DOCSLIB.ORG

AFDD 2-3.1 Foreign Internal Defense

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
AFDD 2-3.1 Foreign Internal Defense FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE Air Force Doctrine Document 3-22 15 September 2007 Interim Change 2 (Last Review), 1 November 2011 This document complements related discussion found in Joint Publication 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense. BY ORDER OF THE AIR FORCE DOCTRINE DOCUMENT 3-22 SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE 15 SEPTEMBER 2007 INCORPORATING INTERIM CHANGE 2, 1 NOVEMBER 2011 SUMMARY OF CHANGES The Air Force Doctrine Working Group has reviewed this document and recommended that it remains valid and will again be reviewed no later than September 2012. AFDD numbering has also been changed to correspond with the joint doctrine publication numbering architecture. AFDD titles and content remain unchanged until updated in the next full revision. A margin bar indicates newly revised material. Old Number New Number Title AFDD 2-1 changed to AFDD 3-1 Air Warfare AFDD 2-1.1 changed to AFDD 3-01 Counterair Operations AFDD 2-1.2 changed to AFDD 3-70 Strategic Attack AFDD 2-1.3 changed to AFDD 3-03 Counterland Operations AFDD 2-1.4 changed to AFDD 3-04 Countersea Operations AFDD 2-1.6 changed to AFDD 3-50 Personnel Recovery Operations AFDD 2-1.7 changed to AFDD 3-52 Airspace Control AFDD 2-1.8 changed to AFDD 3-40 Counter-CBRN AFDD 2-1.9 changed to AFDD 3-60 Targeting AFDD 2-10 changed to AFDD 3-27 Homeland Operations AFDD 2-12 changed to AFDD 3-72 Nuclear Operations AFDD 2-2 changed to AFDD 3-14 Space Operations AFDD 2-2.1 changed to AFDD 3-14.1 Counterspace Operations AFDD 2-3 changed to AFDD 3-24 Irregular Warfare AFDD 2-3.1 changed to AFDD 3-22 Foreign Internal Defense AFDD 2-4 changed to AFDD 4-0 Combat Support AFDD 2-4.1 changed to AFDD 3-10 Force Protection AFDD 2-4.2 changed to AFDD 4-02 Health Services AFDD 2-4.4 changed to AFDD 4-11 Bases, Infrastructure… [Rescinded] AFDD 2-4.5 changed to AFDD 1-04 Legal Support AFDD 2-5 changed to AFDD 3-13 Information Operations AFDD 2-5.1 changed to AFDD 3-13.1 Electronic Warfare AFDD 2-5.3 changed to AFDD 3-61 Public Affairs Operations AFDD 2-6 changed to AFDD 3-17 Air Mobility Operations AFDD 2-7 changed to AFDD 3-05 Special Operations AFDD 2-8 changed to AFDD 6-0 Command and Control AFDD 2-9 changed to AFDD 2-0 ISR Operations AFDD 2-9.1 changed to AFDD 3-59 Weather Operations Supersedes: AFDD 2-3.1, 10 May 2004 OPR: LeMay Center/DD Certified by: LeMay Center/DD Pages: 106 Accessibility: Available on the e-publishing website at www.e-publishing.af.mil for downloading Releasability: There are no releasability restrictions on this publication Approved by: LeMay Center/CC, Maj Gen Thomas K. Andersen, USAF Commander, LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education FOREWORD Today, the United States finds itself embroiled in counterinsurgency operations with multiple manifestations and broad implications. The resurgence of radical Islam and its use of terrorism to subvert and overthrow established governments to reshape society in its own image is but one of these manifestations. Other manifestations include ultra-nationalist militants seeking political autonomy within existing states and the use of violence and illicit narcotics trafficking to subvert or overthrow legitimate governments. Since the 9/11 tragedy, our efforts to prosecute terrorism and insurgency have produced the realization that a successful conclusion lies many years in the future and that success will be impossible without the active participation of global partners. A strategy of enabling partner nations to defend themselves against these internal threats is clearly emerging from that realization. US initiatives to support this strategy fall within an operating area termed foreign internal defense (FID). In fact, the Global War on Terrorism is taking place largely in the FID arena. The strategic end game is a partner nation capable of successfully integrating military force with other instruments of national power to eradicate lawlessness, terrorism, subversion, and insurgency. Although Air Force forces can perform FID across the range of military operations, the main form of FID support consists of assessing, training, advising, and assisting foreign aviation forces. Doctrine stresses this indirect approach to capture those aspects of FID that apply worldwide and that extend beyond the present conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Increased emphasis in this area can multiply US influence globally without requiring a standing-force presence in a multitude of locations. We know that military forces in many lesser-developed nations cannot engage in joint and coalition operations without US Air Force FID assistance. While Air Force forces can apply airpower at virtually any level of intensity, our ability to prosecute an indirect approach is crucial to Air Force FID. Virtually all nations have laws prohibiting foreign combat operations within their sovereign territory. Accordingly, partner nation forces will, in most instances, have to take the tactical offensive supported by US Air Force training and advisory assistance. That form of assistance will most often be the instrument of both choice and necessity. Where US forces must fight as a coalition partner with foreign forces, the full weight of airpower can be brought to bear in appropriate ways, and will play a crucial role. This doctrine document is designed to help Air Force commanders select appropriate options and tailor their efforts to fit the conditions at hand. ALLEN G. PECK Major General, USAF Commander, Air Force Doctrine Development and Education Center TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION.............................................................................................................vi FOUNDATIONAL DOCTRINE STATEMENTS...............................................................vii CHAPTER ONE— Foreign Internal Defense (FID) Fundamentals.................................. 1 Strategic Realities .................................................................................................................... 4 Principal Air Force FID Intiatives ........................................................................................... 5 CHAPTER TWO—Operational Environment................................................................... 9 General Characteristics........................................................................................................... 9 Understanding the Environment .......................................................................................... 10 Social and Political Conditions......................................................................................... 11 Threat Forms .......................................................................................................................... 12 Subversion........................................................................................................................... 12 Insurgency........................................................................................................................... 13 Lawlessness........................................................................................................................ 13 Terrorism ............................................................................................................................. 14 Airpower in Developing Nations........................................................................................... 15 Aircraft.................................................................................................................................. 16 Agile Combat Support Capabilities.................................................................................. 16 Aircraft Maintenance...................................................................................................... 16 Personnel......................................................................................................................... 17 Training ............................................................................................................................ 17 Communications............................................................................................................. 17 Air Facilities......................................................................................................................... 18 Intelligence .......................................................................................................................... 18 CHAPTER THREE—The Role of Airpower in FID ....................................................... 20 Flexibility and Versatility........................................................................................................ 21 Internal Defense and Development Strategy..................................................................... 21 Development and Mobilization......................................................................................... 22 Security and Neutralization............................................................................................... 22 Airpower Functions ................................................................................................................ 23 Air Mobility........................................................................................................................... 23 Agile Combat Support ....................................................................................................... 24 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance........................................................... 25 Command and Control
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Leonardo Helicopters Soar in Philippine Skies
    World Trade Centre, Metro Manila, Philippines 28-30 September 2016 DAILY NEWS DAY 2 29 September Leonardo helicopters soar in Philippine skies Elbit builds on M113 work New AFP projects progress Page 8 Changing course? South China Sea The Philippine Navy has ordered two AW159 Wildcat helicopters. (Photo: Leonardo Helicopters) verdict fallout Page 11 and avionics. It is no surprise that both aircraft and helicopters, the STAND 1250 the Philippine Air Force and Navy are Philippines’ strategic posture is Leonardo Helicopters has achieved extremely happy with their AW109s, interesting as it might open a number outstanding recent success in the considering them a step change in of opportunities for collaboration in the Philippine market. For example, the their capabilities.’ naval and air fields.’ Philippine Navy (PN) purchased five Leonardo enjoyed further success The company added: ‘With the navy AW109 Power aircraft and the when the PN ordered two AW159 undergoing modernisation plans, we Philippine Air Force (PAF) eight Wildcats (pictured left) in March. are ready to work with them in the field examples. The spokesperson commented: of naval guns, Heavy ADAS Daily News spoke to a ‘The AW159s were chosen after a such as the best-selling 76/62 metal Leonardo spokesperson about this. competitive selection to respond to Super Rapid gun from our Defence ‘The choice of the AW109 is very a very sophisticated anti-submarine Systems division. Furthermore, we Asia-Pacific AFV interesting because it represents the warfare (ASW) and anti-surface offer a range of ship-based radar and market analysis ambition of the Philippines to truly warfare (ASuW) requirement of the naval combat solutions that might be Page 13 upgrade their capabilities in terms of Philippine Navy.
    [Show full text]
  • How Technology Impacts Doctrine in Asymmetric Warfare
    0 How Technology Impacts Doctrine in Asymmetric Warfare Jeremiah Rozman Northfield Vermont Bachelors of Arts, University of Vermont, 2014 A Thesis presented to the Graduate Faculty of the University of Virginia in Candidacy for the Degree of Master of Arts Department of Foreign Affairs University of Virginia May, 2016 1 Abstract How does technology impact military doctrine, and how does this in turn impact political support for offensive, preventative or preemptive military action?1 I study defensive weapons systems, specifically focusing on missile defense in the theoretical context of technology and defense-based strategies as a whole. Through the study of Israel’s use of Iron Dome, I aim to demonstrate that technology can be an exogenous factor affecting military doctrine. Through careful case study analysis, I demonstrate that operationally successful defensive technologies can lead to the adoption of a defensive military doctrine by decreasing the political cost of inaction to the extent that allowing attrition becomes politically less costly than launching an offensive. Introduction A comparison of Israel’s two recent wars in Gaza, Operation Cast Lead in 2008/9 and Operation Protective Edge in 2014, indicates that the tactical success of Iron Dome, as a defensive military technology, can effect a change in military doctrine. The goal of this study is to demonstrate the effect of an unexpectedly successful defensive military technology on military doctrine, an effect which leads to prioritizing defense, allowing attrition, and moving away from a long-standing offense-based doctrine, specifically when dealing with asymmetric conflict. This study focuses on Israel, specifically in the Gaza theater of conflict and not in the Northern theater of conflict where Israel’s adversary, Hezbollah is 1 Preemptive war is defined as actor A launching a first strike in order to gain advantage in a situation where an attack by actor B is anticipated to be imminent.
    [Show full text]
  • The Erosion of Strategic Stability and the Future of Arms Control in Europe
    Études de l’Ifri Proliferation Papers 60 THE EROSION OF STRATEGIC STABILITY AND THE FUTURE OF ARMS COntrOL IN EUROPE Corentin BRUSTLEIN November 2018 Security Studies Center The Institut français des relations internationales (Ifri) is a research center and a forum for debate on major international political and economic issues. Headed by Thierry de Montbrial since its founding in 1979, Ifri is a non- governmental, non-profit organization. As an independent think tank, Ifri sets its own research agenda, publishing its findings regularly for a global audience. Taking an interdisciplinary approach, Ifri brings together political and economic decision-makers, researchers and internationally renowned experts to animate its debate and research activities. The opinions expressed in this text are the responsibility of the author alone. ISBN: 978-2-36567-932-9 © All rights reserved, Ifri, 2018 How to quote this document: Corentin Brustlein, “The Erosion of Strategic Stability and the Future of Arms Control in Europe”, Proliferation Papers, No. 60, November 2018. Ifri 27 rue de la Procession 75740 Paris Cedex 15 – FRANCE Tel.: +33 (0)1 40 61 60 00 – Fax: +33 (0)1 40 61 60 60 Email: [email protected] Website: Ifri.org Author Dr. Corentin Brustlein is the Director of the Security Studies Center at the French Institute of International Relations. His work focuses on nuclear and conventional deterrence, arms control, military balances, and U.S. and French defense policies. Before assuming his current position, he had been a research fellow at Ifri since 2008 and the head of Ifri’s Deterrence and Proliferation Program since 2010.
    [Show full text]
  • Winning the Salvo Competition Rebalancing America’S Air and Missile Defenses
    WINNING THE SALVO COMPETITION REBALANCING AMERICA’S AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSES MARK GUNZINGER BRYAN CLARK WINNING THE SALVO COMPETITION REBALANCING AMERICA’S AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSES MARK GUNZINGER BRYAN CLARK 2016 ABOUT THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS (CSBA) The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments is an independent, nonpartisan policy research institute established to promote innovative thinking and debate about national security strategy and investment options. CSBA’s analysis focuses on key questions related to existing and emerging threats to U.S. national security, and its goal is to enable policymakers to make informed decisions on matters of strategy, security policy, and resource allocation. ©2016 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. All rights reserved. ABOUT THE AUTHORS Mark Gunzinger is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Mr. Gunzinger has served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Forces Transformation and Resources. A retired Air Force Colonel and Command Pilot, he joined the Office of the Secretary of Defense in 2004. Mark was appointed to the Senior Executive Service and served as Principal Director of the Department’s central staff for the 2005–2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. Following the QDR, he served as Director for Defense Transformation, Force Planning and Resources on the National Security Council staff. Mr. Gunzinger holds an M.S. in National Security Strategy from the National War College, a Master of Airpower Art and Science degree from the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, a Master of Public Administration from Central Michigan University, and a B.S. in chemistry from the United States Air Force Academy.
    [Show full text]
  • Getting the Philippines Air Force Flying Again: the Role of the U.S.–Philippines Alliance Renato Cruz De Castro, Phd, and Walter Lohman
    BACKGROUNDER No. 2733 | SEptEMBER 24, 2012 Getting the Philippines Air Force Flying Again: The Role of the U.S.–Philippines Alliance Renato Cruz De Castro, PhD, and Walter Lohman Abstract or two years, the U.S.– The recent standoff at Scarborough FPhilippines alliance has been Key Points Shoal between the Philippines and challenged in ways unseen since the China demonstrates how Beijing is closure of two American bases on ■■ The U.S. needs a fully capable ally targeting Manila in its strategy of Filipino territory in the early 1990s.1 in the South China Sea to protect U.S.–Philippines interests. maritime brinkmanship. Manila’s China’s aggressive, well-resourced weakness stems from the Philippine pursuit of its territorial claims in ■■ The Philippines Air Force is in a Air Force’s (PAF) lack of air- the South China Sea has brought a deplorable state—it does not have defense system and air-surveillance thousand nautical miles from its the capability to effectively moni- tor, let alone defend, Philippine capabilities to patrol and protect own shores, and very close to the airspace. Philippine airspace and maritime Philippines. ■■ territory. The PAF’s deplorable state For the Philippines, sovereignty, The Philippines has no fighter jets. As a result, it also lacks trained is attributed to the Armed Forces access to energy, and fishing grounds fighter pilots, logistics training, of the Philippines’ single-minded are at stake. For the U.S., its role as and associated basing facilities. focus on internal security since 2001. regional guarantor of peace, secu- ■■ The government of the Philippines Currently, the Aquino administration rity, and freedom of the seas is being is engaged in a serious effort to is undertaking a major reform challenged—as well as its reliability more fully resource its military to shift the PAF from its focus on as an ally.
    [Show full text]
  • Navy Shipboard Lasers for Surface, Air, and Missile Defense: Background and Issues for Congress
    Navy Shipboard Lasers for Surface, Air, and Missile Defense: Background and Issues for Congress Ronald O'Rourke Specialist in Naval Affairs December 9, 2010 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov R41526 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Navy Shipboard Lasers for Surface, Air, and Missile Defense Summary Department of Defense (DOD) development work on high-energy military lasers, which has been underway for decades, has reached the point where lasers capable of countering certain surface and air targets at ranges of about a mile could be made ready for installation on Navy surface ships over the next few years. More powerful shipboard lasers, which could become ready for installation in subsequent years, could provide Navy surface ships with an ability to counter a wider range of surface and air targets at ranges of up to about 10 miles. These more powerful lasers might, among other things, provide Navy surface ships with a terminal-defense capability against certain ballistic missiles, including the anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) that China is believed to be developing. The Navy and DOD are developing three principal types of lasers for potential use on Navy surface ships—fiber solid state lasers (SSLs), slab SSLs, and free electron lasers (FELs). The Navy’s fiber SSL prototype demonstrator is called the Laser Weapon System (LaWS). Among DOD’s multiple efforts to develop slab SSLs for military use is the Maritime Laser Demonstration (MLD), a prototype laser weapon developed as a rapid demonstration project. The Navy has developed a lower-power FEL prototype and is now developing a prototype with scaled-up power.
    [Show full text]
  • Air America in Laos III – in Combat by Dr
    Air America in Laos III – in combat by Dr. Joe F. Leeker First published on 29 May 2006, last updated on 23 March 2018. When, in May 1987, during the unveiling of the Air America Memorial at UTD’s McDermott Library at Richardson, former CIA director William Colby said that Air America aircraft were not combat aircraft, but transport aircraft, that was only true for most of Air America’s flights. But in at least three programs Air America crews flew or were to fly combat aircraft in Laos: B-26s in Projects Mill Pond and Black Watch in 1961 and T-28s as A-Team pilots for the Tango program. Already in July 1955, 2 C-47s chartered from CAT had participated in the first post-ceasefire combat jump flown by C-47s of the ANL (Armée Nationale Laotienne or Lao National Army), when the aircraft dropped the ANL’s airborne battalion, the Seno-based 1er Bataillon de Parachutistes, over the garrison of Moung Peun beleaguered by Pathet Lao forces.1 In August 59, PEO again contracted an Air America C-46 and C-47 for use in the Moung Peun paratroop drop.2 Then there was another absolutely unofficial use of Air America transport aircraft as bombers dropping “Hot soup”. Finally, many Air America aircraft flew combat support missions that brought them very close to the actual fighting: This was true for many missions flown by Air America’s helicopters, that is by the UH-34Ds assigned to the Madriver-contract and later especially for the Bells and S- 58Ts assigned to the AID-439-713 contract.
    [Show full text]
  • Distribution and Nesting Density of the Philippine Eagle Pithecophaga
    Ibis (2003), 145, 130–135 BlackwellDistribution Science, Ltd and nesting density of the Philippine Eagle Pithecophaga jefferyi on Mindanao Island, Philippines: what do we know after 100 years? GLEN LOVELL L. BUESER,1 KHARINA G. BUESER,1 DONALD S. AFAN,1 DENNIS I. SALVADOR,1 JAMES W. GRIER,1,2* ROBERT S. KENNEDY3 & HECTOR C. MIRANDA, JR1,4 1Philippine Eagle Foundation, VAL Learning Village, Ruby Street, Marfori Heights Subd., Davao City 8000 Philippines 2Department of Biological Sciences, North Dakota State University, Fargo, North Dakota 58105, USA 3Maria Mitchell Association, 4 Vestal Street, Nantucket, MA 02554, USA 4University of the Philippines Mindanao, Bago Oshiro, Davao City 8000 Philippines The Philippine Eagle Pithecophaga jefferyi, first discovered in 1896, is one of the world’s most endangered eagles. It has been reported primarily from only four main islands of the Philippine archipelago. We have studied it extensively for the past three decades. Using data from 1991 to 1998 as best representing the current status of the species on the island of Mindanao, we estimated the mean nearest-neighbour distances between breeding pairs, with remarkably little variation, to be 12.74 km (n = 13 nests plus six pairs without located nests, se = ±0.86 km, range = 8.3–17.5 km). Forest cover within circular plots based on nearest-neighbour pairs, in conjunction with estimates of remaining suitable forest habitat (approximately 14 000 km2), yield estimates of the maximum number of breeding pairs on Mindanao ranging from 82 to 233, depending on how the forest cover is factored into the estimates. The Philippine Eagle Pithecophaga jefferyi is a large insufficient or unreliable data, and inadequately forest raptor considered to be one of the three reported methods.
    [Show full text]
  • Asymmetric Warfare - the Siege of Fallujah
    ASYMMETRIC WARFARE - THE SIEGE OF FALLUJAH Csér Orsolya Abstract: Asymmetric warfare is a tactical process based on policy objectives which can be used to force our will upon the enemy. The non-traditional, inexpensive actions involving material damage and human casualties (such as terrorism, deployment of weapons of mass destruction, threat of using them, information warfare); guerrilla- and partisan-type raids implemented with simple tools and techniques are considered its basic advantages. All these are usually the weapons of the party fighting in the occupied territories (eg. bombings, suicide attacks, actions against logistics, command posts, attacks against officers, command staff, destruction of supply routes and transportation routes). The detection of these weapons and the psychological preparation of the soldiers is very difficult, because the offenders do not comply with the conventions of warfare. The siege of Fallujah in Iraq, which wrote itself into the history books as one of the most infamous and serious insurgencies and in which the media and propaganda played a major role, is regarded as an example of asymmetric warfare. Keywords: asymmetry, insurgency, guerrilla, civilians, civilian victim, propaganda, military gain 1. Introduction Asymmetry doesn't mean anything other than the lack of symmetry between the belligerents, partially or wholly. Asymmetric warfare is: "A warfare for the sake of precisely outlined political aims, often based on ideological, religious, ethnic community of several organizations, implementing military and non-military operations, tactics and techniques building upon direct and indirect effects and intensifying each other's effects, endangering different dimensions of security, mainly tactical procedures, with whose effect altogether we may force our will upon the enemy." All of this is such an activity that can be connected to asymmetric challenges, when the executors - in most cases not even sparing their own lives - execute military actions, and is usually done against a belligerent on a higher technological level.
    [Show full text]
  • Navy Irregular Warfare and Counterterrorism Operations: Background and Issues for Congress
    Navy Irregular Warfare and Counterterrorism Operations: Background and Issues for Congress Ronald O'Rourke Specialist in Naval Affairs November 8, 2011 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RS22373 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Navy Role in Irregular Warfare and Counterterrorism Summary The Navy for several years has carried out a variety of irregular warfare (IW) and counterterrorism (CT) activities. Among the most readily visible of the Navy’s recent IW operations have been those carried out by Navy sailors serving ashore in Afghanistan and Iraq. Many of the Navy’s contributions to IW operations around the world are made by Navy individual augmentees (IAs)—individual Navy sailors assigned to various DOD operations. The May 1-2, 2011, U.S. military operation in Abbottabad, Pakistan, that killed Osama bin Laden reportedly was carried out by a team of 23 Navy special operations forces, known as SEALs (an acronym standing for Sea, Air, and Land). The SEALs reportedly belonged to an elite unit known unofficially as Seal Team 6 and officially as the Naval Special Warfare Development Group (DEVGRU). The Navy established the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) informally in October 2005 and formally in January 2006. NECC consolidated and facilitated the expansion of a number of Navy organizations that have a role in IW operations. The Navy established the Navy Irregular Warfare Office in July 2008, published a vision statement for irregular warfare in January 2010, and established “a community of interest” to develop and advance ideas, collaboration, and advocacy related to IW in December 2010.
    [Show full text]
  • Gunships-By-Norm-Evans.Pdf
    Gunships There were many pre-Vietnam gunship-like aircraft, not only in the USA, and even more helicopter during and after this war. I will concentrate here on USAF and USMC fixed-wing gunships, starting with the early '60s. Project Tailchaser: Convair (A)C-131B First test flights with armed C-131B, serial 53- 7820, at Eglin AFB, 08/1964, with General Electric 7.62 mm SUU-11A/A Gatling Minigun. Project Gunship (I): Douglas C-47, FC-47D, AC-47D Tests were continued with a similar armed C-47D 44-8462 Terry & Pirates at Eglin AFB in 1964. The first real FC-47D was 43-48579 "Puff" (often called Puff the Magic Dragon), ferried back from Nha Trang to Bien Hoa, and fitted with 3 GE Miniguns, a Mark 20 Mod 4 sight (from A-1E Skyraider), VHF/UHF/FM radios, TACAN, IFF, 45 flares (200,000 candlepower) and 24,000 rounds of ammunition. Converted in 10/1964, and used by the 4th Air Commando Squadron. In Spring 1965 a second C-47D was converted in the same way. Four other were later armed with ten .30 calibre machine guns, Type M-2 Browning air-cooled. One of them was 43-48491 'Git-Em' Bullet, another was Grunt 2 and one may have had the serial '36440' (?). Three were operational with the 4th ACS and one was used for crew training at the Forbes AFB. All 6 original FC-47D were later redesignated AC-47D. Air International at Miami, FL, converted 20 more C-47 to AC-47D, which were used from Fall 1965 by the 4th ACS.
    [Show full text]
  • Ground Electronic Warfare: Background and Issues for Congress
    Ground Electronic Warfare: Background and Issues for Congress September 17, 2019 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R45919 SUMMARY R45919 Ground Electronic Warfare: Background and September 17, 2019 Issues for Congress John R. Hoehn Ground electronic warfare (EW) is a group of programs directed by the Army and Marine Corp Analyst in Military which are designed to effect ground forces use of the electromagnetic spectrum. The U.S. Capabilities and Programs military has several ground EW programs that are used for different missions. These programs can broadly be categorized into counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) systems, counter- unmanned aerial systems (C-UAS), and communications and radar jammers. Over the past several years, senior leaders in the Army and Marine Corps have testified about the need to improve EW capabilities. Role of EW in Ground Operations EW is a component of modern warfare, particularly in response to threats posed by potential adversaries such as Russia and China. EW refers to operations that use the electromagnetic spectrum (i.e., the “airwaves”) to detect, listen to, jam, and deceive (or “spoof”) enemy radars, radio communication systems, data links, and other electronic systems. EW also refers to operations that defend against enemy attempts to do the same. Ground EW programs have gained importance in an era of “great power competition.” Countries like Russia and China have developed so-called anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems, some of which are designed to prevent U.S. military access to radio and satellite communications, and to deny the use of radars for artillery and air defense operations.
    [Show full text]