational phase. mission, the situation, and the personalities The collection plan is continually revised as concerned. Examples of collection plans are required. found in Appendix H. In effect, it is a slate where new entries are written and outdated entries are COLLECTION MANAGEMENT removed. PROCESS Because information requirements are more complex at higher echelons, the collec- As shown in the following illustration, tion plan is normally more extensive and collection management is cyclic. formal at these levels. At any level, how- Each collection effort begins by process- ever, collection planning is essentially a ing IRs. These requirements may take mental process and the collection plan, many forms and are generated by many regardless of the format being used, is sources: the commander's PIR and IR as merely an aid. It is not a substitute for identified by the G2, targeting needs of the thinking and is maintained only to the G3 (FSE and EWS), tasking from higher extent that it assists in planning and echelons, and requests for information from

~~THE COLLECTION MANAGEMENT CYCLE~~

RECEIVE DETERMINE AND RESOURCE 1 ^ TASK K UPDATE L EVALUATE ANALYZE collection!^ COLLECTION IW ► availabilityHM REPORTING REQUIRE- AND RESOURCES PLANNING MENTS CAPABILITY *

3-21 subordinate and adjacent commands. At all valid. Requirements from within the com- echelons, most of these requirements are mand are checked to ensure that each mer- based on information needs associated with its commitment of collection and processing NAI and TAI developed through IPB. resources. Regardless of their origin, the collection A requirement is then sent to the ASPS manager transforms them into specific col- where an attempt is made to answer it lection requirements. This transformation immediately. This step is important. If the must be performed as quickly as possible information is readily available the ASPS while ensuring optimum employment of the provides an immediate answer through the limited resources available. CM&D to the requester. This reduces the workload of the ASPS and CM&D section Receive and Analyze Requirements and reduces requirements for collection The first step in the collection manage- resources. ment process is the receipt and analysis of The ASPS checks each requirement to see requirements. An overview of this step is if the information is readily available in its shown in the following illustration. data bases. If the information is not in the data bases, collection subsystems are Receive Requirements. When any checked. For example, at the CTOC, the IA requirement is received in the CM&D sec- section may have acquired imagery that tion it is first logged in the shift journal and contains the needed information. Other identified by assignment of a control sources such as knowledgeable EPW or the number. Requests and tasks from elements TCAE may be able to answer the require- outside the headquarters are identified by ment if queried within the framework of the the control number assigned by the origi- requirement. The key is knowing what nating headquarters. recently completed collection actions have Next, the validity of the requirement is the potential for answering the require- determined. A requirement generated out- ment. Only after available information side the command is generally accepted as has been researched should a requirement be validated for new collection action.

~~RECEIPT AND ANALYSIS STEP~~

~~DETERMINE RECEIVE DETERMINE DETERMINE SPECIFIC REQUIRE- REPORTING INDICATORS INFORMATION MENTS REQUIREMENTS REQUIREMENTS H H~~

3-22 Determine Indicators. A necessary step □ The characteristics of enemy in directing the collection effort is to deter- commanders. mine those enemy activities or characteris- Possible or practicable operations. tics of the battlefield area which answer the □ information requirement. This procedure is □ Collection characteristics. called determination of indicators and is a □ Identification of target characteristics. function of the ASPS assisted by other TOC elements. An indicator is any positive or Event templates are used to determine indi- negative evidence of enemy activity or any cators. They allow the correlation of a par- characteristic of the battlefield area that ticular event or activity with probable points toward enemy capabilities, vulnera- enemy courses of action. Additionally, they bilities, or intentions. The ability to read are used to determine when and where that indicators (including recognition of enemy activity should occur. By determining what deception indicators) may contribute to the events or activities must occur for an enemy success of friendly operations, since an to follow a particular course of action, analysis of all available indicators will be attention is focused on the indicators asso- the basis for recommendations to the com- ciated with those events or activities. Event mander for a specific course of action. templates help to decide— Indicators form the basis of collection tasks. By knowing those indicators essen- □ Where to look. tial to satisfying information requirements, □ When to look. and the most likely methods and places of finding them, the collection manager is able □ What to look for. to determine the specific collection tasks to After determining indicators for each be assigned to available resources. A thor- requirement, the ASPS develops specific ough knowledge of the enemy, the charac- information requirements for each teristics of the battlefield, and the general indicator. capabilities of collection assets is required to develop indicators. Particularly valuable Determine Specific Information is a detailed knowledge of— Requirements. Indicators and target characteristics are analyzed to determine □ The enemy organization, equipment, specific information requirements (SIRs). and doctrine. SIRs are the basic questions that need to be □ The personalities of major enemy answered to confirm or deny the existence commanders when possible. of an indicator. □ The past performance of enemy units. For example, as an indicator of possible enemy intentions, the location of a particu- □ Terrain and weather factors. lar enemy air defense element is needed. □ The event template for current The SIR in this case would be a question operation. asking whether or not there are any ZSU- 23-4s at location X. However, such a Indicators have certain characteristics requirement may be only one part of a which are considered during the selection broader requirement. process. By considering these characteristics, the best possible indicators can be The accurate determination of indicators derived. The determination of indicators is and SIRs is essential for effective collection based on those characteristics that reflect— management. Knowing where, when, and what to look for helps in selecting what to □ Normal doctrinal activity or look with. This in turn maximizes the use of disposition. limited collection assets against a vast □ Activity required for a particular array of collection targets. After indicators course of action. and SIRs have been prepared, the ASPS passes them to the CM&D section for collec- □ Actions within enemy capabilities and tion action. limitations.

3-23 After being validated by the ASPS and of any requirement is its criticality to returned to the CM&D section, new friendly mission accomplishment and the requirements are compared against others time the information is needed or will no in the active collection requirements file. longer be of value. Priorities must be passed The intent is to identify duplication. If the to collection agencies to ensure that they requirement is a duplicate, the requester's collect what is needed, rather than that address and other specific needs are noted which is easy. Requirements are listed on on the original requirement. When the the collection plan by priority, and report- requirement is answered, each addressee is ing requirements are determined for each. provided the information needed. Determine Reporting Requirements. If a requirement is not a duplicate, the Reporting requirements specify when, copy is filed in the collection file as a con- where, and in what detail information is to trol measure and for use in disseminating be reported. Reporting requirements are collected and processed information. developed in terms that are understandable by collection units or agencies. The purpose The next step is to evaluate each require- is to provide the collection agency with spe- ment based on its time sensitivity. The cific collection and reporting requirements evaluation is made based on the time which ensure that the right data is collected required to— and reported promptly to the appropriate □ Process the request. user. When developing reporting require- □ Assign it to a collection unit or agency. ments, the specific information that must be obtained, the assigned priority, and the □ Collect and report the information. origin of the request are considered. □ Process the collected information. The commander, or other originators of □ Disseminate the resulting intelligence information requirements, may need the in time to meet the needs of the information by or at a specific time, or upon requester. the occurrence of specific events. For example, a onetime report on the conditions of a Time sensitivity is also considered in river bottom may be required by a specified light of— time. Reports of other enemy activities such □ The requester's response time to react as movement along particular roads may be to the information. required periodically. By SOP, reports of artillery, nuclear activity, the identification □ Target mobility. of new units, and similar items may be Most time-sensitive requests are anno- required as obtained. Periodic negative tated with the date-time group (DTG) indi- reports pertaining to certain activities also cating when the information will no longer may be required. Reporting times are criti- be of value. cal as they represent the time the requested information must be available if it is to be The next step is to assign a priority to used. (An exception to this is the reporting each requirement. The commander's PIRs of combat information.) In many cases, col- are always the highest priority collection lection requirements not completed by the requirements. IRs, to include requests for specified time are automatically cancelled. information and tasks from higher head- Care must be taken to establish accurate quarters, are evaluated based on SOP and reporting time requirements, to preclude a G2 guidance. Requests and requirements collection requirement being cancelled too from outside the headquarters generally soon. carry a priority assigned by the originators. These priorities are evaluated in light of Combat information is reported to the current collection actions and integrated requester or user as soon as it is collected, with existing priorities as appropriate. The using the most direct means available. primary basis for determining the priority When developing reporting requirements

3-24 for combat information, the first task is to ESM systems, other system ranges, aircraft identify to which recipients collection units mission duration, mobility, linguistic capa- should report. Secondly, a determination is bilities, and other similar factors. This made as to what reporting requirements are knowledge is used to determine which asset necessary for reporting combat information is capable of collecting information that for intelligence processing purposes. This will answer SIRs. A profile of system capa- may involve a different level of detail. Usu- bilities is provided in the DOD Capabilities ally, reporting combat information should Handbook. HUMINT resource capabilities follow SOP. must be obtained from the parent Requesters should not ask for more detail organization. than necessary to fulfill the SIR. This is Availability. For organic or attached especially critical when requesting informa- agencies (such as the MI brigade at corps) tion for use in target development. Other- the collection manager needs to know the wise, valuable time may be wasted collect- collection capability and the percentage of ing unneeded data. This ties up collection that capability available at a given time. and delays the delivery of intelligence and For example, he must know the number of targeting data. SLAR missions the MI battalion (AE) can Conversely, insufficient detail may not fly within 24 hours, the percentage of opera- answer the SIR. This could result in the tional noncommunications collection sys- inefficient use of collection assets and fail- tems, the percentage of interrogators avail- ure of the mission. able, and so on. Reporting requirements must include the For higher echelon resources, it is neces- identity of all units and headquarters sary to know the number of resources allo- requiring the information. Commanders cated and the approximate availability. For who do not receive the intelligence they example, the division must know what EW need at the specific time may miss a fleet- support will be provided by corps and the ing opportunity to catch the enemy at a number of OV-lD missions available to disadvantage. Once determined, informa- support the division in a specified period. tion and reporting requirements influence Selection. Once the available resources the selection of specific collection units and have been identified by unit and type, agencies. potential units are selected for each infor- Determine Resource Capability mation requirement. This selection is made and Availability by comparing each available unit's resources against the collection requirement, The selection and tasking of organic and based on five critical selection factors: supporting collection units and the formulation of requirements for higher-echelon □ Range. support require a basic knowledge of the □ Timeliness. units, agencies, and sources that can provide information. The following chart □ Technical characteristics. defines sources and agencies and shows □ Environment (terrain and weather). what units and activities fit into each Enemy. category. □ A unit's resources are evaluated by the Before a particular unit or agency is collection manager to ensure that the unit is selected to exploit a specific source, a capable of collecting the required informa- determination must be made as to what tion. The intent is to avoid tasking units assets are both available and capable of col- with missions beyond their capability. In lecting the information needed. This MI TOCs, operations personnel perform the includes assets in organic collection agen- same general comparison in the process of cies and those at higher echelons. assigning a collection requirement to a spe- Capability. Asset capabilities must be cific asset. known by the collection manager. These include factors such as frequency ranges for

~~3-25 SOURCES AND AGENCIES~~

~~SOURCES AGENCIES~~

A source is a person, system, or activity Anagencyisany individual ororganiza- from which information is originally tion which exploits a source to collect obtained. Source may or may not be and/or process information. under friendly control.

COMMON SOURCES COMMON AGENCIES Captured enemy Recovered US military Lower and adjacent Military police documents and commands material Displaced persons PSYOP units National Intel Enemy electro- Enemy activities agencies Allied intei magnetic emissions Loca| resjdents Civil affairs ADA units units Shell and Nuclear bursts CSS units missile Chemical units fragments _ . 9 Refugees INSCOM Engineer units Contaminated „ . Sounds CI teams areas Terrain teams S&T Intelligence Radioactive Imagery Weather teams teams material Craters Ml units Other services Weather forecast Artillery reports 0dors Troops Patrols Studies/ Duds Cavalry informants Maps Interrogation Civilian teams agencies EPW

The following illustration shows the may be within range of a target but not able correlations between specific SIRs and sys- to detect the target because of an interrup- tems availability and capability. tion by weather or terrain. In some cases, a system's range may be flexible, depending on its height above the ground, or be limited A system's capability is limited by its by the technical design of the intended range. Range alone, however, may not be target. Range may limit some HUMINT the determining factor. A GSR, for example, agencies such as patrols or scout units.

~~3-26 CAPABILITY/REQUIREMENT CORRELATION~~

~~SPECIFIC SYSTEM AVAILABILITY INFORMATION AND REQUIREMENTS CAPABILITY ELEMENTS~~

~~- xe ^ / / / ^ ¿ * ? ^ ^ /~~

~~Ï Ï RANGE OF RANGE TO TARGET PLATFORM OR COLLECTOR~~

~~TIMELINESS TIME AVAILABLE OF RESPONSE~~

~~CHARACTERISTICS CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TARGET OF THE COLLECTOR~~

~~LOCAL WEATHER WEATHER LIMITATIONS~~

~~ENEMY THREAT THREAT TO THE COLLECTOR~~

~~TERRAIN INFLUENCE TERRAIN ON COLLECTOR~~

~~SELECTED RESOURCES~~

Other HUMINT assets, such as interroga- received and ending when the information tors are seldom affected by range is delivered to the requester. The events considerations. shown in the following graph depict the System timeliness is defined as the period general timeliness sequence that must be beginning when an information request is considered during any system capability

~~3-27 EVENT TIMELINE SEQÜENCE~~

~~T1 T2 T3 T5 T6 T7~~

~~Proc/ System Request Mission Coll Analysis Disem Selection Xmsn Prep Ops Xplt~~

! T ! RECEIPT OF TIME OF REQUESTED INFO REQUEST COLLECTION INFO DELIVERED T4 SYSTEM TIMELINESS = T + T1 + T2 + .. . + T7 assessment. System timeliness is the sum of data to provide a quick reference for the times from T to T7. Times required to com- system selection process. plete each of the events shown in the graph should be calculated or estimated for each The technical characteristics of a system must be examined in detail to ensure that it available system based on the tactical has the capability to fulfill the collection situation and the local SOP. Times will requirement. vary, depending on mission priority assigned, specific system availability for The location accuracy of a system is a the collection requirement, and related technical characteristic that can be information processing and dissemination extremely important to the commander. means. IMINT systems are characteristically accurate since a direct association can be made Timeliness is also affected by dependence between the imagery collected and corres- on communications not included as part of ponding map coverage. In cases where the collection system. Tasking and report- maps are available, location accuracy is ing must flow over communications links limited only by the accuracy of the maps that are highly vulnerable to enemy action, used and the competence of the analyst. limited by range, and difficult to maintain Additionally, various computerized systems during rapid displacement. Although the have been developed that are capable of agency selected may be perfectly capable of identifying the coordinates of a point on acquiring the information needed, reporting imagery. may be delayed by communications problems. SIGINT and ESM systems do not have the inherent geographic accuracy of IMINT Many surveillance systems operate systems. Their location accuracy is limited nearly continuously over wide areas, pro- by electromagnetic propagation factors and viding I&W and tipoff information. Since an inability to correlate collected data to they may not require additional tasking, specific map reference points. Emitter loca- the timeliness sequence to consider begins tion accuracies are enhanced by multiple with those events that follow T4 in the intercepts and LOB on the target transmit- graph. ter by a group of systems working in con- Collection managers should consider concert. The correlation of data collected from structing similar bar graphs using local all sources using templating and other analytic techniques will improve location accuracy.

3-28 The importance of location accuracy requirement. The target range listed at the depends on the planned use of the informa- top of the worksheet is used to determine if tion. Information collected for targeting the OV-lD can meet that requirement. This purposes requires greater location accuracy can be done by reviewing the system de- than information collected for answering scription for the OV-lD. When a system is more general PIR and IR. The intended use considered incapable in any area, it is no of the needed information must be known to longer considered. This procedure is determine the location accuracy needed. repeated for each system capability and environmental factor. Correlation. Correlation of range, timeliness, and technical characteristics will pro- At this point, the procedure is time con- vide a preliminary list of systems that— suming if followed precisely. In practice, however, there are many shortcuts. To □ Are within the required range of the explain these shortcuts, it is necessary to target. first examine the asset scoring procedure. □ Can respond within the time required. As each asset or factor combination is □ Have the technical capability to collect considered, a mark is entered on the unit the desired data. selection worksheet to identify the capability of that asset against that factor. One of Select Collection Resources three marks is used: After availability and capabilities are + = fully capable determined, units and agencies are selected 0 = marginally capable and tasked to acquire and report informa- - = incapable tion. Selection of specific units is influenced by the effects enemy, weather, and terrain A single dash under any factor eliminates may have on the resource's ability to collect that asset from consideration. Often the the required information. During this pro- experienced collection manager can readily cess all units are considered for tasking identify one or more asset or factor combi- against every requirement. Capable assets nations that would result in an incapable are selected by a process of elimination. rating. This constitutes a considerable sav- ing of time, since a large percentage of the Various procedures may be used to select incapable assets can be eliminated by a the unit to collect specific information. One quick inspection of the asset or factor com- procedure is to use a selection worksheet binations. When there is doubt about the prepared in a format similar to the one in capability of an asset, refer to the appro- the following illustration. In many cases priate documents. the worksheet may be preprinted with current resources listed. It is used to consider Enemy capabilities are considered during the major factors determining the capabili- the system selection process. In many ty of an asset to satisfy specific information cases, enemy action will restrict the use of, requirements. or reduce the effectiveness of, a particular system. For example, when the enemy has The collection manager begins the unit air superiority, the use of aerial assets may and agency selection process by listing all be restricted to avoid excessive losses. available units and resources along the left- Heavy concentrations of enemy air defense hand column of the worksheet. Next, the missiles on the FLQT may increase stand- specific information requirement and its off distances and thereby reduce the effec- key elements are entered on the top of the tive range of aerial systems. During periods form. of enemy radio and radar silence, the use of Asset capability then is considered in ESM may produce little information. By light of each of the capability factors. For staying abreast of the tactical situation, example, since the first IMINT asset on the attention is focused on agencies with collec- worksheet is the OV-1D MOHAWK, the tion resources that have the best possibility initial determination would be whether the of completing the collection mission. OV-lD is range capable of satisfying the

~~3-29 UNIT ASSET SELECTION WORKSHEET~~

Org. V Corps Specific Info Requirement: Vehicle Reg. No. 2 movement between coordinates DTG: 050100Z May 82 AC091061 and AC201085 Collection Mgr: Brown Time Required: 052200Z May 82 Target Range: 80km Characteristics:

~~Environmental Capability Factors Factors ASSETS Time- Char- Capable Remarks Range acter- Wea Threat Terrain liness istics IMINT OV-1D SLAR RF-4 Photo~~

~~ELINT QUICKLOOK~~

~~COMINT GUARDRAIL QUICKFIX~~

~~HUMINT LRSU~~

~~IMINT OV-1D SLAR, RF-4 PHOTO ASSETS SELECTED: ELINT COMINT GUARDRAIL HUMINT~~

~~UNIT ASSET SELECTION WORKSHEET~~

3-30 Weather plays a particularly important and the need for additional exploita- role in the selection process. Weather can tion. An example of this is the paying affect both the capability of a system to col- of increased attention to a particular lect data and the exploitation of the data area covered during routine surveil- collected. For example, heavy rain or cloud lance missions. cover directly limits the collection of Reporting and dissemination adjust- imagery. □ ments. This consists of modifying the Terrain also influences the selection of reports distribution plan to accommo- systems. Mountainous terrain masks enemy date requesters who can be satisfied by movers from moving target indicator (MTI) a particular ongoing collection systems. Mountains, hills, and built up operation. areas attenuate radio waves, thereby reducing the effectiveness of SIGINT systems. New tasking is prepared as a last resort Heavily forested areas may obscure enemy when other means of collection are neither movement. possible nor feasible.

All outstanding intelligence requirements The benefits of using one resource to cue and the tactical situation are considered in another should not be overlooked. Cuing collection planning. However, certain col- involves the use of one asset, usually a lection factors must be considered before wide-area-coverage surveillance system to tasking orders are sent. These factors provide necessary targeting information to include resource integration, cuing of one a more accurate point target system. system by another to build the required In some cases, a cuing arrangement is data package, and the selection of a proper essential to mission accomplishment. For resource mix and redundancy to increase example, the requirement to detect and the probability of completing the collection accurately locate antiaircraft artillery mission successfully while defeating enemy (AAA) within a large target area using con- deception attempts. tinuous photo penetration missions would The degree to which newly developed col- be very risky and inefficient. The use of lection requirements can be integrated with standoff ESM systems to report AAA emit- current or planned actions will, to a large ters, locations, or LOB followed by penetrat- extent, determine the efficiency of the over- ing photographic sensors would be timely, all collection effort. As a goal, every more effective, and less costly. MI brigade attempt is made to combine new collection and battalion S3s are the focal points for requirements with ongoing actions to cuing respective corps and division re- employ the fewest resources. This decreases sources. However, the collection manager risk while increasing the overall collection plays a critical interface role in providing capacity available. Before requesting addi- tipoff data from higher echelon systems tional missions, the following possible that do not have a direct communications alternatives for integration of collection link with these organizations. requirements with planned or ongoing mis- In some tactical situations, it may be sions are considered: beneficial to plan for collection against a □ Tasking adjustment. Examples of this target using a combination of similar would be adding new collection resources (redundancy) or of differing requirements which do not conflict resources (mix). Redundant tasking may be with ongoing missions, diverting mis- required against high-priority targets when sions in process to collect against a the probability of collection is too low for higher priority target, and changing any one system. Tasking a number of ESM planned collection operations to substi- resources to target a designated emitter tute higher priority targets. over specific periods of time improves the probability of successful collection. This is □ Exploitation adjustments. This con- true especially when the emitter operates sists of modifying exploitation instructions to reflect the evolving situation

3-31 intermittently. On the other hand, employ- Balance, however, is a very minor considering a mix of systems not only increases the ation when compared with the importance probability of collection but also provides of other factors. more complete information. For example, IMINT may detect and locate an enemy Task Collection Resources tactical force while SIGINT and HUMINT Following agency selection, intelligence supply its identity, organizational structure, requirements tasking is prepared. Intelli- and indications of future plans. Employing gence requirements tasking is directed a mix of systems is always desirable if the toward a unit or agency rather than a spe- situation and available resources permit it. cific asset. However, because of the com- Mixing systems also uncovers deception pleted collection planning process described attempts by revealing discrepancies in above, the collection manager is able to information reported by different collectors. direct tasking to a unit with assets capable Whatever resource mix or redundancy is of collecting the information. considered, the mission integration consid- The purpose of intelligence requirements erations described previously still apply. tasking is to provide the selected unit with a Therefore, any tasking that places greater specific requirement, but not with specific demands on the limited resources available instructions for carrying out the mission. must be clearly justified by the potential Requests for Intelligence Information. intelligence gain. RIIs are generated by a subordinate com- Other factors that are considered before mand to obtain intelligence or information tasking a unit or agency are capability, collection support for needs that exceed suitability, and balance. organic capabilities. Requests for informa- An agency must be physically capable of tion are prepared using the RII or a similar providing the desired information in a narrative format. Requests received that timely manner. For example, an armor unit exceed organic requirements are always in reserve is not asked for identification of consolidated and forwarded to the next units in contact, nor is an OV-lD SLAR higher echelon as RII. A request reaching asked for targeting information about mov- corps is at the highest echelon of tactical ers that can be obtained by an AN/PPS-5. RII processing. Regardless of the echelon Neither is an AN/PPS-5 tasked for target- originating the request or requirements ing information about deep movers. tasking, the tasking is prepared to indicate the degree of urgency and the type of Suitability of the agency or resource request being made. Requests are assigned impacts on the selection process. Every priorities depending on criticality and the effort is made to select an asset that pro- timeline specified by the requester. vides the greatest probability of success and at the same time will not provide inappro- At corps and division, intelligence priate overkill. The collection task assigned requirements tasking is directed toward MI to a unit must be compatible with its pri- commanders and commanders of other ele- mary mission. Only the agencies best suited ments of the combat force capable of collect- to furnish the desired information are used. ing the information. Priorities are assigned For example, information most readily to each intelligence requirements tasking acquired by dismounted patrols should be based on those previously established. obtained by infantry or cavalry units rather When new intelligence requirements task- than MI units. Economy of personnel and ing is generated in an ongoing operation, materiel also is considered. There are many high-priority requirements may preempt units and agencies, other than MI units, lower-priority missions previously tasked. which can be tasked for information. Besides tasking directed to subordinates, Within the limits imposed by other con- requests may be sent to higher or adjacent siderations, the collection workload is bal- commands. Intelligence collection require- anced among MI units and other units. ments, which exceed the capabilities of organic assets, are prepared as specific

3-32 requests for information using the RII. □ Provide intelligence orders or gui- Requests may include information concern- dance, which varies from SOP, for ing adjacent areas of interest, the com- handling of EPWs, refugees, captured mand's own area of interest at ranges documents and materiel during the beyond the capabilities of organic re- operation, and NAI particularly impor- sources, or other information not obtainable tant to the issuing headquarters. by the command. Procedures established by Confirm the orders and requests for SOP and the Joint-Tactical Exploitation of □ information that have been made in National Systems (J-TENS) manual are followed for requesting support from higher fragmentary form and that are still current at the time the annex is issued. echelons and national systems. Preserve brevity, clarity, and simplic- There is also a danger of reported infor- □ ity in the body of the order. mation taking multiple paths to the ÀSPS and confirming itself as if the information □ Amplify an order when information is originated from two or more sources. An of limited application to the entire example of this is a tactical report command or is primarily technical in (TACREP) from the TCAE that is also in a nature. brigade intelligence summary (INTSUM). □ Disseminate information and intelli- To the analyst receiving these reports it gence at the start of an operation and appears that the information originated when there is a major change in from two sources. To avoid this, the collec- mission. tion manager and analysts in the ASPS must validate reports by identifying the Instructions on how to prepare the intel- source and time of the information. ligence annex are contained in Appendix C. Tasking Documents. Tasking documents Paragraph 3 of the intelligence annex, are used to levy intelligence requirements intelligence acquisition tasks, implements on the various agencies. In the case of the collection plan. It contains a complete organic systems, this involves orders to list of current orders and RII. Except for units in accordance with command policy collection orders which are a part of the and SOP. As a general rule, intelligence unit SOP, previously issued taskings not requirements tasking at both corps and di- repeated in the intelligence annex are vision is done through either fragmentary automatically cancelled. When intelligence orders, the intelligence annex to the orders and requests are lengthy, they may OPORD, SOP, or the RII. Request formats be placed in an appendix to the intelligence for support from national systems are speci- annex. fied in the J-TENS manual. Fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) are used Systems controlled by a higher headquar- most frequently because information ters, other services, or national agencies requirements continually change. OPORDs respond to approved requests for informa- have a prescribed format, but, FRAGOs do tion passed through appropriate channels. not. Those elements found in a complete The channels used depend on the agency order are omitted when they have not and the requirement, the agency receiving changed, are not essential, or are unavail- the requirement, and command procedures. able or incomplete at the time of issue. An The intelligence annex is standardized example of a FRAGO is provided in FM and has a more rigid format than other 101-5. annexes. The purpose of the intelligence annex is to— Tasking Flow. Corps is the point where national, departmental, joint, multina- □ Issue instructions to subordinate tional, and tactical levels are integrated. commanders and requests to higher Requests beyond the capability of corps or headquarters to collect information division systems are passed by the collec- before or during the initial phase of an tion manager to EAC, national level, or operation. other services for action. Conversely, EAC,

~~3-33 TASKING FLOW~~

. National Departmental Joint/ EAC Multi- Other national Request for Info î ^ Requests for Corps Information Adjacent G2 « » Corps Requests CM&D Section G2/CM&D for Information TASKING Requests for Info

~~S2 G2 Ml Bde Tac ACR/Sep Bde Div 1 (2-5) CM&D Section Op Ctr CM&D Section~~

~~Requirements Requirements t Requests for Info Tasking Tasking~~

~~Ml Company Ml Bn (TE)~~

~~Requirements Tasking 1~~

~~LRSD Ops Ctr LRSC Ml Bn(AE) Ml Bn Tac Bde S2 Ops Ctr Op Ctr Request for Info Requirements Tasking ^~~

~~C&J EW Co Bn S2 Company Requests for Info Requirements Tasking Requirements Tasking~~

~~QUICKFIX Co Flight Pit l&S Co Cdr (OPCON)~~

~~One Ml battalion (TE) is reserve component.~~

3-34 national, and other services task corps and requests and that these items have a defi- division systems through corps. The corps nite tactical value. Targeting information, collection manager incorporates these composition, and disposition of committed requirements into collection planning as and reinforcing forces, and disposition of . other requirements that must be answered. highly mobile air defense systems are a few RII and tasking flow are shown in the illus- examples that could serve as the basis for tration on page 3-34. immediate requests. Regardless of the echelon originating Surveillance is the systematic observa- requirements tasking, the tasking is pre- tion of aerospace, surface or subsurface pared according to a number of general areas, places, persons, or things by visual, considerations. Requests are normally aural, electronic, photographic, or other categorized by degree of urgency and type. means. Surveillance is normally used to The degree of urgency determines the time gain information on the subject over a long constraints placed on the request. Requests period of time to note any changes that may are assigned a priority depending on criti- take place. cality and how soon the information must Reconnaissance is undertaken to obtain, reach the requester. Requests for informa- by visual observation or other detection tion forwarded to national systems should methods, information about the activities specifically state the time the information is and resources of an enemy or potential required by the user. enemy or to obtain data concerning the Anticipated requirements to collect meteorological, hydrographie, or geo- information are best met by preplanning graphic characteristics of a particular area. and advance scheduling. Preplanning is Reconnaissance is a directed effort to especially important to satisfy basic obtain information on a subject at a partic- requirements such as weather, terrain, and ular time. enemy OB. Satisfaction of these preplanned requests requires thorough coordination Because of the interrelationship of recon- with the ASPS, planning, and naissance and surveillance, the same assets consolidation. used to execute reconnaissance missions may also be used for surveillance tasks. Preplanning often provides the user with more responsive support by allowing mis- As noted above, surveillance missions are sion planners and commanders sufficient characterized by a systematic, although not time to schedule the required collection mis- necessarily routine or constant, watch of sion. This is particularly important when persons, places, or things by HUMINT, advanced systems are coordinated at the IMINT, or SIGINT resources. Surveillance national level. These systems often require missions are usually preplanned and are considerable programing to effect collec- particularly suited to— tion. Preplanning also offers greater flexi- □ Cover large areas rapidly and bility for system coordination in selecting repetitively. the most efficient collection means and con- □ Minimize risk to the collector. solidating collection requests. As a practical goal, as many requirements as possible □ Observe or detect changes on the should be preplanned. In addition, every enemy side of the FLOT. effort should be made to submit requests as early as possible. □ Cue other collectors for more detailed coverage. Immediate requests are limited to unforeseen requirements for information of imme- Planning for surveillance operations is diate value to the tactical commander. This conducted after determining the general can often provide specific information rela- mission of the tactical force. Surveillance tive to satisfying the PIR. However, care missions are often developed as a joint should be taken to ensure that only need-to- effort involving all of the intelligence know items are submitted as immediate organizations having an interest in the

3-35 same area of operations. This is due to the The national SIGINT system also oper- limited availability of surveillànce systems ates against long-term, standing require- and the large number of overlapping ments. In the case of SIGINT, the tactical requests that could be generated in a joint commander's crisis or combat requests will or combined operation. be termed time-sensitive and handled A reconnaissance mission seeks to obtain expeditiously. information by visual or other detection Requests for national HUMINT support means and is characterized by limitations ultimately go through DIA after EAC coor- of coverage to one or more specific target dination procedures have been completed. areas at a particular time without the Evaluate Reporting requirement for systematic coverage. Reconnaissance missions are conducted by Collection management does not end with HUMINT, IMINT, and SIGINT resources the issuance of orders and requests. Steps and are designed to— are taken to ensure that orders and requests □ Collect specific, detailed information at are received by the collection agencies and a particular location and time. that they are clearly understood. Collector and ASPS reports are monitored through- □ Support current or planned operations. out the collection process to ensure that Most reconnaissance requests are pre- intelligence and information are reported to planned before the operation. However, the right user in a timely manner. Reports once operations begin, many reconnais- are selectively extracted for sampling and sance requests will be immediate. The time are reviewed for— constraints of the typical reconnaissance □ Timeliness. The time the event took request will not allow for elaborate plan- place is compared to the time the event ning or coordination. A request that would was reported. This comparison reveals be classified as a requirement for a recon- delays and possible problems with the naissance mission might be for urgent pho- reporting of collected information. tographic coverage of a proposed helicopter LZ some distance beyond the FLOT. □ Format. Reports are checked to see if they contain the proper addressees and Valid justification is particularly impor- data elements. tant for immediate surveillance or reconnaissance requests. This is critical if □ Responsiveness. Reports are checked national systems may be required to collect to see if the information being reported the information. Such systems are in high satisfies the commander's PIR and IR. demand, and the restructuring of pro- The following illustration shows the gramed national collection plans requires report evaluation process. adequate justification. Update Collection Plan Requests for support from national systems cannot be so easily categorized as pre- An important aspect of the collection planned or immediate, or as surveillance or management process is the cancellation of reconnaissance. This is, in part, because of intelligence requirements tasking and the the many national agencies involved and updating of the collection plan. The collec- the diverse missions and performance tion manager must always be able to cancel characteristics of individual collection requirements to make room for new high- resources. In the case of the national priority tasks in response to the command- IMINT, the collection manager must be er's operational needs. For example, if an familiar with the mission, the commander's armored division commander is moving intent, the OPLAN, and the Imagery north and suddenly sees an opportunity for Reconnaissance Directives List (IRDC) a flanking maneuver to the west, collection associated with the area of interest. management must have the flexibility to provide responsive support. It is as important to be able to cancel a requirement as it is to levy it in a situation of limited collection resources.

~~3-36 REPORT EVALUATION PROCESS~~

~~SELECTIVELY EXTRACT COLLECTOR REPORT FOR EVALUATION~~

~~REVIEW REPORTS FOR TIMELINESS, RESPONSIVENESS, AND FORMAT~~

~~REVIEW ASPS NOTATION OF SOURCE RELIA- BILITY AND INFO ACCURACY~~

~~REVIEW REPORTS FOR PIR/IR SATISFACTION~~

~~RESULTS: REPORTING IS EVALUATED FOR RESPONSIVENESS, TIMELINESS, AND FOR SATISFACTION OF INTEL- LIGENCE REQUIREMENTS.~~

When requested information is reported another requirement. If so, the old collection back to the CM&D section, it must be requirement, which is now broader in scope matched with the collection requirement it than necessary, must be rewritten to fill the satisfies. The collection management effort specific void. is only effective if it can match incoming Collection agencies must be notified of information with collection requirements. modifications to collection requirements. The incoming information may not come The modified requirement may also require from the collector that was tasked, and a new priority and an adjustment to its time may, by coincidence, partially satisfy

3-37 specifications. Each time the requirement is PROCESSING modified or satisfied, the collection plan is updated. In the situation development process, intelligence is developed in response to the Updating the collection plan is a continu- commander's information and operational ous process requiring close attention. It is needs. It is then evaluated and integrated updated upon— into an all-source product to provide a con- □ Fulfillment of PIR and IR. tinuing estimate of enemy intentions. Through processing, situation development □ Receipt of new PIR and IR. provides all-source intelligence for tactical □ Modification of existing PIR and IR. decisions. □ Changes in enemy, weather, or terrain Processing is the transformation of which dictate a change in tasking. information into intelligence and targeting data. The objective of information process- The ASPS determines when PIR and IR ing is to— have been satisfied. When it is determined that a requirement has been satisfied the □ Answer the commander's requirements CM&D section is notified immediately. regarding enemy movers, emitters, Satisfied requirements are removed from shooters, sitters, capabilities, vulnera- the collection plan and collection actions bilities, probable courses of action, against those requirements cancelled. This intentions, and terrain and weather in frees tasked resources for other collection the battlefield area. missions. □ Develop the targeting data required for Fulfilled PIR and IR also are compared effective attack of mover, emitter, with the collection plan to determine un- shooter, and sitter targets. satisfied requirements. Unsatisfied PIR and Processing is facilitated through the IR, related indicators, and specific informa- use of intelligence data bases. tion requirements are reviewed to determine if— INTELLIGENCE DATA BASE □ The information requirement is still valid. The intelligence data base provides the basic information required in the situation □ Further tasking is necessary to fulfill development process. The data base is the requirement. created for potential contingency areas Fulfilled and unsatisfied requirements no before hostilities. It is a combination of longer applicable are deleted from the col- what we think we must know, what we do lection plan. Often during the analysis pro- know, and what we don't know about the cess, the ASPS identifies voids in the intel- enemy, weather, and terrain. It— ligence data base. The collection manager is O Is established and maintained by the notified that adjustments are needed to the ASPS or BICC. collection plan. When notified of a void in Focuses on specific areas. the collection plan, steps are taken to □ update the collection plan and initiate the □ Contains information on enemy, appropriate collection action. weather, terrain, sociology, politics, training, economics, psychology, and Collected information is reported to the other factors. CM&D section. As incoming reports are received they are noted on the collection The following matrix depicts, by echelon, plan and forwarded to the ASPS for pro- data base information requirements. cessing. During information processing, The intelligence data base is created by data to support situation development are accomplishing a thorough, in-depth IPB obtained. analysis. Existing OB, to include technical data, is used to create the initial data base. A thorough research of information (from DIA, NSA, CIA, INSCOM, country studies,

~~3-38 DATA BASE NEEDS BY ECHELON~~

~~CATEGORY OF INTELLIGENCE S~~

Companies X X Battalions X X X i" weapons, equipment, location, tactical Regiments X X X X deployment, movement, and strength Divisions X X X X Armies X X X Fronts X X All classes and types of supply X X X Requirements X X X Logistics information about-- Procurement X X Distribution X X X Transportation X X X Installations X X X Terminals X X Evacuation and salvage X X Maintenance X X X Personnel strength X X X X X Amount and condition of weapons /equip X X X : X X Unit effectiveness Information Status of training X X X X X about— Efficiency of personnel X X X X X Length of time unit in combat X X X X X Traditions and past performance X X X X X Personality traits of unit commander X . X X X Status of technical and logistical support of unit X X X X • X Morale, health, discipline, political reliability X X X X • X'

~~( contir ued g n ne)~~

~~3-39 DATA BASE NEEDS BY ECHELON (CONTINUED)~~

~~CATEGORY OF INTELLIGENCE~~

Obstacles X X X X Terrain information Rivers X X X X X about- Bridges X X X X X Fords X X X X Ports and harbors X X Observation and fields of fire X X X Concealment and cover X X X Key terrain X X X X Ground and air avenues of approach X X X X DZ and LZ X X X X Barriers and fortifications X X X X X Trafficability X X X X Roads X X X X X Built-up areas X X X X Temperature X X X X X Weather information Ground visibility X X X X X about— Surface winds X X X X X Precipitation X X X X X Snow and ice cover X X X X X Winds aloft X X X X X Cloud cover X X X X X Light data X X X X X Severe weather X X X X X Location of nuclear explosions and yield X X X X X NBC information Nuclear and chemical weapons X X X X X Direction of fallout X X X X X Emitter nomenclature X X X X Electronic technical data Emitter type X X X X about— Mode of emission X X X Frequency range X X X Location accuracy for DF X X X X 1 Associated use-units or weapons X X X X

and current intelligence) should be done for terrain in the friendly unit's area of data base preparation during peacetime. interest. After hostilities begin, the data base is The intelligence data base must be func- maintained and refined to reflect all perti- tionally organized for the intelligence pro- nent knowledge of the enemy, weather, and duction process to be successful. Organizing

~~3-40 DATA BASE ELEMENTS~~

INTEL INTSUM JOURNAL WEATHER Ï COORDINATE REGISTER OB DATA DATA BASE SITMAP & OVERLAY TECH DATA I IPB TERRAIN PRODUCTS ] the data base is done by separating infor- irregular force units, auxiliary and under- mation, either manually or by automation, ground elements are included in the OB into appropriate files. These files should data base. The OB data base consists of consist of the intelligence journal, OB data, evaluated information on the enemy— IPB products, and situation map (SITMAP). □ Composition. The number of files maintained should be determined by time and resources available. □ Disposition. Elements of the data base are shown in the □ Strength. above illustration. □ Training status. Intelligence Journal □ Tactics. The intelligence journal is a permanent, chronological record of each message or □ Logistics. document entering or leaving the ASPS or □ Combat effectiveness. BICC and may contain administrative data according to SOP. The journal provides a □ Electronic technical data. cross reference—a complete compilation of □ Miscellaneous data. all incoming reports for purposes of future recovery. The journal covers a specified Data is developed in many fields outside time, usually 24 hours, and is recorded on the scope of OB, but all intelligence is ulti- DA Form 1594. mately related to it. For example, S&T intelligence produces intelligence on the The journal file contains the DA Form capabilities of weapon systems, but OB in- 1594 and incoming or outgoing documents telligence determines the effect of weapon collected during the specified time. Docu- capabilities and characteristics on enemy ments are posted with the corresponding tactics, combat effectiveness, and journal entry number and filed in sequence. organization. The journal is an invaluable tool during OB files are cross-referenced and organ- continuous 24-hour-a-day operations involv- ized for rapid access and retrieval. They are ing personnel shift changes. kept current and used to identify gaps in Order of Battle Data data holdings. OB files provide a format for recording enemy combat losses. OB is the identification, strength, command structure, and disposition of the per- Combat loss data, resulting from postat- sonnel, units, and equipment of any mili- tack assessment, provides input to compute tary force. In LIC campaigns involving enemy strength. Information concerning

3-41 strength provides indications of enemy and 21-31, that may be posted on the cur- capabilities and assists in determining the rent SITMAP overlay to show enemy— probable courses of action or options open to enemy commanders. A lack or a pre- □ Unit identifications. ponderance of strength has the effect of □ Unit locations including time of lowering or raising the estimate of the information. capabilities of an enemy force. Similarly, a marked concentration of units in an area □ Boundaries. gives indications of enemy objectives and □ Location of major weapons systems. probable courses of action. During peacetime, changes in the strength of potential □ CPs. enemy forces are important factors which □ Logistics centers. indicate the enemy's intention to wage war. □ Aircraft staging areas. □ LZs and DZs. IPB Products □ NBC contaminated areas. IPB files contain the IPB templates described earlier in this chapter. Posted information varies with the size of the friendly unit maintaining the SITMAP. For example, division SITMAPs will nor- SITUATION MAP mally show the location of enemy units The basic SITMAP provides a temporary down to battalion level. Smaller elements of graphic display of the current, known dis- some critical enemy units, such as artillery, positions, and major activities of both may be shown. If the presence of individual friendly and enemy forces. The basic weapons is considered a decisive factor in a SITMAP provides a format for accurate particular operation, they are shown. notations of enemy forces relative to Reports of individual weapons and equip- friendly boundaries. ment can be critical to the analytical effort whenever such information would contrib- The purpose of the intelligence SITMAP ute to the identification and location of the and all associated overlays is to contribute unit to which assigned. to sound tactical decisions. The primary intelligence uses of the SITMAP and asso- Electronic Order of Battle Overlay ciated overlays are to— EOB overlays are used to graphically □ Display the enemy situation and depict communications and noncommuni- disposition. cations emitters (radio/radar/jammer and so forth) and associated units, facilities, □ Provide a basis of comparison to and activities which have been located determine the significance of newly through ESM or SIGINT. There will be received data pertaining to enemy many more emitters than units on the bat- forces. tlefield. To attempt to depict on one graphic □ Provide a basis for briefings and intel- all OB elements would quickly clutter a sin- ligence reports. gle 1:50,000 scale overlay. Therefore, it is recommended that a separate overlay be □ Focus attention on intelligence gaps used for the emitter data elements listed which require redirection of the collec- below. Emitter types and signal parameters tion effort. can be associated with particular units, in □ Assist in determining patterns of some cases, and aid the analyst in confirm- enemy movement and probable courses ing or denying the presence of enemy units of action. and activities. Not all the data elements listed will be known or will be appropriate Separate topical overlays are used in con- for a single emitter. These elements may junction with the SITMAP, to display all include— other information regarding the enemy. The following are examples of the types of en- □ Emitter type. tries, made in accordance with FMs 101-5-1 □ Modulation.

3-42 □ Frequency. incoming information which meets the □ Unit identification or level of classification levels can be posted on the command. collateral SITMAP overlay. The term "collateral" applies only to the security classifi- □ Weapons system association. cation. More than one collateral overlay □ DTG of observation. may be necessary to allow for an unclut- tered presentation and to facilitate func- , □ Journal number of message providing tional integration. the data. Coordinates Register Other prolific collectors may require their own overlays to avoid map clutter. As an The coordinates register, most effective at example, SLAR MTI reports may be posted brigade and battalion, provides a means of on a single overlay to aid in the analysis of noting intelligence associated with specific enemy movement patterns. areas. It can be compactly formatted and easily carried. One such format is the loose- Collateral Overlay leaf notebook. Each page of the notebook The collateral SITMAP overlay is normally limited to SECRET information. All

~~GRAPHIC STYLE OF COORDINATES REGISTER~~

~~GRID SQUARE 2815~~

~~82 MM~~

~~• V T o~~

~~X 10 \ ***** G 122 Arty r-eS« X 10 10 G I 122 Arty 120M x 10 G I 122 Arty NOTE: 1. Elms of 1st & 3d bns 66 rifle regt~~

~~3-43 NOTIONAL STYLE OF COORDINATES REGISTER GRID SQUARE 2815~~

~~ITEM TIME COORD STATEMENT NOTES~~

MG fired on recon patrol Have next patrol 1. 092235 28381539 from A Co check this area Veh noise - Tk? - Heard Ask air OP 2. 092318 ? direct N. of A Co OP #2 28321507 to look Special OB report on Div OB wants 3. 100600 more info on wpns & fortifications wpns strength

28021523 to Trenches & bunkers 28141527 28141527 to Wire 28221529 Same MG as yesterday? 28611545 to Platoon on line- Check this! 28781551 has 2 MGs 28811551 to Extensive trenches 29001599 and firing pos

4. 102335 28391530 to B Co patrol repts New since 28691541 wire and AP mines 081800 Res unit (Co ?) (From div 5. 110600 28431588 in gen'l area PERINTREP) Med tank spotted How many 6. 110630 28381557 by It plane more??? 28731584 and 7. 111320 Active mortars 28151564

~~Flash from small At? AA? Gun? 8. 120010 28611564 cal arty not over 75 Rclr or Bazooka? Ask higher HQ~~

pertains to a single grid square of the perti- dinate units into all-source intelligence nent map area of interest. Recording of per- using a basic production process. The sec- tinent data can be by either written notation receives data in two forms. The first is tion or a graphic portrayal. The preceding information; data which has not been sub- two illustrations are examples of both styles jected to correlation or analysis. The second of notation. is processed intelligence. Through the process illustrated below, both types of input INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION are correlated and analyzed to give the PROCESS ASPS further refined intelligence. The ASPS converts reported intelligence The following illustration provides an and information from the CM&D or subor- overview of the analysis and production process.

~~3-44 ANALYSIS AND PRODUCTION STEP~~

~~Receive Intelligence Evaluate Intelligence Update Intelligence and Information and Information Files Reports Reports for Accuracy and Pertinence~~

~~Estimate Enemy Probable Courses Develop Targeting Monitor of Action and Data Collection Plan Intentions~~

~~Produce Intelligence Reports~~

Receive Intelligence and third is essential. Flow charting may be Information Reports used to describe the distribution scheme. The first step in the intelligence produc- Log and Distribute Incoming Reports. tion process is the receipt and routing of Incoming reports are logged in the journal incoming information. In this step informa- and distributed immediately after receipt. tion is logged in, checked for reliability, and Reports may be received through message distributed for further evaluation. An over- center channels, by courier, or by either view of this process is shown in the follow- radio or telephone. If the report is received ing illustration. verbally, the information is transcribed Determine Internal Distribution. Dis- before processing. The logging and filing of tribution is determined and noted on each incoming messages and reports provides a incoming report. Experience has proven historical record of data transactions and that a logical sequence for routing data is allows personnel to refer to previously important. Establishing an SOP stating reported data for— who gets a certain report first, second, or

~~RECEIPT AND ROUTING STEP~~

~~Determine Log and Determine Determine Internal Distribute Sourcè/ Credibility Distribution Incoming Agency of Infor- Reports Reliability mation~~

3-45 □ Comparing newly reported data. The reliability of each incoming item is evaluated by a standard system using let- □ Adjusting collection efforts. ters A to F. The overall source or agency □ Evaluating the responsiveness of reliability factor is signified by various tasked collection agencies to produce degrees of confidence as shown in the fol- pertinent data on time. lowing table. Determine Source or Agency Reliabili- ty. Source reliability is determined and Determine Credibility of Information. recorded on the incoming report by the col- Credibility is designated by a number lecting unit or agency. The ASPS personnel between 1 and 6 as shown on page 3-47. also judge reliability based on the past performance of the reporting unit or agency To determine the combined ratings, the and assess an overall reliability factor for two aspects of evaluation, reliability and each incoming report. The overall reliability credibility, must be considered indepen- factor is marked on each report and clearly dently. The rating is expressed as a letter- distinguished from the factor assessed by number combination. For example, infor- the reporting agency. mation received from a usually reliable source that is judged as "probably true" is

~~RELIABILITY OF SOURCÇ/AGENCY TABLE DEGREES OF LETTER USE CONFIDENCE~~

~~Completely A Only assigned under the most unusual circumstances. reliable~~

~~Usually B reliable Indicates a source or agency of known integrity.~~

~~Fairly Indicates a source or agency that is fairly reliable. C reliable~~

~~Not usually D reliable Indicates a source or agency not usually reliable.~~

~~E Unreliable Indicates a source or agency usually unreliable.~~

~~Reliability F Assigned when there is no adequate basis for cannot be estimating the reliability of the sources. judged~~

3-46 rated as "B2". Information from the same are a valuable aid in determining a report s source, but judged as "truth cannot be value. If a report is determined not to be judged" is rated as "B6". pertinent, it will be filed for possible future reference. Coordination with the collection manager is made to modify or clarify task- Evaluate Intelligence and ing. Pertinent information is then fused Information Reports with other information in the data base. The second step in the process is evaluat- Information is evaluated for pertinence ing intelligence and information reports. by determining whether the information All incoming reports must be examined for is— pertinence in terms of reliability and credibility factors. A decision is then made concerning the report's value. Event templates

~~CREDIBILITY OF INFORMATION TABLE~~

~~NUMBER DEGREES OF USE CREDIBILITY~~

~~Confirmed by Used when it can be stated with certainty that the infor- 1 other sources mation originated from two or more different sources.~~

~~Probably Used when no proof of the above can be established, and 2 true no reason exists to suspect that the reported information comes from the same source.~~

Used when investigation reveals that the reported facts Possibly are compatible with the previously observed behavior of 3 true the target, or if known background of a target leads to the deduction that the target might have acted as reported.

~~Used when reported but unconfirmed information contra- 4 Doubtful dicts the estimate of the development or the known behavior of a target.~~

~~Used when reported information is not confirmed by available data and contradicts the experience as- 5 Improbable sumed to be reliable with regard to the development of a target or Issue.~~

~~Truth cannot Used when an investigation or a report reveals that 6 be judged a basis for allocating ratings 1 to 5 does not exist.~~

3-47 □ Pertinent in regard to the enemy or to □ Updating event analysis matrixes. the characteristics of the battlefield □ Considering impact of events on TAI area. and NAI. □ Needed immediately. □ Updating OB, if necessary. □ Of future value. PIR and IR are answered when the □ Of no apparent value. information is available. Questions are answered when there is a reasonable proba- □ Of value to higher, lower, or adjacent bility (80 percent or better) that the answer unit. at hand is correct. The PIR and IR should Update Files be answerable at this point in the intelligence process unless the requirement Intelligence files are updated by fusing involves predicting enemy intentions. If incoming intelligence reports with informa- intentions are required, then the process is tion in the data base. Fusion is accom- continued to develop an estimate of enemy plished by— probable courses of action from which to □ Reviewing reports to determine the predict intentions. event, area, and enemy unit. □ Searching files for corresponding Estimate Enemy Probable information. Courses of Action □ Noting the previous report number and An overview of this phase of the intelli- source or agency on the new report. gence production process is shown in the (When the report cannot be correlated, following diagram. it is noted as a sole-source report.) Compare Information and Intelligence. Comparing reports with event analysis Significant data is extracted from the matrixes is done by— reports and posted to the appropriate file. Extracts from SIGINT, ESM, and collateral □ Reviewing each report to see if it corre- reports are used to update the enemy EOB lates with indicators in the event analy- and collateral SITMAP overlays. Periodi- sis matrix or might be a deception cally, all SITMAP overlays are compared attempt. with the all-source SITMAP. By making □ Posting usable information on decision this comparison, the flow of movement can support templates. As this information be observed and enemy concentrations will is posted, each MC is analyzed for the appear more clearly. enemy's indicated course of action. Once the preceding steps have been □ Determining if events support enemy accomplished, a second level of processing use of particular MCs. is required for further file integration. This is accomplished by— □ Identifying indicators of enemy probable courses of action. □ Posting the PIR and IR number to the report if PIR and IR have been par- □ Considering the impact of events on tially or totally satisfied. TAI and NAI. □ Identifying all significant information This phase provides an updated decision if no PIR and IR have been satisfied. support template. □ Fusing data with known intelligence. Formulate Conclusions. Conclusions are □ Updating the all-source SITMAP. the last step in the interpretation of information. Conclusions are reached by logical □ Comparing the collateral and EOB decisions based on an analysis of available overlays with the all-source SITMAP. intelligence, knowledge of the battlefield □ Reviewing event analysis matrixes. area, and the enemy's situation, capabilities, and vulnerabilities. The illustration on □ Identifying major enemy movements page 3-50 provides an overview of this step. and concentrations.

~~3-48 PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION STEP~~

~~Compare Information and Intelligence Reports with Event Analysis Matrixes~~

▼

~~Compare with Friendly Operations Templates~~

~~Formulate Conclusions~~

▼

~~DETERMINE ENEMY PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION~~

~~Provide / \ Input File~~

~~G2 Intelligence Estimate All-Source Report File~~

A conclusion is arrived at through either deployed and advancing along a particular deductive or inductive reasoning. Deductive avenue of approach. Based on knowledge reasoning gives meaning to certain known gained through previous operations or the factors through inference—leading from the study of enemy doctrine, it can be deduced general to the specific. For instance, that this regiment has certain capabilities through radio intercept it is known that and vulnerabilities and will be used in a a motorized rifle regiment (MRR) is

~~3-49 FORMULATE CONCLUSIONS~~

~~Compare Decision and Situation Templates~~

Based on available informa- ♦ tion of enemy situation, dis- Identify Courses of Action position, and probable Still Available to the Enemy courses of action... i Eliminate Courses of Action No Longer Available

~~i Update Decision Template and Event Analysis Matrixes~~

* FORMULATE CONCLUSIONS

certain way. By considering current intelli- As posted intelligence reports begin to fill gence holdings on this regiment, further out decision support templates, the tem- deductive reasoning will provide a more plates are compared with the situation tem- specific answer. Collection agencies then plates to identify those courses left open to can be tasked, if necessary, to confirm or the enemy commander. Courses of action refute the conclusions reached and to pro- which, by virtue of enemy disposition, are vide information or intelligence to the no longer viable are eliminated. Templates commander. are updated as necessary to reflect these Inductive reasoning leads from specific changes. information to a general hypothesis. For Determine Enemy Probable Courses of instance, over a period of time, intelligence Action. An estimate of the enemy's most collection systems and agencies have probable course of action and intentions is reported the existence of approximately the result of situation development. Esti- eighteen 120mm mortars, eighteen 122mm mating enemy intentions is accomplished howitzers, and over 100 BMPs, BTRs, and by— BRDMs forward of the FLOT and deployed across a 3-kilometer front. Using existing □ Analyzing the current enemy situation OB intelligence, doctrinal templates, and as depicted on the decision support inductive reasoning, the force is identified templates. as an MRR. □ Determining the enemy's most probable course of action based on those

3-50 courses of action left open to the enemy development also support target develop- commander, the disposition and comment. Where the objective of situation position of the enemy force, and the development is an estimate of enemy inten- friendly situation. This effort focuses tions, the objective of target development is on answering the PIR. to provide direct or correlated targeting Develop Targeting Data data which meets the commander's target selection standards. An overview of the Target development is the process of pro- target development process is shown in the viding targeting information to support the following illustration. commander's tactical plans. Performed by The following material addresses the IEW the ASPS at corps and division and, to a functions within the overall targeting pro- more limited degree, by S2s at brigades and cess. Details on the total targeting process, battalions it is an integral part of the all- to include interfaces between fire support, source intelligence analysis and production maneuver, and IEW are located in FC process. The same collection, IPB, and 34-118/6-34-10. analysis functions that support situation

~~TARGET DEVELOPMENT PROCESS~~

~~TACTICAL REQUIREMENTS 1. Close Operations 2. Deep Operations 3. Rear Operations 4. C3CM 5. Post-Attack Assessment~~

TARGET CORRELATION TARGET VALUE ANALYSIS 1. Analyze Information 2. Develop Targeting Data 1. Determine HVTs and HPTs 3. Update Target Sheets 2. Prepare Target Spread 4. Report Target Data to FSE Sheets 5. Determine Target Attack 3. Prepare Target Sheets Damage

~~TARGET ACQUISITION 1. Focus Collection V 7 on HVTs and HPTs 2. Cue and Employ Collections Systems 3. Report Direct Targeting Data~~

3-51 There are two objectives in the target □ Where these targets should be development process. The first objective is attacked. to provide direct targeting data (combat TVA links the effects of attacking a information) to commanders for immediate target directly to target behavior. TVA be- fire and maneuver in close operations. The gins in IPB by a detailed analysis of enemy second objective is to collect and correlate doctrine, tactics, equipment, organizations, information from all sources to develop tar- and expected behavior. Information derived geting data for attacking second-echelon is then used to project how, in each tactical targets in deep operations. formation, the enemy will respond when confronted with different tactical situa- Direct targeting data results from the tions. Activities, behavior, equipment, and immediate identification and location of elements of the selected enemy force which targets and reporting that information directly to FSEs for attack. This normally are critical to successful operation in each situation are identified. An example of this occurs when accurate detection, identification, and location of a target is obtained is the engineer company in an MRR during from a single source and is immediately a march to contact. When the MRR is faced with making a river crossing, the engineer available for fire support use. An example company's location within the march for- of this would be armor targets acquired by mation changes. Other preparatory activi- GSR. ties also must take place in order for the Correlated targeting data results from river crossing to succeed. Through TVA, a comparing or correlating information from listing of actions and elements are devel- multiple sources to accurately fix a target. oped that would prevent the MRR from Target correlation includes TVA. conducting a river crossing. Preventing the TVA is a methodology for identifying river crossing may accomplish the desired HVTs and HPTs. HVTs are elements or effect by disrupting, delaying, or blocking resources of an enemy formation which the the MRR based on the commander's tactical enemy commander considers to be essen- plan. In-depth TVA provides a means of tial to accomplishing a specific tactical determining which targets should be objective. HVTs are determined indepen- attacked for the greatest tactical benefit in dently of friendly capabilities to acquire a given situation. These targets are identi- and engage them. HPTs are HVTs which fied as HPTs. can be successfully acquired and engaged When conducting TVA, the situational by a friendly force to a degree which makes value of a target is a significant factor. As the enemy formation vulnerable to exploita- the distance from the FLOT increases, the tion. It is the successful friendly exploita- value of combat forces decreases with tion of the enemy formation which results respect to CSS forces and facilities. For in the tactical "PAYOFF." Using IPB tem- example, at the FLOT, a tank battalion is a plating, TVA is done before the battle so significant threat and is a very important that during the battle the commander can target to the maneuver battalion com- quickly select and attack specific targets to mander. However, 10 kilometers forward of manipulate the enemy force. When faced the FLOT, that tank battalion is not as with a numerically superior enemy force, important to the success of the enemy's commanders will not have enough re- immediate mission as an ammunition sources to attack every target acquired. supply point (ASP) or a fuel dump. Recogni- Therefore, TVA must be keyed to determin- tion of this situational value element is ing which targets out of the entire enemy important in TVA. array should be attacked to achieve the greatest tactical benefit for the resources TVA tools are an effective means of func- expended. TVA determines— tionally applying TVA and include target spread sheets and target sheets. These tools □ The critical targets. should be prepared in conjunction with the □ When these targets should be attacked. IPB effort. Target spread sheets are a means of describing and identifying targets in specific tactical situations at various

3-52 echelons of Soviet-type forces. Target sheets support spread sheets and list the critical elements of various target groups which, when attacked, will restrict options or capabilities. Both of these products are classified because of the nature of the information depicted. Once completed, these sheets are used by the G2, G3, and FSE as shown in the following chart.

~~SPREAD SHEET USES~~

~~G2 G3/FSE/EWS~~

1. Focus intelligence collection 1. Develop target priorities for assets. the commander. 2. Determine target development 2. Development methods of attack! needs. 3. Establish priority for attack. 3. Recommend target priorities to 4. Develop fire support plans. G3 and commander. 5. Develop ECM plans.

Currently, target spread sheets have been prepared for use in Europe or against Soviet/Warsaw Pact-type forces in any mid- to high-intensity environment. Target spread sheets normally used are shown in the following matrix. Each echelon of command should have and use target spread sheets and target sheets that apply to the enemy forces that command will face. These sheets are prepared and maintained by the ASPS.

~~3-53 SPREAD SHEETS~~

~~ECHELON OF COMMAND TACTICAL SITUATION REGIMENT DIVISION ARMY FRONT~~

~~Movement to Contact X X~~

~~Meeting Engagement X~~

~~Attack Against a Defending Enemy To Seize Subsequent X X X X Objective~~

~~Forced River Crossings X~~

~~Assault Crossing from the March X X~~

~~Hasty Defense X X~~

~~Prepared Defense X X~~

~~Withdrawal X X X~~

~~During TVA and preparation of the target spread sheets, potential targets are grouped into 13 sets. These sets are shown in the following illustration.~~

~~TARGET SETS~~

1. Command, control, and 8. Nuclear/chemical. communications. 9. Class III (petroleum, oils, 2. Fire support. and lubricants (POL)). 3. Maneuver. 10. Class V (ammunition). 4. ADA. 11. Class IX (maintenance). 5. Engineer. 12. Lift (surface transport/ helicopters). 6. Reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition (RSTA). 13. LOC. 7. Radioelectronic combat (REC).

3-54 Once an analysis of enemy doctrine is the effect "Halt or impede preparation of completed, a target spread sheet is prepared crossing site and execution of crossing." A for each specific tactical situation and level specific HVT in this case might be the ferry of command. A sample target spread sheet crossing site with reference to a target sheet is shown in the following illustration. For a number for that HVT, for example, Ferry detailed description of target spread sheets, Crossing Site (75)." refer to FC 6-20-10. The target value matrix also contains The target value matrix is divided into information on enemy doctrine. This five columns. The first three columns des- includes likely formations and distances cribe the effect desired from attacking the (doctrinal template), objectives of the force, target. The Xs in the columns identify and likely enemy courses of action if the which effects can be achieved in a particu- attacks on this force are successful. lar situation against the size of formation for which the sheet is being prepared. The TARGET SET column lists the 13 target sets identified previously. The RELATIVE WORTH column depicts the worth of attacking one target set with respect to the other target sets on the sheet. The subdivisions in the column are not scaled and should not be interpreted as absolute values. This column allows a rapid identification of the priority different target sets should have when resources for attack are scarce. For target sets assigned a RELATIVE WORTH, brief statements describing the rationale for attacking each set are placed, in columnar form, to the right of the target value matrix. Specific HVTs for each target set assigned a relative worth are also listed, in columnar form, to the right of the appropriate attack rationale statement. Specific HVT listings will also contain the number of the appropriate target sheet describing each HVT for easy reference. For example, in the river crossing scenario, the engineer target set may be assessed as critical with an attack rationale statement to

~~3-55 SAMPLE TARGET SPREAD SHEET (EXTRACT)~~

~~A. O V TARGET RELATIVE v/ £ co SET WORTH O~~

Contribution in this situa-, tion to disrupt/delay unit - Fire Support responses. Maneuver ADA Engineer Relative value of RSTA attack in this The nuclear/chemical target REC situation. set is high payoff at division and higher levels —• Nuclear/Chemical regardless of the situation. Class III POL Its contribution varies too Class V AMMO greatly to be predictable, Class IX MAINT thus, the different graphical treatment. L FT LOC

~~DESIRED EFFECT~~

~~THREAT IS ATTACKING THREAT IS DEFENDING~~

~~Preclude the efficient interaction of Same. DISRUPT combat and supporting systems.~~

~~Alter arrival time of the force outside Slow defensive preparation and/or DELAY planned/predicted movement delay reinforcement. schedule.~~

~~Cause the force to shift to another LIMIT Isolate the defender. avenue of approach.~~

~~NOTE: Actual target spread sheets will also contain information on the size of forces, tactical situation, specific HVTs, and doctrinal templates.~~

3-56 A target sheet is prepared for each poten- facilities, depots, or critical materials which tial HVT. The target sheet is numbered for are important to the sustainment of enemy references, identifies the target, and pro- combat operations. These lists also may vides information on the size, doctrinal contain key enemy logisticians, industrial- location, vulnerability, signature (visual ists, scientists, engineers, laboratory tech- and electronic), and probable impact of the nicians, or specific documents. loss of the target on the enemy's operatic A sample target sheet is provided below.

SAMPLE TARGET SHEET TARGET CATEGORY: Engineer HIGH VALUE TARGET: TGT 75. Ferry crossing site. FUNCTION: Provide rapid crossing of water obstacles for tanks and other nonamphibious systems. DESCRIPTION: — TGT radius - point target. — Posture - exposed on water surface FEBA distance. COMPOSITION: Vehicles normally 2 ferries or rafts (if river over 300m wide may be as many as 5) PERSONNEL: SIGNATURE: Visual - see graphic. Electronic - Other - DEGRADATION: — Nonamphibious forces must find alternate means to cross. — Force that secured bridgehead is not reinforced.

When completed, TVA results in a list of S&T intelligence targets are categorized high payoff targets for each enemy echelon and listed by priority and reflect the target's of command and tactical situation. These criticality to current and planned lists are used jointly by the operations, operations: intelligence, and fire support staffs to □ Priority I - highly critical to the out- develop a high payoff target matrix. A come of the campaign and are proba- sample high payoff target matrix is pro- bly perishable. vided in the following illustration. An approved high payoff target matrix □ Priority II - highly critical to out- can then be used to further refine attack come of the battle and are probably criteria and attack guidance as to— perishable. □ What targets are to be attacked (in □ Priority III - significant, not order of priority). perishable. □ When they are to be attacked. □ Priority IV - desirable, not perishable. □ Why they are to be attacked. Targeting data is developed for those □ What are the conditions for success targets that must be attacked to support the and failure. commander's tactical plan. Selected future S&T intelligence target lists must also be targets are identified by the G3 as early as considered in target development. These possible. This permits the detection, loca- lists can be used by fire support and operation, and tracking of these targets as they tions staffs to disrupt, destroy, or capture

~~3-57. SAMPLE HIGH-PAYOFF TARGET MATRIX~~

~~Target Sheet Priority Target Set Description Number~~

~~1. 8 (TS) 77, 79 Nuclear Depot 2. 1 (TS) 29, 34 Division, Army Main CP 3. 2 (TS) 5 Division Artillery Command Btry~~

~~4. 2 1, 2,18 Arty Bn FDC, COP, FA Btry~~

~~5. 1 25, 30 Regimental Main CP, Div Fwd CP~~

~~6. 3 51, 50, 46, 48 Bn Assy Area, March Column, MR/TK Co 7. 4,7 63, 64, 91, 92 AD EW Site, Radio/ Radar Intcp Sites~~

~~8. 9 115, 116 Regiment/Division POL Points~~

~~9. 10 120, 121 Division/Army Ammo Depots~~

NOTE: 1. List may have any number of target priorities. 2. This list is jointly developed by G2/G3/FSE. enter the command's battlefield area. This manager must ensure that the specific facilitates early target development which detail needed is stated in the collection allows attack of targets at the optimum requirement. Reporting requirements must time and distance from the FLOT. include: Collection of information for target and □ Target location accuracy required to situation development normally occurs include the sensor's target location simultaneously. The collection manager error if applicable. establishes separate collection missions □ Time target was last observed at the when priorities are sufficiently high and reported location. planned collection missions will not provide the specific information desired. Informa- □ Target description. tion to support target development is The time required to process collected acquired by the same resources which col- information must be as short as possible to lect for situation development and is ensure target data can be developed and divided into the same categories (movers, reported in minimum time. The objective is emitters, shooters, and sitters). Information to enable attack of the target while it is still collected for targeting purposes requires a where it was detected. This means that tar- greater location accuracy than that col- geting data must be reported as expedi- lected for answering PIR and IR. When tiously as possible. determining reporting requirements to support target development, the collection Targeting data must be reported in time for decisions to be made and fire control

3-58 procedures to be completed before a target The postattack assessment process is leaves a desired attack area. Quick fire shown in the following illustration. channels are established between the G2 Monitor Collection Plan and G3 for use in reporting targets as they meet pre-established criteria. ASPS personnel constantly monitor the collection plan to provide immediate Postattack assessment is performed by responses to collection requirements and the ASPS as part of the processing function recommend adjustments to the collection to determine the effects of deep attacks plan to meet ASPS needs. To fulfill PIR, IR, against the enemy's follow-on and support- and TAI information needs, the collection ing echelons. Damage reports and other plan must ensure that the required informa- information used to assess the effectiveness tion is collected to answer the critical ques- of the attacks are handled in the same way tions asked by the commander. The ASPS other reports are handled. The reports are monitors the collection plan and identifies evaluated for reliability and credibility, gaps by— logged in, distributed, and used to update intelligence files. □ Reviewing template files and the TAI overlays. The corps or division G3 establishes the planned time and desired effects of an □ Determining if TAI information needs attack. After the attack, it is then deter- match PIR and IR. mined, through analysis, if the criteria □ Comparing PIR and IR to the all- established by the G3 have been satisfied. source SITMAP and the event analysis Satisfaction of the attack criteria is deter- matrixes. mined by deciding whether or not the desired damage was done to the enemy. For □ Determining the satisfaction of PIR, example, the attack was to have caused an IR, and event indicators. enemy unit to be delayed for eight hours; or, □ Identifying, if necessary, additional the intent of the attack was to force the information needed to fulfill TAI needs enemy to follow a particular route. Once it and the commander's targeting is known what the attack was supposed to guidance. accomplish, its impact on the enemy force can be assessed, based on the enemy's □ Informing the CM&D section of addi- reaction. tional collection needs.

~~POSTATTACK ASSESSMENT~~

G3 Determines Determine Info Include Post Atk Receive Damage Analyze Results of Desired Effects on Needs Assessment Info Reports Atk in Terms of the Enemy Requirements in Desired Effect Collection Plan

~~Disseminate Results of Assessment~~

3-59 Once gaps are recognized, appropriate The locations of enemy NBC weapons are orders and requests are issued by the reported to the G3 or FSE by the fastest CM&D section to eliminate unproductive means possible. Normally the FAIO will coverage and focus on updated collection assist in expediting targeting data of this requirements. The CM&D section is notified nature. Unit SOP must provide explicit immediately of a gap in intelligence instructions for reporting enemy NBC holdings. intelligence. Produce Intelligence Reports Intelligence reports are produced by the DISSEMINATION ASPS to satisfy situation and target development requirements. Reports are gener- The final function supporting situation ated based on information developed and target development is dissemination. through IPB, extracted from incoming Intelligence and combat information are of reports, or developed through all-source little value if not delivered when and where analysis. The production process focuses on needed. Failure in this respect defeats a identifying reportable information and pre- thorough and successful collection and pro- paring and transmitting the report to the cessing effort. Since most intelligence and necessary units or agencies. Reports are all combat information are time sensitive, prepared after— they must be disseminated to commanders and others who need it, when they need it, and in a form they can use. □ Reviewing the decision support template and PIR and IR file. The free, timely exchange of intelligence and combat information is critical to suc- □ Reviewing the estimate of the enemy's cess on the battlefield. Dissemination is most probable courses of action. driven by battlefield events. Fast-moving □ Identifying enemy events which battles dictate the need for transmitting satisfy PIR and IR. information quickly. Electrical message, data link, secure voice radio, and courier are □ Identifying enemy intentions sup- the primary means of dissemination. ported by actual events. Fragmentary reports transmitted quickly A distribution planning file is used to carry the bulk of intelligence and are pre- control the reporting of intelligence. This is ferred over schedule-driven, standardized a list or matrix that provides a ready refer- reports. Although the methods and means ence for determining the distribution of used to disseminate intelligence and combat each report. The file is used in conjunction information are similar, there are signifi- with the SOP, which stipulates report for- cant differences that must be considered. mats for each report. If an item of informa- Timely dissemination of intelligence ena- tion does not fit within the established bles commanders to make decisions with reporting criteria, an intelligence spot confidence. It also provides knowledge in report is transmitted. light of new information which may be pro- Reporting the enemy's intended or actual cessed. Intelligence is used in much the use of NBC weapons or the location of these same way at all echelons. The means of dis- weapons is especially critical. If it is deter- semination are likewise similar at all levels mined that the enemy has or intends to but volume, distribution, and frequency initiate an NBC attack this information vary. Intelligence is disseminated within must be reported to higher, lower, and adja- the producing headquarters and to the next cent commands by the fastest means, with higher, next lower, and adjacent units. Dis- the highest message precedence. Initial semination to lower and adjacent units is reports are sent using a FLASH message more difficult and yet more important, precedence. Subsequent reports are trans- because— mitted with an immediate message □ The intelligence picture at lower echel- precedence. ons changes more rapidly.

3-60 □ The requirement for greater detail may form varies according to the nature and result in delay. location of the prospective user, the urgency and nature of the intelligence, and availa- □ The specialized intelligence produced only at higher echelons may have sig- ble means of dissemination. Dissemination nificant bearing on the operations of to the commander, the unit staff, and sub- lower echelons. ordinate units located near the CP is accomplished through personal briefing Combat information and targeting data using the SITMAP. Combat information are the mainstay for brigade and battalion and intelligence should be disseminated in commanders and fire support units. Com- the form of brief messages to permit prompt manders use this data for immediate action understanding and use. Information which against the enemy. Any element that can best be shown graphically should, con- obtains combat information must dissemi- sistent with other requirements, be dissem- nate it by the fastest, most direct means inated in the form of overlays, so that it can available. This is achieved by entering the be readily applied to the SITMAP of receiv- appropriate intelligence net or, as appro- ing units. Written intelligence estimates, priate, the command net. When direct com- intelligence annexes, and intelligence munications are not possible, the informa- reports are effective dissemination tools tion is passed through available communi- when the requirement is for general dissem- cations to a relaying headquarters. Combat ination of a large amount of information. information also is reported through intelligence channels for processing and dissemi- Caution must be exercised to ensure that nation. The FAIO assists in disseminating all intelligence is disseminated to all units targeting data to the appropriate FSE. and agencies which have a need for it. In this sense, broad dissemination is prefera- Intelligence, combat information, and targeting data are disseminated based on ble to dissemination which is so selective established requirements. Each unit must that units may fail to receive the intelli- establish a system to differentiate between gence they need. However, dissemination should not result in units frequently receiv- priorities so that only its most critical ing irrelevant intelligence which they caninformation is disseminated immediately. not use or large amounts of information REQUIREMENTS that ties up their communications channels. This is especially valid in the case of dis- The principal requirements for dissemi- semination to brigades and battalions, nation are timeliness, usability of form, per- because of their limited capabilities for pro- tinence, and security. cessing and storage. Generally, dissemina- Intelligence and combat information are tion to subordinates is based on the perti- disseminated in time to permit formulation nence of the intelligence to the unit of plans and initiation of action using that concerned. Intelligence is disseminated to data as a basis. Certain items of informa- adjacent units on the same basis without tion, such as a report of an impending coun- going through the chain of command. Con- terattack, must be disseminated immedi- versely, virtually all intelligence should be ately to permit maximum reaction time. The disseminated upward. immediate significance of such combat Changes in the tactical situation may information is obvious and thus does not cause an item of intelligence which was require much evaluation before transmit- once thought to be unnecessary, to become ting. After transmitting, it is analyzed for pertinent. further significance. The resulting intelligence is disseminated as rapidly as possi- The enemy's awareness that friendly ble. Timeliness in the dissemination of forces have certain intelligence concerning intelligence is affected by the dissemination their situation may cause them either to means employed. alter their actions so that the intelligence is Intelligence must be disseminated in a no longer valid or to strengthen their securi- form which will permit its ready use. The ty effort. This makes subsequent collection

3-61 of information by friendly agencies diffi- With the exception of combat informa- cult. Accordingly, dissemination is accom- tion, the selection of communication means plished with adequate transmission securi- is usually the function of the CM&D sec- ty. Classified messages which are tion. It involves determining the opera- transmitted by a means susceptible to tional status of each communications sys- enemy interception are normally encrypted. tem and the existence and extent of message backlogs, by precedence category, Dissemination officers should be aware for each system. that certain types of SCI may not, by national-level mandate, be decompart- Selection mented or sanitized for collateral level dis- Selecting the most suitable means to be tribution. Any requirement to decompart- used for dissemination depends principally ment or sanitize SCI must be coordinated upon the nature and urgency of the intelli- with the command SSO. Any decision by gence and the means available. When wide the command SSO or the senior intelligence dissemination of a comparatively large officer to disseminate SCI in contravention amount of intelligence is required, it is usu- of national-level directives as a result of a ally disseminated by the issuance of time-sensitive combat requirement must be appropriate intelligence documents. As reported to the SSO at the next higher level examples, during the planning phase of an of command. offensive operation, written intelligence MEANS estimates and intelligence annexes to operations plans are used. INTSUM, There are various means available for the PERINTREP, and periodic intelligence dissemination of combat information and summary (PERINTSUM) are also used simi- intelligence. Combat information is trans- larly during the current phase. Electrical mitted by the most direct means. Normally, communication means are effective for the it flows from the collector directly to the dissemination of intelligence messages. user by voice or message transmissions. However, such dissemination may be sub- Intelligence may be disseminated by— ject to delay because of requirements for □ Any available communication means. transmission of other messages of higher □ Direct contact in the form of conferen- priority. The imposition of radio silence ces, briefings, and liaison visits. requires that messages be delivered by visual means or by messenger or courier. □ Issuance of intelligence documents Graphic materials such as sketches, over- such as intelligence annexes, lays, and reports can be disseminated by INTSUMs, and periodic intelligence means of facsimile equipment. Availability reports (PERINTREPs). of automatic data processing (ADP) equip- Dissemination within a headquarters is ment will permit rapid dissemination of usually made by personal contact, verbal urgent items. Close liaison with the C-E reports, briefings, and by distribution of officer is necessary to keep informed on the intelligence estimates and written reports. availability of communication means. Fre- quent intelligence liaison visits between Dissemination to higher, lower, and adja- units, particularly from higher to lower cent units is made by reports, summaries, units, should be emphasized. estimates, and similar documents. In most cases, reports as formulated in Appendix G Products or in Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command and Control Systems (JIN- The products used to disseminate combat TACCS) formats are used. Selecting the information and intelligence depend upon communication means for such reports their intended use. Command SOP dictates depends on the urgency of the information, what products to use and when to use them. the types of communications available, and Spot reports are one-time reports used by security requirements. all echelons to transmit intelligence or information of immediate value. Since

3-62 information or intelligence may have an "INTSUM" will be the first item of the immediate and significant impact on cur- report. However, when involved in joint rent planning and operations, speed of service operations, originators of INTSUMs transmission is essential. The spot report is will use the format contained in Chapter V, afforded the most expeditious means of JCS Publication 12. Nonessential detail transmission consistent with required should be excluded from the INTSUM, but security. There is no prescribed format for information concerning the issuing unit, the spot report; however, it should provide DTG of issue, brief discussion of capabili- information on size, activity, location, unit, ties and vulnerabilities, and conclusions time, and equipment (the SALUTE should always be included. formula). The supplementary intelligence report The intelligence report (INTREP) is a (SUPINTREP) is a NATO standarized standarized report which is disseminated report form used for more comprehensive on a required basis. An INTREP is pre- reviews concerning information on one or pared when facts influencing the enemy several specific intelligence targets. It may capabilities have been observed or when a also contain selected intelligence data col- change in enemy capabilities has taken lected over an extended period of time and place. The INTREP is passed to higher, may include items contained in the lower, and adjacent units at the discretion INTREP or INTSUM. The nature and con- of the commander producing the report. It is tent of data contained in the SUPINTREP dispatched as quickly as possible following dictate the specific dissemination. At the receipt of the information and is sent by commander's discretion, the SUPINTREP the most expeditious means available. is passed to higher, lower, or adjacent units. There is no prescribed format for the It is normally produced on special request INTREP except that the acronym or in support of a particular operation, and "INTREP" will be the first item to appear is dispatched by the most suitable means in the report. However, when involved in available. joint service operations, originators of INTREPs will use the format contained in The PERINTREP is a summary of the Chapter V, JCS Publication 12. Time per- intellignce situation for a specified period, mitting, the INTREP includes the originat- normally 24 hours, in a tactical situation. ing office's interpretation of the informa- The PERINTREP is a means of disseminat- tion or intelligence being reported. ing detailed information and intelligence. It covers the enemy situation, operations The INTSUM contains a brief summary capabilities and vulnerabilities, character- of information of intelligence interest cover- istics of the area of operations, and CI. ing a period of time designated by the Other intelligence documents such as S&T commander. The INTSUM provides a intelligence S'immaries, intellience interro- summary of the enemy situation in forward gation reportj, translations of captured and rear areas, enemy operations and documents, and weather and climatic sum- capabilities, and weather and terrain char- maries may be disseminated as annexes to acteristics. The INTSUM is an aid in the PERINTREP. The PERINTREP is con- assessing the current situation and updates cise, but complete, and makes maximum use other intelligence reports. Negative infor- of sketches, overlays, and annotated maps. mation may be included in the INTSUM, The use of abbreviations and unnecessary but unnecessary information is excluded. references to map coordinates is avoided. The INTSUM reflects interpretations and The PERINTREP normally is prepared at conclusions of enemy capabilities and corps and higher echelons. Corps may dis- probable courses of action. pense with the PERINTREP if the situation The INTSUM is normally prepared at does not permit timely dissemination. Dis- brigade and higher echelons and is dissem- semination is made by the most suitable inated to higher, lower, and adjacent units. means, usually by liaison officers or mes- It has no prescribed format except that sengers to staff, adjacent units, and to the

3-63 subordinate and higher headquarters at the or by the code word "BOMREP" in the case next two higher and lower echelons. The of an enemy air attack. The text of the mes- PERINTREP should be disseminated in sage is transmitted in the clear except that time for use in daily planning. In joint ser- the current call sign of the unit of origin vice operations, the PERINTREP is will be used rather than unit identification. replaced by the PERINTSUM. The format Also, the position of the observer will be for the PERINTSUM is contained in Chap- encrypted if it discloses the location of a ter V, JCS Publication 12. headquarters or an important observation post. The weekly intelligence summary generally follows the format of a PERINTREP Initial reports and data of enemy or uni- (or the PERINTSUM in joint service opera- dentified nuclear detonations and biological tions). It serves to highlight trends that are or chemical attacks are disseminated from useful in planning future operations and in the source, through designated headquar- processing current information. This report ters to the highest headquarters in the area. normally is prepared at EAC. Reporting is by flash precedence. Initial and follow-up reports are evaluated at each Imagery analysis reports disseminate headquarters and the results are appro- IMINT. The basic types of imagery analysis priately disseminated. reports are the reconnaissance exploitation report, initial programed interpretation Warning of expected contamination from report, and supplemental programed inter- a nuclear burst or biological or chemical pretation report. These reports are prepared attack is disseminated by the first head- and disseminated by the imagery analysis quarters capable of determining such section in the MI battalion (AE). During information. joint service operations, the applicable portion of JCS Publication 12 will be used. Weather forecasts are a prediction of the weather conditions at a point, along a Intelligence interrogation and translation route, or within an area for a specified reports summarize the results of interroga- period. The accuracy and reliability of tions of EPWs, civilian detainee, or refu- weather forecasts depend upon such factors gees, and translations or summaries of as characteristics of the area, available enemy documents. Information of imme- weather data, reliability of weather com- diate value is disseminated in spot reports. munication facilities, and length of forecast Other information is disseminated in the periods. Weather forecasts use encoded most suitable form for the users. At corps graphics or plain language formats. and higher echelons, information gotten Weather forecasts for use by troop units are from interrogation and translation reports usually in plain text formats. The three is included in the PERINTREP (or the types of weather forecasts are— PERINTSUM in joint service operations). □ A short period forecast, which is any Information on enemy bombing, shelling, forecast (to include weather warnings) or mortaring activity is initially dissemi- covering up to 72 hours. nated by means of a bombing report, shell- □ An extended period forecast which ing report, or mortaring report (BOMREP, covers a period of between 3 and 5 SHELREP, or MORTREP), as appropriate. days. Submission is a responsibility of the affected unit. SHELREPs and MORTREPs □ A long period forecast which covers a are provided to the affected unit's fire sup- period of 5 days or longer. port officer (FSO) for input to the counter- Besides the forecasts mentioned above, an fire element of the force artillery TOC. outlook may also be given as an extension Reports are rendered as normal messages to the basic weather forecast (for example, a and are transmitted by the fastest means 48-hour outlook beyond a 24-hour weather available. Each transmission is preceded by forecast). See FM 34-81/AFM 105-4 for "SHELREP" in the case of enemy artillery further information.

3-64 Because of the changing nature of compiled from historical records of weather weather forecasts, especially short period observations over long periods. Format or forecasts, timeliness is a critical factor in content are not prescribed. their dissemination. Weather forecasts Climatic studies are the compilation of normally are transmitted by electrical the climatic data (climatic summary) and means. The intelligence officer makes pro- the analysis and interpretation of the data visions for timely dissemination of severe in light of its possible effects on military weather warnings to enable units to take operations. Climatic studies usually are necessary preventive action. Severe weather prepared at corps and higher headquarters. warnings usually cover tornadoes, thunder- Detailed climatic studies for areas of the storms, dust and sand storms, extremely world are included in the National Intelli- heavy precipitation, freezing temperatures, gence Survey (NIS). The supporting winds above specified speeds, and freezing weather team prepares climatic studies to precipitation. Warnings are issued by the meet the particular requirements of the supporting weather team, as required. Flood command. Climatic studies are dissemi- warnings are the responsibility of the unit nated on the same basis as weather and engineer. Severe weather warnings are climatic summaries. normally disseminated as spot reports. S&T intelligence bulletins and sum- Current weather reports contain informa- maries are prepared at corps and higher tion on existing weather conditions or spe- headquarters to disseminate the results of cific weather elements. They may be verbal, an examination and exploitation of enemy written, or graphic representations provided materiel. Bulletins usually deal with indi- by Army aviators, field artillery target vidual items, while summaries are broader acquisition units, field artillery meteorologi- in scope to include such areas as scientific cal sections, or supporting USAF AWS ele- implications and logistics. They are dissem- ments. Other units furnish current weather inated through command or intelligence reports as directed. Normally these reports channels, depending upon the scope and are disseminated directly to the user by the nature of the contents. The current NATO collection agency. standardized nomenclature for Soviet Bloc army weapons and equipment described in Summaries of weather and climate are FM 100-2-3 is used in S&T intelligence used as a basis for other estimates and reports. plans. They are usually prepared by the Engineer terrain teams provide terrain supporting weather team at the request of reports and specialized engineer reports in the intelligence officer and disseminated in support of the G2. intelligence documents such as the analysis of the battlefield area, intelligence esti- OB books contain lists, histories, code mates, and PERINTREPs. Weather sum- names, and other data concerning foreign maries are used in analyzing the effects on units and biographical data on foreign mili- recent operations and in estimating the tary personalities. OB handbooks contain effects of weather on future operations. data concerning the political structure, mili- They are required for engineer forecasts of tary system and organization, equipment, streamflow, conditions of ground, and traf- and tactical doctrine of foreign nations. OB ficability. Weather summaries have no books and handbooks are usually prepared prescribed format or content. The content of by DA and theater headquarters. EAC may a weather summary is determined by the issue supplements to keep these documents requester based on intended use. current. Climatic summaries give statistical AUTOMATED INTELLIGENCE data in terms of averages, extremes, and SUPPORT frequencies of occurrence for a specified period of time such as a year, season, or The introduction of computers and dedi- month, at a given point, along a route, or. cated intelligence communications will within an area. Climatic summaries are enable the G2 or S2 to collect, process,

3-65 analyze, and produce more pertinent, relia- IDHS and other qualified agencies or activi- ble data, in a much shorter time than with ties that use minicomputers. This system current manual systems. allows the analyst access to, among others, Currently, almost all analysis is done in a the Defense Intelligence Agency On-line manual mode. The analytic functions de- System (DIAOLS), the Community On-Line scribed in this chapter are performed by the System (COINS), the Advanced Imagery analyst with no assistance from automa- Requirements and Exploitation System tion. This process is time-consuming, cum- (AIRES), the Pacific Command Data Sys- bersome, and personnel-dependent. Auto- tems Center (PDSC), the Analysts Intelli- mated assistance is presently being gence Display and Exploitation System incorporated into many newly fielded sys- (AIDES), and SIGINT On-Line Intelligence tems. Systems still in engineering and System (SOLIS). MAXI gives the analyst a advanced development include automated work file capability for— assistance. □ Storage and manipulation of Emphasis now is directed toward develop- information. ing and fielding an automatic data process- □ Message generation, transmission, and ing system (ADPS) to enhance the analytic reception. process. The ADPS is seen as an enhancement of the analytic process, not a replace- □ Analyst-to-analyst communication. ment for the analyst. While systems pre- □ Numerous other functions. sently envisioned will be capable of some degree of analysis, that will not be their A complete system, the ASAS is a compu- primary function. ter assisted, tactically déployable, modular all-source processing system capable of Army units around the world are pres- providing IEW and OPSEC support to light ently using a variety of off-the-shelf ADPS. and heavy units at division, corps, and These systems vary considerably in appli- EAC. It consists of a common set of cation and sophistication. They all, how- modules with each module performing a ever, afford the analyst the opportunity to unique set of functions. All modules consist develop familiarity with ADP, which will of vehicle-mounted shelters. ASAS is a self- ease the transition into a fully automated contained, self-supporting system that con- system. sists of the six following major functional Throughout the Army there are Intelli- areas: gence Data Handling Systems (IDHS) facili- □ Collection management (requirements ties that are the Automated Systems Activi- management, mission management, ty (ASA) under INSCOM. The ASA IDHS asset management). provides the secure switchboard to connect □ Intelligence processing (single source analysts with the national intelligence sys- analysis (MTI, fixed target indicators, tems assets. There are a number of software HUMINT, COMINT, ELINT, systems under development that use ASA COMINT and ELINT integration) and as the conduit to national assets. There are all-source processing). also a number of complete computer supported systems being developed. We will □ Situation development. address one software—the Modular Archi- □ Target development. tecture for the Exchange of Intelligence (MAXI), and one complete system—the All □ EW support. Source Analysis System (ASAS). □ OPSEC support. The MAXI is a component of the Com- ASAS has the capability of processing mon Users Baseline for the Intelligence the intelligence data transmitted to it from Community (CUBIC) software program. its supporting units and the message traffic The CUBIC program provides an orderly received by it. ASAS at present, does not and systematic approach for developing, have connections with the national data implementing, disseminating, maintaining, bases except by message traffic received by and supporting common software for the the system.

~~3-66 CHAPTER 4 Counterintelligence~~

CI includes those intelligence activities Intelligence collection and target acquisi- intended to detect, evaluate, counteract, or tion are the means by which Soviet ground prevent hostile intelligence collection, sub- commanders acquire information on oppos- version, sabotage, terrorism, or assassina- ing forces. Rapid success in military operation conducted by or on behalf of any per- tions, a basic tenet of Soviet doctrine, sons or organizations operating to the demands that commanders have timely detriment of the US Army. It includes the information on the terrain, weather, and identification of the hostile, multidiscipline their opponents. Their doctrine recognizes intelligence collection threat; determination three general types of intelligence: of friendly vulnerabilities to that threat; and the recommendation and evaluation of □ Strategic intelligence is collected to security measures. CI supports OPSEC, ensure national safety and to provide rear operations, and tactical deception, and information for conducting strategic anti-intelligence warfare as part of those military operations. actions critical to the protection of our □ Operational intelligence concerns itself plans, units, and operations. This chapter with the application of theories and describes, in general terms, the enemy intel- practices to current operations of ligence threat, tasks which must be per- fronts and subordinate armies. formed, and the integration of CI with the command's tactical operations. FMs 34-60 □ Tactical intelligence is considered the and 34-60A, provide a detailed description most important category of military of specific methods and procedures for pro- intelligence for ensuring the success of viding CI support. FM 34-62 provides tactical operations (division level and detailed information on special methods below). Tactical intelligence collection and procedures for counter-SIGINT support. is conducted to obtain information necessary for the preparation and con- SUPPORT TO OPERATIONS duct of tactical operations—air, ground, and sea. SECURITY The Soviets have an excellent intelligence CI support to OPSEC orients on defeating collection, analysis, and dissemination or degrading an enemy's multidisciplined capability. This capability is organic to all intelligence effort. It includes those counter- echelons from front through regiment. HUMINT, counter-IMINT, and counter- Below regimental level, the results of SIGINT measures necessary to oppose reconnaissance operations are passed to effectively the collection systems available regimental level or above for evaluation. to the enemy at the tactical, operational, The Soviet commander uses this capability and strategic levels. It also includes CI to detect, locate, and, if possible, destroy analysis performed as an integral part of enemy forces. the OPSEC process. In order to fully appreciate the value of OPSEC and, in turn, To the Soviets, reconnaissance is the most CI support to OPSEC, it is necessary to important element of combat support. It is have a basic understanding of the enemy defined as all measures taken to collect intelligence threat. information on— THREAT □ Nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction. Since most potential enemies of the US are trained in Soviet military doctrine, the □ Formations. following paragraphs are based on the □ Organization for combat. Soviet doctrinal approach to intelligence.

4-1 □ Intentions. and SIGINT capabilities. Reconnaissance aircraft, in general, also carry weapons and □ Weather and terrain of the specific area of future operations. are capable of attacking ground targets of opportunity. A certain portion of reconnais- The Soviets recognize that in order to sance missions are accomplished by pairs make maximum use of their massed fire- of fighter and ground attack aircraft power and mobility, their target acquisition assigned locate and attack missions. These capabilities must be characterized by accu- missions are directed particularly against racy and short reaction times. Tactical nuclear delivery sites. reconnaissance is conducted to varying The Soviets are credited with air recon- depths by specialized reconnaissance units naissance capabilities similar to those of as well as all other troop units. the West. If a high priority is assigned to a The Soviets also recognize that recon- reconnaissance mission and mission analy- naissance operations will be met by coun- sis, targets might be engaged within 2 termeasures and deception operations. For hours after imaging. this reason, diverse, multi discipline collec- The Soviets have an extensive intercept tion means are employed to obtain informa- capability for both radio and radar. Inter- tion. The various collection means often cept units are moved forward just behind overlap and are redundant. Reconnaissance leading maneuver regiments. They have the is organized by commanders and staffs of capability to intercept all electronic emis- all combat arms and services. Soviet tacti- sions within the following distances from cal writings state that reconnaissance is the FLOT: effective only if it is conducted actively and continuously under all conditions and cir- □ Target acquisition radar: about 25 cumstances. Continuity of action, timeli- kilometers. ness, and accuracy of information are con- □ VHF: about 40 kilometers. stantly stressed. Soviet principles for reconnaissance missions are— □ HF ground wave: about 80 kilometers. □ Aggressiveness. Decisive actions and □ HF skywave: unlimited. initiative are used by commanders and These ranges are greatly extended when headquarters to obtain necessary airborne intercept equipment is used. information by all means available. Information derived from the intercept of □ Continuity. Intelligence is acquired at "clear" traffic is immediately evaluated and all times, regardless of the intensity of exploited. Decryption is normally very slow. combat, time of day, or weather conditions. The Soviet DF capability is equivalent to that for intercept. While information from □ Timeliness. The gathering and report- DF is evaluated quickly, it is unlikely to ing of reconnaissance information to provide a sufficiently accurate fix on a mov- allow sufficient time to counter enemy ing, tactical target. If a nuclear strike is action is stressed. required, confirmation is most likely □ Reliability. Information is verified by accomplished by aerial reconnaissance. At more than one source to accurately least 2 to 2-1/2 hours might elapse from portray the tactical situation. initial electronic intercept before a strike is launched. Targets within artillery range, □ Accuracy. The exact determination of such as forward command and control facili- coordinates of important targets such ties, are attacked within minutes after DF. as missile installations and nuclear storage sites is essential. Reconnaissance in depth is carried out by specially trained personnel. Organized into Air reconnaissance is a good source of teams, they operate up to 100 kilometers tactical intelligence and is undertaken by forward of the main force and can be aircraft of the frontal aviation. These air- expected to infiltrate deep into division, craft have visual, photo, infrared, radar, corps, and EAC rear areas. Their primary mission is to collect information concerning

4-2 nuclear weapons, units in assembly areas, The chart on page 4-4 shows the range of moving headquarters, technology, and Soviet tactical reconnaissance assets in communication facilities. Normally, teams relation to the FLOT. are equipped with long-range radios and, Intelligence collection threats to US except in emergencies, probably report by forces vary according to many factors such burst transmission on a scheduled basis to as the depth and density of friendly forces minimize detection. and the weather and terrain. The chart on All combat units of the Soviet Army have page 4-5 depicts a general estimate of the organic tactical ground reconnaissance enemy's capability to collect against vari- capabilities. Motorized rifle and tank divi- ous echelons. sions and regiments have reconnaissance RESPONSE battalions and companies equipped with tanks and scout cars, infantry fighting vehi- The intelligence threat described in the cles, and motorcycles. These units often preceding paragraphs means that US operate up to one day's march ahead of the commanders must take specific actions to main body. Regiments on the march dis- minimize the enemy's ability to collect patch battalion-sized advance guards for- against them. Such actions are embodied in ward of the main body. The advance guard the command's OPSEC program. This pro- sends a company forward, and that com- gram includes the coordinated application pany deploys a reconnaissance patrol of of a variety of measures and procedures tai- reinforced platoon strength. Engineer, lored to the unique requirements of each artillery, and chemical troops all have their unit, mission, and situation. This requires a reconnaissance elements which are totally integrated effort consisting of cross-attached to leading reconnaissance actions in three major categories of OPSEC units in the advance. These same elements measures: countersurveillance, countermea- are always close to the FLOT in more static sures, and deception measures. situations and continually perform reconnaissance for target acquisition and combat Countersurveillance measures are those planning. measures routinely taken to protect the true status of friendly activities and operations Front, army, and divisional artillery units from enemy intelligence activities. They have an organic target acquisition capabili- include measures which are integrated in ty. Generally, these units have surveillance daily training, such as the use of secure and weapon locating radars. They are also communications, correct electronic mainte- capable of sound ranging out to about 14 nance procedures, and camouflage and con- kilometers from the FLOT and flash spot- cealment. Such measures generally are ting from OPs. required by regulations, directives, or SOP. The intelligence derived by the Soviets Countermeasures are planned, recom- from imagery and signals is not considered mended, and selected to overcome specific to be sufficient to determine the morale of aspects of enemy intelligence collection troops, the level of combat effectiveness, nor operations which are not countered by more intentions. To obtain this data, great routine countersurveillance. Once a friendly emphasis is placed on aggressive patrol- vulnerability is identified and determined to ling. The capturing of prisoners is consi- be a risk, a specific countermeasure is devel- dered essential to tactical intelligence col- oped to preclude exploitation by the enemy. lection at all levels. Troop units gain Countermeasures may include both protec- information by using— tive and offensive actions. Protective mea- □ OPs. sures include those taken to protect against hostile collection without directly attacking □ Raids. the collector. Offensive measures include □ Ambushes. ECM, fire, and maneuver directed against □ Patrolling of designated areas. the collector. Although countermeasures are

~~4-3 RANGE OF SOVIET RECONNAISSANCE MEANS~~

~~Distance in kilometers from FLOT 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 200 300400500600700 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I~~

~~AIR RECONNAISSANCE Fighter reconnaissance —450 Lt bomber reconnaissance~~

~~LONG RANGE RECONNAISSANCE From army recon company 350~~

~~TACTICAL GROUND RECONNAISSANCE Divisional recon battalion Nuclear operations ■ 100 Conventional operations ■ 50 Regimental recon company Nuclear operations ■ 50 Conventional operations 125~~

ARTILLERY TARGET ACQUISITION AND RECONNAISSANCE Surveillance and weapon locating radars Sound ranging ■ 10 Flash spotting —14 (Visual limits) always written into each SOP, specific the analyst as opposed to the enemy deci- countermeasures are dependent upon the sion makers. situation and the mission. OPSEC encompasses every element of the Deception is all action taken to mislead command and requires the involvement of the enemy into actions which are counter to commanders, staffs, and troops to be effec- his intentions. This can be done as a separ- tive. In fact, every soldier must take an ate operation in support of the unit's mis- active part in protecting the command sion or it can be used as an OPSEC mea- through OPSEC. OPSEC is directed and sure to protect the real operation. guided by the commander, coordinated by Deception measures used as OPSEC mea- the operations officer, supported by other sures are aimed more at the collector and staff members, and executed by the soldiers of each unit.

~~4-4 SOVIET COLLECTION MEANS~~

~~ENEMY COLLECTION AGAINST~~

~~HUMINT EAC CORPS DIV BDE BN Agents X X O 0 Line Crossers O 0 0 X X Recon Units X X X X Combat Units X X X Patrols 0 X EPW O 0 0 X X SIGINT AND REC~~

~~Radio Intcp X X X X X Radar Intcp 0 0 0 X X DF 0 0 0 X X Sonic 0 0 X~~

~~(MINT~~

Photo X X X X X Infrared (near/far) X X 0 0 o Radar Survl 0 0 0 X X Early Warning Radar X X X 0 o REMS 0 0 X X Night Vision Devices X Visual X SLAR 0 X X X X LEGEND X-High Threat O - Moderate Threat Blank - Limited or no Threat

4-5 The OPSEC program must be applied to □ Has staff responsibility for defensive all aspects of military operations during source nets and tactical agent opera- peace and war. Its objectives are to support tions (when approved by EAC). our principles of war, to ensure command □ Performs staff supervision of all CI security, and to preserve the element of sur- activities of the command. prise. To be effective, an OPSEC program must be— The G2, augmented by the CI analysis section, performs the detailed staff func- □ Established by the commander. tions in support of the OPSEC program. □ Emphasized at all levels of command. The CI analysis section— □ Designed for the single purpose of pro- □ Analyzes enemy intelligence viding security to the command. capabilities. □ Based on operational requirements. □ Assists in developing friendly force profiles. □ Aggressively implemented. □ Maintains the intelligence threat data □ Adaptable to changing situations. base. Staff Responsibility □ Assists in identifying friendly vulnera- The G3 has staff responsibility for the. bilities to hostile intelligence collec- command's OPSEC program in coordination, sabotage, and terrorism. tion with the G2 and reinforced by the □ Supports G3 OPSEC risk analysis. OPSEC staff element. The G3— □ Recommends OPSEC measures. □ Manages the command's OPSEC program. □ Prepares appropriate portions of CI □ Develops EEFI and associated indica- estimates, plans, annexes, and similar tors for each operation. documents. □ Establishes OPSEC policy and □ Recommends OPSEC evaluation procedures. requirements. □ Prepares OPSEC estimates, plans, and CI Support annexes. CI support is a critical element in any □ Reviews OPLANs and similar docu- effective OPSEC program. CI functions, ments to ensure adherence to OPSEC performed by the intelligence staff, are policies and procedures. integrated with the OPSEC functions of the □ Develops friendly force profiles with operations staff. The following illustration the assistance of other elements of the describes the overall OPSEC process, iden- command. tifies staff responsibilities, and demon- strates the integration of the operations and □ Evaluates operational risks. intelligence efforts. □ Selects OPSEC measures. An accurate assessment of enemy intelli- □ Directs OPSEC evaluations. gence capabilities is the foundation of friendly vulnerability assessments and the The G2 has staff responsibility for CI and development of effective OPSEC measures. performs the CI staff functions needed to Identification and assessment of the hostile support the OPSEC program. The G2— intelligence threat are accomplished □ Coordinates the collection and process- through a continually updated data base ing of intelligence to support the maintained by the CI analysis section. OPSEC program. Information for the data base is obtained □ Recommends EEFI to the G3. from the ASPS as a result of requested collection actions or intelligence disseminated □ Evaluates hostile intelligence, sabo- from higher levels of command. Using all tage, subversion, and terrorism available information, the CI analysis sec- capabilities. tion assesses the hostile intelligence threat

~~4-6 THE OPSEC PROCESS~~

~~G2 G2 & G3 G2 & G3 Identify the hostile Identify friendly force Identify friendly force intelligence collection profiles and recommend vulnerabilities threat EEFI 1 G3 G2 & G3 G2 & G3~~

~~Select OPSEC Recommend Perform risk analysis measures OPSEC measures and select EEFI~~

THE FORCE G2 & G3 G2, G3 & THE FORCE Direct efforts to Monitor OPSEC Apply OPSEC monitor the effectiveness measures measures of applied 1 OPSEC measures effectiveness 8 G2 & G3 Recommend adjustments to OPSEC measures 10

for use in later phases of the OPSEC procedures and, over time, may be used to process. determine intentions. Collectively, profiles Included in the OPSEC data base are can be used by the enemy to help predict friendly force profiles made up of signa- probable courses of action. Friendly OPSEC tures, patterns, and indicators. These show analysts assist units to develop their pro- how a unit might appear through the eyes files to determine weaknesses and recom- of the enemy. The friendly force data is cru- mend corrections to commanders. To do cial to planning operations because it aids this, all unit activities must be identified to in developing EEFI, OPSEC measures, determine whether they provide indicators accurate appraisals, and effective deception to the enemy. Profiles which should be plans. maintained include— □ C2 communications. Profiles are comprehensive studies of a unit and its activities to include equipment, □ Intelligence. doctrine, SOPs, and so forth. Profiles result □ Tactical operations and maneuvers. from actions, to include the timing of those actions, taken by military units and indi- □ Logistics. vidual soldiers. Once compiled, unit profiles □ Administration and other support. provide a picture of the unit as the enemy sees it. Analysis of a unit's profiles can reveal signatures and patterns about unit

4-7 Signatures are unique characteristics of Friendly force vulnérabilités are identi- a unit which result from the presence of a fied through comparison of friendly indica- unit or activity on the battlefield. Signa- tors and hostile collection capabilities. As tures are detected because various units an aid to analysis, IPB techniques are ap- have different equipment, are of differing plied to friendly force patterns and signa- sizes, emit different electronic signals, and tures so we can see ourselves as viewed by have different acoustic, thermal (infrared), enemy collection systems. For example, the and seismic signatures. Detection of indi- range and focus of hostile collection means vidual signatures can be grouped by ana- can be plotted on a map and, with intervisi- lysts to show installations, units, and bility overlays, a determination made of activities. what friendly activities are vulnerable to Patterns are stereotyped actions which enemy observation. Further, IPB can be habitually occur in a given set of circum- applied to develop OPSEC measure recommendations. For example, a map overlay stances. Military forces have SOPs for virtually everything they do. Predictable pat- could be constructed to indicate which terns may be developed by commanders, routes minimize detection during move- planners, and operators. Types of patterns ment, or which areas would afford concealment and cover for signature-unique are as numerous as there Eire procedures in military operations. For example, before equipment. every offensive operation the volume of Data bases on friendly forces are contin- communications increases dramatically ually updated as the situation changes. and then drops off equally dramatically just Changes in operations, tactics, equipment, before the attack. Enemy analysts would or personnel that may alter any signatures note this pattern and be able to predict a and patterns are immediately entered into unit's intentions for all future offensives. the data base.

Indicators are bits of information con- OPSEC risk analysis is a three part pro- cerning a militEiry unit and its activities cess where risks to an operation are deter- (much like a piece of a puzzle) which allow mined, OPSEC measures are identified, and enemy Emalysis to make estimates of then the cost of implementing those mea- friendly capabilities, weaknesses, and sures is compared to the benefit in terms of intentions. In preparing for a tactical opera- derived risk reduction. It is conducted and tion, it is virtually impossible for military presented by the G3 to the commander for forces to avoid or conceal all indicators. In decision. The results of risk analysis many cases, these activities can be detected include the identification of the EEFI which by the enemy and used to predict probable must be concealed from the enemy. EEFI, courses of action. Indicators that cannot be in turn, provide the basis for applying eliminated or concealed may be considered appropriate OPSEC measures. as a basis for a deception plan. OPSEC measures must be systematically Identification and interpretation of spe- developed to protect EEFI from enemy cific indicators Eire critical tasks in intelli- detection. Generally, there are six options gence operations whether the indicator is for the decision maker: friendly or enemy. Intelligence people look □ Apply one or more OPSEC measures. for indicators, analyze them, and make □ Accept risk of detection. estimates of capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intentions. These analyses lead to □ Use deception. requests for information and planning and □ Change the operation enough to elimi- eventuEilly provide the basis for decisions nate the vulnerability. and orders. □ Any combination of the above. □ Prohibit the activity (cancel the mission).

4-8 Based upon recommendations from the If any actions indicate possible compromise G2 concerning the capabilities and vulnera- of essential information, the data is bilities of enemy intelligence systems and reported to the CI analysis element for effective OPSEC measures, the G3 selects analysis of the probable information dis- those commensurate with the planned closed and the risks to which the command operation. Selected OPSEC measures are may be subjected. Examples of the data to implemented through the OPSEC annex to be reported include— the OPORD. □ Suspected disclosure of designated Proper application of OPSEC measures EEFI. allows essential activities to take place □ Serious violation of established securi- while at the same time reducing the proba- ty procedures. bility of detection or correct enemy interpretation of their meaning. OPSEC measures □ Friendly losses attributable to proba- are planned to protect indicators which can ble compromises. be collected by specific enemy collection □ Indications that the enemy had prior means. Since the enemy will rely on more knowledge of a friendly operation. than one means of gathering intelligence, indicators are weighed against each collec- □ Enemy activity directed against other- tion capability. wise well-concealed friendly vulnerabilities. Elements of the command implement Based on the information reported, OPSEC plans as directed in the OPSEC adjustments are made to the OPSEC pro- annex. Simultaneously, the G3, supported gram. When necessary, new EEFI are devel- by the G2, identifies those OPSEC mea- oped and changes to OPSEC measures pre- sures which should be monitored closely to pared and disseminated. determine their effectiveness. Ad hoc OPSEC evaluation teams are formed and Analysis of the OPSEC program is an directed to monitor the OPSEC measures ongoing activity during the operation and concerned. Generally, the teams are com- is continued after the operation has been prised of personnel well-qualified in the completed. Post evaluation reports concern- areas under evaluation and CI personnel ing OPSEC conditions and the effectiveness from the MI unit. For example, if engineer of OPSEC measures previously imple- operations are to be evaluated, engineers mented are presented to commanders and are assigned to the team along with CI per- operations officers. The detail of these sonnel. OPSEC evaluations may also be reports will vary with the extent of an opera- performed by unit personnel with expertise tion, size of unit, time available, and the in the area being evaluated. It is not neces- current situation. The purpose of these sary to always use CI personnel as long as reports is to allow analysis of OPSEC mea- the subject matter expertise is used. sures to determine changes necessary to improve the security of the command. CI personnel assigned to the teams assist Command patterns and signatures are in evaluating units for identifiable patterns examined for possible changes to the data and signatures exploitable by the enemy. base. SOP items are evaluated for effective- Their knowledge of enemy intelligence col- ness and training emphasis. OPSEC plan- lection capabilities and effective OPSEC ning practices are reviewed to assure that measures is critical to the effectiveness of future planning considers present weak- the team. Additionally, CI personnel may nesses when developing OPSEC measures assist in the interrogation of selected EPWs for operations. and refugees to determine enemy intelligence requirements and to gage the effec- OPSEC Measures Worksheets are work- tiveness of OPSEC measures. ing documents used by the OPSEC analyst to facilitate using the ten step OPSEC pro- During the course of OPSEC evaluations, cess. They are also used to task units for the teams advise commanders and staffs implementation of specific OPSEC mea- about inadequate security practices that sures. A sample OPSEC Measures Work- may compromise EEFI or provide indica- sheet follows. tors of any planned or ongoing operations. 4-9 OPSEC MEASURES WORKSHEET

~~FRIENDLY HOSTILE COSTS/ INDICATOR COLLECTOR EVAL OPSEC MEASURES RISKS BENEFITS RESPONSIBLE UNITS REMARKS~~

SUPPORT TO REAR □ Provide area damage control (ADC) OPERATIONS before, during, and after hostile action or natural disaster. The primary purpose for conducting rear CI supports rear operations through a operations is to retain freedom of action to variety of actions designed to defeat or conduct close and deep operations. The assist in defeating the enemy threat to our objectives of rear operations are to— rear areas. Each action is based on the □ Secure the rear areas and facilities. threat posed by enemy agents, elements, and units normally used against the rear. □ Prevent or minimize interference with command, control, and communica- THREAT 3 tions (C ). Soviet military doctrine stresses attack- □ Prevent or minimize disruption of ing enemy forces throughout the depth of combat support and CSS forward. their dispositions. The Soviets fully appreciate the important role that unconven- □ Provide unimpeded movement of tional warfare (UW) can play in support of friendly units throughout the rear the main attack. UW operations consist of a area. variety of military and paramilitary operations to include partisan warfare, subversion, sabotage, and terrorism conducted during periods of peace and war. It also includes other operations of a covert or clandestine nature.

4-10 Soviet UW missions can be divided into purpose units would perform these mis- three basic categories: strategic, opera- sions. Their primary objective would be to tional, and tactical. The principal differ- destroy or neutralize enemy nuclear capa- ences in the missions are the level of C2 bilities forward of the front to a depth of 350 used in an operation and the nature of the to 1,000 kilometers. Additional missions targets engaged. The overall objectives are include— similar regardless of mission category and □ Preparation arid security of landing include— sites for regular airborne forces. □ Weakening the military capabilities of □ Intelligence on the location and the target country. strength of enemy forces.

□ Supporting follow-on conventional mili- □ Sabotage operations against airfields, tary operations. railway lines, road and rail bridges, and communications systems. Strategic UW missions are controlled by the Committee for State Security (KGB). □ The use of terror to intimidate the These missions, conducted in the heartland population. of the enemy, are aimed at reducing the □ Organization of local guerrilla or par- enemy's ability to continue fighting and tisan groups. toward breaking the national will to resist. Operating in the enemy rear areas, these Strategic missions include efforts to— units try to prevent effective and timely □ Intimidate and demoralize the employment of reserves. They also serve to populace. generally disrupt enemy offensive and defensive capabilities. □ Create chaos and disrupt public services. Tactical UW missions are conducted in support of divisions and are similar to the □ Undermine national resistance. operational missions described above. Tac- Strategic UW missions also may be per- tical missions are carried out on a smaller formed by select regular airborne forces. scale and directed at targets in the divi- These would not be normal airborne mission's area. The Soviet divisional recon- sions which generally require coordination naissance battalion has a limited capability with front-line operations, but small, elite to perform UW sabotage missions to a airborne groups which operate at great depth of 100 kilometers. depths behind enemy lines. Their basic The Soviet leadership has a variety of objectives are to weaken enemy operational elite forces for conducting UW missions: readiness and combat effectiveness. Their special units of the KGB, GRU, airborne, missions could include— and ground and naval forces normally □ Neutralization of major enemy called special purpose forces or SPETSNAZ. headquarters. Responsibility for the overall planning and coordination of sabotage actions in peace □ Destruction of enemy nuclear weapons. and war probably resides with the KGB. □ Sabotage to support disruption of The KGB special purpose teams have a enemy communications and key sabotage mission and are thought to be tar- logistics. geted primarily against the civilian sector. Their tasks would be to create general panic Operational UW missions in support of among the civilian population, to disrupt the front and subordinate armies are car- civil government and public utilities, and to ried out under the control of the front com- damage or destroy key production facilities. mander. Airborne forces, the General Staffs Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) special purpose units, and army special

4-11 The regular armed forces maintain elite The level I threat includes activities of airborne units, special sabotage and recon- enemy agents, sabotage by enemy sympa- naissance units, special long-range recon- thizers, and activities of terrorist organiza- naissance units for UW missions, and tions. Level II includes diversion, sabo- SPETSNAZ forces. SPETSNAZ are tage, and reconnaissance conducted by intended to operate in small groups against tactical units smaller than battalion size. key political, military, C2, and transporta- Level III includes airborne operations, air tion and industrial targets in the enemy assault insertions, and amphibious opera- rear area. tions of battalion size or larger. The potential for UW is not limited to The defeat of the threat at each level is special KGB and elite airborne units. The accomplished by base defense forces and GRU maintains a number of small, special MPs deployed in the rear area. When threat purpose units. These units are primarily activities exceed the capabilities of base concerned with UW activities in DS of com- defense forces and MPs (level III threat), a bat operations. Their main tasks include— tactical combat force under the control of the rear operations officer (ROO) will be □ Preparing for the landing of airborne used to defeat the threat (see FM 90-14). CI units behind enemy lines. provides support in countering all target □ Reconnaissance against nuclear deliv- levels; however, CI is most effective in pro- ery means, storage facilities, and other viding indications and warning regarding vital military targets. level I and level II threat activities. □ Sabotage, disruption, and neutraliza- RESPONSE tion of key political and military CI support to rear operations includes personnel. those functions performed in support of □ Possible use of NBC weapons. OPSEC. It also includes a number of other A special purpose brigade is assigned to functions normally not accomplished in and controlled at front level. Subordinate support of the OPSEC mission. armies and divisions have elements within CI personnel conduct liaison with local their reconnaissance units that are capable police and intelligence agencies, both mili- of conducting long-range UW operations. tary and civilian, to foster a spirit of cooperation and to obtain information. Gener- UW is primarily designed to support a ally, liaison is established in peace and surprise attack. Clandestine operations in carried over into war. The cooperation the target area before the start of hostilities obtained from such agencies through liai- increase the probability of destruction of son efforts is critical to neutralizing the key targets well before rear operations mea- level I threat. sures are heightened. The CI analysis section creates and US divisions and corps can expect to be confronted with a significant rear area maintains black, gray, and white lists to threat regardless of where they fight. In permit rapid identification of key indige- most cases, this threat will be based on the nous personnel in rear areas. Persons on Soviet model described in the preceding black lists are those personnel whose cap- paragraphs. To counter this threat, US ture and detention are of prime importance Army doctrine divides it into three levels to the US Army. They include known or . and establishes procedures for dealing with suspected agents, saboteurs, enemy sympa- each. (These levels do not correspond thizers, and others who represent a serious directly with the three levels of the Soviet threat to rear area security. Gray lists con- UW mission.) tain the identities and locations of those personalities whose inclinations and attitudes toward the political and military

4-12 objectives of the US are obscure. Regardless preclude extensive tactical HUMINT opera- of their political inclinations or attitudes, tions, but enemy agents, sympathizers, and personalities may be listed when they are terrorists can often be neutralized. known to possess information or particular CI personnel also are used to support ter- skills required by US forces. They also may rorism counteraction. The role of CI in be individuals whose political motivations countering terrorism is primarily to identify require further exploration before they can the threat including terrorist organizations, be of use to US Forces. White lists contain capabilities, tactics, and targets. Army CI the identities and locations of individuals activities, in respect to counterterrorism who have been identified as being of intelli- investigations, involve a close working rela- gence or CI interest. They are expected to be tionship with criminal investigation ele- able to provide information or assist in col- ments, the provost marshal's office, indi- lecting needed data. Persons listed on white genous police, and allied intelligence lists usually are in accord with, or favora- agencies. Crisis management teams (CMT) bly inclined toward, US policies. Contribu- consisting of various military staff sections tions are based on a voluntary and coopera- include CI personnel to advise and assist tive attitude. the commander in the event of terrorist CI teams identify and assist in neutraliz- incidents. Information relating to terrorist ing UW teams and cells, an important activities is gathered by the CMT intelli- priority in rear operations. Information gence representative from local sources and provided by CI personnel is passed to local through liaison with INSCOM elements. police or military forces, US MPs, or other Each CI function conducted to support US combat elements. the security of the rear area is controlled CI personnel also conduct defensive and coordinated by the G2 for maximum source operations (DSOs) to provide I&W effectiveness. The results of these actions information on potential hostile rear area contribute to the success of close and deep activity and to provide leads for the identi- operations. Security of the rear area permits fication of perpetrators of incidents against the uninterrupted flow of support to the friendly units and personnel. The sources combat forces deployed forward, an action are personnel who serve as paid or unpaid critical to sustaining the fight. Addition- informants. They are generally local ally, the counterespionage functions of CI national employees such as barbers, facili- contribute directly to the OPSEC of the ties engineers, and others whose access to entire force and, in some cases, levels of the military and civilian communities may command above that at which the functions permit them to become aware of potential are carried out. activities against friendly facilities. SUPPORT TO DECEPTION CI teams conduct incident investigations of suspected sabotage, subversion, and BAT-D includes all actions at ECB taken espionage directed against the rear area. to mislead the enemy into actions which are These investigations can lead to the identi- counter to enemy interests. Based on the fication and elimination of perpetrators of G3's recommendation, the commander hostile actions in the rear area. Pattern selects a deception objective. The operation analysis of multiple incidents can reveal includes manipulating, distorting, of falsi- enemy plans and intentions. fying information available to the enemy to CI teams conduct tactical HUMINT operations to exploit captured personnel who can identify other hostile agents and saboteurs, pinpoint team locations, or provide other information. Time constraints generally

4-13 ensure security of actual plans, operations, The deception operation must achieve a or activities. Generally, deception opera- delicate balance in the amount of true and tions closely parallel actual operations and false data the enemy is permitted to collect. require a high degree of security through Enough data must reach the enemy analyst the application of effective OPSEC and to allow conclusions to be drawn about our other support to achieve effectiveness. Part apparent intentions without raising suspi- of the support provided is CI. CI supports cions about the deception itself. The CI deception with— analysis attempts to identify exactly which elements of information should be exposed □ Analysis of the intelligence threat. to enemy collection and the most effective, □ Recommendations of deception least suspicious way of presenting each measures. element. □ Support to the security of the deception Based on the analysis of the enemy's and the actual operation. intelligence system and its comparison with □ Evaluation of the implementation of the deception objective, the CI analysis sec- deception measures. tion prepares recommendations for deception measures. Generally, detailed coordina- □ Evaluation of the effectiveness of the tion (based on a need to know) is conducted deception. with other elements of the intelligence staff Analysis of the enemy intelligence system before the recommendations are presented is the critical element of any deception. to the G3. Analysis is performed on the information Security is critical to the effectiveness of maintained in the hostile intelligence col- the deception. CI supports the OPSEC mea- lection data base, which is used for both sures taken in conjunction with the decep- OPSEC and deception. When this analysis tion to protect factual information from is accomplished for OPSEC purposes, it enemy intelligence collection. It also sup- focuses on enemy capabilities. When supports the OPSEC measures taken to protect porting deception, it focuses on enemy intel- the deception itself. The enemy must be ligence vulnerabilities. CI analysis of the convinced that the intelligence collected enemy intelligence system determines— and processed is valid. Therefore, all indica- □ The types of collectors, their capabili- tions of a deception must be suppressed. ties and limitations, to which false CI teams are used as part of ad hoc teams information must be presented. to monitor the implementation of deception □ The minimum requirements for real- measures. Their expertise in enemy intelli- ism in deception measures. gence capabilities and limitations is critical to determining the probable effectiveness of □ The strengths and weaknesses of deception measures. The presence of unit enemy intelligence analysis to further experts on these teams is even more critical determine the amount of information for deception operations than for OPSEC needed for the enemy to draw appro- evaluations. Only those personnel familiar priate conclusions. with a unit's operations will know if the deception measure appears realistic.

4-14 The CI analysis section, in coordination Counterintelligence support to C3CM with the G2 and the ASPS, evaluates the integrates age-old principles of combat to effectiveness of the deception throughout effectively prevent the enemy's intelligence the operation. When necessary, and only systems and decision-making cycle from after thorough analysis of the situation, the completing the circuit needed to take action section makes recommendations for adjust- against friendly forces. (See the following ment of the deception plan. The final deci- illustration.) sion and responsibility for implementing The first two links of his decision-making such changes rests with the G3. chain (observation and orientation, or his collection and'analysis capabilities) are the SUPPORT TO COMMAND, targets of the offense-oriented, extremely CONTROL, AND aggressive CI support to C3CM program. COMMUNICATIONS The first step to accomplish the goals of COUNTERMEASURES CI support to C3CM is to completely iden- 3 tify the threat! What sensors does the C CM tasks are designed to prevent the enemy have; where are they located; how enemy from being able to decisively concen- and when does the enemy use them; and trate his combat power. They are designed what are their] specific capabilities? These to isolate the enemy commander from his are all questions which must be answered. means of battle synchronization at the 3 The same types of information must also be same time that he experiences a C crisis. identified for his intelligence data process- Timed to fit the friendly commander's opera- ing and analysis elements. tional plan, C3CM can help create the moment to seize the initiative. C3CM tasks Once the threat is completely understood, also involve those actions which cause the commander must allocate resources, enemy decision times to be lengthened, as such as infantry, artillery, armor, or EW well as to cause faulty decisions. C3CM systems to destroy or significantly degrade measures may be direct or indirect. Direct the key sensors or processing nodes at the measures include attacks against the most critical points of the battle. means (functions) used to control elements At the same time, the theme must be proof combat power. They include not only liferated to our combat elements that enemy troop control centers, weapons system con- REC and RSTA systems must be engaged trol centers, and weapons direction means, when encountered on the battlefield. Enemy but RSTA control centers and REC systems REC and RSTA systems have unique physi- as well. Indirect measures which lead to the cal signatures and are normally fielded in inability of the enemy commander to effec- thin-skinned vehicles. Such soft targets are tively concentrate combat power are decep- thus easily neutralized. They should be tion and OPSEC. engaged on sight, since the payoff for their For much too long, the enemy's intelli- destruction is considerable. gence systems have been ignored when identifying targets for destruction within the C3CM strategy. With the sophistication of the sensors on the modern battlefield, this is no longer a possible option. Surviva- bility of our military forces depends heavily on the elimination of the enemy's "eyes and ears" or on keeping collected information from reaching the enemy commander. Anti- intelligence warfare is designed to do just that.

~~4-15 DECISION-MAKING CYCLE~~

~~ORIENTATION~~

~~DECISION~~

~~OBSERVATION~~

~~4-16 CHAPTER 5~~

~~Electronic Warfare~~

Modern combat forces depend heavily on agrees with, or at least does not refute, the electronic devices to acquire and distribute indicators presented by other deception information and to command and control measures. forces and weapons systems. Each new electronic device increases the ability of the This chapter describes the planning and commander to apply combat power. It also targeting of ESM and ECM—the offensive brings with it a susceptibility to exploita- components of EW. It emphasizes ECM tion and disruption. EW is a vital element techniques to provide an understanding of of C3CM. Specifically, EW is the means ECM employment. ESM, although a critical through which commanders protect their element of EW, are not described in detail own electronic systems while attacking as these operations are conducted the same those of the enemy. It integrates the offen- as other collection operations described in sive use of jamming, electronic deception, Chapter 3. and support to physical destruction to degrade, influence, or destroy enemy elec- ELECTRONIC WARFARE tronic capabilities. EW is conducted within three broad mission areas of C3CM— SECTION defend, degrade or disrupt, and deceive. The EWS is a critical element in accomp- The defend mission is accomplished lishing the EW mission of the command. It through the use of ECCM to protect our use augments the G3 staff with the necessary of electronic systems. ECCM are the personnel and expertise to perform the responsibility of every soldier who uses or detailed planning, target «(election, and supervises the use of radios, radars, or other coordination that are required for EW electronic equipment. ECCM are described success. in FM 24-33. Defending is also supported by The EWS deploys and operates as an ESM and ECM. ESM locate enemy integral part of the G3 staff. The primary jammers for destruction while friendly function of the EWS is mission manage- jammers can be used to screen friendly ment of ECM, to include both jamming and communications from the enemy. electronic deception. The section determines Enemy use of electronic systems is dis- ECM requirements based on guidance from rupted through destruction, jamming, or the G3 and plans and coordinates the deception. The goal is to completely disrupt actions necessary to satisfy each require- enemy activities. However, the small ment. The EWS assists in preparing EW number and vulnerability of jammers estimates and annexes and developing available generally limits their use to criti- ECM mission tasking. cal targets that have significant impact on The EWS assesses enemy vulnerabilities, the enemy. Disruption is fully supported by friendly capabilities, the friendly mission, intelligence and ESM activities that iden- and the friendly EW strategy. The section tify, locate, and provide technical informa- then targets those enemy nets and emitters tion on HVT. that pose the greatest threat to the friendly The deception mission is accomplished by mission. These targets are assigned a priori- feeding false or misleading information to ty and nominated for attack by fire, enemy electronic sensors or by transmitting maneuver, jamming, or deception. ECM it directly into operational channels. Elec- techniques are described in the following tronic deception generally is part of an section to provide a basis for understanding overall deception plan. This ensures that how targets are attacked electronically. what the enemy collects electronically

5-1 To fully integrate ECM with the com- ELECTRONIC mander's scheme of fire and maneuver, the COUNTERMEASURES EWS must maintain a close, continuous working relationship with other staff sec- ECM are of two types—jamming and tions and elements within the division TOC deception. Through jamming, the passage, and the MI battalion TOC. The key to the receipt, or gathering of information by elec- coordination process is the presence of tronic means is prevented or disrupted. officers trained in EW operations in most of Electronic deception feeds false information these elements. This provides a common to the enemy, either through their electronic basis for understanding the potential uses, collection devices or directly to their elec- capabilities, and limitations of EW. Equally tronic systems. All types of electronic important is that EWS personnel be knowl- equipment are vulnerable to both jamming edgeable of the mission of the command and deception. The following descriptions and the functions and responsibilities of the focus on radio communications and radar elements with which they coordinate. The systems because they are the most numer- following chart depicts EWS coordination ous. Other systems such as missile guid- requirements. ance, telemetry, and navigational aids may

~~EWS COORDINATION REQUIREMENTS~~

~~SECTION/ELEMENT COORDINATION~~

~~Friendly situation G3 Staff Planned operations Target priorities~~

~~HVT identification Fire Support Element Integrate jamming and fires~~

~~MUI feeder report evaluation TABOO, PROTECTED frequencies C-E Officer Electronic deception ECCM planning ECM effects on friendly C-E ECM support to ECCM~~

Mission tasking CM&D Section ESM requirements to support ECM GUARDED frequencies Jam or listen decisions Electronic deception OPSEC Staff Element ECCM Electronic OB ^ Electronic ASPS Enemy situation ? preparation of the Enemy capabilities J battlefield

~~Asset status TCAE Technical data Effectiveness assessments~~

5-2 be of equal, greater, or lesser importance ers tuned to a given frequency are jammed depending on the tactical situation, and the by delivering more power to the receiver to need to counter a specific enemy capability. prevent the receiver from receiving its The ECM techniques listed herein are fully intended signal. In general, the effective- described in FM 32-16. ness of jamming depends on relative power between transmitter and jammer; relative JAMMING distance between transmitter, jammer, and Jamming is the deliberate radiation or receiver; on terrain barriers; and on reradiation of electromagnetic energy to whether or not the receiver is using a direc- prevent or degrade the reception of informa- tional antenna as shown below. tion by a receiver. Radio and radar receiv-

~~JAMMING~~

~~< < A ► ( r~~

— intended signal jamming T - transmitter R - receiver J - jammer J1 - needs less power than T to jam R J2 - needs the same power as T J3 - needs much more power than T J4 - needs the same power as T (can be defeated by R using a directional antenna)

5-3 Communications jamming interferes with In sweep jamming, the jammer goes enemy communication systems. It may be through a frequency range then repeats the applied to secure communication systems to sweep continuously. All frequencies in the force the enemy to transmit in the clear so range are jammed and friendly frequencies that the communications can be exploited may be affected. for combat information. Jamming also can Barrage jamming spreads the jammer's aid in DF by forcing the enemy to transmit longer, allowing time for tip-off and multi- power over a much larger portion of the frequency spectrum than spot jamming, there- ple LOB from different locations for position determination. When not dedicated to by reducing the radiated power directed at jamming missions, jammers are used in an any single target frequency. It is similar to ESM role to intercept communications. sweep jamming because there are no frequencies free of jamming within the tar- Care should be exercised when using jam- geted portion of the spectrum. ming systems for ESM. Damage to power units and equipment may occur if an ECM The advantage of barrage jamming is system is used for a prolonged period for that more frequencies can be jammed at the ESM. same time. The disadvantages are that friendly frequencies may be jammed. Also, Noncommunications jamming is directed spreading the jammer's power over a against such electronic devices as radar, greater portion of the spectrum reduces the navigation aids, and guidance systems. The amount of power available to jam each fre- Army does not currently possess a non- quency, reducing the effectiveness and communications jamming capability. Such range of the jammer. support must be obtained from Air Force assets. The jamming signal may be varied by amplitude, frequency, or pulse with an Jamming against communications almost unlimited variety of modulating equipment is accomplished using spot, signals. The type of signal used is deter- sweep, or barrage jamming. mined by the capability of the jamming Spot jamming may be directed at a single equipment, the nature of the signal to be frequency or multiple frequencies through— jammed, and the desired result. □ Sequential spot jamming, in which Reradiation jamming is accomplished by various frequencies are jammed one at using special equipment to receive enemy a time, in sequence. transmissions, alter them in some way, and □ Simultaneous multi-spot jamming, in reradiate (retransmit) the signal back to the which several frequencies are jammed enemy. There are two types of equipment at the same time. used for this purpose. They are— In both spot and sequential spot jamming □ Repeaters, which intercept the enemy the full power of the jammer is directed signal, alter it, amplify the altered ver- against one frequency at a time, which sion, and retransmit it. increases the effectiveness and range of the □ Transponders, which automatically jammer. Multi-spot jamming is directed transmit a predetermined signal in against more than one frequency. Spot response to the reception of a given jamming is less apt to interfere with signal. friendly frequencies that are close to the frequency being jammed. The main disad- The principal targets of reradiation jam- vantage is that receivers can easily avoid ming are radars and navigation aids. The spot jamming by slightly changing (detun- Army currently has no reradiation ing) the frequency they are receiving. Soviet jammers, since these systems are primarily radios have continuous tune capability used by aircraft which must penetrate the while most US equipment uses detent-tuned FLOT. frequency settings. Another reradiation jamming method is reflection jamming. Also called mechanical

5-4 jamming, it is used to confuse enemy elec- The objective of MED is to have the tronic systems. It causes those systems to enemy ESM and SIGINT analysts accept receive false targets, thereby degrading sys- the profile or information as valid and there- tem effectiveness. The most common types by arrive at an erroneous conclusion con- of reflective jammers are— cerning friendly activities and intentions. □ Chaff, which consists of narrow metal- There are two basic forms of MED, manip- lic strips of various lengths and fre- ulative communications deception (MCD) quency responses. It is primarily used and manipulative noncommunications to defeat antiaircraft radar by reflect- deception (MNCD). ing radar echoes to the receiving com- MCD requires a complete knowledge of ponents of the enemy system. the friendly force communication signature □ Rope, a form of chaff, which consists over an extended period of time and in a of a long roll of metallic foil or wire variety of combat situations. Enemy ana- designed for broad, low frequency lysts look for deviations from the US and response. allied communications norms before and . during all situations. When isolated, these □ Corner reflectors, which consist of flat deviations may become indicators of pro- reflecting surfaces connected to form a jected actions by US and allied forces. MCD three-dimensional reflector. Corner techniques include— reflectors reflect a strong return to radar, thus enhancing the radar signa- □ False traffic levels. ture of the object. When using corner reflectors, small boats at sea appear □ False peaks. larger on radar screens, and small vehi- □ Padding. cles can appear to be tanks. □ Routing. DECEPTION □ Electronic cover. Electronic deception is employed to cause □ Controlled breaches of communication the enemy to misinterpret what is received security (COMSEC). by electronic systems. Normally, it is conducted as part of a larger deception opera- MNCD applies the same principles as tion and is seldom, if ever, conducted alone. those in communications deception. The technique differs only in the type of equip- It involves actions associated with friendly ment used. The activity of noncommunica- electromagnetic radiations (manipulative electronic deception (MED), simulative elec- tions emitters is increased or decreased to tronic deception (SED)), and, with those of imply a like change in the activity of the the enemy force (imitative electronic decep- unit. Both MCD and MNCD depend heavily tion (IED)). on the friendly C-E and SIGINT/REC data base developed by unit counter-SIGINT or MED and SED are accomplished by non- CI analysis personnel. Mi elements of the force. The C-E officer plays a major role in planning and execut- SED is conducted to mislead the enemy ing MED and SED. Because of its technical as to the actual composition, deployment, and capabilities of the friendly force. It requirements, IED is accomplished almost seeks to counter hostile EW and SIGINT exclusively by MI elements. efforts by simulating nonexisting units or MED is conducted by altering the elec- capabilities, or by simulating actual units tromagnetic profile of friendly forces. It or capabilities at false locations. Both seeks to counter hostile EW and SIGINT communications and noncommunications activities by manipulating friendly electromagnetic emissions. This is done by modifying the technical characteristics and profiles which would provide an accurate picture of friendly intentions, or by deliber- ately transmitting false information.

5-5 equipment may be,used in the simulation, □ Nuisance intrusion. depending on the type of deception being □ Planned message intrusion. projected to the enemy. SED tactics include— □ Cryptographic intrusion. □ Unit simulation. A network of com- □ Deceptive jamming. munications and noncommunications All but nuisance intrusion require exten- emitters is established and operated to sive technical support and specially skilled match those emitters and activities operators. Nuisance intrusion requires only found in the type unit or activity being compatible radio equipment and foreign simulated. language ability. All require specific □ New or different equipment capability authorization. simulation. The electronic signature of new or differing equipment is projected Imitative noncommunications deception by an actual or simulated unit to mis- (INCD) is conducted for the same purpose lead the enemy into believing that a as ICD. It involves the introduction of radi- new capability is being introduced into ations into the enemy's electronic system to the friendly force. imitate their emissions and to confuse or deceive them. The variety of target acquisi- □ False location simulation. The election, surveillance, and electronic reconnais- tronic signature of a unit is projected sance systems deployed in the battle area from a false location while the signa- produces individual signatures for each ture from the actual location is class of equipment that requires unique suppressed. INCD capabilities. IED is conducted against both communi- Some enemy radars can be deceived by cation and noncommunication emitters. repeaters, reflectors, and transponders Imitative communications deception (ICD) which substitute an altered or generated injects false and misleading information signal in imitation of the radar's normal directly into enemy communication net- return echo. Successful deception requires a works. The communications imitator gains much better knowledge of the characteris- admission as a bona fide member of the tics of the enemy radar than that required enemy communications system and main- for jamming operations. However, if suc- tains that role until the desired false infor- cessful, IED is more effective than jam- mation is passed to the enemy. Extreme ming. When repeaters and transponders are care is exercised in entering the enemy used in a jamming role, enemy forces soon communications system because each emit- discover that their operational difficulties ter produces its own particular signature. are caused by jamming and employ ECCM The friendly ICD emitter must approximate to defeat it. When the same equipment is closely the enemy signature. If friendly ICD used in an INCD role, it is difficult for operations are unmasked, the enemy is pro- enemy forces to perceive the deception vided an indication of US and allied forces because their equipment appears to be func- COMINT success. With this information, tioning in a normal fashion. At the same enemy forces may increase their COMSEC time, the subtlety of deception effects versus efforts to impede the intercept and analysis those of jamming makes it more difficult for of their communications resulting in loss of us to evaluate the effects of deception COMINT by US and allied forces. operations. ICD varies in scope based on the sensitivi- INCD techniques include— ty of the intelligence and the sophistication of techniques and equipment used. It □ False target generation or spoofing. includes— □ Range gate pull-off. □ Scan rate modulation. □ Inverse gain modulation.

5-6 ELECTRONIC WARFARE technical data to support jamming and electronic deception. Signal parameters are TARGETS measured and analyzed to determine the The targets for offensive EW are selected type of emitter and its battlefield function. based on the operational requirements of Locating, or DF, provides approximate each command and the enemy emitters locations of enemy radio and radar anten- arrayed against it. Through the target nas. This facilitates the use of directional development process described in Chapter antennas in jamming operations and, when 3, critical nets and emitters are identified combined with other information such as and targeted for destruction and electronic terrain analysis, may provide targeting- attack. quality data. ATTACK OPTIONS Jamming disrupts the receipt or exchange 3 of orders and battlefield information. It can EW plays a major role in C CM actions of the command. The EW mission areas de- delay the enemy long enough for the scribed earlier directly relate to three of the friendly commander to exploit a situation 3 that otherwise would have been corrected. four C CM mission areas. The fourth, destruction, is supported by targeting data For maximum effect and survivability, 3 jamming is used sparingly. The jammer is collected through ESM. C CM coordinates activated only when necessary to disrupt the use of destruction, jamming, and decep- vital enemy communications. Jamming tion into a single, unified attack on enemy 3 provides a nonlethal alternative or supple- C by the Army, Air Force, and other ment to attack by fire and maneuver and is services. particularly well suited for targets that Specific C3CM objectives are to— cannot be located with targeting accuracy □ Degrade and disrupt enemy C2. or that only require temporary disruption. □ Destroy, degrade, deceive, and dis- Electronic deception provides false infor- credit the enemy intelligence system. mation to the enemy through electronic devices to induce them to act counter to □ Protect friendly C3 by degrading the their best interest. enemy's ability to exploit, disrupt, or destroy it. The following tables identify types of enemy communications nets and noncom- 3 Supporting C CM and EW are intelli- munications emitters for interception, loca- gence and the G2. The G3 directs both tion, or jamming. Deception is an alterna- efforts but does so in close coordination tive method of attack in all instances. The with the G2. This focuses efforts on HPT to distances are representative guides. Actual magnify the value of violence, shock, and distances will vary based on equipment, uncertainty pn the enemy. terrain, and the tactical situation. The preferred option for attacking enemy Generally, communications and non- 3 C is destruction. However, there are four communications systems of combat ele- electronic options—intercept, locate, jam, ments near the FLOT are located for de- and deceive. Although normally separate struction or jamming. These options are functions, some options may be executed most effective near the FLOT. Communica- concurrently. An enemy communications tions between planning elements, generally link can be jammed while the transmitting found well beyond the FLOT, are usually station is being intercepted and located for located and intercepted for intelligence. The destruction. Electronic deception may be value of information from enemy communi- applied to compound the disruptive effects cations at the planning levels may out- of jamming. weigh the impact of destruction or jamming Intercepting provides combat information making intercept the preferred option. and technical data on the enemy's electronic systems as well as raw data for processing into intelligence. Signals are intercepted to determine their function and for

~~5-7 ELECTRONIC OPTIONS~~

~~COMM NET SECOND FRONT BY ECHELON FIRST ECHELON ECHELON~~

Distance from 0-3 3-6 6-9 9-15 15-20 30-50 50-100 100-Up FLOT (km) 20-30 Command INTCP JAM JAM JAM INTCP INTCP INTCP INTCP INTCP INTCP INTCP INTCP and Control LOCATE LOCATE LOCATE LOCATE LOCATE LOCATE Rocket and Artillery JAM JAM JAM LOCATE LOCATE LOCATE LOCATE LOCATE LOCATE and Associated TA LOCATE LOCATE LOCATE JAM

~~SSM LOCATE LOCATE LOCATE LOCATE LOCATE LOCATE~~

~~Air JAM JAM JAM JAM LOCATE LOCATE LOCATE LOCATE Defense LOCATE LOCATE LOCATE LOCATE LOCATE JAM JAM INTCP Intelligence LOCATE JAM JAM LOCATE INTCP INTCP INTCP INTCP~~

~~Jammers LOCATE LOCATE LOCATE LOCATE~~

~~Engineers LOCATE LOCATE LOCATE LOCATE LOCATE INTCP INTCP INTCP INTCP~~

~~JAM JAM JAM JAM INTCP INTCP INTCP INTCP INTCP CSS LOCATE~~

~~SECOND NONCOM RADAR FIRST ECHELON FRONT BY ECHELON ECHELON~~

~~Distance from 0-3 3-6 6-9 9-15 15-20 20-30 30-100 100-Up FLOT (km) PRIMARY PRIMARY Air (SAM & AAA) LOCATE LOCATE LOCATE LOCATE LOCATE LOCATE Defense AF RESP AF RESP~~

~~Weapons LOCATE LOCATE LOCATE Locating LOCATE~~

~~Noncom LOCATE LOCATE LOCATE LOCATE LOCATE Jammers~~

~~NOTE: These options change little during contact in either the attack or the defense~~

5-8 ENGAGEMENT RULES RESOURCE USE Commanders are authorized to employ EW resources always are given a stan- EW forces, equipment, and techniques to dard mission such as DS, GS, general sup- support assigned missions in accordance port reinforcing, or reinforcing. Their rela- with the following rules of engagement. The tively low density, in comparison to the employment of— potential number of targets on the battlefield, dictates that they be used to the maxi- ESM are authorized at all times. □ mum extent possible. They are never held in □ ECM are authorized when the condi- reserve. tions specified in AR 525-22(S) are met. JAMMING CONTINUITY □ ECCM are authorized at all times in accordance with applicable security Continuity of operations is essential if guidance for specific weapon systems. jamming is to have the desired effect on the enemy. Combat losses, equipment failure, degraded or lost C2 and displacement may ELECTRONIC WARFARE cause frequent reordering of priorities. Con- PRINCIPLES tinuity of operations is provided through— EW operations are planned and con- □ Preplanned and targets of opportunity ducted according to certain basic principles. target lists. These principles are supportive of the IEW principles described in Chapter 1. □ Backup (redundant) coverage of high priority targets. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT □ Planned leapfrog movement of Successful ECM planning and execution jammers. is fundamentally dependent on the quality and timeliness of supporting intelligence □ Primary and alternate means of com- and ESM data. All-source intelligence aids munication with jammers. in determining enemy vulnerabilities, □ Positive and negative control fre- selecting targets and priorities, and eval- quency lists. uating the effectiveness of actions taken. Intelligence operations— □ Training for worst-case situations. □ Correlate the various signatures, iden- □ Alternate jamming using two or more tifying the target. jammers. □ Determine target operational status, □ Imaginative use of airborne jammers criticality, and vulnerability. during fast-moving situations.

□ Locate the target accurately, when FLEXIBILITY required. EW resources must have the flexibility to- □ Disseminate target identity and respond to tasking from higher echelons location. when operating forward in brigade and bat- □ Provide technical data required for talion task force areas. The required degree jamming and deception. of flexibility is established through the FIRE AND MANEUVER assignment of a support relationship as INTEGRATION described in Chapter 6. MOBILITY EW is only one facet of C3CM and combined arms warfare. To achieve their full System survivability and the ability to potential, ESM and ECM operations must provide sustained support in a fast moving be planned and executed as an integral part operation are directly affected by mobility. of the combat power of the force. Maximum Therefore, EW systems placed in support of shock effect is achieved through a well- a command must be as mobile as the sup- coordinated attack on the enemy by fire, ported command. maneuver, jamming, and deception.

5-9 ELECTRONIC WARFARE target may dictate that several means be PLANNING employed in a combined attack. CONSIDERATIONS Planning is crucial to the success of EW operations. The effectiveness of EW is EW planning follows the normal staff dependent on the degree to which it is inte- planning process. It begins with the mis- grated with the commander's scheme of fire sion and commander's guidance which lead and maneuver. Full integration is best to the development of an EW estimate and achieved by systematic planning and full annex. Planning is based on the principles understanding of employment factors. of EW and the following considerations: The G3 supervises the integration of ECM □ Priorities. into the scheme of fire and maneuver. The □ Technical effectiveness. EWS, FSE, and G3 staff operate together to plan the attack of HVT and support the □ Jammer deployment. commander's concept of operations. When □ Communications. ECM will improve the effectiveness of fire support it is employed together with fire. □ Jammer controls. Since fire support requires more accurate Priorities target location, jamming may be the preferred attack means for certain targets. The many HPTs anticipated on the bat- Other ECM operations are planned to dis- tlefield will generate competing demands rupt enemy C2 at certain critical times. for EW support. These demands will always . Formats and descriptions of EW target lists exceed the MI unit's capability to respond. and worksheets used in planning are pro- The commander must establish priorities vided in Appendix F. among the types of targets selected for attack. These priorities are guidelines by IPB is used throughout the EW planning which the G3 or S3 manages the EW plan- process. Templates are used to focus EW ning and coordination process. operations on identified HPT and to determine defensive EW measures to defeat Although the tactical situation may enemy counter-C3 efforts. IPB applications require frequent reordering of priorities, the and HPT determination are described in following are used as guidance for estab- Chapter 3. lishing initial priorities: 3 During the planning process, electronic □ First Priority—Protect friendly C HPTs are divided into four general catego- systems. ries for attack. These include— □ Second Priority—Attack enemy □ HPTs that will be located for artillery, rocket, and surface-to-surface destruction. missile (SSM) forces. □ HPTs that will be jammed. □ Third Priority—Degrade or locate for destruction enemy air defense □ Enemy emitters that will be inter- elements. cepted for combat information or intelligence. □ Fourth Priority—Disrupt critical enemy C3 links. □ Enemy elements that will be deceived. The outcome of the battle depends largely The categorization of specific enemy ele- on the commander's ability to control ments is made by the G3 assisted by the friendly forces and weapon systems elec- EWS and other staff elements in their par- tronically. This is accomplished, in part, by ticular areas of expertise. This facilitates locating enemy jammers and target acquisi- further planning and ensures that all HPTs tion systems for destruction, screening are attacked with the optimum means friendly communications transmitters from available. The nature or importance of the enemy SIGINT efforts, and strict adherence to CEOI and COMSEC procedures. It is

5-10 essential that the commander retain the □ Radio LOS betweeriithe jammer and capability to control. It is equally essential the targeted receiver. that combat information flow without □ Antenna polarization. jamming interference. □ Effective radiated power of the jammer EW degrades enemy rocket and artillery and the enemy transmitter. capabilities by locating communications arid target-acquisition means for destruc- □ Compatible bandwidths between the tion and jamming. SSM, artillery, multiple jammer and enemy transceiver. rocket launcher, and antitank units operate □ Weather, terrain, and vegetation. well forward within range of our jammers. Deployment Joint suppression of enemy air defenses (JSEAD) is the responsibility of both Jammers are HPTs for destruction. ground and air forces. JSEAD is critical to Because of their high power output and cross-FLOT heliborne operations, as well as unique electronic signature, they are rela- to support friendly CAS. EW support of tively easy to detect and locate. Ground JSEAD is a two-phased operation. First, based jammers must deploy within range of enemy air defense systems that pose an enemy indirect fire weapons and their thin immediate threat to friendly air operations skin makes them highly susceptible to are located and either destroyed or jammed. damage. Taken together, these factors dic- Second, critical elements of the enemy air tate that jammer deployment be well defense system are identified, located, and planned and executed. Proper site selection destroyed. and strict adherence to SOP are essential to survival. The enemy uses command nets to transmit combat orders between a superior and General site locations are established by immediate subordinates, or, in a skip- MI commanders or the TCAE, coordinated echelon mode, two echelons down. Regi- with the unit in whose area they are operat- mental command nets are good ECM ing, and refined by the platoon or team targets since they represent the link leaders. Distance to the targeted enemy between the planners at division and the radio receivers, terrain, LOS, and the tacti- fighters at battalion. Jamming is particu- cal situation are critical selection factors. larly effective in close operations when the Because of LOS requirements of VHF fre- enemy is forced to deviate from a set plan. quencies, jammers in that frecuency range It degrades enemy ability to move, reorga- will have to be close to the FLOT to nize, and deliver fire on target. Timing is a accomplish the mission, probably within 2 key factor as the value of jamming is very kilometers. Where higher terrain is availa- short-lived. ble, VHF jammers may successfully operate farther back. HF jammers may be as close Effectiveness as 7 kilometers but are usually farther back. Jamming effectiveness is governed by the Jammers have to move to survive and to following technical factors. The most maintain favorable transmission paths important of these are the distances of the against enemy radios which are moving as target receiver from the jammer and the battle progresses. Changes in battle between the transmitter and receiver of the lines will require frequent displacement. targeted enemy communications. The tech- Primary and alternate sites are preselected nical factors are— for each phase of the battle. These sites must— □ Target link distance. This is the distance between the enemy transmitter □ Be accessible and concealed from and receiver. For example, it is the dis- enemy direct fire weapons. tance between a regimental CP and a □ Provide for continuity of operations. subordinate battalion CP. □ The distance betwèen the jammer and the enemy receiver.

~~5-11 JAMMER DEPLOYMENT; DISPERSED~~

~~M i i~~

~~Njxj/ w Sjw~~

□ Facilitate electronic massing of several Communications jammers against single targets as shown in the illustration. Control and coordination are essential to effective EW operations. Communications □ Facilitate communications. is the key to effective control. Secure, reliable communications are required for— EXJAMs are used to overcome the LOS and distance limitations of standoff sys- □ Tasking and technical support. tems. EXJAMs can be hand-emplaced or artillery-delivered to target enemy receivers □ Control of jamming operations. in a particular area. EXJAMs may also be □ Tipoff and cuing between collectors mounted on unmanned aerial vehicles. and jammers, both air and ground, to Their proximity to target receivers enables include DF. them trteffectively jam enemy communica- □ Coordination between jammers. tions with minimum interference to friendly systems. They are normally employed in an □ Dissemination of combat information. array to disrupt communications over a □ Resource status reporting. large area. EXJAMs are generally capable of barrage jamming. □ Mission status reporting. Control Mechanisms Control of jamming operations is essential to their success. Control keeps jamming directed at HPTs while minimizing its

5-12 effects on friendly systems and operations. also include internationally controlled or Either positive or negative control methods treaty-governed frequencies, such as broad- may be used. However, a combination of cast emergency frequencies and commerical both is generally used for maximum coordi- air and shipping traffic control frequencies. nation between the ECM teams and the A TABOO frequency can be time-oriented, command they are supporting. and the restriction may be removed as the situation develops. This decision is the Positive control methods include— responsibility of the originating headquar- □ Authorizing specific frequencies for ters. The G3, assisted by the C-E officer, is jamming on an individual basis or by responsible for obtaining the TABOO list publishing a list of frequencies cleared from higher headquarters. for jamming. No other frequencies may PROTECTED frequencies are those used be jammed without permission. by tactical friendly forces for a particular □ Authorizing specific enemy functions operational requirement. They are desig- to be jammed unless they operate on a nated by the senior tactical commander to TABOO frequency. control interference produced by friendly jamming and deception operations. Con- □ On-off control, which allows for the flicts between frequency requirements for immediate starting or stopping of jamming and tactical command are jamming. Reliable communications are resolved by the commander. The G3, required and the command's ability to assisted by the C-E officer, is responsible exercise this type of control must be for obtaining the protected list of the next verified prior to its implementation. higher headquarters and adding local On-off control usually is exercised by requirements. the TCAE but may be held by the G3 or delegated to lower echelons as cir- GUARDED frequencies are those of the cumstances dictate. It is the most cen- enemy's C-E systems from which SIGINT tralized form of control. and ESM information of technical and tactical importance is derived. A GUARDED Negative control is exercised through the frequency may be jammed only after the publication of frequencies restricted from commander has weighed the potential jamming. These lists coordinate the use of operational gain against the loss of infor- the electromagnetic spectrum to impose a mation. The TCAE recommends minimum of restriction on jamming or fre- GUARDED frequencies for approval by the quency usage. They are grouped into G3 in coordination with the G2. These fre- TABOO, PROTECTED, and GUARDED quencies are time-oriented in that the list classifications. Conflicts in frequency may change as the enemy assumes differ- grouping among services, staffs, and agen- ent combat postures. cies are resolved at command level. Fre- quencies not on these lists may be jammed ESTIMATE at will. Based on the commander's guidance, the TABOO frequencies must never be delib- G3 staff and the EWS prepare the EW esti- erately jammed or interfered with by mate. The staff may issue initial warning friendly forces. These frequencies are nor- orders to subordinate units to give them mally announced by higher headquarters advance warning of a forthcoming action or such as the joint force or Army component order. This allows subordinates to forecast commander. Examples include but are not and state their EW support requirements. limited to Defense Communications System These may later form the basis for task (DCS) radar frequencies used for friendly organization of EW resources or affect the early warning air defense, enemy frequen- selection of a course of action. cies being exploited by higher headquarters IPB products are the basic tools for for intelligence purposes, frequencies used 2 assessing enemy capabilities and vulnera- for C of friendly forces and formations, bilities. They provide OB data and the friendly missile control frequencies, and probable disposition of forces and emitters. search and rescue nets. TABOO frequencies

5-13 Critical events are forecast by time and ELECTRONIC WARFARE location which aids in identifying HVTs and determining the impact EW can have TASKING on the enemy. Terrain and LOS overlays Organic and supporting MI units are together with friendly force information aid tasked to accomplish the ESM, communica- in determining EW resource deployment tions, jamming, and IED missions stated in and estimating their effectiveness. Once the OPORD. ESM requirements to support planning is underway, the EW estimate is EW are developed by the G3 and EWS and prepared. stated to the G2. They are incorporated into The EW estimate is a logical presentation the collection plan by the CM&D section of enemy and friendly EW capabilities and and tasked as described in Chapter 3. The vulnerabilities as they relate to the mission. following illustration depicts the EW units It includes EW courses of action available organic to each tactical echelon. to the commander and weighs the relative Jamming and IED mission tasking is merits of each. Based on an analysis of all formulated by the EWS and transmitted to factors, the best EW course of action is the MI tactical unit operations center. The recommended. The format of the EW esti- TCAE allocates specific EW assets and mate is given in Appendix D. tasks them to carry out the missions. This ANNEX asset tasking contains the necessary technical and parametric data as well as the The EW annex details the EW mission, target, timing, priority, and control infor- concept, and tasks to be performed by ele- mation provided in mission tasking. ments of the force. It describes how EW will be used to support the operation. It is pre- ELECTRONIC WARFARE pared in the standard five-paragraph OPORD format by the G3 with major ASSESSMENT inputs from the G2, EWS, and C-E officer. As with any combat operation, the effec- For clarity and brevity, amplifying details tiveness of EW operations must be continu- are contained in appendixes to the annex. ously evaluated. If the desired effect was Electronic deception and defensive EW may not achieved, the reasons must be deter- be covered briefly in the EW annex with mined. Réévaluation of the target may lead reference to the deception and C-E annexes to allocation of additional jamming re- when appropriate. sources, or it may be determined that attack The appendixes to the EW annex provide by fire is preferred. If failure results from the details necessary for subordinates to insufficient or erroneous information, ESM implement the plan. They may include a requirements are revised to make sure that composite EW target list (at division level) information shortfalls are eliminated. and initial restricted frequency lists. These Assessment is crucial to the EW process. lists require periodic update during opera- It identifies strengths and weaknesses and tions. These updates are normally dissemi- provides a base of knowledge for planning nated informally rather than by republish- and executing future operations. Assess- ing the EW annex. ment is conducted at each step of the EW process to ensure that EW operations are responsive to the commander's need. Both the TCAE and the EWS are involved in the assessment process. The TCAE is primarily concerned with assessing technical effectiveness while the EWS is more concerned with the overall effects on the enemy. Poststrike assessment was described in Chapter 3.

~~5-14 ELECTRONIC WARFARE UNITS~~

~~Ml MAJOR EW ECHELON ORGANIZATION EW UNIT SUBUNIT~~

~~Ml BN (TE) EW CO EW CO (COLL) & CORPS BRIGADE Ml BN (TE) (RC) EW CO (ECM) Ml BN (AE) EW AVN CO~~

~~C&J CO C&J PLT (3) HEAVY DIV BATTALION EW CO SIGINT PROC PLT OPCON QUICKFIX FLT PLT~~

COLL CO VOICE COLL PLT (3) LIGHT DIV BATTALION OPCON QUICKFIX FLT PLT HHOC QUICKFIX FLT PLT AIR ASSAULT DIV BATTALION C&J PLT (3) & C&J CO NONCOM PLT C&J CO C&J PLT (3) & AIRBORNE DIV BATTALION NONCOM PLT OPCON QUICKFIX FLT PLT C&J PLT (2) ACR COMPANY OPCON QUICKFIX FLT PLT

~~COLL PLT (VOICE) SEP BDE COMPANY VHF ECM PLT~~

~~5-15 CHAPTER 6~~

~~Organization For Combat~~

IEW operations support combat opera- □ Attached. Attachment places a unit tions. Given a mission by the force com- under the temporary C3 of another mander, the MI commander, subordinate unit. The directive establishing this commanders, and staffs must quickly relationship establishes specific terms determine the— of attachment, such as the provision of □ Mission to be accomplished. CSS. Although subject to limitations specified in the attachment order, the □ Unit(s) to be supported. commander to which the unit is at- 2 □ MI assets available. tached exercises the same degree of C over the attached unit as over those □ Organization of MI assets to provide units ogranic to the command. the required support. □ Operational control. This relationship This chapter describes the principles that places one unit under the control of guide the MI commander and staff in another for its direction and employ- organizing to meet IEW mission requirement. OPCON basically has the same ments. It describes command and support intent as attachment but the control- relationships and offers methods of task ling unit does not have responsibility organizing an MI unit. It also describes the for logistical and administrative sup- communications that are vital in organiz- port. OPCON does not permit the gaining the MI unit for combat and ensuring the ing commander to tailor the unit timely flow of information and intelligence placed under OPCON. which affects the outcome of the air-land battle. During IEW operations, MI assets are assigned standard tactical missions. Standard missions describe in detail the COMMAND AND SUPPORT IEW support responsibilities for an MI unit. RELATIONSHIPS They also establish an MI unit's relationship to a supported force or another MI The MI commander provides the direction unit. Standard tactical missions do not to subordinate elements to accomplish the affect the organizational structure or the IEW mission generated by the force com- command relationship that results from mander's concept of the operation. MI that structure. commanders command and control MI resources assigned to support the combat The four standard tactical missions are— force. The command relationships which □ DS. direct MI commanders are— □ GS. □ Organic. Those assets which form an integral part of a military organiza- □ Reinforcing. tion. These assets are listed in a TOE □ General support reinforcing. and specify the personnel, materiel, and structuring of a unit. An MI element in DS of a specific unit is required to respond to the IEW require- □ Assigned. A unit which is placed in an ments of that unit. The supported unit will organization on a relatively permanent identify its requirements through liaison basis and is controlled and adminis- elements, which will route them to the MI tered for its primary function, or a element for execution. As well as their first greater part of its function, by the priority to respond to the requirements of organization to which it is assigned. the specified unit, DS elements have a

6-0 second priority to respond to the needs of MI commanders must understand clearly the force as a whole. A unit in DS has no the overall mission of the force commander, command relationship with the supported the MI unit mission, and how the MI unit unit, and remains under the C2 of its MI will be organized to support the force com- chain of command. mander's objective. They select objectives for MI unit assets that will directly and An MI element in GS will provide support indirectly contribute to the ultimate to the force as a whole and not to any par- objective. ticular subordinate unit. It responds to the requirements of the force commander, as The principle of economy of force requires tasked by the MI unit TOC. that MI commanders organize limited available MI resources with emphasis in The IE W capabilities of MI units or staff the area where the main effort of the force sections are extended by MI units reinforc- will take place. However, MI commanders ing other MI units. Reinforcing MI units must also allocate resources that will ade- remain under the command of the MI com- quately support secondary efforts. mander assigning the reinforcing mission, while operational control is retained by the MI commanders ensure unity of com- MI unit or staff sections being reinforced. mand by coordinating the actions and The reinforcing mission permits increased organization of all MI assets toward the support to specific maneuver units without common goal through mission orders. MI giving up complete control of MI assets to commanders control their subordinates, yet the supported elements. extend to them the freedom to exercise their initiative. An MI element assigned a general support reinforcing mission is required to MI commanders accomplish the mission respond first to the IEW requirements of the in the simplest way possible. Direct, simple force as a whole and then to reinforce the plans and clear, concise orders reduce mis- activities of another specified MI element as understanding and confusion. Simplicity a second priority. The general support rein- generates flexibility and results in respon- forcing mission gives the force commander sive IEW support. the flexibility needed to meet the changing tactical situation. TASK ORGANIZATION There are inherent responsibilities within each standard mission. The following MI units organize for combat to provide matrix illustrates these responsibilities as the best possible mix of MI assets to support the force commander's concept of opera- applied to the four standard IEW missions. tion. The MI commander must retain flexibility by organizing the unit to quickly adjust to the unexpected. Flexibility is PRINCIPLES OF achieved by planning for each possible con- ORGANIZATION tingency. This requires MI commanders and staffs to identify MI assets from one or All actions in the air-land battle are more units that can be task organized based on the nine principles of war. These rapidly and moved to a designated location principles are fundamental, interrelated on the battlefield. Flexibility also elimi- concepts that vary with the situation. In nates the need for establishing IEW reserve organizing for combat, four of the nine forces. principles take precedence for consideration by MI commanders. They include— □ Objective. □ Economy of force. □ Unity of command. □ Simplicity.

~~6-1 STANDARD TACTICAL MISSION RESPONSIBILITIES MATRIX~~

~~AN Ml UNIT WITH GENERAL SUPPORT GENERAL MISSION OF. . . DIRECT SUPPORT REINFORCING REINFORCING SUPPORT RESPONSIBILITY~~

~~1. Supported 1. Force as a Force whole Responds to unit Reinforced as a 2. Force as a Ml unit 2. Reinforced requirements of whole whole Ml unit~~

~~1. Reinforced 1. Ml Bn TOC Ml unit Technical Ml Bn TOC 2. Reinforced Ml Ml Bn 2. Ml Bn control unit TOC TOC~~

~~1. Supported 1. Div area of Same as re- Div unit opns Zone of ac- inforced Ml area area of opns 2. Same as Sup tion unit of opns 2. Div area of units opns~~

~~Furnishes Ml battalion (division) provides an IEWSE to each maneu- IEWSE ver brigade regardless of what Ml assets are in the brigade AO.~~

~~1. Supported 1. Ml Bn TOC 1. Reinforced Ml Establishes Ml Bn unit 2. Reinforced unit comm with TOC 2. Ml Bn TOC Ml unit 2. Ml Bn TOC~~

~~Ml Unit Reinforced Ml Bn TOC Commander Ml unit or or reinforced Is posi- Ml Bn in coord w/ as ordered Ml unit if tioned by supported TOC unit by Ml Bn approved by TOC Ml Bn TOC~~

~~1. Ml Bn TOC 1. Supported Reinforced 2. Reinforced Ml Ml Bn Tasked by unit Ml unit unit TOC 2. Ml Bn TOC~~

6-2 In organizing for combat, MI command- IEW support in a specific area to ers assign resources to support the force respond to the needs of a commander. commander's battle. In allocating MI assets for DS and reinforcement, consideration □ Positioning of GS assets and assigning must be given to retaining sufficient assets those assets an area of coverage that in GS and general support reinforcing roles concentrates on a critical sector or to provide the flexibility to influence the zone of the battlefield. battle at critical times and places. Consid- MI commanders must assure uninter- erations which the MI cpmmander must rupted IEW support by organizing their make when organizing for combat are— units in such a way as to ensure the smooth □ Degree of control. transition from current to future operations. The MI commander does not hold assets in □ Sufficient support to accomplish the reserve. Immediate responsiveness to the assigned mission. force commander's priorities demands that □ Future operations. the MI commander organize MI units with a mix of assets that provide multidisci- MI units require a sufficient degree of plined support to the maneuver force. centralized control to maximize their capa- Future operations are facilitated by— bilities to influence close and deep operations. Each tactical mission requires a dif- □ Using on-order missions. ferent degree of centralized control which □ Providing a comprehensive CSS will affect MI responsiveness to supported package. forces. In the defense, more centralized control allows the force commander to influ- □ Dispersion of units to provide surviv- ence close operations as it develops and at ability from chemical and nuclear the same time concentrate on deep opera- attacks. tions. In the offense, a moderate degree of □ Detailed SOPs that provide flexibility. centralized control allows subordinate MI commanders and leaders the initiative to MI resources are organized for combat to develop the tactical situation and provide provide the most reliable and responsive the supported tactical commander the support possible to the combined arms information needed to exploit opportunities team. Each level of command—MI com- and maintain momentum. pany through MI brigade—organizes according to the mission and the resources Sufficient support is provided to the force available. How a particular unit is orga- commander by assigning standard IEW nized depends on METT-T. missions. MI units are most responsive to a supported commander in the DS role. Addi- Through the distribution of assets, the MI tional support is provided with other MI commander rapidly organizes for combat units in reinforcing or general support rein- and readjusts the organization as the tacti- forcing roles. In the offense, the sector of cal situation changes. Shifting assets the main attack should be weighted with between command structures creates a mix the required MI assets. In the defense, MI of MI assets immediately responsive to the assets are weighted to the covering force force commander's maneuver plan. first and then to the most probable enemy Divisional MI battalion commanders avenue of approach. Weighting is accom- must establish control measures for plished by— deployed MI assets. The degree of control □ Stating priority of IEW effort to for- required depends on the number and diver- ward deployed force. sity of the MI resources operating in a given area. When sufficient numbers are □ Assigning reinforcing or general sup- deployed, IEW company teams are formed port reinforcing missions to some IEW to provide the required control. In addition assets which provide immediate to the operational elements, maintenance response to the IEW assets supporting elements deployed and operating in the forces in contact. This increases the area are included in the company team.

6-3 THEME IS NO STANDARD ORGANI- COMMUNICATIONS ZA TION FOR AN IEW COMPANY TEAM. THE FORMATION AND Every aspect of IEW operations is domi- ORGANIZA TION OF EA CH COM- nated by the requirement for rapid, reliable, PANY TEAM IS DEPENDENT redundant, and secure communications. SOLEL Y UPON THE RESOURCES IEW assets cannot perform the mission for OPERATING INA GIVEN AREA AT which organized unless they can be effec- ANY GIVEN TIME. tively tasked and controlled. In addition, the value of information they collect is questionable unless it is rapidly transmitted The following illustration depicts one to the processing and combat elements method of organizing a company team needing it. based on the MI assets operating in a brigade area. A detailed description of IEW The communications needed for C2, company teams and their control is pro- administrative and logistical actions, and vided in Chapter 3, FM 34-10. intelligence and combat information reporting are the basis for development of com- The MI brigade commander (corps) has munications systems and nets. less flexibility when organizing for combat since the MI brigade principally provides Combat information and intelligence are GS to the corps. Aerial assets, such as critical to the conduct of tactical operations. GUARDRAIL and QUICKLOOK, remain When possible, combat information must as a battalion at corps. Depending on the flow directly from the collector or processor tactical situation, these may weight support to the user. Intelligence and targeting data to one of the divisions, or the ACR. MI ele- must be communicated quickly to users or ments from the MI battalion (TE) (EW, processing elements. Communications for interrogation, and CI elements) are nor- administrative and logistical operations are mally organized as platoons or teams and essential to sustain IEW personnel, equip- assigned corps GS missions or attached to ment, maintenance, and supply. Communi- the MI units at division or ACR. FM 34-25 cations means must support information describes how an MI brigade organizes for exchange between coordinating staffs, sup- combat. porting CSS units, and MI units and subordinate elements. MI company commanders in support of MI units use several types of communica- ACR or separate brigade deploy and fight tions to ensure the efficient flow of informa- assigned IEW assets of the company, with tion. These are— the exception of GSRs, under control of the MI company. The role of the MI company in □ The multichannel system. support of the ACR operations is described □ RATT. in FM 34-35. □ FM voice radio (secure). □ Landline telephone. □ Radio-wire integration. □ Messenger or courier. □ Facsimile RATT communications are the primary means for record traffic used for tasking and reporting. Multichannel systems (or links) provide communications for combat operations and tie units into the area communications system. Multichannel systems are the back- bone of the division, corps, and EAC communications system. Terminal equipment,

~~6-4 A TYPE IEW COMPANY TEAM~~

~~in IEW CO TM~~

~~I 1~~

~~CO HQ INTO* CI* C&J TM TM PLT~~

~~SVC SPT TEAM PLT HQ~~

~~T&A VOICE TM COLL TM~~

~~VHP HF/VHF ECM TM ECM TM~~

~~WHEN SUFFICIENT AUGMENTATION IS RECEIVED FROM CORPS~~

required for multichannel communications, provides for communications from widely is installed and maintained by the signal dispersed MI assets to their MI unit TOC or units. Current intelligence requirements for the DTOC or CTOC. For example, interro- direct, high security communications links gators at the division's main EPW cage will are met by the multichannel system. Auto- use the nearest terminal of this common- mated switching systems meet the require- user system to report results of interroga- ment for both speed and security. MI units tion and screening to the CM&D at the at corps and division use the multichannel DTOC. system for much of their communications needs. As it is a common-user system it

6-5 FM voice radio is the primary means of Coordination of IEW activities between communications for command and control, corps, divisions, and ACRs is through administrative, and logistical information. CM&D-to-CM&D and TCAE-to-TCAE At division and ACR, FM radio is often the communications. The MI brigade provides only means of tasking and reporting the dedicated RATT communications between specific MI elements. required for this purpose. « Wire is one of most dependable means of EAC is responsible for dedicated com- communications available to MI elements. munications between the echelon above The MI commander's decision to establish corps intelligence center (EACIC) and corps landline communications must be based on ASPS. Intelligence and targeting data are need, time available, and the ability to disseminated to and received from other maintain it. The best use of landline is to services and allies through the EACIC interconnect closely located activities, such located at the joint intelligence center (JIC). as CPs and operations centers, that remain Information from the national level is dis- relatively stable. seminated directly to the corps and the JIC simultaneously. The following matrix iden- Net-radio interface (NRI) is flexible, tifies the principal stations and means of responsive, and provides the MI com- communications for IEW operations. mander with additional communications means. Responsibility for providing NRI This matrix identifies the principal sta- facilities belongs to supporting signal ele- tions and means of communications used ments; however, the transmitter link to the for tactical IEW operations, tasking, and NRI facility is the responsibility of the sup- reporting. Not all stations have been identi- ported MI unit. fied. Dissemination channels are not shown. Reliance upon intelligence nets at Messengers or couriers provide a secure each level of command, direct dissemina- means of delivery for large or bulky items tion channels established as required, and such as map overlays or large quantities of staff interfaces satisfy dissemination com- message traffic. Strong consideration munications requirements. should be given to the use of messengers or Each tactical echelon of command nor- couriers in and around TOCs and other mally operates an operations and intelli- closely located activities. Care must be gence net. Controlled by the G3 or S3, this taken to ensure that classified information net links major elements of the command is entrusted to only those couriers cleared for the reporting and dissemination of for the level of material in their possession. orders, intelligence, and combat information. MI unit TOCs are stations in these operations and intelligence nets. Operations and intelligence nets are normally FM (secure). A standby courier capability should be established at each echelon of command as backup, and for the transmission of bulk products to enhance COMSEC.

~~6-6 PRINCIPAL TASKING AND REPORTING COMMUNICATIONS~~

/o/*¥/&At/ */£M$/sZzh 9/ù/S/v/S /o o » A, O < XT' /v> / o //*j/Qí «/ /o/^/c □ □ □1 □ □ CTOC SPT ELM (CM&D SEC) • • • • □ □ □ Ml BDE TAC OP CTR/TCAE • • • □ 1 X DTOC SPT ELE (CM&D SEC) • □ □ • Ml BN TAC OP CTR/TCAE • X X □ □ ACR TOC SPT PLT t • □ AVN CO (AS) (Ml BN (AE)) • Xa □ AVN CO (EW) (Ml BN (AE)) • ECM & INTCPT PLTS (Ml BN (TE)) • □ Cl INTO CO (Ml BN (TE)) • X CI/EPW TEAMS (DIV) □2 X C&J PLT (DIV) X X BDE IEW SPT ELM X • SIG1NT PROC PLT (DIV) CEWI FLT PLT (DIV) X SURVL PLT (DIV) OPS SPT PLT (ACR) (SEP BDE) X X • • C&J PLT (ACR) (SEP BDE) X X SURVL PLT (ACR) (SEP BDE) X X CEWI FLT PLT (ACR) X X • CORPS TAC CP X DIV TAC CP s X

~~□ - MULTICHANNEL • - RADIO TELETYPEWRITER X - FM RADIO~~

~~1 CM&D TO CM&D COMMUNICATIONS INCLUDE SSO AND WEATHER COMMUNICATIONS ^REPORTING ONLY CHAPTER?~~

~~Offensive Operations~~

Successful offensive operations demand □ Disrupting and destroying enemy imagination, thorough coordination, and command, control, communications, skilled execution. They are characterized by and intelligence (C3I). aggressiveness, initiative, rapid shifts in Maintaining the integrity of IEW the main effort to take advantage of oppor- □ operations. tunities, momentum, and deep, rapid destruction of enemy forces. Offensives should move fast, follow successful probes through KNOWING THE BATTLEFIELD gaps in enemy defenses, and shift strength quickly to widen penetrations and reinforce Offensive operations require detailed intelligence on the enemy, weather, and ter- successes to carry the battle deep into the rain. Detailed, accurate, and comprehensive enemy's rear. They should destroy or control the forces or areas critical to the ene- IPB begins before initial deployment and my's overall defensive organization before continues during the battle. Knowing the the enemy can react. battlefield, commanders can attack over advantageous terrain. They can use terrain Offensive operations are undertaken for masking and seize key terrain. They can primarily to destroy enemy forces. They exploit weaknesses in the way the enemy may also— uses terrain. □ Secure key terrain. To avoid a tactical surprise, the com- □ Gain information. mander must locate enemy forces, including defensive units and reserves, as early as □ Deceive and divert the enemy. possible. To prevent surprise and to esti- □ Deprive the enemy of resources. mate enemy intentions, the commander places the battlefield under continuous sur- □ Fix the enemy in position. veillance in depth. Commanders rely heavi- Secondary purposes contribute to the de- ly on aerial assets to see deep. Armored struction of enemy forces, but are almost cavalry squadrons, because of their mobili- never ends in themselves. ty and organization can perform security and reconnaissance operations over large The destruction of the enemy fighting areas. force and its will to resist is the only way of winning in combat. Doing so is most practi- Once the enemy force is located, IEW cal after the enemy has been driven from assets track its movement continuously for prepared positions or caught in a vulnera- both intelligence and targeting purposes. ble position. This purpose is well served by IEW assets monitor HVT, track enemy effective and efficient IEW support. forces, and pass essential information to the targeting cells. Ground intelligence assets provide mobile support to the deve- IEW PRINCIPLES loping close operations, using leapfrog movement. MI must collect information In the offense, certain IEW principles are which will reduce the friendly commander's essential to battlefield success: uncertainty about the battlefield. □ Knowing the battlefield. Offensive operations pit friendly □ Denying the enemy intelligence. strengths against enemy weaknesses. Therefore, MI systems determine enemy vulnerabilities which friendly commanders can exploit while simultaneously avoiding known enemy strengths.

7-0 IEW assets available to friendly com- MAINTAINING THE INTEGRITY manders are limited and must be used judi- OF OPERATIONS ciously. Centralized collection management is essential. All collection operations must The integrity of IEW operations is tied to support PIR and IR. the integrity of the force as a whole. In weighting the main attack at a particular place and time, the commander takes risks elsewhere. In these areas, mobile MI assets DENYING THE ENEMY serve in an economy of force role to provide INTELLIGENCE early warning and to support deception operations. MI assets supporting the main IEW systems seek to reduce battlefield attack and those serving in an economy of uncertainty for the friendly commander and force role must be task organized and tai- increase uncertainty for the enemy com- lored to suit the mission and mobility mander. A primary element in doing so, requirements of the force. CI- Survivability of IEW assets is essential in □ Monitors force OPSEC posture. any operation and particularly so in offen- □ Identifies and recommends measures sive operations. Consistent with security to conceal friendly profiles. and communications requirements and mission responsiveness, IEW assets should □ Monitors and recommends OPSEC disperse to the maximum extent possible. measures. They also apply the full range of OPSEC Deception operations may be critical to measures. denying the enemy accurate, clear informa- Command and control of IEW resources tion about friendly forces. Well planned and and their effectiveness are directly related. coordinated deception operations will If IEW is to be continuous and responsive, increase the enemy's uncertainty of the bat- the level, type, and means of command and tle area by misleading and confusing his control of these assets must be determined intelligence system. Deception operations early. may include both electronic and tactical deception measures. SUPPORT TO THE DESTROYING AND DISRUPTING OFFENSIVE ENEMY C3I IEW elements provide support to all MI units support the destruction and dis- forms of offensive operations. The five ruption of enemy C3I systems through primary types of offensive operations are— ECM. Timing ECM missions, to include □ Movement to contact. electronic deception and selecting targets, is critical to gaining the maximum effect. □ Hasty attack. There is a significant CI mission on the □ Deliberate attack. battlefield, particularly in the rear area. CI □ Exploitation. assets not only support OPSEC but also isolate key targets of interest for exploitation □ Pursuit. or neutralization. Then, as the force moves These operations are described in detail in forward into areas previously under enemy FM 100-5. control, CI actively seeks out personnel engaged in espionage, sabotage, or subversion against US forces. Close coordination with higher echelons for CI target development is necessary.

7-1 MOVEMENT TO CONTACT □ Probable enemy courses of action and their effect on friendly courses of Movement to contact is a tactical opera- action. tion to find and engage the enemy. The force is organized to hold the bulk of its □ Flank security data. combat power in the main body. It moves IEW resources look deep to determine aggressively toward the enemy, making second-echelon vulnerabilities. These maximum use of IEW resources to find the enemy before the enemy detects the friendly vulnerabilities form the basis for friendly force. CI denies the enemy intelligence offensive action, particularly deep interdiction. Many of these vulnerabilities will be about the force. When contact is made, associated with HVTs—both natural and combat information and intelligence deter- manmade. IEW resources identify, locate, mine where and with what force to attack to and track HVTs and monitor selected key overcome enemy resistance. ECM supports terrain. the attack. In a movement to contact, the friendly While continuing to look deep, IEW force may encounter an enemy that is resources also support close operations defending or moving to contact. Once con- directly. They continue to be sensitive to tact is made, the action must be resolved enemy vulnerabilities which would bring quickly if the movement to contact opera- maximum friendly success when exploited. tion is to continue. This is normally done by Where possible, IEW resources support means of a hasty attack launched as deception operations. quickly as possible with whatever assets Interrogators deploy well forward to are on hand. No time is available for interrogate indigenous personnel, particu- detailed IPB and analysis, other than what larly refugees, to determine as much as pos- was done prior to the beginning of the opera- sible about the enemy and terrain which tion. The intelligence analysis is quickly lies in the path of the advancing force. GSR updated for the commander and continues teams also deploy forward and on the to be updated as the attack progresses. If flanks of lead elements to provide early the enemy is in a well-prepared defensive warning and flank security to the force. To position and a deliberate attack is neces- provide responsive support, ground-based sary, then detailed IPB and analysis is ESM and ECM assets deploy as far forward necessary to provide critical information as security and the mission allow. These about— assets use leapfrog movement techniques in order to provide support as continuously as □ Enemy defensive belts. possible. Aerial EW assets cover the times' □ Obstacles supporting the enemy's de- when ground assets are moving or are fensive plan. masked by terrain. They are also tasked to □ Enemy security forces. look deep, beyond the range of ground- based systems. CI teams work closely with □ Enemy nuclear and chemical delivery interrogators in screening local nationals means. about the situation in front of friendly □ The best avenues of approach into the forces. They also implement CI plans pre- defensive area. pared prior to the movement to contact by neutralizing or safeguarding persons identi- Should the enemy force be in a march to fied on white, black, or gray lists. contact formation, IEW resources provide critical information about— MI assets are deployed to directly support forward deployed elements. This ensures □ Enemy reconnaissance elements, the most responsive IEW support possible advance guard (combat reconnais- to forces leading the movement to contact. sance patrols, forward security ele- MI assets designated to support deep opera- ment, the advance guard main body), tions require much more centralized control the main force, the rear party, and in order to derive maximum effectiveness flank security parties. for the force as a whole.

~~7-2 The following illustration depicts a unit in the movement to contact formation with typically deployed MI assets.~~

~~Ml UNIT DEPLOYMENT IN THE MOVEMENT TO CONTACT (DIVISION)~~

* CS ^ COVERING FORCE

~~ADVANCE GUARD~~

~~FLANK Í üD GUARD FLANK nn Lm • • • GUARD /Mi/ Ml m Ml~~

~~M XX~~

~~/Si~~

~~MAIN BODY~~

~~• • Ml~~

~~REAR GUARD~~

7-3 MEETING ENGAGEMENT MI support to the maneuver commander The meeting engagement may be the end is critical as his forces consolidate on an result of a movement to contact. It occurs objective. This is the time when he is most when a moving force, incompletely vulnerable to counterattack either by maneuver or fire. At objective consolida- deployed for battle, engages an enemy force tion, MI assets must be positioned to pro- about which it has inadequate intelligence. Once contact is made, ECM are employed vide immediate support and facilitate early 2 warning of such a counterattack. against key C communications and electronic guidance systems. All available col- In both the hasty and deliberate attacks, lection resources deploy to determine the IEW tasks are virtually the same. MI size, composition, disposition, capabilities, resources determine as much information and intentions of the enemy force. They as possible about the enemy's defensive immediately report critical information, posture. Key information determined by such as the location of assailable flanks IEW assets includes— and other enemy vulnerabilities, to the force □ How the enemy's defense is organized. commander. The commander needs such information quickly to decide whether to □ Where enemy reserve and counterat- bypass, attack, or defend against the tack forces are located and when they enemy. Effective integration and use of move. IEW resources generally preclude meeting □ What NBC weapon systems the enemy engagement battles. If intelligence is effec- has and where they are located. tive, the commander can prepare for battle before encountering the enemy force. □ Where the enemy's conventional artillery is located. HASTY ATTACK □ Where enemy REC assets are located. Hasty attacks are launched with mini- MI units may deploy for the attack as mum advance warning or planning. They shown in the following illustration. usually develop from movement to contact, IEW resources with either the main or but commanders can also use them to seize supporting attacks are tailored to the par- the initiative following a successful defense. ticular mission and scheme of maneuver. At company level and below, hasty attacks MI units must be able to keep pace with are often launched using battle drill. Battal- attacking forces and still provide support. ions employ preconceived plans to launch Certain MI elements cannot operate on the hasty attacks. Brigades and divisions move; therefore, they must use leapfrog improvise hasty attacks or conduct them by techniques. In highly mobile situations, executing contingency plans. aerial systems provide continuity of support while ground assets relocate to new DELIBERATE ATTACK positions. Deliberate attacks employed against a Fluid action will be common on the bat- prepared enemy are thoroughly planned tlefield, and MI units must be tailored and and coordinated and take time to prepare. employed for flexibility. When a supporting In a deliberate attack, the commander attack meets with unexpected success, the trades momentum and possibly the initia- commander may elect to exploit it, making tive for the time required to assemble addi- it the main effort. MI units must be pre- tional resources, including IEW resources, pared for this contingency. Should forces for the attack. Sufficient information must shift laterally across the battlefield to be available to plan the attack properly and accomplish this objective, MI elements synchronize all elements of the force. must be sufficiently mobile to keep up with them.

~~7-4 TYPICAL Ml DEPLOYMENT FOR DIVISION OFFENSE~~

~~U1 XX XX~~

~~w. 111 X X X X X X X X U1 11 111 ■ II~~

~~X X~~

~~CD CD d Cd~~

~~□ □ CD Ml Ml S~~

~~X Cd X X X X X~~

~~M pLl x x~~

7-5 EXPLOITATION AND PURSUIT which have driven deep into enemy territory. To prevent surprise, they keep the Commanders planning offensive opera- commander constantly informed. tions must be prepared to conduct exploitation and pursuit actions. Without prior Second, the enemy will probably reconsti- detailed planning for these contingencies, tute its defense. MI determines the place, fleeting opportunities to press a successful time, and type of defense being established. attack to completion may be missed. IEW They perform the same functions as de- resources, particularly MI assets, play an scribed earlier in support of the deliberate important part in planning for and execut- attack. ing exploitation and pursuit missions. ECM are critical in conducting exploita- IPB is critical and helps identify enemy tion and pursuit. Jamming is especially vulnerabilities. Intelligence supports target- important. Jamming selected key C2 coming by identifying, locating, and tracking munications at decisive times enhances the enemy forces which may move to counter combat power of the attacking force. ECM exploitation forces. assets provide the most mobile support possible to pursuing forces. Aerial assets pro- Following the initial assault, MI units vide near-continuous support in highly determine the integrity of the enemy's mobile situations. Surveillance assets defense. They locate gaps, holes, and weak deploy well forward to provide early warn- spots that may be exploited. They deter- ing and on the flanks to provide force mine if the enemy intends to defend in security. place, delay, or withdraw to subsequent defensive positions. ECM are maximized to As is the case with all IEW assets sup- increase enemy force confusion. MI units porting this offensive maneuver, agility continually pass intelligence on the with- must be planned in advance. MI resources drawing force's direction and rate of move- must be capable of shifting rapidly to meet ment, locate and track HVTs, and provide the changing demands of the battlefield, targeting data to FSEs. They identify especially on the extremely extended flanks exposed or open enemy flanks which are of deep penetrations. vulnerable to offensive action. CI supports the whole force. Although the To prosecute the exploitation and pursuit ability to perform detailed analysis or to successfully, commanders apply pressure recommend countermeasures is diminished against the enemy continuously. Its most because of the rapid pace, CI still plays a vulnerable areas are located, identified, and valuable role. Monitoring EEFI and taking targeted. Such targets include communica- measures to protect them are key tasks. The tions, supply, and maintenance centers in success of exploitation and pursuit opera- the rear areas. As the force drives forward, tions is closely linked to their security. these targets become increasingly vulnerable to friendly action. RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE As the offensive continues, two events will occur. First, the enemy will respond A reconnaissance in force is a limited- with strong, violent counterattacks. Aerial objective operation by a substantial force to surveillance and reconnaissance assets look obtain information and to determine enemy deep into second- and follow-on echelons to dispositions and strengths. The reconnais- identify, locate, and track counterattacking sance in force also tests enemy reactions to forces. Intelligence and combat information friendly force action. Enemy reactions may about these forces is disseminated quickly reveal major defensive weaknesses which to the commander, staff, and FSEs. Deep could be exploited. Even when using it to interdiction delays, disrupts, and destroys gain information, commanders executing a these forces so that exploitation can con- reconnaissance in force must be alert to tinue. MI assets remain alert to any at- seize an opportunity to exploit tactical suc- tempts to outflank or cut off friendly forces cess. If the enemy situation must be developed across a broad front, a reconnaissance in force may probe the enemy at selected

7-6 points. Recognizing that reconnaissance in river crossing operation is to project combat force is primarily an information gathering power across a water obstacle while ensur- operation, commanders must carefully con- ing the integrity and momentum of the sider the risks involved. Precise plans must force. Because the modern battlefield is so be made in advance to extricate the force or lethal and because even small enemy units exploit success. Commanders must be pre- can be destructive, crossings must be quick, pared to develop the success initiated by the undetected, and coherent. It is essential, reconnaissance in force into a full-fledged therefore, that rivers be crossed in stride as offensive operation. a continuation of operations. IEW principles for reconnaissance in River crossing is a special operation force are the same as for any other offen- because it requires more planning and sup- sive operation. Additionally, however, IEW port than normal operations. It also re- resources, as well as the entire force, must quires unique operational considerations. In be prepared to exploit enemy reactions. this case, however, special does not mean an uncommon or infrequently conducted In many respects, MI for the reconnais- operation. In central Europe, for example, sance in force is much like that for the rivers, lakes, and canals greater than 18 movement to contact. Supporting MI meters wide occur on an average of every 50 resources are tailored in such a way that, kilometers. Thus, river crossing operations should the reconnaissance in force develop must be integral to all tactical operations into another form of offensive maneuver, and practiced regularly. River crossings are those resources would be able to continue to normally conducted by divisions but may provide support. To accomplish this, only be conducted by corps. Brigades and battal- the most mobile ground assets support the ions may cross independently or as ele- reconnaissance in force. Maximum use is ments of a larger force. Regardless of size, made of aerial assets to provide continuity MI units support all river crossing of support. operations. MI support in a reconnaissance in force is To succeed, river crossings require con- decentralized to the extent possible to centration of effort, speed of execution, ensure timely support to the commander. flexibility, and audacity. Planning ensures This is because the reconnaissance in force that the correct type and mix of equipment can easily develop into a hasty attack. Sup- and support arrive at the designated cross- porting MI resources plan for on-order mis- ing site at the proper time. sions which may derive from the tactical situation. Command and control of river crossing Regardless of the specific type of offen- operations is the most difficult part of the sive operation conducted, IEW resources are operation. Centralized command of the vital to the success of all offensive opera- operation ensures coordination of assault, tions. Without sound intelligence upon MI, and other units. Positive control of which the commander can make tactical crossing elements while concentrating, decisions with a degree of certainty, suc- moving across, and dispersing increases the cessful offensive operations are unlikely. probability of success. However, the plan Well-timed and well-planned EW operations must be sufficiently flexible to permit also make a significant contribution to well- adjustments and changes during execution. executed attacks. Finally, intelligence sup- . A crossing force commander is desig- port to OPSEC is essential to the security of nated to plan and control the operation. In both the force and the operations it a division crossing, the crossing force com- conducts. mander usually is the assistant division commander for maneuver. The crossing force commander is assisted by a crossing RIVER CROSSING force staff which includes G2 and G3 eler River crossing operations are an integral ments. In addition to a crossing force com- part of land warfare. The objective of any mander, each crossing area has a crossing

7-7 area commander who is normally a brigade and the G3's assessment and estimate of executive officer. The crossing area com- resource supportability, the commander mander controls engineer regulating points, decides whether the crossing will be— holding areas, MP checkpoints, and crossing sites. The brigade commander provides □ Hasty or deliberate. IEW support to the crossing area com- □ Day or night. mander from those IEW assets allocated to □ Wide or narrow on the front. the brigade, most notably GSR teams. A crossing force commander is then selected. The division G2 and G3 normally SUPPORT designate one of their assistants to serve on the staff of the crossing force, or they serve MI units contribute to the planning and on that staff themselves. The MI battalion execution phases of river crossing opera- commander or S3 serves as the crossing tions. IPB enables the commander to select force commander's IEW executor. the best crossing site and know the battlefield beyond, so that operations can be sus- The crossing force commander facilitates planning by dividing the operation into tained without interruption. IEW resources deploy forward and continue seeking enemy four distinct and manageable segments: weaknesses for exploitation and to warn of □ Advance to the river. enemy forces capable of affecting the opera- □ Assault crossing of the river. tion. Other elements guard the flanks to prevent enemy surprise. By identifying, □ Advance from the exit bank. locating, and tracking enemy NBC-capable □ Securing the bridgehead. delivery systems, MI resources further help the commander know the battlefield and The execution phase of the river crossing guard against a surprise counterattack. is accomplished by dividing the force into MI units supporting an offensive that four separate groupings: includes a river crossing operation seek to □ Assault forces. deny the enemy knowledge of the time and place of crossing. The force commander □ Follow-up forces. may direct that a deception plan be exe- □ Support forces. cuted to further confuse the enemy. Such plans require positive C2 at the highest tac- □ CSS forces. tical level to ensure success. MI units pro- Assault Forces vide ICD, jamming, CI support, and the full range of intelligence support. Assault forces make the initial assault on the river and continue until final objectives are secured. They cross the river by any means available and move as rapidly as PLANNING AND EXECUTION possible. In order of priority they ford, Crossing operations require detailed and swim, raft across, or bridge the river. MI thorough IPB planning at corps or higher, units normally are not part of the assault normally starting weeks and even months force; however, GSR teams may accompany before a crossing is executed. The length of the assault force if exit bank surveillance of long-range IPB planning will depend on the enemy approaches to the crossing site can- severity of the obstacle and the intelligence not be conducted from the entry bank. GSR assessment of a likely enemy capability to may also guide assault forces through resist. obscuration. Aerial ESM and surveillance systems directly support the assault force, The division commander starts the staff add depth to the IEW support, and provide planning process which leads to formula- early warning of enemy counterattack and tion of the commander's concept of the movement of the enemy reserve. They also operation. Based on the picture of the bat- provide ELINT support and cue ground- tlefield drawn by the G2 as a result of IPB based ELINT systems.

7-8 The crossing force commander also con- for the shoulders of the bridgehead. Enemy siders using airborne and air assault forces defenses on the exit bank are identified, to secure terrain objectives in the bridge- located, and defeated. At the same time, head area. Should such forces be used, the interrogation, CI, and S&T intelligence assault force is responsible to linkup with teams carefully study and exploit sources these forces. Man-packed ESM and GSR for information which will enhance the con- and interrogation teams may accompany tinuation of the attack without loss of airborne and air assault forces performing momentum. such missions. Such support enhances the Continuous support of close operations IEW support available to the crossing force provides the time necessary to build combat commander and helps sustain the momen- power on the far side of the crossing and to tum of the attack. continue the offensive. For a detailed dis- MI units must clarify the enemy situation cussion of the various control measures on the exit bank before the operation is used in this phase, see FM 90-13. launched to ensure that the full value of Support Forces artillery and offensive air support are brought against HVTs. In addition, maxi- Support forces provide engineering and mum use of smoke is essential, as is full traffic control support to the crossing force exploitation of ECM to "freeze" enemy commander to ensure momentum through units in place and deny them the ability to the crossing area. orchestrate a counterattack. Combat Service Support Combat service support units sustain the Follow-Up Forces attack. MI and other unit trains establish Follow-up forces move close behind the themselves in forward areas of the bridge- assault force and provide support as head to get ready for continuation of the required. The majority of MI assets are part attack. Rearming, refueling, and mainte- of this group. They provide support from nance points are established along advance the entry bank; read the battle on the exit routes to speed servicing. bank to identify enemy disposition, strengths, and weaknesses; and provide ECM support against enemy fire direction and air defense communications nets. As consolidation progresses, MI units concentrate on developing the situation to continue the attack and provide flank security

~~7-9 CHAPTER 8~~

~~Defensive Operations~~

Defensive operations can retain ground, KNOWING THE BATTLEFIELD deny the enemy access to an area, and damage or destroy attacking forces. They In the defense, the commander has the cannot, however, win the battle by impos- best opportunity to know and control the ing the will of the commander on the battlefield in detail, and to maximize the enemy. For this reason, the defense is a exploitation of such knowledge. IEW ele- temporary expedient, undertaken only ments, and MI units, in particular, are the when it is impossible to conduct offensive key to seeing and controlling the battlefield. operations, or when attacking in another They perform IPB well before the defensive area. All defensive actions are undertaken battle and provide detailed graphic analy- in anticipation of ultimately resuming the ses. These are reinforced by the personal offense. reconnaissance of commanders and staffs. IPB not only helps the friendly commander Corps and divisions fight unified defen- to use terrain, but also to anticipate how the sive battles based on five elements: enemy will use it. Additionally, IPB identifies key terrain essential to the success of □ Continuous deep operations in the force's area of operations. the defense. □ Covering force operations to support Outnumbered and outgunned combat the main effort. forces cannot be permitted to suffer surprise on the battlefield. IEW operations act in □ Close operations in the main battle two ways to defeat enemy attempts to sur- area (MBA). prise the friendly commander. First, IEW □ Reserve operations either in the MBA provides intelligence and combat informa- or in the covering force area (CFA). tion which tells the commander what to expect from the attacker. Secondly, IEW □ Rear operations. supports OPSEC which denies the enemy Deep operations, covering force opera- information needed to set up situations tions, and operations in the MBA are which can surprise friendly forces. If enemy planned and executed as complementary forces are unaware of the actual friendly actions of a single unified battle plan sup- defensive deployment, they will be unable ported by reserve and rear operations. to maneuver with certainty to attain surprise. IEW offers the commander one of the Commanders plan the overall defensive few capabilities to take the initiative away effort on the basis of the METT-T. MI from the enemy by highlighting windows of assets are allocated within the elements of opportunity for the conduct of offensive the organizational framework to support action. the overall scheme. MI units find, track, and target enemy forces for deep operations, enabling the IEW PRINCIPLES commander to attack them most effectively at long range. They provide early warning The IEW principles stated in Chapter 7 of enemy approach in both the CFA and the apply to the defense, as well as other opera- MBA. They search for unexpected offensive tions. Slight variations in application may opportunities. They also provide flank and occur as priorities are changed to meet tac- rear security by finding, tracking, and tar- tical requirements. The following para- geting enveloping enemy units. graphs describe the particular application of IEW principles to the defense. Collected information is analyzed to read enemy intentions and to provide early

8-0 warning. The enemy is capable of conduct- by orders from the higher enemy command. ing a wide range of deception operations Such efforts may prevent the enemy from which pose a particularly serious threat. concentrating, dispersing, maneuvering for IEW elements must work to uncover enemy envelopments, or exploiting momentary attempts at deception in time for the com- friendly vulnerabilities. Jamming is also mander to react effectively. used against enemy C2 and air defense links to suppress fire support and air The composite IEW support provided in defense operations. the defense enables the commander to read the battlefield clearly. IEW tells the com- CI attacks the enemy's capability to col- mander which enemy forces will attack and lect intelligence concerning the friendly when, where, and how they intend to do it. force. It contributes to OPSEC objectives of This knowledge enables the commander to the friendly force and attacks enemy agents position weapons and forces to finish the conducting espionage, sabotage, subver- assault force fight quickly and resume the sion, and terrorism. offensive. S&T intelligence contributes to the de- DENYING THE ENEMY fensive through the identification of tech- INTELLIGENCE nological weaknesses in enemy systems. Enemy uncertainty is key to defensive Although these actions are applicable to operations. Every opportunity to create all operations, countermeasures developed uncertainty in the minds of the enemy through S&T intelligence may be most commanders, to make them hesitate even effective in defense operations. slightly, or to make wrong decisions must be seized and developed. Enemy hesitation and wrong decisions permit the friendly MAINTAINING INTEGRITY OF commander to take the initiative. OPERATIONS IEW works toward this end by participating in and supporting deception operations, IEW units are organized in depth to pro- protecting friendly C2 and emphasizing vide flexibility and maintain the integrity countersurveillance operations. Support to of IEW operations in the defense. Resources deception includes providing intelligence are task organized to meet all requirements for planning and executing the operation. of a single, unified battle through the Participation includes the execution of IED assignment of appropriate resources to actions, operating C-E equipment as part of close or deep operations. Generally, control MED and SED actions, and conducting is centralized with resources deployed operations which reinforce the deception throughout the battle area. In close opera- objective. CI activities are oriented toward tions, IEW support is weighted in favor of the protection of C2, a critical function in the most likely approach to defensive posi- the defense, especially since solid C2 are tions. In deep operations, support is weight- essential to seizing the initiative. ed in favor of the most lucrative approach in terms of NAIs and HVTs. Other IEW resources must be used to cover gaps, DESTROYING AND DISRUPTING flanks, unit boundaries, and other areas ENEMY C3I where combat power is weak, or where coordination is less than desired. Flexibility IEW elements contribute to the defense is essential in all task organization and through ECM, CI, and S&T intelligence. deployment schemes for the defense. The Jamming is used to disrupt and degrade IEW system must be capable of reacting to enemy C2 at crucial times in the defensive both friendly- and enemy-initiated changes battle. Enemy units are prevented from in the tactical situation. The IEW system receiving orders essential to adjust their supports every aspect of the defensive bat- plan of attack. In essence, part of the battle- tle. Units are deployed early to provide field is "frozen" long enough for the combat information, targeting data, and friendly commander to exploit a situation intelligence to support deep operations, which otherwise would have been corrected covering force, and MBA.

8-1 BEEF OPERATIONS strength, rate of movement, and intentions. When necessary, they cue collection opera- Deep operations begin before the enemy tions to produce data needed to answer spe- closes with the friendly force. They go on cific questions. Analysts also maintain a throughout the CFA and MBA engage- constant watch for enemy attempts at ments, and will usually continue after direct deception. contact between forces has ended. In conducting deep operations, the com- TARGET DEVELOPMENT mander focuses the intelligence collection effort on areas and units of particular con- Target development begins simulta- cern, while maintaining a current intelli- neously with actions to determine the ene- gence picture of enemy forces throughout my's main effort. IPB assists in target the area of interest. As enemy formations selection, and the G2 provides advice on approach the FLOT, the commander moni- priorities and values assigned to probable tors their movement, seeks HVTs, and targets. Collection operations are initiated initiates deep attack options. to locate and assess HVTs such as bridges, defiles, and similar targets. As soon as the Deep operations, designed to wear down, main effort is identified, targeted enemy delay, disrupt, and, where possible, to de- forces are tracked to provide data on when stroy enemy second-echelon forces, require they will arrive at the attack point. Ana- detailed planning and coordination. Limit- lysts cue the G3 staff in time to permit ed strike and acquisition means must be attacking the target's point of highest efficiently employed, allowing no margin value. Once the target has been attacked, for waste or error. Deep operations, so es- collection and analysis resources are used sential to a sustained and effective defense, to determine the effectiveness of the attack are highly dependent on responsive IEW in terms of a damage assessment and if the support. objective of the attack was reached. IEW support of deep operations consists The intelligence assessment of targets of two primary tasks: Identifying the ene- before and after the attack is essential to my's main effort, and target development. the air-land battle. The commander must Each of these actions is critical to the suc- keep follow-on echelons away from the cessful interdiction of the enemy's second MBA until close operations are won. Only and follow-on echelons. by knowledge of the effectiveness of deep operations will the commander be able to see the accomplishment of this part of the IDENTIFY MAIN EFFORT mission. The first task for IEW support, once the Just a few organic IEW resources are battle begins, is to identify the enemy's capable of supporting deep operations at main effort as early as possible. Time is corps and division levels. Aerial systems essential. The commander must have time and long-range surveillance units are the to plan the operation, both deep and close; primary organic resources available for see- request release authority for nuclear and ing deep. Therefore, corps and division rely chemical weapons, if to be used; and pre- on EAC, other services, and national sys- pare resources to execute the plan. IPB is tems for much of the intelligence required. the starting point and its products are used to direct collection activities and to cue Aerial resources of the corps and divi- analysis elements. sions are coordinated to provide 24-hour surveillance to the greatest depth possible. Collection resources first orient on find- SLAR provides MTI coverage from which ing and tracking enemy formations and enemy movement patterns and target con- then on updating the information as often centrations may be discerned. When abso- as necessary. Analysis elements use col- lutely essential, aerial photographic and lected data and IPB products to determine infrared missions may cross the FLOT to the enemy's composition, disposition, acquire imagery of critical targets. Aerial

8-2 COMINT and ELINT systems collect infor- MI units deploy to support the covering mation on enemy C2 communications and force battle. Reconnaissance and surveil- noncommunications systems. Long-range lance actions extend the capabilities of the patrols, when available, provide detailed covering force to collect essential informa- HUMINT on activities and locations tion. Jamming can provide electronic deemed critical to deep operations. The screening and disruption, which reinforces fusion of this information provides part of combat power. CI support helps to preserve the intelligence needed to find, track, and the combat power of units fighting the target enemy second-echelon forces. battle. Other services, especially the USAF, pro- IEW support to the covering force battle vide additional data on the area covered by consists of four primary tasks: Army systems and extend the range over which surveillance is maintained. EAC and □ Providing early warning. national systems complement this coverage □ Contributing ECM to the combat and extend surveillance well beyond the power of the force. FLOT. □ Targeting. The complete picture needed for deep Supporting deception. operations can only come from the inte- □ grated use of collection resources available Each of these actions contributes directly to at tactical and strategic levels, and from the the success of the covering force mission. fusion of the resultant data. Time is a criti- The IEW system provides early warning cal factor, especially in the targeting func- by locating and tracking enemy units at tion. Planning must consider the time extended ranges. Corps and division aerial required to identify the target, its movement assets, supported with intelligence from into the target area, and the initiation and EAC and national agencies, provide the execution of attack options. earliest warnings of the enemy's approach. Additional considerations for the employ- As enemy units close on the CFA, shorter- ment of IEW resources in support of deep ranged resources assume the tracking func- operations include— tion. Targeting begins beyond the maximum range of weapons available to the □ Centralizing control of deep operations covering force. assets. Identification of the enemy's main attack □ Ensuring that resource deployment is an essential element of the covering force permits agility. mission. IEW resources identify the enemy □ Synchronizing resource deployment force most likely intended for the main with maneuver battle plans to ensure attack. Other enemy forces are identified in direct, positive contributions to win- terms of relative strength, composition, ning the battle. direction of movement, and probable mission. This data permits the covering force commander to concentrate on positions COVERING FORCE which oppose the probable main attack and The second aspect in the organization of any supporting attacks. Concentration is the defensive battle is the covering force possible through economy of force actions operation. The commander organizes a cov- which include the deployment of MI ele- ering force and deploys it forward of the ments to monitor thinly-held or undefended MBA to— avenues of approach. Simultaneously, MI resources are deployed to the flanks to pro- □ Force the enemy to reveal the main vide continuous surveillance. attack. As the enemy force encounters the cover- □ Deceive the enemy. ing force resistance, reconnaissance and □ Strip away enemy air defenses. □ Delay the enemy.

8-3 advance guard elements attempt to over- □ Surveillance radars located with come or bypass the friendly force. If the reconnaissance forces. covering force's combat power has been □ Countermortar and counterbattery concentrated at the right place and time, radars. sufficient resistance will be applied to stop the advance elements and force deployment □ Air defense radars. of the main body. As the main body deploys, IEW resources monitor the action to Aerial ESM resources are used to over- identify more clearly the enemy command- come LOS and mobility limitations and fill er's intentions. It is also crucial at this gaps in coverage left by ground resources. point to provide detailed combat informa- Use of aerial resources is closely coordi- tion and intelligence to the covering nated with ground resources. A major force commander about the progress of advantage in using aerial resources is that enemy deployment. At the critical time they are capable of cuing ground ESM before decisive engagement, the covering resources and GSR. force commander initiates a delaying action back to the MBA. Concentration of covering GSR teams support the covering force by providing early warning of approaching force combat power and the subsequent enemy forces and the detection and location delaying actions may represent targets for enemy NBC weapons. Therefore, IEW re- of lead elements for targeting at maximum range. The teams— sources closely monitor NBC delivery systems and provide early warning of their □ Continuously search avenues of intended use. approach to detect or locate enemy activity. The decentralized, fluid nature of the covering force battle requires interrogation □ Monitor choke points, such as bridges support at the lowest possible echelon. This or road junctions. requires DS interrogation teams from the □ Increase effectiveness of fire support supporting MI companies, battalions, and by detecting and accurately locating corps MI brigade. Questioning of civilians targets. and EPWs is brief, and is conducted to gain information of immediate tactical value. □ Provide surveillance of gaps between Interrogators gather information about the deployed units. identification, composition, location or Corps aerial resources, especially SLAR, direction of movement, strength, and capa- provide continuous updates on the move- bilities of enemy forces involved in the ment of enemy forces toward the deployed immediate covering force battle. covering force. This supports the interdic- ESM resources support the covering force tion effort of deep operations and keeps the from successive positions established along covering force commander aware of the each phase line. ESM assets are used enemy force disposition. against the following types of targets dur- A significant portion of the C3CM avail- ing the initial and subsequent covering able to the covering force is in the ECM sys- force engagements: tems deployed for its support. ECM systems □ Reconnaissance nets. initially jam C2 communications among reconnaissance elements, the advance guard, C2 nets between first-echelon battal- □ and the main body. The intent is to disrupt ions, regiments, and divisions. reports to the enemy force commander and □ C2 nets associated with artillery and to prevent or disrupt orders sent to the rocket units, especially those with an advance elements. As the enemy main body NBC capability. begins to deploy, ECM assets jam C2 communications to slow deployment and to □ Communications and noncommunica- inject as much confusion as possible. ECM tions jammers. also provide electronic screening for OPSEC.

8-4 Targeting is vital to the covering force ployed forward. Generally, all elements operation. Since the strength of the cover- located in the covering force element are ing force is limited, it is essential that attached to the covering force. available weapons concentrate on destroy- A prime consideration in selecting re- ing HVTs. IEW resources seek out and sources to support the covering force is mo- assess the value of specific targets and bility. The covering force mission requires a make nominations to the operations staff. high degree of mobility, and MI units must Both primary and alternate targets are then have the same degree of mobility. Resources tracked so that they can be attacked at their which are unable to keep up with the sup- time and place of peak value to the enemy ported units or require excessive displace- commander. Destruction of HVTs contrib- ment time should not be deployed in the utes to the covering force mission by delay- CFA. ing the enemy main attack and weakening enemy combat power. Resources supporting the covering force are deployed well forward in the CFA. The principal deception conducted by the Deployment positions are selected to pro- covering force is to make the enemy com- vide the maximum forward coverage and mander believe that the friendly main force appropriate security to enhance resource has been encountered. IEW contributes to survivability. An additional deployment this deception by supporting OPSEC, con- consideration is flexibility. MI resources ducting limited ICD, and participating in must be positioned to respond quickly to the command's tactical cover and deception changes in the tactical situation. operations. In line with flexibility is the exercise of CI teams are employed in GS and operate decentralized control. Control is decentral- throughout the CFA. They monitor friendly ized due to the normally extended front of OPSEC procedures and, in conjunction with the covering force and to the need for the processing elements, provide informa- immediate reaction to changes in the tacti- tion to the commander concerning enemy cal situation. Such flexibility is attained by collection capabilities. They recommend delegating control to the lowest level capa- OPSEC and deception measures. ble of meeting mission requirements. The types of MI resources supporting the Decentralized control increases the respon- covering force are dependent on whether a siveness of MI resources since each resource division or corps exercises control of the is allocated against those targets of greatest covering force. A division covering force is value to the local commander. normally supported by task organized ele- Concentration of MI resources is depen- ments of the divisional MI battalion. The dent on the desired effect. ECM resources corps covering force may include an ACR or normally are concentrated against high divisional armored cavalry squadrons, bri- threat areas. Collection resources may first gades, or battalion task forces. When an be concentrated against high threat areas ACR is involved, its organic MI company and then dispersed to provide wide-area moves with, and supports, the ACR. coverage to cover gaps and exposed flanks. Resources from the corps MI brigade may Contingencies for ECM and collection also be deployed forward. When divisional resources are carefully planned to meet the resources are a part of the corps covering flexibility required by the tactical situation. force, each division provides the appropriate MI elements to support them. The following illustration shows MI deployment for a division defense (covering Command and control of MI units is es- force) operation. tablished at the discretion of the covering force commander. Generally, the senior MI commander assigned to the covering force is given OPCON of all MI resources de-

~~8-5 Ml DEPLOYMENT FOR A DIVISION DEFENSE (COVERING FORCE)~~

~~IDP~~

~~1-23 "F TF V TF CAV 13 TF 1/201 14 14 CAV PL~~

~~GREEN~~

~~FEBA~~

~~O " O~~

* % • • • Ml IX)

~~CEWI~~

8-6 SUPPORT TO THE MAIN Friendly strengths, weaknesses, and inten- BATTLE tions must be hidden or falsely represented to the enemy. The enemy must be lured into Success in close operations is dependent action favorable to the friendly commander. on knowing the enemy, terrain, and weath- IEW supports these actions by determining er and deploying to heighten the natural enemy collection capabilities and by devel- advantages of the defense. IEW resources oping countermeasures to be applied by the concentrate on tracking enemy forces, tar- friendly force. IEW monitors the OPSEC geting, integrating ECM with fire and ma- posture of the friendly force to determine neuver, and contributing to the security of how much the enemy can collect about the defending force. friendly disposition, composition, strength, and intentions. Close operations, fought at close range in the MBA, rely more heavily on combat in- IEW supports deception through IED and formation than on intelligence. Immediate by providing the intelligence necessary to reports of enemy activities, weaknesses, plan and conduct the operation. Accurate and vulnerabilities are passed to com- assessments of enemy vulnerability to mander, operations staff, and fire support deception, and the effectiveness of the system. Combat information provides the deception, are critical to the success of the basis for friendly fire and maneuver to defense. exploit exposed HVTs and to attack and IEW resources are used to provide early destroy vulnerable enemy units. Local warning of threats against exposed flanks counterattacks, based on the overall intelli- or gaps in defensive positions. Especially gence picture of the battlefield, may be trig- important is the detection and early warn- gered by combat information. ing of enemy attempts to envelop the Intelligence is used for the development of defending force. the battle plan, identification of enemy As the covering force withdraws into the intentions, and the location and targeting main defensive positions, IEW assets are of NBC-capable weapon systems. It also redeployed to support close operations. provides other data available only through Resources organic to the ACR remain with analysis of multisource information. the regiment to support the planned use of IEW support is planned and executed to the ACR. Division and corps assets revert meet the priorities and established needs of to division or corps control. Generally, corps the commander. Resources are task organ- resources which normally support divisions ized and deployed to support these priorities are placed under the control of the division- and to maintain flexibility to meet chang- al MI battalions. Other resources normally ing requirements. The priority of IEW under corps control are assigned new mis- efforts is generally in the area of the sions by the MI brigade. expected enemy main attack or other criti- Close operations are conducted by bri- cal areas. Such efforts must be synchro- gades, and are orchestrated and supported nized with the actions of other elements of by the division. Short-range IEW resources the combined arms team to achieve maxi- are deployed well forward to support bri- mum effect. gade close operations. Generally, the bri- ECM are integrated with fire and ma- gade or division blocking the avenue of neuver to ensure that the actions of each approach of the main attack is weighted are complementary and mutually support- more heavily with IEW assets. Other sec- ing. ECM, in conjunction with fire support, tors are provided support essential to defeat attack enemy C2 communications to dis- supporting attacks and to cover gaps or rupt, delay, and disorganize enemy forces weaknesses. When necessary, MI resources before, during, and after entry into close are deployed to maintain surveillance over operations. assailable flanks. The deployment of The defense, especially in close operations, depends on effective OPSEC.

8-7 resources is in accordance with the com- GSR teams may be deployed to target mander's battle plan for both the defense enemy assault forces, to overcome obscura- and the assumption of the offense. Gener- tion caused by weather or battlefield smoke, ally, MI support to brigade operations or to cover gaps and exposed flanks. When requires a high degree of centralized control used to target the assault force, GSR teams and decentralized execution. provide highly accurate data to indirect fire systems for immediate attack of the target. Interrogation teams generally deploy When deployed in gaps or on flanks, the forward to immediately exploit EPWs for GSR teams increase the combat power of combat information usable by the brigade defending elements by providing early commanders. Teams, when supported with warning of enemy activity and by targeting additional interrogators from corps, deploy the enemy force at maximum range. to brigade and division EPW collecting points established by the MPs. At each of Aerial resources may provide limited sup- these collecting points, EPWs are subjected port to close operations; however, they usu- to rapid interrogations designed to obtain ally are concentrated against follow-on information of immediate value. Further enemy forces in the deep operations area. interrogation may be conducted at the divi- The simultaneous execution of coordinated sion central EPW collecting point, in the deep and close operations is crucial to the corps EPW holding area, or in the com- success of the air-land battle. Therefore, the munications zone EPW camps. dividing line on MI system deployment is generally one of range. Long-range assets Ground-based ESM resources, supported concentrate on deep operations while close by aerial missions, concentrate on enemy 2 operations support is provided by shorter- first-echelon forces. ESM systems target C , range resources. fire support, air defense, and other critical elements of the enemy force. Destruction of ECM are as important to close operations these elements, or temporary disruption as they are to the covering force operations. through ECM, weakens the attacker Aerial and ground ECM systems are concen- quickly, creates confusion, and builds trated against the main attack to maximize opportunities for enemy mistakes. These the combat power of the defender. Concen- mistakes lead to exploitable vulnerabilities. tration for ECM is not necessarily physical. Generally, ESM systems in close operations Depending on range, LOS, and power re- concentrate on— quirements, jammers are deployed for flexibility and survivability. They must also be ready to switch from the main attack to a □ Enemy REG elements, especially supporting attack, should the supporting communications jammers. attack appear to be succeeding. 2 □ C nets between battalions and OPSEC in close operations, as stated pre- regiments. viously, is essential to maximize the natural □ Regiment and division fire support advantages of the defense. OPSEC evalua- systems. tion teams deploy before and during the battle to support brigade OPSEC require- Surveillance radars with first-echelon □ ments. It is essential that OPSEC and IEW battalions. support to deception help conceal friendly □ Air defense radars with first-echelon strengths, weaknesses, and intentions. regiments. The following illustration shows a type of □ Countermortar and counterbattery MI deployment for support to division close radars. operations. □ Meteorological radars. Defensive operations stated in this chapter are based on the premise that the commander will seize the initiative at every opportunity and proceed with an offensive operation. Under certain conditions, the commander may choose to withdraw from

~~8-8 the CFA or MBA. This type of operation is covered in Chapter 9.~~

~~Ml DEPLOYMENT FOR DIVISION DEFENSE (CLOSE OPERATIONS)~~

~~x x JLU.~~

~~m 1,1 _Ui- X X X X X X m X X X ■" 111 111 III ■■■ I~~

~~ÈSil lüi fíüi B B I 1 H 1 lui Iji m m rn Sr~~

~~« s~~

~~M. Ml r^~i r^i~~

~~JÛL X X X x~~

~~m Ml XX~~

~~CEWI m~~

~~8-9 CHAPTER 9~~

Retrograde operations are organized all aspects of offensive and defensive opera- movements away from the enemy that tions. When conducting retrograde opera- relinquish terrain to enemy control. Such tions, commanders require highly accurate, operations may be forced by enemy action timely information in order to make deci- or executed voluntarily. Unlike the defense, sions and execute, at the precise time, spe- the intent of retrograde operations is to cific actions associated with each combat avoid decisive engagement. operation. The primary purpose of retrograde opera- Commanders require the clearest possible tions is to preserve the integrity of the force, picture of the enemy's disposition and the so that, at some future point, the offense terrain over which the operation is to be may be resumed under more favorable con- conducted. The focus of intelligence opera- ditions. Retrograde operations are also con- tions is on— ducted to— □ Locating and tracking enemy forces. □ Harass, exhaust, resist, delay, and □ Determining when and where the inflict damage on the enemy. enemy will attempt to mass combat □ Draw the enemy into an unfavorable power to overtake and destroy the position. friendly force. □ Permit the use of forces elsewhere. □ Identifying natural obstacles and related key terrain around which the Avoid combat under unfavorable □ commander plans and conducts a de- conditions. lay or withdrawal operation. Priority □ Gain time. of effort is given to detecting enemy □ Reposition forces. attempts to outflank and isolate friendly forces. IPB identifies routes to □ Shorten lines of communications. enhance force security and mask There are three types of retrograde opera- friendly activities from enemy tions: delay, withdrawal, and retirement. observation. IEW support to C3CM is oriented on de- In the delay, units trade space for time 2 without losing freedom of maneuver, while stroying or disrupting key enemy C and inflicting the greatest possible punishment intelligence links during critical periods of on the enemy. the operation. Especially critical is the period when enemy forces have been During withdrawal, units disengage from stopped and forced to deploy. When this the enemy voluntarily to gain freedom for a occurs, the delaying force must break con- new mission. Withdrawals are conducted tact and withdraw to avoid becoming deci- with or without enemy pressure and may be sively engaged. Destruction or disruption of assisted by another unit. key enemy links during this period delays In a retirement operation, units not in enemy response to the disengagement and contact with the enemy conduct an admin- withdrawal. This gains the friendly force istrative movement to the rear. Retirement additional time to prepare and occupy the operations are not described in this chapter. next delay position. Electronic deception is also used to deceive the enemy as to when EEW PRINCIPLES disengagement has occurred. Retrograde operations increase the de- OPSEC and deception are essential to the mands on the IEW systems by combining successful conduct of retrograde operations.

9-0 CI supports OPSEC by assisting the G3 to DELAY FROM SUCCESSIVE identify those critical friendly activities POSITIONS that must be protected to keep the enemy This technique is used when the sector is uncertain of the time and place of actual so wide that available forces cannot occupy disengagement. IEW systems are used both more than a single tier of positions simul- physically and electronically to deceive the taneously. It requires units to continuously enemy about the disposition of the friendly delay at or between positions and is charac- force. IEW support concentrates on those terized by simplicity of control, minimum measures that obscure the size and intent of preparation of positions, and less depth of the delaying force and preserve the element forces. It is more easily penetrated than the of surprise. Each time enemy commanders delay from alternate positions technique. A are engaged by the delaying force, they graphic representation of the delay from must be convinced through the application successive positions technique is shown in of combat power, OPSEC, and deception the following illustration. that they have engaged the main force. This causes them to deploy their forces, Delay from successive positions is most reinforce, and prepare to sustain an attack. frequently conducted at division and bri- The delay incurred is the purpose of the gade levels. This tactic requires that the delay operation. In addition, the operation majority of available forces deploy forward creates a situation in which the enemy along the most critical sector. Due to the commander may expose weaknesses and inherent vulnerability to flank penetration, vulnerabilities that the friendly force can the forces provide major mission support to exploit to regain the initiative. units conducting an economy of force screen along the flanks. This frees the maxi- In retrograde operations, centralized con- mum number of maneuver units for the trol of IEW resources is required. This en- major avenue of approach, since selection of ables the IEW coordinators to draw upon this tactic presumes a thinly spread force the full spectrum of division, corps, and over a wide front. EAC assets to achieve the support required for the operation. GSR and ESM assets are IPB efforts identify a series of delay posi- located well forward to ensure maximum tions which maximize the natural value of coverage of flanks, gaps, and thinly held terrain. As time permits, these positions are areas. The organization of IEW support improved and occupied before or after con- must be flexible enough to provide DS to tact with the enemy is established. brigades as required, give support to the force as a whole, and be capable of transi- Ground surveillance radar and CI ele- tioning immediately to support follow-on ments (when available) of the MI battalion operations. will directly support brigade commanders in maintaining contact with the enemy, DELAYING help them identify local counterattack opportunities, and ensure security. The Units assigned a delay mission will conduct a series of operations which are de- remaining MI battalion elements will operate in a GS, general support reinforcing, or signed to retain the initiative while trading reinforcing role to allow flexibility. The as little space for as much time as possible. These operations consist of varying combi- bulk of these forces is located in positions behind the initial delay position (IDP) and nations of attack, defense, screen, ambush, raid, and feint. They are conducted within a focuses on developing the situation in the deep operations area. CI personnel enhance framework of two basic types of operational the force OPSEC posture by advising units techniques—delay from successive positions on concealment of locations, secondary and delay from alternate positions. A com- delay positions (SDP), and times and routes bination of both also may be used. The se- of withdrawal. Areas behind the IDP are lection of technique is based on the factors of METT-T. cleared of information which would be of

~~9-1 DELAY FROM SUCCESSIVE POSITIONS~~

~~Initial v. Delay Position • • • ® . V . ® 0~~

~~(-) □«-) Second Delay Position ¥ 0 0 0 • • • • • 0 J -i-.A'i'~~

Elements of delay force break Elements remaining in contact Elements rejoin parent unit on contact and move to rear to fight to rear maintaining con- next delay position and con- next delay position. tinuous contact. tinue delay. use to enemy intelligence. Target develop- originally on the SDP begin a phased with- ment is emphasized after situation determi- drawal back to the next delay position. This nation is completed. As the enemy moves process is completed for each successive closer to IDPs, TAIs selected in the IPB delay position. During this displacement, process are attacked and ECM are inte- aerial platforms provide the majority of grated with fire and maneuver as the ene- deep operations coverage. my repeatedly concentrates on the various ECM missions are carefully controlled. TAIs. This process continues until de- Centralized control is maintained while cisive engagement is likely. providing close support to brigade com- Withdrawal from the IDP begins on the manders. Control is exercised by the MI order of the next higher commander. MI battalion, based on the tactical situation resources behind the IDP reinforce forward and G3 guidance. deployed MI units and assume their coverage to permit their displacement to the DELAY FROM ALTERNATE SDP. MI units along the flanks between the POSITIONS IDP and SDP maintain their positions until physically relieved and picked up by with- The principal difference between alter- drawing IDP forces. Upon completion of nate and successive delay operations is SDP occupation by IDP forces, MI units that, in the alternate system, two units are

9-2 used in a single sector. Each delays alter- The delay from alternate positions is nately. While the first is fighting, the characterized by a higher density of forces second occupies the next delay position in operating on a narrow front. In these opera- depth and prepares to assume delay respon- tions the IEW company team may be given sibility. As the first disengages and passes a DS role due to the greater combat infor- through or around the second unit, the mation requirements generated by unex- second unit takes up the fight. The first unit pected enémy initiatives. The remaining MI then occupies a deeper position and pre- resources are given a GS, general support pares to subsequently resume the delay. reinforcing, or reinforcing mission. How- Delay from alternate positions is character- ever, due to the complicated nature of this ized by continuous, more complicated coor- operation, a larger portion of resources is dination of fire and maneuver; requires given either general support reinforcing or more forces; and provides greater security. reinforcing on order missions in support of It is also more difficult to maintain contact for"'0*"' '1-~1'wed units. with the enemy. A graphic representation of this technique is shown in the following illustration.

~~DELAY FROM ALTERNATE POSITIONS~~

~~£=□ [=□ CZI Initial Delay Position ® . . ® Second Delay Position~~

~~Third B Delay Position ,• • $ • e 0~~

Elements of task force IDP elements delay back Elements of second organize initial and through second position delay position assume second delay position. to third delay position. delay action. Third delay position is prepared and occupied.

9-3 WITHDRAWAL A withdrawal not under enemy pressure is used by commanders to enhance freedom Units assigned a withdrawal mission of maneuver and to minimize casualties. maintain contact with the enemy to provide This type of withdrawal is characterized by security and deception and to prevent a centralized control and contingency plan- rapid enemy advance. Withdrawals, like ning to include alternate routes, priorities of delays, are facilitated by the conduct of— movement, and effective traffic control. □ Limited objective attacks. Other contingency actions may be necessary and should be planned. A graphic □ Feints and ruses. representation of this technique by opera- □ Maximum use of limited visibility and tional phases is shown in the following darkness. illustration. □ Deep operation interdiction by conven- The withdrawal not under enemy pres- tional, chemical, and nuclear fires. sure is begun by brigades and other units in contact by designating detachments left in □ Offensive air support. contact (DLIC) to protect the first move- Withdrawals are of two basic types—a ment of the main body to the rear. DLIC withdrawal not under enemy pressure, and also simulate a continuation of normal a withdrawal under enemy pressure. activity, representative of the larger unit, to mask the movement from enemy intelli-

~~WITHDRAWAL NOT UNDER ENEMY PRESSURE~~

~~PHASE ONE \ INITIAL CP DELAV \0> ® POSITION • • "(-) IS GSR 1 ' GSR X~~

~~• « COVERING * X ® FORCE POSITION~~

~~DIVISION . ON COVERING ORDER FORCE ,i~~

9-4 gence. IEW resources, especially CI teams, OPSEC measures, fire and maneuver are play an important part in this action. employed to reduce the effectiveness of enemy collection capabilities. CI personnel The simulation of normal unit activity is assist MPs and civil affairs units in main- closely monitored by OPSEC evaluation taining control of the civilian populace in teams based on the unit's signatures, pat- the zone. terns, and profiles. In addition to other

~~WITHDRAWAL NOT UNDER ENEMY PRESSURE~~

~~PHASE TWO~~

~~• • • • M Ml GSR GSR~~

~~• •~~

~~• • 'V Ci r~~

~~□ a n~~

~~/ ra~~

9-5 Based on previous IPB, intermediate Those units scheduled to withdraw first delay positions and the final new positions are either given missions in the crossing will have been identified and the prepara- area or assigned to overwatch defenses on tion begun. The division covering force, the exit bank. MI units will usually not be with appropriate MI support, is in place and withdrawn early because of their critical ready to support the operation. The first role in supporting the entire retrograde elements to withdraw include combat sup- operation. The MI battalion tactical opera- port and CSS units not essential to support tions center and trains, however, retire the DLIC. These elements normally include early and, by close coordination with the MI resources assigned reinforcing or gen- corps MI brigade, maintain a continuous eral support reinforcing missions. With- watch on the deep operations. Especially drawal of these units is followed by that of critical is airborne HF and multichannel the main body, which includes nonessential intercept of enemy second-echelon commu- MI assets. Finally, the DLIC and residual nications by corps assets. MI assets withdraw through the covering The delay will normally be continued force into new positions. Both GSR and until the battle is within communications SLAR assets can help vector this force dur- and fire support range of the exit bank ing periods of limited visibility and dark- defense. At this point, forward of the hold- ness. This sequence is shown in the illustra- ing line, the exit bank defense assumes tion on the preceding page. responsibility for the battle. A withdrawal under enemy pressure The defense force is initially small. It differs significantly from the withdrawal develops plans for rapid lateral movement without pressure. In this type of operation, to cover likely contingencies. After the units use delaying tactics to fight their way defense force has assumed responsibility for to the rear. All units initiate action simul- the battle, the requirement for close and taneously in a given sector. A covering continuous coordination becomes critical. force is highly desirable to assist the disen- Time and space constraints may have to be gagement of committed units. It may also imposed to enable the entire delay force to be used to initiate a counterattack. Key to cross the obstacle. MI units provide greater the successful conduct of a withdrawal concentration on the flanks and other likely under enemy pressure is superior mobility, problem areas. Such economy of force mis- effective covering force employment, sound 2 sions enable more of the delay force to C , and local air superiority. A graphic withdraw and establish a viable exit bank representation of this technique is shown defense. CI teams sweep CPs, unit areas, on the following page. IEW support and and withdrawal routes to minimize any- actions eure similar to a delay from alternate thing of intelligence value falling into positions. enemy hands. Selective use of ECM complements and supports mission success. MIVEE CROSSINGS ESM and surveillance aircraft are used to River crossing operations conducted as provide continuous coverage and to permit ground-based systems to cross the obstacle. part of delay or withdrawal operations are If a counterattack is planned, stay-behind characterized by highly centralized control and detailed planning for IEW resources. MI elements begin their preparation. They are conducted similarly to other Activities in the crossing area do not phases of the retrograde; however, there are differ significantly from the offensive cross- specific considerations applicable. ing. The main difference is that friendly In conducting a crossing of a water units have control over both entry and exit obstacle in the delay, units not assigned banks of the river. The actual turnover of missions and thus free to move execute a responsibility from the crossing area com- preplanned retirement across obstacles as mander to the defending commander is by quickly as possible. mutual agreement or as directed.

~~9-6 WITHDRAWAL UNDER ENEMY PRESSURE~~

~~DIVISION • • COVERING FORCE Ml f GSR ! ®~~

~~DELAY POSITION A~~

~~Ml L. I~~

~~DELAY "I POSITION B Ml Ml~~

~~NEW POSITION~~

~~! Ml ! Ml i i _j~~

~~9-7 CHAPTER 10~~

~~Defense and Breakout of Encircled Forces~~

The nonlinear nature of the battlefield maneuver, to include nuclear and presents a high probability that units will chemical munitions. find themselves encircled by enemy forces. □ Break out or link up with relieving This is especially true for maneuver bri- forces. gades and battalions and the MI elements located within these forces. Encirclement When encirclement is unforeseen, other may happen unexpectedly, due to a rapidly actions must be rapidly accomplished. changing situation, or it may be by design. First, a defense must be organized and A unit is considered to be encircled when unity of command established. The senior all ground routes of evacuation and rein- commander in the encircled area normally forcement are cut off by the enemy. The controls all units therein. The immediate criteria for being encircled will differ, de- problem for the commander is the preserva- pending on unit mobility. For example, the tion of the force. The commander first evalu- circumstances of encirclement for a mech- ates the adequacy of the unit's all-around anized unit would differ from those of a defense posture. Breakout is the next pri- light infantry unit. In either case, encircle mary concern. The desires of the next ment would most often happen when a unit higher commander concerning immediate is bypassed or cut off as a result of an breakout or defense of position must be enemy counterattack. Encirclement does determined. If the unit is to break out, an not necessarily mean that a unit is sur- attempt should be made before the enemy rounded by enemy forces in depth. An ene- forces can consolidate their position or take my force may occupy only scattered posi- full advantage of the situation. If the tions in the unit area and may not realize encircled commander cannot break out, the that the unit is located there, or know its defense is continued, a linkup is planned, size or composition. The unit must, unless and assistance is provided to the relieving ordered to hold its position, rapidly seize the force. Finally, a rapid reorganization and initiative, exploit the advantages of enemy consolidation must occur. These actions confusion, and break out before the enemy also apply to MI units operating apart from realizes what has happened. It is impera- supported maneuver units. tive that the encircled force commander IEW support to an encircled force is cru- have a clear understanding of the next cial. The commander must have immediate higher commander's plan. Any action taken intelligence concerning— by the encircled force must coincide with, and reinforce, these plans. □ The composition and disposition of encircling enemy forces and enemy forces capable of reinforcing. DEFENSE □ The exploitable weaknesses in enemy When a unit participates in a mission dispositions through which breakout where encirclement is by design, or where and linkup can be effected. the risk of encirclement is very high, the □ The enemy's intent to use nuclear and staff plans to— chemical weapons. □ Continue the mission as long as Additionally, the commander must have possible. CI support to establish effective OPSEC. If □ Establish an all-around defense and a deception operation is part of the com- prepare for attacks by fire and mander's plan, intelligence and CI support are critical. Finally, EW support, most

10-0 especially jamming, will be critical during efforts of MI units with the main force. breakout operations. When no MI elements are in the encircled force, all support must be provided by the When MI units or elements are part of the main force MI units. encircled force, direct contributions are made to the commander's mission. Support provided by MI elements with the encircled force is carefully coordinated with the

~~IEW SUPPORT TO DEFENDING ENCIRCLED FORCE ENCIRCLED FORCE IEW SUPPORT COMMANDER~~

~~Re-establish chain of • Ml chain of command established. command. • Re-establish communications with higher (parent) Ml unit.~~

~~Establish a viable de- • Orient on the dangerous avenue of fense. approach. • Disperse and protect IEW systems for survivability. • Integrate Ml elements into defensive plan.~~

~~Establish a reserve. • Assign Ml elements on-order missions to support commitment of reserves to contain penetrations/maintenance of interior lines.~~

~~Reorganize fire support. • Establish procedures for integration of EW.~~

~~Reorganize force • Centralize common supplies. logistics. • Enforce supply discipline. • Acquire external SIGINT/EW/GSR unique resupply if required, possibly by air drop or helicopter lift.~~

~~Establish security. • Integrate IEW assets. • Provide CI support.~~

10-1 MI units or elements within the encircled A reserve force assists the rupture force or force are generally placed under the tem- assumes its mission. It then passes through porary command of the senior MI officer the rupture force, maintaining the momen- (other than the G2 or S2). That officer is tum of the breakout. The reserve force will responsible for quickly reorganizing the MI normally pick up GSR, interrogation, and elements available to support the mission of EW assets from the rupture force. the encircled force commander. For example, if elements of two IEW company teams The main body consists of the encircled are with the encircled force, the senior com- force commander's headquarters and most pany team commander takes charge of combat support and CSS elements. It moves these MI elements. He may consolidate as a single group following the reserve force through the rupture. Most remaining MI transcription and analysis teams from two C&J platoons to perform technical tasking assets move with the main body, especially ESM systems which must provide support of SIGINT/EW assets, until contact is regained with the division's TCAE. The for the reserve force, the flanks, and the rear guard. reorganized units then respond to the commander and staff as the divisional MI bat- A rear guard deceives the enemy as to the talion commander responds under normal location of the main effort and protects the circumstances. rear of the force as it moves through the The encircled force commander accom- rupture. The rear guard, like a covering plishes those tasks listed in the left column force, must contain representative elements of the chart on page 10-1. The G2 or S2 and to simulate the activities of the entire force. MI commander support these tasks by Under command of the force executive initiating corresponding actions shown in officer, the rear guard will normally contain the right column. such IEW assets as GSRs; a CI team to minimize information falling into enemy BREAKOUT hands, especially from disabled equipment, supplies, and CPs; and ECM assets to dis- The attack to break out of an encircle- rupt the coherence of enemy actions and ment is conducted on a narrow front while a slow reinforcing units. simultaneous defense is maintained in other sectors of the perimeter. To achieve a A graphic portrayal of the breakout force breakout, the encircled force commander is shown on page 10-4. It highlights the dis- accomplishes those tasks listed in the left tribution and allocation of MI assets nor- column of the following chart. IEW sup- mally supporting a brigade. ports the preparation for breakout by The rupture force moves over covered and initiating those supportive actions in the concealed routes to attack positions. The right column. rear guard stays in position to cover move- An encircled force and its supporting MI ment and to deceive the enemy. unit are organized into four elements for the Once the attack has started, momentum execution of breakout operations. must be maintained. As the rear guard A rupture force opens a gap for the re- clears the penetration, the force moves on mainder of the encircled force to pass column axis toward the nearest friendly through. It holds the shoulders until the unit. If the distance is great, the force will main body passes, then joins the rear move in a movement to contact formation guard. This force is usually armor-heavy for speed and increased security. Enemy and should be supported by GSR to see forces along the route should be bypassed ahead of the rupture and to guide forces and reported. If bypass is not possible, a during limited visibility or darkness. Inter- hasty attack is conducted from the move- rogators are used to screen prisoners and ment to contact. documents along the breakout corridor, and If a breakout is not possible, the encircled jammers disrupt the enemy communica- force may be relieved by another force tions to delay his decision cycle. attacking to defeat the encircling force. The encircled force commander must perform

~~10-2 the tasks in the left column of the chart on these tasks through the actions in the right page 10-5 to effect a linkup. IEW supports column.~~

~~IEW SUPPORT TO PREPARATIONS FOR BREAKOUT~~

~~ENCIRCLED FORCE COMMANDER IEW SUPPORT~~

~~Deceives the enemy es to the time • Advises and assists in # Provides CI and ECM and place of breakout preparation of plan to include support OPSEC aspects~~

Exploits gaps and weaknesses in • Identifies enemy dispositions • Identifies assailable enemy forces and possible reinforcements weaknesses • Identifies exploitable advantages of weather and terrain, especially concealed routes • Directs collection to fulfill information gaps

Exploits darkness and limited • Uses GSR to guide forces • Uses GSR for targeting visibility • Integrates Ml support into • Ensures continuity of IEW Organizes the breakout force advance force main body communictions via aerial and rear guard relay during breakout • Integrates ECM into breakout • Uses ECM to "slow/freeze" to magnify surprise, enhance enemy reinforcements shock effect, and "freeze" 0 Jams the control communications enemy in place ^ Provides surveillance and • Sees ahead of advance force reC0nneissance for flanks to maintain momentum to and. rear breakout 9 Coordinates coverage with • Provides combat information higher IEW staH unit to unit conducting supporting attack • Provitles cl

~~Re-establishes communications • Reports all deep battle data • Requests aerial/ground relays to higher headquarters~~

~~Limits damage by nuclear or • Increases MOPP level chemical attack • Locates and reports enemy NBC delivery systems Continues the defense • Develops contingency plans~~

Maintains morale • Counters rumors, subversion, • Ensures NBC readiness sedition,.... and. propaganda. • Takes action to minimize effects of EMP Considers exfiltration • Develops intelligence • Provides continuous IEW support reporting channels to exploit # prov¡des counter.technica, HUMINT in the breakout ¡nt.nig.nee for destroyed corridor equipment • Provides Cl coverage for « Provides wounded with EEFI 11. ; evacuated areas and CPs •_ Supports„ ^ creation.. of. 1 diversions

~~10-3 THE BREAKOUT FORCE~~

~~RESERVE FORCE . REAR RUPTURE (gsfT) MAIN BODY (V) (^gsfT) - ö NTG JAMMER JAMMER TM~~

~~(gsfP) ESM (^GSR^)~~

~~GUARD FORCE~~

~~IEW SUPPORT TO LINKUP OPERATIONS~~

~~ENCIRCLED FORCE COMMANDER IEW SUPPORT~~

Coordinates plans for linkup. • Shifts IEW control to linkup force. • Exchanges enemy situation data with linkup force. • Coordinates and fulfills linkup force PIR. • Provides IEW-unique logistic requirements. • Sees deep and develops situation for actions after linkup.

~~Supports the relief attack. • Reports results of collection effort to linkup force. • Supports with ECM.~~

~~Coordinates subsequent actions. • Coordinates subsequent actions.~~

~~10-4 CHAPTER 11 Rear Operations~~

A major principle of Soviet military doc- AIR-LAND BATTLE TENETS trine is to disrupt an adversary's rear area through the use of agents, saboteurs, terror- Rear operations will be fought using the ists, special action and diversionary forces; basic tenets of the air-land battle. They attacks by maneuver units; and aerial and include— artillery fires. Attacks against rear area □ Initiative—to aggressively deny the targets are carefully coordinated as an enemy landing areas, to restrict access extension of close operations. The goal of to critical bases, and to ensure continu- such rear area attacks is to degrade friendly ous logistical support. support and sustainment of close operations and to divert forces from it. These attacks □ Depth—to ensure a distribution of sup- also contribute to the demoralization of port so that close operations are not friendly forces. dependent on only one facility or stor- Air-land battle doctrine counters this age area to continue the fight. To plan threat by fusing rear, close, and deep opera- for alternative support and be prepared tions into one unified, coherently executed to shift that support without battle. Actions and decisions in all areas interruption. impact upon one another. Unity of effort is □ Agility—to anticipate and react to any the foundation of success. Commanders rear threat by preparing and moving responsible for conducting deep and close the necessary forces to meet and de- operations are also responsible for conduct- stroy the threat at any level through- ing rear operations. They allocate available out the width and depth of the rear combat, combat support, and CSS to area. achieve success throughout the entire depth of the battle area. □ Synchronization—to simultaneously sustain combat support and CSS of In any future conflict against a major close operations and to coordinate enemy force, the rear area will be character- combat assets to neutralize the rear ized by intense enemy activity whose intent threat without degradation of forward is to create panic and disruption. The objec- support. tives of enemy forces in the rear area are to— Rear operations are defined as those actions, including ADC, taken by all units □ Destroy nuclear-capable delivery sys- (combat, combat support, CSS, and host tems, headquarters, logistical installa- nation) singly or in a combined effort, to tions, and nuclear storage sites. secure the force, neutralize or defeat enemy □ Disrupt rear area C3 centers, airfield operations in the rear area, and ensure operations, and air warning and air friendly freedom of action in the rear area. defense systems. ADC includes those measures taken □ Neutralize high-ranking political and before, during, and after hostile action or military personalities. natural or man-made disasters to reduce the probability of damage and to minimize its □ Harass supply lines and disrupt lines effects. of communication movement by seizing or destroying rail and highway junctures, key bridges, tunnels, defiles, and flood plain gates.

11-1 OBJECTIVES These threat activities will not occur in a specific order nor is there a necessary The objectives of rear operations are to— interrelationship between threat levels. The □ Secure the rear areas and facilities. rear area may face one or all actions at any given time, and in some cases, level I or □ Prevent or minimize enemy interfer- 3 level II activity will be conducted in support ence with C . of a level III incursion or a major attack □ Provide unimpeded movement of occurring in close operations. Additionally, friendly units throughout the rear some activities may take place well ahead area. of general hostilities, including terrorist attacks against key personnel and □ Find, fix, and destroy enemy forces in activities. the rear area. Other Soviet actions that may occur in □ Provide ADC before, during, and after the rear area include fires, floods, conven- an attack or natural disaster. tional and NBC artillery fires, aerial bombing, and missile attacks. THREAT Level I Although rear operations have worldwide applicability, the threat to NATO is pre- Activity of Enemy-Controlled Agents. sented here as an example. Soviet UW operations are supported by agent networks in the target country. The The Soviets will conduct operations in the KGB and the GRU recruit agents in vital enemy's rear area as part of their overall social sectors of the target country. Current operations. Operations in the enemy rear estimates of the number of agents located in area will support current (and prepare for NATO countries who are controlled directly future) operations. These activities in the or indirectly by potential enemy intelligence rear area are designed to create fear, panic, and security organizations exceed 20,000. and confusion among the civilian popula- Their primary missions include, but are not tion, and to disrupt CSS operations limited to, espionage, interdiction, and sub- throughout all echelons of their enemy's version. Some agents are employed in a rear area through independent activity or passive role as sleepers during peacetime, operations that support efforts in the close but their activities are keyed to a buildup in operations. preparation for war. Agents are scattered LEVELS throughout the theater of operations. Con- centrations of agents can be anticipated Three levels of activity provide structure around key military, military-industrial, for and describe the threat. They serve as a communications, and transportation guide when planning rear operations. They centers. are as follows: Sabotage by Enemy Sympathizers. □ Level I - Activity of enemy-controlled Substantial numbers of civilians are sym- agents, sabotage by enemy sympathiz- pathetic to the enemy. Though they are not ers, terrorism. part of the organized agent structure, they □ Level II - Diversionary and sabotage will constitute a significant threat to the operations conducted by unconven- rear area. Sympathizers will be difficult to tional forces. Raid, ambush, and neutralize because their activities will be reconnaissance operations conducted random and unpredictable. Some of their by combat units. Special missions or actions include arson, assassination, sabo- UW missions. tage, and the theft of supplies and materiel. Their activity could also extend to political Level III (battalion-sized or larger) - □ demonstrations which could create civil Heliborne, airborne, amphibious, strife in the host country. This activity ground force deliberate, and infiltra- should be closely monitored for a link to tion operations. enemy sympathizers.

11-2 Terrorism. Terrorist organizations are □ Major logistic fácilities. groups whose goals are to overthrow a SPETSNAZ forces are oriented against government or economic structure by hos- very specific targets. Depending on the tile force. Their actions are defined as crimi- situation, these forces may attack targets of nal acts, often symbolic in nature, intended opportunity. There is a SPETSNAZ brigade to influence an audience beyond the imme- assigned to each front during wartime. diate victim. Terrorists instill fear by vio- Each Soviet fleet also has a naval lence or threats of violence to obtain politi- SPETSNAZ brigade. These main cal, religious, or ideological goals. During SPETSNAZ forces may be employed in a the preparation for war and at the outbreak joint operation by all army fronts in a uni- of hostilities, terrorists will take advantage fied effort. of these economically and politically stressed situations. Their actions will be Raid, Ambush, and Reconnaissance directed against the government or its eco- Operations Conducted by Combat nomic symbols such as large corporations, Units. Each Soviet motorized rifle and military facilities, government agencies, tank division has a reconnaissance battal- and key military and civilian leaders. Many ion, and each motorized rifle and tank regi- terrorist organizations have a Marxist- ment has a reconnaissance company within Leninist philosophy, so it is presumed that its force structure. The reconnaissance bat- these organizations will assist Warsaw Pact talion will conduct reconnaissance and pro- forces. Also, there are independent terrorist vide intelligence on enemy troop disposi- cells whose actions will be difficult to ana- tion, to include the enemy rear area. lyze or predict. The reconnaissance battalion normally employs itself in squad elements. It may Level II have six to eight separate armored recon- Diversionary and Sabotage Operations naissance squads which consist of two to Conducted by Unconventional Forces. three BRDMs, BMPs, motorcycles, and The Soviets maintain highly trained special medium tanks. The division reconnaissance purpose forces under the GRU, known as battalion has an operational depth of some SPETSNAZ. These forces will be introduced 50 kilometers (conventional) to 100 kilome- into the target countries before the actual ters (nuclear) ahead of their parent organi- outbreak of hostilities. These forces are zation. This unit is capable of conducting manned by skilled officers, warrant officers, reconnaissance probes on three or four and senior NGOs operating in 5- to 12-man axes. teams. They are adept at demolition, com- Specially organized reconnaissance munications, and foreign weapons. Gener- groups may be directed to raid installations ally, some team members are fluent in the or to conduct ambushes, although their appropriate foreign language (for example, primary mission is to collect information. German or English) and are trained to They can also be directed to locate specific imitate the culture of the infiltrated area. reserves and to identify boundaries between There are various methods of insertion for units. These groups may also conduct spe- these teams, including air-drop, helicopter, cific missions, such as the capture of pris- vehicles, foot, or by sea. They may wear oners or documents or the surveillance of NATO uniforms or civilian clothes, and unit positions or movements. their mission will be to conduct reconnais- Special Missions or UW Missions. These sance and possibly to disrupt or destroy operations are conducted by either para- critical military targets and installations in chute or helicopter assault forces (company- the rear area. Their primary targets follow sized or smaller) that are organized for the same mission profile as all the rear reconnaissance or tailored to conduct sabo- threat units: tage or raids. Their missions include target □ Nuclear weapons and their storage reconnaissance and intelligence collection. sites. They may attack nuclear delivery means and they may attempt to disrupt C2 assets □ C2 facilities.

11-3 and logistic facilities. These forces will □ Operational airborne assault. This is a harass units throughout the rear area. This battalion-, regiment-, or division-sized mission may be used to assist level III airborne assault conducted in support threat forces. of a front offensive in which a linkup would occur in several days or less. Level III This mission would strike such key Heliborne Operations. The Soviets pos- targets as bridgeheads; theater, army, sess dedicated heliborne forces. Doctrinally, group, or corps headquarters or CP; these forces are employed to a depth of 50 airfields; or river crossing sites. kilometers and normally will be battalion- □ Tactical airborne assault. This is a sized or smaller. The Soviets will attempt to shallow tactical assault, controlled at keep the insertion within range of Soviet division level, normally against a spe- artillery and will also try to linkup with the cific objective. It is conducted by a heliborne force in a few hours. Selected reinforced company or battalion. This motorized rifle battalions are also trained to tactical assault is directed against conduct heliborne operations supported by enemy nuclear weapons and delivery army or front helicopter regiments. means, CPs, logistic facilities, communication sites, and airfields. Because of the number of helicopters required to lift a motorized rifle battalion □ Special airborne operations. A special and the weight restrictions of the helicop- airborne mission is established by the ters, most of these operations are conducted Soviet Supreme High Command and without light armored vehicles. A battalion controlled by front and army com- heliborne force could contain 500 troops. mands. This mission is conducted at Typical heliborne missions are normally the operational level or as directed by terrain-oriented but may be tailored to the KGB. The mission will be a sabo- 2 attack C elements or communication facili- tage or reconnaissance mission and ties. Additional missions suitable for the will be conducted by a company-sized heliborne force are ambushes, raids, sabo- or smaller unit. The UW mission will tage, and laying or clearing minefields in be directed against a specific target to the enemy rear area. destroy nuclear delivery means, or, Airborne Operations. The Soviet Union through demolition, arson, or flooding maintains an elite force of paratroopers. to destroy or deny the use of critical The Soviets will employ airborne assets on facilities. These special missions can both conventional and nuclear battlefields. also be conducted for PSYOP to spread Airborne forces are used to project combat rumors and to create panic, thereby power deep into the enemy rear area. The disrupting the rear area. airborne insertion may support the rapid advance of a large combined arms force Amphibious Operations. Soviet naval (operational maneuver group (OMG)) that forces have initiated extensive training and may be attacking into the enemy rear area. development of their naval infantry. Recent These airborne forces can be dropped with developments indicate a definite enemy their armored vehicles, the BMD airborne seaborne threat against critical US and infantry fighting vehicle, and the ASU 85 other western rear area ports and facilities. assault gun. Soviet doctrine describes four The Soviet naval infantry has the capabili- types of airborne operations: ty to conduct tactical landings with highly □ Strategic airborne assault. This is a mobile forces, air-cushioned vehicles, and deep strike that will have a significant high-speed landing ships. The Soviets impact on a war or campaign. Some categorize amphibious operations as strategic objectives are national capi- follows: tals, administrative and political cen- □ Strategic landing—multidivision land- ters, industrial and economic centers, ing with naval and air support to open and major airports and seaports. or expand a military operation.

11-4 □ Operational landing—a regiment- or SUPPORTING FORCES AND division-sized landing to seize an TECHNIQUES island, a base, or a coastal facility. The Soviet Air Force will provide attack □ Tactical landing—a strike of battalion helicopters, ground attack aircraft, and size or larger against an enemy coast- fighter bombers in support of heliborne and line or facilities. This operation may be amphibious operations. They will attempt conducted in support of an inland to destroy air defense systems that defend a group force operation. corridor into the rear area. This is a critical □ Reconnaissance and sabotage step in gaining air access for a level III landing—a landing conducted by a incursion into the rear area. battalion, company, or platoon against Soviet combat helicopters (HAVOC/ coastal facilities. HIND/HIP) will be employed in support of Ground Forces Deliberate Operations. offensive operations (airborne or heliborne) The threat may attack units in the rear in the rear area. The armed helicopter will with an OMG. An OMG is generally a high also conduct armed reconnaissance in the rear area. Helicopters will attack missiles speed, tank-heavy, operational exploitation 2 force, separate from the second echelon. The being transported or in firing positions, C mission of an OMG is to conduct operations facilities, and air assets on the ground. deep into the enemy rear as early in the They will also conduct raids and ambushes. offensive as possible. The OMG is to de- Attack helicopters will operate in teams of stroy enemy nuclear weapons, C3, and air two to four helicopters. The plan is to attack defense; seize or disrupt lines of communi- after artillery preparations. cations and airfields; and assist in the The FROG, SCUD, SCALEBOARD, SS- advance of main forces by seizing bridge- 21, and SS-23 can deliver high explosive heads, road junctions, and so forth. chemical or nuclear warheads at ranges from 70 to 900 kilometers. They are targeted At front level, an OMG could be as large against nuclear-capable artillery, rockets, as a tank or combined arms army consist- control systems, CPs, radar stations, ing of two to four divisions reinforced with reserves, combat support, and CSS areas. airborne or air assault forces, aviation, artillery, air defense, engineer, and logisti- Mines provide another system for disrup- cal elements. An OMG could be committed tion of the rear area. Antipersonnel and well before the front's immediate objective antitank mines can be delivered by vehi- (enemy corps rear) is attained by first- cles, aircraft, artillery, or individual sol- echelon forces, normally on day 2 or 3 of the diers. The mines will be used to isolate facili- offensive. ties, deny avenues of approach, and to restrict forward support. An OMG at army-level probably would be as large as a reinforced division and could The Soviet concept of REC integrates EW be committed as early as the first day of an with artillery, rocket fire, and air opera- operation. If the OMG is operating on the tions. Tactical EW reconnaissance ele- main axis of advance, the second echelon ments, both on the ground and in the air, may be required to destroy forces bypassed will follow closely behind advancing regi- by the OMG or to secure the OMG's lines of ments. These units will use SIGINT, DF, communications. Mission objectives could jamming, and deception against our forces. be nuclear weapons, withdrawing troops, The goal of REC is to disrupt and destroy 2 reserves, C3, logistics bases, or key terrain. C elements, radars, communications centers, and nuclear delivery means. Tactical Infiltration Operations. Dismounted missile systems will support REC targeting infantry forces may attempt to infiltrate to a depth of more than 200 kilometers. battalion-sized and larger units into the friendly rear area. The unit will infiltrate as Additional information on Soviet threat small elements through the main battle forces can be found in FMs 100-2-1, 100-2-2, area and assemble at a key terrain feature and 100-2-3. at a designated time.

11-5 COMMAND AND CONTROL □ Ensure close, continuous coordination between the G2, G3, and the RAOC. Rear operations are a command responsibility. Several key players are involved: □ Coordinate with G5 and CA to integrate host nation support. □ ROO PRINCIPLES □ G3. Unity of Effort □ Rear area operations center (RAOC). This principle ensures the uninterrupted □ Security, plans, and operations and support of the main effort and the protec- security, operations, training, and tion of the rear area. The keys to rear opera- intelligence (SPO/SOTI) officer. tions are sound planning, early warning, □ MPs. continuous OPSEC, and the rapid deployment of sufficient forces and resources to □ Engineers. counter any threat. Rear operations arè a □ Base or base cluster commander. command responsibility (brigade, division, corps, and theater army). Planning and The ROO will be appointed by the echelon execution will occur as part of the entire commander based on the factors of combat operation. The operation staff (G3, METT-T. The ROO is responsible for the C2 DCSOPS) will ensure that planning of rear operations and has control of all includes consideration for deep, close, and RAOC operations. The G3 or DCSOPS rear operations. receives operational planning and support from the RAOC to conduct rear operations. Economy of Force The RAOC is the tactical center of the rear This principle requires combat support CP that controls rear operations at each and CSS units to defend themselves against echelon. In each echelon support command, attempts to disrupt their operations. They the SPO/SOTI officer provides planning must be able to minimize destruction, rein- and control of all logistical distribution. force their units, and defeat attacks or gain time until response forces arrive. They will The MPs provide the combat link of rear form a base defense perimeter to defend operations. Their employment throughout against the threat. When enemy forces the rear area provides the commander with exceed base defense capabilities, MPs may a light, mobile force to affect rear provide the initial force to close with and operations. destroy the enemy. If a threat exceeds the The engineers are positioned throughout capability of units (MPs, CSS) in the rear the battlefield and are given missions by area, combat forces will be assigned to rear the echelon commander depending on the operations to neutralize the threat. MPs and situation. The base or base cluster com- engineer units, respectively, are responsible mander will plan, prepare, and supervise to the ROO for rear operations. internal defense for rear operations. Combat support and CSS commanders ROOs are physically located in their must be prepared to defend their units. respective rear areas. The ROO will— Each establishes a base defense and pro- 2 2 □ Ensure that geographical areas of vides a C element for the base. This C responsibility are clearly defined in the element is called a base defense operations rear area. center (BDOC). It is staffed and equipped by the host and tenant unit (or units) of the □ Use the RAOC to plan, coordinate, and base. When a base comes under attack, out- direct rear operations. side response forces are not normally pres- □ Be provided adequate, reliable com- ent. The base commander plans and directs munications equipment to facilitate C2 base defense efforts with organic assets. of rear operations. The troops must be trained, equipped, and prepared to defend the base.

11-6 When units are grouped for security or □ Accurate intelligence. emplaced for mission support, they will be □ Centralized planning and decentral- formed into a base cluster for mutual sup- ized execution. port. The base cluster commander will establish a base cluster operations center □ Organic mobility of response forces. 2 (BCOC) for C to coordinate rear operations □ Training and rehearsals. among bases in close proximity to one another (distance will be dependent on ter- □ Prior assessment of the capabilities of rain and mutual support). The BCOC will bases and facilities to withstand be staffed and equipped from units within enemy attack. This assessment is the cluster. based on their degree of exposure and their importance as enemy targets. It The RAOC coordinates directly with the assists the commander in allocating base cluster commander.. The RAOC pro- resources to protect personnel, sup- vides centralized tactical planning and con- plies, and facilities in consonance with trol of rear operations. The RAOC will con- their importance to the mission. duct direct staff coordination with the SPO, or with the SOTI of the echelon support TASKS command and the G3 or DCSOPS. The The base or base clusters will prepare RAOC is under the operational control of their defense to accomplish the following the ROO. tasks. The G3 assists in the integration of plan- Secure Forward Support ning and execution of rear operations. Rear operations are integral to the overall opera- Rear operations must secure and sustain tions, mission analysis, threat assessment, combat support and CSS for forward com- resource allocation, and base assessment of bat units without seriously degrading the the echelon staff. capability of the support command to accomplish its primary support mission. Detailed coordination is necessary between a host nation and the G5 to provide Detection information and depth to security in the Detection of the enemy is the responsibil- rear area. Interface between civil affairs ity of every soldier and intelligence collector teams or cells, CI teams, civilian police, and in the command. Detection is accomplished MPs aids in the efficent execution of rear by observation, reconnaissance, and sur- operations. veillance during all weather and light conditions on any terrain. MPs aggressively The ROO reports directly to the echelon patrol road networks and key terrain commander. The ROO controls rear opera- throughout the rear area. All personnel in tions through the RAOC and receives sup- the rear area provide information about any port from the G3. As the theater develops and all unusual or suspected activity. and more combat assets become available, the echelon commander may assign a tacti- The extensive use of active and passive cal combat force to fight rear operations. measures to counter the enemy is manda- Responsiveness tory. Detection means include the use of day and night observation devices, SIGINT This principle is key to defeating enemy assets, radar, REMS, and chemical and incursions in the rear area. This involves radiological detection equipment. These not the immediate reaction and rapid deploy- only detect enemy infiltration attempts or ment of sufficient combat power and ADC the use of chemical or nuclear weapons, but resources to destroy the enemy and to mini- also aid in preventing reactions to false mize damage. Responsiveness is achieved alarms such as movements by friendly per- through— sons, defectors, or refugees. □ Effective command relationships and command supervision. □ Reliable communications.

11-7 Delay CHAIN OF COMMAND Rear operations must sufficiently hinder The technical chain (see the following the enemy's progress after detection to pro- illustration) continues to function (performs vide adequate time for friendly forces to combat support and CSS missions) until a react. This is done by establishing a base of threat requires a response by the base or fire and by employing mines, boobytraps, base cluster commander. At this time, the wire, or other obstacles to slow, impede, or base or base cluster commander uses the canalize the enemy's movement. Scatter- tactical chain of command (the RAOC) to able mines make an effective rapidly- defend his base. (See illustrations on pages emplaced obstacle system. After infiltration 11-9 and 11-10.) The RAOC immediately attempts have been detected along existing notifies the SPO/SOTI, who, in coordina- or reinforcing obstacles, scatterable mines tion with the materiel management center can be used to block the enemy's with- (MMC) and the movement control center drawal, to restrict his lateral movement, or initiates coordination with other support to strengthen the obstacles. elements outside the threatened area to

~~TECHNICAL CHAIN OF COMMAND~~

~~The technical chain of command controls all OS and CSS units. It ensures the continuation of forward support to the for- Echelon ward combat units. Commander~~

~~Support Command or Assigned Headquarters~~

~~CS Units assigned on Units an area basis~~

~~CSS Units c COORD~~

Destruction ensure mission support provided from the attacked base or base cluster can be sus- After the threat is detected and delayed, tained from another location. the enemy must be destroyed as quickly as possible. This is accomplished by air, land, or sea forces that kill, capture, or repel the ORGANIZATION enemy with all appropriate available fire- The RAOC is a tactical operations center power and manuever resources. whose organizational size will vary, based on geographical responsibility, the echelon it supports and the number of support units within the support area. The RAOC will be

~~11-8 DIVISION TACTICAL CHAIN OF COMMAND FOR REAR OPERATIONS XX DIVISION ADC-M Main XX~~

~~TAC I XX ■0 Rear Area Ops Officer (RAOC) TCP~~

~~Engr Base Base Clusler~~

~~The mission of the rear operations is 2 accomplished through the tactical chain C _ COORD of command.~~

~~CORPS TACTICAL CHAIN OF COMMAND FOR REAR OPERATIONS~~

~~CORPS XXX Main XXX~~

~~TAC XXX Rear Area Ops Officer (RAOC) TCP~~

~~Engr Base Base Cluster~~

~~- 02 .. COORD~~

~~11-9 THE COMBINED RELATIONSHIP OF THE TACTICAL AND TECHNICAL CHAIN OF COMMAND~~

~~Another primary mission of the tactical chain of command is to ensure that the technical chain is not interrupted and that it continues to provide logistical Echelon support. Commander~~

~~TECHNICAL CHAIN Rear Operations Officer~~

~~Support Command TACTICAL CHAIN or Assigned Headquarters RAOC~~

~~Bases and Base Cluster~~

~~c? COORD~~

centrally located within its AO. All RAOCs base as the base commander, who in turn will normally position with the assigned will establish a BDOC. The RAOC will also ROO to enhance coordination. The RAOC is cluster bases for mutual support. The base within the rear CP. The RAOC will act as cluster commander will establish BCOCs. the tactical center of the rear CP under the The base commander or base cluster com- control of the ROO who may also control manders report directly to the RAOC to the rear CP. This relationship is the conduit form the tactical chain of command for rear for direct coordination with the main CP. operations. The RAOC is responsible for the establishment of the tactical communica- RESPONSIBILITIES tions net to support the rear operations Based on echelon priorities and plans, the plan. The RAOC commander will coordi- RAOC plans, coordinates, advises, and nate with the echelon signal officer or unit directs the execution of rear operations. As to ensure that sufficient communication the tactical operations center for fighting in assets are available for bases or base clus- the rear area, the RAOC responds to the ters and alternative means of communica- requirements of the echelon ROO. tion are available. When bases are so positioned that direct communications are not The RAOC, in the execution of rear opera- available, the RAOC will coordinate with tions, will assist in the positioning of units the MPs to augment the rear operations in the rear area through the G3. The RAOC (tactical) communications net. The MPs can will designate the senior officer within each provide this assistance through their organic communications and mobile patrols.

11-10 The division RAOC is the tactical opera- with the units operating in the area support tions center for rear operations in the divi- group (ASG). sion. The division RAOC will use base The ASG in the TAACOM will request defense liaison teams (BDLTs) to coordi- support from assets in the TAACOM. The nate with the S3s of the forward brigades. ASG RAOC will request support from the The ROO will appoint base cluster com- MP and engineer brigades for rear manders as area commanders when the operations. geographical area exceeds the capabilities of the RAOC. If area commanders are Though RAOCs are organized differently appointed in the division area, a BDLT will at each echelon, basic responsibilities are be attached as a staff augmentation to that inherent to each section. The smaller area commander to assist in coordination of RAOCs that do not have some sections (divi- that geographical area. sion RAOC, CSG RAOC, TAACOM RAOC) have personnel (for example, artillery The corps RAOC has responsibility for officer or ordnance officer) within the rear operations in the corps rear area. This organization who perform these tasks or RAOC provides missions to the MPs, engi- obtain specific support from other echelon neers, and explosive ordnance disposal organizations (see the following (EOD) control center in support of rear illustration). operations, The RAOC also provides a BDLT to the corps G3 and coordinates The sections within the RAOC have the directly with the MP brigade, engineer bri- following responsibilities. The headquarters gade, and host-nation assets within the and administrative section coordinates all corps area. It also has direct access to the personnel, administrative, and logistic sup- corps G2 for intelligence information and port as required for the RAOC. The opera- planning. tions and intelligence section— The corps support group (CSG) RAOCs □ Receives, correlates, analyzes, and are management centers for the corps reports the rear situation to the G3 and RAOC. The CSG RAOCs will coordinate base clusters. with all base clusters in the support group. □ Develops PIR and IR for the G2 to The CSG RAOCs will also submit mission assist intelligence collectors in gather- requests for MPs, engineers, and EOD sup- ing intelligence for rear operations. port to the corps RAOC. MP and engineer assets are so austere that commitment of □ Receives intelligence and information these assets at support group level would from the BDLT and reports it to the piecemeal these assets. The corps RAOC G2. Receives analyzed intelligence and has the full perspective of rear operations information.from the G2 and applies it and can request assets in the best interest to rear operations. of the corps. The corps RAOC BDLT will □ Receives IPB products from the G2 and assist CSG RAOCs on an area basis. applies them to the intelligence prepa- The theater army RAOC (TA RAOC) is a ration for rear operations. staff element for coordination and control □ Receives and distributes air defense of rear operations. The TA RAOC, located alert status from the ADA brigade, near the TA DCSOPS, coordinates with the Receives base defense plans and devel- host nation and RAOC of the Theater Army □ ops operational plans for tactical com- Area Command (TAACOM). The TÀ RAOC bat forces (TCP) or other forces provides directives from the TA employed in support of rear operations. commander. □ Receives requests from BDLTs and The TAACOM RAOC exercises the same directs assets under control of the control relationship as the corps RAOC. RAOC or requests assistance from the However, because of the size of the G3. TAACOM area, the TAACOM areá support group RAOC coordinates mission requests for engineer, MP, and EOD assets directly

11-11 □ Coordinate directly with the G3 and □ Initiates the request for a TCF to be SPO/SOTI on critical bases, passing employed in the rear and provides guid- units, and moving of units. The RAOC ance as to tactical boundaries, units will accomplish all support command under the OPCON of the TCF, and coordination through the SPO/SOTI. mission requirements. □ Coordinates Air Force support through □ Monitors and supervises the communi- the Air Force liaison officer attached to cations data distribution and tactical the RAOC. computer systems and coordinates □ Coordinates the positioning of critical required support for the system. supplies in the rear and makes recom- □ Coordinates automation requirements mendations for critical bases deter- for the RAOC. mined by the logistics available at □ Coordinates training of base defense each echelon. units with the appropriate unit or staff. □ Coordinates with the SPO/SOTI on all □ Maintains rear operations pattern movement of bases or units into the analysis files, conducts pattern analy- RAOC area of responsibility. sis, requests additional MI assets, and adjusts its collection plan to support nattern analysis.

~~RAOC SECTIONS~~

~~HQ and Admin Fire Support Operations Section~~

~~X Civil Rear Base Military Operations Defense Operations Plans Liaison (CMO) Section Teams Section~~

~~ADC Air COMM P ans Support Section Section Section~~

11-12 Tactical Combat Force Support Artillery for Rear Operations The TCF is a combined arms organization assigned to fight rear operations. This When artillery is committed to weight may be a unit reassigned a RAOC mission rear operations instead of a TCF, the from close operations or initially assigned artillery unit may be in DS of the RAOC, to the rear. Any echelon may create a TCF the MPs, or a unit directly involved in rear and attach this tactical unit to the RAOC to operations. The FSE or artillery officer of fight rear operations. The TCF will be task the RAOC will provide the artillery unit organized by the G3 to defeat the threat. It with the overlays and disposition of forces may have supporting artillery or aviation in the AO. In coordination between the support as task organized by the G3. RAOC and the artillery unit, control measures will be established. A restricted fire When the TCF is employed for rear opera- area may be established around each base tions, they will use their organic CEOI. The or base cluster as required to support fires BDLT as the coordination element will for the MPs. operate with the TCF S3 or G3 and provide liaison and direct communications between If forward observers are not available, the the TCF and the RAOC. If additional sup- MPs, base cluster commander, or an port is required, the rear operations net can appointed individual in the AO may act as be used to expand support through the area the forward observer for the artillery unit. signal system. The MP assets OPCON to The RAOC will coordinate with the SPO/ the TCF will provide an additional back-up SOTI who will assist in establishing the communications capability. necessary logistic support for the artillery unit while it is in support of the RAOC. If When the threat in the rear area exceeds the TCF is still required after the introduc- the capability of the MP and base defense tion of the artillery unit, the artillery unit forces, the RAOC will notify the ROO that a may revert to the support of the TCF on TCF is required. The ROO will notify the order of the RAOC. echelon commander. The G3 will analyze G2 /Intelligence the situation with other staff elements and will make one of the following recommen- The RAOC must generate requirements dations to the commander: for intelligence collectors. The RAOC is a consumer of intelligence. The RAOC must □ Direct MP and reaction forces to harass and delay to gain time. ask questions of the G2 or echelon TOC support elements so that the G2 can iden- □ Provide direct or indirect fire systems tify collectors to assist the RAOC intelli- to weight the battle for the MPs. gence officer. The RAOC must assume the □ Commit assets from close operations. initiative in this area. Requests for over- flights of the rear area and CI teams to □ Request a TCF from a higher head- operate near built-up areas and industrial quarters. (Depending on the tactical facilities are part of the RAOC responsibil- situation, a TCF may have been ity for developing the intelligence for rear assigned to rear operations. In this operations. case, the ROO will have the authority to commit this force.) Counterintelligence If the MPs are tasked by the G3 to delay Early coordination with CI teams the force, the MP commander (provost mar- through the G2 aids the RAOC in identify- shall, MP brigade commander) will become ing and reducing possible level I threats in the response force commander. The MP the rear area. The CI teams coordinate with commander will consolidate MP assets and local police, government officials, and coun- execute a delay using MP assets and any terterrorist organizations. CI teams provide other available force under the control of invaluable sources for intelligence to predict the RAOC. Assets committed to support the and identify levels I and II threat activity. delay will be under the OPCON of the MP The CI effort is a continuous long-range commander.

11-13 operation which will provide sources of The RAOC intelligence officer is the information to the RAOC. See FM 34-60 for interface into the intelligence system. The a detailed discussion of CI support to rear rear operations intelligence system is operations. dependent on division, corps, EAC, and G5/Civil Affairs allied and host-nation intelligence collection, processing, and dissemination sys- Civil affairs (CA) units will be operating tems. These must be exploited through all in and around the rear area. They operate available means. from the forward brigade area through the RESPONSIBILITIES communications zone. The coordination and assistance they provide are critical to Rear Area Operations Center the development of host nation support. During their work, CA elements will often The"RAOC is the focal point for the col- gain information critical to the discovery, lection and dissemination of all rear opera- control, and neutralization of level I and tions intelligence. The ROO uses this some level II threats. The MP and CA information to allocate and position rear teams will share this type of information operations forces and to evaluate the posi- through mutual support. The ADC plans tioning of critical bases. section can also use the CA teams to locate G2/DTOC Support Element/ and identify host-nation assets for ADC CTOC Support Element support. The support element provides analysis INTELLIGENCE MISSION and fused intelligence (including IPB) on probable enemy courses of action directly to To conduct rear operations successfully, the RAOC at each echelon. the echelon commander and the ROO must know enemy capabilities and intentions. MI Brigade (CEWI) They must anticipate enemy actions and The MI brigade at corps supports rear receive early warning of incoming incur- operations as part of its mission. This missions in the rear area. Therefore, the all- sion is carried out, in response to G2 priori- source intelligence mission in support of ties, principally by the MI brigade along rear operations is to provide echelon com- with indigenous security, CI, and police manders with timely and accurate intelli- agencies on matters relating to rear opera- gence regarding rear operations. This mis- tions (countersabotage, counterespionage, sion requires the following: countersubversion, and terrorism). The MI □ Integration of intelligence from all brigade also supports rear operations sources at all echelons. through the following: □ Exchange of intelligence between US, COMINT. The brigade will employ host nation, and allied forces. COMINT systems that can intercept and locate enemy HF and VHF communications □ Provision of OPSEC support to US in the rear area. combat, combat support, and CSS elements in the rear area. Weather support. Tactical weather support is provided by the USAF SWO and the □ Dissemination of all-source intelli- USAF weather team (WETM). Weather gence and combat information in a information allows the commander to timely manner. assess the effects of weather on weapons A critical intelligence task in support of systems and tactics. rear operations is to determine when and Intelligence preparation of the rear where enemy airborne or airmobile forces area. This continuous process develops a may be committed. Since these forces stage comprehensive and accurate data base of and deploy from areas beyond the corps weather, enemy, and terrain information area of interest, the corps is highly depend- from all available sources before and during ent upon EAC for early warning. hostilities. This information, when integrated and analyzed with other intelligence

11-14 before and during hostilities, is the key to EW support. EW planning and support determining level III threat targets, landing are provided to the RAOC to electronically sites, and air and ground avenues of degrade or disrupt enemy C2 communica- approach. It enables the echelon com- tions. Requests for EW support from the mander to determine his vulnerable areas, RAOC are directed to the appropriate EW analyze the threat, upgrade facilities and section (electronic warfare support officer procedures as necessary, and prepare con- within the corps G3 section). tingency plans. The same methodology and OPSEC support. OPSEC support pro- analytical approach applied to the intelli- vides the commander with the ability to see gence preparation of deep and close opera- himself through the eyes of the enemy tions also applies to the IPB for rear opera- commander. The OPSEC data base identi- tions. This analysis extends past the fies enemy intelligence capabilities and echelon commander's area of operations friendly unit HVTs, patterns, and profiles. into his area of interest. It identifies the vulnerabilities of friendly An important aspect of this process is the forces and recommends countermeasures. preparation of the templates that analysts OPSEC support reinforces the commander's 1 use to postulate and graphically portray base assessment. enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, intentions, and courses of action. The RAOC will IMINT. SLAR, infared radiation, and need doctrinal templates of enemy airborne photographic IMINT are provided to the and heliborne DZ and LZ configurations, as RAOC upon request. IMINT allows the well as of battalion and regimental opera- RAOC and TCP commanders to see the tions once on the ground. threat during periods of darkness and assists in assessing the OPSEC posture. Target development. This process pro- CI support. Besides being familiar with vides targeting information to the ROO the hostile threat capabilities in the rear based on the commander's base assess- area, CI personnel are aware of the scheme ment. It involves cueing intelligence assets of maneuver for friendly deployed units. to provide accurate and timely detection, They also know and understand the com- identification, and location of enemy activ- mander's rear operations plan. ity and HVTs in sufficient detail and in time for effective attack. Ah example of a Upgrading intelligence holdings from high-value rear area target for attack heli- reports submitted by all sources plays an copters, close air support aircraft, and important part in providing an accurate artillery would be an enemy airmobile bat- picture of enemy intentions for rear opera- talion on an LZ. tions. Because the rear threat is dynamic, Situation development. This process CI personnel must continually assess the provides information that enables the level of threat and develop and recommend commander to see rear operations in suffi- appropriate countermeasures to frustrate or cient time and detail to generate the eliminate the threat. appropriate force at the right time and Close liaison with police, civilians, MI place. Situation development includes a agencies, the G5, and CA personnel is a detailed analysis of the weather, terrain, daily function. When hostile rear area and enemy capabilities based on intelli- attacks begin, cooperation between agen- gence from all sources and provides the cies is critical in neutralizing the threat, basis for projecting enemy intentions. particularly at level I. Collection management. Through Based on information on potential hostile integrated management, intelligence collec- rear area activity, DSO are established to tors interface with, cue, and complement provide leads for the identification of perpe- other collectors at each echelon and within trators of incidents against friendly units the national intelligence structure to satisfy PIR and IR.

11-15 and personnel. DSO are composed of per- being of CI interest. CI personnel conduct sonnel who serve as paid or unpaid infor- interviews or interrogations of these indi- mants. They are generally local national viduals and are primarily concerned with employees such as barbers, civil laborers, CI information of current tactical value. and others whose access to the military and Frequently, these interviews or interroga- civilian community may put them in a positions require a joint effort by CI and inter- tion to become aware of potential activities rogation personnel using the appropriate against friendly facilities. language. INVESTIGATIONS MPs will frequently collect intelligence and information from US or host-nation Incidents of suspected sabotage, espio- sources while performing their mission in nage, or subversion are investigated by CI the rear area. The MP headquarters will personnel as directed. These investigations disseminate this information to the RAOC can lead to identification and elimination of via the existing communications net. perpetrators of hostile actions in the rear area. Pattern analysis of multiple incidents Examples of sources of information and can reveal enemy plans and intentions. intelligence to the RAOC for the three threat levels are as follows: Black lists are created and updated to permit rapid identification of key suspects □ Levels I and II: in the rear area. Persons on these lists are • MI battalion (TE). those personnel whose capture and detention are of prime importance to the US • CI teams. Army at or during the outbreak of hostili- • Bases and base cluster S2s. ties. They include known or suspected agents, saboteurs, enemy sympathizers, • MP. and others who represent a serious threat to • Convoys. rear operations. • Civilian police. Identification and neutralization of hostile teams and cells are an important prior- • Host and allied nations. ity in rear operations. Information provided • Special forces detachments. by CI personnel is passed to local police, MPs, or allied forces for action. • Inflight reports from aircraft. Tactical HUMINT operations are • GSRs. employed to exploit those captured person- • Remotely monitored sensors. nel who can quickly identify other hostile • CA units. agents and saboteurs and pinpoint unit or team locations, future plans, or weaknesses. □ Level III: Time constraints generally prevent exten- • EAC intelligence units. sive tactical HUMINT operations at level III, but enemy agents, sympathizers, and • MI battalion (TE). terrorists can often be neutralized at levels I • Division MI battalion. and II. • Air defense radars. CI personnel identify line crossers, refugees, or defectors who can provide critical • Air Force intelligence systems. information. In TA, this mission exists dur- • Combat units. ing times of war and peace and provides for medium- and long-range CI planning and • Inflight reports from aircraft. activities. During war, CI teams located • Allied and host-nation units. near or collocated with the corps EPW cage will have EPWs, refugees, defectors, and • MP. line crossers identified by interrogators as • National systems.

11-16 INTELLIGENCE AND IEW assets (EW, GSR, interrogation) will ELECTRONIC WARFARE have, on order, missions to redirect their efforts from deep and close operations to SUPPORT rear operations to support combat forces While the collection efforts of all IEW against level III threat. assets support rear operations through col- Additional information on rear opera- lection against enemy forces that pose a tions is contained in FM 90-14. threat to the rear area, normally only CI assets will directly support rear operations against levels I and II threat. Some other

~~11-17 CHAPTER 12~~

~~Special Operations and Environments~~

The geographic range of US interests assault tactics is a rapid tempo of opera- demands that the Army be prepared to fight tions over extended ranges. Air assault and win on all types of terrain and in all operations are described in FM 71-101. climates. This chapter describes IEW sup- Security of aircraft enroute to LZs is a port to special operations and in special major concern. Friendly air and air defense environments. Each operation or environ- support must ensure air routes are free of ment is described in general terms to estab- enemy air and air defense forces. When lish a basis for understanding its impact on REMS are available, friendly air assets IEW operations. Special considerations for seed likely enemy ground approach routes conducting and sustaining IEW operations into the LZ with REMS to detect and report are then described to aid in planning, movement on the ground. GSR are organizing, and training for these opera- employed to warn of enemy movement on tions and environments. friendly flanks. Weather conditions may restrict the use SPECIAL OPERATIONS of air assault forces especially when ceil- ings are below 200 feet and visibility is 1/4 JCS Publication 1 defines special opera- mile or less. Adverse weather and natural tions as operations conducted by specially and artificial obscuration hamper air and trained, equipped, and organized DOD ground navigation, reconnaissance and forces against strategic or tactical targets surveillance, and resupply or extraction of in pursuit of national military, political, committed forces. Sensitivity to weather economic, or psychological objectives. factors guide the G2 during IPB and collec- These operations may be conducted during tion planning. Both current and predicted periods of peace or hostilities. They may surface and aloft conditions are critical. support conventional operations, or they may be prosecuted independently when use Terrain is equally critical. Terrain in the of conventional forces is either inappro- intended area of operations must be ana- priate or infeasible. lyzed for its impact on the mission and the weapons and equipment required for the This chapter focuses on the MI aspects of operation. Terrain in the objective area is air assault, airborne, riverine, amphibious, analyzed to determine where the air assault and LIC operations. Division operations are force can obtain the best observation, fields described, but the considerations given also of fire, and concealment and cover. Obsta- may apply to smaller task force operations. cles to air and ground movement and key These exceptions are noted where terrain are identified. Key terrain for an air appropriate. assault operation may include— AIR ASSAULT □ Objectives of the assault and subse- Air assault operations are characterized quent operations. by a high degree of tactical mobility. They □ Primary and alternate LZs. 'are conducted by transporting infantry and fjeld artillery units, with the necessary □ Emergency LZs enroute to the combat support and CSS, into battle by objective. helicopter. Once deployed on the ground, air □ Air routes in and out of the objective assault infantry battalions fight like other area. infantry battalions. The essence of air Size and proximity to the objective and enemy forces are considerations for selecting an LZ.

12-0 Thorough IPB is required to give friendly and to cause uncertainty and confusion in forces detailed intelligence about antici- the enemy commander's mind once the pated friendly and enemy avenues of operation has begun. approach, LZs, and the area around the ECM also supports friendly efforts to LZs. Barriers and obstacles must be located stave off effective enemy responses to the precisely. 2 operation. By jamming critical C links, Surprise is crucial to air assault opera- confusion and disorder can be created tions which place forces in enemy held ter- within the enemy command structure, pro- rain. Therefore, OPSEC before and during longing the time required to organize and the operation must deny the enemy infor- react. mation concerning the planned operation. MI personnel supporting the air assault In particular, OPSEC must hide indicators force rely heavily on higher echelons for which would give the enemy knowledge of both intelligence and CI support to aug- the— ment and reinforce organic capabilities. In □ Intent to use air assault forces for a some cases, depending on the size of the particular operation. assault force, higher echelons must also □ Date and time of the operation. provide additional EW support. Requests for information and requests for specific □ Size of the force to be used. types of support are submitted as early as □ Air routes to and from the planned possible in the planning phase. LZs. The MI unit commander supporting an air assault operation task organizes to meet □ Locations of the planned LZs. the special requirements for mobility by Air assault operations require extensive helicopter. Generally, emphasis is on light- CI support in both the preparation phase weight, manpacked systems for the initial and the actual operation. CI analysis is assault. In the air assault division these critical to ensure OPSEC measures are include man-transportable, voice intercept taken to prevent giving away any of the systems in the low-level intercept teams and information listed above. CI must also sup- manpacked GSR. Vehicle mounted IEW port actions at the staging areas to prevent systems may be lifted into the assault area espionage, sabotage, and acts of terrorism after LZs are secured. which could impact adversely on the operation. AIRBORNE Depending on the size of the operation, Airborne forces are organized to deploy the first few hours on the ground are the rapidly anywhere in the world to— most dangerous for air assault forces in areas under enemy control. If the enemy is □ Secure critical installations or able to react quickly and with sufficient facilities. force, the assault force can be defeated □ Reinforce US or allied forces. before its objective is achieved or before the □ Conduct a show of force. bulk of its combat power and support can be consolidated and used effectively. In addi- □ Assault the enemy's rear area, secure tion to OPSEC measures designed to deny terrain, or interdict routes of supply or the enemy information about the operation, enemy withdrawal. other activities must be oriented toward Airborne forces are lightly equipped and, preventing a thoroughly coordinated, rapid as a general rule, fight as light infantry enemy response. once on the ground. To conduct sustained Deception measures are used for both combat operations, they must be reinforced purposes. Actions are taken to deceive the with additionad medium artillery, air enemy about the operation and its purpose defense systems, and transportation.

12-1 Airborne operations are most often joint The MI commander supporting the air- operations. Airborne forces are usually borne force task organizes MI resources to transported to the operational area by support every phase of the operation. Gen- USAF aircraft although Army helicopters erally, MI units organic to airborne divi- may be used in some cases. sions are capable of accompanying combat forces on the initial parachute drop into the Airborne operations require specialized objective area. Those MI resources capable information on the— of functioning without extensive transpor- □ Enemy composition, disposition, and tation or logistic support normally are the strength in and near the projected AO. elements assigned to accompany the com- □ Enemy reinforcing capabilities. bat forces. The remaining elements of the MI unit and supporting elements from □ Enemy air defense capabilities. higher headquarters may be airdropped or □ Weather conditions and seasonal airlanded after the immediate objectives peculiarities in the objective area. have been taken. □ Weather conditions at the departure Doctrine for planning airborne operations airfields and along the route to the is contained in FM 100-27 and airborne divi- objective area. sion operations are described in FM 71-101. □ Visibility in the objective area pro- RIVERINE jected for the time of the assault and Riverine warfare differs from conven- during follow-up operations. tional ground warfare chiefly in environment. Environmental considerations have Key or decisive terrain. □ significant impact on the IEW support □ Primary, alternate, and potential required for both planning and operations. emergency DZs. Riverine operations are normally conducted jointly by Army and Navy forces. □ Routes into and out of the objective area for both enemy and friendly Intelligence personnel coordinate through forces. the J2 to achieve common objectives. Opera- □ Concealment and cover and fields of tions are jointly planned and decentrally fire in the AO. executed. Riverine operations may include force insertion by watercraft, helicopter, □ Obstacles which inhibit or enhance parachute assault, and mounted or dis- airborne operations. mounted overland techniques. □ Soil conditions in the objective area. The enemy's use of inland waterways and EW and CI support requirements for air- attempts to control friendly use of them borne operations are nearly identical to demand special attention. The criticality of those of the air assault operation. However, terrain intelligence and route reconnais- in some cases, CI and EW support may be sance in riverine operations places unusu- even more critical to the airborne operation. ally heavy demands on IEW elements. Airborne operations often take place well Significant contributions to the special beyond the range of MI assets supporting environmental intelligence requirements the airborne force. During planning for air- can be made by combat engineer units. The borne operations, corps, EAC, other ser- following types of information are provided vices, and national systems are the primary by these units: sources of intelligence. During the opera- □ Width, depth, and bottom characteris- tion, organic resources provide much of the tics of waterways. intelligence needed with additional support coming from the higher levels. □ Velocity and nature of current and tidal effects.

12-2 □ Height, slope, and condition of banks. The requirement to collect, process, and □ Location of natural and man-made disseminate information and intelligence obstacles. on the enemy, weather, and terrain is made more difficult by the riverine environment. □ Location and gradient of possible The following factors inhibit effective IEW crossing sites. operations: □ High and low water underbridge □ Temporary or nonexistent security of clearance. land-based sites for sensor □ Predictions of river stages during employment. floods or heavy rains. □ Limitations placed on overhead plat- MI personnel modify standard IPB and forms by overcast skies, ground fog, collection techniques to accommodate the and heavy rain. peculiarities of riverine operations. The fol- □ Limitations placed on ground mobility lowing categories of information receive by waterways, mud, lack of roadways, special attention for priority collection: and uncertain cross-country mobility. □ Size and capabilities of enemy forces. These factors apply to the foot soldier and wheeled and tracked vehicles. □ Attitudes of local civilians. □ Marginal effectiveness of GSR and □ Descriptions of enemy-controlled con- night observation devices when oper- gested areas. ated from unstable waterborne □ Presence, condition, and capacity of platforms. bridges in enemy controlled areas. □ Limited data from ground-based □ Presence and use of mines, boobytraps, SIGINT or EW systems operating at or demolitions. reduced ranges. Accuracy of DF systems will be reduced due to vegetation □ Presence of heavy vegetation and tree and surface water. lines. Because of these limitations, heavy □ Areas along and adjacent to water- reliance is placed on aerial platforms. ways which are potential landing sites Aerial reconnaissance and SIGINT systems or zones for watercraft or air assault provide the most valuable, explicit intelli- vehicles. gence and targeting information in a riv- □ Key terrain which offers excellent erine environment. However, other sources, observation, fields of fire, and maxi- such as HUMINT, must not be overlooked. mum grazing fire into a landing site or The requirement to operate an IEW force zone. in a riverine environment challenges the □ Terrain which offers successive delay ingenuity of MI commanders, logisticians, position opportunities. and maintenance technicians. Ground- based prime mover and shelter configura- □ Location of trails and footpaths paral- tions are modified to accommodate the lel to waterways. environment. Early identification of suita- □ Movement of indigenous personnel to ble watercraft requirements is necessary to and from civilian activities. assure operational and service support capabilities. Shelter integrity is maintained □ Presence and location of enemy and where possible to facilitate position configu- civilian signal, communication, and ration and movement between waterborne noncommunication systems. carriers. Single position redundancy of elec- □ Enemy or civilian use of the electro- tronic systems and power generation equip- magnetic spectrum. ment is desirable. System components and operators must be shielded from small arms □ Alteration of waterway inlets which fire. provide concealment for small watercraft.

12-3 MI Commanders task organize resources The following types of information are to sustain independent operations in remote critical to Army participation in amphibi- locations for extended periods. Communica- ous operations: tions personnel are trained in manual □ Location, length, width, gradient, soil Morse HF techniques in order to overcome composition, and trafficability of or reduce the relative ineffectiveness of FM beaches. radios. Adjustment to one-time, pad-type encryption and decryption is made. Appro- □ Natural and man-made obstacles on priate cryptomaterials are requisitioned and adjacent to beaches. through normal channels. □ Avenues of approach and areas of AMPHIBIOUS advance to and from the beachhead. Amphibious warfare integrates virtually □ - Enemy beach defenses. all types of ships, aircraft, weapons, and □ Key terrain adjacent to beaches. landing forces in a concerted military effort against a hostile shore. The naval character □ Sea approaches including depth of of amphibious operations is reflected in the water, underwater gradient, and off- principles which govern the organization of shore obstacles to include minefields. the forces and the execution of the □ Surf, tide, and current conditions. operations. □ Visibility. MI commanders and staffs should have a thorough understanding of FMs 31-11 and □ Winds. 31-12 prior to planning or executing □ Light data. amphibious operations. The joint nature of Precipitation. this type operation, and the unique intelli- □ gence and information requirements, make □ Height of breaking surf and deepwater full knowledge of C2 and coordination pro- waves. tocols an absolute necessity. Operations are □ Temperature adjusted for wet bulb or jointly planned and decentrally executed. windchill. Army IEW operations prior to an amphibi- □ Type, strength, and capabilities of ous assault sometimes are hampered by the enemy forces in the beachhead and range to the target. Army IEW assets nor- objective areas and those that are capa- mally will not be operational prior to the ble of reinforcing. operation nor while enroute to the objective area. This problem is overcome partially The amphibious task force commander is through thorough, detailed IPB before responsible for the consolidation of intelli- embarkation. Additionally, Army IEW gence requirements for the entire task force. staffs coordinate with Navy counterparts to Additional responsibilities include— maintain continuity on Army targets and □ Collection, processing, and dissemina- areas of interest. tion of intelligence to major elements of the amphibious task force in accor- The desired objective is that there be no dance with the requirements of each. loss of continuity to Army IEW efforts while in transit. Heavy reliance on national □ Acquisition and distribution of maps, systems and naval intelligence assets will charts, photographs, and special intel- be necessary until land-based IEW opera- ligence materials. tions are established and fully functioning. □ Preparation of intelligence estimates PIR and IR of Army commanders are inte- affecting the entire task force. grated with and communicated to the intelligence center of the JTF conducting the □ Preparation of intelligence studies operation. which relate to the mission and AO. □ Establishment of liaison with operational intelligence agencies which are not part of the amphibious task force.

12-4 □ Initiation of requests and directives for MI unit commanders are provided oppor- the collection of information. tunities for sharpening the skills of their soldiers during the extended transit times of □ Security and CI measures. waterborne, surface movement. Training □ Preparation and distribution of an deficiencies and combat indoctrination con- intelligence annex to the amphibious cerning the enemy, weather, and terrain task force operation plan. receive the top priorities. In-transit mainte- □ Establishment of a target information nance of equipment and physical fitness are center. emphasized. □ Establishment of a JIC at the outset of LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT planning in conjunction with the land- LIC is defined by FM 100-20 as the use of ing force commander as required. military assets, in concert with other The landing force commander assists the aspects of national power, by the national amphibious task force commander in the command authority to gain or protect its execution of intelligence duties and respon- national objectives and interests. It may sibilities. The landing force commander include the direct or indirect support of one assists in the determination of the require- or more foreign governments or groups, or ments for a JIC and provision of required be initiated as unilateral activities in the representatives to staff the JIC. absence of such foreign support. Low intensity activities primarily focus on the use of Other force commanders are responsible power, and only on military force as a final for determining and stating their intelli- alternative. Such activities can have limited gence requirements and for preparing and or unlimited objectives. executing an appropriate intelligence plan. Requests for intelligence peculiar to the LIC is a form of confrontation that has specialized operations of these forces is become a major concern of US policy. Since submitted by the force commander to the the Korean War there have been no high amphibious task force commander through intensity conflicts involving major powers, intelligence channels. but there have been hundreds of LICs. His- torically, US involvement has been in Once an amphibious plan is implemented, response to an insurgency in a developing and the joint command becomes opera- nation. tional, the procedures for requesting and receiving information change. There are The IEW principles for the air-land battle two major reasons for this. First, shared apply equally well for LIC. The intelligence national resources focus capabilities on a indicators for insurgent activity are, how- centralized AO and become responsive to ever, unique. Anything that insurgents can the mission of the JTF. Second, priorities do to influence and direct a society toward for collection are established by the JTF J2. overthrowing its government is reflected by The result is more efficient processing and some action or indication, no matter how dissemination of intélligence. Although the subtle. As described in Chapter 3, the devel- process becomes more efficiènt, required opment and application of appropriate indi- intelligence details may become more ob- cators is a key step in quantifying the col- scure to the force commander due to the lection effort. macro-nature of the products. It is, there- US Army commitment in a LIC may fore, the Army G2 and G3 responsibility to occur suddenly or gradually over a period of anticipate contingency areas for likely joint time. The IEW staff, in coordination with amphibious operations, and to begin IPB the security assistance office and other and operations planning early. The JTF members of the country team, assists in the intelligence effort can then focus its recon- development of the intelligence portion of naissance and surveillance resources on contingency plans for US assistance. US updating or reinforcing data which is support may consist of advice, financial already held.

12-5 and material aid, provisions for profes- US MI activities develop close relations sional education, and development of an with the NPCC and ACCs counterparts. intelligence documentary data base. Most of The interchange of personnel between all this effort is directed at the host-country in-country ACC activities serves to educate national level, but mobile training and those personnel and improve overall intelli- advisors may be sent throughout the coun- gence operations. ACCs have three mis- try to subnational levels. Some MI advisors sions. They are to— may be required to assist paramilitary and nonmilitary elements in developing □ Provide integrated planning, coordina- HUMINT sources and exploiting the infor- tion, and direction to all governmental mation they provide. efforts in their area of responsibility. US military involvement in a LIC can □ Assure an immediate, coordinated shift rapidly from the advisory role to an response to operational requirements. operational role. Those already established □ Communicate with the people and intelligence functions would continue. Addi- invite their participation in programs tional roles for intelligence elements in an designed to improve the economic, operational environment may include— social, and political well-being and □ Population and resource control. security of the area. □ Tactical operations. US Army MI efforts support the missions assigned to an assumed by the NPCC and □ Combined MI operations with the host ACCs by— country in the form of interrogation, materiel and document exploitation, □ Determining intelligence objectives. and imagery analysis centers. □ Integrating local intelligence programs LIC is the least studied of all potential with host-country national programs. conflicts, but has a high probability of US □ Evaluating intelligence resources. involvement in foreign political and mili- Organizing and training new intelli- tary affairs. The US Central Command □ gence activities. gives high priority to preparation for LIC contingencies. LIC peculiarities must be □ Formulating new intelligence plans. thoroughly studied by all MI personnel. □ Establishing priorities and allocating The LIC intelligence system consists of resources. all host-country intelligence support and □ Conducting an active liaison program. intelligence support provided by US forces channeled through the host structure. The In the event that US tactical forces are national intelligence structure of the host committed to a host country, the intelli- country normally is established to direct gence personnel of the tactical forces work information from all sources into a single with the combined intelligence elements channel. This channel leads to a central already in place on a mutual support basis. body whose responsibility is to produce a A description of LIC would not be com- composite intelligence picture for the coun- plete without mention of urban terrorist and try as a whole. This central body is the guerrilla activities. The terrorist strikes in host-country National Planning Coordina- urban as well as rural areas. tion Center (NPCC). The NPCC is organized to direct and coordinate the collection, Urban terrain is analyzed using standard processing, production, and dissemination IPB methodologies. Urban terrain has both of intelligence. Intelligence operations at horizontal and vertical acreage that offers the subnational level are carried out at both the terrorist and the guerrilla tactical facilities called Area Coordination Centers protection and vantage points. The terrain (ACCs). The function and format of an ACC of an urban environment is different in is similar to that of an NPCC. Supporting terms of features, but the analytical methodologies are the same.

12-6 Man has created steel and concrete jun- The terrain and weather conditions of an gles which, in most cases, offer more oppor- anticipated LIC operational area are impor- tunities for terrorist and guerrilla activities tant considerations in terms of both the than natural jungles. The following de- human factors and materiel maintenance. scribes the urban jungle: The conditions described in the following □ Stairwells and elevators. paragraphs also may apply to a LIC. Additional LIC information is contained in □ Roof tops. FM 100-20. □ Vacant buildings and empty rooms in occupied buildings. SPECIAL ENVIRONMENTS □ Basements. The environments encountered in areas of □ Underground utilities. US strategic concern are varied, and each exercises a unique influence on the conduct □ Sewer systems. of military operations. This uniqueness is □ Subways. important in determining how Army doc- □ Mass transit terminal systems. trine is applied to individual challenges posed by each of these environments. Doc- □ Other elements of key urban terrain trine itself will not change. which offer tactical advantages such as observation and fields of fire, con- This section describes the various special cealment and cover, and structures environments for which Army preparedness and facilities which offer protection is maintained. It highlights the unique from NBC operations. challenges of each environment and focuses on considerations for adapting core IEW All traditional intelligence categories are doctrine to special operations in jungle, used effectively during LIC situations. desert, mountain, winter, and urban terrain. National policies and security constraints limit certain aspects of intelligence data JUNGLES which can be bilaterally shared without The jungle regions of Asia, Africa, and sanitization. Normally, there will be little, if the Western Hemisphere are potential bat- any, terrain which will be completely tlefields. Jungles vary from tropical rain denied to all US collection systems or activi- forests and secondary growth forests to ties. The host country will not, in normal swamps and tropical savannas. The domi- circumstances, have sufficient hardware or nant features of jungle areas are thick vege- knowledge to exploit the opportunities for tations, high and constant temperatures, intelligence collection which would be pres- heavy rainfall, and humidity. Military ent in a LIC environment. The factors operations in jungles are affected primarily which inhibit effective collection operations by two factors—climate and vegetation. are— These factors combine to restrict movement, □ Lack of OB data on the guerrilla observation, fields of fire, communications, insurgent force. and battlefield intelligence collection operations. Both factors constrain MI units' opera- □ Difficulties in differentiating insurgent tional and sustainment capabilities and military equipment from materiel in- demand extraordinary measures to mini- digenous to the area. mize their effects. In a LIC, US MI personnel support the Operational Considerations host country both in advice and assistance roles, and when required, as a part of mili- Because of the nature of the jungle, tacti- tary operations. The MI officers of various cal operations will be attached or placed in elements may have to coordinate require- DS. Ground mobility restrictions require ments in innovative and nontraditional that IEW systems be lighter, manportable, ways. Chains of command and political , and more rugged, and that they be fielded architecture of the host country are defined in greater densities. This also dictates an and used as the basis from which support increased reliance on helicopters. channels are established.

12-7 The climate, vegetation, and restricted Environmental constraints reduce the LOS will significantly reduce the effective- effectiveness of EW in the jungle. Vegeta- ness of AM and FM communications. Jun- tion limits the effective range of jamming gle vegetation and humidity will absorb and ESM collection. This may be offset in electromagnetic radiation by a factor of 10 part by the use of aerial resources. to 25 percent. While landline is a logical Smstainmemt Corasideratioms alternative, maintenance and security considerations limit its use. Maximum use of High incidence of rust, corrosion, and hilltops and aerial relays is necessary to fungus caused by jungle moisture and achieve effective C2. humidity increases the necessity for daily The lack of distinctive terrain features maintenance on equipment—especially at and poor map coverage of jungle areas lim- the operator level. This is especially true for its location accuracy. Aerial observation electronic systems and encryption equip- and imagery collection are affected by can- ment which are subject to very high failure opy cover while vegetation limits the range rates in jungle environments. Continuous of ground surveillance systems. HUMINT operation of such systems generates heat operations, particularly reconnaissance which combats moisture, corrosion, rust, patrols, may be the most accurate, timely, and fungus decreasing the mean time between failures but hastening system and dependable sources of combat informa- wearout. tion and intelligence in jungle operations. Reliable information also may be obtained Increased reliance on helicopter mobility, from friendly civilians living in the area. especially for supplies, demands command attention be placed on supply discipline to Communication problems may arise as a result of terrain and the inability to reason- reduce resupply rates and ensure helicopter availability for operational missions. ably protect landlines from destruction or monitoring. Jungle areas in which heavy Troop health hazards in a jungle envi- rain, high humidity, and closely grouped ronment are a serious threat to foxhole tall trees dominate the terrain cause a strength. Individual sanitation, protection, communication phenomenon known as RF and acclimatization against gastrointesti- absorption. RF absorption affects higher nal disease and fungus infections are vital. frequencies more than lower frequencies, and vertically polarized antennas more DESERTS than horizontally polarized antennas. FM equipment is affected more by absorption Many desert areas of the world are poten- because of the higher operating frequencies tially vital to the national interests of the and the use of vertically polarized anten- United States and demand Army prepared- nas. However, AM systems operating at ness. Deserts may be semiarid or arid so the lower frequencies can employ horizontally availability of water is a prime factor in polarized antennas. Currently authorized planning and conducting desert operations. RATT equipment can be used in a voice or They are characterized by the extremes of Morse mode by qualified personnel (opera- cold and heat, unequaled visibility and tors holding additional skill identifier A4 blinding sandstorms, drought and sudden (International Morse Code)). rains, water shortages and flash floods, or excellent trafficability and interspersed Very detailed attention must be paid to obstacles. Military operations in the desert noise, light, camouflage, and litter disci- are characterized by rapid movement of pline, as well as preoperation reconnais- large units, good observation and long sance and artillery preparations. Effective fields of fire, mandatory use of deception, small unit OPSEC is absolutely vital in the and lack of what has traditionally been jungle. considered key terrain.

12-8 Operational Considerations advice and assistance to tactical cover and deception (TC&D) operations. The impor- The vastness of the desert necessitates tance of terrain intelligence is increased in wide dispersal of units and SIGINT and the desert because of map inaccuracies and IMINT systems. System density is consid- the relative absence of traditionally encoun- ered when task organizing the force. Addi- tered key terrain. Small discriminations in tional assets are highly desirable, but may terrain are identified, recorded, and dissem- not be available. The desert environment inated. Weather intelligence value is con- also will necessitate centralized operations sistent with standard doctrine. at brigade and division level. This requires more DS and general support reinforcing OPSEC increases in importance due to missions than in Central Europe. The the long range of IMINT and SIGINT sys- mobility factor of the desert requires more tems in the desert. COMSEC and camou- tracked and fewer wheeled vehicles for IEW flage, supported by deception and intelli- systems. gence, are vital in preserving the security of any force. The enemy intelligence system The desert climate causes some degrada- must be deceived or no advantage on the tion in AM and FM radio communications battlefield will be possible. due to thermal heating and dead spots. Communications during hours of darkness Like OPSEC, the value of EW on the are excellent. During daylight, heat, dry- desert battlefield has increased importance. ness, and soil mineral content can cause 20 The expansiveness of the desert precludes to 30 percent loss in radio communications. using terrain masking to avoid jamming. Strong temperature inversions and mois- EW can freeze the battle for destruction by ture layers found in many desert regions fire and maneuver, and plays a significant can have severe consequences on electro- role in air defense and CAS suppression. magnetic wave propagation of all types. In addition, frequency crowding will limit Sustainment Considerations radio capabilities. RATT will suffer fre- The dust, sand, and heat of the desert quent downtime from sand and dust if place heavy requirements on preventative unprotected. Communication links are maintenance checks and services and unit established during the more severe daylight maintenance. Excessive dust and sand conditions at high power settings. During cause contamination of POL. Sand gets into more favorable conditions, low power set- internal mechanical parts through air tings are used when possible. Wire should intakes and increases wear. Excessive heat be employed to enhance communications causes overheating and burnouts in vehicle security. electrical systems as well as in all types of power generation equipment. In addition, Within the limitations cited, the desert the gravelly consistency of desert soil environment is well suited for the operation extracts a heavy price on tires, tracks, and of IEW systems. Operator maintenance of vehicle suspension systems. Command equipment is required on a continuous basis supervision and active involvement in to keep sand and dust from seeping into maintenance is an important element of critical items. IMINT systems are subject to success in the desert. heat wave distortion and dust storms which limit their overall usefulness. Nevertheless, Units operating in the desert use a higher these systems provide extremely valuable volume of repair parts than units in Central intelligence in the desert. However, long- Europe. Unit prescribed load lists (PLL) range reconnaissance patrols, strategic and authorized stockage lists (ASL) should offensive forces, and irregular force opera- be increased by as much as 40 percent for tions produce HUMINT useful for planning such items as tires; fan belts; filters for and data base confirmation. S&T intelli- automotive, generator, and C-E equipment; gence identifies the technical vulnerabilities tow chains; clutch plates; shocks; and track of critical systems and critical resources for pins. denial. It also provides a source of technical

12-9 Acclimatization training for the desert is The rugged, irregular terrain degrades a must to ensure soldier sustainment. Lead- normal AM and FM radio effectiveness as ers must insist that total environmental well as associated C2. Heavy reliance on training is conducted before arrival in the relays and retransmission stations is desert. Soldier sanitation and hygiene are required. The use of wire is limited by the practiced. The untrained soldier is suscepti- difficulty of maintenance. ble to dehydration, heat stroke, heat HUMINT is a very valuable source of exhaustion, snake bite, and numerous phys- intelligence in the mountain environment. iological and psychological disorders which The heights offer numerous sites for OPs come from improper desert operating which may nullify the effect of terrain practices. masking. OPs are supplemented with Additional information on desert opera- reconnaissance patrols. In the valley areas, tions is contained in FM 90-3. population centers may provide a HUMINT collection and interrogation potential, espe- MOUNTAINS cially for terrain intelligence information. Mountainous terrain exists throughout The majority of IMINT and SIGINT will be the world from the northern regions to the provided by aerial systems. tropics and significantly impacts on mili- Weather intelligence will be of prime tary operations. Mountain operations are importance because of the highly erratic characterized by— weather patterns associated with the moun- □ Reduced ranges for direct fire weapons. tains. Cloud cover, fog, rain, winds, and normal seasonal variations have a signifi- □ Increased importance of indirect fire. cant impact on military operations. □ Mobility canalized along valley floors. A defending enemy force will enjoy a dis- □ Decentralized combat. tinct advantage in terms of terrain and the □ Increased collection operations from ability to deceive. For an attacker, OPSEC heights dominating LOCs. will be of major importance, as will be the ability to deceive the enemy. □ Reduced C2 capabilities. The irregular terrain patterns, abundant dead space, and degraded C2 will render EW Operational Comgideratioma less effective in the mountains than in other Because of canalization, greater reliance types of terrain. on the helicopter for troop movement, Sustamment Comsideiratioiis resupply, and medical evacuation is required. Use of helicopters can be limited Equipment used in a mountainous envi- by density altitude, clouds, fog cover, and ronment must be rugged, light, and man- icing, and can necessitate pilot oxygen portable. Cold weather in the higher eleva- requirements at higher altitudes. This tions or during seasonal variations will requires that IEW systems be rugged, light, affect equipment in the same manner as in and manpacked to exploit the surveillance winter operations. advantages offered by the higher eleva- Transportation limitations will require tions. Once within the mountain complex, greater use of field expedients than in other IEW systems must be manpacked because types of operations. Because of the rugged most movement is by foot. Because of the nature of the terrain, greater consumption compartmented nature of the mountain ter- of class IX repair parts will occur and rain, combat operations tend to be piece- demand a 20-percent overage in PLL and meal and decentralized requiring more DS ASL for such items as tires, transmissions, and attachment. This decentralization also clutch plates, filters, brake shoes, tracks, demands a higher density of IEW systems track pads, and fuel pumps. to ensure sufficient coverage. The key to sustaining soldiers in the mountains, as in other special environments, is training. Mountain combat can

12-10 affect a soldier's mental alertness, accentu- are subject to icing conditions which limit ate fears of heights and closeness, and reliability and usefulness. Terrain and cause dehydration and sickness. weather intelligence continues to be critical. Additional information on mountain Camouflage is very difficult to achieve operations is contained in FM 90-6. effectively in a winter environment. How- ever, concealment is easier to attain making WINTER CONDITIONS maximum use of dispersion, vegetation, The effects of winter conditions have a darkness, fog, and falling snow. Bivouac significant impact on military operations. areas, motor parks, and large numbers of Winter is characterized by long nights, warming shelters are difficult to conceal. extreme cold, and deep snow. Its effect on COMSEC also requires added emphasis military operations can be degradation of because of the extensive use of radio. weapons performance due to brittleness, ice The increased role of radio communica- fog over optic sights, and ice loading on tions, the essential part played by all types antennas and intake filters. Winter condi- of aviation support, and the importance of tions increase the time required to perform air defense, all combine to produce a lucra- even simple tasks, and adversely impact on tive environment for EW. Electronic decep- soldier health and morale. tion is accentuated in winter operations. Operational Considerations Sustainment Considerations Due to the extensive snow covering of the terrain, mobility can be canalized along The major impact of winter operations on major LOCs, unless the land surface is fro- equipment is caused by cold and snow. zen making cross-country mobility possible. Extremely low temperatures cause metal The use of helicopters for transportation, parts of weapons to become brittle resulting resupply, and reconnaissance tends to in a high breakage factor for internal parts. offset this mobility constraint. IEW systems Vehicle engines and generators require fre- should be either manpacked for movement quent starting and the frequent starts cause by helicopter or track-mounted for surface condensation in the internal parts of the movement. Like other extreme environ- engine which later freezes. The intake fil- ments, winter operations are decentralized, ters of carburetors and C-E equipment are necessitating a larger than normal use of particularly susceptible to icing. Condensa- DS missions and attachment for MI ele- tion covers on microphones and telephone ments. MI units operating in a winter handsets ice frequently if not protected. environment should also be afforded a Blowing snow will also jam air intake higher density of IEW systems than normal valves. Pneumatic antenna masts and ADP due to the severe terrain and climate equipment freeze because of condensation conditions. and freezing temperatures. Batteries provide only a fraction of their normal power HUMINT and IMINT are two important when they are cold. RATT equipment is sources of intelligence in winter operations. very susceptible to malfunction in these The extensive reliance on reconnaissance circumstances. and patrolling, employment of special operating and irregular forces, and the use of Units preparing for winter operations indigenous scouts all serve to increase the require a larger than normal PLL and ASL. value of HUMINT. IMINT systems, espe- Each unit will need larger class III alloca- cially photo capabilities, are a valuable tions because of frequent engine starting. source of intelligence with respect to con- Higher PLL usage factors will be expe- trast, long shadows, and track activities. rienced for filters, batteries, spark plugs, SIGINT systems are potentially very valu- hydraulic hoses, and all types of seals. Less able, given the extensive reliance on radio viscous lubricants are required. communications; however, they are so sen- In winter operations the human element sitive to extreme cold that their availability is all important and demands concerned will be limited. Aerial platforms

12-11 leadership and thorough training. Particu- The urban environment restricts or limits lar attention must be given to minimizing the effectiveness of AM and FM communi- the effects of vision whiteouts with the cations for C2. More use should be made of attendant loss of perception which affects wire and operational civilian telephone sys- driving and flying. High windchill factors tems. In addition, FM frequency crowding and the potential problems of frostbite and may be experienced, and the best use of FM immersion foot are additional considera- will be in conjunction with tall buildings or tions. Cold weather training experience is towers which provide unobstructed LOS. absolutely essential prior to deployment to The IPB efforts which precede operations the operational area. in urban areas should include the collection Additional information on cold weather and analysis of city plans. City plans operations is contained in FMs 31-70 and include buildings and structures, sewer and 31-71. subway networks, and the specific location of key targets for destruction or retention. UKBAN TEKRAIN HUMINT is effective in collecting information from local inhabitants, gathering ter- Commanders have always recognized the rain information, and identifying residual importance of urban centers as strategic pockets of enemy resistance. CI personnel objectives but the direct seizure of cities and seek to neutralize the remaining enemy towns has always been difficult. Commit- intelligence collection systems, and take ting forces to urban areas should not be advantage of the support of local police and undertaken unless the attacker or defender civil administration. OPs on high buildings can realize significant advantages. The eliminate dead space and provide complete Army must be prepared to exploit the surveillance coverage. Reconnaissance advantages of urban terrain. Military patrols and aerial observers also are excel- operations in urban terrain are character- lent collection means. Terrain intelligence ized by shorter engagement ranges, struc- supplements existing map coverage with tural obstructions to observation, extreme locally acquired data. S&T intelligence will canalization, obstructed communications, provide considerable insight into enemy and the addition of a new vertical dimen- sustainment capabilities. S&T intelligence sion provided by sewer systems and build- personnel of the EAC MI brigade will exam- ings. There are frequent limitations posed ine enemy training areas, depots, and dis- by rubble obstacles, control of civilian popu- carded equipment and exploit factories and lations, and the greatly reduced effective- laboratories. IMINT and SIGINT collection ness of reconnaissance and surveillance will be reduced primarily due to LOS systems. These factors constrain MI unit obstructions caused by structures. SIGINT operational and sustainment capabilities collectors use towers and tall buildings in and demand imaginative and innovative the urban area to cover terrain outside the solutions to minimize their effect. built-up area and between villages. Aerial Operatiomal Comsideirailioms imagery can enhance terrain intelligence. Any enemy use of civilian telephone sys- The fragmented and compartmented tems and landlines can be exploited for nature of urban combat necessitates decen- SIGINT. tralization of operations. MI elements nor- Defender advantages of concealment and mally are placed in DS of, or attached to, maneuver units assigned combat missions cover; protected, elevated platforms for IMINT and SIGINT systems covering in urban areas. Vehicle-mounted SIGINT approaches to the urban areas; and the abil- systems are less useful than manpacked equipment because of restricted LOS. ity to hide key installations without risk of detection all place a premium on good OPSEC. The urban environment limits the use of EW. However, airborne EW systems may be useful in disrupting the enemy command and control links from higher echelons.

12-12 Sustainment Considerations There are no unique sustainment considerations for MI equipment, supplies, and soldiers in the urban environment. Additional information on operations on urbanized terrain is contained in FM 90-10. CHAPTER 13

~~Joint And Combined Operations~~

Any future conflict of any significance □ Discharging intelligence missions and will undoubtedly involve major US land, functions assigned by higher air, and naval forces operating in concert— authority. joint operations. It is also very likely that □ Planning, coordinating, and integrat- US joint operations will be conducted as ing EW operations. part of a larger effort involving allied forces—combined operations. The advent of □ Directing CI operations. World War II marked the beginning of an era in which joint and combined military forces have increasingly "been used as the PRINCIPLES primary means of waging war. This trend The same principles that guide IEW opera- shows no sign of reversing itself. This chap- tions at lower tactical levels are appropriate ter describes the organizations, responsibili- at joint command level. However, the ties, principles, considerations, and pro- nature of joint IEW organizations, mis- cesses that make up the IEW operations so sions, and operations dictates that addi- critical to joint and combined military tional principles be followed to ensure a forces. coordinated and effective effort. The follow- JOINT OPERATIONS ing principles will not ensure success or even cover all contingencies; however, they The joint IEW system includes the IEW are vital ingredients of all joint IEW staffs, agencies, and resources in the joint operations: and component commands and at ECB. Develop a single intelligence product. The system supports the unified, specified, □ and component commanders during peace, □ Integrate joint IEW operations into a crisis, and war. During peace, IEW supports total IEW system. contingency planning and training. It □ Centralize IEW support functions. plans for the full spectrum of military operations including such sub-hostility opera- □ Conduct peacetime transition training. tions as evacuation of US citizens, disaster □ Employ ADP support for IEW relief, humanitarian assistance, and peace- operations. keeping. During crisis situations, collection and analysis activities are increased to A single intelligence product is developed satisfy the force commander's PIR. During rather than separate products addressing war, the system supports battle coordina- the air, land, and naval force aspects. Simi- tion at joint and tactical levels. It also sup- larly, EW and CI are integrated to achieve ports rear operations. the most effective use of resources. Although each component has unique IEW The missions of IEW agencies and units requirements, they are integrated at the supporting a joint command include— joint level. This principle is achieved □ Collecting, producing, and disseminat- through joint staff structures and IEW ing intelligence necessary to plan and fusion centers composed of personnel from execute assigned missions. all components of a joint force. □ Providing IEW support to subordinate The IEW effort is coordinated throughout elements of the joint force. the joint command and with US and allied national intelligence operations. Joint IEW systems must be an integral part of the

13-0 IEW architecture that extends from the tac- Joint IEW staff organization should tical to the national level. Interoperability reflect consideration of a number of factors. and mutual support between all compo- The joint staff must not only consider the nents and echelons within a command are IEW needs of the parent command and its essential. Duplication of effort must be subordinates, but also those of higher and avoided. adjacent headquarters. It should provide the degree of centralized control that will IEW support functions are centralized best benefit all elements of the command. when it is expedient and efficient. Respon- Where distance or operating conditions sibilities should be assigned to the compo- would cause delay in the production or dis- nent best able to perform the function. If it semination of intelligence, forward staff becomes obvious that no component within agencies may be established. the joint force can properly perform the specific function, the commander of the joint The joint intelligence staff coordinates force may establish intelligence agencies the intelligence effort. It integrates intelli- responsible to the joint staff intelligence gence received from the component IEW division, JIC. systems with that provided by the joint, national, and allied agencies to produce an Peacetime planning, operations, and all-source product to satisfy the needs of the training facilitate a rapid transition to war. joint commander. Missions, organizational structures, C2 relationships, operating procedures, and coor- There are two basic types of joint intelli- dination channels must be designed to meet gence staffs. The first is a relatively large, wartime requirements and to be modified self-supporting staff. It includes all staff for peace. IEW data bases are maintained elements required for planning, policy for- and updated continually and include inputs mulation, coordination, and processing and from all component and national systems. dissemination. A regional variation of a Peacetime training and operations stress large staff is shown on the following page. the development of procedures for employ- The second is small and is more depen- ment in war. dent on subordinate commands for support. Automated assistance is required to man- The smaller staff confines itself primarily age joint IEW data bases and to effectively to policy formulation, planning, and coor- process a heavy flow of IEW data. Digital dination. It relies on the IEW organizations links between critical IEW fusion centers of subordinate component commands for will enhance interoperability and speed the collection, production, and dissemination of flow of information. intelligence. To facilitate intelligence operations, the joint force commander may form STAFF a JIC out of the joint intelligence staff and A joint staff is established at the joint supporting elements from component command level to coordinate air, land, and commands. sea operations. A joint J2 and J3 staff structure is vital to effective coordination of Joint Intelligence Center the IEW effort. A joint staff structure can better satisfy the needs of both the joint and The JIC integrates the intelligence efforts component commanders. of the component commands to provide intelligence essential to the joint force J2 and J3 staffs coordinate and provide commander and staff and to supplement the commanders operational guidance. The that available to subordinate commands. joint commander has the authority to direct The JIC— component commands not under the operational control of an allied command to col- □ Coordinates joint intelligence collec- lect specific types of information or perform tion operations. specific IEW functions. The intelligence divi- □ Provides the joint, component, and tac- sion (J2) provides operational direction for tical commanders with a coordinated intelligence and CI operations while the view of the battlefield. operation division (J3) does the same for OPSEC and EW.

~~13-1 US EUROPEAN COMMAND J2 ORGANIZATIONAL CHART~~

~~INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE~~

~~EXECUTIVE OFFICE~~

~~USEUCOM DEFENSE SPECIAL SECURITY AND ANALYSIS CENTER (EUDAC) SPECIAL ACTIVITIES OFFICE~~

~~COLLECTION PLANS DIVISION DIVISION~~

~~RQR CONTROL BR PLANNING BR OPS BR POLICY BR~~

~~APPLICATIONS INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS DIVISION CENTER CURRENT INTEL BR THREAT ASSESSMENT BR PRESENTATIONS AND TARGETS BR SUPPORT BR~~

~~Staff Cognizance~~

Tasks joint and component command □ Produces integrated all-source collection assets through appropriate intelligence. tasking channels. □ Obtains intelligence support from Provides centralized control of national intelligence agencies and national assets placed OPCON to the provides intelligence developed within joint force. the joint command to national agencies. Provides technical advice and support to subordinate command IEW staffs □ Disseminates intelligence and target- and units. ing information.

~~13-2 JOINT INTELLIGENCE CENTER ORGANIZATION CHART~~

~~CENTER COMMANDER~~

~~EXECUTIVE SSO CENTER~~

~~INTEL TARGET DEFENSE OPS SPT APPL ANALYSIS ANALYSIS CTR DIV DIV DIV DIV~~

□ Provides IEW support to US Military A special interdependency exists between Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG). a joint force and national-level intelligence A type JIG is illustrated above. agencies. Joint forces are dependent on strategic, technical, and current intelligence In combined operations, the JIG may developed by national agencies. National locate US intelligence support elements agencies rely on joint force information and (ISE) at combined and allied commands to intelligence, including that developed by facilitate the mutual exchange of IEW component commands. Joint forces repre- information. The ISE interoperates directly sent a significant part of DOD collection with the JIG. It identifies the supported capabilities. command's IEW requirements and estab- Joint force intelligence agencies, includ- lishes priorities. It passes the IEW require- ing component agencies, are linked directly ments of the joint command to the com- with national intelligence agencies for tac- bined or allied IEW staff, and assists in the tical exploitation of national capabilities interpretation of IEW data. The ISE provides communications equipment compatible with US equipment if required.

13-3 (TENCAP) and national exploitation of tac- □ Assists in deception planning. tical capabilities (NETCAP). Tactical units □ Coordinates with the J2 for SIGINT request information from or forward infor- and ESM data required for planning mation to national agencies directly or and coordinating EW operations. through joint or component command intelligence channels. National intelligence □ Coordinates with the C-E officer (J6) to agencies may, in turn, forward information ensure ECM do not interfere with directly to subordinate tactical commands friendly C2 and communications. (such as an Army corps) at the same time it Joint use of EW is coordinated and tasked is forwarded to the higher command. at the component command level when pos- Joimt EW Staff sible. EW staffs within component command operations centers establish and The joint commander's EW staff maintain close and continuous liaison with (JCEWS) reinforces the joint commander and the J3 in coordinating EW operations their counterparts in the other components. When EW support cannot be coordinated or throughout the command. It provides each resolved at the component command level, component the flexibility to satisfy their EW requirements consistent with the need assistance is requested from the JCEWS. to avoid mutual interference with friendly However, due to communication delays, such support requires considerable lead systems. The JCEWS facilitates cross- time. service EW support and the mutual exchange of E W technical data. (See the fol- The corps G3 coordinates joint EW sup- lowing illustration.) port of the land battle. This is done through the air support operations center (ASOC) The JCEWS advises and assists the J3 in and the battle coordination element (BCE). carrying out EW responsibilities. It— The Army provides a BCE at the Air □ Prepares EW estimates and annexes to Force tactical air control center (TACC) to joint OPLANs and OPORDs. ensure Army operations and requirements □ Coordinates EW operations. are coordinated with the Air Force. The □ Evaluates the impact of friendly and BCE monitors and analyzes the land battle enemy EW activities on joint force for the TACC, and provides the interface for operations. exchanging intelligence and operational data between the CTOC and TACC. Based □ Monitors the status of available EW on the battle plan and the commander's resources. guidance, it establishes priorities for corps □ Monitors the use of aerial EW assets requests for Air Force EW support. and coordinates airspace required by The Air Force TACC EW element coordi- aerial EW operations. nates joint EW activity in support of air □ Acts as the joint focal point for pre- operations. The Air Force provides an ele- planning and integrating EW ment at each level of command of the Army operations. force to coordinate air operations. An ASOC is located at each corps TOC to interface □ Monitors EW request nets to expedite directly with the corps staff. Tactical air actions and resolve conflicts. control parties (TACP) are located with divi- □ Establishes priorities for EW support sions, brigades, and maneuver battalions to based on the joint commander's con- coordinate air operations at these levels. cept of the operation. The immediate control, direction, and □ Assists in emission control (EMCON) supervision of intelligence, CI, and EW planning. assets are usually handled by component commanders. In wartime, however, geographic locations, communications means, and economy of resources may dictate that the joint staff exercise direct control and supervision of some component IEW assets.

~~13-4 JOINT ELECTRONIC WARFARE ORGANIZATION~~

~~JOC AIR FORCE ARMY JCEWS~~

~~XXX 1 TACC CTOC EW ELM BCE G3EWS ASOC~~

~~XX DTOC~~

~~G3 EWS TACP~~

~~CP S3 TACP~~

* CP S3 TACP

In any event, the IEW effort must respond Time is normally a limiting factor in to the requirements of the joint command as planning and conducting IEW operations in well as the component commands. These a JTF. Forces may not be assigned to the requirements are set forth in intelligence, JTF early enough to permit reconnaissance CI, and EW plans prepared at each joint and development of its initial data base. It echelon and disseminated throughout the relies on the superior joint command for command. much of its data requirements and consid- JOINT TASK FORCE erable support during the operation. It also IEW STRUCTURE relies on the capabilities of subordinate component IEW elements. IEW needs at the JTF level are normally The size and type of IEW organizations less than those of higher level joint com- for a JTF will vary greatly. A typical JTF mands. The JTF mission is limited in scope intelligence staff organization is illustrated and duration requiring mostly tactical intel- in the following chart. ligence. Howèver, EW needs may be very significant, and the JTF becomes inti- mately involved in the specific planning and coordination of EW operations.

~~13-5 JOINT TASK FORCE INTELLIGENCE STAFF~~

~~J2 JIC~~

~~1 1~~

~~ADMINISTRATIVE ESTIMATES AND POLICY GROUP PLANS GROUP GROUP~~

~~INTEL PERSONNEL OPERATIONS DEPUTY, ADMINISTRA- LIAISON CI TIVE GROUP RECORDS SPECIAL ACTIVITIES DEPUTY, ESTIMATES FISCAL - SUPPLY INTELLIGENCE AND PLANS GROUP TRAINING TS CONTROL REPRODUCTION~~

CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS organizations are assigned region-oriented missions worldwide. In areas where a major Contingency operations involve the conflict is possible, IEW organizations deployment and use of US forces, usually a should be in place and operating in case of joint force, by the direction of the national a crisis or war. command authority (NCA) in support of national policy. The size of a contingency During peacetime, IEW operations are force, its mission, and the area of its focused on satisfying contingency planning employment can vary widely. Plans may requirements and developing the capability already exist for these situations, or unfore- to satisfy wartime requirements. Peacetime seen conditions may preclude detailed prior contingency planning requires current, all- planning. source intelligence. Intelligence operations must be initiated early in order to satisfy The IEW system is organized to provide this requirement. The IEW system must integrated IEW support for contingencies at develop and coordinate sources for collect- all levels. Units are tailored to support the ing required information and build data needs of unified, specified, and combined bases to store, retrieve, and manipulate this commands, other EAC commands, and information to satisfy planning CONUS-based organizations with a contin- requirements. gency mission. Data base development and source con- To ensure worldwide coverage of areas of trol may be performed by either a desig- US interest and to support both forward- nated regional IEW unit which has been deployed and contingency forces, IEW assigned the mission to support contingency operations in a specific area, or from

13-6 a designated IEW unit in the CONUS base. As deployment commences, an ISE An IEW unit supporting a contingency deploys with the contingency force com- force will develop its data base through mand group. The ISE serves as the inter- directed collection using its own assets and face between the organic IEW capabilities by exploiting the data bases of national- of the contingency force and national intel- level agencies. ligence systems. If additional IEW units are needed to support the operation, they deploy Updating the data base and satisfying to the contingency area of operations as intelligence gaps requires active coordina- soon as the situation permits. A tailored tion between the contingency force IEW JIC or an EACIC will normally accompany system and the national intelligence system. National intelligence assets with a reduced headquarters element. As the theater matures, additional IEW capabili- deployed IEW units play a key role in fulfilling the contingency commander's intelli- ties will be deployed. gence requirements. After deployment, COMBINED OPERATIONS these systems continue to augment contingency force collection assets in the opera- Many contingencies involve US joint or tional area. Army forces operating as a part of a combined allied force. In Europe as part of During peacetime, IEW operations cover NATO and in Korea as a part of the ROK- the areas where the contingency force is US Combined Forces Command, US forces most likely to be employed. During crisis operate under principles and procedures situations the focus is shifted to a specific which have been developed, practiced, and objective area, and the contingency force standardized in peacetime. In other poten- commander is provided only that informa- tial combat areas where combined forces tion that is pertinent to operations in that may be established, agreements on princi- area. Continuous maintenance of data ples and procedures are either nonexistent bases during peacetime permits rapid iden- or only partially developed. These opera- tification of intelligence gaps which become tions present the most demanding circum- immediate collection requirements during a stances for commanders and intelligence crisis. and operations staffs. Procedures to inte- Upon execution of a contingency plan, grate US and allied operations will have to the IEW system provides continuous sup- be developed after the outbreak of port during the predeployment, deployment, hostilities. and operational phases. Combined operations with even our clos- Predeployment actions by the IEW sys- est allies present some problems that might tem in support of a contingency force com- hinder the accomplishment of common mander include— objectives. Each nation has unique capabilities, needs, and methods of operation. Each □ Refining IEW requirements. has its own economic, political, and socio- □ . Increasing collection operations to logical system. These differences may be satisfy the contingency force com- compounded by different languages and mander's PIR. customs. IEW operations must respond to the unique environment that may exist □ Initiating requests for additional intel- within each theater. ligence collection from national systems. A multinational IEW system at combined □ Increasing the frequency of IEW data echelons is essential to achieving the full base updates on contingency areas of cooperation and participation of allied operations. resources in coordinated IEW operations. The system must include representation □ Increasing the frequency and timeli- from each national force within the com- ness of information provided to subor- mand. Combined IEW staffs and support dinate elements of the contingency force.

13-7 organizations provide a means for the mu- exchange of IEW requirements and intelli- tual exchange of IEW requirements and gence data. data and coordination of collection Channels for exchanging IEW require- requirements. Combined staffs and intelli- ments, combat information, and intelligence centers enhance cooperation, coordi- gence must be established for peace and nation, and interoperability between all war. Security requirements, traffic volume, elements of the combined force. Centralized and command and control relationships analysis at the combined level provides a may require that different tasking and coordinated perception of the battlefield reporting channels be used during peace, and promotes mutual understanding. crisis, and war. However, the wartime flow PRINCIPLES must be defined in advance. It must provide for a rapid flow of information laterally and Combined operations are based on the vertically and an efficient transition from same principles by which joint operations peace to war. are conducted. However, the inclusion of forces from two or more countries in the Standard tasking, reporting, and dissemi- same force requires that other factors be nation policies, procedures, and formats considered to achieve an effective and coor- enhance understanding and interpretation dinated effort. The diverse nature of allied of requirements, information, and intelli- forces and their tactical doctrine, national gence. Standard procedures that are prac- prerogatives, and other differences create ticed in peace will enhance a quick transi- obstacles to a unified IEW effort. The fol- tion to war. Agreements between allies lowing considerations provide a guide to regarding the exchange of IEW data, such overcoming these obstacles and raising the as third party release of information, level of cooperation and coordination should be negotiated prior to hostilities. among allied forces participating in com- Standardization agreements (STANAG) bined operations: and quadripartite standardization agreements (QSTAG) are examples of standard- □ Develop a combined IEW system. ized procedures agreed on by the allies in □ Establish channels for the flow of IEW peacetime to enhance wartime operational data. efficiency. □ Establish standard procedures for IEW Dedicated, secure communications sys- operations. tems are required to ensure timely tasking, □ Develop a secure, reliable communica- coordination, and dissemination. Interopera- tions capability. bility of communications equipment must be assured to permit operations in both US □ Ensure a linguist capability. and allied IEW nets. If equipment is not compatible, a system of equipment Establish liaison between allied IEW □ exchange may be established. units. US intelligence personnel must be capa- □ Establish a common data base includ- ble of communicating in the language of the ing formats. allied forces with which they will operate. □ Ensure interoperability of equipment. Interpreters and translators must be The combined system must be based on trained on common IEW and technical ter- multinational all-source inputs, analysis, minology. In addition to linguists, all opera- and dissemination to support the combined tional US MI personnel should receive and subordinate national commands. It training in basic communication in the must provide access to intelligence devel- allied languages. Key word lists, phrases, oped by allied national and theater re- reporting formats, and terminology used in sources. It must have tasking authority IEW operations and printed in multiple over all IEW elements within the combined languages will help facilitate the communi- force. It must provide for effective coordina- cations process. tion of the IEW effort and a free and timely Liaison is vital in a multinational structure. Liaison teams ensure a free exchange

13-8 of IEW information and support. They pre- is dictated by the nature of the supported vent or reduce misunderstandings over force and theater. Each combined force or procedures and terminology. Bilingual liai- theater of operations is unique. Thus, the son teams must be knowledgeable of the IEW system that supports these forces must doctrine, organization, procedures, and be tailored to each environment. The follow- equipment of both US and the allied forces. ing charts illustrate types of combined force A data base developed through a com- IEW systems. bined effort during peace will enhance a The combined intelligence system must quick and efficient transition to wartime provide for the input of all-source intelli- intelligence operations. The data base gence developed by each allied nation. This should be composed of all-source data pro- includes intelligence developed by the vari- vided by all allied intelligence systems in ous national agencies. National policies accordance with national restrictions on the must be respected and sources protected. exchange of information. Combined analy- National cells within combined intelligence sis based on IPB techniques will provide a centers provide for sanitizing sensitive common perspective of the threat and intelligence reports before they are fed into enhance a coordinated intelligence opera- the combined intelligence system. tion in case of war. STRUCTURE Due to the diverse nature of combined forces and respective theaters of operation, the development of combined IEW systems

~~COMBINED INTELLIGENCE STAFF~~

~~THEATER C2 STAFF CIC~~

~~GNDCOMP AIR COMP NAVAL COMP C2 STAFF C2 STAFF C2 STAFF CIC CIC CIC~~

~~X US AIR ALLIED AIR INTEL STAFF INTEL TACC STAFF~~

~~US CORPS G2 ALLIED US NAVAL ALLIED NAVAL CTOC CORPS G2 INTEL INTEL ASOC SPT ELM STAFF STAFF~~

~~13-9 COMBINED EW STAFF~~

~~THEATER C3 STAFF CCEWS~~

~~1 COMBINED COMBINED COMBINED GND COMP AIR COMP NAVAL COMP C3 STAFF C3 STAFF C3 STAFF CCEWS CCEWS CCEWS (1)~~

~~1 US CORPS US TACC C3 STAFF ALLIED CORPS ALLIED AIR C3 STAFF FORCE STAFF EWS ASOC BCE~~

~~(1) Naval components below combined level not shown~~

~~13-10 CHAPTER 14~~

~~Logistics~~

Logistics, the science of moving and the consumer. Throughput is the most pre- maintaining forces and equipment, is criti- ferred method of distribution because it cal to sustaining the combat capabilities of allows MI elements to conduct continuous any Army unit. It is especially critical to operations. sustaining MI units. The quantities of complex, low-density equipment and the varied CLASSES I AND VI operational requirements characteristic of Class I supplies for MI units are obtained MI units pose an exceptional challenge to through the supply point distribution sys- logistics support. MI logistics support tem. Each MI unit dispatches organic vehi- requirements are satisfied through a com- cles to pick up rations at the intermediate bination of internal and external support. DS class I supply point. Field rations are This chapter describes the logistics required obtained in the same manner and retained and the support established to sustain MI in the unit supply until needed. The basis of tactical operations. issue is the unit daily strength report sub- SUPPLY mitted through Gl channels. The objective of supply is the issue of Deployed MI elements depend on units in material and equipment to the user. Sol- the forward support area for class I supplies diers must be armed, fed, housed, clothed, and generally for food service support. and equipped with the items necessary to do Coordination for class I supply and food their job. service support is conducted by the parent MI unit and by the officer in charge of the Supply is a complicated, time-consuming supporting MI elements. task. The closer to the combat zone, the more demanding are the storage and distri- MI teams attached to maneuver units rely bution problems. To get required supply totally on the unit to which attached. The items to using units, three methods of disorders directing attachment specify support tribution are used: supply point distribu- responsibilities. tion, unit distribution, and throughput Class VI items normally are sold through distribution. the Army and Air Force Exchange Service Supply point distribution is that method (AAFES). When the situation permits, of distributing supplies in which the receiv- AAFES establishes retail outlets in combat ing unit is issued supplies at a distribution zones. In other situations, some class VI point, the transportation being supplied by items are issued as sundry packs in the the receiving unit. This is the most common same manner as class I. distribution method and is used for all Health and welfare items may be consid- classes of supply except class IX and ered class VI supplies and are handled and COMSEC items. issued through the supply system. In this case, class I supply points stock and issue Unit distribution is that method of distri- health and welfare items as gratuitous buting supplies in which the receiving unit issue. Class VI supplies are issued along is issued supplies in its own area, the trans- with class I based on unit strength reports. portation being furnished by the issuing agency. This method may be used for any An overview of the procedures applicable class of supply except COMSEC items; to classes I and VI supplies is shown in the however, it is the exception rather than the following illustration. rule. Throughput distribution is that method of distributing supplies directly to

~~14-1 CLASS I AND VI~~

~~-XX XXX XX~~

~~CONUS 2 / G1 G1~~

~~CONUS ( MMC ) M MC~~

~~Ml Ml~~

~~FROM CONUS~~

~~LEGEND: supply flow — — strength report allocation instructions MMC requirements~~

CLASSES II, III classes IV and VII items are handled (PACKAGED), IV, separately. The following illustration out- AND VII lines the flow of items in these four classes for a typical MI unit. Classes II, III (packaged), IV, and VII have been grouped to expedite issue and MI elements operating in maneuver in a í simplify handling. At brigade and division brigade area coordinate requirements with level, MI units obtain all four supply classes the brigade. Supplies are issued by elements from one supply point. MI units at corps of the division support command (DISCOM) level receive classes II and III (packaged) main support battalion or forward support from one supply point, while the heavier battalion. Supply support is tailored to meet the needs of the supported brigade.

~~14-2 CLASSES II, III (P), IV, VII~~

~~REQUIREMENTS REQUIREMENTS/STATUS REPORTS~~

~~S "N XXX MMC XX 3 [ MMC ] y J tl Ml >/ I I 3 / / I IV, VII %~~

~~Q m (P), IV.VII~~

~~(P)~~

~~S CONUS A XX~~

~~LEGEND. ... supply flow ... forecasts activity summary allocation instructions (P) 'packaged in 55 gallon or smaller containers~~

In an ACR, support for the MI company CLASS III is normally provided by elements of the MI units use fueling points established by ACR support battalion or corps support elements of the COSCOM in a manner simi- command (COSCOM). lar to a stateside filling station. MI unit Deployed elements of an MI unit will tanker trucks receive POL at the fueling coordinate with the nearest supply point and the unit in whose area they are operating.

14-3 point and return to the parent unit to ser- CLASS V vice vehicles and generators and refill con- Class V supplies are normally obtained tainers. Deployed MI unit vehicles in for- by the supply point distribution system ward or rear areas, are driven to and from any ammunition supply activity. The refueled at the nearest fueling point. At- DISCOM monitors requests but does not tached MI units receive fuel from units to store or issue class V. The division ammu- which they are attached. Five-gallon cans nition officer, assigned to the DISCOM, or tanker trucks organic to the MI unit are provides administrative control of the used to move fuel to equipment at dispersed ammunition flow within the division and is positions. the authenticating authority for ammuni- The following illustration shows the flow tion requests. of bulk class III to MI units. MI units in a division area or brigade sec- MI units also have a requirement for avia- tor get class V resupply from a COSCOM ammunition supply point. Class V is allo- tion POL. Aircraft performing EW missions cated by the division ammunition officer receive POL support from established air- who authorizes release by type and quan- fields and heliports. Helicopters performing MI missions in forward areas may use one tity based on unit requests. MI elements in of the forward arming and refueling points a brigade sector are resupplied by the sup- (FARP) established at a brigade support ported unit at ammunition transfer points. Class V on flatbed trailers is positioned in a area or closer to the FLOT. brigade sector for ready access by using units.

~~BULK CLASS III~~

~~REQUIREMENTS REQUIREMENTS/ STATUS REPORT XXX ,XX MMC MMC~~

~~Ml Ml~~

~~BULK FUEL~~

~~LEGEND supply flow forecasts ^ allocation instructions~~

~~14-4 The resupply of class V items is shown in the following illustration.~~

~~CLASS V~~

~~COSCOM DISCOM LT—A. ■~~

~~□ Ml~~

~~n i A ) ( ù.) ATP V ViATP V^/ASP~~

~~LEGEND: supply (low forecasts allocation instructions — — — —~~

CLASS VIII CLASS IX MI units will receive health care or health Repair parts may be the most critical service support from local medical TOE aspect of logistic support. The effectiveness units on an area basis. These units provide of unique MI systems is severely reduced by the inpatient and outpatient medical needs inadequate repair parts support. Unlike for the sick and wounded. Class VIII re- repair parts support for common items, supply is provided within the division by support for systems such as GUARDRAIL the division medical supply officer (DMSO), and TRAILBLAZER is less readily avail- and within the corps by the medical supply, able because of the low density of such optical, and maintenance (MEDSOM) bat- equipment. It is therefore essential that talion. The DMSO is normally located in repair parts support be closely monitored by either the division medical battalion, the MI commanders and staffs. main support battalion, or the medical company of the separate brigade. The corps The battalion must have on hand or on MEDSOM battalion is assigned to the corps order a PLL of repair parts, as authorized under the command and control of the medi- by the commander. Maintenance is predi- cal brigade or medical group. cated on the principle of on-site repair and

14-5 return to operational status with the least providing assets not immediately available possible delay. Repair parts for Mi-peculiar through the Army supply system. Material equipment are requested by the lowest level awaiting disposition by the National Inven- authorized to conduct that repair. In most tory Control Point will not be cannibalized cases involving Mi-unique systems, inter- without specific approval of the proper mediate (DS) is performed by the MI battal- materiel readiness command or until dispo- ion's service support element within the sition instructions have been received autho- headquarters, headquarters and service rizing local salvage or cannibalization of company. In such cases, the MI battalion the materiel. Cannibalization policies and S4 section submits spare parts requests to procedures for intermediate and depot the Supply Support Activity (SSAJ. The maintenance activities are contained in SSA, if unable to satisfy these requests, ARs 37-55 and 710-2, and DA Pam 710-2-2. passes them to the corps MMC which autho- MI units with aviation assets have rizes the release of parts from the GS supply organic elements that perform aviation unit - unit in the corps support group. maintenance (AVUM). Each AVUM ele- Deployed MI elements receive mainte- ment has a limited number of spare parts nance and repair parts support from the and depends on an aviation intermediate battalion maintenance section organic to maintenance (AVIM) unit for additional the MI battalion. When MI units are task spare parts. AVIM units deploy mainte- organized into IEW company teams, addi- nance teams to provide on-site support. tional maintenance elements aire included Coordination between MI units and the in the service support elements of the com- supporting AVIM unit is required on a con- pany organization. Through coordination tinuous basis. AVIM units operate from the with the brigade S4, forward-deployed MI division rear area, the corps airfield, and elements also may receive common equip- from other locations depending on the den- ment repair parts support from division, sity off aircraft being supported. Aviation ACR, or brigade forward-deployed interme- maintenance is further described in this diate (DS) maintenance units. chapter under maintenance. Information on AVIM also may be found in FM 1-500. Controlled exchange, the removal of serviceable parts, components, assemblies, and The following chart provides more infor- subassemblies from unserviceable, economi- mation on aviation repair parts. cally repairable material for immediate OTHER SUPPLY SUPPORT reuse in restoring a like item of material is authorized only when the required parts, MI units are staffed and equipped to components, or assemblies cannot be operate their own dining facilities. MI ele- obtained from the supply system in time to ments operating in other unit areas coordi- meet operational readiness requirements. nate with those units for the support Controlled exchange is performed by using needed. support maintenance organizations. During All units in the field require water for periods of combat or transition to combat, drinking and food preparation. Some MI MACOM commanders may modify the con- units also need water for other purposes, trolled exchange conditions as deemed such as imagery processing. Elements of necessary. Controlled exchange require- the COSCOM locate and develop water ments for using support maintenance sources in the combat zone and supply class organizations are specified in Chapter 4 of I issue points. MI units draw water in bulk AR 750-1. from the nearest class I point and transport Cannibalization, the authorized removal, it to the unit in organic tankers or 5-gallon under specified conditions, of serviceable water cans. Deployed MI elements depend and unserviceable parts, components, and on the supported unit for potable water. assemblies from material authorized for Bath and laundry services normally are disposal, supplements supply operations by coupled with clothing exchange. Laundry and clothing exchange are provided by intermediate DS supply units supporting brigades, divisions, and corps.

~~14-6 AVIATION REPAIR PARTS~~

~~UNIT PERFORMS RECEIVES FROM~~

~~Aircraft maintenance battalion element Ml BN (AE) AVUM AVIM located at corps airfield.~~

~~CEWI FLT PLT Aircraft maintenance (OPCON TO Ml AVUM AVIM company located in BN (DIV)) the division rear.~~

~~Aircraft maintenance Ml CO AVUM AVIM company located in (ACR) the division rear.~~

Map coverage of the area of present and channels and is used to refine and update projected operations is critical to effective personnel replacement plans. Replacements IEW support and tactical operations. are obtained from MI units not committed Responsibility for the storage and issue of to combat, from units of the reserve compo- maps rests with the COSCOM or DISCOM nents, and from service schools. Combat supporting MI elements. The MI unit S2 loss data also is used as a basis for recruit- determines unit requirements for maps and ment and training. coordinates with the S4 for the establishment of a map supply account at the MAINTENANCE, REPAIR, appropriate storage site. Map issue is AND RECOVERY accomplished by the supply point distribution method. Maintenance is defined as all actions necessary for retaining or restoring an item Since MI units go to war with the person- to a specified condition. It includes inspec- nel they have on hand, personnel replace- tion, testing, servicing, classification as to ment is a critical support consideration. serviceability, repair, rebuilding, and rec- During the initial stages of the conflict lamation. It also includes all maintenance replacements are provided in accordance related supply actions. The term mainte- with plans worked out in peacetime and nance includes all repair actions necessary based on information gathered in previous to keep a military force in condition to carry combat actions. As current data becomes out its mission. available, it is reported through Si or G1

14-7 The Army maintenance system is com- mental purpose is to support the posed of the following levels: theater supply system through repair □ Unit. User maintenance, which is of components, class VII, and class IX. characterized by quick turn around □ Depot. Maintenance at this level will based on repair by replacement and support the supply system. It will be minor repair (adjust, clean, lubricate, production-line oriented and will be tighten). Maintenance personnel use performed by special repair activities, built-in test equipment to calibrate and AMC depots, and contractor personnel. isolate defective modules (black box or line replaceable units). Though each category is separate and distinct, there are times when a shop per- □ Intermediate. This category is orga- forms more than one category of mainte- nized as intermediate (DS) and inter- nance. The maintenance allocation chart mediate (GS). The first is characterized remains the primary tool for assigning spe- by high mobility, forward orientation, cific tasks which can be performed at each and repair by replacement. Interme- category of maintenance. The following diate (GS) maintenance is character- chart describes each level of maintenance ized by semifixed facilities. Its funda- and who performs that maintenance. It also prescribes the next higher source of repair parts.

~~LEVELS OF MAINTENANCE~~

~~TYPE OF INTERMEDIATE INTERMEDIATE EQUIPMENT UNIT MAINTENANCE DS MAINTENANCE GS DEPOT~~

~~COMMON HQ HQ & SVC FWD SPT BN TAACOM AMC CO, Ml BN CONUS/ HNS~~

~~C-E HQ HQ & SVC HQ HQ & SVC CO, TAACOM AMC CO, Ml BN Ml BN AND FWD CONUS/ SPT BN HNS~~

~~COMSEC HQ HQ & SVC HQ HQ & SVC CO, THEATER AMC CO, Ml BN Ml BN AND DIV CLSU CONUS/ SIG BN HNS~~

~~RADIAC HQ HQ & SVC MAINT CO (TMDE) MAINT CO AMC CO, Ml BN DIV SIG BN (TMDE) CONUS/ COSCOM HNS~~

~~SIGINT/EW HQ HQ & SVC HQ HQ & SVC CO, THEATER AMC CO, Ml BN Ml BN CONUS/ HNS~~

~~GSR/REMS HQ HQ & SVC HQ HQ & SVC CO, THEATER AMC CO, Ml BN Ml BN CONUS/ HNS~~

14-8 VEHICLES, AIR CONDITIONERS, assessments, every effort is made to repair AND POWER GENERATORS equipment as far forward as possible to reduce the time required to return it to bat- Vehicles, air conditioners, and power tle. This is the essence of the forward sup- generators make up the bulk of items port maintenance concept. known as common equipment. In the MI battalion, the mechanical maintenance pla- In most tactical situations, MI assets toon of the headquarters, headquarters and deploy well forward. Common equipment is service company provides unit maintenance repaired by MI unit maintenance contact for this equipment. teams, or if properly coordinated in advance, by maintenance support elements Maintenance support teams perform unit supporting maneuver units. Unique equip- maintenance on MI battalion equipment ment must be repaired by specially trained deployed in the brigade areas. They repair personnel in the MI unit, or by division or the equipment on site whenever possible. corps maintenance support units. Intermediate (DS) maintenance support for common military equipment is also avail- The MI battalion's forward maintenance able from maintenance support teams contact teams provide maintenance support (MSTs) of the forward support battalion for deployed MI battalion elements. Addi- which may be under the OPCON of the tional support—up to intermediate (DS) forward area support coordinator of the maintenance—remains with the battalion supported brigade: Additional maintenance in the C-E or IEW equipment repair section. is available from the nondivisional intermediate (DS) maintenance battalion which Unit maintenance for SIGINT and EW will provide corps back-up maintenance equipment is performed on site, if possible, support. by the forward maintenance contact team. If they cannot repair it, it is recovered to the Maintenance and repair parts support are MI battalion trains area and repaired by closely related. Each unit carries its manda- the C-E or IEW maintenance section. The tory combat stockage class IX repair parts MI battalion provides intermediate (DS) into combat but must rely on maintenance maintenance support for this equipment. If units for repair parts support. In almost all the MI battalion cannot repair it, it is cases, the unit that provides intermediate further evacuated to a TAACOM interme- (DS) maintenance also provides repair parts diate (GS) maintenance battalion repair support. facility. COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT RECOVERY AND EVACUATION The C-E or IEW maintenance section When on-site repair of MI battalion provides unit and intermediate (DS) main- equipment is not practical due to the tacti- tenance for MI battalion C-E equipment, cal situation, the damage involved, or the and COMSEC, EW, GSR, and REMS moni- nonavailability of mobile maintenance toring equipment. Additional COMSEC teams and when recovery cannot be per- unit or intermediate (DS) maintenance formed at the platoon level, the headquar- requirements are met by the division signal ters, headquarters and service company will battalion or theater Army COMSEC logistic provide special purpose equipment from the support units. The platoon maintains a MI battalion trains to perform recovery shop stock of repair parts and class IX for operations. Recovered equipment will be the MI battalion in accordance with AR relocated to a unit maintenance collection 710-2, DA Pam 710-2-1, and the command- point, intermediate forward maintenance er's policy. collection point, or to the brigade support area where damage can be assessed and the FORWARD SUPPORT repair level determined. When equipment requires repair, battle damage assessments are made by skilled unit maintenance teams. Based on these

14-9 Recovery may also be conducted to □ Such action will not degrade any of the retrieve enemy material found on the battle- materiel involved to an uneconomi- field which might be of intelligence use. The cally reparable condition. headquarters, headquarters and service □ It is the only means reasonably avail- company has the primary responsibility for able to eliminate an adverse effect on the task. the operational readiness of the unit, Recovered equipment which cannot be organization, or activity performing repaired at the unit or intermediate DS level the controlled exchange. will be evacuated by the intermediate (DS) □ All actions are immediately taken to maintenance unit. Evacuation is used to prevent further degrading of materiel expedite movement of disabled equipment from weather or other adverse condi- to an activity or maintenance level where tions. The organization performing the repairs can be made. controlled exchange will take prompt Prior to evacuation, the maintenance action to restore the unserviceable officer considers a controlled exchange of materiel to a fully mission-capable parts according to regulation and command condition. The unserviceable part or guidance. Systems which have suffered assembly should be replaced on or excessive damage may be used as a source retained with the materiel from which of repair parts. the serviceable like item is removed. This is to retain identity and integrity Controlled exchange by using organiza- of the reparable materiel. tion is authorized only when— □ Approved by the commander of the □ Required serviceable parts, compo- organization performing the controlled nents, and assemblies cannot be exchange action. obtained through maintenance exchange, maintenance (repair and In those instances where the exchange return), or supply channels in time to satisfies a repair parts requirement already meet operational readiness due in on requisition through the normal requirements. supply system, that requisition will either be canceled or used to restore the remaining □ All of the unserviceable reparable unserviceable materiel to a fully mission- materiel involved are owned or under capable condition. Requisitions will be pro- control of the organization performing cessed according to AR 710-2, DA Pam 710- the controlled exchange action. 2-1, and DA Pam 710-2-2. □ The maintenance effort required to re- Controlled exchange by support mainte- store all of the unserviceable reparable nance is authorized only when— materiel involved to a full mission- capable condition is within the main- □ It is the only means of providing fully tenance authority and capability of the mission-capable materiel to a sup- organization performing the controlled ported unit within the time frame indi- exchange. cated by the issue priority designator code entry on the applicable mainte- □ The unserviceable economically reparable materiel from which the service- nance request (DA Form 2407). ble parts, components, or assemblies □ It is approved by the shop officer or are removed is classified not mission- installation maintenance officer capable supply. responsible for restoring the not fully □ The action will immediately restore the mission capable economically repair- unserviceable reparable materiel able materiel involved in the action to involved to a fully mission-capable a fully serviceable condition. condition. □ The maintenance effort required to restore all of the materiel involved to a fully serviceable condition is within the maintenance authority and capability of the organizations performing the controlled exchange.

14-10 □ Required serviceable parts, compo- battalion, and the divisional maintenance nents, and assemblies cannot be battalion. Backup intermediate (DS) main- obtained on a timely basis through tenance support may be provided by the direct exchange or normal supply nondivisional intermediate DS battalion or channels. the corps intermediate GS facility. Controlled exchange on maintenance When the MI battalion (division) task floats is not authorized. organizes an IEW company team, it places forward deployed maintenance elements Repair parts, components, or assemblies under the command and control of the team removed in controlled exchange action by commander. support maintenance will be noted on the maintenance request (DA Form 2407), or The aviation element is under the opera- other appropriate documents for the mate- tional control of the MI battalion (division) riel from which the serviceable items are but is organic to the CEWI flight platoon, removed. general support aviation company, which provides AVUM. The division's aircraft AVUM responsibilities for QUICKFIX maintenance company, a part of the avia- rests with its parent unit, the aviation bri- tion brigade, provides AVIM. The C-E gade. Unit-level repair of EW systems on maintenance section of the headquarters, the QUICKFIX aircraft is performed by 33R headquarters and service company of the personnel assigned to the MI (QUICKFIX) MI battalion provides intermediate (DS) platoon. The MI battalion is responsible for maintenance support for IEW systems. intermediate (DS) maintenance of SIGINT/ EW systems on board these aircraft. Since QUICKFIX is OPCON to the MI battalion, MI BRIGADE (CEWI) (CORPS) if an aircraft is downed during a mission the MI battalion S4 is responsible for noti- Maintenance support for the MI brigade fying the aviation brigade to initiate recov- (corps) is similar to that for the MI com- ery operations. pany and battalion. However, that support is complicated by the dispersal of equipment throughout the corps area. Interme- MI UNIT MAINTENANCE diate DS and intermediate GS maintenance and backup support are provided by MI COMPANY (CEWI) COSCOM. AVIM is provided by the trans- (ACR/SEPARATE BRIGADE) portation aircraft maintenance company of The MI company (ACR/separate brigade) the corps support group. is similar to, but smaller than, the MI battalion (division). It employs ground and REPLACEMENT aerial resources and has organic assets to maintain IEW systems. Maintenance on' Replacement of IEW peculiar equipment common items such as vehicles; air condi- is accomplished through the MMC at divi- tioners; power generators; and radiation, sion, corps, and EAC. The theater Army detection, indication, and computation MMC requisitions replacements through (RADIAC) and COMSEC equipment fol- the appropriate national inventory control lows the three-level maintenance system points. previously described in this chapter.

MI BATTALION (CEWI) (DIVISION) Maintenance support for the MI battalion (division) is similar to support provided an MI company (ACR/separate brigade) except that intermediate (DS) maintenance support comes from the forward support

~~14-11 CHAPTER 15~~

~~NBC Survival and Reconstitution~~

The capability and willingness of a grow- EFFECTS ing number of nations to employ NBC weapons makes it urgent that US forces plan to Unit vulnerabilities and defensive mea- fight in an NBC environment. US forces sures are dependent upon the effects gener- can not allow enemy surprise or first use of ated by NBC weapons and agents. IEW NBC weapons to decide the outcome of the force deployment and operations are conflict. The employment of these weapons planned and executed to minimize these drastically alters the traditional concept of effects. fire and maneuver. Their use can rapidly and effectively decide the outcome of the NUCLEAR WEAPONS battle. Soviet doctrine places great emphasis on MI operational objectives are to— the depth, intensity, and destructiveness of an initial nuclear strike. They view this □ Survive, operate, and win in an NBC initial massive attack as a means to gain environment. surprise, achieve a major penetration, and □ Successfully conduct sustained opera- destroy effective resistance. The objectives tions under NBC conditions. and depth of intended operations will dictate the delivery systems, techniques, Achieving these objectives requires that yields, and number of nuclear weapons MI leaders and soldiers fully understand employed. When employed, nuclear weap- the NBC weapons and the vulnerabilities of ons are viewed as the primary means of IEW systems. It also requires that in- destroying or crippling US forces. dividual soldiers and teams be well trained and prepared to operate with minimal mis- The devastating effects of a nuclear deto- sion degradation. Prestrike actions include nation are felt immediately or encountered OPSEC measures which help a unit avoid as a residual hazard. The initial effects becoming a target. The IEW system may create personnel casualties and material provide the first indications that an NBC damage within the time span of the current attack is imminent and the response time operation. The residual effects create long- for either a preemptive attack or additional term problems and impact on maneuver- protective measures. ability and survivability within the immediate battle area. The principal initial When NBC weapons are used, catastro- effects are blast, thermal radiation, initial phic losses may occur in seconds or min- nuclear radiation, electromagnetic pulse utes. Regeneration of combat power must be (EMP), blackout, and transient radiation initiated immediately. The commander will effects on electronics (TREE). Residual have an immediate need for intelligence on effects will include tree blowdown, fire, which to base tactical decisions and force debris, fallout, neutron-induced patterns, reconstitution. With the havoc that can be and rainout. created by NBC weapons, MI units must recover rapidly for their own survival as BIOLOGICAL AGENTS well as that of the combined arms team. Biological agents are germs or toxins that can be used to cause disease, incapacita- tion, or death among personnel, animals, or plants and, to a lesser extent, deterioration of materiel. The agents will probably be directed against troops in rear areas; however, some agents may be used in forward

15-0 areas when the delay in casualty produc- VULNERABILITIES tion due to the incubation period of the agents is not a factor. For more information All IEW systems and personnel are see FM 3-100. vulnerable to enemy use of nuclear weapons. Personnel and equipment are also CHEMICAL AGENTS vulnerable to chemical and biological Chemical agents are used to kill or inca- agents in terms of contamination. Surviv- pacitate personnel as well as contaminate ability is significantly enhanced by the use terrain and equipment. The contamination of protective cover and shielding against of areas and equipment forces extended the direct effects of a nuclear detonation wear of individual protective equipment and the use of protective clothing against which degrades individual and unit perfor- chemical and biological hazards. mance. In addition, contaminated areas Electronic systems are also very vulnera- impact on maneuverability. For more ble to EMP and TREE damage. EMP and detailed analysis of chemical agents and TREE primarily affect electronic and elec- their effects see FM 3-100. trical systems and can cause temporary or permanent damage. PSYCHOLOGICAL STRESS One of the most critical problems a com- EMP is caused by gamma rays stripping mander must deal with following an NBC electrons off air molecules. This sets up an attack is the psychological impact on per- intense localized electrical field and sonnel. The uncertainty, anxiety, and shock radiates an extremely strong electromag- following a nuclear strike can be just as netic field. This is picked up by antennas, devastating as the strike itself. Unprepared wire, cables, power leads, internal equip- soldiers can become disoriented, confused, ment circuitry, and other metal objects and lose their will to fight. causing overloads. These fields can cause permanent damage or temporary degrada- The massive ground attack that will certainly follow an NBC attack will seek to tion by burning out or degrading components, or by introducing undesirable sig- exploit and compound this psychological nals. Modern communications and disorientation. Under such conditions, there will be little time to rebuild confidence and electronic equipments are sensitive to EMP due to the extensive use of microcircuit fighting spirit. Preparedness and strong transistor technology. The effective range professional leadership are crucial to com- of EMP varies with weapon yield and bating psychological effects while main- height of burst. taining a coherent fighting capability. TREE is caused by neutron and gamma It is well documented that soldiers per- radiation. The radiation degrades electronic form best if they are physically and psycho- components, changing the characteristics logically prepared for the conditions under of electronic systems. Semiconductors and which they must perform. Soldiers must other solid state components are especially know what to expect and what is expected sensitive. Widespread use of radios and of them. They must understand battlefield other electronic devices by MI units requires conditions as they will face them and prac- extensive protective measures against the tice their skills to proficiency under such effects of EMP and TREE. These measures conditions. include disconnecting antennas, cables, and Because of the very nature of the inte- power leads; storing equipment in closed grated battlefield, it is not possible to fully vehicles; insulating electronic equipment; replicate the battlefield in a training or improving employment procedures; and exercise environment. The gap between using natural or man-made features for training and reality must be bridged shielding. Specific protective measures for through psychological preparedness. In the individual items of equipment are covered chaos of NBC warfare, training provides in appropriate equipment technical the knowledge of what must be done; psy- manuals. chological preparedness provides the will to do it.

15-1 SUEVIVAL afterwards. The unit must be able to recover and continue with the mission. After the One of the imperatives of air-land battle attack, the unit must implement reconstitu- is to protect the force. On the integrated tion plans. battlefield, the destructive power of NBC weapons renders personnel and equipment Protective measures against living biologi- extremely vulnerable to instantaneous de- cal agents include immunization and wear- struction. It is therefore critically important ing of the protective mask, hood, and that we understand the nature of specific gloves. In conjunction with the duty uni- IEW vulnerabilities and be prepared to take form, this ensemble prevents the agents appropriate protective measures to ensure from penetrating the body and causing casu- survival and continued mission alties. For vectors, insect repellents and effectiveness. insecticides are used. The basic dilemma facing the commander The primary defense against chemical or is how to minimize the risk of NBC destruc- toxic agents is the implementation of tion while continuing to provide effective mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP). MI support. This conflict is resolved based The commander weighs the extent of the on a risk-benefit analysis that weighs vul- chemical threat, mission, work rate, and nerabilities against mission requirements. heat stress involved and then specifies the MOPP to complete the mission with mini- MI units seldom constitute a priority mum casualties. The choice of MOPP NBC target by themselves. Their primary ranges from no protection to full protective vulnerability lies in their deployment with clothing sind equipment. Higher levels of or near other forces that are HVTs. There- MOPP increase the incidence of heat fore, survivability can be significantly exhaustion and fatigue which degrade indi- improved by OPSEC helping the supported vidual efficiency. The choice of MOPP mini- unit avoid becoming an NBC target. Good mizes chemical casualties while still provid- OPSEC denies the enemy targeting infor- ing for mission accomplishment. mation and minimizes the risk to combat forces and supporting MI elements alike. Personnel and equipment survivability is greatly enhanced through the use of protec- Defense against nuclear weapons effects tive measures as described in FMs 3-100 involves three basic areas: prestrike mea- and 3-4. FM 3-100 also provides an example sures, survival measures, and poststrike of an NBC defense annex to a unit SOP measures. that is readily adaptable to MI operations. Prestrike measures require an adequate Additional actions that MI units may take OPSEC posture to preclude detection and to reduce vulnerability and provide for con- targeting by the enemy. This may require tinuity of operations when an NBC strike is some MI units to move more often than in imminent include— the past. Units will have to streamline their □ Further dispersing resources, to intelligence reporting procedures, and dis- include command and control and pro- perse their collection systems. Units must cessing facilities. improve their operational techniques and incorporate them into their defense plans □ Moving selected systems to hardened and SOPs. This includes EMP protection, battle positions. hardening of equipment and battle posi- □ Moving selected portions of the MI tions, reconstitution plans, and taking unit operations center and TOC sup- advantage of natural terrain features for port element to more hardened battle concealment and cover. For survival, every positions when a nuclear strike warn- individual must be trained to immediately ing is issued. take protective action upon attack and □ Taking protective measures for selected systems and personnel. □ Changing the designated MOPP, if applicable.

15-2 □ Providing contingency tasking, intelli- field, MI commanders may alter the gence, and technical information to MI deployment profile to increase the surviv- elements to provide for limited inde- ability of selected systems. Within the con- pendent poststrike operations. straints of the current situation and the DECONTAMINATION mission, they select the deployment profile that provides the best probability of mis- Contamination is a problem because it sion success and survivability. can kill or injure soldiers, or, as a minimum, This involves a risk assessment that bal- degrade their ability to fight by forcing ances IEW system vulnerabilities against them to MOPP 4. Protective clothing and the need to accomplish the mission and shelters are only temporary solutions. De- continue operations. It centers on enemy contamination is the solution. Decontami- capabilities and intentions and the need to nation is the removal, destruction, or neu- protect specific capabilities and systems tralization of contamination. There are four from destruction.. It is a continuous process, practical reasons for conducting changing with the situation and updated decontamination: knowledge of the enemy. □ Contamination can be lethal to unpro- The operational profile of MI units is tected soldiers. designed to enable each element to operate □ MOPP gear degrades a soldier's to its fullest potential. Changing this profile performance. to increase survivability on an NBC battlefield generally results in some elements □ MOPP gear has limitations. operating at less than full potential because □ Contamination tends to spread. of range, LOS, or other system limitations. Profile options that increase survivability There are three types of decontamination: include— basic soldier skills, hasty, and deliberate: □ Stand off coverage by aerial resources □ Basic soldiers skills consist of skin in lieu of ground-based systems. decontamination, personal wipedown, Deploying critical systems to low and operator's spraydown. A soldier □ threat areas where they operate at must be able to perform these tech- their range limits. niques automatically to sustain life. □ Emphasizing survivability over mis- Hasty decontamination allows a □ sion capability when employing sys- force to fight longer and sustain its tems within high threat areas. mission while contaminated. The techniques of MOPP gear exchange □ Remote operation of systems. and vehicle washdown allow for re- □ Relying on unmanned devices in high- moval of gross amounts of contamina- est threat areas. This option will tion. Hasty decontamination should be increase in importance as additional done as soon as practical. unmanned systems such as drone air- □ Deliberate decontamination is done craft, robotics. Remotely Monitored as part of an extensive reconstitution Battlefield Sensor System effort in brigade, division, and corps (REMBASS), and expendable jammers support areas. Detailed equipment and enter the inventory. troop decontamination is conducted by Based on projected enemy use of NBC the contaminated unit with assistance weapons, MI commanders determine the from the chemical unit. capabilities they could lose to such an attack. They assess the impact of the lost DEPLOYMENT capability on future operations and deter- MI resources routinely are dispersed mine if additional protective measures are throughout the battlefield to make maxi- required. If such measures would degrade mum use of their capabilities. When preparing for operations on an integrated battle-

15-3 current operations, commanders may— Closely allied with C2 in MI units is the capability to process information and direct □ Accept the risk and continue operations. resources to effectively provide IEW support. When such capabilities are lost, they □ Request higher headquarters support. too must be replaced immediately. Alterna- □ Operate at reduced capability. tives include reconstituting with personnel instructions for actions required at each □ Change the profile of the unit. echelon. At a minimum, they provide instructions on— BECONSTITUTION □ Replacing lost C2. Reconstitution is the regeneration of the 2 □ Primary and alternate means of com- force with people, organization, C , and munication to include skip echelon. equipment. It may be accomplished through individual item or personnel replacement, □ Mission profiles for different threat the combining of units or functions, or con- intensities. tinuing operations at reduced strength and □ Limits of independent operations. capability. Reconstitution consists of short- and long-term actions. □ Reporting of status and needs. Short-term actions are taken immediately Greater reliance on EAC and national after an NBC strike, and are aimed at assets for operations during and after regenerating combat power from surviving nuclear strikes includes the need for equip- resources. They are keyed to the immediate ment repair or replacement, personnel fill, tactical situation and the commander's and data base replacement as well as con- most urgent IEW needs. Priority of effort is tinued information flow. directed toward those IEW resources needed COMMAND AND CONTROL to collect against, report on, and assist in 2 countering the immediate threat— Regenerating C is critical to restoring essentially enemy first-echelon forces that effective, responsive functioning of the IEW can be committed up to about 18 hours fol- system. Command and control provide the lowing the strike. A much greater reliance means for reorganizing and redirecting on EAC, other services, and national assets surviving assets, assessing the extent of will be necessary to meet the commander's losses, determining reconstitution require- intelligence requirements. ments, and initiating reconstitution actions. If the C2 of an MI unit or element is lost Long-term actions are those taken to fully or rendered ineffective, it should be reinsti- assess the extent of losses and to acquire tuted immediately. SOP or plans should the personnel and equipment needed to re- clearly state the manner of replacement. store full operating capability. They are Alternatives include a backup CP, assump- keyed toward IEW support of the long- tion of command by a preselected subordi- range plans of the command. Replacements nate commander, or insertion of a capabil- may be available from higher headquarters ity from higher headquarters, or adjacent units, but this will depend upon and equipment from other elements or reas- availability and an assessment of enemy signing the responsibility to another ele- intentions. In both long- and short-term ment which possesses the necessary capa- situations, IEW support may be available bilities. Personnel expertise, from higher and adjacent commands on a communications, and existing data bases mission or priority of effort basis. are primary considerations. Centralized PLANNING operations should be reestablished as quickly as possible for unity in coordinat- Planning and preparation are essential to ing, cuing, and applying various IEW rapid and effective reconstitution. SOP or assets. contingency plans are developed to guide 2 both long-and short-term reconstitution Rapid reconstitution of C requires a con- actions. They provide clear and detailed certed effort by all echelons within the IEW system. Each must use whatever means

15-4 available to reestablish communications performed as far forward as the situation with both superiors and subordinates. Skip- permits. echelon communications may be necessary Personnel replacements are provided to bypass an echelon that is no longer based on losses reported through Gl or Si functioning. channels. Because many MI skills are The wide dispersal of MI units and teams unique, replacement personnel may not be across the battlefield creates severe C2 prob- readily available. Immediate replacements lems. Many MI elements will be cut off from will be drawn from other MI units within their controlling headquarters for varying the theater of operations based on the mis- lengths of time. Because much of the IEW sion and priorities of the units concerned. mission is executed by these elements, it is On a long-term basis, these personnel urgent that they continue to operate while requirements may be filled from CONUS- the control system is being reestablished. based units, other overseas units, the reserves, and the training bases. Continued operation requires that tasking be evaluated in light of the current situation Initial regeneration of equipment will unless specific poststrike tasking has been focus on the repair of lightly damaged established. A decision is made whether to equipment to return it to service as quickly continue current tasks or change to tasking as possible. Degraded communications, that better suits the situation. Such alterna- decontamination requirements, and the tives must be fully covered by SOP or plan need to avoid heavily contaminated areas to provide the element leader with a clear will seriously hamper maintenance and statement of poststrike IEW objectives on supply operations. Cannibalization may be which to base decisions. required until the supply system can catch Isolated MI teams should establish con- up with the demand for parts. Major tact with nearby maneuver units and pro- equipment items needed to replace losses vide them with IEW support until the IEW are requested through command channels. command and control system is regenerated The IEW mission in an NBC environment and centralized control is reestablished. remains the same as for a conventional bat- When doing so, the team leader explains the tlefield. That mission is to provide timely, type of support that can be provided and accurate intelligence; effective CI support; assists the commander or S2 in using that and a responsive EW capability to the support. commander. Accomplishing this mission depends on planning, the SOP, the general REGENERATION defense plan, and centralized control at the Regenerating the IEW system to full mis- MI unit operations center level. Communi- sion capability is essentially a long term cations difficulties and the dispersal of operation. It begins with an assessment of units characteristic of a nuclear battlefield the situation to determine the extent of will make control difficult. It requires care- losses and the amount and type of reconsti- ful planning and a full understanding of tution required. Initially, this may be only a IEW system capabilities and limitations. prediction by the staff based on element Survivability is directly dependent on the locations and ground zeroes. As detailed positioning of resources and the protective information or poststrike analysis on per- measures taken. The commander decides sonnel and equipment losses and repair how and where to employ resources based parts needed becomes available, the on an assessment of risk and missions assessment is revised. assigned. The operational profile may be Regeneration normally involves remov- vastly altered to enhance survivability. ing a severely depleted unit from its present mission status; however, MI units are regenerated in place when possible. Per- sonnel and equipment are moved forward to replace losses and enable units to continue operations. Repair and decontamination are

15-5 Reconstitution efforts immediately following a nuclear strike focus on rapidly regain- ing maximum mission capability with surviving resources. Further efforts are directed at fully regenerating all IEW capabilities.

~~15-6 APPENDIX A The Analysis of the Battlefield Area~~

An analysis of the battlefield area is □ The civil-military operations or G5's made to determine its effect on the enemy information on sociology, politics, eco- and friendly force's courses of action. Con- nomics, psychology, technology, and siderations for the analysis are: local labor conditions. □ Climate and weather conditions. □ The unconventional warfare officer's information from areas not under the □ Relief and drainage systems. control of friendly forces. □ Vegetation. The G2 uses other sources such as area . □ Surface materials. studies, periodicals, the US Army Institute □ Man-made features. for Military Assistance, DIA, and the CIA to prepare the analysis of the battlefield □ Military aspects of the area. area. □ Observation and fire. The analysis of the battlefield area is □ Concealment and cover. begun well in advance of hostilities. It focuses on each contingency area for which □ Obstacles. the command is tasked or anticipates task- □ Key terrain. ing. IPB is facilitated by the initial data gathering done for the analysis of the bat- □ Avenues of approach (air and ground). tlefield area. Once the initial data gathering □ Other effects of the area on combat is accomplished, IPB proceeds concurrent, service support operations. with the preparation of the analysis.of the battlefield area, with each contributing to ■•= Additional considerations are: the other. The G2 ensures that there is no □ Sociological. duplication of effort between the analysis of □ Political. the battlefield area and IPB. The terrain and weather analyses accomplished in IPB, □ Economic. can provide data which will fully support □ Religious. paragraphs 2a, 2b, and 3a of the analysis of the battlefield area (see the example in this □ Scientific. appendix). When the prehostility IPB analy- □ Technological. sis nears completion, the G2 uses all available data and analyses to determine the □ Materiel. effects of the characteristics of the battle- □ Transportation. field area on both friendly and anticipated enemy courses of action. □ Hydrography. The analysis of the battlefield area is On receipt of an order to implement a a critical product of the G2's activities. contingency plan, the intelligence officer reevaluates the analysis. After the com- The G2 has primary staff responsibility mander has reached a decision and issues a for initiating, coordinating, and ensuring concept of operations, the analysis of the completion of the analysis. Other staff sec- battlefield area may require refinement tions contribute within their respective because of the adopted course of action. As fields. Primary contributions include— the operation progresses, new battlefield □ The engineer's terrain study. areas are assigned and changes in mission □ The S WO climatological studies and weather forecasts.

A-l or recipt of additional or more accurate (2) Vegetation. information may require a revision of the analysis of the battlefield area. (3) Surface materials. (4) Man-made features. A written analysis is usually completed only at corps and EAC to support projected c. Additional Characteristics. operations. At division, a written analysis 3. MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE AREA. may be prepared for projected operations (such as airborne operations) to be carried a. Tactical Aspects. out at great distances. Most division opera- (1) Observation and fire. tions, however, will use the corps analysis of the battlefield area supplemented by IPB (2) Concealment and cover. information pertinent to the division. (3) Obstacles. FM 101-5 presents the format including a (4) Key terrain features. general description of the content of each (5) Avenues of approach. element. A brief outline of the format follows. b. Combat Service Support Aspects. (1) Personnel. ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLEFIELD (2) Logistics. AREA (3) Civil-military operations 1. PURPOSE AND LIMITING requirements. CONSIDERATIONS. 4. EFFECTS OF CHARACTERISTICS OF 2. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE THE AREA. AREA. a. Effect on enemy courses of action. a. Climatic or Weather Conditions. b. Effect on own courses of action. b. Terrain. Paragraph 2 of the intelligence estimate (1) Relief and drainage systems. contains an abbreviated version of the analysis of the battlefield area. Whether the analysis of the battlefield area is in written format or briefed verbally, all the information required in paragraphs 1 through 4 of the format must be presented.

~~A-2 APPENDIX B m The Intelligence Estimate~~

The intelligence estimate is a logical, order of their adoption. It provides an orderly examination of the intelligence fac- analysis of the AO, and information on tors affecting the mission. Its main purpose enemy strength, capability and vulnerabil- is to determine the courses of action open to ity. It is a basis for planning operations and the enemy commander and the probable disseminating intelligence.

~~(Classification)~~

~~Headquartèrs Place Date, time, and zone~~

~~INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NO.~~

~~References: Maps, charts, or other documents.~~

~~1. MISSION The restated mission determined by the commander.~~

2. THE AREA OF OPERATIONS This paragraph discusses the.influence of the AO used in arriving at conclusions. It is based on the facts and conclusions of IPB and the analysis of the AO, if one has been prepared. It may be a reference to an analysis of the AO, if adequate coverage and discussion are contained therein.

~~a. Weather.~~

~~(1) Existing situation. Include light data and either a weather forecast or climatic information, as appropriate. Use appendixes for detailed information.~~

(2) Effect on enemy courses of action. Describe the effects of weather on each broad course of action (e.g., attack, defend). Each description concludes with a statement of whether the weather favors the course of action. Among the courses of action, include use of chemical agents; nuclear weapons; and special methods, techniques, equipment, procedures, or forces.

~~(Classification)~~

~~B-l (Classification)~~

~~(Short title Identification)~~

~~(3) Effect on own courses of action. Describe in the same manner as for (2) above, except that the estimate excludes the use of biological agents.~~

~~b. Terrain.~~

(1) Existing situation. Use graphic representations such as IPB templates where possible. Use annexes for detailed material. Include as much information as necessary for an understanding of observation and fire, concealment and cover, obstacles, key terrain features, and avenues of approach. Include effects of nuclear fires, enemy biological and chemical agents, and any other pertinent considerations on each of these factors as appropriate.

(2) Effect on enemy courses of action. Describe in the same manner as for the effects of weather In a(2) above. For defensive courses of action, state the best defense area and the best avenues of approach leading to it. For attack courses of action, state the best avenues of approach.

~~(3) Effect on own courses of action. Describe in the same manner as for effects of weather in a(3) above.~~

c. Other Characteristics. The following additional characteristics considered pertinent are included in separate subparagraphs: sociology, politics, economics, psychology, and other factors. Other factors may include such items as science and technology, materiel, transportation, manpower, and hydrography. These factors are analyzed using the same subheadings as weather and terrain.

~~3. ENEMY SITUATION~~

This paragraph gives information on the enemy which will permit later . development of enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities and refinement of these capabilities into a specific course of action and its relative probability of adoption.

~~a. Disposition. Reference may be made to overlays, enemy situation maps, or previously published documents.~~

~~(Classification)~~

~~B-2 (Classification)~~

~~(Short title identification)~~

b. Composition. Summarize enemy order of battle that can influence accomplishment of the mission. Reference may be made to previously published documents. Special mention is made of units capable of EW. low-intensity operations, and other special operations, as appropriate.

c. Strength. Enemy strength is listed as committed forces, reinforcements, air, nuclear weapons, and chemical and biological agents. The purpose of this listing is to assist in developing enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities for use by the commander and staff in selecting courses of action. The unit mission, location of the enemy, enemy doctrine, and the level of command at which the estimate is being prepared are factors to be considered.

(1) Committed forces. List those enemy ground maneuver units currently in contact and those ground maneuver units with which imminent contact can be expected regardless of the specific friendly course of action implemented. Designation of enemy forces as committed forces, depends on disposition, location, controlling headquarters and doctrine. The intelligence officer usually accounts for committed forces based on the size unit doctrinally used to oppose the friendly unit. Generally, enemy units are counted in terms of units two echelons be^ow the friendly unit's size (e.g., a brigade S2 normally considers committed forces in terms of companies; a division G2, in terms of battalions; and a corps G2, in terms of regiments). If there is doubt whether a unit is a committed force or a reinforcement, it is considered a reinforcement. This attributes to the enemy the maximum capability to reinforce forces to oppose a given friendly course of action.

(2) Reinforcements. Include designation and location. Reinforcements are those enemy maneuver units that may or may not be employed against us, depending on our choice of a specific course of action and enemy plans. Reinforcements are enemy units not committed in or out of the friendly sector, but which can react to the friendly course of action, subject to time and distance considerations, in time to influence the* accomplishment of the mission. Imminent contact is not expected. Disposition, location, level of control, or other factors at the time of the estimate are considered in determining wnxch enemy forces are reinforcements.

~~(Classification)~~

~~B-3 (Classification)~~

~~(Short title identification)~~

~~(3) Air. List the number of enemy aircraft by type within operational radius. Include the number of possible sorties per day by type of aircraft, if known.~~

(4) Nuclear weapons and chemical and biological agents. Estimate, as appropriate, the number, type, yield, and delivery means of enemy nuclear weapons and chemical and biological munitions or agents available to the enemy.

d. Recent and Present Significant Activities. List selected items of information to provide bases for analyses to determine relative probability of adoption of specific courses of action and enemy vulnerabilities. Enemy failure to take expected actions are listed as well as positive information.

e. Peculiarities and Weaknesses. Based on knowledge of enemy tactical doctrine, practices, the principles of war, the AO, and the enemy situation previously described and discussed, list peculiarities and weaknesses and briefly describe each, indicating the extent to which they may be vulnerable and how they influence possible friendly courses of action. The items listed are grouped under the headings indicated below. Only pertinent headings are used.

~~(1) Personnel. An estimate of strength usually is included if less than 80 percent of authorized strength. Status of morale is included, if known.~~

~~(2) Intelligence. An estimate of enemy intelligence success, ineffectiveness, and susceptibility to deception and detection usually is included.~~

~~(3) Operations. An estimate of combat effectiveness usually is included if less than excellent.~~

~~(4) Logistics. An estimate of the enemy's capability to support their forces logistically is included if there are apparent weaknesses.~~

(5) Civil-military operations. An estimate of the attitudes of the enemy and the civilian populace and the status of food supply, medical facilities, communications, and other critical resources usually is included.

~~(Classification)~~

~~B-4 (Classification)~~

~~(Short title identification)~~

~~(6) Personalities. An estimate of the capabilities and weaknesses of the enemy commander and principal staff officers usually is included.~~

~~4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES~~

Based on all the previous information and analyses, develop and list enemy capabilities. The listing provides a basis for analyzing the available information to arrive at those capabilities the enemy can adopt as specific courses of action and their relative probability of adoption.

a. Enumeration. State what, when, where, and in what strength for each capability. b. Analysis and Discussion. To provide a basis for conclusions of enemy capabilities and their relative probability of adoption, each capability, or appropriate combination thereof, is discussed in a separate subparagraph. Consideration of enemy deception measures is included. All the pertinent previous information and conclusions are tabulated as either supporting or rejecting the adoption of the capability. After listing all the evidence, each capability is judged from the enemy point of view of whether the adoption of the capability is advantageous to the enemy. Such judgements need not be made if the conclusion is obvious or if there is no evidence that the enemy will adopt the capability, except when the capability is one that will make the accomplishment of the friendly mission highly doubtful or impossible. This exception is to focus attention on dangerous threats.

~~5. CONCLUSIONS~~

Based on all the previous information and analyses, conclusions are stated concerning the total effects of the AO on friendly courses of action; the courses of action most likely to be adopted by the enemy, including their relative probability of adoption; and the effects of enemy vulnerabilities that can be exploited. These conditions assist in the selection of a friendly course of action.

~~(Classification)~~

~~B-5 (Classification)~~

~~(Short title identification)~~

a. Effects of Intelligence Consideration on Operations. Indicate whether the mission set forth in paragraph 1 above can be supported from the intelligence standpoint. Indicate which course(s) of action can best be supported.

b. Effects of the AO on Own Courses of Action. For attack courses of action, indicate the best avenues of approach. For defensive courses of action, indicate the best defense areas and the best avenues of approach leading to and into the defense areas. (This subparagraph is omitted if the discussion of the effects of the area on own courses of action in paragraph 2 has been omitted because of the availability of a current analysis of the AO.)

c. Probable Enemy Courses of Action. List courses of action in order of relative probability of adoption. A listed course of action may include several subordinate courses of action that can be executed concurrently. Usually, no more than two or three courses of action, in order of probability of adoption, can be justified by the available evidence.

d. Enemy Vulnerabilities. List the effects of peculiarities and weaknesses that result in vulnerabilities that are exploitable at own, higher, or lower levels of command. The order in listing these vulnerabilities has no significance.

~~/s/ (Designation of staff officer)~~

~~Annexes (as required)~~

~~(Classification)~~

~~-6 APPENDIX C~~

~~The Intelligence annex~~

~~This appendix implements STANAG 2014 (Edition Five)~~

The intelligence annex is an integral part The intelligence annex provides informa- of any operation plan or order. The purpose tion and direction to subordinate units of of the annex is to provide details not incor- the command. It is usually prepared at divi- porated into the basic order. The annex sion and above by the G2 supported by the should be as brief as possible yet provide ASPS and CM&D section. It is unique sufficient information to accomplish the among annexes in that it has provisions for mission. It is used to keep the basic text of requesting information from higher and the order short and allows the selective dis- adjacent units needed to support the unit tribution of its contents. The annex is used collection plan. to disseminate PIR, IR, and intelligence tasks.

~~(Classification)~~

~~Copy no. of copies Issuing headquarters Place of issue (may be in code) Date/time group of signature Message reference number~~

~~(Short title identification)~~

~~ANNEX (INTELLIGENCE) TO OPERATION ORDER NO References: Maps, charts, and other relevant documents. Time zone used throughout the order:~~

~~1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION~~

Information about enemy forces essential to implementing the operation plan. When the amount of detail makes it appropriate, a brief summary and reference to the appropriate intelligence document or appendix to the annex may be used. Reference to documents not included in the annex should not be made when they aré not available to all recipients of the annex.

~~(Classification)~~

~~C-l (Classification) 2. INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS~~

~~List each PIR in priority order, in a separate subparagraph. The fact that they are In priority order should be made clear. In a final subparagraph, list other intelligence" requirements, if any.~~

~~If an intelligence annex Is not prepared or is distributed separately from the basic order, PIR should be listed in the coordinating instructions subparagraph of the operation order.~~

~~3. INTELLIGENCE ACQUISITION TASKS~~

~~a. General. Common collection tasks and NAIs of concern to the issuing headquarters are listed.~~

b. Orders to subordinate and attached units. Detailed instructions for reports required by the issuing headquarters are listed, by unit, in a separate numbered subparagraph. Units are listed in the same order as they are listed in the operation order.

~~c. Requests to higher, adjacent, and cooperating units. List requests for information from units not organic or attached in a separate numbered paragraph.~~

d. If publication of an intelligence annex is deferred or omitted, the intelligence and information requirements are put in the coordinating instructions subparagraph of the OPORD. They are not, however, published in both places except when the commander desires that certain requirements be emphasized.

~~4. MEASURES FOR HANDLING PERSONNEL, DOCUMENTS, AND MATERIEL~~

~~This paragraph contains instructions pertaining to the operation not contained in SOP or which modify or amplify SOP for the current operation. For example:~~

~~a. Prisoners of war, deserters, repatriates, inhabitants, and other persons. Special handling and segregation instructions.~~

~~b. Captured documents. Instructions for handling and processing of captured documents from time of capture to receipt by specified intelligence personnel.~~

~~c. Captured materiel. Designation of items or categories of enemy material requirements for acquisition and examination, and specific instructions for its processing and disposition.~~

~~(Classification) (Class ification)~~

~~5. DOCUMENTS OR EQUIPMENT REQUIRED~~

This paragraph lists, in each category, the conditions under which certain documents or equipment required by or allocated to units to execute their intelligence collection requirements can be obtained or requested. This includes routine requirements for maps.

~~6 COUNTE RINTELLIGENCE~~

~~a. This paragraph is covered largely by SOP. Many special operational instructions having counterintelligence aspects are listed in the operation order or in other annexes.~~

b. Certain instructions and procedures pertaining to the operations of special personnel may require limited dissemination on a "need to know" basis. Therefore, a "Special Counterintelligence Measures" appendix may be prepared for a limited and specified number of addressees.

~~7. REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION~~

This paragraph may be covered largely by SOP. It stipulates the conditions (dates, number of. copies, issue, etc.) regulating the issue of intelligence reports to the originating command for the duration of the operation. Any or all of the following items may be covered in this paragraph:

~~a. Periods to be covered by routine reports and distribution.~~

~~b. Routine and special reports which differ from SOP required from subordinate units.~~

~~c. Periodic or special conferences of intelligence officers.~~

~~d. Distribution of special intelligence studies, such as defense overprints, imagery intelligence reports, and order of battle overlays.~~

~~e. Special intelligence liaison when indicated.~~

~~8. MISCELLANEOUS INSTRUCTIONS (if required)~~

~~List here, under special subparagraphs, necessary items not covered above or in SOP, or which require action different from that detailed in SOPs.~~

~~Acknowledgement instructions.~~

~~(Classification)~~

~~c- (Classification;~~

~~Last name of commander Rank~~

~~Authentication.~~

~~Appendixes :~~

~~Distribution:~~

~~(Classification)~~

~~-4 APPENDIX D~~

~~The Electronic Warfare Estímate~~

The EW estímate is designed to assist the will be affected by enemy EW conducted staff officer in considering recommended against friendly C-E systems. courses of action for accomplishing a specific task, providing the commander a Because of the broad scope of EW, it is sound basis for decision making. The esti- essential that information, conclusions, and mate is as thorough as time and circum- recommendations from other pertinent stances permit. It may be written or verbal estimates be used in developing the EW depending on the level of command estimate. Close coordination with intelli- involved. In either case, a logical system- gence, operations, and C-E staff activities is atic approach is required. The estimate will essential. FM 101-5 and FM 34-40 (S) con- show the commander how his maneuver tain information on the EW estimate. courses of action can be supported by EW or

~~(Classification)~~

~~Copy no. of copies Issuing headquarters Place of issue (may be in code) Date/time group of signature~~

~~ELECTRONIC WARFARE ESTIMATE NO. References: Maps, charts, and other relevant documents. Time zone used throughout:~~

~~1. MISSION This paragraph states the general mission of the command.~~

2. SITUATION AND COURSES OF ACTION a. Considerations affecting the possible courses of action. (1) Characteristics of the AO. (a) Weather. (b) Terrain. (2) Enemy EW situation. (3) Own EW situation. (4) Relative EW combat support power. (5) EW resources used. (6) EW support to other plans.

~~(Classification)~~

~~D-l (Classification) (Short title identification)~~

~~b. Enemy capabilities. (1) Enumerated EW capabilities (2) Enemy probable course of action and effect on EW. (3) Enemy EW vulnerabilities. c. Friendly EW vulnerability. d. Own courses of action.~~

~~3. ANALYSIS OF OPPOSING COURSES OF ACTION~~

~~4. COMPARISON OF OWN COURSES OF ACTION This paragraph compares maneuver courses of action by listing EW support and C-E protection advantages and disadvantages derived from paragraph 3.~~

~~a. Course of Action. (1) Advantages. (2) Disadvantages. b. Discussion.~~

5. RECOMMENDATION This paragraph translates the "best" course of action as determined in paragraph 4 into a complete recommendation outlining who, what, where, when, how, and why from the EW and C-E point of view. It states which maneuver course of action will best be supported by friendly EW as well as how it can be supported and protected. The recommendation should point out how much less vulnerable the friendly force will be to enemy EW.

~~/s/~~

ANNEXES: (Include annexes as required. Annexes with pertinent details, should be used to the extent practical to support the contents of the estimate. These annexes may be in considerable detail with only the high point included in the body of the estimate. Annexes should add depth to the contents of the body and not be used as a substitute. Key points, those having a direct bearing on the problem, must be included in the body of the estimate at the expense of brevity.)

~~(Class ification)~~

~~D-2 APPENDIX E~~

~~The Electronic Warfare Annex~~

~~This appendix implements STANAG 2014 (Edition Five)~~

The EW annex is usually an integral part Information pertaining to operation of an operation plan or order prepared at plans, orders, and annexes is found in FMs division level or higher. Its purpose is to 101-5 and 34-40 (S). provide detail not readily incorporated into the basic order. It also allows the selective distribution of EW information.

~~(Classification)~~

~~(Change from verbal orders, if any)~~

~~Copy no. of copies Issuing headquarters Place of issue (may be in code) Date/time group of signature Message reference number~~

~~ANNEX (ELECTRONIC WARFARE) to OPERATION ORDER NO References: Maps, charts, and other relevant documents. Time zone used throughout the order:~~

1. SITUATION Items of information affecting EW operations not included in paragraph 1 of the operation order or which need to be expanded. a. Enemy forces. Provide information about those enemy forces capable of affecting the mission upon which the overall plan is based. Reference may be made to the intelligence annex. (1) Major elements. Identify major enemy commands that will exercise command and control in the coming battle. (2) Enemy electronic systems. Provide information on electronic doctrine employed by the major elements listed in paragraph l.a. (1) above. Known deviations from doctrine should be included.

~~(Classification)~~

~~E-l (Classification)~~

~~(Short title identification)~~

(3) Enemy radio electronic combat. Provide information on the employment of REC resources against US and allied forces. Identify the US and allied targets of REC operations. b. Friendly Forces: (1) Outline higher headquarters plan. (2) Outline higher and adjacent unit EH plans. (3) Note additional EU resources supporting the unit. c. Attachments and Detachments. EW resources attached and detached to include effective times, if applicable.

~~2. MISSION A clear, concise statement of the EW task.~~

3. EXECUTION a. Concept of Operation. A brief statement of the EW operations to be carried out to include priorities. b. EW Tasks to Subordinate and Supporting Units. c. EW Tasks to Subordinate and Supporting Units. d. EW Tasks to Subordinate and Supporting Units. e. Coordinating Instructions: (1) Instructions applicable to two or more subordinate units. (2) Reference to supporting appendixes not referenced elsewhere in the annex. (3) Reference to other annexes necessary for coordination of EW operations (deception, C-E, psychological operations).

~~4. SERVICE SUPPORT This paragraph contains a statement of the instructions and arrangements supporting EW operations.~~

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL This paragraph contains instructions relative to command and to C-E in support of EW operations. There are usually two subparagraphs. a. Command. List the location of controlling elements for EW operations. b. Signal. Reference the C-E annex to the order, the appropriate portions of the CEOI pertaining to EW operations. May provide an appendix including the restricted frequency list.

~~(Classification)~~

~~E-2 (Classification)~~

~~(Short title identification)~~

~~Acknowledgement instructions.~~

~~Last name of commander~~

~~Rank AUTHENTICATION.~~

~~APPENDIXES: As needed. (Hay include division composite EW Target List and Restricted Frequency List.) distribution;~~

~~(Classification)~~

~~E- APPENDIX F~~

~~Electronic Warfare Targeting Formats~~

Electronic warfare target lists, work- BRIGADE ELECTRONIC WARFARE sheets, and jamming schedules are critical TARGET LIST WORKSHEET tools in developing and cuing ESM and Maneuver brigades develop this work- ECM missions. While certain ECM control measures give jamming system operators sheet to identify their EW requirements. the latitude to engage targets freely, pre- The brigade S3, S2, and the supporting IEW planned or on-call ECM missions usually support element use the worksheet to priori- have a greater effect in support of a specific tize EW targets that support the brigade's planned operation. This worksheet is for- operation. Preplanned ESM missions can warded to the division EW section in the provide key targeting data or combat information regarding enemy C2 decisions. DTOC for consolidation. The brigade Elec- tronic Warfare Target List (EWTL) Work- Typical formats for preplanning EW mis- sheet includes identification of the unit to sions are provided in this appendix, with be targeted with its location, the type of brief descriptions of their use and the communications activity to be jammed or echelon at which they are provided. reported, and information of reporting requirements. A format for this brigade worksheet is provided below.

~~BRIGADE EW TARGET LIST WORKSHEET~~

~~PRIG RITY TIME TARGET TARGET TARGET CONTROL FEEDBACK/ ESM ECM WINDOW UNIT LOCATION ACTIVITY MECHANISM COORDINATION~~

~~SAMPLE ENTRIES:~~

~~t NA 310100Z- Ind Tk Bn NB448292 Report move NA TACREP w/in 310400Z of 39 GMRD from as area 5 mln~~

~~NA t 310100Z- RAG. 141 NB 325310 Call for Negative EWMSNSUM 310130Z MRR fire msns~~

F-;0 DIVISION COMPOSITE EW activities, and to identify whether divi- EW TARGET LIST sion assets will execute the mission or if it will be requested of corps. The Division The EWS of the DTOC support element Composite EWTL is normally published as consolidates EW requirements from the bri- an appendix to the Division EW Annex. A gade worksheets and adds division EW format for the Division Composite EWTL is missions. The EWS uses the Division Com- provided below. posite EWTL to identify and prioritize all

~~DIVISION COMPOSITE EW TARGET LIST~~

~~PRIO RITY TIME TARGET TECH TARGET TARGET EW CONTROL COORDI- ESM ECM WINDOW UNIT DATA? LOCATION ACTIVITY UNIT MECHANISM NATION~~

SAMPLE ENTRIES 310300Z- Ha 131 Corps Ml TACREP 1 NA 310400Z MRR NO UNK BN (AE) NA 310Ü01Z- RECON DIV Ml Negative EWMSNSUM NA 1 310100Z 39 GMRD YES NB227314 INTREPS BN 310100Z- RAG. 141 Call for DIV Ml On-oH EWMSNSUM NA 2 310130Z MRR YES NB448292 fire msns BN

F-l TCAE EW TARGET LIST/ of the systems in that platoon. This TCAE JAMMING SCHEDULE EWTL/Jamming Schedule (JS) will be used to list and monitor each EW mission and is Based on the Division Composite EWTL the basis for asset tasking messages. It is and copies of the Brigade EWTL Work- updated constantly during the operation sheets, the MI battalion task organization with input from the division EWS and the and actual deployment, and the technical IEW support elements. While the EWTL at data available in the TCAE, a working brigade and division are planning tools, the board for EW missions will be maintained TCAE EWTL/JS is a management tool for in the MI battalion TOC. Normally, one the tasking of the C&J platoons, SIGINT such board is maintained for each subordi- processing platoon, and flight platoon. A nate EW unit. The TCAE EWTL for each format for this TCAE EWTL/JS is provided unit will include the status and capabilities below.

~~TCAE EW TARGET LIST/JAMMING SCHEDULE WORKING BOARD~~

~~BOARD FOR PLATOON~~

~~ASSETS: STATUS: LOCATION: CAPABILITIES: PERSONNEL: GAR GAR GAR GAR GAR~~

~~PRIORITY TIME TARGET TARGET TARGET TECH DATA CONTROL COORDINATION RESULTS ESM ECM WINDOW UNIT LOCATION ACTIVITY FREO CSGN MECHANISM~~

~~SAMPLE ENTRIES:~~

310100Z- RAG. 141 NB325310 Calls lor 35.10 LION- On-off EWMSNSUM to NA 1 310200Z MRR fire msns MHz 34 2d Bde IEWSE 310300Z- Ha 131 Unknown Location 54.85 BEAR- 1 NA 310400Z MRR (LOB) MHz 62 NA TACREP to TCAE

~~F-Z APPENDIX G Dissemination Devices~~

The following chart indicates some of the governed by International Standardization intelligence reports and summaries used at Agreements with the exception of SIGINT corps and below and the types of informa- reports which are governed by US SIGINT tion or intelligence reported in each. This Directives (USSID). chart may be used to help determine which reports or summaries to select when reporting the types of information indicated in the left column of the chart. Most of the formats and reporting criteria applicable to these reports/summaries are

~~G-l DISSEMINATION SUMMARIES AND REPORTS~~

IMAGERY INTSUM SITREP PERINTREP INTREP ENEMY ACTIVITY REPORTS* NBC AIR MOVEMENTS NAVAL LOGISTIC AIRBORNE IRREGULAR EW ENEMY OB MISSIONS UNITS PERSONALITIES STRENGTH UNIFORMS/INSIGNIA CAPABILITIES/VULNERABILITIES NONEFFECTIVE UNITS COMPOSITION & DISPOSITION TACTICS TRAINING COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS CODE NAMES/NUMBERS RADIO FREQS/CALL SIGNS COMM/NONCOM SECURITY FWD TRACE POTENTIAL NUCLEAR TARGETS OBSTACLES & BARRIERS INSTALLATIONS, EVENTS,SIGHTINGS

~~ENEMY CAPTURED DOCU/EQUIP ESPIONAGE SABOTAGE WEATHER & TERRAIN FRIENDLY FWD TRACE LOCATION OF FRIENDLY UNITS RESULTS OF OPERATIONS PIR~~

~~• IN-FLIGHT REPORT • INITIAL/SUPPLEMENTAL PROGRAMED • RECONNAISSANCE EXPLOITATION REPORT INTERPRETATION REPORT • RADAR EXPLOITATION REPORT~~

~~G-2 APPENDIX H The Collection Plan~~

The collection plan has no prescribed At corps and division, collection planning format. The selection of a format at any is more complex. The PIR of a corps com- particular headquarters is based on the mander often require painstaking analysis, requirements of that headquarters and the and the coordination of the overall collec- resources available for collection manage- tion effort is a major undertaking. For that ment. However, regardless of the format reason, written collection worksheets preselected, it must follow the logical sequence pared at these echelons are very detailed. of collection management described in The following diagram shows a collection Chapter 3. In addition, the plan must be plan format suitable for division and corps. easily adjustable to changing requirements, Brigades and battalions modify this format situations, and missions. This appendix to fit their requirements. provides two recommended formats which may be adjusted to fit specific requirements. The intelligence collection plan worksheet is a valuable aid to collection, management in planning and directing the collection effort. For many requirements, particularly those concerned with enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities, a written collection worksheet is advisable. The detail in which it is prepared, however, depends on the particular requirement to be satisfied and the extent to which the overall collection effort must be coordinated. At battalion and brigade, the collection plan worksheet is very informal. It may consist of a list of available collection means plus brief notes or reminders on current intelligence requirements and specific information that must be collected.

~~H-l COLLECTION WORKSHEET FORMAT~~

~~COLLECTION AGENCIES~~

~~PRIORITY INDICATORS SPECIFIC PUCE AND TIME REMARKS INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION TO REPORT REQUIREMENTS REQUIREMENTS AND INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS~~

INSTR JCTIONS PUCE AN X UNDER EACH PUCE MAY BE A INCLUDE MEANS AGENCY THAT CAN COLLECT HEADQUARTERS OR OF REPORTING LIST PIR/IR. LIST INDI- LIST SPECIFIC INFOR- THE REQUIRED INFORMATION. UNIT. ¡VIA SPOT RE- LEAVE SUF- CATORS MATION REQUIRED TO CIRCLE THE X WHEN AN PORT FORMAT); FICIENT SPACE THAT WILL SATISFY THE INDI- AGENCY HAS BEEN SELECTED TIME MAY BE ESTABLISHED TO LIST SATISFY CATOR. KEY REQUIRE- AND TASKED. SPECIFIC. PERIODIC. COMMUNICATIONS INDICATORS EACH PIR. MENTS TO NAI ON THE OR AS OBTAINED. ¡MULTICHANNEL. FOR EACH EVENT TEMPUTE IF FM. RATT). OR PIR/IR POSSIBLE. THESE STATE "BY SOP" IN COLUMN 2. REQUIREMENTS FORM IF SOP CRITERIA THE BASIS FOR SPE- APPLIES FOR CIFIC ORDERS ANO RESPONDING TO REQUESTS. COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS. EX Ah IPLE

1. Will ths Massing of mach Enemy movement enemy atlick? elements, between ridge trie If so. whan, artillery. 5047-5042 to Seine where, and and logistical River. Rpt size and in what support. type unit direc- strength? tion of movement dhd termination pt. Special attention to 2. — NAI 3. 5. & 8.

~~The following illustration provides an example of a completed collection worksheet using fictitious data.~~

H-2 CLASSIFICATION UNIT: Wnd Inf Div COLLECTION PLAN PERIOD COVERED: FROM TO- COORDINATES AGENCIES TO BE EMPLOYED PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE INDICATIONS AVENUE OF APPROACH FM TQ 5720 HOUR AND REQUIREMENTS AND (ANAYLSIS OF INTELLIGENCE TO UQ 9273 DESTINATION OF INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS) MOBILITY CORRIDOR NO O REPORTS REQUIREMENTS 5 m CT/> toZ 5i *o O ^ PIK NAMED SPECIFIC ORDERS OBSERVED O 55 AREA OF TIME r> so "o "O > — Z ** I. Will th* fnemy iitiark.' «. Formaîtunof RAGs & DAG», INTEREST OR REQUESTS Z- ci en O O a tu o O b. Excessive barrage jamming Report formation of If si>. who. whut. when, RAG# &DAGs for O where, and in wHri strength' c Massing of motorized rifle the following units; r elements, tanks, artillery & logistic H +4 67TD. 63TD. U/J © © support MRD VIC UQOfil? r- d. Movement of units forward. m lb Report jamminguf o all nets w/empha- H-M'2 sisonCMDÄ con © © © © © H trol nets Report number & type of vehicles in emphasisfwd assembly to areas vie TQG020. TyfUlH ■ü UQOfil 7 r Report of move > mem south out of fwd assembly areas vie highways 7."». © © 2:i. 120. 36 & 7 COORDINATES AGENCIES TO BE EMPLOYED o AVENUE OF APPROACH a FM TQ 5901 Bnelly state specific information MOBILITY CORRIDOR NO to ce sought that will substantiate 2 TO TQ 8220 each indication. > NAMED SPECIFIC ORDERS OBSERVED Specific information needs AREA OF OR REQUESTS TIME become the basis io> orders and INTEREST requests to collect mlormation (List all available units that can be employed m the collection of requoed information) Place an "X" under each unit that caninformation acquire soughl.the specific Circle the "X" thatunder will Ihe be unit assigned actually colleciion selected action CLASSIFICATION

aI 03 A visual file index, using 5x8 inch cards, □ Additional distribution of results. is another method for maintaining a collec- Collection agencies tasked and time. tion plan. In this method, a collection □ requirement is displayed across the bottom □ Time the answer was received. of a card. The remainder of the card may □ Answer. contain the following: □ Time the answer was disseminated to Priority. □ the requestor. □ Request or request number. □ Time requested and time when infor- The following illustrations provide exam- mation will no longer be of value. ples of the visual file system.

~~COLLECTION COORDINATION VISUAL FILE FOLDER~~

PRIORITY: 1 PRIORITY: REQUESTOR: G2, 52d DIV (M) REQUESTOR: TIME REQUESTED: 050200 MAY 82 TIME REQUESTED: ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION: NONE ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION: COLLECTION AGENCY COLLECTION AGENCY TASKED: 5th CORPS TASKED: REQUEST NO: RM 04 REQUEST NO: TIME REQUIRED: 052100 MAY 82 TIME REQUIRED: RESPONSE: TELS LOCATION RESPONSE: VICINITY OF COORDINATES NB580160. TIME ANSWER TIME ANSWER DISSEMINATED: 052015 MAY 82 DISSEMINATED: REQUEST LOCATIONS OF ANY TELS IN VICINITY OF COORDINATES NA430970, NB370180, AND NB580160. REQUEST LOCATIONS OF ANY METEOROLOGICAL ASSOCIATED RADARS IN VIC OF COORDS NA4397, NB3718, AND NB5816. REQUEST REPORT OF HEAVY VEHICLE MOVEMENT AND DIREC- TION IN VICINITY OF COORDINATES NA660980 AND NB664014. REQUEST LOC OF ANY HEAVILY GUARDED AREA WHERE PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED IN VIC COORDS NA430970, NB370180, AND NB580160. REQUEST LOCATIONS OF ANY 180MM GUN AND 240 MORTARS IN SECTOR.

~~H-4 COLLECTION MANAGEMENT VISUAL FILE CARD~~

PRIORITY: 1 REQUESTOR: G2, 52d DIV (M) REQUEST NO: Rll 04 TIME REQUESTED: 050200 MAY 82 TIME REQUIRED: 052100 MAY 82 ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION: NONE COLLECTION AGENCY TASKED: 5th CORPS TIME: 052015 MAY 82 RESPONSE: TWO TELS LOCATION VICINITY OF COOR- DINATES NB580160, UNDER CAM, LAUNCHERS ERECTED.

~~REQUEST LOCATIONS OF ANY TELS IN VICINITY OF COOR- DINATES NA430970, NB370180, AND NB580160.~~

Priorities can be shown by using different If the visual file method is used, the col- colored cards or index tabs. For example, if lection manager must maintain two charts. a request must be answered within a certain One chart is used to depict the PIR and IR timeframe, a red card or index tab will which drive the collection effort. The second highlight its importance to the collection chart lists the available units and agencies, manager, no matter how many shift and those tasked with each requirement. changes take place. This chart is needed to prevent overloading or overlooking any single available collec- The cards can be grouped in the visual tor. Both charts are shown in the following files in a number of ways: OB factors, illustrations. NAIs, requestor, or collector. In each operation the file may start out one way and, by necessity, be changed as the situation changes. This can be accomplished quickly as the cards are easily manipulated. When the collection requirement is satisfied, the card is removed from the visual files. The remainder of the cards are not disrupted. The 5x8 card can then be placed in a small file organized by geographic areas. This enables the collection manager to build a data base on the responsiveness of the collection agencies within the geographical areas.

~~H-5 COMMANDER'S PIR/IR~~

~~PIR IR~~

~~1. Does the enemy intend to 1. What is the location of deploy nuclear weapons in the the second echelon? When the division sector? will it be committed?~~

~~2. What avenue of approach will the enemy use Into FULDA?~~

~~AVAILABLE AGENCIES AND TASKING~~

~~AGENCIES TASKING~~

~~Ml BN RII-01~~

~~DIVARTY RII-03~~

~~ENGR BN~~

~~ARMORED CAVALRY SOD~~

~~BRIGADES~~

~~CORPS RII-02, R11-04, RII-05~~

~~ADJACENT DIVISIONS~~

~~6 APPENDIX I~~

~~Tactical Special Security Operations~~

INTRODUCTION peacetime as in war. Additionally, the SSO / in the field will have to comply with the tac- The SSO system is a DÓD security and tical commander's OPSEC policy. communications system used to transmit SCI between commands and services and to and from national-level intelligence agen- SECURITY STANDARDS FOR cies using the Defense Special Security FIELD OPERATIONS Communications System (DSSCS), the Armed Forces Courier Service (ARFCOS), Minimum physical security requirements or secure facsimile systems. It also secures for field sensitive compartmented informa- SCI and provides for its widest possible dis- tion facilities (SCIFs) are specified in Chap- semination consistent with applicable ter 7, Defense Intelligence Agency Manual security guidelines. In addition, the system 50-3. SSOs must review and update their provides privacy communications (EYES unit field SOP to ensure that security ONLY) service to general officers, promot- standards are applied. The requirements able colonels, and designated equivalent- identified in the following paragraphs grade civilians. should be improved upon as the enemy situation, terrain, and timé dictate. The ACSI-DA is responsible for operation of the DA portion of the SSO system. This When the SCIF area is located within the is accomplished through the US Army Spe- confines of the supported command's TOC cial Security Group (USASSG). USASSG is and defensive perimeter, the SCIF area responsible for direction and coordination must be conspicuously marked by a physi- of all Army SCI operations and facilities. It cal barrier. When the SCIF area is outside directly commands and controls all nontac- the supported headquarters TOC and de- tical EAC SSOs and exercises security fensive perimeter, the SCIF area should be jurisdiction over tactical SSO operations at fenced with triple-strand concertina wire. corps and below. This security jurisdiction However, if the SCIF is subject to frequent includes advice and assistance relating to moves (once per 8- to 10-hour span), single- the security, handling, and use of SCI, billet strand concertina or a similar type of wire management, completeness of documents may be employed. requesting SCI products, and inspections of The SCIF perimeter must be guarded by SCI facilities and SSO operations. It also fixed or patrolling armed guards. The types includes training for tactical SSOs, both of weapons and ammunition issued to the active and reserve. guards will be prescribed by the supported In the training environment the SSO has command. The use of deadly force should be the added responsiblity of controlling the addressed in the unit tactical SOP. distribution of both "real world" and exer- Access to the SCIF area is restricted to a cise SCI traffic. Although exercise traffic in single gate or entrance. The gate or most instances is written for a particular entrance to the SCIF area must be guarded training exercise, the SSO must bear in on a 24-hour basis. A landline between the mind that exercise data pertaining to opera- entrance point guard and the SSO adminis- tional forces' OB, organization, operational trative area will facilitate the rapid and indicators, formations, and use of terrain efficient entry of cleared personnel. can readily become "real world" traffic in wartime. It is imperative that the tactical The SSO maintains a current access ros- SSO realize that special security functions ter that includes SCI-indoctrinated person- in the field environment are the same in nel of the local command, very important

1-1 persons, observers, umpires, controllers, COMMUNICATIONS augmentées, and other authorized person- The SSO coordinates with the local unit nel requiring access. Access will be re- headquarters commandant and, as neces- stricted to those on the access roster. Access sary, with the signal battalion for teletype by others (such as maintenance personnel) circuits, landlines, establishment and resto- may become necessary, but must be mini- ration priority, key lists, backup systems mized and controlled by the SSO. (usually courier), maintenance of on-site A minimum of two SCI-indoctrinated per- communications equipment, and any sonnel will be present in the SCIF(s) at all unique communications procedures such as times. changing the teletype word-per-minute rate to achieve system compatibility with other SSOs. The SSO will not be the only element Communications, both wire and radio if in the CP with SCI communications. MI possible, will be established and main- units have access to a variety of SCI-secure tained with the security guards. Use of field communications facilities. Requirements to phones is authorized if a filter or some other support several locations can be met by suitable means is used to preclude inadver- combining equipment to meet both tent disclosure of information over open requirements or in agreements to serve as lines or circuits. One acceptable method alternative deliverers. would be to utilize a TA 312 connected to a switchboard in the SCIF. The internal phone lines are connected to the switch- TRANSPORTATION board only when talking. At all other times Vehicles for the SSO should be requested the internal phone lines will be discon- through headquarters and headquarters nected. Use of FM radios in SCIFs is a company, corps, or division. Should addi- potential security hazard, but, if used, tional vehicles be necessary to support sev- radios should be as far away as possible eral dispersed field SCIFs, they should be from classified discussion areas and other requested through the headquarters and communications equipment. When FM headquarters company commander. radios are transmitting, classified discussion must be kept to an absolute minimum MILITARY POLICE consistent with operational necessity. The SSO coordinates with the headquar- Emergency destruction and evacuation ters commandant or the MP unit supporting plans will be current and maintained in the the command for SCIF-entrance point and facility. roving guards and the reaction force. The SSO should provide SCIF guards an SOP When not in use, and during SCIF reloca- that addresses, but is not limited to, control tion, SCI material will be locked in GSA- of the SCIF, criteria for admittance, actions approved containers. If for some reason the during attack, use of deadly force, and above minimum standards cannot be met, inspection of notebooks and briefcases. SSOs should request a waiver in accordance Alternate SSOs supporting separate bri- with procedures outlined in Chapter 7 of the gades or TCAEs may have to employ non- SSO Handbook. MP guards. Guards themselves need not be COOEDINATION SCI indoctrinated provided they conduct MEQUIMEMENTS roving patrols and control accesses outside the protective perimeter. The following guidelines apply to the EXERCISE COMMUNICATIONS planning and preparation for field opera- INTELLIGENCE tions. Although the responsibility for SSO operations rests with the G2, in most cases Chapter 7, DOD Directive 5200.17(M2), the SSO effects coordination in the name of permits the use of exercise COMINT during the G2. exercises provided that the material is handled in accordance with existing regulations governing the security, use, and dissemination of real-world COMINT material.

1^ The authority to approve the use of exercise the prepositioning of materiel configured to COMINT is governed by Chapter 5, AR SSO- unit sets (POMCUS) draw, and movement SS. The chief, TCAE should be consulted to various marshalling and assembly areas. regarding current guidelines contained in Eligible users should be reminded of the the appropriate USSID. When used, exer- parallel "Personal For" channel provided cise COMINT must be physically separated by the signal corps. and handled separately from real-world VISIT CERTIFICATION COMINT. In some commands, the SSO performs the sanitization, while in others the The SSO coordinates visits with the SSOs ASPS sanitizes under the supervision of the of higher, lower, and adjacent participating SSO. Whatever the process, the SSO is units, and with the secretary of the general ultimately responsible for ensuring saniti- staffs protocol and joint visitors bureau, if zation and must ensure that all evidence of established. Visit certification messages COMINT is removed from documents dis- should be received by the SSO in advance of seminated outside the SCIF, When exercise the planned visit. Visit certifications should COMINT is used, a report is required by reflect personnel traveling with the visiting paragraph 5-4c, AR 380-35. The proper VIP who are authorized to receive EYES authority for use of exercise COMINT is ONLY messages. given to the MACOM commander in PERSONNEL AUGMENTATION CONUS and outside continental United States (OCONUS) or is delegated from the The SSO coordinates with the G2 for per- unified command OCONUS. The proper sonnel augmentation. Additional personnel authority must designate in writing those may be needed to operate a garrison SCIF staff sections that can act in the command- and one or more field SCIFs simulta- er's behalf. Noncodeword COMINT-based neously. SSO augmentation personnel reporting under the provisions of USSID should be given sufficient time prior to 369 and USSID 316 is exempt. movement to become familiar with SSO equipment and procedures. BLACK BOOK OPERATIONS SECURITY The SSO coordinates with the G2, command group, and other authorized recip- OPSEC includes all actions taken to pre- ients, to determine delivery requirements. vent the enemy from gaining knowledge of General officers probably will have limited operations. Sound physical security and time for the black book during an exercise communications security procedures must or contingency situation. Due to security be followed for a successful OPSEC pro- constraints, it is recommended that the G2 gram. The SSO coordinates with the com- and SSO restrict delivery to the general mand's CI analysis section for information officer level but have the black book avail- on the multidisciplined hostile threat. The able in the SCIF for other indoctrinated SSO should consider the following security personnel with a need to know. measures: EYES ONLY MESSAGES □ Separating trash and paper (including all forms of written material and The SSO coordinates with the G2 and carbons). command group. Due to the importance of EYES ONLY messages to the command, □ Destruction means. the SSO must know how and when to reach □ Screening of all outgoing material. authorized users and be aware of unusual transmission procedures. The SSO must □ Appointing and briefing additional plan to provide service during periods when SCI couriers. SSO communications systems are not □ Briefing all SCIF personnel on SCI operational or not yet in place. Situations handling and security. where this contingency should be considered include the aerial port of debarkation/seaport of debarkation (APOD/SPOD),

1-3 □ Obtaining TOC passes. SCIF perimeters should have restricted area signs displayed around them and, due to □ Using wire instead of radio. SCI holdings, should be designated nonplay □ Using authorized authentication areas during exercises. In exercise situa- procedures and codes. tions, the SCIFs should be placed off limits SUPPLIES AND SERVICES in the exercise directive and the G2 and chief umpire or controller should publicize The SSO coordinates requirements for that fact. protective wire and camouflage nets with In most units the location of the SCIF the corps or division headquarters and will be directed by the G2 in coordination headquarters company. with the G3. The priorities assigned to the SPECIAL SECURITY OFFICERS work needed to establish a SCIF, once the COORDINATION SSO arrives on site, vary according to command SOP and current conditions. Coordination between SSOs participating However, the work will include the follow- in a joint training exercise is necessary to ing tasks: ensure that information impacting on SSO operations is disseminated in a timely □ Position vehicles. manner. □ Ready work areas for use. FIELD SCIF CONFIGURATION □ Establish communications. AND ESTABLISHMENT □ Establish SCIF perimeter. Due to the importance of IE W to tactical units, SSOs are responsible for the techni- □ Camouflage the area. cal security supervision of increasing □ Control access using guards or SSO numbers of SCIFs during exercises. In addi- personnel. tion to supporting TOCs with SCIFs, MI operations centers will also serve as SCIFs, □ Declare area secure. stretching SSO supervision to the maxi- □ Begin SCI operations. mum. As described earlier, the SSO has overall responsibility for all SCI activities. Special attention must be paid to coordi- To facilitate supervision of multiple loca- nation of SSO requirements with the divi- tions, an assistant SSO may be appointed sion or corps headquarters commandant. on orders. The actual establishment of a This officer is responsible for the physical field SCIF will depend on a number of fac- plant of the division or corps TOC. He oper- tors, including doctrinal requirements and ates in the name of the division or corps the real-world considerations of fighting a chief of staff and has the authority to over- well-armed, increasingly technologically rule the SSO regarding SCIF siting. The oriented enemy versus participation in a SSO must carefully orient the headquarters controlled exercise. The SSO, G2, G3, and commandant regarding tactical SCIF MI unit commander should consider the fol- requirements. The SSO must be aware of lowing when planning for the establish- TOC relocation plans and schedules. The ment of a SCIF: SSO must also be aware when the TOC perimeter has been dropped since a reduc- □ SOP of local command and supported tion in overall security has a negative unit. impact on SCIF protection. □ Terrain. MI UNIT RESPONSIBILITIES □ Enemy capabilities. The MI unit has responsibility for SCI Rear area threat. □ operations associated with MI unit opera- A SCIF must have its own separate tions. In supporting its operations, the MI perimeter no matter where it is located. unit may find it necessary to hold data base material and otherwise process SCI at the TCAE and at other locations. In any case,

1-4 these locations must meet field SCIF stan- also applicable to the corps SSO and MI dards as discussed in this appendix and in brigade. In addition, the corps SSO will relevant portions of Defense Intelligence have the responsibility of ensuring security Agency Manual 50-3. A responsible officer for assigned AN/TSQ-134(V), Interim Tac- must be assigned on orders as an alternate tical ELINT Processor, Digital Imagery SSO exercising SCI security responsibilities Test Bed, the tactical user terminal, and under the jurisdiction of the division SSO. any other SCI-processing systems. When These alternate SSOs can perform other not located in a CTOC SCIF area, these tasks such as MI unit billet management, systems must be supervised by an alternate indoctrinations, debriefing, sanitization, SSO acting for the corps SSO. and decompartmentation. It must be Further information concerning the SSO remembered, however, that all SSO opera- system and SCI security responsibilities tions in the division are the staff responsi- may be found in AR 380-28, AR 380-35, TB bility of the G2 and are supervised by the 380-35, DIAM 50-3, and the unofficial SSO division SSO. Thus, close coordination Handbook, published by the USASSG. between the SSO and MI unit alternate SSOs is essential. Personnel assigned as alternate SSOs must receive the same SSO training as the division SSO. The functions and responsibilities in the preceding descriptions of SSO operations were oriented toward the division. They are

~~1-5 GLOSSARY~~

AAA antiaircraft artillery AAFES Army and Air Force Exchange Service AASLT air assault abn airborne AC active component ACC area coordination centers ACofS Army Chief of Staff ACR armored cavalry regiment ACSI Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence AD air defense ADA air defense artillery ADC area damage control ADC-M assistant division commander-maneuver ADP automatic data processing ADPS automatic data processing system AE aerial exploitation AIDES Analyst's Intelligence Display and Exploitation System AIRES Advanced Imagery Requirements and Exploitation System ALO air liaison officer AM amplitude modulated AMC US Army Materiel Command ammo ammunition AO area of operations AOE Army of Excellence APOD aerial port of debarkation appl application AR Army regulation ARFCOS Armed Forces Courier Service arty artillery ASA Automated Systems Activity ASAS All-Source Analysis System ASG area support group ASL authorized stockage list ASOC air support operations center ASP ammunition supply point ASPS all-source production section assy assembly ATP ammunition transfer point AVIM aviation intermediate maintenance avn aviation AVUM aviation unit maintenance A WS Air Weather Service

BAT-D battlefield deception BCE battlefield coordination element bde brigade BCOC base cluster operations center BDLT base defense liaison team BDOC base defense operations center BICC battlefield information coordination center

~~Glossary-0 bn battalion BOMREP bombing report btry battery~~

C2 command and control C3 command, control, and communications C3CM command, control, communications countermeasures C3I command, control, communications, and intelligence CA civil affairs C&J collection and jamming CAS close air support cbt combat CCEWS Combined Commander's Electronic Warfare Staff C-E Communications-Electronics CEOI Communications-Electronics Operation Instructions CEWI combat electronic warfare and intelligence CFA covering force area chem chemical CI counterintelligence CIA Central Intelligence Agency CIC combined intelligence center CLSU COMSEC logistic support unit CM&D collection management and dissemination CMO civil/military operations CMT crisis management team co company COINS Community On-Line Intelligence System coll collection COMCAT Character Oriented Message Catalog COMINT communications intelligence comm communications comp component COMSEC communications security CONUS continental United States coords coordinates COP command observation post COSCOM corps support command CP command post CSA corps support activity CSG corps support group CSS combat service support CTOC corps tactical operations center ctr center CUBIC Common Users Baseline for the Intelligence Community

DA Department of Army DCS Defense Communications System DCSOPS Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans decon decontamination DF direction finding DIA Defense Intelligence Agency DIAOLS Defense Intelligence Agency On-Liné System

Glossary-1 DIE Defense Intelligence Estimate DISCOM division support command disem dissemination div division divarty division artillery DLIC detachment to be left in contact DMA Defense Mapping Agency DMSO division medical supply officer DOD Department of Defense DP decision points DS direct support DSO defense source operations DSSCS Defense Special Security Communications System DST decision support template DTG date-time group DTOC division tactical operations center DZ drop zone

EAC echelons above corps EACIC EAC intelligence center ECB echelons corps and below ECCM electronic counter-countermeasures ECM electronic countermeasures EEFI essential elements of friendly information ELINT electronic intelligence elm element EMCON emission control EMP electromagnetic pulse engr engineer EOB electronic order of battle EOD explosive ordnance disposal EPW enemy prisoner of war ESM electronic warfare support measures EW electronic warfare EWS electronic warfare section EWTL/JS electronic warfare target list/jamming schedule EXJAM expendable jammers

FA field artillery FAIO field artillery intelligence officer FARP forward arming and refueling points FDC fire direction center FEBA forward edge of the battle area FISINT foreign instrumentation signals intelligence FIST fire support team FLOT forward line of own troops fit flight FM field manual/frequency modulated FRAGO fragmentary orders FSE fire support element FSO fire support officer FSTC Foreign Science and Technology Center

~~Glos8ary-2 FTI fixed target indicators fwd forward~~

Gl Assistant Chief of Staff, G1 (Personnel) G2 Assistant Chief of Staff, G2 (Intelligence) G3 Assistant Chief of Staff, G3 (Operations and Plans) G4 Assistant Chief of Staff, G4 (Logistics) G5 Assistant Chief of Staff, G5 (Civil Affairs) GS general support GSA General Services Administration GRU General Staffs Main Intelligence Directorate (USSR) GSR ground surveillance radar

HF high frequency HHC headquarters and headquarters company HHOC headquarters, headquarters and operations company HHSC headquarters, headquarters and service company HPT high payoff target HQ headquarters HHT headquarters headquarters troop HNS host-nation support HUMINT human intelligence HVT high value target hvy heavy

IA imagery analysis I&W indications and warning ICD imitative communications deception IDHS Intelligence Data Handling Systems IDP initial delay position IED imitative electronic deception IEW intelligence and electronic warfare IEWSE intelligence and electronic warfare support element IMINT imagery intelligence INCD imitative noncommunications deception info information INSCOM Intelligence and Security Command intcp intercept intel intelligence intg interrogate/interrogation INTREP intelligence report INTSUM intelligence summary IPAC Intelligence Center Pacific IPB intelligence preparation of the battlefield IR information requirements IRDL Imagery Reconnaissance Directives List ISE intelligence support element ITAC Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center

Glos8ary-3 J2 Intelligence Directorate J3 Operations Directorate J6 Communications-Electronics Directorate JCEWS joint commander's EW staff JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff JIC Joint Intelligence Center JINTACCS Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command and Control Systems JOC joint operations center JSEAD joint suppression of enemy air defenses J-TENS Joint-Tactical Exploitation of National Systems JTF joint task force

~~KGB Committee for State Security (USSR) km kilometer~~

~~LIC low intensity conflict LLVI low-level voice intercept LOB line of bearing LOG lines of communication loe location LOS line of sight LRSD long range surveillance detachment It light LZ landing zone~~

MAAG Military Assistance Advisory Group MACOM major Army command maint maintenance MAXI Modular Architecture for the Exchange of Intelligence MBA main battle area MC mobility corridors MOD manipulative communications deception MGS master control station mech mechanical MED manipulative electronic deception MEDSOM medical, supply, optical, maintenance METT-T mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available MI military intelligence MUI meaconing, intrusion, jamming, and interference MMC Materiel Management Center MNCD manipulative noncommunications deception MOPP mission oriented protective posture MORTREP Mortar Bombing Report MP military police MRR motorized rifle regiment MR/TK motorized rifle/tank MST maintenance support team MTI moving target indicator MTM mission tasking message

Glossary-d NAI named area of interest NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NBC nuclear, biological, chemical NCA national command authority NETCAP national exploitation of tactical capabilities NIE National Intelligence Estimate NIS national intelligence survey NONCOM noncommunications NPCC National Planning Coordination Center NPIC National Photo Interpretation Center NSA National Security Agency

OB order of battle OCOKA observation and fields of fire concealment and cover obstacles key terrain «venues of approach and mobility corridors OCONUS outside continental United States OMG operational maneuver group OP observation post op operations OPCON operational control OPLAN operations plan OPORD operations order OPSEC operations security

PACOM Pacific Command PCAC primary control and analysis center PDSC Pacific Command Data System Center PERINTREP periodic intelligence report PERINTSUM periodic intelligence summary PIR priority intelligence requirements PL phase line PLL prescribed load list pit platoon POL petroleum, oils, and lubricants POMCUS prepositioning of overseas materiel configured to unit sets prep preparation proc processing PSYOP psychological operations pt point

~~QSTAG Quadripartite Standardization Agreement~~

~~RADIAC radiation, detection, indication, and computation RAOC rear area operations center RATT radio teletypewriter RC reserve component REC radio electronic combat (not a US term)~~

Glossary-5 regt regiment reinf reinforced RE MB ASS Remotely Monitored Battlefield Sensor System REMS remotely employed sensors RF radio frequency RII request for intelligence information ROK Republic of Korea ROO rear operations officer rpt report RSTA reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition RTOC regimental tactical operations center

51 Adjutant (US Army) 52 Intelligence Officer (US Army) 53 Operations and Training Officer (US Army) 54 Supply Officer (US Army) 55 Civil Affairs (US Army) S&T intelligence scientific and technical intelligence SALUTE size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment SCI sensitive compartmented information SCIF sensitive compartmented information facility SDP second delay position SDIE Special Defense Intelligence Estimate sec section SED simulative electronic deception SHELREP shelling report sig signals SIGINT signals intelligence SIGSEC signal security SIR specific information requirements BITMAP situation map SLAR side-looking airborne radar SOLIS SIGINT On-Line Intelligence System SOP standing operating procedure SOTI security, operations, training and intelligence SPO security, plans, and operations SPOD seaport of debarkation spt support sqd squad SSA supply support activity SSM surface-to-surface missile SSO special security officer sta station STANAG Standardization Agreement STOL short takeoff and landing SUPINTREP supplementary intelligence report survl surveillance svc service S WO staff weather officer

~~TA target acquisition/theater Army TAACOM Theater Army Area Command~~

Glossary-6 tac tactical TACC tactical air control center TACFIRE tactical fire direction computer system TACP tactical air control party TACREP tactical reports TAI target area of interest T&A transcription and analysis TB technical bulletin TCAE technical control and analysis element TC&D tactical cover and deception TCF tactical combat force TE tactical exploitation TEL transporter-erector-launcher TENCAP tactical exploitation of national capabilities tm team TM training manual TMDE test, measuring, and diagnostic equipment TOC tactical operations center TOE Tables of Organization and Equipment TPL timed phase line TRADOC United States Army Training and Doctrine Command TREE transient radiation effects on electronics TS top secret TST time-sensitive target TVA target value analysis

UHF ultra high frequency USAF United States Air Force USAICS United States Army Intelligence Center and School USAINSBD United States Army Intelligence and Security Board USAREUR United States Army, Europe USASSG United States Army Special Security Group USIA United States Information Agency USSID United States Signals Intelligence Directive UW unconventional warfare

~~VHF very high frequency vic vicinity VTOL vertical takeoff and landing~~

~~WETM weather team xmsn transmission xplt exploitation~~

~~Glossary-7 REFERENCES~~

~~REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS~~

~~Required publications are sources which users must read in order to understand or to comply with this publication.~~

~~Field Manuals (FMs)~~

~~100-5 Operations~~

~~RELATED PUBLICATIONS Related publications are sources of additional information. They are not required in order to understand this publication.~~

~~Army Regulations (ARs)~~

37-55 Uniform Depot Maintenance Cost Accounting and Production Report- ing System 380-Series Security 380-28 (O) The Army Special Security Officer and Office System 380-35 (S) Department of the Army Communications Intelligence Security Regulations (U) 381-Series Military Intelligence 525-22 (S) Electronic Warfare (EW) Policy (U) 530-Series Operations and Signal Security 710-2 Supply Policy Below the Wholesale Level 750-1 Army Materiel Maintenance Concepts and Policies

~~Field Manuals (FMs)~~

1-100 Combat Aviation Operations 1-500 Army Aviation Maintenance 3-4 NBC Protection 3-5 NBC Decontamination 3-100 NBC Operations 5-30 Engineer Intelligence 5-146 Engineer Topographic Units 6-121 Field Artillery Target Acquisition 17-95 Cavalry Operations 19-1 Military Police Support for AirLand Battle 21-31 Topographic Symbols 21-32 Topographic Support 24-1 Combat Communications 24-33 Communications Techniques: Electronic Counter-Countermeasures 31-11 Doctrine For Amphibious Operations 31-12 Army Forces in Amphibious Operations (The Army Landing Forces) 31-70 Basic Cold Weather Manual 31-71 Northern Operations

Reference-)0 32-16 (C) ECM Handbook (U) 33-1 Psychological Operations 34-Series Intelligence and Electronic Warfare 34-2 (S) Collection Management (U) 34-3 Intelligence Analysis 34-10 Division Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations 34-25 Corps Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations 34-35 Armored Cavalry Regiment Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations 34-37 Echelons Above Corps Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations 34-40 (S) Electronic Warfare Operations (U) 34-52 Intelligence Interrogation 34-60 Counterintelligence 34-60A (S) Counterintelligence Operations (U) 34-62 Counter-Signals Intelligence (C-SIGINT) Handbook 34-80 Brigade and Battalion Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations 34-81 Weather Support for Army Tactical Operations 44-1 Air Defense Artillery Reference Handbook 55-40 Army Combat Service Support Air Transport Operations 71-101 (HTF) Infantry, Airborne, and Air Assault Division Operations (How to Fight) 90-2 Battlefield Deception 90-3 (HTF) Desert Operations (How to Fight) 90-6 Mountain Operations 90-10 (HTF) Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT) (How to Fight) 90-13 (HTF) River Crossing Operations (How to Fight) 90-14 Rear Battle 100-2-1 Soviet Army Operations and Tactics 100-2-2 Soviet Army Specialized Warfare and Rear Area Support 100-2-3 The Soviet Army Troops Organization and Equipment 100-10 Combat Service Support (How to Support) 100-20 Low Intensity Conflict 100-27 US Army/US Air Force Doctrine For Joint Airborne Tactical Airlift Operations 101-5 Staff Organization and Operations 101-5-1 Operational Terms and Symbols

~~Technical Bulletin (TB)~~

~~380-35 (C) Security, Use, and Dissemination of Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) (U)~~

~~Miscellaneous Publications~~

~~DIAM 50-3 (C) Physical Security Standards for Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (U) DOD 5200.17(M2) (TS) Special Security Manual (U)~~

~~JCS Pub 1 Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms JCS Pub 12 (S) Tactical Command and Control Procedures for Joint Operations (U)~~

Reference-1 DA Pam 550-Series Area Handbooks DA Pam 710-2-1 Using Unit Supply System Manual Procedures DA Pam 710-2-2 The Supply Support Activity (SSA) Supply System USSID 316 (S-CCO) Non-Codeword Reporting Criteria (U) USSID 369 (SCW) Tactical Reporting (U)

~~COMMAND PUBLICATIONS~~

Command publications cannot be obtained through Army wide resupply channels. Determine availability by contacting the address shown. Field circulars expire three years from the date of publication unless sooner rescinded.

~~Field Circulars (FCs)~~

6-20-10 Fire Support Targeting, USA Field Artillery School, Ft Sill, OK, May 85 34-118/6-34-10 The Targeting Process, USA Field Artillery School, Ft Sill, OK and USA Intelligence Center and School, Ft Huachuca, AZ, May 85

Reference-2 INDEX air defense artillery 2-20 intelligence and electronic warfare air-land battle 1-1, 2-4 mission 1-1 area of interest 1-3 system 2-1, 2-20 area of operations 1-2 intelligence, categories of targets 2-14 automated intelligence support 3-62, intelligence cycle 2-8 3-65 intelligence preparation of the battle- all-source analysis system 3-66 field 1-1,3-1, 3-3, 11-14 aviation 2-21 battlefield area evaluation 3-5, A-l decision points 3-20 named areas of interest 3-15 battlefield information coordination rear area 3-15, 11-14 center 2-3, 2-4, 2-24 target areas of interest 3-19 templates 3-4 decision support 3-19 collection management 3-3, 3-21, 11-15 doctrinal 3-12 collection plan 3-21, 3-36, 3-59, H-l event 3-15 collection resources 2-16 situation 3-15 combat information 2-13, 2-20, 3-24, terrain analysis 3-7, 3-10 3-61 threat evaluation 3-10 command, control, and communica- threat integration 3-10 tions countermeasures 1-3 weather analysis 3-9 CI 2-41, 4-15 intelligence resources 3-26 EW 2-41, 5-0, 5-7 armored cavalry regiment 2-38, 2-48 command relationships 6-0 battalion 2-24, 2-48 communications 5-12, 6-4 brigades 2-26, 2-48 counterintelligence 1-4, 2-19, 4-1, 4-10 company 2-22 corps 2-41, 2-48 departmental 2-47 data base 3-10, 3-38 division 2-30, 2-48 deception 2-19, 4-1, 4-13 echelons above corps 2-45, 2-48 battlefield deception cell 2-31, 2-41 rear area 11-16 CI support 2-19, 4-13 separate brigade 2-38, 2-48 electronic 5-5 intelligence, types of 2-7 human 2-13 imagery 2-14 electronic warfare 1-3, 2-16, 5-1 operational 2-10 control mechanisms 5-12 scientific & technical 2-14, 3-57, 3-65 ECCM 1-3, 2-18, signal 2-13, 2-34 ECM 1-3, 2-18, 5-2 strategic 2-9 ESM 1-3, 2-18, 2-34 tactical 2-11 planning 5-10 principles 5-9 targeting 5-7, F-0 engineers 2-21 long range surveillance detachment 2-34 low intensity conflict 12-5 field artillery 2-7, 2-20 maintenance 14-7 military intelligence battalions G2 2-3, 2-5, 2-30, 3-3, 4-6 aerial exploitation 2-43 G3 2-3, 2-5, 2-30, 3-3, 4-6 CEWI 2-34 ground surveillance radar 2-14, 2-28 operations 2-42

Index-1 tactical exploitation 2-42 rear area operations 4-10,11-1 tactical exploitation (reserve component) center 11-6,11-8 2-43 CI support 2-19, 4-10 military intelligence brigade (CEWI) IPB 11-14 2-36, 2-41, 11-14 reports G-l military intelligence companies electronic warfare annex 5-14, E-l armored cavalry regiment 2-38 electronic warfare estimate 5-14, D-l collection and jamming company, heavy imagery 3-64 division 2-28, 2-32, 2-34 intelligence annex 3-62, C-l collection and jamming company, light intelligence estimate B-l division 2-28 INTREP 3-63 company teams 2-26, 6-1 INTSUM 3-62, 3-63 electronic warfare company 2-34 interrogation 3-64 intelligence and surveillance company PERINTREP 3-62, 3-63, 3-64 2-34 PERINTSUM 3-64 separate brigade 2-38 S&T intelligence 3-65 spot 3-62 SUPINTREP 3-63 OPSEC 11-15,1-3 weather forecasts 3-64 CI support 2-19, 4-1, 4-6

~~signal security 2-19 psychological operations 2-21 situation development 1-1, 3-1, 11-15 special security officer 2-3,1-1 standard tactical missions 6-0 QUICKFIX flight platoon 2-36, 2-39 supply 14-1~~

tactical operations center support element 2-3, 2-30, 2-32, 2-41 ASPS 2-32, 3-10, 3-20, 3-22, 3-59 CM&D 2-32, 3-20 CI analysis 2-33, 2-34 EWS 2-31, 2-33, 5-1 FAI O 2-31, 2-33, 3-60 OPSEC staff element 2-31, 2-33, 2-34 terrain team 2-33 weather team 2-33 target development 1-1, 3-1, 3-51, 8-2, 11-15 tasking flow 3-33 task organization 6-1 technical control and analysis element 2-33

~~Index-2 FM 34-1 2 JULY 1987~~

~~By Order of the Secretary of the Army:~~

~~CARL E. VUOIMO General, United States Army Chief of Staff Official:~~

~~R. L. DILWORTH Brigadier General, United States Army The Adjutant General~~

~~DISTRIBUTION: Active Army, USAR, andARNG: To be distributed in accordance with DA Form 12-11 A, Require- ments for Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations (Qty rqr block no. Ill 7).~~

~~«U.S. G.P.O. 1987-726-0lU:¡mi3 3000020914~~

~~PIN: 056073-000~~