The Maritime Compromise: British and American Naval Co-Operation, 1917-1919

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2015-08-06 The Maritime Compromise: British and American Naval Co-operation, 1917-1919

Halewood, Louis

Halewood, L. (2015). The Maritime Compromise: British and American Naval Co-operation, 1917-1919 (Unpublished master's thesis). University of Calgary, Calgary, AB. doi:10.11575/PRISM/28242 http://hdl.handle.net/11023/2385 master thesis

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The Maritime Compromise: British and American Naval Co-operation, 1917-1919

Louis Marc Halewood

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS

GRADUATE PROGRAM IN HISTORY

CALGARY, ALBERTA

JULY, 2015

Historians have portrayed the Anglo-American naval partnership during the Great

War as a fleeting oddity. It began under the pressure of the German submarine campaign, endured through to victory, and rapidly collapsed. Even in 1917-1918, that relationship was dominated by rivalry. The natural product was the so-called ‘naval battle of Paris’ in 1919.

In fact, this thesis demonstrates that between 1917-1919, the maritime relationship between these states always was characterised by co-operation and compromise, tempered by rivalry. This partnership was driven by the mutual aim of defeating Germany, and spurred by the exigencies of war. When that goal was accomplished, both Britain and the United

States recognised in the other a useful partner in constructing a liberal post-war order.

Consequently they worked together, postponing discussions over their naval differences so not to obstruct the Treaty of Versailles and the creation of a League of Nations. The failure of the peace caused naval rivalry, not the other way around.

ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A significant debt of thanks is owed to Dr. John Ferris for his tireless support and guidance. I am extremely grateful for his patience and persistence as a supervisor; it has been a privilege to work with someone so dedicated to his students and their betterment. I cannot thank the Department of History at the University of Calgary enough, not least for its generosity in funding. Without this, and the support of its first-rate students and academic staff, this thesis would not have been completed. I also owe my gratitude to the many staff I reached out to at archives during my research for their kindness.

On a personal note, I am greatly appreciative for the warm welcome and hospitality

I have received from the many wonderful people I have met during my time in Calgary, especially Anita. To my parents: thank you for your unwavering support in this endeavour, several thousand miles from home.

iii TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ...... ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... iii TABLE OF CONTENTS ...... iv

INTRODUCTION ...... 1

CHAPTER 1 ...... 16 1.1: The Historical Relationship ...... 16 1.2: The Outbreak of War ...... 20 1.3: The Test of American Neutrality ...... 22 1.4: Forcing Wilson’s Hand ...... 35

CHAPTER 2 ...... 42 2.1: Forging a Partnership ...... 42 2.2: Into Battle ...... 48 2.3: The Timetable of Co-operation ...... 58 2.4: Financial Difficulties ...... 63 2.5: Taking Action ...... 65

CHAPTER 3 ...... 75 3.1: Problems of Communication and Direction ...... 75 3.2: The House Mission ...... 81 3.3: Maintaining the Maritime Highways ...... 82 3.4: Taking the Offensive ...... 95 3.5: Harmony in the Grand Fleet ...... 101 3.6: The Mediterranean ...... 106

CHAPTER 4 ...... 113 4.1: Toward a New World Order ...... 113 4.2: American Shipbuilding and the Geddes Mission, August – October 1918 ...... 117 4.3: The Pre-Armistice Negotiations, October – November 1918 ...... 123 4.4: To the Peace Conference, December 1918 – February 1919 ...... 139 4.5: The Naval ‘Battle’ of Paris, March – April 1919 ...... 146 4.6: The Continuation of Co-operation and Compromise ...... 161

CONCLUSION ...... 165

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 170

INTRODUCTION

On 4th May 1917, with the underwater German guerre de course at its peak, the first

United States (US) destroyers ordered to serve with the Royal Navy (RN) arrived in

European waters. The Mayflower had returned, an event immortalised in an iconic painting of the Great War at sea, ‘The Return of the Mayflower’, by Bernard F. Gribble. Over the next eighteen months, a close and effective partnership was forged between the British and

American navies, particularly among the officers and men at sea. With the foe vanquished in November 1918, American ships sailed back to the Western Hemisphere, with goodwill toward their British counterparts, and vice versa. The commander of the Grand Fleet,

Admiral Sir David Beatty, told the senior American officer serving under his command,

Admiral Hugh Rodman: ‘We trust [your departure] is only temporary and that the interchange of Squadrons from the Two Great Fleets of the Anglo Saxon Race may be repeated… come back soon’.1 Rodman replied: ‘We all hope to serve again under your command’.2 Such warm words are easily dismissed as sentiment, but this was not the case.

Genuine friendships had grown up. The United States Navy (USN) replaced the Imperial

Japanese Navy (IJN) as Britain’s ‘closest sister service’.3

Such friendships were not the whole of Anglo-American relations. The First World

War damaged the British Empire, and boosted the US financially. Now holding the second largest navy in the world, senior American naval officers wanted more: a navy second to

1 Beatty to Rodman, 1st December 1918, ADM 137/1964 2 Rodman to Beatty, 1st December 1918, ADM 137/1964 3 Andrew Gordon, ‘The Admiralty and Imperial Overstretch, 1902-1941’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 17:1 (1994), 65 1

none. The decline of Britain and the RN and the rise of the US and the USN was one of the central events of the 20th century. Seapower was one of its key levers. It was critical to the outcome of both world wars. Despite the lack of fleet actions when compared with the

Second World War, seapower mattered as much to victory in the First World War. Britain’s ability to isolate Germany and exploit the resources of the empire and the world – especially the finances and manpower of the US – ensured that Germany could not resist its grinding down by the Allies and Associated Powers.4 Seapower remains a vital, if undervalued, element of international relations today. Two-thirds of the earth is ocean. Seas divide the greatest powers on earth, and maritime highways remain critical to global trade.

Naval power demands further study, especially naval co-operation, a part of maritime operations which has grown in importance through the joint exercise of seapower by organisations such as NATO.5 These needs are particularly true with regard to the First

World War, where little is known about how seapower was applied and functioned.

Historians know more about naval warfare in the age of sail than the Great War.6

Seapower was vital to national security and expansion in 1900. Britain, an island nation, had long depended on naval power as its safeguard. As its imperial expansion coloured the map red, the importance of the navy heightened. The end of British naval

4 Strachan’s work has been vital in shedding light on the First World War in its true global context beyond the Western Front, and explaining that the importance of seapower was not confined to the clash between the Grand Fleet and the German High Sea Fleet in the North Sea. William Philpott has also made a significant contribution to understanding the dynamics of this war of attrition, including the maritime front. See: Hew Strachan, The First World War (London: Simon & Schuster, 2003), 207-15, and The First World War Vol. I: To Arms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 1017-21; William Philpott, War of Attrition (New York: The Overlook Press, 2014), 7-8 5 John Hattendorf, ‘Foreword’ in Naval Coalition Warfare, ed. Bruce Elleman and S. C. M. Paine (London: Routledge, 2008), xvii. Cited in Louis Halewood, ‘What Explains the Effective Anglo-American Naval Co- operation during the Second World War?’, (BA diss., King’s College London, United Kingdom, 2012), 4 6 James Goldrick, ‘The need for a New Naval History of the First World War’, Corbett Paper No. 7 (2011), i 2

mastery during the Second World War marked a literal sea change in international relations. The US became the world’s predominant naval power, and one of the world’s only two superpowers, whereas the British Empire fell apart and its navy decayed. As with all transfers of military and naval power, the relationship between the RN and USN is most easily understood as one of competition. Britannia did not want to give up the trident.

Columbia sought to seize it. Yet such a notion does not fit the context of excellent Anglo-

American naval relations during the Second World War, when they combined to destroy the naval power of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Imperial Japan. Consequently, many historians have insisted that a belligerent power struggle took place earlier in Anglo-

American naval relations. In particular, the aftermath of the First World War, namely the

Paris peace conference, has been designated as the moment when battle lines were drawn between Britain and the US in the struggle to rule the seas.

That era is an obvious contender to that role for numerous reasons, principally because by 1919 the American and British navies were the two greatest navies in the world.

However, a broader study of Anglo-American relations between 1917 and 1919 reveals that the dynamics of their partnership were consistent from the US entry into the war to the achievement of an informal naval agreement at Paris in 1919. This relationship was driven by the pressure to attain mutual goals, firstly, to destroy German power, and then to establish a new liberal world order which would safeguard the individual interests of both these states and eliminate the possibility of another Great War. The exigencies of war, and then peace, exerted their own pressure to co-operate. When the German threat lessened during 1917-1918, and disappeared in 1919, pressures lessened, loosening the relationship.

Nevertheless, even then, overlapping aims gave British and Americans cause, and need, to co-operate and compromise on maritime matters.

Before the war the US surged onto the world stage as a serious naval power. It had fought Britain during the 19th century. The challenge was limited, and without attempts to overhaul the RN’s primacy. When the US looked outward as the 19th century drew to a close, American naval ambitions were stirred by the publication of Alfred Thayer Mahan’s

The Influence of Sea Power Upon History in 1890, which outlined the path to American greatness via maritime expansion on the model of the British Empire.7 In 1898, the US announced itself as a naval power as it triumphed over the Spanish at sea.8 Despite the

USN’s growth, Anglo-American political relations were amicable. Relations became more turbulent with the outbreak of war in Europe. The British immediately applied economic pressure on Germany, and prevented neutral American ships from trading freely with continental Europe. This outraged sections of American society.

Despite the furore over the challenge to neutral rights, the US soon found itself in partnership with Britain as Germany, via its campaign of unrestricted submarine warfare, made itself the greater menace. The nature of the American entry into the war set the basis for the partnership with Britain which developed. The US disliked British practices of economic warfare between 1914 and 1916, but the limits posed to the US economy by closing the markets of the Central Powers were outweighed by the enormous orders submitted by the Allies, which caused the American economy to soar. Principled outrage

7 Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, new edition (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1987), 1 8 Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), 182 4

over British violations of ‘neutral rights’ was insufficient as a casus belli. German aggression and the atrocities pinned to it by Allied propaganda were similarly insufficient to spur the US into action. Self-interest dominated decision-making in Washington. Only when Germany posed a serious, sustained threat to American lives and territory did the US enter the fray. Consequently, historians must be wary of notions of ‘pan-Anglo-Saxonism’ which abounded in the early 20th century, shaped parts of the historiography, and affect our own views in hindsight. Senior politicians, diplomats, and naval officers on both sides of the Atlantic, notably Sir Arthur Balfour, the American Ambassador in London Walter

Hines Page, Rear Admiral William Sowden Sims, and Captain William Pratt, spoke heartily of an Anglo-Saxon brotherhood. They meant that Britain and the US, through blood ties, a common tongue and shared heritage, dating back to the US’ roots as a British colony, had a kindred connection which naturally promoted good relations between them.

Yet Britain’s Anglo-Saxon ‘kin’ sat idly by while the country bled. Their commonalities had some impact on the relationship, and a common language made communication easier, particularly at lower levels. Yet the Anglo-French relationship on land was effective too, as were Franco-American ties, in sentiment, despite the absence of a common tongue.9 The language barrier sometimes interfered at the operational level, as at the Battle of the Marne.10 Yet such incidents rarely damaged strategic co-operation; nor did speaking the same language offer fuel for co-operation. Commonalities and ideas of kinship were happy accompaniments to co-operation, but sentimentalism did not drive policy in

9 William Philpott, ‘Managing the British War in Warfare: France and Britain’s Continental Commitment, 1904-1918’, The British Way in Warfare: Power and the International System, ed. Keith Neilson and Greg Kennedy (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), 94 10 Strachan, The First World War, 57-8 5

either Britain or the US. Some of those who expressed this sentiment undoubtedly believed in it, but it was not a sound basis for conducting international affairs. The historiography is varied on this issue. George Davis’ A Navy Second to None puts great stock in Anglo-

Saxon sentiment.11 Yet this factor must be firmly discounted in explaining why Britain and the US forged an effective maritime partnership. The motor for this co-operation was the pressure of war and a dangerous enemy, Germany, which sought to become a global power, imbued with Weltpolitik.12 If effective co-operation was not undertaken, a powerful, militaristic Germany must dominate the world, to the detriment of Britain and the US. In

Britain’s case, its survival and empire were at stake. For the US, it was a threat to liberalism and the growing desire to spread this throughout the world through free trade. A mutual foe joined these maritime powers.

Chapter two examines the foundations of the co-operative relationship. Chapter three takes this co-operation toward the end of hostilities while considering its development and efficiency. Historians generally agree that the Anglo-American partnership at sea was effective, meaning ‘unity of effort such that the partnership is greater than the sum of its parts’.13 Ultimately, the states achieved their mutual goal of overcoming German naval power and saw off the U-boat threat to Allied shipping. Britain carried out the lion’s share of this work, and probably could have triumphed without the USN’s assistance.

Nevertheless, American help was appreciated, and the USN believed its role was pivotal.

11 George T. Davis, A Navy Second to None (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1968), 108-14 12 Holger H. Herwig, Hammer of Anvil? Modern Germany 1648-Present (Lexington: D. C. Heath and Company, 1994), 155-6 13 Definition provided by Jane Dalton, ‘International Law and Coalition Operations’, Naval Coalition Warfare, ed. Bruce Elleman and S.C.M Paine (London: Routledge, 2008) 7. Cited in Halewood, ‘Anglo- American Naval Co-operation during the Second World War?’, 35 6

The partnership overcame the challenges they faced at sea. Its efficiency is uncontested in the historiography: the navies’ primary objective was to maintain the trans-Atlantic sea lines of communication (SLOCs), and this they did effectively. The American

Expeditionary Force (AEF) reached Europe safely. Britain was not starved. The RN perhaps could have achieved this alone, but the role of the USN was beneficial, smoothing the path to victory at sea. Deficiencies elsewhere do little to detract this overwhelming triumph in their critical mission.

The focus of this analysis is on what drove this co-operation, rather than its effect.

David Trask, in Captains and Cabinets, set the benchmark for understanding the wartime collaboration between the RN and USN. The British official history of the war at sea,

Corbett and Newbolt’s Naval Operations, and Arthur Marder’s five volume history of the

RN in the war, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, illuminate Trask’s path, but neither work devoted significant attention to Anglo-American co-operation. Trask established the primacy of exigencies in fuelling co-operation. His thesis has been accepted by the few historians who have studied Anglo-American naval co-operation since.14 He devotes much attention to internal American issues, and on how the USN co-operated with the RN, rather than how they co-operated together. Despite examining British records, his work is stronger on American evidence. Room remains for a more balanced approach to the partnership,

Captains and Cabinets remains unsurpassed because no historian has taken up the challenge since. Michael Simpson’s Anglo-American Naval Relations 1917-1919 features

14 David F. Trask, Captains and Cabinets: Anglo-American Naval Relations, 1917-1918 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1972), 361. Brief discussion of the importance of exigencies in Anglo- American naval co-operation during both world wars can be found in Halewood, ‘What Explains the Effective Anglo-American Naval Co-operation during the Second World War?’, 4 7

excellent analysis, but the work, written for the Navy Records Society, primarily serves as a collection of printed archival material. William N. Still’s The Crisis at Sea, the best single volume on the USN during the First World War, focuses even more on the Western

Hemisphere than Trask.

Captains and Cabinets received criticism, notably from Dean C. Allard who highlights the rivalry between the RN and USN. However, Allard underrates Trask’s vital point about the exigencies of war. Trask, moreover, did not completely assess many issues, most notably the bid to create a secret treaty between Britain and the US which would have guaranteed co-operation beyond the war, which suggests that the President of the US,

Woodrow Wilson, saw Anglo-American co-operation as purely a wartime expedient.

Wilson did not want to tie his hands, and believed that his bargaining position would rise.

This left the door open for continued co-operation once the war was won. Wilson sought to work with Britain when the war ended suddenly in 1918. His bargaining position was weaker than hoped for, and he needed British assistance to pursue his post-war programme.

Trask also presents problems regarding the end of hostilities. His study halts in

1918, leaving ample room for historians of Anglo-American naval relations to argue, in particular over the so-called ‘naval battle of Paris’ in 1919. Chapter four, which deals with victory and the creation of a new liberal order, is the critical element of this thesis.

Historians such as Andrew Gordon have deemed the co-operation during the war a

‘transient moment in Anglo-American relations’.15 The collaboration of 1917-1918 is depicted as a flash in the pan, an uneasy partnership between two of the world’s greatest

15 Gordon, ‘The Admiralty and Imperial Overstretch, 1902-1941’, 65 8

navies who ought to have been rivals. Historians, focusing on contentions, often prefer to depict both sides privately preparing for ‘the war after the war’, throughout their joint effort.16 With the common enemy defeated, co-operation collapsed. Their former partner replaced Germany as the naval threat in British and American minds, setting the stage for a new rivalry, culminating in the ‘naval battle of Paris’, during which British and American admirals threatened war.

The literature on this confrontation is divided by the Atlantic. British and American historians largely have ignored each other’s work, and the archival record on the other continent in any detail, creating distinct literatures. The traditional American view is one of a ‘battle’, and a turning point as the USN marched toward becoming a ‘navy second to none’. This view spawned from Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral William

Shepherd Benson and Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels’ views following the Paris peace conference. Benson, angry that the USN did not become the all-conquering navy he envisaged, depicted the discussions as a clash between virtuous Americans and underhanded British. His provocative account of the events of 1919 was written to advise

American negotiators heading into the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-1922.17 This story was picked up by American naval historians during and after the Second World War, as they sought to explain how the USN became the world’s greatest navy. The first important works tracing this ascent were Toward a New Order of Sea Power by Harold and

Margaret Sprout, and A Navy Second to None. Written as the USN surpassed the RN during

16 Jeffrey J. Safford, Wilsonian Maritime Diplomacy 1913-1921 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1978), 143 17 ‘Memorandum by Benson on Anglo-American Talks on Naval Building at the Paris Peace Conference, March 1919’, 16th May 1921, Benson Papers Box 36 9

the Second World War, the Sprouts were influenced by contemporary naval thought in

Washington, and the vitriol of Benson. Davis conveys this same idea in A Navy Second to

None. Together, these works built a school of thought which is best described as ‘linear triumphantalism’. From 1919, when the USN stood toe-to-toe with the RN, it took an unstoppable course to the top. The Paris peace conference became ingrained as the moment when the US seized for Neptune’s trident.18

The Sprouts recognised that an Anglo-American naval agreement was reached, but cautioned that ‘it certainly was no more than a truce’.19 Mary Klachko, who addressed the matter in her PhD dissertation ‘Anglo-American Naval Competition, 1918-1922’ considers the Anglo-American achievement in reaching this unofficial agreement, but does not recognise the importance of these concessions. Her American-centric view, mirrored in her later biographical work Admiral William Shepherd Benson: First Chief of Naval

Operations, paints these events as American victories rather than as the continuation of a relationship of co-operation and compromise.20 The tradition is continued by William

Reynolds Braisted. His seminal work, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1909-1922, depicts the Anglo-American naval relationship from October 1918 as boiling without a mutual peril to hold them together. At Paris in 1919, it produced an ‘engagement’ which immediately saw the trident pass to the US.21 Trask, whose work followed shortly after

18 Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, Toward a New Order of Sea Power: American Naval Policy and the World Scene, 1918-1922 (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 61-9 19 ibid, 69 20 Mary Klachko, ‘Anglo-American Naval Competition, 1918-1922’ (PhD diss., Columbia University, United States, 1962), 151-2; Mary Klachko with David F. Trask, Admiral William Shepherd Benson: First Chief of Naval Operations, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1987), 151-3 21 William Reynolds Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1909-1922 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1971), 412, 440 10

Braisted, sought to escape this tradition, but succeeded only in part. While not venturing into 1919, he noted that the unity in Anglo-American naval relations during the war

‘concealed a broad range of conflicts, some of them irreconcilable’, and trouble brewed as the maritime powers headed to Paris.22

The theme of Anglo-American discord was seized on by Allard and Jeffrey J.

Safford in Wilsonian Maritime Diplomacy. They focus almost exclusively on episodes of

Anglo-American disharmony, such as Benson’s desire to keep US battleships for the

Pacific, and the Imperator affair.23 The result is an unbalanced assessment. These works built a view of Anglo-American disharmony which ruptured, or at least severely strained, the relationship in late 1918 and 1919, with competition dominating against co-operation.

This view has become the norm, accepted by historians addressing the period such as

George W. Egerton in Great Britain and the League of Nations, and John Maurer.24 A recent scholarly article on Anglo-American naval relations, by Jerry W. Jones, devotes its attention purely to the ‘naval battle of Paris’, detailing every scuffle and threat.25 While

Jones’ work is useful, it stresses confrontation, hostility, and the search for ‘victory’.

One American scholar, Seth Tillman in Anglo-American Relations at the Paris

Peace Conference of 1919, takes the opposite view. He explains that the British and

Americans had overlapping interests in establishing a new liberal world order following the

22 Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 185 23 Dean C. Allard, ‘Anglo-American Naval Differences During World War I’, Military Affairs, 44:2 (1980), 77-8; Safford, Wilsonian Maritime Diplomacy, 199 24 George W. Egerton, Great Britain and the League of Nations: Strategy, Politics, and International Organization, 1914-1919 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1978), 161; John Maurer, ‘Arms Control and the Washington Conference’, The Washington Conference, 1921-22, ed. Erik Goldstein and John Maurer (London: Frank Cass, 1994), 268-73 25 Jerry W. Jones, ‘The Naval Battle of Paris’, Naval War College Review, 62:2 (2009), 77, 82 11

defeat of Germany, but did not ‘identify their community of interests to the point of pursuing acknowledged common objectives by a coherent strategy’.26 Perhaps due to his critical conclusions, limited source base, and seemingly sentimental approach toward

Anglo-Saxon unity, few historians have carefully considered Tillman’s conclusions about the continuation of a common goal into 1919.

The British school on Anglo-American naval relations in the aftermath of the First

World War rejects linear triumph, but differs over how far rivalry drove the actions of both states. The issue matters less to British than American naval history. The only thorough account is given in Stephen Roskill’s Naval Policy Between the Wars Vol. I. The former

British naval officer sees the relationship as hostile, stating: ‘the fires of Anglo-American antagonism, which had actually begun to smoulder before the end of the 1914-1918 war, were fanned into flames by zealots on both sides as soon as the guns stopped firing’.27 In a less detailed, yet more sober, account, Arthur Marder states that talks were held ‘in an explosive atmosphere.’28 John Ferris treats these issues as combining compromise and co- operation in both states, linked to the post-war period. In ‘The Symbol and Substance of

Seapower’, he argues that between 1919-1921 Britain decided on a one-power standard with the USN, thus accepting the Americans as a serious naval power without resorting to hostility. But knew that it need not confront the US to safeguard the empire.29 The linked

26 Seth P. Tillman, Anglo-American Naval Relations at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 (1961, Princeton: Princeton University Press), vii 27 Stephen Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars Vol. I: The Period of Anglo-American Antagonism 1919- 1929 (London: Collins, 1968), 21 28 Arthur Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919 Vol. V: Victory and Aftermath (January 1918 – June 1919) (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 231 29 John R. Ferris, ‘The Symbol and Substance of Seapower: Great Britain, the United States, and the One- Power Standard, 1919-1921’ in Anglo-American Relations in the 1920s: The Struggle for Supremacy, ed. B. J. C. McKercher (Edmonton: The University of Alberta Pres, 1990), 60 12

theme of co-operation and competition is central to David Reynold’s treatment of Anglo-

American naval relations at the end of the inter-war years.30

A significant problem in the historiography is that few historians have considered the context of Anglo-American naval relations in the inter-war years. Conferences at Paris and Washington are studied on their own merits. Events are divided into digestible segments: 1914-1918, 1919, 1919-1922, 1922-1941, or 1945-1973, and emphasise the nadir of Britain. Simpson’s collection of documents, from archives on both sides of the Atlantic, tackled these distinct literatures. Yet even he is influenced by the American linear triumphantalist school, and its obsession with a post-war ‘naval battle’ at the peace table.31

These historians who reach melodramatic conclusions fall wide of the mark. The events in

Paris in 1919 appear perturbing when taken alone. There undoubtedly were elements of naval competition between these two powers. This comes as no surprise: Britain wanted to remain supreme at sea; the US wanted to expand there. Yet in the broader context of the period 1917-1919, the Anglo-American naval partnership continued unimpeded. The relationship was fired by the exigencies of war. They ebbed and flowed. When they were at their peak, as in the spring and summer of 1917, co-operation was most effective, because it was based on compromise. When the urgencies of war required it, both Britain and the

US were willing to bend. As Germany was defeated, a new issue emerged: creating a new liberal world order in the wake of this destruction. In pursuing this goal, London and

Washington postponed clashes over maritime rights and naval competition. Both agreed to

30 See: David Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance 1937-41 (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1981) 31 Michael Simpson, Anglo-American Naval Relations 1917-1919 (Aldershot: Scolar Press for The Navy Records Society, 1991), ix 13

solve these issues through bilateral negotiations after the creation of a League of Nations, away from other powers with maritime interests. There was no naval battle at Paris, but rather an unofficial Anglo-American decision to compromise with each other and settle their naval differences through bilateral talks, dominated not by admirals, but politicians. It failed for political reasons, thus distorting our view of its naval roots.

This thesis contributes to the literature by examining evidence in a new light, looking beyond obvious differences to discern a broader pattern of co-operation and competition. Instead of focusing on individual incidents of Anglo-American animosity, this wider period must be seen as one of continued Anglo-American co-operation and compromise. It must be considered through the lens of 1917-1919, not 1914-1918 or 1919 alone. Discontinuity in relations was caused not by the end of hostilities and the co- operation, but the collapse of Wilson following the Paris peace conference, and the failure to bring the US into the League of Nations. The peace conference concluded with questions about Anglo-American naval relations yet to be answered. They were intended to be answered in light of renewed co-operation brought about by a strategic alignment, with

Britain and the US members of the League of Nations and guarantors of French security.

The decks were cleared for this bid: the RN was kept on a leash by the British government, and British Prime Minister David Lloyd George spent the summer preparing to make these agreements and shore up the Anglo-American partnership, culminating in the despatch of

Sir Edward Grey as Ambassador to Washington. The collapse of Wilson undid these possibilities. The navies resurged, Anglo-American naval relations became centred around rivalry, but long after the so-called ‘naval battle of Paris’.

This thesis adopts a naval-political approach to Anglo-American relations aiming to win the First World War, and the peace which followed. This lens of analysis, pioneered by

Trask in Captains and Cabinets, focuses on examining the strategic actions of states at sea, therefore on political and naval leaders and institutions. This approach bridges the gap between naval and diplomatic histories of these events, which have often taken different perspectives. Naval historians have neglected diplomatic history and vice versa, and worked in isolation for too long. As Britain and the US were the two greatest maritime powers of the 20th Century – the former established, the latter in the ascendancy – this approach illuminates the broader nature of their relationship. Naval relations were at the core of the British and American partnership during and after the First World War. Navies reflect their society, and the RN lay at the centre of the British state.32 A naval-political approach cuts to the heart of the matter of why these two powers worked together between

1917 and 1919.

32 Andrew Lambert, War at Sea in the Age of Sail (London: Smithsonian Books, 2002), 30. Cited in Halewood, ‘What Explains the Effective Anglo-American Naval Co-operation during the Second World War?’, 4 15

CHAPTER 1 PRELUDE TO CO-OPERATION

1.1: The Historical Relationship

1917, the fourth year of the First World War, dawned with no end in sight. Britain had spent the latter half of 1916 slogging it out with the German Army on the Somme. The attritional battle came with a large butcher's bill for the British Expeditionary Force, which left politicians in London queasy at the thought of 'Two Sommes at once' – General Sir

Henry Wilson’s solution to finish off the foe that year.33 Meanwhile, Britain's principal ally on the Western Front, France, had held firm against the German onslaught in 1916, and was optimistic about its planned offensive in the spring.34 In the east, Russia had won stunning operational successes under General Aleksei Brusilov, but suffered staggering losses against the Germans. The strategic fruits of tactical and operational victories for the Entente remained elusive on all fronts.

The Central Powers did not look like they stood on the brink of defeat – in fact, it seemed that they easily could win the war. Meanwhile, one of the premier industrial, financial, and naval powers of the world sat on the side lines. Although its immediate power was limited, the US could turn the war decisively in favour of either group of belligerents if it chose, but the Americans had little appetite for entanglement in European affairs. Indeed, they recently had re-elected Wilson to the White House, on the basis of a campaign which promised to avoid intervening in the messy conflict raging across the

33 William Philpott, Bloody Victory (London: Little, Brown, 2009), 628, War of Attrition, 249-51, 267 34 French optimism was misplaced. General Robert Nivelle’s offensive was a spectacular and costly failure which caused the French Army to mutiny. See: Strachan, The First World War, 242-4 16

Atlantic. This position was the continuation of a tradition of isolationism. This long- standing policy, and the historical relationship between the US and Britain, must be considered in order to contextualise their co-operation between 1917 and 1919.35 America's birth as a country came at the expense of the British Empire in 1783. Relations remained terse in following decades: war was narrowly avoided in 1794, but in 1812 President James

Madison recklessly 'picked a fight he could not win' and set out to conquer the remainder of

British North America.36 After the British saw off that American challenge, relations became mixed. Fears of another war in North America worried British decision makers in the 1840s and 1850s. Unsurprisingly, Britain flirted with the Confederate States of America between 1861 and 1865, but opted not to seize the chance to wreck the US and remained neutral during the American Civil War. The British government, particularly the Prime

Minister, Lord Palmerston, opposed slavery and had little appetite to sustain the slave states of the South. The risk to the empire's security was too great to consider war with the militarily powerful Union short of compelling reasons.37 Throughout this period of strained relations with the US, naval supremacy was Britain’s chief tool, and Britain remained the main potential enemy for the US.

In the latter part of the 19th century, as further conflict became increasingly unattractive for either side, Anglo-American relations thawed considerably. From 1895 a

35 A brief discussion may be found in Halewood, ‘What Explains the Effective Anglo-American Naval Co- operation during the Second World War?’, 9-11 36 Andrew Lambert, The Challenge: America, Britain and the War of 1812 (London: Faber and Faber, 2012), 57 37 Howard Jones, Blue & Gray Diplomacy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 323 17

rapprochement began between the US and Britain.38 The US relinquished its enormous military power after the South was quelled, but remained a considerable player at sea. The crushing of Spanish colonial power in 1898 cemented this reputation: the US now was a naval power with genuine maritime interests.39 Foreign navalism of this sort tended to invoke panic in the Admiralty, but the rise of the USN 'scarcely ruffled British calm'.40 The

US was not attacking any vital British interests. While it might become a great power, it was not yet one, nor was it provocative or threatening. The US could prove a nuisance, but to a global power like Britain, few states were not so. This tolerance also was due to

'Britain's economic dependence on the world's producers of primary resources'.41 Julian

Corbett, the noted British naval theorist, favoured closer ties with the Americans on such economic grounds.42 Economic co-operation was one of the greatest benefits of improved

Anglo-American relations before 1914. The British allowed the Americans into imperial markets via their policy of free trade. Economic competition between the British and

Americans was muted – indeed, even economic rivalry with Germany was scarcely an issue at the strategic level.

More broadly, the rise of Imperial Germany from 1871 as a mighty Central

European state posed a long-term threat. Initially Britain enjoyed good relations with

38 Kenneth Bourne, Britain and the Balance of Power in North America, 1815-1908 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 351 39 Davis, A Navy Second to None, 101 40 Arthur Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era Vol. I: The Road to War, 1904-1914 (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), 11 41 Strachan, To Arms, 442 42 Greg Kennedy, ‘Some Principles of Anglo-American Strategic Relations, 1900-1945’, in The British Way in Warfare: Power and the International System, 1856-1956, ed. Keith Neilson and Greg Kennedy (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), 36-7. Cited in: Halewood, ‘What Explains the Effective Anglo-American Naval Co-operation during the Second World War?’, 9 18

Imperial Germany, primarily smoothed by the excellent diplomacy of the German

Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck and the British statesman, Lord Salisbury.43 However, in

1888 Wilhelm II was crowned Emperor of Germany, and launched Germany on a ‘New

Course’.44 Bismarck was sacked. London began to seek friends from 1890 as clumsy

Wilhelmine diplomacy alienated its former British friends. German naval construction commenced in earnest a decade later. Germany concerned Washington too, not least because Germany had designs on the US. The Americans worried about a threat from the

German navy rather than the RN, not unreasonably. From 1890-1914 the RN did not plan for war against the US, while the Germans did.45

Sentimental ideas of Pan-Anglo-Saxonism seemingly became more prominent in this period. In 1904 the Admiralty declared the US ''a kindred state with whom we shall never have a parricidal war''.46 The British lent American naval power a hand between 1907 and 1909 by coaling the circumnavigation of President Theodore Roosevelt's Great White

Fleet. On 26th May 1909, shortly after the fleet completed its journey, Britain abandoned the two-power standard.47 Historians such as George Davis retrospectively claimed that this move was designed to bring the Anglo-Americans closer together in a posture against the

43 John Stone, Military Strategy: The Politics and Technique of War (London: Continuum, 2011), 46 44 See: Holger H. Herwig, Luxury Fleet: The Imperial German Navy 1888-1918 (Amherst: Humanity Books, 1980), 24-53 45 Paul M. Kennedy, The War Plans of the Great Powers, 1880-1914 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1979), 42, 53 46 Marder, Dreadnought to Scapa Flow Vol. I, 125, 183 47 British naval standards were used to determine the strength of the fleet. From 1890 Britain set a two-power standard to handle a combined threat of the second and third most powerful navies after its own. These standards were flexible, and did not represent British potential at sea, but simply reflected what London believed necessary to defend the British Empire. Dropping the two-power standard to concentrate on Germany with a new 160% standard of the High Seas Fleet did not represent a decline in British naval power. See: Ferris, ‘Symbol and Substance’, 57-8 19

second greatest naval power, Imperial Germany: the British 'confessed that they were not strong enough to defend a common Anglo-Saxon civilization alone'.48 Washington developed the US fleet largely with a view to Germany's maritime expansion, Theodore

Roosevelt used this supposed threat partly to justify the expenditure.49 However, Davis over-emphasises the significance of desire to protect a common Anglo-Saxon culture. Such statements were fanciful. The two-power standard was dropped simply because the

Americans were not seen as a threat. Financial considerations also played a role. Britain faced a threat in the German High Seas Fleet (HSF), against which it massively expanded naval construction. While naval expenditure had to ensure superiority in the North Sea, the country's economy could not be weakened in favour of illogical spending to match a benign power far from home.50 In any case, the spending forced by the naval arms race with

Germany caused Britain to increase its lead over the smaller USN. If the US became dangerous, Britain also had an ally in Japan, and possibilities in improved relations with

Russia and France. Japan and its large and effective navy worried the Americans more than the RN.

1.2: The Outbreak of War

In 1914, Anglo-American relations were amicable, but the cultural and social ties between the two states, while far from fictional, must not be overemphasised. Men at the highest level of politics on either side of the Atlantic, such as Balfour and Page, favoured

48 Davis, A Navy Second to None, 110 49 Strachan, To Arms, 458 50 Ferris, ‘Symbol and Substance’, 57-8 20

better relations, and Pan-Anglo-Saxonism. These views were not central to policy, even if certain politicians sometimes were carried away with them. They were not influential enough to overcome realpolitik: in August 1914, when Britain deemed that the German conquest of Continental Europe would threaten its interests and declared war, the

Americans did not rush to the aid of its 'kin'. Despite trans-Atlantic goodwill, Anglo-

American relations were rooted in self-interest. Britain relied on American industry, so could not risk offending the Americans too greatly, and yet its struggle to defeat Germany must involve what some Americans would deem the violation of neutral rights. Its exploitation of naval power damaged American interests, namely exports to countries now at war. These actions might turn the US into an enemy, and all but guarantee a German victory. Britain therefore must walk a delicate balance between waging war against

Germany, while placating Americans and ensuring that they acknowledged neutrality as in their best interests. Ideally London wanted Washington to see that its interests were best served by joining the fight against Germany. Yet 1914 was not 1941: the British government was not yearning for American support to replace the loss of its greatest military ally, France, as Winston Churchill did. In 1914, London held that the British

Empire could win a war with its European allies. The Americans simply had to keep supplying munitions and money.

'Britain already enjoyed maritime supremacy' upon the declaration of war.51 The

German surface fleet never threatened to alter this status – its crowning glory in the North

51 Strachan, The First World War, 195 21

Sea was a fortuitous escape from the guns of the Grand Fleet on the evening of 31st May

1916 off the Jutland peninsula.52 The US, while not sending its own naval might against the

Central Powers, did not seek to threaten British command of the sea. Under President

Wilson’s leadership, it charted a middle course of neutrality. There was 'no significant increase in the naval budget' in Washington, although many advocated it, including

Theodore Roosevelt.53 Such an increase naturally would suit the agenda of American naval officers, but many had greater sympathy for Britain than Germany. Some senior officers, such as Rear Admiral Fiske, saw 'Germany's drive across France in 1914 as a threat to the very existence of the United States'. They concurred with Mahan that the British navy presented 'the first line of American security against Germany'.54 But such staunch views about Britain's war were confined to naval circles. American society was divided across a broad spectrum between pro-Allied and pro-German viewpoints, not least because of 'its large German population in the Midwest and [the] vociferous Irish immigrant community'.55

1.3: The Test of American Neutrality

In 1914 many British actions threatened American interests and antagonised the US.

In the Pacific, the Japanese combined with their British ally to capture the German base of

Tsingtao in China. This angered Americans who foresaw a clash across the Pacific Ocean,

52 Andrew Lambert, Admirals: The Naval Commanders who Made Britain Great (London: Faber and Faber, 2008), 360 53 Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-19, 477 54 Davis, A Navy Second to None, 204 55 Strachan, The First World War, 209 22

and feared any expansion of Japanese power. More damaging was the immediate introduction of a strategic ‘blockade’ of Germany – and in effect Western Europe – by the

RN. Blockade had evolved from the Napoleonic Wars, and continued to do so throughout the First World War. Conditions in the littoral were now more dangerous for large warships, which could no longer wait outside of ports as had occurred during the age of sail, lest they be sunk by torpedo or mine. The ‘blockade’ of 1914 was very different to what previously had constituted a blockade, as Britain cut Germany off in the Straits of

Dover, and between Scapa Flow and Norway. This new approach was called ‘distant blockade’, often shortened simply to ‘blockade’. While still economic warfare, this was not technically a ‘blockade’ in legal terms. It simply consisted of exercising British rights to inspects ships for contraband. The blockade was Britain's traditional strategic weapon, exploiting its naval prowess against continental foes with mightier land forces. The blockade of 1914 frequently has been misunderstood by historians. As the possessor of the world's greatest merchant marine, Britain stood to lose if all rules for maritime war were cast aside.56 In 1914 the British sought to stay within international 'law' as defined by the

Declaration of London in 1911, not least so to prevent a break with the US. Yet the status of these laws were far from clear. The Declaration of London had not been ratified by any state, although all accepted it. The declaration was founded on the 1856 Declaration of

Paris. These declarations were outdated as practices of maritime trade advanced, causing it to be 'contradictory or incoherent in technical terms' so wrecking 'the legal basis of

56 John R. Ferris, ‘Pragmatic Hegemony and British Economic Warfare, 1900-1918: Preparations and Practice’ (forthcoming), 10 23

economic warfare for all parties'.57 Regardless, Britain attempted not to breach this understanding, and did not enforce the tightest blockade it could have in 1914, so squandering Britain's naval advantage.

Britain also sought to minimise the effect of the blockade on neutrals, especially the

US. Britain did not fear an American response, but did not wish to incur unnecessary costs by alienating the US, especially as it hoped to gain from American industry.58 The Board of

Trade, the Treasury, and the Bank of England sought to restrain economic warfare in order to protect the City of London as the world's financial and banking centre, which was critical to British prosperity. While the navy tended to take a harder view, it was prepared to follow the Declaration of London early in the war, and also took care not to provoke the

Americans over other issues, such as the definition of what comprised American territorial waters.59 London was prepared to enforce a stringent blockade if necessary in a long war, but only once a vital pre-requisite was fulfilled: Germany had to make the first major offence – only then could Britain follow suit and tear up the rule book.60

This effort to stay within the law did not eliminate American outrage. Annoyance at the blockade of Germany was exacerbated as Britain's action against shipping which might assist the Central Powers was not limited to European waters: on 15th September the British seized the American ship SS Rio Passig, which was carrying coal without destination papers, in the Far East.61 Such exploitation of seapower on a global scale raised concerns

57 Ferris, ‘Pragmatic Hegemony’, 5 58 John R. Ferris, ‘To the Hunger Blockade: The Evolution of British Economic Warfare, 1914-1915’, (forthcoming) 5 59 Memorandum by Trade Department, 8th January 1915, ADM 137/2829 60 Ferris, ‘Pragmatic Hegemony’, 9, 12 61 untitled, ADM 137/11/13, 616 24

for the Americans.62 Upon hearing of the seizure of the Rio Passig, the US Consul at

Sandakan quickly 'protested and stated that he was informing Washington'.63 Protests from the top followed suit. American officials disparaged the British practice as illegal, and

Wilson warned the British that the Americans would not continue to accept what he called

Britain's continued violations of international law.64 These actions challenged the American belief in the freedom of the seas – a liberal concept which owed much to the Dutch lawyer

Hugo Grotius. Grotius contended that the sea was free to be used by all nations, which they interpreted to mean that belligerents essentially should not intervene with neutral ships.65

However, the seizure of the Rio Passig was perfectly legitimate under the British interpretation of international law in 1914, even if it angered the US. Moreover, the US violated the Declaration of London too, by allowing Germans to sell ships to American firms, and then sailing them under the American flag.66

The key problem for the US was that, as a neutral, it stood to gain by trading with both belligerents. Both the Entente and the Central Powers would seek to exploit American industry to meet their war needs. British naval power prevented this outcome, limiting the

American market to the Allies. Not only did British action against American shipping upset the government, but it infuriated American businesses: by the end of the year, five

American meat packers signed a joint letter appealing for help from the State Department

62 Note by Cecil Spring Rice, 4th December 1914, ADM 137/2736; Note from Wykes, New York, to Central News, London, 12th March 1915, ADM 137/2806 63 Untitled, ADM 137/11/13, 616 64 Page to Grey, 17th July 1915, ADM 137/2736; Emil Klaessig, New York to Wolffe Telegram Bureau, Berlin, 18th January 1916, ADM 137/2736 65 Hugo Grotius, Mare Liberum, trans. Richard Hakluyt (1609), in The Free Sea, ed. David Armitage (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2004), 56, 58-60 66 Ferris, ‘Hunger Blockade’, 8. See also: Nicholas Lambert, Planning Armageddon: British Economic Warfare and the First World War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012) 25

against Britain from detaining their ships.67 Yet the US did not consider British actions sufficiently contrary to its interests to warrant anything more than protests. This outcome was assisted by British restraint in the early period of the war, as it sought to stay within international law and minimise the damage done to US interests.

Moreover, although Britain closed one market, it opened another. Soaring American profits warded Washington away from the costly business of war. Entente orders accelerated the American economy into prosperity – a matter which Grey reminded Page of: 'the increased opportunities afforded by the war for American commerce have more than compensated for the loss of the German and Austrian markets'.68 In July 1914

American exports totalled $154 million, and the economy was in depression. By December

1916 these exports had more than tripled to $523 million, while 'the Dow Jones index showed an 80 per cent gain between December 1914 and December 1915'.69 This prosperity made the blockade more tolerable. Many neutrals complied with British arrangements to ensure that they benefited from the unique financial opportunity presented by the war. The US, the Netherlands, and Denmark let domestic firms 'form combines and negotiate directly with Britain', ensuring that they complied with British regulations.70

Ultimately, British actions, while frustrating to many Americans, were not a casus belli for them, nor dangerous enough to foster significant support in the US for a German victory.

67 Cudahy Packing Company, Morris and Company, Armour and Company, Swift and Company, and Sulzberger and Sons to Lansing, 2nd December 1914, ADM 137/2806 68 Grey to Page, 23rd July 1915, ADM 137/2736 69 Strachan, The First World War, 209 70 Ferris, ‘Pragmatic Hegemony’, 22 26

War would also be expensive. The US wanted to remain out of the European conflict. It accepted the blockade.

Grey traditionally has been hailed for tempering American outrage over these issues. He did so by striving to maintain the Declaration of London. He kept a lid on

American uproar by keeping cotton a free good, and allowing food to be conditional contraband, allowing it to be sent straight to enemy territory, rather than blacklisted.71 Grey deserves some praise for his careful management of the American Ambassador and the

White House, though this success was partly the product of sheer luck. As it turned out, the

Americans 'would not offer serious resistance to practically unlimited expansion of belligerent rights by the Allies as the war developed.72 The Americans were not willing to fight Britain because this would ensure a German victory, which Washington thought a bad outcome. American political leaders, including Wilson, shared the assessment of senior

American naval officers regarding the threat of 'Prussian militarism'. Acceptance that the

British limitation of American trading opportunities was outweighed by Entente orders, and a preference to avoid German victory, however, did not translate into American military action. War against Germany was not in American interests, as it was not threatening the

US.

Beyond the blockade, the Americans also challenged another 'ancient right' of the

British at the beginning of the war: the practice of arming merchant vessels. This matter

71 Ferris, ‘Pragmatic Hegemony’, 16 72 John W. Coogan, The End of Neutrality: The United States, Britain, and Maritime Rights 1899-1915 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981), 246 27

directly affected the US as British merchantmen made port on the East Coast. The Germans also pressed the Americans about this practice. While the British were not pleased with the

American stance, they remained careful not to offend it. The Naval Trade Division feared that reckless disregard for American sensitivities might cause the US to release German liners detained in US ports, or coal German war vessels.73

The matter soon was settled when the Americans produced a list of rules defining what weapons merchantmen could be armed with, without becoming classified as offensive vessels. The key indicators included guns no larger than six inches in calibre and mounted at the stern, artillery and small arms kept only in small quantities with small amounts of ammunition, the ship being slow and not being crewed by soldiers or sailors.74 The British accepted these restrictions, and Captain Richard Webb, Director of the Trade Division, ordered that they be followed.75 Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, declared the outcome a victory – an indicator of how determined the British were not to antagonise the

Americans from an early stage.76

Thus, when Germany declared British waters a war zone in 1915, it took a significant risk. So far, American troubles with Britain had not provoked open Anglo-

American hostility. Nor might these disagreements over blockade prevent war against

Germany if it threatened American national security. While the British blockade cost the

73 Director of Trade Division Memorandum, 2nd September 1914; Memorandum by Captain Webb of the British Trade Division, 12th September 1914, ADM 137/2829 74 ‘Conditions Laid Down by the United States Government in Regard to Merchant Vessels with Defensive Armament’, ADM 137/2736 75 Letter by Richard Webb to War Staff, 26th September 1914, ADM 137/2736 76 Note by Winston S. Churchill, 20th September 1914, ADM 137/2736 28

Americans money, German actions would cost American lives – a crucial difference to which the British quickly drew attention.77 This move highlighted previous German acts against civilians (notably in Belgium) of which the British reminded the Americans, and

'the likelihood of [American intervention] increased in direct proportion to German attacks on American shipping'.78 Even if Washington did not declare war, it might still flex its naval muscles to defend its ocean commerce.

On 1st May 1915, U-boats attacked the first American ship, the Gulflight.

Washington immediately protested strongly, causing a rift between the cautious German politicians who feared an American backlash, and the German navy, which sought 'to prosecute the U-boat campaign as vigorously as possible' and knock out the British.79

German-American relations were severely tested one week later when the German U-boat

U-20 sank the British liner RMS Lusitania, killing 1,198 men, women, and children, many of whom were American. For the British this act ranked alongside those German outrages in Belgium 'as a symbol of faith in the crusade upon which we had embarked'.80 In the US, it appeared that America was moving toward war with Germany. Colonel House, Wilson's close associate and friend, sought to exercise his considerable sway over the President when he said that the US 'must determine whether she stands for civilized or uncivilized warfare. We can no longer remain neutral spectators'.81

77 Michael Howard, The First World War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 89; Jellicoe, ‘Commander-in-Chief’s Remarks on American Note of 5 November 1915’, ADM 137/2736 78 Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 37 79 Strachan, The First World War, 216 80 Julian S. Corbett, Naval Operations Vol. II: From the Battle of the Falklands to the entry of Italy into the War in May 1915 (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1921), 394 81 House to Wilson, 9th May 1915, in Charles Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House Vol. I: Behind the Political Curtain 1912-1915 (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1926), 437 (hereafter cited as House Papers) 29

Wilson, however, took exactly that step, renewing his course of neutrality in the face of German aggression. Claims by Corbett and Davis that the US became irreconcilably set against Germany after the sinking of the Lusitania are not borne out: even after the losses of May were compounded by the sinking of the SS Arabic on 19th August 1915, with two Americans killed, Washington remained open to reconciliation rather than war.

Germany was surprisingly slow to exploit this opportunity. Initially it offended the

Americans by expressing regret for the loss of American lives but not taking responsibility for them. Eventually however it negotiated an indemnity for the loss of the Arabic, and the storm of 1915 'rapidly died down'.82 Indeed, tensions were smoothed to the extent that

Germany continued its U-boat campaign at low levels and torpedoed SS Sussex in May

1916. This action triggered merely an American demand that Germany 'declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of submarine warfare against passenger and freight- carrying vessels'.83 Germany did so this time, recognising that its gamble had not paid dividends and the risks were becoming too great. But if the Americans had proven unwilling to defend neutral rights in the face of the British blockade, their refusal to go to war against a belligerent power which had taken its own citizens lives was more surprising.

In 1915-1916 Washington was struggling to walk the delicate line of strict neutrality as it continued to assist the Allies financially. Wilson concluded that if the US entered the war,

82 Julian S. Corbett, Naval Operations Vol. III: The Dardanelles campaign… up to and including the Battle of Jutland (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1923), 142 83 Corbett, Naval Operations Vol. III, 142 30

it would be on the Allies' side, but was not clear that this would mean military and naval assistance.84 It was still not in American interests to go to war.

Moreover, the US did not believe itself ready for war. In order to secure itself against any potential German threat in the future, a new naval bill was proposed in 1916.

The idea of bolstering the fleet had gathered pace throughout the submarine campaign on

1915-1916. As early as 30th July 1915, the General Board told Wilson that to guarantee

American security, the USN needed to match the greatest fleet in the world.85 Over a year later, on 29th August 1916, the Secretary of the Navy green-lit a $500 million continuous programme to build up the navy. The bill would see 156 ships of all classes laid down before 1st July 1919. It aimed to provide ten battleships, six battle cruisers, and 350 other warships of various types – a battle fleet superior to the RN.86 Despite this target, the

British were not cast as the enemy: it was an optimistic appeal for an American future, rather than the means for the destruction of the British present. The fleet was not built with the expectation that it would enter the present war. It, however, would enable the

Americans to overtake the exhausted European powers, seize their markets, and protect the

US from post-war threats.87 It was an implicit long-term challenge to British maritime supremacy – and one far more capable of succeeding than the German fleet sitting in

Wilhelmshaven.88 However, this possibility would be a matter for the future.

84 Henry Newbolt, Naval Operations Vol. IV: June 1916 to April 1917 (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1928), 240 85 Davis, A Navy Second to None, 213 86 ibid; Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-19, 479 87 Davis, A Navy Second to None, 222-4 88 Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-19, 479 31

The British were not alarmed at the 1916 bill. Nonetheless, the decision to build battleships which seemed just as likely to engage the Grand Fleet as the HSF, coupled with a resurgence of pro-German sentiment in the US in mid-to-late 1916, made American intervention alongside the British appear more distant than it had seemed in 1915. Indeed, with the U-boats tethered in April, British challenges to American interests returned to the spotlight. From mid-1915 a coalition government between the Liberals and the

Conservatives under Prime Minister Herbert Asquith proved more radical regarding the blockade. Balfour became First Lord of the Admiralty in May 1915, replacing Churchill.

Robert Cecil became the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs. Under these two men, the blockade became more rigorously enforced. Cecil 'proved a terrible warlord on behalf of empire and international law: the master of the hunger blockade'.89 The

German submarine campaign threatened the British Isles with starvation, as well as killing civilians. While Washington had chosen to forgive Berlin, to London the Germans had crossed the line. Now was the time to tear up the rulebook and enforce a more stringent blockade. London listed effectively any goods being shipped to Germany, including food, as contraband.90 This decision provoked further annoyance across the Atlantic. While unlikely, a rupture in Entente relations with America would be catastrophic, even if it did not lead to armed conflict. The economic services which the US was providing to the Allies had become a foundation for their war effort, without which they would collapse.91 London

89 Ferris, ‘To the Hunger Blockade’, 14 90 Ferris, ‘Pragmatic Hegemony’, 18 91 David French, British Strategy and War Aims 1914-1916 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986), 59; Strachan, To Arms, 442 32

therefore had to minimise American anger, and persuade Washington that even now, war with Britain was not in its interests.

Some in Britain were displeased with the decision not to use the full force of its naval might from 1915. The continued efforts to keep neutrals on-side were perceived as the worst of both worlds: the blockade was not being fully enforced, yet the concessions did not eliminate American exasperation at British actions. Several newspapers were disgruntled at this unwillingness to crush Germany. The navy was dismayed at the decision not to exert the utmost pressure on the enemy. Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, commanding the

British Grand Fleet, sought to persuade politicians that they had nothing to fear from neutral countries.92 His efforts were not met with success, and his analysis proved wrong, given Britain's increasing economic dependence on the US, as pointed out to him by

Balfour and Cecil.93 Jellicoe eventually came to realise this fact by the end of 1916.94

In July 1916 British commitment to victory became total. On the Somme Britain engaged the German army en masse on 1st July. At sea, the Germans battle fleet was engaged at Jutland. London intensified its blockade of goods and blacklists of firms selling contraband items to the enemy.95 To Wilson, the blacklist appeared a flagrant attempt to stop the US from entering markets dominated by the British. The economic co-operation forged prior to 1914, and Anglo-American relations as a whole, were under strain. With the

92 Arthur Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919 Vol. II: The War Years: To The Eve of Jutland (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), 375 93 Jellicoe to Beatty, 22nd December 1915, in Temple A. Patterson, The Jellicoe Papers Vol. I: 1893-1916 (London: Spottiswoode, Ballantyne and Co. Ltd. for The Navy Records Society, 1966), 191 94 Jellicoe to Beatty with enclosure, 30th December 1916, in Temple A. Patterson, The Jellicoe Papers Vol. II: 1916-1935 (London: Spottiswoode, Ballantyne and Co. Ltd. for the Navy Records Society, 1968), 134 (hereafter cited as Jellicoe Papers) 95 Ferris, ‘Pragmatic Hegemony’, 22 33

Declaration of London abandoned, Britain deployed a new three pronged approach to soothe American outrage over the blockade throughout 1915 and 1916. Diplomatically,

Grey continued to deal with the American leadership. His reasoning stressed that British actions were in the same vein as in the past, but had evolved to match 'the peculiar circumstances with which we are confronted'. London also pointed to American use of the blockade in the American Civil War half a century prior, and emphasised German atrocities to remind the Americans why Allied actions nevertheless were legitimate – and at least constituted the lesser of two evils.96 Cool reasoning was supported by ideological appeals:

Britain seized on the ties of 'brotherhood' which had been highlighted prior to 1914, exploiting their common language, constitutional inheritance, and shared liberalism to court

American opinion.97

However, reassurances over the blockade were far from sufficient to quell trans-

Atlantic unrest. The suppression of the Irish revolt did not help matters among the large

Irish-American community, eager to see the 'evil Empire' suffer.98 The Americans renewed their concerns over the arming of British merchantmen, particularly given new evidence that such ships were acting offensively against submarines, with orders to fire on sight found on one merchant ship.99 This order posed problems for the neutral Americans, as such actions compromised the ability of the U-boat to act in a legal manner in a guerre de course. The Admiralty replied by citing other historical examples from American naval history, notably the Quasi War against France, which demonstrated that the US previously

96 Grey to Page, 23rd July 1915, ADM 137/2736 97 Strachan, The First World War, 209 98 Davis, A Navy Second to None, 219 99 Bouman, Sgravenhage to Associated Press, London, 10th February 1916, ADM 137/2901 34

had ordered its own merchant vessels to act offensively.100 The US government disregarded these British arguments. It maintained that merchantmen could arm themselves for defensive purposes only, and demanded reassurances of this point.101 This position did not please the British, with The Times in particular writing strongly against the American position.102 The last American act which challenged relations with the British in 1916 occurred after Wilson won his second term in the White House. He quickly renewed

American attempts to mediate between the Entente and Central Powers, but both sets of belligerents were so heavily invested in victory that compromise was unrealistic: the terms presented were unacceptable to both the British and Germans.103

1.4: Forcing Wilson’s Hand

At the start of 1917 the most important neutral still remained out of the fighting, balancing its commercial business with the Allies against a disapproval of their violations of neutral rights. Had Germany maintained the American favour which it had curried in

1916, the US may have remained on the side lines. Neutrality remained the option which best served American interests, namely with regard to trade. However, with the war reaching a critical phase, Germany's new military leadership of Paul von Hindenburg and

Erich Ludendorff opted to gamble everything on defeating the Allies' financier, Britain, with a counter-blockade carried out by the navy's U-boat arm. On 1st February 1917

100 Letter to H. W. Malkin of the Foreign Office, ADM 137/2901 101 Intercepted Telegraph, from Emil Klaessig, New York to Wolffe Telegraph Bureau, Berlin, 28th April 1916; Letter to Webb, 14th December 1916, ADM 137/2901 102 untitled, The Times, 10th February 1916, ADM 137/2901 103 Howard, The First World War, 94 35

Germany declared unrestricted U-boat warfare, knowing that these actions most likely would bring the US into the war, given the American demand following the sinking of the

Sussex the previous year.104 However, Germany believed that it could starve Britain out of the war before the US, possessing meagre military power, could mobilise and affect the

Western Front.105

Britain faced a significant challenge at sea at the start of 1917 and did not effectively contain the U-boat threat immediately. Yet the Americans were not willing to assist them, and Wilson hoped that Germany's actions would not force him to do so. Cecil

Spring Rice, British Ambassador to the US, noted that shortly after the resumption of the

U-boat campaign Wilson 'expressed his sincere friendship for the German people and his earnest desire to remain at peace'. Spring Rice believed that Wilson did not want further provocation from Germany, but that if it came, the US would have no alternative but war.106 Pressure soon began to mount. The submarine campaign hampered business by sinking merchant shipping, which caused other shippers to worry about venturing out into the Atlantic, creating congestion in ports. The Chicago Chamber of Commerce led the way in urging Wilson to take 'steps to relieve congestions'.107 Grey, now in retirement, held that

104 Upon hearing that Germany had opted for a new U-boat campaign, the British Naval Attaché in Washington, Captain Guy Gaunt, declared that he would get drunk at once – presumably in celebration at the renewed prospect of US entry into the war. See: Gaunt to Captain W. R. Hall, 3rd February 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-19, 12; Cecil Spring Rice to Balfour, 9th February 1917, ADM 137/1436 105 Andrew Lambert, ‘Naval Warfare’ in Palgrave Advances in Modern Military History, ed. Matthew Hughes and William Philpott (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) 184 106 Cecil Spring Rice to Balfour, 9th February 1917, ADM 137/1436, 19 107 Cecil Spring Rice to Foreign Office, 22nd February 1917, ADM 137/1436, 75 36

American inaction would serve as '“a failure that must grievously depress the future history of America”'.108 Yet Wilson refused to go to war until the 'pressure [became] irresistible'.109

Wilson explored options short of war to keep American ships sailing. Moves toward armed neutrality were the preferred choice.110 The US began to arm its own merchant vessels, even providing 'fire on sight' orders,111 thus ending the long-standing contention over the British arming of vessels, with the verdict heavily in favour of the British.112

Spring Rice believed this decision to be a signal that war was 'inevitable', and the country

'seems prepared to accept it'.113 The USN, meanwhile, began to consider co-operation with the RN in the Atlantic seriously. On 4th February the Navy Department decided to arrange plans with the Allied navies to ensure 'the joint protection of trans-Atlantic commerce'.114

Recognising that it had little understanding of the war which was being fought at sea, the

Navy Department began to query Britain about matters as basic as the descriptions and profiles of German warships. The RN was happy to oblige, sensing that the reinforcements they desired to overturn the U-boats' success might be on the way.115 Some officers in the

USN, such as Captain T. P. Magruder, held that the Americans could best assist the Allies by subordinating their forces to British command and letting them direct the battle against the U-boats.116

108 Page to House, 9th March 1917, in Charles Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House Vol. II: From Neutrality to War 1915-1917 (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1926), 463 109 Cecil Spring Rice to Foreign Office, 22nd February 1917, ADM 137/1436 110 Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 44 111 Note by Cecil Spring Rice, 10th March 1917, ADM 137/2829 112 Note by Captain Webb, 17th March 1917, ADM 137/1436, 90 113 Note by Cecil Spring Rice, 10th March 1917, ADM 137/2829 114 Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 45 115 Captain MacDougall, USN, to Sir Graham, 12th February 1917, 48; Letter by Langley, 15th February 1917, ADM 137/1436, 52 116 Magruder to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 5th February 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-19, 13 37

Not everyone in the USN, however, was eager to promote co-operation with, and certainly not subordination to, the RN in the event of war. Its professional head, CNO

Admiral William S. Benson, warned that the situation in the Atlantic was so dire that the

Allies might be defeated before the US could influence the outcome. This indeed was the hope of the German government. Even if Britain did survive, Benson believed that the US needed to 'retain full strategic, tactical, and administrative control of all its forces', and should operate solely in waters closest to the Eastern Seaboard. This aim suited Benson's preferences for the least degree of entanglement, and his insistence that the US must remain prepared for the 'next war', able to contest the freedom of the seas with 'more potential enemies'. Whether this statement meant Britain is debatable, especially given his gloomy view of the Atlantic battle, but this staunch American nationalist was determined that his country must be strong enough at sea to defend its own interests and carry out its policies.117 While the USN had not shifted from its previous views that Germany, not

Britain, was the threat, there was a marked contrast in attitudes between officers regarding the logistics of co-operation if the US did enter the war. The British, while eager for assistance, were hesitant to begin working out the details of collaboration. Until American entry into the war became certain, the habit of American officers to speak freely to journalists and the continued presence of pro-German officers in the navy deterred the

117 Benson often is painted as an Anglophobe (see: Stephen Roskill, Admiral of the Fleet Earl Beatty: The Last Naval Hero (London: Collins, 1980), 244; Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London: Penguin Books, 1976), 263). In reality, much like his successor as CNO in the Second World War, Admiral Ernest J. King, Benson was more pro-American than anti-British, although he had a particular propensity to distrust the intentions of other states while guarding American interests. See: Allard, ‘Anglo- American Naval Differences’, 75; Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 47-9 38

Admiralty from in-depth discussions.118 The two services, hesitant and cautious of one another, waited until the interests of their political masters aligned, before establishing a partnership.

The US remained poised on the brink of war, but its direction was uncertain. A return to strict neutrality, while unlikely, was not impossible. Even those sections of the US which looked on the British war effort most favourably, such as the USN, were not united on how closely the two navies should co-operate were the US pushed over the precipice by

German actions. Uncertainties, however, were swept away between late February and mid-

March 1917. Berlin, recognising that the U-boat campaign probably would trigger

American intervention, but determined to win the war before it could have any impact, sought to further distract Washington by asking Mexico to consider invading the US. The

British intercepted this communication, which became known as the Zimmerman telegram, and skilfully deployed the information to push Wilson toward war at the end of February.

Confronted with this proposal to violate the territorial integrity of the continental US,

Wilson was enraged and knew he must act: American interests had now firmly been targeted by Berlin. The telegram was used to persuade even those Americans who preferred to remain staunchly neutral that Germany could be ignored no longer.119

To remain neutral in the face of this threat would leave Wilson looking weak and indecisive, sacrificing any hope of using the growing American economic and military

118 Note by Oliver, 21st February 1917, ADM 137/1436, 71 119 Strachan, The First World War, 220 39

influence to shape a new world order after the Europeans exhausted themselves.120 This issue became more prominent once the defeat of Germany loomed, but its importance to

Wilson's decision-making in 1917 must not be underestimated. Present exigencies drove

Wilson in 1917, but his decision also largely stemmed from his desire to 'dictate the post- war settlement to all the other warring nations'.121 He previously had pursued this end via mediation, but failed to impose his will. In order to reach this state of affairs, Germany must be defeated first and foremost. This policy would drive the US through to the conclusion of the war and the post-war negotiations, although once the latter came into view, the matter of constructing a new world order returned to the fore.

In the short-term, it was naval power which forced Wilson's hand. On 20th March, three American steamers were sunk without warning by the Germans.122 Colville Barclay,

Counsellor at the British Embassy in Washington, claimed that Wilson had reached his decision to enter the war before this event, but had dithered in the hope that Germany would declare war on the US.123 This new aggression at sea meant that Wilson could no longer remain inactive: he summoned Congress for 2nd April with the intent of ending

American neutrality. Germany had shown itself not only to be untrustworthy, but a genuine danger in the New World. The US must act to stop this 'Teutonic expansion'. In comparison to this naked German aggression under Hindenburg and Ludendorff, the British blockade

120 Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 50 121 David F. Trask, ‘The Entry of the United States into the War and its Effects’, in The Oxford Illustrated History of the First World War, ed. Hew Strachan, new edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 238 122 Wilson’s speech to Congress on 2nd April focused on German outrages at sea as the reason for the end of neutrality. 123 Memorandum by Barclay, 20th March 1917, 112; Telegraph from Barclay, 21st March 1917, ADM 137/1436, 117 40

was irrelevant. The interests of the US finally aligned with the British Empire. Now both states and their navies would work together toward a mutual goal: the 'destruction of

German military power' on land and at sea.124 The Anglo-Americans were finally in partnership, but not one stemming from Anglo-Saxon sentiment.125 Both states were fighting Germany to protect themselves and their interests. The question was whether they could collaborate in order to achieve this end.

124 Davis, A Navy Second to None, 233-4 125 Halewood, ‘What Explains the Effective Anglo-American Naval Co-operation during the Second World War?’, 10 41

CHAPTER 2 AMERICAN ENTRY INTO THE WAR AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF CO- OPERATION

2.1: Forging a Partnership

Although President Wilson did not ask Congress to recognise a state of war between the US and Germany until 2nd April 1917, many believed that step was inevitable when he called Congress into session on 20th March. Even if Wilson still wished to remain neutral, some Americans speculated that the House of Representatives and the Senate would push through a declaration of war regardless.126 The USN and RN consequently prepared to co- operate with one another to defend their shipping against the mutual threat posed by

German submarines. Before this moment, the two navies ‘were largely unacquainted’.127

British and American officers had experienced largely positive encounters with each other in distant stations, notably China, and some friendships had emerged, but there was little precedent for formal collaboration between the two navies. Serious talks began between

Washington and London in late March. Captain William MacDougall, the US Naval

Attaché, asked ‘how far the Admiralty is prepared to advise him… as to how the United

States Navy… may best serve [the] Allied cause’.128 Wilson, having dithered for much of the previous month, was similarly keen to act: ‘The main thing to do is to get into immediate communication with the Admiralty… and work out the scheme of cooperation’.129 Wilson and House’s ‘clandestine discussions’ went through Page.130

126 R. Gleadowe to the Secretary of the Admiralty, Sir William Greene, 23rd March 1917, ADM 137/1436, 32 127 Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, xi-xii 128 R. Gleadowe to Greene, 23rd March 1917, ADM 137/1436, 32 129 Wilson to Daniels, 24th March 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 17 130 Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 5 42

Meanwhile the Navy Department, via Assistant Secretary Franklin Delano Roosevelt, wanted to forge American plans before anti-British sentiment hampered them, or the submarine challenge got out of hand. Roosevelt wanted firm details about a base on the coast of Ireland for thirty US destroyers. 131 The General Board of the Navy took these discussions to Daniels, stating that the US should ‘“obtain from the Allied Powers their views as to how we can best be of assistance”’.132 Daniels disdained these actions, believing Roosevelt and Admiral Samuel McGowan, Paymaster-General of the USN, ‘war mad lunatics’.133

The RN was pleased to take soundings from the Navy Department. Page believed it would ‘heartily fall in with any plan we propose as soon as cooperation can be formally established’.134 In fact, London remained wary as these American moves were unofficial, and the US might withdraw from the brink, as it had done in 1915. Consequently, the

Admiralty were guarded in their response to these feelers, lest they come across as too

‘anxious that America should enter the war’. 135 This stance was due partly to a wariness of implying that Britain was in a helpless position, but also so not to reveal secret methods to a neutral power.136 1917 was not 1941, when both sides knew that American help was urgently required.

131 Telegram from Mr. Barclay, 20th March 1917, ADM 137/1436, 127; Telegram from Mr. Barclay, 26th March 1917, ADM 137/1436, 147 132 Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 58 133 Emmet to Sims, 22nd June 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 69 134 Page to Lansing, 23rd March 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relation 1917-1919, 15 135 Memorandum by D.I.D., 21st March 1917, ADM 137/1436; Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 5-6 136 Oliver to Greene, 26th March 1917, ADM 137/1436, 36 43

Vague discussions happened between the Anglo-American navies. The Admiralty

War Staff drafted a memorandum on 24th March, for Captain Guy Gaunt’s (Britain’s naval attaché in Washington) use only as ‘personal guidance if and when [his] advice [was] sought’ by the USN, which must ‘not be communicated as a written record’.137 This memorandum proposed four types of immediate assistance. The Admiralty was most keen to take up Roosevelt’s idea, describing the despatch of US anti-submarine warfare (ASW) vessels to Ireland as having primary importance.138 The British also wanted an American flying squadron to counteract enemy raiders in the Atlantic, and recommended that the

USN should patrol its own coasts, and retain a naval presence in the Far East, from which the Admiralty had recalled assets. Balfour, taking the perspective of the Foreign Office, prioritised the securing of shipping from the Americans. 139 The Admiralty wanted the USN to plug the gaps it could not fill due to the RN’s overstretched resources. This strategy would see the USN reinforce a British-directed strategy rather than pursue a substantial

USN effort of its own. However, there were limits to British requirements, particularly with regard to battleships, for which the British had little need.140

While the British remained cautious, the Navy Department forged ahead. Even before Wilson called Congress, the USN geared up to combat the submarine menace. On

19th March a minimum of 260 submarine chasers were ordered for immediate construction.

The Naval Emergency Fund was tapped for $115 million to fund these ships and purchase

137 Telegram to Barclay, 28th March 1917, ADM 137/1436, 156 138 The British nevertheless understated their importance, simply stating that ‘Their assistance would be most welcome’, Admiralty War Staff Memorandum, 24th March 1917, ADM 137/1436, 120 139 Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 56 140 Beatty to Secretary of the Admiralty, 3rd April 1917, ADM 137/1436, 196; Oliver to Beatty, 6th April 1917, ADM 137/1436, 197 44

guns and aircraft. The navy also was increased by nearly half to 87,000 men, and the graduation date of the Naval Academy classes was advanced.141 On 28th March 1917 Rear

Admiral Sims was sent to London, initially to act ‘simply [as] ‘a transmitter of information’’.142 However Page, familiar with British ‘spirit and methods’, recognised that the USN needed a man inserted into British naval circles in order to fully represent

American views.143 Sims was the ideal candidate for a task which centred on fostering good relations with the Admiralty. An avid Anglophile, as early as 1910 he had advocated his own interpretation of Anglo-Saxon brotherhood by stating that the Americans would join any war on Britain’s side. Sims was reprimanded by President William H. Taft for this remark, made to a British audience at the Guildhall, London.144 Sims was well-acquainted with the professional head of the RN, Jellicoe (promoted to First Sea Lord after the Battle of Jutland), having befriended him in China sixteen years previously, and came with an endorsement from Gaunt.145 These factors immediately endeared him to many in the RN, who bent over backwards to welcome him in London. He soon earned the respect of other officers who were more dubious, such as Vice Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly. The Admiralty made special arrangements, to the inconvenience of its own staff, to house Sims in Room

63 in the Admiralty Old Building. However, the space proved too congested and Sims ultimately set up headquarters near to the US Embassy, in Grosvenor Square.146

141 Memorandum by Mr. Barclay, 20th March 1917, ADM 137/1436, 114 142 Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 8 143 Page to Lansing, 23rd March 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 16 144 Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 55 145 William Sowden Sims, The Victory at Sea (London: John Murray, 1920), 5-6; Gaunt to D.I.D., 29th March 1917, ADM 137/654, 1099 146 Memorandum by Greene, 16th April 1917, ADM 137/1436, 44; ‘A Brief Summary of the United States Naval Activities in European Waters with Outline of the Organization of Admiral Sims’ Headquarters’, by the Intelligence Section of Admiral Sims’ Staff, 3rd August 1918, ADM 137/1964, 448 45

His amiability with the British unfortunately left Sims open to accusations that he had ‘gone native’, although he was not singled out in that criticism. During the First World

War, Washington generally took statements from all of its officers and representatives stationed overseas with a large pinch of salt. Benson ‘seemed to think Admiral Sims and our officers abroad in danger of becoming obsessed with all thing British to detriment of clear judgement’.147 This attitude was representative of a staunchly nativist view held by

Benson, and to a lesser extent Daniels. Benson’s words to Sims upon his departure were:

‘“Don’t let the British pull the wool over your eyes…. We would as soon fight the British as the Germans”’.148 This statement was nonsense, but Benson was acting professionally by urging his officers not to over-commit themselves to their potential allies. His job as CNO was to defend the US and its interests first and foremost. Once he better understood the situation and the US officially entered the war, he became ‘“anxious to co-operate to the very fullest”’.149 This desire to collaborate was driven by a mutual goal. Effective co- operation, as the USN soon learned, was vital to defeating the U-boat in 1917. The USN was wanted to bolster British strength, but could only help if the Navy Department let its ships be directed to plug the gaps in British resources.

Sims proved invaluable in achieving effective collaboration, particularly at the operational level.150 He worked hard to achieve compromises between the navies, striving

147 Emmet to Sims, 22nd June 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 89; Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 92 148 Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 55 149 Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 9; General Report on Mr. Balfour’s Mission, 15th May 1917, ADM 137/1436, 250 150 Halewood, ‘What Explains the Effective Anglo-American Naval Co-operation during the Second World War?’, 10 46

to create an exception to the rule that allies have never ‘operated together for any considerable length of time without more or less serious friction.’151 Since disagreements between the partners could hamper their joint bid to destroy German power, it was in his – and his compatriots’ – interests to listen and work with the British as best they could. Sims could not eradicate friction entirely, but he significantly smoothed relations between the

Admiralty and the Navy Department, particularly during the forging of the relationship in mid-1917. He served in this role until the end of the war. However, suggestions that

‘Anglo-American relations revolved around Sims’ are true only at the operational level during hostilities. His significance in Anglo-American naval co-operation declined at the end of 1918.152

The Admiralty did not send its own Sims to the US in 1917, precisely for the reasons why the Navy Department did so. Already in Washington was Gaunt, who enjoyed excellent relations with the Americans. American officials were keen for ‘him to be [the] head of any naval mission’.153 As he was perhaps too junior for a post above naval attaché, the Admiralty promoted him to Commodore on 20th March, in order to keep him in place.

However, when the French dispatched a Rear Admiral – de Grasset – the British sent Vice

Admiral Sir Montague E. Browning to Washington so to prevent France from seizing the initiative in collaborating with, and using, American naval forces. Browning commanded

British naval forces in the Western Hemisphere, and was no stranger to the Americans, although did not quite enjoy the reputation of Gaunt among the USN. The British and

151 Sims to Pratt, 7th June 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 68 152 Simpson makes this claim in Naval Relations 1917-1919, 55 153 Greene to Jellicoe, 20th March 1917, ADM 137/1436, 106 47

French, meanwhile, enjoyed excellent naval relations, based on British strategic and French operational control in the Mediterranean. While they competed for American favour in the spring of 1917, these allies strove to be on the same page. Browning and Grasset held a

‘preliminary and satisfactory conference’ before arriving in Washington.154 Thus, the

British continued to direct the Allied naval effort to a successful conclusion, and were not undercut by the French at this pivotal time of organising the deployment of reinforcements at sea.

2.2: Into Battle

With personnel in place and channels of communication open, co-operation between the RN and USN could begin in earnest. Following Wilson’s speech of 2nd April,

American belligerency became official on 6th April 1917, as RN bases across the world were rapidly told.155 However, the US entered the war not as an ally, but as an ‘Associated

Power’, reflecting a traditional American determination to avoid ‘entangling alliances’. The

US was independent and uncommitted to the details of Allied war aims and their ‘secret treaties’.156 Immediately American war aims revolved around two key policies. The first was to destroy German power on land and at sea. This policy drove the American war effort from 6th April 1917, until the completion of this policy via negotiations in Paris, and the scuttling of the HSF at Scapa Flow in 1919. However, this aim also was a preliminary step to clear the way for a new international order, which would make the world safe ‘for

154 Leviathan in Hampton Roads to Admiralty, 11th April 1917, ADM 137/1436, 172 155 Memorandum on Declaration of War between United States and Germany, 7th April 1917, ADM 137/1436, 302 156 Trask, ‘The Entry of the United States into the War’, 239 48

democracy’.157 While this second aim was never submerged by the exigencies of war, in

April 1917 the US had to focus on containing the danger posed by the submarines. Serious discussions over the post-war order would wait for later.

Despite the trans-Atlantic communications of the preceding fortnight, there were no detailed plans on how the US would help the Allies. It was clear only that the British wanted naval assistance, the Americans would provide it, and each wished to destroy

German seapower.158 The exigencies of war drove both navies to collaborate to achieve these aims, but strategy remained to be set. In April 1917 Britain and the US faced a considerable, but hardly insurmountable, danger. It was sufficient to force these fleets to co-operate, but the German naval threat never truly threatened to defeat either state.

German attacks on British shipping were nothing new, as the merchant marine was the

Achilles heel of this global, maritime empire. Germany attacked this weakness from the start of the war, but its initial surface cruises, including the voyage of Admiral Maximilian

Graf von Spee in the Pacific Ocean, sank a mere 2% of British commercial tonnage

(approximately 215,000 tons) by January 1915.159 The submarine promised greater results as these platforms relied on stealth, and could avoid British surface threats such as the battle cruisers which sunk Spee. However, in 1917 submarines, little more than submersible torpedo boats, had to spend most of the time on the surface.160 These limitations, along with

German caution, hindered the U-boat campaign of 1915. Only 21 British ships were sunk in its ‘war area’. The Mediterranean, which offered less chance of inadvertently killing

157 Howard, The First World War, 95 158 Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 58 159 Strachan, To Arms, 480 160 Howard, The First World War, 86 49

American citizens, proved an easier hunting ground: in 1916 832,000 tons of Allied shipping was sunk there. While damaging, this work would not wreck the British or their allies.

In early 1917 Germany opted to renew the submarine campaign in the Atlantic, as an alternative to its faltering effort on land. Germany recognised that this campaign likely would bring the US into the war, but gambled that it would be too slow to mobilise, and

Britain – the lynchpin of the Allies – would be defeated before American troops arrived on the Western Front en masse. German planners estimated that 600,000 tons of British shipping must be sunk per month for six months in order to starve Britain out of the war, and wreck the Allied war effort. They put their plan into action on 1st February 1917. In

March they hit 600,000 tons for the first time. In April German submarines sank a staggering 881,000 tons, a ratio of ‘one in every four ocean-going vessels clearing British ports’.161 This campaign has led many historians to believe that Britain was on the cusp of defeat in spring 1917,162 not least because the question some people in Britain began asking was: ‘‘Can the Army win the war before Navy loses it?’’163

A broader examination of the war at sea, however, indicates that historians such as

Trask and Davis go too far in claiming that the war was in the balance in early 1917. The

Germans did not have sufficient U-boats to continue sinking 600,000 tons of shipping per month if the RN, and the USN, organised more effectively. This problem was not difficult to solve, especially once the US entered the war, providing additional ships via the

161 Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 23 162 Davis, A Navy Second to None, 234-5; Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 61 163 Philpott, War of Attrition, 273 50

flexibility of seapower. Once the solution of convoy was implemented, Germany did not have enough U-boats to defeat merchant shipping.164 Its pre-war calculations deemed that

222 submarines were needed ‘to wage an effective campaign of attrition against enemy commerce’. The German navy had 121 submarines in commission, of which only 41 were on station at a time.165 Under these circumstances, there was ‘never any chance’ that the U- boats could starve out Britain.166

However, a solution still had to be implemented, which produced a ‘grim attritional struggle between small craft’.167 Time was of the essence in April, with the Germans at the peak of their success. Herbert Hoover, then US War Food Administrator, estimated that

‘there is only sufficient grain in [Britain] for three weeks’.168 In response, London decided that the problem could best be overcome by constructing small craft in American shipyards

‘to the extreme limits of possible production, not only during the present year but… next year’.169 The cautious170 Jellicoe did not believe that the RN could find a solution to the problem unless the US helped ‘to the utmost of their ability’.171 This claim was far from certain. Captain Pratt, Benson’s assistant, believed ‘England can do it herself, but we can shorten the process’.172 American materiel was a boon which eased the path to defeating the

164 Lambert, ‘Naval Warfare’, 184 165 Philpott, War of Attrition, 274 166 Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis 1916-1918 Pt. II (London: Thornton Butterworth Limited, 1927), 350 167 Lambert, ‘Naval Warfare’, 184 168 Sims to Daniels, 14th April 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 208 169 Foreign Office to Sir Cecil Spring Rice, 10th April 1917, ADM 137/1436, 305-6 170 Jellicoe, nicknamed ‘Silent Jack’, was cautious to the point that by the end of 1916 the decision had been taken to remove him from his post as Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet, in favour of his more daring junior Admiral David Beatty 171 Henry Newbolt, Naval Operations Vol. V: from April 1917, to the end of the War (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1931), 24 172 Pratt to Sims, 2nd July 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 77 51

U-boats, but historians such as Ben Wilson are incorrect in claiming that the USN

‘transformed’ the campaign.173 The RN, the greatest navy in the world, had the means to overcome the submarine threat if it merely utilised its resources effectively. Essentially, the addition of American ships reduced the level of efficiency required to attain victory.

Meanwhile, the Americans were newcomers, although they had climbed the naval ladder quickly. Despite Jellicoe believing US assistance necessary to victory, the Admiralty was reluctant to relinquish strategic control. Exigencies could not force complete compromise. The Admiralty envisaged directing American assets toward the war effort.

This belief was reflected in the aims of Rear Admiral Dudley de Chair’s mission to

Washington in 1917: ‘“the development of their Sea Forces should proceed along lines dictated by the British war experience and be co-ordinated with British policy in order that the utmost value may be obtained by British-American combination on the sea”’.174 Sims agreed that the US must ‘view our forces as an… integral part of the combined Allied naval forces’.175 As newcomers, the US should compromise on strategic control so to achieve an effective partnership greater than the sum of its parts which would overcome the U-boats.

This position was hardly unreasonable: the RN remained the largest in the world by some distance. The USN lagged behind: on 1st November 1916 it slipped to fourth in the naval rankings. In first class capital ships, the traditional measure of naval power, the USN had only six dreadnoughts which mounted 14-inch guns.176 The day after the bruising clash at

173 Ben Wilson, Empire of the Deep: The Rise and Fall of the British Navy (London: Phoenix, 2014), 550 174 Memorandum on Naval Mission to the United States, 25th June 1917, ADM 137/1436, 258; Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 87 175 Sims to Secretary of the Navy (Operations), 11th May 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 261 176 William N. Still Jr., Crisis at Sea (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2006), 6 52

Jutland the RN could put 24 capital ships to sea.177 Moreover, the war at sea was fought primarily in European waters, where the British and their Allies operated from established shore facilities. In small craft, the British vastly outmatched the Americans.

Daniels and Benson had other views, but the Navy Department’s lack of preparation for war weakened their attempt to resist the Admiralty’s quest for control. The Navy

Department was inefficient and uncoordinated. As late as June it was ‘certainly not being run as if anything momentous was going on’.178 The navy’s senior officers knew little about anti-submarine warfare, and were lethargic. The American fleet was of variable quality in all classes except its impressive dreadnoughts. Only 51 of its 74 destroyers were suitable for gruelling patrols in the Eastern Atlantic. Such unpreparedness made integrating US forces into the Allied effort at sea a challenge in itself, especially given the challenge of absorbing so many new recruits.179

When it came to deciding how to deploy the useful American assets, the USN was split until the summer of 1917. Sims advocated the deployment of the USN to the Atlantic to combat enemy submarines, integrating American ships with Allied navies in order to immediately ‘effect a more vigorous conduct of the war [which is] already so thoroughly underway in all areas’.180 This approach would avoid ‘much wasted effort and time

[should] any attempt [be] made to take over any particular area and operate it entirely with

177 Strachan, The First World War, 207 178 Emmet to Sims, 22nd June 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 69 179 Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 10-1, 22-3; Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 64 180 ‘A Brief Summary of the United States Naval Activities in European Waters with Outline of the Organization of Admiral Sims’ Headquarters’, by the Intelligence Section of Admiral Sims’ Staff, 3rd August 1918, ADM 137/1964, 448 53

U.S. Naval Forces’.181 American merchant shipping should focus on supplying the Allies and the Western Front.182 Benson and the Navy Department, conversely, believed that their primary duty was to defend the eastern seaboard.183

However, in April Browning reached several agreements during his visit to

Washington. Eager to listen to the voice of experience, by mid-April the USN agreed to all the suggestions from the Admiralty War Staff Memorandum of 24th March.184 Small patrol boats and railway materials also would be sent to France, although Grasset believed the

British were receiving far more American assistance than the French. While British suggestions aimed to bolster the wider Allied war effort, there undeniably was a closer bond between the two Anglo-Saxon powers in these early meetings. Browning even won over ‘pronouncedly anti-British’ officers such as Benson.185 However, this bond must not be overstated: these men were co-operating to achieve a mutual aim. Pan-Anglo-Saxonism smoothed collaboration, but did not drive it.186

In London, Sims had similar discussions with the Admiralty. By early May he arranged how ‘our destroyers and other forces should be deployed in the campaign against the submarines’.187 These arrangements made US ships available for action against the U- boat, which raised the next issue – how to act. Jellicoe identified three means of ‘“dealing with the submarine menace”’. The first ‘was to prevent the vessels from putting to sea’ –

181 ‘A Brief Summary of the United States Naval Activities in European Waters with Outline of the Organization of Admiral Sims’ Headquarters’, by the Intelligence Section of Admiral Sims’ Staff, 3rd August 1918, ADM 137/1964, 448 182 Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 66 183 Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 199 184 Browning to Greene, 13th April 1917, ADM 137/1436, 184; Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 63 185 Telegram by Cecil Spring Rice, 24th April 1917, ADM 137/1436, 194 186 Browning to Greene, 13th April 1917, ADM 137/1436, 186 187 Sims to Daniels, 8th May 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 67 54

the American preference, but one the Admiralty deemed unfeasible. Jellicoe’s favoured method was his second: sinking U-boats at sea, the RN’s tactic since the start of the

German guerre de course in 1915. This approach reflected the aggressive doctrine of the

RN: imbued with the spirit of Nelson, British officers were commanded to ‘“Attack”’ and not give U-boats any rest. They must be ‘“constantly harried and hunted”’.188 This aim too proved impractical. Anti-submarine warfare was a continuous headache for the Admiralty in 1917. The patrol groups established to hunt produced dismal results. Only seven U-boats were sunk in the course of one hundred engagements with the submersible foe in 1916.189

The problem largely was technological. ‘Existing anti-submarine measures, though considerable and varied, were clearly inadequate’.190 Mines and nets were ineffective as waves dispersed and cut them. Aircraft, few in number, were limited in range and bomb load. Armed merchantmen, the subject of such heated debate in earlier years but now endorsed by the Americans, had lost the vital element of surprise. Depth charges were the most promising weapon, and Sims encouraged adoption of the British design, but they were primitive.191 Meanwhile Allied warships wore themselves out in fruitless patrols, hindered by their poor sounding equipment. The war started without any suitable equipment being available. While much effort was directed toward developing the hydrophone during the war, it never reached the required standard to make hunting anything other than a waste of resources.192

188 Still, Crisis at Sea, 338-9 189 ibid, 338 190 Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 194-5 191 Sims to Daniels, 7th July 1917, ADM 137/656, 1107 192 Still, Crisis at Sea, 457 55

The solution to the U-boat menace lay primarily in organisation. Jellicoe’s third means to overcome the U-boat was the protection of merchant ships: convoy.193 The

Admiralty was reluctant to implement this system in early 1917 because convoy was strategically defensive, with warships escorting merchant ships rather than carrying the fight to the enemy. This policy seemed to contravene British naval doctrine. The Admiralty also proposed a logistical argument, that the RN had too few escorts to attempt convoy.194

This claim was not without merit in 1917, but in hindsight was illogical. While the strength of a convoy increased the more warships it had, to protect a convoy by some ships was better than independent sailings protected by none, with ASW ships wasted on pointless patrols. Poorly defended convoy did not suffer unduly from submarines: a U-boat attack on a convoy yielded approximately 20% losses, whereas the loss rate for independent sailings was 25%.195 Convoys were concentrated, making them hard to find. Convoy also negated the need to seek out submarines with limited sounding equipment, instead putting the burden of location on the U-boats, forced to disperse to find targets.196 If they stumbled upon merchant ships, U-boats must expose themselves in order to strike.197 ASW ships might be strategically defensive in this system, but they remained tactically offensive, able to counter-attack any vessel which dared strike at merchant ships.198 With the arming of

193 Still, Crisis at Sea, 338 194 Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 195 195 ibid, 198 196 Sims to Daniels, 29th June 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 72 197 Archer Jones, The Art of War in the Western World (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987), 467 198 Jellicoe to Gaunt, 28th June 1917, ADM 137/656, 792; Report on Cabinet Committee on War Policy, 10th August 1917, CAB 27/6, 12 56

merchantmen no longer taboo, convoys even could form a crude battle group, with all ships firing on an attacking U-boat.199

Here Sims was a visionary. Originally a supporter of patrol, he soon recognised that it was futile and attempted to make the British adopt convoy long before significant bodies of British sailors did so.200 President Wilson was for convoy, but Sims’ only ally in London was the British Ministry of Shipping – the Navy Department opposed the idea even more than the Admiralty. Sims’ pressure soon told however, and the trial for convoy was ordered on 21st April 1917. Convoy was officially instituted less than one week later, on 27th April.

Sims’ influence mattered, but it was not the only factor at play, or contribution of the USN.

Simpson and Newbolt cite Admiral Alexander Ludovic Duff’s memorandum of 26th April, which argued that ‘additional escort forces made available by’ the Navy Department, prompted Jellicoe to implement convoy.201 Given Jellicoe’s belief several weeks earlier that

American ships were urgently needed, perhaps it was the arrival of American reinforcements which changed the First Sea Lord’s mind.202 In any case, the logic of convoy and its benefits, even with only a few British escorts, ought to have been recognised long before. The contribution of the USN was not so much to make convoy possible, as to make the case for trying it undeniable: there were no longer too few escorts to try the test.

199 ‘A case has occurred of a whole convoy opening fire on a submarine’, Naval Staff, 17th September 1917, ADM 137/1437, 166 200 Still, Crisis at Sea, 339 201 Duff was head of the Royal Navy’s Anti-Submarine Division from December 1916 202 Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 25, 197; Newbolt, Naval Operations Vol. V, 20 57

2.3: The Timetable of Co-operation

More ships were still wanted by the Admiralty. Even if they were not the difference between victory and defeat, they were welcome and enabled the RN to balance its deployment of forces effectively. In a bid to quell the U-boats, destroyers were stripped from the Grand Fleet at Scapa Flow, among other stations.203 To receive more ships was a central part of the mission to Washington led by Balfour from 22nd April 1917.204

Specifically, Balfour wanted 20 sloops, 20 convoy sloops, 50 new destroyers, 200 trawlers, two mine layers, and two light cruisers for anti-submarine and convoying purposes.205

This request immediately caused problems in Anglo-American relations, to which a curious solution was proposed. The USN was hesitant to switch the construction in its naval yards, engaged in producing the 1916 programme. Its aim was to ensure that the US could defend itself against maritime threats, which meant Germany and the IJN first and foremost, but also the RN in certain scenarios.206 Yet now Britain asked its associate to halt this programme. Not surprisingly, this idea was ‘not received enthusiastically in the Navy

Department’.207 The solution unofficially proposed by Colonel House was closer Anglo-

American naval co-operation. As House identified the problem, ‘To [build destroyers] now would leave us at the end of the war where we are now, and in the event of trouble… we would be more or less helpless at sea’. If Britain and the US could agree that the former would ‘give [the US] an option on some of her major ships in the event of trouble... we

203 Jellicoe to de Chair, 27th April 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 211 204 Telegram from Halifax to Admiralty, 21st April 1917, ADM 137/1436, 330; Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 103 205 Vessels Urgently Required by the British Admiralty, 22nd May 1917, ADM 137/1436, 252 206 Telegram by Balfour, 10th May 1917, ADM 137/1436 207 Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 104 58

could go ahead with our destroyers without fear’.208 Such an arrangement implied an

Anglo-American entente after the war. With a view to a possible post-war clash with Japan, the US also asked the Admiralty for intelligence on the IJN. At this stage, Anglo-Japanese relations were in odd state. A Japanese flotilla served in the Mediterranean, where it performed well, yet many Japanese agencies challenged British interests, especially in

China. British authorities were suspicious of Japan – and vice versa. Thus, Britain did not hesitate to furnish some details on its ally to the Americans.209 London was attracted by the prospect of a semi-official Anglo-Saxon alliance, but unwilling to abandon its friend in the

Far East. When the Cabinet discussed the matter it was suggested that Japan be brought on board, perhaps via a triple alliance. This idea was shelved when the Cabinet concluded that both the US and Japan would reject such terms.210

Nevertheless, the British, ‘primarily impressed by the prospect of the possible development of Anglo-American naval co-operation in the future’, responded with a counter-proposal constructed by Balfour.211 As the RN could not consent simply to handing over capital ships on American demand – the HSF was still a real danger – the War Cabinet offered a different solution: a general naval alliance.212 Britain would guarantee American security until the US caught up on its planned battleship programme, allowing the US to safely ‘“forego building capital ships at the present time”’.213 This prospect would tie

208 House’s Diary Entry, 13th May 1917, in House Papers Vol. III, 70 209 Washington to the Admiralty, 10th May 1917, ADM 137/1436, 210-2 210 War Cabinet Meeting, 22nd May 1917, ADM 137/1436, 216 211 Cecil to Spring-Rice, 4th June 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations, 499 212 Jellicoe to Northcliffe, c. 10th July 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations, 87 213 Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 109; The Americans were told that ‘The United States should be generally aware that in case of need the British Navy would certainly come to its assistance’, Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 111 59

Anglo-American naval co-operation to the timetable of the construction of warships, rather than war, and co-operation would continue beyond the defeat of Germany. It would support the dream of pan-Anglo-Saxonism harboured by Sims, Balfour, and Pratt. The latter thought this ‘‘a solution which I hope from the bottom of my heart may be accomplished for the future well-being of the Anglo-Saxon race’’.214 Closer Anglo-American ties would be cemented, and this agreement would provide the foundation for continued collaboration in peace and war.

Japan remained a thorny issue. Britain had another motive for retaining control of its capital ships: it did not want them used in an attack on Japan.215 Jellicoe sought to turn the Japanese problem on its head, and use American concern over a war in the Pacific

Ocean to convince the Navy Department to build destroyers. He prepared a memorandum which demonstrated that the USN was lacking sufficient ‘light cruisers, destroyers and anti- submarine craft’, not battleships, to win a war in the Pacific.216 However, Jellicoe was not wholly sincere, skirting the issue that the USN was deficient in battle cruisers against the

IJN.

The matter was not concluded by the end of Balfour’s mission, but he left US

Secretary of State Robert Lansing a memorandum aimed at reaching an agreement. He resumed his work upon returning to Britain. On 19th June Balfour presented a more developed proposal to the War Cabinet, which would bring together the navies of the Allies and the US under an umbrella agreement of mutual assistance: ‘“the Governments of

214 Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 116 215 ibid, 109-10 216 Telegram to Cecil Spring Rice, 1st June 1917, ADM 137/1436, 221 60

America, Great Britain, France, Italy, Russia, and Japan [should] engage singly and severally to assist each other against any maritime attack for a period of four years after the present war”’.217

Even Balfour’s initial proposal for an Anglo-American agreement was not viewed favourably in the White House. House stated ‘This is not quite what we had in mind’. He saw ‘no reason why our first proposal should not be accepted’.218 He still hoped for a deal, but Wilson found even House’s informal proposal unacceptable. The inability of House to sway Wilson on this issue – a matter important to the Colonel – demonstrates how seriously

Wilson took his decision to avoid entangling alliances. Wilson was actually dismissive of the threat of Japan to the west coast, and so was motivated simply by the desire to avoid entanglements.219 Just as when he entered the war as an Associated Power, he was cautious that alliances may ‘lessen his ability to influence the post-war peace settlement’.220 With

Germany’s defeat seemingly years away, Wilson held that co-operation should be fuelled purely by the exigencies of the present war. His determination to retain a free hand after the war, however, did not mean that he rejected all forms of co-operation with the British beyond hostilities. Anglo-American naval co-operation was set to the timetable of war, but was not doomed when that clock expired: it could be renewed. Wilson simply wanted to maximise his bargaining position and to ensure that when the time came for constructing a new order, he was not hamstrung by agreements made under the pressures of war. Wilson

217 Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 115 218 House to Wilson, 8th July 1917, in Charles Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House Vol. III: Into the World War April 1917 – June 1918 (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1928), 72 219 Wiseman Memorandum upon Conference with the President, 13th July 1917, in House Papers Vol. III, 75 220 Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 114 61

wanted to dedicate his focus to winning the war: ‘“I have not permitted myself to think of plans and policies when war ends. We trust our allies but make no alliances and this country will be ready to see that the right settlement is made when we all sit at the peace table”’.221 This policy was perhaps wise: the US had enormous potential, but was far from fulfilling it in 1917, with Britain and France stronger players in the effort against Germany.

By waiting until the war was won – presumably by American power – Wilson would have a stronger hand to play, than if he made agreements immediately upon American entry.

This was not a tale of British hopes for pan-Anglo-Saxonism cruelly dashed.

Realpolitik dominated the British offer: that agreement would serve Britain immediately by helping to defeat the U-boats and to stymy the American bid to reach parity with the RN via the 1916 programme, at a time when Britain had halted its own capital ship construction to focus on combating the submarines. The 1916 programme admittedly was not a pressing concern in 1917, and Britain’s solution to American construction was radically different to that against German naval ambitions. Nevertheless, such an agreement would serve two purposes for the Admiralty, by ensuring British maritime supremacy for years beyond the war. The debate over a secret treaty to bind together the two great Anglo-Saxon powers was dominated by self-interest, not pan-Anglo-Saxonism. Wartime co-operation was no different, with the crucial exception that their self-interests aligned.

221 Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 114 62

2.4: Financial Difficulties

Self-interest also reigned over finances, although shared exigencies forced some compromise. In this instance the Americans held the stronger hand. In late 1916, Entente borrowing from US markets, covered by Britain, had become so problematic that the

Federal Reserve Board advised Americans against purchasing foreign treasury bills.

American investors had become overexposed and dependent on an Allied victory. This recommendation endangered Allied finances. Britain’s overdraft in the US was $385 million, and it continued to spend $75 million per week.222 No British authority now knew how to finance the Allies beyond April 1917. However, just when this financial crisis was about to cut trade, the German navy intervened with the same aim, much less effectively.

‘On one interpretation it saved Britain’ – Berlin could have seen this prospect, but focused on operational solutions to the neglect of financial calculations.223

Britain’s financial problems were not easily resolved upon US entry into the war, and remained severe into the summer. Both states were pulling for the same end, yet the US

Treasury was reluctant simply to prop up its co-belligerents, especially if it could leave one of them stuck with the bill. This stance left Britain ‘hard-pressed to pay for goods in the

United States’.224 In late June Balfour told House: ‘we seem to be on the verge of a financial disaster which would be worse than defeat in the field’.225 This warning had an effect: British financial collapse would deal an enormous blow to the American war effort,

222 Strachan, The First World War, 221-2 223 Strachan, To Arms, 972 224 Keith Neilson, ‘Reinforcements and Supplies from Overseas: British Strategic Sealift in the First World War’, in The Merchant Marine and World Affairs 1850-1950, ed. Greg Kennedy (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 41; Strachan, To Arms, 976 225 Balfour to House, 29th June 1917, in House Papers Vol. III, 106 63

and the chances of defeating Germany. Consequently, Secretary of the Treasury William

Gibbs McAdoo first loaned $50 million to Britain, and on 23rd July agreed to make some monthly advances, beginning in August with $185 million, followed by $400 million in

September. In effect, the Treasury loaned Britain the US dollars which Whitehall needed to underwrite all Entente purchases in the US, eliminating pressure on the exchange rate of sterling. The US thus supported the British financially, chiefly from self-interest, because a collapse of the value of sterling would wreck Allied finances, and perhaps lose the war.

This borrowing ‘became the goad with which the United States could drive forward allied economic cooperation’.226 Meanwhile, the US opted not to ‘use the war to force out sterling as the principal medium of international exchange’, instead shoring up the pound.227 This decision was an early indication that Washington was prepared to work with Britain after the war, although there was no long-term commitment yet. It was not yet certain whether these states would continue to co-operate once Germany was defeated, and any permanent financial arrangement must reflect American interests. Regardless, neither the collapse of the secret naval treaty, nor American hesitancy over finances in 1917, point toward Anglo-

American animosity after the war.

The US also wielded its economic might against Germany with immediate impact: the blockade lost its strongest opponent, and soon was reinforced with additional naval assets.228 The British were delighted, for these actions ‘should render our blockade policy far more effective’.229 An American Exports Control Committee was set up, which listened

226 Strachan, The First World War, 222 227 Strachan, To Arms, 977 228 Strachan, The First World War, 221-3; Ferris, Pragmatic Hegemony, 20 229 Report on Cabinet Committee on War Policy, 10th August 1917, CAB 27/6, 6-7 64

to the British War Trade Intelligence Department – although it did not publish its own black list.230 By February 1918, the export of American goods was supervised by the War

Trade Board, although the British contractors which once had helped to make up this board became sub-departments of the US Government, meaning that Britain was not in complete control of the meeting. American companies guaranteed that they would not export raw materials such as rubber, diamonds, and various metals to British enemies ‘so long as Great

Britain is at war with any European Power’.231

The Americans also took a different attitude than Britain at the operational level, with Benson advocating a close-in, true blockade of the German coast.232 Recognising the risks in such an undertaking, the British were not malleable on this matter. US reinforcement ultimately served to tighten the blockade, producing ‘food shortages in

Germany [which] had a disastrous impact on morale’.233 With neutrality a fading memory, there was harmonious co-operation on the blockade from 1917 – a marked change from less than one year earlier.

2.5: Taking Action

Meanwhile, the US switched to constructing smaller ships for ASW. The exigencies of war forced the Navy Department to do largely as the British wished, because that was the best way to tackle U-boats.234 It did so without any formal British assurances of

230 Newbolt, Naval Operations Vol. V, 34-5 231 Agreements Print: United States, February 1918, ADM 137/2808 232 Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 65; Ferris, ‘Hunger Blockade’, 2 233 Lambert, ‘Naval Warfare’, 184 234 While switching to the construction of smaller ships was Admiralty’s priority, the Navy Department refused the request for two light cruisers. See: Gaunt to Admiralty, 23rd June 1917, ADM 137/1436, 257 65

compensation, although Sims believed an official agreement was not needed, such was his faith in Anglo-Saxon co-operation.235 This act nevertheless involved a unilateral decision to cease capital ship construction, in which the USN took a risk. It did so in a belief that this act would remove the current threat facing the US. On 6th July the construction of 200 destroyers was authorised. 236

Despite this move, and an acceptance in Washington that it must win the war, co- operation against the U-boats was imperfect in the summer of 1917. By this point the

Admiralty understood that the U-boat would not win the war, but it was ‘seriously affecting the [Allied] war effort’.237 The British still wished to direct US naval forces during the present war, and to ‘weld the two [navies] into a single Force operated on similar lines’.238

Yet the Admiralty remained cautious not to cause ‘offence… through too eager a desire to press a desired policy on the United States’.239

Benson remained reluctant to abandon his primary duty of defending the eastern seaboard, and the Western Hemisphere in general, in favour of operating in European waters.240 When a U-boat threat in these waters failed to materialise, Sims attempted to have Washington send more ships to the Eastern Atlantic, by writing alarmist telegrams to

Benson and Daniels, to little avail.241 Benson should not be too condemned for his hesitance. Although arguably he was ignoring the pressures of the submarine threat out of

235 Sims to Wilson, after 4th July 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 81 236 Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 115-6 237 ibid, 140 238 Memorandum on Naval Mission to the United States, 25th June 1917, ADM 137/1436, 258 239 ibid, 261 240 Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 49 241 Sims to Benson, 14th June 1917; Sims to Daniels, 16th June 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations, 228-9 66

self-interest in protecting the US, he was chiefly reluctant to give his naval assets to the

British when they had not presented a clear policy to him, instead merely asking for ships as and when needed.242 Furthermore, he was not yet convinced of the value of convoy, believing that arming merchant vessels offered better protection against U-boats.243

Officers in London were astonished by this attitude. Jellicoe was aghast: ‘Benson has an idea in his head that the gun and a sharp pair of eyes are the answer to a submerged submarine: One would hardly believe that such ideas could be held by any naval officer – but there it is’.244 Sims summed up the situation as: ‘It would be very funny, if it were not so tragic’.245

Anglo-American collaboration also faltered over the routing of convoys. The

British, with colonial interests in the Western Hemisphere at Newfoundland, Canada, and the West Indies, had routed Allied shipping in these seas in the first three years of the war.

When the US entered the war, the Navy Department naturally wished to have a hand in this effort by routing ships from their own ports, and American vessels worldwide.246 This proposal displeased the Admiralty, which rightly asserted that its organisation in American ports was already ‘very complete’, while any changes would produce great difficulty.247

Both of these problems concerned how much each state would demand, and the other concede, in the control of maritime resources against Germany. The challenge posed by the U-boats forced compromise on both issues in the summer of 1917. As Page told

242 Gaunt to Admiralty, 5th July 1917, ADM 137/1437, 15 243 Gaunt to Jellicoe, 1st July 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919¸ 234 244 Jellicoe to Browning, 7th July 1917, in Jellicoe Papers Vol. II, 181 245 Sims to Pratt, 3rd July 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 237 246 Gaunt to Admiralty, 8th May 1917; Gaunt to Admiralty 1st July 1917, ADM 137/1436, 379, 385 247 Memorandum by Webb, 13th May 1917, ADM 137/1436, 380 67

Wilson, ‘“it’s another case of all hanging together or all hanging separately”’.248 Sims saw sense on the issue of shipping, calling a transfer of routing to American authorities ‘a fundamental military error’ and so sought to persuade his political masters.249 By 5th July

Washington accepted this point and left the present system in place so to overcome the immediate damage of the U-boats, although the Navy Department still wanted to chase the matter later.250

Around the same time, the USN began to co-operate with convoy more fully. The change came when Wilson, who always opposed ‘allowing merchantmen to cross the

Atlantic without convoy’, ordered his officers to comply.251 Daniels signalled American intentions in a memorandum to Lansing which endorsed full co-operation with the Allies, and recognised that the USN’s chief task was to secure the SLOCs to Europe.252 The US was prepared ‘to discuss more fully plans for joint operations’.253 In turn, the Admiralty addressed Benson’s concern that the Admiralty was keeping the USN in the dark.254 In order to overcome the problem, Jellicoe suggested that the Navy Department send more officers ‘to come over and work at the Admiralty in London’.255

At sea, the first batch of six destroyers (8th Division), agreed upon shortly after

American entry into the war, reached their base in Queenstown on the coast of Ireland on

4th May. They were quickly followed by the 9th and 6th divisions on 17th and 24th May, after

248 Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 83 249 Admiralty to Gaunt, 3rd July 1917, ADM 137/1436, 388 250 Gaunt to Admiralty, 5th July 1917, ADM 137/1437, 15 251 Wiseman Memorandum upon Conference with the President, 13th July 1917, in House Papers Vol. III, 74 252 Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 94 253 Daniels to Lansing, 9th July 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 88 254 Browning to Jellicoe, 20th July 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 90 255 Browning to Benson, 26th July 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 91 68

the British applied pressure via the Balfour Mission.256 By July 37 ships were on station and escorting convoys.257 The US also offered three light cruisers to the British, which

Beatty gladly accepted.258 Relations at Queenstown formed a microcosm of broader Anglo-

American relations at this time: they were largely good, but not without disagreement and compromise. Sims, as commanding officer of American warships in European waters, was sent to Queenstown to liaise with the British officer in charge, Bayly. Sims had first met

Bayly in London, and was not impressed: ‘he was very rude’ and ‘is a peculiarly difficult man to deal with’. The Admiralty ordered Bayly not to create any friction, but fortunately, once Sims arrived, he soon was taken with the American, who quickly displayed his professional competence.259 The Americans also bolstered their reputation by sending two excellent officers, Captain Joel Pringle and Commander Joseph Taussig, the latter of whom had served in China during the Boxer Rebellion and had admirers within the RN. Sims, determined to establish good working relations, ordered his officers ‘to refrain from all criticism of British methods, manners, and custom’, and to encourage friendly relations among enlisted men on both sides. 260 These methods worked well. Before long ‘Sims was able to report absolute smoothness in Anglo-American relations at the base’.261

This collaboration had limits: for logistical reasons, the British wanted the

Americans to rely on their own supply and repair ships.262 Of greater significance, by the

256 de Chair to Greene, 15th May 1917, ADM 137/1436, 432; Newbolt, Naval Operations Vol. V, 35 257 Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 201 258 Beatty to Jellicoe, 6th July 1917, ADM 137/1964, 414 259 Sims to Taussig, 29th April 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 213. See also: Michael Simpson, ‘Admiral William S. Sims, U.S. Navy and Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly, Royal Navy: An Unlikely Friendship and Anglo-American Cooperation, 1917-1919’ in Naval War College Review, 41:2 (1988), 66-80 260 Sims to Taussig, 29th April 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 212-214 261 Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 201 262 Sims to Daniels, 8th May 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 219 69

summer the problem of transporting the AEF – still being raised and trained – came to the fore. The USN was determined not to let the army down and to deliver its men to the

Western Front with minimal incident. The AEF was central to the US’ wider war effort.

American strategy focused on getting the army safely to the Western Front where it could crush the Central Powers’ centre of gravity, the German army. To secure this end, the Navy

Department kept over 20 destroyers in American waters and demanded that its assets in

European waters be dedicated to escorting troop convoys.263 This matter produced greater friction as the US Army expanded.

A series of disagreements also emerged over American criticism that the RN was not offensive enough. The Navy Department emphasised the destruction of the U-boat, whereas the Admiralty had progressed from this view. The Navy Department still did not recognise that convoy was tactically offensive and the best means of luring U-boats to their destruction. Daniels and Benson thought its use proved that the British were ‘lethargic’ and

‘defensive’. Wilson claimed that ‘the British Admiralty had done nothing constructive in the use of their navy’.264 The belief that the British were sitting on their hands was widespread on the East Coast. Media mogul Lord Northcliffe, on a mission to spur British influence in America, reported that this was hampering his work ‘as much as [the] question of Ireland’.265 Washington hoped to solve the problem at source, the bases of the U-boats –

‘even if we render some of the most conservative of our naval advisors uncomfortable’ –

263 Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 200 264 Wilson to Daniels, 2nd July 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations, 78; Allard, ‘Anglo-American Naval Differences’, 78 265 Northcliffe to War Cabinet, 5th July 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 84 70

rather than chase ‘‘hornets all over the farm’’.266 Wilson and Benson agreed that action had to be taken even if it meant heavy American losses, and applied pressure on Jellicoe to act.

Benson stated ‘I think it better to lose some of our older battleships and other fighting craft than to remain on the defensive’.267

To force Jellicoe’s hand, the Navy Department enthusiastically sent several submarine chasers, a small craft designed to track and sink prowling U-boats, to European waters. They also developed their own daring schemes to seal off German bases, which tapped into new and old technology. One scheme proposed ‘using Aeroplanes carrying [a] large charge of T.N.T. to blow up Zeebrugge, the Kiel Canal, or German naval bases’,268 another to build ‘special unsinkable monitors’ to prevent U-boats from escaping into the seas. None were feasible. Jellicoe believed monitors would be impractical and take too long to build. Moreover ‘the construction of unsinkable monitors in the numbers required would take the steel and labour which is essential’ for other ship types which could defeat the U- boats.269

The Americans were building castles in the sky, and infuriated the Admiralty by accusations of passivity in the battle against the U-boats. Jellicoe claimed ‘The ‘alleged inactivity’ of the Navy in dealing with the Submarine exists only in the imagination of those not acquainted with the facts’.270 The British were prepared to take action and risk

266 Wilson to Daniels, 2nd July 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 78; Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 203 267 Browning to Jellicoe, 20th July 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 90. See also: Wilson to Sims, 2nd July 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 79 268 General Report on Mr. Balfour’s Mission, 15th May 1917, ADM 137/1436, 245 269 Jellicoe to Northcliffe, c. 10th July 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 86. See also: Northcliffe to War Cabinet, 5th July 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 84 270 Jellicoe to Northcliffe, c. 10th July 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 86 71

losses too: ‘…we are quite ready, as at Gallipoli, to risk and lose our older battleships… but the operation must afford some chance of success’.271 These American plans were impractical, and Jellicoe resented his need to waste time ‘endeavouring to show amateur strategists the impossibility of their ideas’.272 Sims agreed, but pressure from the

Admiralty’s political masters to preserve collaboration forced Jellicoe to engage with

American ideas. In turn, he offered a dubious proposal to sink battleships so to block the

German approaches. This suggestion did not placate the Americans; a young Ernest J.

King, serving on the staff to Admiral Henry T. Mayo, Commander in Chief of the US

Atlantic Fleet, claimed the plan was a straw man to silence the USN.273 In order to meet

American demands, the RN eventually allowed the USN a free hand on one of its preferred schemes: the North Sea Barrage, an enormous enterprise which aimed to block off the entrance to the North Sea between the British Isles and Norway.274. As early as May 1917 the USN had been keen to take up this old British idea,275 which the Admiralty dismissed as

‘quite impracticable’.276 The RN took consolation in the fact that this effort would force the

USN to send further naval forces to European waters, which might be redirected should the scheme fail.277

Despite this concession, the Americans failed to seize the initiative in directing naval strategy against the U-boats. The opportunity to do so passed them by in the months

271 Browning to Benson, 26th July 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 92 272 Jellicoe to Browning, 7th July 1917, in The Jellicoe Papers Vol. II, 181 273 Allard, ‘Anglo-American Naval Differences’, 78 274 The rights of neutral Norway concerned Washington very little. See: de Chair to Admiralty, 10th May 1917, ADM 137/1436, 352 275 de Chair to Admiralty, 10th May 1917, ADM 137/1436, 352 276 de Chair to Admiralty, 12th May 1917, ADM 137/1436, 354 277 ibid 72

immediately following American entry into the war. By the end of summer 1917, the basic

British strategy of containing the HSF and defending merchant shipping had to be accepted in order to maintain effective co-operation, and to maintain the grip the navies now had on the U-boats. The Navy Department was not delighted by this outcome, but could not disprove the Admiralty’s arguments.278 It had to compromise and work with the Admiralty to achieve the destruction of German seapower. This aim proved effective; by the end of

August convoy was working well and U-boat successes were reversed.279 Never again would the Germans hit their target of 600,000 tons of British monthly losses.280 Convoy had not lost all of its opponents on either side of the Atlantic,281 but the Navy Department accepted it in order to mount a forceful joint effort. Even American submarines were sent to the Eastern Atlantic to co-ordinate with the British.282

The British and Americans had weathered the storm of July very well – a month in which they anticipated that the U-boat effort would reach its peak.283 Debates over co- operation at the strategic level had been more or less resolved by the exigencies of war.

There were disagreements over details, and disgruntlement in Washington over British direction of the war at sea. However, by the end of the summer the USN accepted that it should listen to the more experienced service, and bolster its resources in order to defeat the

German navy. Even Benson was eager to facilitate co-operation, and left a good impression

278 Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 157 279 Sims to Bayly, 14th August 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 249 280 Churchill, The World Crisis 1916-1918 Pt. 2, 368 (diagram) 281 Report on Cabinet Committee on War Policy, 10th August 1917, CAB 27/6, 13 282 Telegram to Sims, 31st August 1917, ADM 137/1437, 70 283 Sims to Daniels, 29th June 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations, 71 73

with the British officers he encountered.284 The Admiralty were eager for this outcome.

Despite being the stronger navy, they recognised the benefits of collaboration with the

USN, and were eager not to offend – yet ready to be stubborn where their experience showed it was the right course. The British had tied the Americans to important principles of strategy, but were flexible when necessary, as over the North Sea barrage. Once the most important neutral, many Britons now saw the Americans as their ‘most important ally’.285

Exigencies similarly forced effective co-operation operationally and tactically, notably at

Queenstown – but the amicable relationships forged in battle suggest that these navies discovered they had more in common than just an enemy. Professional admiration became prevalent among the officers who had closest contact with their counterparts across the

Atlantic, and eased the path to co-operation. The pressure to achieve their mutual policy drove the relationship, and forced co-operation and compromise. Anglo-American naval relations were so good here that even Irish rebels, who had a great deal of support among

Irish-Americans and had stoked anti-British feeling throughout the war, had little impact on the American sailors they targeted with anti-British propaganda. The British took careful action to ensure any local hostility to the USN was muted.286 Despite capping U-boat sinkings in mid-1917, however, the end of the war was still distant. With the struggle of spring and summer 1917 receding, rumblings of discontent were beginning anew in

Washington.

284 General Letter No. 120, by Browning, 18th August 1917, ADM 137/504, 242 285 Wiseman to Northcliffe, August 1917, in House Papers Vol. III, 98 286 Bayly to Jellicoe, 1st September 1917, in Jellicoe Papers Vol. II, 202; Admiralty Memorandum for the War Cabinet by Geddes, ‘Attitude of Civil Population Towards Men of the United States Naval Forces at Queenstown’, 19th September, ADM 116/1768 74

CHAPTER 3 WINNING THE WAR AT SEA

3.1: Problems of Communication and Direction

In the autumn of 1917, discontent emerged in Washington regarding the situation at sea. Operational success damaged good relations: with the exigencies of war lessened, the

US no longer had to apply every sinew to quell the U-boat immediately, and lobbied for change. Part of this divide stemmed from the USN’s awkward position: it was a fifth wheel in Allied naval strategy. The USN was a service in search of a mission, to bolster its prestige, and to use in forthcoming funding battles against the army. Its power was too small to break the strategic stalemate, yet too large to ignore. However, the Navy

Department felt that the British were detaching Washington from the war effort. Benson believed, correctly, that the British were ‘unwilling to take them into full partnership’.287

He felt surprised and disappointed ‘that no definite plan of operation of the combined forces of the Allied power has been taken up and decided upon long ere this’.288 For this reason he held onto warships until Wilson forced his hand, and the complaint still persisted.

Trask has identified a deterioration in Anglo-American relations during this period, although this claim must not be overstated. The relationship was built on solid foundations.

Communications and collaborative arrangements needed tweaking, not an overhaul.289

This disgruntlement was compounded by the feeling that the USN had made a critical contribution at the vital moment: ‘if we hadn’t added to their convoys our fleet of

287 Telegram from Sir Cecil Spring Rice, 13th September 1917, ADM 137/1437, 319 288 Benson to Sims, 24th September 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 106-7 289 Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 166 75

destroyers…. the Allies by this time would have been lost’.290 This view was an overvaluation of the American contribution. The USN aided the ASW campaign, but its role was helpful rather than necessary. Nevertheless, the USN was an ambitious service. It was growing in size before the war and sought to continue to do so. Its power was considerably less than that of Britain, and it acknowledged that collaboration was vital to the successful conduct of the war. However, if the Admiralty was not prepared to take the fight to the Germans, then the USN would. This ambition flickered throughout the summer.

In late 1917 it burst into flame, with consequences for the post-war naval balance.

With the threat of the U-boat diminishing, both services reconsidered their partnership. Both agreed that deficiencies must be addressed, for the U-boat soon would return with a bid to wreck Allied SLOCs. Mayo made the most significant attempt to rectify lingering problems of co-ordination, holding a conference in London ‘to secure the further co-operation of the American and Allied Fleets and to discuss the best plans of operations to ensure victory.’291 American ambition was central to this conference: Wilson told Mayo to ‘take the “lead” and “be the senior partner in a successful naval campaign”’.292 Mayo hoped to learn what was happening at sea, and to ensure that the USN employed ‘more intelligently and effectually… its strength and resources in co-operation with the Allies to win the war’.293 To the Navy Department this aim meant offensive action.

290 Page to Daniels, September 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 254-5 291 Telegram to Murray, 30th August 1917 ADM 137/1420, 270. Murray became Secretary of the Admiralty on 7th August 1917, replacing Greene. See also: Geddes to Lloyd George, 29th August 1917, ADM 116/1804 292 Allard, ‘Anglo-American Naval Differences’, 78 293 Admiral Mayo’s Notes on the Purpose of his Visit, ADM 116/1804 76

It wanted ‘a mutually acceptable plan of operations’ – it would not mindlessly follow the

British.294 With the U-boat menace diminishing, the Americans were prepared to challenge the British, albeit so to improve their joint effort. Their chance to shape grand strategy had gone, but they could still alter operations.

Mayo’s mission failed to make an impact. The Allies knew that offensive action would furnish limited results. The only offensive plan Mayo gained was the North Sea barrage, which the British proposed because the Americans would fund it. Instead, pressure was applied on Mayo to declare war on Austria-Hungary.295 Sir Eric Geddes, First Lord of the Admiralty from 17th July 1917, was the only politician present. No Admiral could make unilateral decisions on behalf of their state, not even Mayo, when asked which American destroyers could work in the Mediterranean.296 He left London disappointed, complaining

‘that the conference rarely moved beyond generalities’.297 He was underwhelmed by the

Admiralty and its lack of organisation: ‘the war has been carried on from day to day not according to any comprehensive policy’.298 This view was reinforced by the American writer, Winston Churchill: ‘the British Admiralty… has been living from hand to mouth, from day to day… it has been making no plans ahead’.299

294 Memorandum for First Sea Lord by Admiral Mayo, September 1917, ADM 137/1437, 98 295 Report of Naval Conference of Powers United Against Germany, 4-5th September 1917, ADM 137/1420, 290 296 ibid, 302 297 Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 152 298 Admiral Mayo’s general impressions regarding conditions in the Admiralty, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 97 299 Winston Churchill (U.S.) to President Wilson, 22nd October 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 118 77

The USN occupied an increasingly strong position, as the Allies knew that

American assistance could further improve the situation at sea.300 Thus, the Admiralty worked to bring the Americans into the fold. The British Naval Staff sent the USN lengthy memoranda on naval policy and strategy in all theatres, which centred on economic warfare and the protection of SLOCs rather than aggressive action.301 Geddes, keen for further visits from senior US officers, proposed that Benson visit London in order to improve

Anglo-American naval relations.302 The British must bring Benson on board if they were to receive the assistance they required. Geddes did not want to wait for a new crisis to receive effective assistance. Moreover, although Benson had warmed to the British, he was annoyed that they were keeping him ‘in the dark on important matters’ and feared that Rear

Admiral Sims was going native.303 Gaunt conveyed several alarming signals to London, suggesting that the Admiralty cut out the middle man of Sims and communicate with

Benson directly – a solution most likely suggested by Benson. The latter wished Gaunt to visit London to address the problem of poor trans-Atlantic communication.304

The British believed that the Americans were overly-suspicious, and exaggerating their problems.305 Jellicoe told Gaunt to reassure Benson, while Page defended the honour of Balfour, Geddes, and Jellicoe.306 Benson was ‘satisfied’ by this news, but the matter still needed to be addressed. In order to further that objective, Gaunt was sent to London.307 The

300 Newbolt, Naval Operations Vol. IV, 134 301 Present Naval Policy, 29th September 1917, ADM 137/1437, 103 302 Geddes to Daniels, 13th October 1917, ADM 116/1805 303 Gaunt to Jellicoe, 11th September 1917, ADM 137/1437, 318 304 Telegram from Spring Rice, 13th September 1917, ADM 137/1437, 319 305 Spring Rice to Cecil, 18th September 1917, ADM 137/1437, 321 306 Jellicoe to Gaunt, 14th September 1917, ADM 137/1437, 322; Page to Daniels, 21st September 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 113 307 Telegram by Spring Rice, 27th September 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 113 78

situation threatened to boil over when anti-British members of the American press learned of Gaunt’s return, and newspapers ran headlines such as: ‘British withhold their secrets of naval warfare’.308 In order to prevent such claims from damaging relations across the two navies, London and Washington made public declarations. Daniels quickly praised the

‘perfect openness and frankness and cooperation’ of the Admiralty.309 Yet action was needed to ameliorate these problems: public denials did not end Benson’s private outrage.

London knew that the USN needed to be in step with the RN in order to see the war to a successful conclusion. Page noted: ‘Our only job now – and everybody’s job – is to win the war. Misunderstandings are crimes’.310 Poor communication hindered good Anglo-

American relations, and must be mended. The British decided that communications should go directly to Washington, and to Benson via Gaunt, instead of through Sims.311 This proposal pleased Benson, who enjoyed positive relations with Gaunt. Even Browning had made a good impression in Washington. He soon reported that Benson was ‘most cordial, and many matters of importance for cooperation were discussed and settled’.312

These developments threatened Sims’ position. He might ‘be confined to matters relating to U.S. Naval forces in European waters under his command’.313 However, he ensured that he was not side lined through arrangements with the Admiralty and Gaunt. All recognised that Sims’ good relationship with the British was beneficial to joint naval

308 Gaunt to Admiralty, 6th October 1917, ADM 137/1437, 330; Barclay to Balfour, 8th October 1917, ADM 137/1437, 340 309 Gaunt to Admiralty, 7th October 1917, ADM 137/1437, 331 310 Page to Daniels, 21st September 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 114 311 Jellicoe to Gaunt, 4th October 1917, ADM 137/1437, 244 312 General Letter No. 123, Vice Admiral Browning, 31st October 1917, ADM 137/504, 274 313 Memorandum by J.W.S. Anderson, 8th October 1917, ADM 137/1437, 248 79

operations, while co-operation might erode if communications were restricted to the

Admiralty and Benson. Sims ensured that he was kept in the loop by having Benson reinforce his staff with more officers,314 and attaining formal acknowledgement that he was to be ‘equally informed of all important Naval Staff matters’.315 The British recognised that

‘The organisation under Admiral Sims has been established in London with the primary purpose of serving as the co-ordinating link between the Admiralty and the United States

Navy Department’.316 By the end of the year, Sims was appointed Naval Attaché to formalise the arrangements, with the old officer, MacDougall, sent back to the US ‘for sea duty’.317 Sims integrated further with the Admiralty, attending daily conferences, and having a British officer at his headquarters in Grosvenor Square.318 He maintained the good working relationship with the USN while placating the irascible CNO.

Sims remained pivotal in ensuring smooth relations between London and

Washington on naval matters. Co-operation was driven by mutual self-interest, but made more effective by facilitators such as Sims and Gaunt. Credit, like caviar, should be spread further: the Admiralty and the Navy Department were able to forgive the other’s mistakes.319 This arrangement was not always easy, not least because of the disparity in

314 Sims to Benson, 9th October 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 112-3; Sims to Benson, 28th October 1917, Benson Papers, Box 5 315 Procedure for Informing United States Naval Authorities of Naval Staff Matters, Admiralty S.W., 17th October 1917, ADM 137/1437, 259 316 Office Memorandum, by Charles Walker, 4th December 1917, ADM 137/1437, 281 317 Page to Balfour, 14th December 1917, ADM 137/1437, 293 318 A Brief Summary of the United States Naval Activities in European Waters with Outline of the Organization of Admiral Sims’ Headquarters’, by the Intelligence Section of Admiral Sims’ Staff, 3rd August 1918, ADM 137/1964, 448 319 J.W.S. Anderson, 30th October 1917, ADM 137/1437, 278 80

power and effort between the RN and the USN. Both however did ‘the very best possible to carry the war to a successful conclusion’, and achieve their shared aim.320

3.2: The House Mission

While this naval problem was resolved, a significant US diplomatic mission arrived in Europe in October 1917, led by Edward M. House. Benson was part of this mission, along with several Navy Department officials, taking up the Admiralty’s invitation. This mission addressed Allied grand strategy, in which the war at sea remained pivotal.321 A critical result of the House Mission was the establishment of the Supreme War Council.322

Wilson was not keen on such joint arrangements, but Lloyd George argued that Allied failures in 1917 stemmed from failures in strategic liaison. The pressure of war forced the

US to participate, although it sent only a military representative, General Tasker H. Bliss, so to avoid political entanglements.323 Wilson was particularly concerned not to shift power in the war from Washington, lest Europeans dominate the shaping of the new world order.324

House returned to the US with a poor opinion of European co-operation, believing that the Allies did not like each other, or the US. He urged better collaboration with the

Allies in order to win the war. Benson felt the same way. His view of the RN had improved

320 Mayo to Jellicoe, 5th November 1917, The Jellicoe Papers Vol. II, 225 321 Lord Reading to President Wilson, 15th October 1917, in House Papers Vol. III, 202 322 See: David F. Trask, General Tasker Howard Bliss and the “Sessions of the World,” 1919 (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1966) 323 Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 173-6 324 Seymour, House Papers Vol. III, 206 81

considerably after visiting the Admiralty, and seeing its difficulties first-hand. 325 However,

Benson remembered the need to preserve US interests. He wanted better co-operation with the British to achieve victory and to further the new order envisaged by Wilson. They both felt that the US should be ‘a full partner in policy making’. When visiting Downing Street,

Benson spoke to Lloyd George on the importance of the freedom of the seas: ‘“there must be free communication, and that communication can only be carried on through freedom of the seas”’.326 This statement was ill-received.327 During the House Mission, the pressures of the war at sea were less than in the preceding months. The US therefore felt more able to demonstrate its ambition, and intention not to let the Europeans make a peace settlement without American input. These matters would be broached once peace had been achieved, but the seeds began to sprout in late 1917.

3.3: Maintaining the Maritime Highways

The wider war effort was dark in the latter months of 1917. While the U-boats’ threat had diminished, its resurfacing was feared.328 The Eastern Front had collapsed, enabling Germany to aim a decisive blow at the Allied armies in the west. The AEF needed to be functional as quickly as possible, which meant shipping enormous quantities of men and materiel across the Atlantic. This task fell to the RN and the USN. Neither could carry

325 Report of Colonel House, 14th December 1917, in House Papers Vol. III, 308; Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 181 326 Klachko, Benson, 96-7 327 Trask, Captain and Cabinets, 178 328 Balfour to House, 11th October 1917, in House Papers Vol. III, 196-7 82

it out alone.329 This mission demanded close co-operation, and solutions to several problems.

The first problem was the lack of shipping, ‘the foundation of the successful prosecution of the war’.330 Merchant ships were no longer being lost at the rate of spring

1917, but remained in short supply. The seriousness of this danger increased as time passed. In August the British War Cabinet proclaimed limits to shipping would not ‘prevent us from continuing the war in 1918’.331 The truth of the dire situation soon dawned on

London, and in November the Admiralty Plans Division sounded the alarm: if ships were not built soon, ‘the operations of the American military forces in Europe will be crippled’.332 In addition to resolving British finances and warship building, the Balfour mission had pursued a solution to merchant shipping. In October Balfour asked the US to make up the shortfall in Allied shipping by constructing 6 million tons per year. US industry was the only means to achieve this end, as Britain’s industrial capacity already was directed toward production of other materiel which had been pressing earlier in the war, notably munitions.333 A joint organisation to resolve the issue was set up in November, the

Allied Maritime Transport Council.

However, the body which directed American construction, the US Shipping Board

(USSB) was difficult to work with, and the US Government indecisive on ship building. An anti-British block in Congress held up the RN’s requests to use German passenger liners

329 Letter to Pershing, 10th September 1917, ADM 116/1805 330 Memorandum by Spring Rice, 29th November 1917, ADM 137/1621, 171 331 Report on Cabinet Committee on War Policy, 10th August 1917, CAB 27/6, 14 332 Memorandum by Admiralty Plans Division, 17th November 1917, ADM 137/2710, 615 333 Balfour to House, 11th October 1917, in House Papers Vol. III, 196. However, Britain would still construct 2.5 million tons of shipping. See: Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 170 83

which were detained in US ports. 334 Eventually German and Austrian ships in US ports were seized, producing a gain of 638,000 gross tons.335 Moreover, when the US entered the war, it had seized ships under construction in American shipyards for British companies, mainly Cunard. The British were not allowed to place any new orders in these yards. With the US entering the fray, Britain need not own these ships to defeat Germany. The US, however, also planned to keep these ships after the war. This annoyed the British ship owners who had placed these orders. Animosity was stoked by the USSB’s chairman,

William Denman, who held strong anti-British sentiments. However, he was replaced by

Edward Hurley, who worked to reach a compromise with the British, recognising the importance of subordinating shipping rivalry in order to achieve their mutual aim. The US agreed to return the merchant ships they had seized within six months of the war’s end, and would receive the monetary cost of their original construction from the organisations which had originally ordered these ships.

More ships were needed, and Washington was keen to build them – but not exclusively for wartime purposes. The US began to expand its merchant marine with an eye to creating the world’s largest merchant marine, displacing Britain.336 This rivalry was not suppressed by the exigencies of war, and caused problems in addressing immediate necessities. The US wanted to build a great merchant fleet, but was not in a position to

334 Memorandum by Commodore Gaunt, 23rd May 1917, ADM 137/1436, 254; de Chair to Greene, 15th May 1917, ADM 137/1436, 434-7 335 Figures from David Stevenson, With Our Backs to the Wall (London: Allen Lane, 2001), 338. See also: ‘Germans Sank 69 U.S. Ships in Year, But Fleet Grows, in New York World, 30th January 1918, ADM 137/1621, 321 336 Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 170-1 84

infuriate its new partners, whose ships would be needed for the AEF.337 So too, in 1917 the

British refused to use its own ships to transport the AEF. The lack of pressure from the U- boats in the autumn of 1917 enabled the Admiralty to take a sterner line, one detrimental to

Anglo-American naval relations, rather than force it to compromise.

The direction of merchant ships afloat also needed to be organised. Convoy was accepted as the only way to sail safely across the Atlantic. Since its introduction, only 10 ships out of 829 convoyed had been lost.338 October, the deadline set by the German navy for crippling British trade, passed without fanfare: only 1.5 million tons was sunk in the final third of 1917 – an average of 375,500 tons per month, well below the target of

600,000 tons per month.339 The USN did its part, having sent 70% of its modern destroyers to Queenstown, where they received ‘universal praise’.340 More still were needed. The

British were pumping out destroyers, sloops and trawlers,341 but USN warships not yet in

European waters offered a more rapid solution.342 Benson recognised the British need, yet

Washington’s attention began to shift to transporting the AEF, rather than convoying merchant vessels.343 30 US destroyers and 31 cruisers, later joined by ageing battleships, were dedicated to escorting troop transports.344 The safety of American troops trumped that of British goods and sailors. This decision was rational: the AEF, a war winning

337 Safford, Wilsonian Maritime Diplomacy, 100-8 338 This figure included those lost due to collision. Mercantile Convoy System, Naval Staff, 17th September 1917, ADM 137/1437, 139-40 339 Herwig, Luxury Fleet, 228 340 Winston Churchill (U.S.) to President Wilson, 22nd October 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 119. Also see: Allard, ‘Anglo-American Naval Differences’, 76 341 ‘The Influence of the Submarine upon Naval Policy & Operations’, Naval Staff, 18th November 1917, ADM 116/1768 342 ‘Further Assistance Desired from the United States’, Naval Staff, 27th September 1917, ADM 116/1768 343 Benson to Opnav, 19th November 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 259 344 Allard, ‘Anglo-American Naval Differences’, 76-7 85

instrument, needed to be prioritised. Little drama surrounded the Navy Department’s decision to focus on transporting the AEF safely. The Admiralty recognised that this project was necessary, even if the USN’s attention on this was detrimental to the supply of goods to Britain.

As 1917 drew to a close, the British brought the U-boat menace under control and planned to take the strategic offensive against them. The attempt to strangle British SLOCs in 1917 failed because of the inadequate resources of the U-boat service, and the power of convoy. U-boat successes rested on the incomplete nature of the convoy system. Just 10% of ships sailed independently. They accounted for 85% of losses.345 Surface ships remained impotent against the greater British and American fleet. They achieved minor tactical victories in late 1917, which soon were nullified by deploying heavier ships on routes vulnerable to German sorties, like the convoys from Scotland to Norway. Allied maritime communications had been maintained and the AEF was being transported to the Western

Front. These accomplishments were achieved through compromise. The Navy Department was willing to follow British strategic direction, and the Admiralty proved ready to assist the USN with its more aggressive plans, notably the North Sea Barrage, and the transportation of the AEF.

However, much work remained to be done. The progress made in 1917 had to be built upon. The German army had defeated Russia, and prepared to attack in the west: the pressures of war were heightened once more. On 21st March 1918 the highly anticipated

345 Stevenson, Backs to the Wall, 315 86

German spring offensive, Operation Michael, commenced.346 With the US supplying the

Allies with men and materiel in increasing quantities, this was the last hand Germany could play. Ludendorff declared that the war must be won in 1918, and to do so Britain must be beaten. This aim demanded the isolation of the Western Front from British and American reinforcements. Head of the German Naval General Staff, Admiral Henning von

Holtzendorff, promised that the U-boats would play their part in this task. The U-boats sought to re-launch their guerre de course in the improved weather of spring. They would sink 650,000 tons of shipping per month, which, combined with friction (such as losses due to shipwrecks) would reduce Allied shipping by 350,000 tons per month. This would leave the Allies only 10.5 million tons of shipping with which to transport 60 million tons of supplies, plus the AEF. To achieve this end, a new naval construction programme of 450 submarines, two battleships, and 15 cruisers was ordered – but lack of resources left it a pipe dream.347 U-boat officers spent the winter of 1917/18 seeking counter-measures to convoy. New crews were trained to attack convoys, especially in shore, where escorts were few, including the Eastern Seaboard of the US. U-boats would pool information on convoy sightings, but not use wolf group attacks against convoys, despite urgings from many officers and the Kaiser.

To overcome these threats and win the war at sea, the Entente and the US established ‘the closest touch and complete co-operation’ between the allied and associated navies.348 The Allied Naval Council was formed in Paris on 29th November 1917, with two

346 Holger H. Herwig, The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914-1918 (London: Arnold, 1997), 392-3 347 Herwig, Luxury Fleet, 228-45 348 Memorandum by Geddes, 11th December 1917, ADM 116/1769 87

specific goals: to further improve Anglo-American co-operation, and to energise the obstinate Italian navy.349 Benson pronounced: ‘I believe that no time should be lost nor should any effort be spared to assist all the Allies at the earliest possible date and to the utmost extent by any means which help towards the prosecution of the war’.350 US commitment to this aim, however, once again would depend on self-interest, and the exigencies of war.

The renewed German challenge again forced co-operation between the USN and

RN. Since the U-boats had not been conquered, British and American shipbuilding remained dedicated to the cause. Convoy still was the best means to limit U-boat successes, especially by closing the gaps in the system. Even those American officers determined to take more offensive measures accepted this verdict.351 More ASW craft, especially destroyers, were needed to escort every merchant ship.352 Therefore the Admiralty continued to prioritise ASW ships over merchant vessels and capital ships.353 The Navy

Department too promised significant numbers of destroyers for European waters, although

American output flattered to deceive.354 Only 45 destroyers were constructed between

November 1917 and November 1918.355 This failure caused friction between the two navies. The British were frustrated at the American failure.356 The Navy Department

349 Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 179 350 Report of Admiral Benson, 14th December 1917, in House Papers Vol. III, 311 351 Memorandum by the United States of America: The General Naval Situation at present, and Decision that should be taken to further successful War’, 12-14th March 1918, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 154 352 Operations Committee Minutes, 27th August 1918, ADM 137/2709, 372 353 Memorandum by Plans Division, 17th November 1917, ADM 137/2710, 617 354 Sims to Murray, 28th March 1918, ADM 137/1621, 257 355 Sims to Niblack, 23rd May 1918, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 413; also see 131 356 Admiralty Memorandum to the War Cabinet: Naval Effort – Great Britain & United States of America, 2nd August 1918, ADM 116/1771 88

remained suspicious of Britain’s shipbuilding, and Daniels and Benson fretted that the

British were bluffing about suspending capital ship construction while shifting the burden of building small craft onto the Americans.357 Discontent was voiced internally, however.

Both sides hid their annoyance from their partner in order to prevent a fall-out at the top.

The transportation of the AEF posed many difficulties for US naval leaders. The

USN was determined not to let the army down.358 It continued to prioritise European waters as the destination for its ASW craft, though it left the Eastern Seaboard vulnerable. This concession was not altered by the appearance of U-boats in American waters in 1918, partially because that threat was small.359 Only 110,000 tons of shipping was lost here.360 In any case, the USN contributed only 27% of destroyer and 35% of cruiser escorts in the convoy system,361 so ‘the great bulk of responsibility for escorting those troops and stores devolve[d] upon the British Navy’.362 British destroyers escorted 62% of the US troop ships that reached England and all of those which crossed the Channel to the Western Front.363

Against this, the Queenstown force handled ‘certain merchant convoys coming to France and to the United Kingdom’. US destroyers operating from Brest also escorted coastal convoys, while the small force based at Gibraltar worked ‘with the British in escorting

Allied trade in and out of the Mediterranean’.364 Allard therefore is wrong to cite the

357 Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 191-2 358 Allard, ‘Anglo-American Naval Differences’, 77 359 Admiralty to Grant, 22nd July 1918, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 466 360 Herwig, Luxury Fleet, 243 361 Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 204 362 Admiralty Memorandum to the War Cabinet: Naval Effort – Great Britain & United States of America, 2nd August 1918, ADM 116/1771 363 ‘A Brief Summary of the United States Naval Activities in European Waters with Outline of the Organization of Admiral Sims’ Headquarters’, by the Intelligence Section of Admiral Sims’ Staff, 3rd August 1918, ADM 137/1964, 464-51 364 ibid, 459 89

priority given to troop transports over ‘the defense of the mercantile convoys serving Great

Britain or of the general defeat of the German U-boat’ as a proof of poor Anglo-American collaboration.365 The USN deployed its escorts in a logical fashion, integrated with the wider British convoy system. By May, the Anglo-American ‘convoy system [had] practically defeated the submarine’.366

Meanwhile, both British and American vessels shipped the AEF. The British wanted the US, with its ‘unequalled resources in men and material’, to produce merchant vessels at a rate which would replenish losses and make losses to U-boats irrelevant. Spring

Rice believed that the solution to this shortage ‘lies in [American] hands and her hands alone’.367 This aim would take time to achieve, as the US was preparing for a long war. At the start of 1918, the British accepted that their ships must carry American troops in the immediate future.368 The Admiralty’s initially stubborn attitude was reversed as it became apparent that there was no alternative to that approach.369 Despite much competition in mercantile matters, these states needed to co-operate to fight the war. This situation nevertheless infuriated the British: ships vital to the imperial economy were conveying a foreign army to the battlefield, while some US ships operated outside the danger zone.370

While British ships were put at risk, the uproar would be ‘more far reaching results in the

United States than if the ship sunk were an American one’, as the American public would

365 Allard, ‘Anglo-American Naval Differences’, 80 366 Sims to Rear Admiral H. O. Dunn, U.S. Navy, 7th May 1918, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 296 367 Memorandum by Spring Rice, 29th November 1917, ADM 137/1621, 172-3 368 Stevenson, Backs to the Wall, 338-45; Admiralty Memorandum, 10th January 1918, ADM 137/1621, 145 369 Stevenson, Backs to the Wall, 339 370 Admiralty Memorandum to the War Cabinet: Naval Effort – Great Britain & United States of America, 2nd August 1918, ADM 116/1771 90

blame the British for the loss of life.371 Despite its anger, the Admiralty forged ahead.

American troops were to stem the tide of German gains on the Western Front.372 The exigencies of war forced Britain to compromise and work toward the more important mutual policy.

As with warship construction, by early 1918 optimistic American forecasts of late

1917 about building merchant tonnage had proven wide of the mark.373 Between February and October 1917, the US built only one million tons of mercantile shipping.374 Allied organisations created to solve the matter, notably the AMTC, failed, partly because the

Americans distrusted their overseas representatives.375 The inability of US shipyards to produce ships to meet present shortfalls fuelled British fear that the US programme focused on future mercantile domination. Anglo-American shipping rivalry, muted by wartime co- operation, grew as the threat of defeat diminished.376 In July 1918, as the U-boats faltered again, Geddes agitated to make the US compensate Britain for the work its yards carried out on US ships in British waters. Time spent on repairing these vessels was lost for constructing new merchantmen. Geddes believed that time equated to five completed oilers.377 Sims supported the Admiralty on this issue, but the Navy Department refused even to discuss it, claiming that present exigencies precluded anything other than prosecuting the war to a successful conclusion.378 The Admiralty retorted that in that case,

371 Memorandum by Wemyss to Geddes, 6th August 1918, ADM 116/1810 372 Neilson, ‘Reinforcements and Supplies’, 46 373 Admiralty Memorandum for the War Cabinet, 16th April 1918, ADM 116/1770 374 Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 207 375 Safford, Wilsonian Maritime Diplomacy, 149 376 Neilson, ‘Reinforcements and Supplies’ 46 377 Admiralty Memorandum to the War Cabinet: Naval Effort – Great Britain & United States of America, 26th August 1918, ADM 116/1771 378 Sims to Vice Admiral Charles M.do Batolome, R.N., 15th August 1918, ADM 116/1771 91

it must modify its own shipbuilding programme to build merchant tonnage, and the US must increase its own construction to compensate.379 Trouble was brewing on this issue, and promised to heighten further once the defeat of Germany eliminated the greatest bond between the two states. The future of the world carrying trade occupied the thoughts of certain US officials, notably Hurley, who began preparing for the ‘war after the war’ in

1918. This prospect worried the British, who sent Geddes to Washington to discuss the future of the British and US merchant fleets.380 Hurley, however, was an outsider, and was challenged on his views by colleagues such as Secretary of Commerce William Redfield.381

Shipping was the most controversial matter between these maritime powers, and not just because of disappointing output. The La Follette Seamen’s Act of 1915 enabled

American sailors on merchant ships to leave at port with pay. This was among numerous important measures designed to benefit the lives of sailors, but this law in particular caused problems for British ship owners, who struggled to maintain crews for return journeys.

Spring Rice brought this matter to the State Department’s attention, which decided that

‘England’s needs had to be met’. Secretary William Wilson of the Labor Board refused to bend, stating that ‘he would not endorse a plan that promised to strengthen an already

“decided economic advantage for the foreign shipowner”’.382 Instead, he argued, the problem was low rates of pay by British ship owners. Wilson backed his secretary on this point, and Lansing abandoned support over the issue. Thus, the US maintained a policy which would empower their own ship owners.

379 Memorandum by Admiralty Plans Division, 30th August 1918, ADM 137/2709, 352 380 Safford, Wilsonian Maritime Diplomacy, 141-60 381 ibid, 147 382 ibid, 115 92

During the war, Anglo-American relations were mixed over the matter of shipping construction. The increasingly ambitious Americans at times prioritised self-interest, which was projected further into the future than the defeat of Germany. The exigencies of war tempered this dispute, but it threatened to boil over once the time came to construct a post-

Wilhelmine world order. However, when the war ended so did the effort at a renaissance of

American mercantile capacity, removing it as a central bone of Anglo-American contention post-war.

The routing of shipping was a similarly hot topic during hostilities, but the Navy

Department contained its objections. Benson announced that the appearance of a U-boat on the East Coast would be sufficient for the Navy Department to take matters ‘into its own hands’.383 However, this statement was designed not to seize control of routing, but to prompt the Admiralty into action. The Navy Department would take such action only if

Britain did not improve its preparations and communication with the USN. Benson wanted the Admiralty to work more closely with American officials in London, and to create ‘a

Controlling British Authority representing the Admiralty in Washington’.384 The U-boat could best be overcome and American interests served by improving the existing system, not uprooting it. The Admiralty implemented Benson’s recommendations ‘without delay’.385 Vice Admiral Grant, Browning’s replacement, was made the British ‘Sims’ in

Washington, and the ‘ultimate convoy authority’.386 Gaunt would no longer suffice, not

383 Benson to Sims, 20th February 1918, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 273 384 ibid 385 Sims to Benson, 25th February 1918, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 457 386 Sims to Benson, 1st March 1918, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 457 93

least because he ‘had fingers in several pies’ and perhaps was too distracted.387 Benson was delighted to receive Grant. The British also eased frustrations in Washington by allowing the USN greater influence. It facilitated the establishment of an American Convoy Section, and the installation of US Routing and Shipping Intelligence Officers in the Western

Hemisphere, who conformed with existing British methods.388 Once the pressure of protecting shipping lessened in October 1918, the Navy Department made a last bid for control over AEF convoys. While perhaps a reasonable request, the Admiralty remained firm: a war was still on, and such a drastic change could not be facilitated before victory.389

Trans-Atlantic shipping and its protection was a vital element of the Great War. Without compromise on these issues, the Americans and British may have failed to safeguard the crossing of men and materiel to Europe, the critical theatre of the war.

Recognising the primacy of this objective, the Americans conceded most throughout 1917-1918, letting the British maintain control of the system they had already implemented. Britain compromised too, so as not to offend the Americans, whose support they wanted. Thus the British did not grumble too loudly, and sacrificed merchant and naval shipping to support the American effort while acknowledging that the USN must focus on this element of the Battle of the Atlantic too. Yet the threat of the U-boats was not so great that mutual peril smothered every difference. The arguments over the world carrying trade seemed set to begin with the U-boats diminished and the AEF safely landing in France.

387 Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 441 388 Memorandum by J. Whithead, 18th March 1918, ADM 137/1621, 322; Memorandum by the Navy Department, 11th July 1918, ADM 137/1619, 381 389 General Letter No. 8, by Grant, 1st October 1918, ADM 137/504, 426 94

3.4: Taking the Offensive

Despite the understanding over convoy, the US could not fathom why the RN was not undertaking further offensive operations. The RN was not convinced that plans put forward by American planners could succeed. The USN’s frustration with apparent British inactivity showed no signs of abating. Lobbying from the US went beyond the navy; newspapers such as the Tribune began to question British ‘reasons for not adopting [the] offensive’.390 By November, Benson drew up an American naval policy – the counterpart to that provided by the British in September. This was bolstered by the establishment of a US

Planning Section in London ‘as part of the plans department of the Admiralty’, a compromise suggested by Sims.391 Any offensive operation still would need the support of the larger British navy.392 Moreover, close co-operation would be needed to establish which ambitious American plans were feasible, and to further reduce the impact of the U-boat.

The Navy Department had not given up on hunting U-boats. The submarine chasers despatched to European waters were the brainchild of Roosevelt. At 110 feet long, these quick ships packed a punch with their 3-inch gun and four depth charges, and Benson was optimistic that they could succeed.393 Yet their size caused them to suffer in the bad weather which permeated British waters, while their operations epitomised the ‘chasing across the farm’ which Wilson wished to avoid. The British had long doubted the suitability of these vessels for patrol or as escorts. They knew whereof they spoke, given their past

390 Mr. Butler to Colonel John Buchan, 23rd October 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 125 391 Daniels to Benson, 17th November 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations, 141; Sims to Benson, 28th October 1917, Benson Papers, Box 5 392 Benson to Daniels, 19th November 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 141 393 Description of 110ft. Submarine Chasers, ADM 137/1437, 81-2; Statement of Admiral Benson, November 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 130 95

attempts to use motor launches for similar purposes.394 Yet the ambitious, aggressive officers of the USN refused to abandon these warships. Consequently, the British let the

Americans learn their own lesson, but only with their own crews.395

The RN helped the USN to continue its experiments with submarine hunting in

European waters into 1918.396 The USN wanted to ‘Put the best brains and skill available into the anti-submarine service’, and liaised with the British Anti-Submarine Division to improve the transfer of knowledge between the services.397 Captain R. H. Leigh, USN, was appointed to this duty, as well as organising and training hunter units, and developing tactics to destroy U-boats. This new arrangement benefitted the British, as the collaborative effort yielded new technologies (such as instruments to deploy depth charges) which the

Americans produced but let the British carry.398 Operational and tactical co-operation was excellent. Tests carried out over the winter re-affirmed American faith in their ability to hunt U-boats despite the Admiralty’s doubts. Sims blamed these doubts on the poor performance of British instruments compared to American ones, but the Admiralty were right to criticise the hydrophone.399 Its development was slow and costly.400 By the summer, listening equipment remained useless in unfavourable conditions, and chasing

394 Memorandum by D.A.S.D., 4th September 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 253. By September Captain William Wordsworth Fisher had taken over the post from Duff 395 Note by D.A.S.D., 4th September 1917, ADM 137/1437, 77 396 Memorandum by U.S. Planning Section, undated, ADM 137/2709, 382 397 Memorandum by the United States of America: The General Naval Situation at present, and Decision that should be taken to further successful War’, 12-14th March 1918, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 155 398 Murray to Sims, 17th December 1918; Gunnery Department, United States Destroyer Flotillas based on Queenstown, Ireland, 24th December 1918, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 316-8 399 Sims to Opnav, 9th January 1918, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 263 400 Directory of Admiralty Intelligence: Endorsement on Prawle Point Hunt, 10th March 1918, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 286 96

submarines ineffective.401 Aircraft proved far more promising, and received substantial attention from both the Admiralty and the Navy Department, but were hindered by primitive technology.402 Convoy proved the most effective means of taking on the submarine.

The USN misunderstood the British intentions to take the war to the foe. Beatty had his eyes fixed on the HSF rather than the U-boats, and drilled the Grand Fleet hard with new principles in order to crush the German surface fleet in open battle. Naval aviation had great potential, which Beatty more than any other officer recognised. While the RN accommodated US efforts to take on the U-boats, Beatty worked on a plan to crush the

German fleet in 1918. It centred on launching ‘Cuckoo’ planes carrying torpedoes from aircraft carriers, despatched near Wilhelmshaven, and sinking the HSF at anchor. This planning was exclusively British; Beatty did not take the USN into his confidence, because it had nothing to offer. Unfortunately for Beatty, his plan never took flight. The technology

– as with submarine hunting – was not sufficiently advanced to permit such a daring plan.

The RN had too few carriers and planes. The earliest an attack could take place was 1919.

The RN made massive investments to establish such a force, but the war ended before

Beatty could press his plan to fruition.403 Material limitations aside, Beatty’s operational planning was sound, and the plan formed the basis for the British attack on Taranto in

1940.

401 Sims to Captain N. A. McCully, U.S. Navy, 4th August 1918, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 301 402 Memorandum by U.S. Navy Planning Section (London)’, 15th February 1918, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 156 403 Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow Vol. V, 141-2 97

The ray of light for the USN in its quest for offensive action was British support for the North Sea Barrage, despite pessimism from past experience, because the US would provide the money and materiel, namely mines, minelayers, destroyers, and patrol craft.404

Moreover, this operation no longer threatened the convoy system.405 Roosevelt wanted this programme to be a joint effort, which was unavoidable if, as he believed, it required 4,000 vessels.406 The Admiralty was reluctant to make such an investment. Beatty would not spare any destroyers from the Grand Fleet.407 The RN’s mining attempts had been futile, and it felt that ‘the present methods of dealing with the submarine menace’ made construction of a barrage across the wide gap between Scotland and Norway impossible’.408

The USN believed technology could overcome these problems. It had a new type of ordnance (the ‘antenna’ mine) which reduced the projected number of mines needed from

400,000 to 100,000.409 These weapons took time to construct, especially because the

Admiralty wanted the US to build more minelayers as it anticipated ‘considerable losses’ due to enemy resistance.410 Spring also would offer more daylight hours to construct the barrage.411 Consequently, minelaying did not commence until March 1918.

Ironically, the very fact that Britain supported this offensive caused the Navy

Department to fear it would seek to control the operation, despite relying on American

404 Memorandum on Mayo’s Requests, ADM 137/1437, 100 405 Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 368 406 Memorandum by Asst. Secretary Roosevelt on Submarine Situation, 24th May 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 376 407 Beatty to Admiralty, 19th December 1917, ADM 137/1437, 382 408 De Chair to Roosevelt, 12th July 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 378 409 Herwig, Luxury Fleet, 206-7; Benson to Sims, 18th August 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 378 410 Memorandum by Plans Division, 17th November 1917, ADM 137/2710, 616 411 Policy of the Future, Naval Staff, 17th September 1917, ADM 137/2710, 616 98

resources. Hence, it chose Captain Reginald Belknap to head the barrage, as he would dominate the plan ‘no matter who the British select’.412 A veteran of the Spanish-American

War, Belknap had the qualities Roosevelt wanted: ‘somebody with imagination and authority’. The Navy Department wanted to dominate the scheme because they felt it could prove ‘the single biggest factor in winning the war’.413 It needed British co-operation to do so, but did not trust them to be offensive enough. The Admiralty, conversely, wanted

American ships in British waters, and was willing to try the barrage because it hoped the ships would achieve their purpose and remain even if the strategy failed. Each side needed its partner to pursue the policy which it believed would win the war, and was willing to compromise in order to woo the other.

The North Sea Barrage finally got under weigh in 1918. The burden was shared, although the Americans supplied the mines and money. The Admiralty’s planning ran into problems, most significantly Norwegian neutrality. Unless these waters were mined, the U- boats had a safe passage to the north: ‘the plan will collapse unless a base is established in

Norwegian waters’.414 The USN cared little for Norwegian neutrality, but the politicians declined to force the issue.415 Similar problems existed at the southern end of the barrage, where Beatty insisted that a clear passage exist in British waters for his capital ships. He would not take any risks, lest he lose a battleship to a mine. This demand caused ‘a first- class row’ with the Navy Department, which complained that it would wreck the project.

412 Pratt to Daniels, c. 12th November 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 124 413 Roosevelt to Daniels, 29th October 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 383 414 ‘The Anti-Submarine Campaign’, 11th February 1918, ADM 137/2707, 526 415 Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 369 99

Ultimately, the dispute was settled with a compromise: Beatty’s passage would span a mere three miles.416

The North Sea Barrage failed. For the cost of $40 million, and 70,000 mines, the barrage caused the loss of three U-boats and a further three damaged417 – ‘a meagre result’.418 The results might have been better had the project been completed sooner, but the

British doubted that it even could be made effective. The barrage was a waste of assets strategically, but a manageable one that did not hinder the convoy system. It was a reasonable concession by the British: it reduced the American clamour for offensive action, while tempting more ships away from their US bases.

The Admiralty indulged the USN’s desire to take offensive action simply for the sake of good naval relations. Limits to the capabilities of the USN left it out of the one offensive operation in which the Grand Fleet was genuinely interested, an aerial assault on

Wilhelmshaven. The USN struggled to find a mission, and when the North Sea Barrage proved a disappointment, the USN refused to give up. American ambition remained central in the drive to urge offensive action on the Admiralty. The sacking of Jellicoe at the end of

1917 did not prompt a change in the stance of the Admiralty, nor the Americans. Jellicoe’s objections to American plans had been grounded in reality, but the US Planning Section enjoyed strong relations with the Admiralty. They worked in close proximity to create joint memoranda, ‘producing offensive plans like rabbits out of a hat’ in 1918.419 They sought to find alternatives, and compromises, such as the bid to make convoy – the Admiralty’s

416 Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow Vol. V, 67-8 417 Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 369-70 418 Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow Vol. V, 73 419 Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 203 100

preferred method of ASW – more offensive by detaching half of a convoy’s escort to hunt a

U-boat if sighted.420 Overall the Americans remained more ambitious, and were frustrated by pessimistic – yet realistic – British assessments. The Sea Lords shelved most of their plans. Yet collaboration at the operational level remained a success. The Admiralty’s bid to accommodate the USN reduced the frustration of the American planners, but the USN failed to find a genuine part to play.421

3.5: Harmony in the Grand Fleet

The Grand Fleet, based at Rosyth in Scotland during 1917, prevented German heavy ships from raiding into the North Atlantic, while pinning the HSF in port. Britain had a significant advantage in capital ships over the HSF at a ratio of 2.5:1, but its resources were limited.422 Britain, fighting a global war, used the capital ships it could spare in other waters. As the British manpower drain sucked potential naval recruits into the trenches, the

RN could not easily continue to man all of its capital ships while crewing the new ASW vessels its shipyards were producing.423 Britain wanted to relieve some outdated battleships with dreadnoughts, but these could only come from the Grand Fleet. Moreover, in 1918 the

HSF might sortie (as it ultimately planned to).424 If so, additional US battleships would be useful, but only if prepared for combat. The USN had not fought a serious action since the

420 Notes on Admiralty Conference, 28th May 1918, ADM 137/2708, 257 421 Memorandum by Planning Section, U.S. Naval Forces in European Waters, 30th December 1918, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 184-5 422 Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 325 423 Memorandum on Admiral Mayo’s Requests, ADM 137/1437, 99 424 Herwig, Luxury Fleet, 247 101

dreadnought revolution in 1906.425 Adequate preparation required months of training with the Grand Fleet.426 Consequently, in the summer of 1917, the Admiralty decided that it wanted to work with the US battleships in which it had expressed little interest earlier.427

The Admiralty sent Commander Richard Down to inspect the US battle fleet. His findings were largely positive, easing concerns over the capabilities of the USN.428

Nevertheless, Beatty feared that he was taking these warships on for political reasons, which was partly true.429 Having British and American battleships – the symbol of national power – side by side at the centre of the naval war would project an image of co-operation between the British and Americans. This would boost morale in both navies, with sailors in the Grand Fleet increasingly ‘‘fed up’ to the last degree’430 at the lack of a chance to sink the HSF, and the US battle fleet far from the fray.431 It would also serve to fuel the drive for improved co-operation in naval relations with the European powers.

The USN remained reluctant to detach its battleships. Benson was a stern adherent to Mahan, who championed the principle of concentrating the battle fleet.432 Benson did not want this concentration to be in the North Sea,433 but in home waters, which he refused to strip of even a squadron.434 In the middle of 1917, Benson still feared an Allied collapse, and wanted to shield the USN from losing assets should this happen. Moreover, to weaken

425 Memorandum by Benson, November 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 333 426 ‘Co-operation of the British and American Battlefleets and Suggested Re-distribution of Forces’, 19th November 1917, ADM 137/2706, 339 427 Sims to Opnav, 21st July 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 330 428 Down to Browning, 27th June 1917, ADM 137/1621, 125 429 Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 327 430 Sims to Benson, 2nd April 1918, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 159 431 Memorandum by Benson, November 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 333-4 432 Alfred Thayer Mahan, Influence of Sea Power, 30 433 Sims to Benson, 1st September 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 331 434 Benson to Sims, 20th August 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 331 102

the US battle fleet presented an opportunity for Japan in the Pacific, to American minds.435

Yet in the autumn of 1917, the chance of Allied collapse was receding temporarily. The

Lansing-Ishii Agreement calmed concerns over Japanese intentions, while the British continued to press the Japanese to send more of its fleet to Europe.436 The tipping point emerged when Benson visited the Grand Fleet in November and received an overwhelming reception. Discussions with Jellicoe swayed him too.437 Benson compromised, agreeing with Sims that a squadron should serve with the Grand Fleet, and made a ‘Tentative agreement to send [the] entire Atlantic Fleet to European waters in the spring provided conditions warrant such action’.438 He defended his action against any remaining critics by stating that to despatch four dreadnoughts did not divide the battle fleet, while any setback to the Grand Fleet would damage the USN’s reputation, if it had refused to send its battleships to help.439

These four coal-burning battleships, arriving in mid-December, became the 6th

Battle Squadron of the Grand Fleet. It was commanded by Admiral Hugh Rodman, who enjoyed enormous popularity in the Grand Fleet – as did the American sailors in general – and became close friends with Beatty.440 British and American sailors enjoyed excellent relations, and a sense of fraternity developed.441 Their arrival boosted British and American

435 Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 325-6 436 ‘Co-operation of the British and American Battlefleets and Suggested Re-distribution of Forces’, ADM 137/2706, 340; Allard, ‘Anglo-American Naval Differences’, 77 437 Benson to Opnav, 9th November 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 334 438 Secret Memorandum by Benson for Colonel House, in House Papers Vol. III, 307 439 Memorandum by Benson, November 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 333-4 440 Sims to Benson, 15th February 1918, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 343; also 327 441 Report of Captain D. W. Knox, US Navy, on visit to Rosyth and Mine Bases, 24th May 1918, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 347 103

morale. The Americans considered it ‘a great honor and a great privilege’.442 Beatty called it ‘a great day’.443 Meanwhile, the morale of the HSF was decaying toward mutiny.

The US ships were to integrate with the British under Beatty’s command.444 The stakes were too high for independent American action, which the USN accepted. The war could still, as Churchill famously quipped, be lost in an afternoon. From the start political niceties and morale were significant factors in this deployment. To the new First Sea Lord,

Admiral Rosslyn Wemyss, the US battleships ‘were not a real addition of strength, but possibly even the reverse’.445 Their personnel were keen, but took time to adapt to the

Grand Fleet’s ways of manoeuvring. Beatty refused to let the Navy Department rotate

American battleships as they pleased, as he could not waste time constantly training inexperienced crews.446 Beatty deemed American ‘‘signalling and wireless [to be] of a very primitive kind’’.447 Some American battleships met the Grand Fleet’s standard in gunnery, others were poor. These problems soon waned, however, the intangible benefits were greater. The Admiralty also enjoyed the strategic flexibility extra American ships allowed them.

The deficiencies of the US battleships declined with time. They reached the high standard maintained by the Grand Fleet. Co-operation was excellent, because both navies recognised the importance of their mission in the North Sea – the fate of the war at sea

442 Rodman to Beatty, 9th December 1917, ADM 137/1964, 434 443 Beatty to Sims, 5th December 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 339 444 Head of M. Branch to Admiralty, 14th December 1917, ADM 137/1437, 391 445 Verbal Statement by Wemyss before Imperial War Cabinet, 27th June 1918, ADM 1/8520/103; Marder, Dreadnought to Scapa Flow Vol. V, 125 446 Still, Crisis at Sea, 413 447 Roskill, Beatty, 243 104

hinged on their ability to contain the HSF. If the Germans mauled the Grand Fleet and ventured into the Atlantic, Allied shipping would be annihilated, and the Allied and

American armies on the Western Front cut off. This pressure forced the Americans to integrate, and the British to train them.448 By the middle of 1918, a force had been melded which could withstand any German foray. Wemyss deployed their example to encourage closer co-operation in the Mediterranean, and then to goad the British dominions into enabling their ships to serve with the RN.449

The Navy Department and Benson did not abandon Mahan simply to boost morale.

They recognised that to place American capital ships in European waters made the victory easier to win. They deployed another three battleships to Berehaven on the south coast of

Ireland, further dividing their fleet, to ensure that the Germans could not replace their faltering U-boats with battle cruiser raids into the Atlantic. As Sims admitted, the prospect of this was ‘never… very probable…. if a battle cruiser did go out, and we had no warning of her, the chances of her finding a convoy out in the Atlantic would be small’.450 Still, US battleships contained the HSF, applying an added layer of security to convoy from

Berehaven. The importance of containing the German fleet forced the USN to subordinate the words of its prophet Mahan to ‘the stress of actual warfare’.451 Exigencies overcame theory.

448 Still, Crisis at Sea, 413 449 Wemyss to Captain D. A. H. Larking, 3rd May 1918, in Paul G. Halpern, The Royal Navy in the Mediterranean 1915-1918 (Aldershot: Temple Smith for The Navy Records Society, 1987), 466; Verbal Statement by Wemyss before Imperial War Cabinet, 27th June 1918, ADM 1/8520/103 450 Sims to Benson, 10th August 1918, Benson Papers, Box 9 451 Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 328 105

3.6: The Mediterranean

The Mediterranean Sea was the lesser theatre of the naval war. Given Allied naval preponderance on the surface, as in the North Sea, the Central Powers were pinned in their bases. The Austro-Hungarian battle fleet could not sortie lest it be destroyed by the larger

French and Italian navies. However, constant vigilance was needed over the Adriatic Sea and the Dardanelles to counter any surface threat. As in the Atlantic, the best means to attack the Allies at sea remained below the surface. No more than 50 U-boats operated in the Mediterranean in the latter stages of the war, ‘a remarkably small number’, yet they harmed Allied shipping.452 Between November 1917 and June 1918 only 800,000 tons of shipping was sunk in the Mediterranean, compared to 2,516,000 tons of world shipping lost in the same period.453 Allied resources were large enough to manage. The Allies dedicated their warships to ‘anti-submarine warfare and the protection of trade’.454 As in the Battle of the Atlantic, effective co-operation could facilitate victory. Unlike there, this aim was not found in the Mediterranean. Many naval powers – Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and the US

– with their own national interests, hampered co-operation. All of these states wished to defeat the Central Powers, but its pressure was far less significant than that in the Atlantic.

Consequently, some states limited their commitment due to lack of interest, like the US and

Japan. Mediterranean states with significant interests focused on long-range issues, such as what they could gain from the war without fighting the common enemy. Italy was the worst offender.455

452 Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 226 453 Herwig, Luxury Fleet, 244; Stevenson, Backs to the Wall, 312 454 Policy in the Mediterranean, Naval Staff, 17th September 1917, ADM 137/1437, 186 455 Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 397; Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 225 106

While the RN remained the leading naval power in the Allied war effort, it was subsidiary to the French navy (Marine Nationale) and the Italian navy (Regia Marina) in the Mediterranean theatre.456 The USN was far less interested in the Mediterranean, and did not declare war on Austria-Hungary and become officially involved in the theatre until 7th

December 1917, after Italy’s defeat at Caporetto. Wilson had not recommended declaring war earlier because ‘they have not made war upon us or challenged us to defend our right and our honor…. We enter this war only where we are clearly forced into it because there are no other means of defending our rights’.457 It was Germany which threatened the US, not the Dual Monarchy.

Until December 1917, requests by the Admiralty for American reinforcements to the Mediterranean past Gibraltar were denied. Benson deemed these proposals ‘a waste of ships’.458 Both the British and Americans remained unwilling to commit forces which were badly needed elsewhere, principally for the convoy system.459 Those that were sent deployed for the damage they would cause to German U-boats. Once it had been decided that the defeat of Austria-Hungary was in American interests, the USN’s involvement in the Mediterranean increased exponentially. The Americans brought with them the same demands for the offensive which they had pressed on the Admiralty in the Atlantic. The

British and Americans co-operated well again as they worked to energise the Regia Marina into action. In particular, the RN and USN wanted an assault in the Adriatic to close

456 Memorandum for the War Cabinet: Command in the Mediterranean, Geddes, 8th June 1918, ADM 116/1770 457 James Brown Scott, ‘War Between Austria-Hungary and the United States’, in The American Journal of International Law, 12:1 (1918), 165-72, see: 166-7 458 Gaunt to Jellicoe, 6th July 1917, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 402 459 Paul G. Halpern, The Naval War in the Mediterranean 1914-1918 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987), 401 107

submarine bases.460 The plan included an attack on the Austrian surface fleet, a critical first step to victory in the Mediterranean because ‘success in the Adriatic would release large forces for other important operations and make possible a still clearer concentration in the areas which finally must be the areas of critical importance’.461 Acting as a fleet-in-being, the Austro-Hungarians were wasting Allied naval assets which were needed elsewhere.

American involvement in the theatre was not welcomed by the Italians, who would have to carry out much of this plan and bear the cost. Rome was obstinate, content with the status quo – there was no pressure to act against the passive Austro-Hungarians.462 In fact,

Sims wanted the USN to take the offensive in the Adriatic to glorify itself: the reputation of

American naval power had suffered due to its late entry into the war, and the USN had few battle honours to its name. The meagre Austro-Hungarian fleet promised a much needed tangible success against enemy capital ships.463 Italy remained unmoved. Rome was wary of American influence in post-war Europe, and was not eager to assist in achieving their mutual aim.464 The Navy Department settled for a new mining project. As with the North

Sea, offensive plans were constrained also by logistics, and a barrage offered the best means to contain the enemy in lieu of Italian action. The Americans supplied the mines, and sent reinforcements to the theatre in the form of submarine chasers.465 36 of these were stationed at Corfu to serve the barrage which aimed to block the Straits of Otranto at the

460 Paper by US Planning Section on Possible Allied Operations in the Adriatic, 30th January 1918; Sims to Opnav, 8th March 1918 in Simpson, Naval Relations, 406-7, 411. See also: Halpern, Mediterranean, 434 461 Memorandum by Admiralty Plans Division on Proposed Operations in the Adriatic, 7th March 1918, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 411 462 Halpern, Mediterranean, 439; Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 228-31 463 Sims to Wemyss, 10th March 1918, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 411 464 Halpern, Mediterranean, 439 465 Calthorpe to Admiralty, 15th August 1918, in Halpern, The Royal Navy in the Mediterranean, 529 108

entrance to the Adriatic.466 However, the Otranto Barrage was never completed and largely ineffective. Not a single U-boat was destroyed by the barrage.467 This ‘displeased the

British and infuriated the Americans’.468

These failures stemmed chiefly from conflicts of interests. There was little pressure to unite and pursue a mutual goal. The Mediterranean remained insignificant because the threat of the Central Powers was impotent. The naval war here simply petered out. A lack of desire to co-operate, and the absence of pressure to force this, meant that the Allies achieved little other than to contain the Austro-Hungarian surface fleet. Their overwhelming resources managed the U-boat campaign, despite allowing for more havoc than should have been permitted.469 Yet these losses were strategically insignificant. The

Allies could afford them. The Mediterranean remained a sideshow, and this status prevented effective collaboration. This reinforces the importance of exigencies in driving collaboration, and forcing compromise. The Italians had no incentive to co-operate – their interests were served by standing still. Britain and the US attempted to foster co-operation, but the theatre was of secondary importance to them, and they did not work as hard as they did in the Atlantic to bring about arrangements for effective joint action: they had no need to.

466 ‘A Brief Summary of the United States Naval Activities in European Waters with Outline of the Organization of Admiral Sims’ Headquarters’, by the Intelligence Section of Admiral Sims’ Staff, 3rd August 1918, ADM 137/1964, 448 467 Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 280-1 468 Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 399 469 ibid, 397 109

Bulgaria’s withdrawal from the war on 29th September 1918 signalled to Berlin that the war was lost. German military leaders asked the Kaiser to arrange an armistice. The

HSF remained in port, rotting toward mutiny. Unrestricted submarine warfare ended on 16th

October. It had been a disaster, crushed by convoy. By June 1918, 93% of shipping to and from Britain was convoyed, and only 0.75% of it was sunk.470 Allied shipping grew, albeit not at the rate anticipated, while shipping shortages remained.471 U-boat losses rose to

7.4%. Britain was not starved into submission, and the AEF reached the front. The U-boats failed to stop a single US troop transport heading east across the Atlantic.472

Both the RN and the USN had played their part in this victory, chiefly by maintaining the maritime highway between North America and Europe, so shared the honour of escorting the defeated HSF into captivity at Scapa Flow.473 The RN had shouldered the burden of responsibility, but US and French aid mattered. In fact, France provided more seapower to the Entente than the US, and exercised major and independent commands. The Americans bolstered morale and provided much needed ships.474 45% of

US troops were transported overseas in American ships. US warships escorted 27% of the

Atlantic convoy system. The USN comprised 12% of the Grand Fleet’s battleship strength, and laid 80% of the Northern Barrage. These accomplishments were impressive for a service thrust into the maelstrom unprepared.475

470 Admiralty Memorandum, 17th July 1918, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 300 471 See: Stevenson, Backs to the Wall, 323-5 472 Herwig, Luxury Fleet, 243-6 473 Rear Admiral Rodman’s Final Report, after the Armistice, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 364 474 ‘We do not forget that your destroyers came to our assistance at a moment when our small craft were feeling the severe strain of three years’ continuous warfare’, Wemyss to Sims, 16th November 1918, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919. See also: 205 475 Sims to Opnav, 13th November 1918, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 181-2 110

The unity of action between the RN and USN was spurred by the pressures of war and the threat of the U-boat. There were disagreements, particularly when the U-boat faltered and each partner had room to pursue its preferences. Yet the British and Americans fought together to achieve their mutual aim: the destruction of German seapower. In

October, the USN was preparing to take over several of Britain’s old pre-dreadnoughts for convoy work, while the US squadron with the Grand Fleet was preparing a new scheme of rotation.476 The commitment to victory was total until the war’s sudden end.

Fighting alongside one another, British and American officers and sailors became brothers in arms. Regardless of the station, or the present exigencies, both navies enjoyed excellent relations at the operational level. A common language helped, as did a shared sense of professionalism and dedication to a cause. As hostilities ended and Britons and

Americans returned home for new assignments or retirement, they left warm wishes for their comrades. These were not mere niceties, but enduring friendships. Bayly and Sims,

Rodman and Beatty – unlikely associates in 1917 – were by 1918 lifelong friends.477 Beatty himself, often irritated at the enthusiasm of the Americans for the offensive when he recognised that the Grand Fleet was the keystone of the naval war, told the departing

American battleships that he looked forward to future co-operation,478 a desire shared by

Rodman.479

476 D. of P. to A.C.N.S., 27th October 1918, ADM 137/1622, 419; Sims to Murray, 15th October 1918, ADM 137/1622, 431 477 Elisabeth and Hugh Rodman to Lord and Lady Beatty, 14th October 1919, BTY 16/13/3 478 Beatty to Rodman, 1st December 1918, ADM 137/1964 479 Rodman to Beatty, 1st December 1918, ADM 137/1964 111

Yet the exigencies of war which had framed these friendships dissipated. Close friendships were not evident at the level of grand strategy. Wemyss and Benson were not so amiable. They recognised that 1919 would bring new challenges. The forging of a new world order by British and American politicians must expose the differing interests of

Britain, the world’s only global power and dominator of the world carrying trade, and the ambitious US, aspiring to create prosperity through free trade. With German seapower defeated, the question remained whether the British and Americans, the world’s two greatest maritime powers, would remain partners or become rivals.

112

CHAPTER 4 ANGLO-AMERICAN CO-OPERATION AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER

4.1: Toward a New World Order

Historians of Anglo-American naval relations have portrayed the period following the armistice as one of breakdown between the US and Britain – now the world’s two greatest maritime powers – and express disappointment at how wartime co-operation went awry. Allegedly, a fierce rivalry sprang up in its place, exemplified by the heated exchanges of the so-called ‘naval Battle of Paris’. This story is not correct. Relations between the fleets were no longer as close as they had been, as the exigencies of war eased, and then disappeared. Yet new pressures to co-operate took their place. No longer forced into close co-operation by the need to defeat a common enemy, British and American leaders still sought to co-operate in order to achieve a new mutual goal: the establishment of a liberal world order which would safeguard their respective interests.

The British and Americans had to handle several thorny issues. With the threat of defeat by Imperial Germany removed, differences which existed before 1917, and new ones which had developed as American naval power grew, were no longer submerged.480 In particular, the freedom of the seas and the future naval balance of power were up for debate. London and Washington did not see eye-to-eye on these issues, yet that did not destroy co-operation. Bitter exchanges occurred in conferences – chiefly between the sailors on each side – but in broader terms relations remained good. While the partnership became more distant, it still rested on the pattern of co-operation and compromise which

480 Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 365 113

had been established in the wartime relationship, tempered by conflicting interests and rivalry. Threats were made, but this was more akin to revealing a card, to show one had it, and then to throw these cards away. In part, threats were a trust-building exercise. So too, in naval arms limitations between 1921-31, the liberal power in the stronger position made sacrifices to enable negotiations to happen, giving the weaker power more than realpolitik required. Potential was demonstrated, then discarded in order to achieve compromise.481

Relations were not poisoned. Neither side felt threatened, nor did Britain or the US treat the other as the ‘new Germany’ in actuality, only in service planning documents which sought to promote naval expenditure. Instead, each saw in the other a friend with aligning interests regarding the construction of a liberal world order. The future of seapower must be resolved, but both states were willing to co-operate and compromise to achieve this aim.

With their maritime partnership intact, rather than producing a conflagration of clashing interests, London and Washington could more easily bend the other players at the peace conference, France and Italy, to their will, and ensure the successful establishment of this new order: the League of Nations.

Wartime co-operation between the two navies had produced the greatest partnership at sea during the war. Although the strategy-makers in London and Washington were more guarded toward their partners than the officers and men who had fought side-by-side at sea, they were impressed by how well the RN and USN had collaborated. Many naval officers and politicians on both sides agreed with Wemyss that their naval partnership had ‘been

481 A fuller discussion on the mechanics of liberal naval diplomacy can be found in: John R. Ferris, ‘Information Superiority: British Intelligence at London’, in At the Crossroads Between Peace and War: The London Naval Conference of 1930, ed. John H. Maurer and Christopher M. Bell (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2014) 114

one of the outstanding features of the war’, and something positive to take away.482 For

Beatty and one of his successors as First Sea Lord, Admiral Ernle Chatfield, the USN replaced the IJN as the ‘closest sister service’ to the RN.483

This development was in sharp contrast to their relationship with the European

Allies. British relations were good with the French, but co-operation was active only in the

Mediterranean. The Admiralty wanted to dictate strategy across the Allied naval effort, but trusted France to run the Mediterranean. The Marine Nationale dominated that sea operationally, including its part in economic warfare. Britain maintained a keen interest in areas vital to the empire, notably Gibraltar and the Suez Canal, and kept sufficient warships in the theatre to guarantee Allied numerical superiority. Arguments with the French rarely were significant, and Anglo-American disagreements perhaps were greater. However, the

British and Americans co-operated to overcome these problems, and enjoyed a closer relationship primarily because their units were in closer co-operation. The Italians, on the other hand, were quite correctly distrusted everywhere. Like all states, Italy was keen to

‘win the peace’. Unlike its allies, it did not subordinate this exigency to the need to defeat the Central Powers. Consequently, the British, French, and Americans experienced a rocky relationship with the Italians, as the Regia Marina refused to pull its weight. Rome wanted naval assistance from its Allies in the Adriatic, yet to maintain command here despite the greater size of the French fleet. Relations between Italy and the rest of the Allies and

482 Wemyss to Sims, 16th November 1918, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 182 483 Gordon, ‘Imperial Overstretch’, 65 115

Associated Powers were poor as the war reached an anti-climactic end in the

Mediterranean.484

Japan was Britain’s ally, but the US’ natural rival in the Pacific. It escorted imperial convoys in seas where the RN’s resources had been stretched. The IJN, built on the British model, was an effective force. The Japanese warships sent to the Mediterranean were of a high standard, and were trusted operationally. However, Japan was not wholly trusted strategically by the US or Britain. Lastly, little collaboration was undertaken with the

Russian navy, as it operated in isolation in the Baltic and Black Sea. There was strategic co-operation, and the Dardanelles campaign was launched partly in response to Russian requests to divert Ottoman forces. The RN officers who did work with the Russian navy were fairly happy with that relationship, but co-operation was limited, and Russia was frustrated in its requests for more aggressive British action in the North Sea.485 Ultimately,

Russia capitulated before the war ended and played no part in the peace making process.

Anglo-American relations therefore were the closest of the Allied effort at sea.

Once the war was won, however, the question emerged as to whether ‘The brightest spot in the tragedy of this war’ would dim without the fuel of hostilities. This partnership had always been based on mutual self-interest, and compromise had been instrumental in achieving these goals. Without the exigencies of war, the partnership might collapse as

Anglo-American differences became clearer.

484 Paul G. Halpern, ‘The Naval Coalition Against the Central Powers, 1914-1918’, in Naval Coalition Warfare, ed. Bruce Elleman and S. C. M. Paine (London: Routledge, 2008), 98-101 485 Halpern, ‘The Naval Coalition’, 99-100 116

4.2: American Shipbuilding and the Geddes Mission, August – October 1918

The first problem was ship building. Although the summer saw the land war swing in favour of the Allies, the problems of insufficient shipping were not resolved. The British merchant marine continued to carry most Allied men and materiel, despite its losses. It remained the world’s largest merchant marine, with four times as much tonnage as its

American equivalent, but Britain still needed American assistance. Only American yards could remedy the shortfall in Allied shipping, but the US continually fell short of its promises and under-delivered on its shipping programmes, prompting Geddes to call them

‘a tax on the Alliance’.486 To add salt to the wound, the Admiralty suspected that the US was exploiting the British merchant marine and dockyards, letting Britain carry the burden while building up American shipping strength away from the peril of combat.487 Geddes warned that the US was closing the gap on Britain’s superiority in shipping, and ‘the position of Great Britain as the Carrier of the World is seriously threatened’.488 The Board of Trade supported him. Leo Chiozza Money of the Ministry of Shipping fuelled fears with his alarming prediction that the US would catch up to British tonnage by 1921-22.489

British grievances were kept private so not to upset the Americans, but Geddes visited Washington to resolve the matter. He stressed that Britain had played a greater role in the war, and that the US must pull its weight. The US also should clarify the allocation of new American naval assets, and make firm arrangements about shipbuilding. Most

486 ‘Notes for Guidance as to the Line to be adopted in Conferences with the United States Navy Department and in Informal Conversations’, October 1918, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 525 487 Wemyss to Geddes, 3rd October 1918, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 524 488 Memorandum by Geddes for War Cabinet, 2nd August 1918, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 505 489 Neilson, ‘Reinforcements and Supplies’, 46-7; Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 292-4 117

controversially, he wanted the US to compensate Britain for work carried out in British yards on American ships. The hours spent on such maintenance had deprived the dockyards of time which could have been spent producing British merchantmen. The US must respond by building ships for the Admiralty which cost the same ‘man power effort’ as

Britain had spent ‘in the repair and refitting of United States vessels’.490

The First Lord also wanted the US to agree to produce naval and merchant shipping at the same rate as Britain, which would maintain Britain’s lead in maritime tonnage, thereby protecting its supremacy.491 Such a step also would prevent the US from building battleships when Britain was not. Despite the switch to focusing on ASW vessels in 1917, the Americans had continued to build the 1916 naval construction programme, albeit at a vastly reduced pace. Geddes told the Americans that they must sacrifice this aspiration – as

Britain had done – so to produce the small craft required to win the war.492 He did not want

Britain’s lead in capital ships cut while its navy carried the burden of the war at sea.493

Indeed, to out-flank American construction, he urged the construction of two battle cruisers in addition to HMS Hood in August 1918.494 His mission blended the pressures of war, with preparations for peace. Geddes’ hopes of attaining these goals were bleak.495 Geddes’ suspicions of the US shipbuilding programme were matched by American suspicions over

490 Memorandum by Geddes, 19th September 1918, ADM 137/1622, 342-4; quoted from Geddes to Daniels, 10th October 1918, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 534 491 Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 295 492 Transcript of a Speech made by the First Lord of the Admiralty at a Luncheon given by the Board of Admiralty to the Members of the Committee on Naval Affairs of the House of Representatives, Washington, at The Mall House, Admiralty, 2nd August 1918, ADM 116/1809 493 Geddes to Roosevelt, 31st August 1918, ADM 116/1809 494 Admiralty Memorandum for the War Cabinet: The Battlecruiser Position and the Shipbuilding Programme, 31st August 1918, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 512-14 495 Neilson, ‘Reinforcements and Supplies’, 47 118

British scheming. The Navy Department rejected any compensation for merchant vessel repairs as Geddes wanted, believing that it already was paying for the ships via war loans.

Warship construction proved similarly complicated. Senior American officers, reluctant to suspend the 1916 programme, looked for the moment to construct a great navy in earnest. On 2nd April 1918 Captain Pratt asked Rear Admiral Sims when dreadnought construction could resume. In the following month, the US Planning Section demanded that the US build the most powerful navy in the world. Victory in Europe could not guarantee

American security.496 Japan remained a threat. The US needed a navy possessing ‘a commanding superiority of naval power’ in the Pacific, while still able to handle any challenge in the Atlantic.497 Even if a League of Nations was formed, the USN must be able to ‘“restrain, if necessary, its strongest member”’ – Britain.498

This plan, advocated by the General Board of the USN, was a new three-year plan for the construction of warships on 10th September 1918. It aimed to augment the 1916 programme by allocating the equivalent of £120,000,000 of construction, to build sixteen capital ships and 140 smaller vessels.499 If both programmes were completed, the USN would have a staggering 61 capital ships. This new fleet was proposed to handle a nightmarish coalition of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Japan, but as the war drew to a

496 Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 289 497 Memorandum by US Planning Section, May 1918, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 503 498 Davis, A Navy Second to None, 245 499 Paragraph from “The Globe”, 24th October 1918, ADM 137/2709, 633 119

close, Britain, the only navy which would come close to this size, fell into the natural role of potential enemy in American navy plans.500

The announcement of the 1918 programme puzzled the RN. President Wilson advocated a reduction in post-war armaments, yet his sailors proposed to build an enormous navy, with his blessing. Grant thought this proposal ‘illogical’; the Admiralty

Plans Division pronounced it ‘a matter of great concern’, but concluded ‘it is inconceivable that the proposed expansion… is in any way aimed at this country’.501 Geddes saw the programme as a threat: ‘it is the aim and purpose of the President to reduce comparatively the preponderance in seapower of the British Empire’.502 The Admiralty’s reaction was mixed. The 1918 programme set alarm bells ringing in London, although it did not derail the partnership. Co-operation was under weigh and the war must be won.

The 1918 programme proved befuddling because its purpose was not agreed on in

Washington. The sailors, Benson leading the way, believed the ships must be built, and the

USN at least reach parity with the RN after the war.503 Sailors, however, did not dictate policy. Politicians did, and they saw the programme as a bluff – a chip to be played against

Britain when the time came.504 Their programme was aimed at achieving a beneficial peace: should London waver on forming a new order, then Wilson could threaten to

500 Press Statement by Daniels on US Postwar Building Programme, c. 4th January 1919, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 586; US Planning Section, early 1919, London, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917- 1919, 578 501 Grant to Murray, 1st November 1918, ADM 137/504, 439; Memorandum by Plans Division: ‘Remarks on U.S.A. Building Programme’, 11th November 1918, ADM 137/2709, 632-7 502 Admiralty Memorandum to the War Cabinet, 7th November 1918, ADM 116/1771 503 Daniels to Wilson, 7th April 1919, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 600. See also: Jones, ‘Naval Battle of Paris’, 81-2; Klachko, Benson, 137-8 504 Ferris, ‘Symbol and Substance’, 58 120

outmatch them at sea.505 The programme also attracted strong opposition from the

Republican Party. Henry Cabot Lodge deemed such tactics against the British

‘“unbelievable” [and] “extraordinary”’.506 Grant believed that these politicians, who after the mid-term elections of November 1918 dominated Congress and the Senate, held ‘to the justice of England’s claim for a predominant fleet… [and] appear to be prepared to back up the British point of view’.507 If the British were not a threat, many Americans were content to let them police the sea in their mutual interest. Many politicians accused Wilson of fighting against militarism only to turn the US militaristic. US taxpayers were not eager to fund further military ventures.508 Nevertheless, Wilson supported the programme to bolster his position at the end of the war.509 He recognised that its failure would be fatal to his bargaining position viz. the British.510 Ultimately, however, it stalled in Washington after the armistice. Lack of support weakened Wilson’s stance, but he still could use it as leverage.511 Much of the heat in naval relations during the spring of 1919 centred on this decision because the 1918 programme would give the US maritime supremacy, and force

Britain into massive new naval construction.

Despite the Navy Department’s grandiose proposals, the pressures of war dictated that capital ship construction must wait until the war had been won, ‘or when shipping was

505 Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 488 506 Klachko, ‘Anglo-American Naval Competition, 1918-1922’, 129, source of quote: Daniels to Wilson, 26th January 1919, in Arthur S. Link and others, The Papers of Woodrow Wilson Vol. 54 (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986), 281 (hereafter cited as Wilson Papers) 507 Grant to Murray, 1st December 1918, ADM 137/504, 456 508 Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 490-2 509 ‘An Annual Message on the State of the Union’, by Wilson, 2nd December 1918, in Arthur S. Link and others, The Papers of Woodrow Wilson Vol. 53 (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986), 282 510 President’s Message for Daniels, Gilbert F. Close to Benson, 27th January 1919, in Wilson Papers 54, 303 511 Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 425-6 121

no longer a controlling factor in the conflict’. Only when one of these conditions was reached did the Planning Section believe the US ‘should turn their efforts sharply to the

Naval programme’.512 Geddes reminded American officials of this necessity during his visit to Washington. He was furious that the US had produced only 11 warships and auxiliary vessels outside submarine chasers in the first five months of 1918.513 Although the Navy

Department recognised the need to build more ASW vessels, it claimed that US shipyards could not provide the number of destroyers the Admiralty wanted, falling 34 short of the desired total.514

Despite such difficulties, Geddes’ visit remained cordial and positive. Pratt claimed that the mission ‘established a closer relation and gave us a little better [?insight] into the

Admiralty’s way of working’.515 Anglo-American naval relations remained good, yet relations were cooler than when the U-boats had truly threatened. This attitude was not helped by Wilson’s high handed approach to discussions with the Central Powers: when their mutual enemy approached him alone to end hostilities, he declined to involve the

Allies at first.516 On this point, Lloyd George told Geddes to say no more than ‘“that the

British Empire is resolute that there shall be no sham or humbugging peace”’.517 The rapid

512 Memorandum by US Planning Section, May 1918, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 503. See also: 481; Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 286-7 513 Memorandum by Geddes for War Cabinet, 2nd August 1918, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 504; Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 293 514 Admiralty Memorandum to the War Cabinet: Shipbuilding Programme, October 1918, ADM 137/2710, 708 515 Pratt to Sims, 15th October 1918, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 535; House to Balfour, 13th October 1918, in ADM 116/1809 516 Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 306 517 Klachko, Benson, 117-9 122

turn of events that month soon nullified the purposes of Geddes’ mission; the promises he received regarding shipping output for 1919 meant little with peace within reach.518

4.3: The Pre-Armistice Negotiations, October – November 1918

The defeat of Germany surprised all when it came suddenly.519 Although Wilson consulted the Allies over his negotiations by the end of October, he intended to control the tiller. His inability to do so, and need to treat Britain and France as equals and to compromise with them, shocked and irritated him. Meanwhile, the American policy of ending ‘“an old and intolerable order”’ in Europe by defeating Germany soon was superseded by the aim of building a new world order.520 These aims were two sides of the same coin: Wilson sought to achieve a peace with Germany based on his Fourteen

Points.521 This ambition inevitably complicated Anglo-American naval relations. Their close co-operation had stemmed from the need to defeat a mutual foe. This need was fading, and Wilson’s programme contained several elements which could provoke problems.

The standing of these two states at the armistice bears consideration. Many historians have read backward too much too fast into this era, seeing the rise of the US as a superpower as rooted in the First World War, and thus overestimating its influence in

1919.522 The US had strengthened as a power in 1917 and 1918, especially in its finances.

518 Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 483 519 Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 312 520 Quoted in Tillman, Anglo-American Relations, 364 521 David Stevenson, ‘War Aims and Peace Negotiations’, in The Oxford Illustrated History of the First World War, ed. Hew Strachan, new edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 214 522 Trask makes this mistake; see Captains and Cabinets, 314, 326 123

Its military and naval strength had increased, especially with German power crushed. The

USN was the world’s second largest navy. Meanwhile, the war had damaged the British

Empire. Its financial dominance was slipping away, and it owed large sums of money to the

US. However, its European allies also owed enormous sums to Britain. The British Empire had, in fact, ‘emerged from the war stronger than ever’.523 This outcome continues to be misunderstood by historians, such as Paul Kennedy and Corelli Barnett.524 Kennedy claims that Britain was a ‘weary Titan’525 in decline from the late 19th century onward, and the US and Japan were the only powers ‘to benefit from the Great War’.526 This argument has since been challenged by many historians, such as Gordon Martel, Keith Neilson, John Ferris, and B. J. C. McKercher.527 Britain was not a superpower – but it never had been. It ‘was the pre-eminent great power’ in 1914; it remained the world’s only global power in 1919.528 It added vast amounts of overseas territory to the empire, including vital oil reserves in the

Middle East. Britain remained by far the world’s greatest naval power, with ‘flourishing commerce, a large mercantile marine… naval bases commanding the chief maritime arteries, [and] cables covering the globe’.529 Breaking with tradition, it developed a formidable army which crushed the world’s best armies in the field. This involved heavy costs in manpower – the Empire suffered one million men killed – and Britain’s economic

523 David Woodward, Trial by Friendship, 219 524 John R. Ferris, ‘‘The Greatest Power on Earth’: Great Britain in the 1920s’, The International History Review, 13:4 (1991) 726-750, see: 726 525 Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, 268 526 Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (London: Fontana Press, 1988), 291-2, 423 527 See: ‘The Decline of Great Britain’, International History Review, 13:4 (1991) 528 Keith Neilson, ‘‘Greatly Exaggerated’: The Myth of the Decline of Great Britain before 1914’, The International History Review, 13:4 (1991) 695-725, see: 696, 725 529 Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 409 124

position was damaged. Yet the state was hardly in ruins, and these sacrifices had crushed its greatest foe, Imperial Germany.

The British Empire, a unique empire of the seas, depended upon naval mastery to safeguard its colonies and trade, its lifeblood.530 British rule over the enormous population of the empire rested on prestige alongside physical power. The most important symbol of

British rule was the RN’s dominance of the sea, which could not be tarnished at the hands of the Americans. Britain’s chief aim after the defeat of Germany was to secure a peace which served the interests of the empire, centring on maritime supremacy. In naval terms, what this really meant was ‘nothing more or less than that naval strength which would sustain the symbol of Britain’s special position and the substance of its vital interests’.531

This aim could be achieved while accommodating a larger USN, and Britain realised that it could not force the Americans to relinquish their naval ambitions entirely. Ideally, British authorities would have liked the Americans simply to accept British maritime pre- eminence, and eschew naval construction. Practically, they rejected the idea of the

‘freedom of the seas’, or of the 1918 programme, but otherwise they had no defined bottom line. With reluctance, even the Admiralty was willing to accept part or all of the 1916 programme as a fact of life. Moreover, Lloyd George and the Admiralty had different views on maritime details, while British public opinion had a real and powerful effect. Finally, all of them wished Anglo-American co-operation to become a permanent fixture of the post- war order, and none viewed the US as a military threat. Experience in the war had

530 Admiralty Memorandum: Notes on Matters Affecting Naval Interests Connected with the Peace Settlement, January 1919, ADM 116/1861, 13 531 Ferris, ‘Symbol and Substance’, 57 125

demonstrated that Britain could do business with the US. Co-operation with the US, not confrontation, would be key to attaining a liberal peace which safeguarded the empire, and prevented a new continental European threat. Although the US had grown in power,

Washington was in no position to bully London.

Understanding of Anglo-American naval relations in 1919 has been hampered not just by misunderstanding of the limits of heightened American power in 1919, but also from a division between naval and diplomatic histories. Rarely have diplomatic historians of the Paris peace conference examined the work of naval historians, and vice versa. Thus, naval issues have been seen in isolation from diplomatic and strategic matters, to the damage of all studies of these areas.

Co-operation was vital to achieving American interests too. The US sought to expand as a commercial power, which it thought required increasing the size of the

American merchant marine and accessing new markets, often dominated by Britain. A potent navy was needed to protect this trade. Yet even Hurley, far from favouring the

British during the war, recognised that the US must tread lightly as Britain was sensitive to commercial rivalry at sea. The US could not adopt ‘a policy of absolute inflexibility [as this] would only foster retaliation by the Entente’. Meanwhile, Wilson’s priority was to create a European peace which would serve American interests, rather than to provoke confrontations with European powers, especially that state which dominated the globe, and the prospects for expansion of US trade.532 Within such a peace, the US could expand commercially.

532 Safford, Wilsonian Maritime Diplomacy, 170, 177 126

Consequently, Britain and the US had overlapping interests once again.533 Once the war was won, they sought to win the peace by establishing a new liberal international order.

Britain and the US believed that collective security and alliances would prevent a future great war. Their precise images differed, but both recognised that they shared ideals. Lloyd

George told Wilson: ‘“the ideals of our two countries in regard to international reconstruction are fundamentally the same”’.534 As the two most liberal great powers, it was important that they collaborate to prevent other states from twisting the settlement into one which left another war likely. France similarly sought a liberal peace and collective security. However, its geostrategic position dictated interests in Europe, especially that

Germany must be crushed, that were not shared by Britain and the US. Italy was a problem, and was primarily interested in territorial gains. The US and Britain had their own selfish interests too, but recognised the overwhelming importance of creating a new order which would serve those interests, and guarantee peace and prosperity. Neither could do this alone.

Naval historians have ignored this commonality in aims during the armistice talks and the Paris peace conference. These mutual interests fuelled Anglo-American co- operation throughout this period. Even those scholars who have accepted that the British and Americans were more aligned than the other victors, have protested correctly that

‘there was by no means a close identity of interest’.535 This issue has been neglected for two reasons. Firstly, after the armistice British and American co-operation did decline. The

533 Britain was one of the few who were enthusiastic over Wilson’s ideals. See: Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 492-3; Tillman, Anglo-American Relations, vii 534 Tillman, Anglo-American Relations, 37 535 Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 314 127

exigencies of war had vanished, replaced with lesser pressures to organise peace. Hence, the British and Americans never explicitly identified ‘their community of interests to the point of pursuing acknowledged common objectives by a coherent common strategy’, as they had during the war.536 Instead, London and Washington were prepared to stand their ground so to accomplish their individual interests. On naval matters, this pressure was exacerbated by the USN emerging from its junior position: it no longer had to come to heel in order to ensure a partnership which could overcome the German U-boats. The warm relations at the operational level ceased as American warships returned home, leaving the cooler diplomats and heads of services to conduct Anglo-American naval relations. Yet loose collaboration continued, and both compromised in order to build the new liberal order.

Historians have also read backward into 1919. The American decision not to join the League of Nations has led many to conclude that collaboration ended with the collapse of the German army in late 1918. In fact, enthusiasm for a new order ‘had a long history in the peace movements of both Europe and America’, and was renewed during the war.537 It found form in the idea of a League of Nations, ‘a diplomatic mechanism to be employed to lessen the probability of war’. Wilson’s name was the one most associated with the league, which he wanted founded upon his Fourteen Points. The US was critical to the project, but it was not solely its idea, nor was Wilson the only architect. Many British and French leaders favoured a league, most notably Robert Cecil. Historian B. J. C. McKercher claims

536 Tillman, Anglo-American Relations, viii 537 George W. Egerton, ‘Ideology, Diplomacy and International Organisation: Wilsonism and the League of Nations in Anglo-American Relations, 1918-1920’, in Anglo-American Relations in the 1920s: The Struggle for Supremacy, ed. B. J. C. McKercher (Edmonton: The University of Alberta Press, 1990), 19-20 128

that ‘By the time of the armistice… British League policy was the only one of consequence’, which demonstrates that this was not simply an American project in which

Britain expressed some interest. Britain chose to lead the way when the US declined to partake, rather than revert to the pre-1914 system.538 More generally, Lloyd George, the

Lord Chief Justice of England Lord Reading, and Canadian Prime Minister Robert Borden were keen to continue with a strategic alignment with the US, which could be done via a league.539 The liberal powers also needed ‘to offer an alternative’ to the threat of

Bolshevism, which was wreaking havoc in Russia.540 Lloyd George therefore declared that

Britain would join such a league upon the creation of peace, although he was wary not to sacrifice British power to it.541 Anglo-American interests still overlapped at the end of the war. Co-operation and compromise were necessary in order to achieve a mutual goal.

Returning to the negotiating table, Wilson’s second ‘point’, the freedom of the seas, was certain to cause controversy between Britain and the US. The American definition for this concept was: ‘Absolute freedom of Navigation upon the seas outside territorial waters alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants’, which in practice meant that belligerents could interfere with each other’s trade, but not that of neutrals, not

538 B. J. C. McKercher, ‘ The Golden Gleam, 1916-1920; Britain and the Origins of the League of Nations’ (MA Diss., University of Alberta, Canada, 1975), abstract, 145, 148 539 These men had initially wanted to involve the US in ‘the Empire’s civilizing mission (and its future security) by giving Washington the administration of some Turkish and German territories: for example, Palestine and German East Africa’. See: Woodward, Trial by Friendship, 211 540 A memorandum by David Lloyd George, 25th March 1919, in Arthur S. Link and others, The Papers of Woodrow Wilson Vol. 56 (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1987), 263 541 Tillman, Anglo-American Relations, 28, 37; Egerton, ‘Ideology, Diplomacy and International Organisation’, 31 129

even regarding the old concept of contraband.542 This statement was not mere sentiment,

Wilson was serious on the matter.543 Washington believed that Britain previously had bent freedom of the seas to suit their own purposes. The US Planning Section claimed that the

British conception was ‘the freedom of the belligerent to adjust his maritime action to the necessities of the military and naval situation’.544 It could not be tolerated.

Britain had not openly objected to point two following Wilson’s initial speech in

January 1919, yet never accepted it. In the hour of victory Britain could not accept a law which would destroy its chief weapon, naval power and the blockade, in future conflicts.

The American definition of freedom of the seas would make military power more valuable than naval power – which could benefit continental powers, including a resurgent

Germany. A powerful navy was an existential issue in London. The Admiralty accused the

Americans of misunderstanding ‘the nature and meaning of maritime war’, arguing that

‘rules designed to protect a neutral assisting a belligerent by these means must inevitably break down when vital issues are at stake’.545

The Admiralty also protested that this power must not be handed over to an untested

League of Nations, not least because Britain had generally not misused its naval supremacy.546 A British definition of freedom of the seas was therefore produced:

'“the freedom of the seas is free and unfettered access in time of peace, to all the seas by all who wish to cross them “upon their lawful occasions”; in

542 Memorandum by Wemyss, An Inquiry into the Meaning and Effect of the Demand for ‘Freedom of the Seas’, 17th October 1918, in Simpson, 548 543 Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 486 544 Memorandum by US Planning Section: The Freedom of the Seas, 7th November 1918, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 552 545 ‘The Freedom of the Seas’, 21st December 1918, ADM 116/1772, 3-6. Emphasis added. 546 League of Nations: Admiralty Comments on Lord R. Cecil’s Memorandum, undated, ADM 116/1861; Admiralty Memorandum for the War Cabinet: ‘An Inquiry into the Meaning and Effect of the Demand for “Freedom of the Seas”’, 17th October 1918, ADM 116/1810, 384; Jones, ‘Naval Battle of Paris’, 79 130

time of war this privilege must be fought for by belligerent navies, causing as little inconvenience as possible to neutrals, but maintaining the rights of capture of belligerent merchant ships and of searching neutral merchant ships in order to verify their nationality and prevent their aiding a belligerent”'.547

Despite British protests, Wilson initially believed that the American position was so strong that he could weather any challenge to the Fourteen Points. The Allies needed

American support to accomplish their ends in the peace negotiations. When acting as

Wilson’s mouthpiece in Paris in October 1918, Colonel House demanded that all the

Fourteen Points be accepted as part of the armistice negotiations. When Wiseman and

Reading questioned point two, House retorted that the US would not ‘willingly submit to

Great Britain’s complete domination of the seas any more than to Germany’s domination of the land’. This principle had broader concomitants, in which Britain potentially would become strategically subordinate to the US. If the British did not accept this demand,

House threatened, the US would build a larger navy to enforce its will.548

Such threats could not alter London’s position. Seapower was a matter of survival, and Lloyd George hit back publically: ‘“This point… we cannot accept under any conditions; it means that the power of the blockade goes”’.549 The Prime Minister had national support for this uncompromising stance, voiced by the British Press. This support for seapower backed Lloyd George and drove him – literally, he could not accept proposals which the public interpreted as a threat to maritime security. Britain would not and could

547 Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 320-1 548 House Diary, 28th October 1918, in Charles Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House Vol. IV: The Ending of the War June 1918 – November 1919 (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1928), 165. Also see Seymour’s analysis 549 Statement by Lloyd George to House, 29th October 1918, in House Papers Vol. IV, 166 131

not compromise on this matter. Lloyd George informed the Americans ‘that he was prepared (as was French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau) to continue the war without the United States rather than give up the right of naval blockade’.550 Simultaneously,

British spokesmen offered other solutions to the deadlock. Wiseman (inaccurately) passed the blame for the steadfastness of Britain’s position on to the Admiralty, while Lloyd

George opened the door for future negotiations by telling House: ‘“If the League of Nations is a reality, I am willing to discuss the matter”’.551 House told Wilson that the best route to an agreement would be to make the freedom of the seas conditional on the formation of a league.552

Wilson replied ‘I cannot consent to take part in the negotiation of a peace which does not include freedom of the seas because we are pledged to fight not only to do away with Prussian militarism but with militarism everywhere’. He authorised House to renew the threat of American naval construction.553 On the following day, while expressing sympathy for Britain’s position, he added another threat: if Britain did not agree, then the

US would take the freedom of the seas to the Germans for discussion in the armistice negotiations.554 This threat was high handed and badly considered, a bluff waiting to be called. Discussions continued without a breakthrough during the first two days of

November. House worked with Wiseman, Reading and Lloyd George to press for British

550 Marder, Dreadnought to Scapa Flow Vol. V, 240-1 551 Statement by Lloyd George to House, 29th October 1918, in House Papers Vol. IV, 166; see also Seymour’s analysis on 184-5 552 House to Wilson, 30th October 1918, in Arthur S. Link and others, The Papers of Woodrow Wilson Vol. 51 (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1985), 511 553 Wilson to House, 30th October 1918, in Wilson Papers Vol. 51, 513 554 Wilson to House, 31st October 1918, in Wilson Papers Vol. 51, 533 132

concessions, combining empathy with veiled threats and references to the US’ history of going to war over maritime rights in 1812 and 1917. Lloyd George repeated that Britain could not bend on this matter. He responded to American threats of naval construction by stating that ‘“Great Britain would spend her last guinea to keep her navy superior to that of the United States or any other power”’. The threats of a naval arms race were hollow: neither side wanted ‘to go into a naval building rivalry’.555

Wilson disliked British views, but he soon realised that the US needed British support in dealing with the continental European powers. Furthermore, he saw that

Britain’s decision to join a league would influence other smaller states.556 Washington saw

Britain as the keystone to the League of Nations’ success. Hence, a compromise must be reached to establish a liberal order. House was the first to relent: his discussions led him to conclude on 3rd November that the British would not compromise. The freedom of the seas was national survival for the empire, but just an ideal for the US. ‘Convinced that the entire peace depended upon a solid foundation of Anglo-American cooperation’, he held that the

Americans must accommodate the British on this issue lest the deadlock threaten the new order. House ‘ceased to insist that the principle of freedom of the seas must be then and there recognized and required only… full and free discussion of the issue at the Peace

Conference’.557

Wilson accepted this argument, abandoning his own strong argument over neutral rights. He still wanted point two, but admitted that it must wait. Arranging acceptable

555 House Diary, 4th November 1918, in House Papers Vol. IV, 185-6; Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 341 556 Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 487 557 Tillman, Anglo-American Relations, 50 133

armistice terms and presenting a united front to Germany was more pressing. ‘“Any other decision would cause serious friction and delay”’ which would take time to settle – and time was precious.558 Britain had accepted all thirteen of the remaining points.559 Such an organisation could not be effective if one of the world’s greatest power abstained, as the

US’ ultimate decision in late 1919 demonstrated. Moreover, Wilson knew that in reality the

RN was not an instrument of militarism. When he met Geddes several weeks earlier, he

‘admitted that the British Navy had in the past acted as a sort of naval police for the world – in fact for civilization’, and Britain had never abused this power.560 He detested the blockade before 1917, but joined in wholeheartedly once the USN entered the fray. He recalled that German actions had plunged the US into the war, not British ones.

Lloyd George made his own compromise. While he would not accept the principle of the freedom of the seas, the Prime Minister agreed to discuss the matter at the peace conference. He told House: ‘“I don’t despair of coming to an agreement”’, although privately he believed that Washington would drop the matter entirely. Wilson and House accepted this olive branch, believing an agreement could be reached later.561 Ultimately, the matter was left until after the peace conference, enabling the British and Americans to conclude the armistice more quickly.562 The matter was never brought up again in Anglo-

American relations or the Paris peace conference.

558 Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 340, 342, 487 559 From the Diary of Josephus Daniels, 4th November 1918, in Wilson Papers Vol. 51, 592 560 Memorandum by Geddes: Notes of an Interview with the President at the White House, 16th October 1918, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 547. See also: E. David Cronon, The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels, 1913-1921 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1963) 561 From the Diary of Josephus Daniels, 4th November 1918, in Wilson Papers Vol. 51, 592; House to Wilson, 5th November 1918, in Wilson Papers Vol. 51, 594 562 Seymour, House Papers Vol. IV, 190; Tillman, Anglo-American Relations, 51; Jones, ‘Naval Battle of Paris’, 80; Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 342 134

Britain got its way on the first big maritime question confronting the British and

Americans before the armistice, and on the second: the future of German naval power.

Germany had been defeated, but its capital ships and submarines remained afloat. Both navies had fought to defeat Germany and destroy its seapower, but the process and extent of this dismantling had to be decided. To eradicate the U-boat arm caused little consternation in Anglo-American relations. For the US, the U-boat had broken the rules of war, killed American civilians, and forced the US into war. For Britain, the U-boat had posed an existential threat; ‘The surrender or destruction of all Germany’s present submarines would add considerably to [Britain’s] security for many years after the present war’.563 Leaders on both sides even considered a general prohibition on the use of submarines.564

The surface fleet, however, posed a dilemma. Unlike the German army, and the U- boat arm, the HSF was not beaten in battle when the pre-armistice negotiations began.565 It was intact, having done little in the war. Yet for Britain this fleet-in-being remained a threat to its maritime communications on par with the U-boat. The HSF had caused significant

British expenditure before the war. Chances to sink it during hostilities had been fleeting.

The Admiralty could not miss the opportunity to dismantle it in peace. Its preferred terms,

563 Memorandum by Plans Division: ‘Possible Guarantees of Naval Security under the Peace Settlement’, 31st October 1918, ADM 137/2709, 597 564 Admiralty Memorandum for the Imperial War Cabinet: Freedom of the Seas – The Use of Submarines and Mines in War’, 21st January 1919, ADM 116/1772 565 ‘Remarks on Armistice Terms, More Especially as to Surrender of Enemy Ships’, undated, BTY 7/11/5 135

supported by Sims, were savage: ‘The destruction of the German surface fleet’.566 Germany must be left with little more than a coastal defence force.567

The US wanted the German navy knocked down the ladder of comparative strength.

Yet the USN considered whether it might be better to leave Germany some seapower, so countering the RN and preventing Britain from being able to use all of its naval power anywhere it chose. Otherwise, Wilson feared the RN could ‘“do with our new merchant marine as she saw fit”’.568 The British also feared such an outcome. Both Balfour, now the

Foreign Secretary, and the Admiralty worried that Britain would be in danger if, after the war, Germany did not lose the HSF while the USN continued naval construction on a large scale. The US Planning Section advised that ‘not more than ten German ships should be taken over’.569 Wilson wished to impose terms which would punish Germany appropriately, but not unduly, so as not to anger Germans into attempting to rebuild their military power.570

In order to secure peace, the Allies and the US must present terms to Germany which it would accept, and also ‘make the renewal [of] hostilities on [the] part of Germany impossible’.571 British and American naval leaders differed over the meaning of these aims.

The US insisted on terms which would be ‘neither humiliating in expression nor impossible in acceptance because of their severity’.572 To Benson, representing the USN on the ANC,

566 Memorandum by Plans Division: ‘Possible Guarantees of Naval Security under the Peace Settlement’, 31st October 1918, ADM 137/2709, 59 567 Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 484-5 568 Jones, ‘Naval Battle of Paris’, 79 569 Memorandum by Planning Section, US Naval Forces in European Waters: United States Naval interests in the armistice terms, October 1918, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 543 570 Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 328 571 Benson to Daniels, 3rd November 1918, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 551 572 Benson to Daniels, 10th November 1918, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 553 136

this meant handing over part of the fleet, not all of it. Here Benson was alone. The Allies wanted harsher naval terms, including the surrender of another ten German battleships.

This aim concerned American leaders, as the Allies did not say what they intended to do with the German ships they would take into custody.573 The USN feared that the

Allies were in collusion, planned to strip Germany of its fleet and split the spoils amongst themselves. Such an act would multiply Britain’s lead in capital ships to a four power standard with 51 capital ships, compared to 17 American.574 Even Benson agreed that such a deficiency would be too costly for the Americans to remedy.575 The British recognised this fact, and some figures in the Admiralty wished to take precisely this course of action.

Rear Admiral Sir Sydney Fremantle declared that ‘The surrender of the German Fleet is the only compensation we can accept as the consequence of our great successful naval efforts’.576 The Marine Nationale also spied an opportunity to bolster its flagging strength – its shipbuilding had stagnated during the war.577

Leaders outside of naval circles feared that the British and French navies’ demand for Germany to hand over those ten additional battleships would scupper the armistice process, as Germany could not accept such terms. It would be difficult to persuade the armies to keep on fighting if they knew that this was the only roadblock to peace. Benson proposed a solution: to intern the German fleet and settle its fate at the peace conference.

573 Meeting between the Prime Ministers of Great Britain and France, Foreign Ministers, and Colonel House, 29th October 1918, in House Papers Vol. IV, 120 574 Memorandum by Planning Section, US Naval Forces in European Waters: United States Naval interests in the armistice terms, October 1918, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 541-2 575 Benson to Daniels, 27th November 1918, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 573 576 Memorandum by Rear-Admiral Sir Sydney Fremantle and Comments by US Planning Section, October 1918, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 544 577 Jones, ‘Naval Battle of Paris’, 81 137

British and French admirals rejected this idea, which might let ships return to Germany.

Fraught exchanges occurred within the ANC on this issue. However, the need to achieve peace trumped the urge for revenge. House and Lloyd George stepped in, using the authority of the SWC to force the ANC to accept internment.578 Here Britain made the concession: it would not resist the American point and prejudice their mutual goal of winning the war. Whether the HSF would return to Germany, join Allied navies, or be sunk, would be decided in 1919. The ultimate decision, however, met British demands, not

American ones.

The problem of the Austro-Hungarian fleet was easier to solve. Its naval strength was minimal and did not trouble the British or Americans, making it a less contentious issue. To make the proposals acceptable to Vienna, Britain agreed to lessen the original terms, which had demanded that more Austro-Hungarian warships be surrendered. An armistice with the Central Powers was therefore signed on 11th November 1918. Italy was concerned about the potential naval power of the New South Slav State, its only rival in the

Adriatic.579 Indeed, the commander of the Habsburg Adriatic fleet surrendered his flagship, the Viribus Unitis, to the Yugoslavs in October. Whether the Regia Marina knew of this event is unclear, but it was keen to reduce the Austro-Hungarian fleet, and on 1st November sank the Viribus Unitis and other vessels with frogmen using mines. Ultimately, the New

South Slav State gained little of the Austro-Hungarian navy.580

578 Allied Naval Council Report of the Sixth Meetings, 11th November 1918, BTY /7/11/9, 19-47; Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 347 579 Brian R. Sullivan, ‘Italian Naval Power and the Washington Disarmament Conference of 1921-22’, in ed. Erik Goldstein and John Maurer, The Washington Conference, 1921-22 (London: Frank Cass, 1994), 223 580 Halpern, Mediterranean, 567 138

4.4: To the Peace Conference, December 1918 – February 1919

Clashes over matters of naval and merchant shipbuilding, and the freedom of the seas, as the war ended has led historians to claim that competition overshadowed co- operation in Anglo-American relations.581 Certainly competitive elements were rising, yet co-operation had remained vital in achieving an armistice with Germany, and then to ensuring that the peace settlement suited British and American interests. While their aims differed in certain elements, both hoped to establish a new international order based on liberal principles. This aim was not idealistic, sentimental, or Anglo-Saxon: a league would be the platform for guaranteeing security against a future great war. Indeed, in December

1918 Wilson dismissed the idea of ‘Anglo-Saxon brotherhood’, telling a junior British official ‘“there are only two things which can establish and maintain closer relations between your country and mine: they are community of ideals and interests”’.582 Instead, the fundamental objective in British and American policy was to establish a league to guarantee peace and prosperity and to avoid another Great War. Furthermore, Germany and its navy still needed to be dealt with. These pressures continued to push Britain and the US together before and during the Paris peace conference, which officially opened on 18th

January 1919.

Wilson recognised that in order to achieve this mutual aim, co-operation must continue with Britain: ‘we are so sure we can count [on Britain] for cooperation in the delicate and difficult tasks which remain to be performed in order that the high purposes of

581 Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 349 582 Tillman, Anglo-American Relations, 66 139

the war may be realized and established in the reign of equitable justice and lasting peace’.583 He remained ‘anxious to secure British membership of the League’.584 Lloyd

George similarly hoped that the Anglo-American states ‘cooperate fruitfully to promote the reign of peace with liberty and true democracy throughout the world’.585

To achieve this end, Britain and the US must agree on two key issues. The first was the freedom of the seas, which Captain Pratt identified as the prime source of Anglo-

American difficulties.586 Wilson had compromised on this claim, but the RN took no chances, and prepared the case against. However, it was anxious not to rupture Anglo-

American relations.587 Lloyd George told the War Cabinet that ‘“he had made it perfectly clear that we were unable to accept the proposals regarding freedom of the seas”’.588 He recognised that he might have to make some compromise on the matter, as he had done with the German fleet, but hoped that the US would not risk raising the matter.589

The USN demanded that the freedom of the seas be accepted at the peace conference, but Wilson declined to press the point.590 Prior discussions demonstrated that this issue ‘touches everybody’s daily bread in Great Britain’.591 Attempting to force it upon

Britain might scupper their partnership. Wilson could not afford to face the Allies alone: he needed British co-operation, or his programme must fail. House told Wilson that ‘If they

583 Wilson to King George V, 12th November 1918, in Wilson Papers 53, 54 584 Simpson, Anglo-American Naval Relations, 1919-1939, 5 585 Lloyd George to Wilson, 19th November 1918, in Wilson Papers Vol. 53, 130 586 Memorandum by Pratt on League of Nations, 28th November 1918, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917- 1919, 573 587 Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 359 588 ibid, 348 589 Woodward, Trial by Friendship, 218; Tillman, Anglo-American Relations, 51 590 Benson to Daniels, 20th November 1918, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 571 591 Memorandum by Frank Irving Cobb, c. 6th November 1918, in Wilson Papers Vol. 51, 614 140

brought up the question of the freedom of the seas… listen sympathetically, but not to commit himself and not to antagonize them. The main thing is to get the League of Nations.

With that accomplished, everything else follows or becomes minor considerations’.592

When he reached Europe in late 1918, Wilson jettisoned the freedom of the seas. When he met Lloyd George he ‘was very vague. He did not oppose [Lloyd George’s] suggestions that the matter could be left for further consideration after the League of Nations had been established and proved its capacity in actual working’.593 Wilson agreed to this idea. He claimed that once a league was created, there would be no neutrals in any war, thus the matter was moot.594

This was an enormous concession to Britain. The freedom of the seas was ‘the very principle for which [the US] had gone to war’.595 While Wilson tried to save face by calling the freedom of the seas ‘a practical joke on myself’,596 his solution required a utopian version of the league to hold true.597 It did not impress the USN, and House soon complained that the concession may have been an error.598 In July 1919 he told Wilson ‘the

Freedom of the Seas is the one thing above all others that brought us into the war, and yet it is no nearer solution to-day than it was before Germany collapsed’.599 Moreover, the best time for the US to achieve its aims on this matter was at an international conference, where it could gain help from other states. Instead, the US did not even challenge British claims to

592 From the Diary of Colonel House, 27th December 1918, in Wilson Papers Vol. 53, 525. Emphasis added. 593 A Memorandum, Imperial War Cabinet, 30th December 1918, in Wilson Papers Vol. 53, 559 594 Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 487 595 ibid 596 Marder, Dreadnought to Scapa Flow Vol. V, 242 597 Seymour, House Papers Vol. IV, 432 598 Klachko, Benson, 138 599 House to Wilson, 30th July 1919, in House Papers Vol. IV, 512 141

blockade rights which were more ambitious than they had been for 60 years (and, incidentally, adopted by the USN during 1917-1918 and after 1940). Yet the compromise was made and the matter no longer troubled Anglo-American naval relations. This was a

‘signal concession… it was a major contribution to the achievement of the political agreement required’ to bring about a new order.600 Co-operation and compromise once were again dictated by exigencies.

The second problem in Anglo-American naval relations was the balance at sea, involving the future of the HSF, and the relative sizes of the RN and USN. These issues needed to be decided if peace was to be settled. A League of Nations could not commence with a naval arms race between its two strongest members.601 One solution to the problem was to create a League of Nations Navy. Pratt was the chief proponent of this idea, which

Wilson also envisaged.602 Benson deemed the idea ‘“absolutely impractical”’ and ‘“time wasted”’.603 Instead, he urged the 1918 programme be carried forward, partly for domestic service competition. The USN had struggled to find a role for itself during the war, and had even less ammunition than the US Army in arguments for service funding. An obvious solution was to portray the RN as a menace, particularly in arms with its ally Japan.604

Benson also sought to twist politicians’ views of the 1918 programme being a bargaining

600 Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 342 601 Marder, Dreadnought to Scapa Flow Vol. V, 232 602 Pratt to Benson, 12th November 1918, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 567-8 603 Klachko, Benson, 137 604 US Planning Section, early 1919, London, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 582; Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 419-23 142

chip, arguing that it would prove more effective if construction began immediately.605 By

January 1919, Benson shifted to an emphasis that unless the USN could restrain Britain, the

League of Nations could not function properly.606

However, Benson’s designs would collapse if Britain received a large share of the

HSF. If German warships were divided up, Sims had already admitted publicly that

Britain’s effort in the war had been so great ‘that practically the entire strength of [the]

German captured vessels would go to [the] British’.607 This potential was a British bargaining chip which many British authorities considered using. Ultimately, however, by

January 1919 the Admiralty already was proposing internally that it would be best not to distribute so ‘To avoid disagreement among the Allies and Associated Powers’.608 It was not keen to break with the US over this matter. This again marked a great concession. In

1919, the RN possessed in reality a three-power standard. Had it acquired a large share of the HSF, that power would have risen astronomically, for free. This possibility was

Benson’ nightmare. The British conceded the issue without more than a mere effort to make it a bargaining chip.

Furthermore, many senior British naval officers, including Jellicoe, did not want to build against the US. However, the Admiralty believed that supremacy at sea was essential to the empire. It did not trust a league navy, nor the goodwill of the US.609 The RN must be

605 Benson to Daniels, 20th November 1918, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 571 606 Benson to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, 21st February 1919; Daniels to Wilson, 4th March 1919; Memorandum by Benson, c. May 1919, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 594-5, 607 607 Benson to Daniels, 27th November 1918, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 572-3 608 Memorandum by Wemyss for War Cabinet, 6th January 1919, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 576 609 Memorandum by Wemyss for War Cabinet, 18th December 1918, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 574 143

stronger than the USN.610 The Admiralty doubted that the USN could surpass the RN, and believed that the 1918 programme was ‘almost certainly a bluff’.611 However, the

Americans clearly were aiming for ‘an equality with this country’, so the RN should be defined at a size which would secure the empire, and this could then be tweaked based on the programme the US ultimately chose.612

The Cabinet’s view differed slightly. It did not want to ‘establish any service policies until the peace conference had clarified Britain’s strategic position’,613 this in part because the government believed it could secure a deal with the US to avoid a new wave of naval building.614 However, while numerous historians, such as Simpson, contend that

Britain could not have won a naval arms race, hence the need to seek a deal, this case is not borne out by the facts. 615 Although a new naval rivalry was undesirable, and London wanted to avoid one if possible, Britain nevertheless ‘had the material and financial resources needed to match any American construction short of full economic mobilisation for naval competition’.616 Britain had greater resources for warship building than the US, and built them faster, cheaper, and better. In 1919, Britain was the only state which knew how to build post-Jutland battleships, and had aircraft carriers, not to mention a crushing numerical superiority over the USN. Britain had the willpower, and truly would spend its

610 Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 490 611 Memorandum for War Cabinet by Admiral Sir William Lowther Grant, 25th February 1919, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 593. Also see: Jones, ‘Naval Battle of Paris’, 82-3 612 Memorandum for War Cabinet by Admiral Sir William Lowther Grant, 25th February 1919, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 593 613 John R. Ferris, Men, Money, and Diplomacy (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1989), 18 614 Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 359 615 Michael Simpson, Anglo-American Naval Relations 1919-1939 (Farnham: Ashgate for The Navy Records Society, 2010), 5 616 Ferris, ‘Symbol and Substance’, 62 144

last penny for seapower. The US did not possess that will, as the frosty reception to the programme at home demonstrated.617 The American naval officers who spoke vociferously for the programme ‘had little power or influence in the country’, contrary to the RN’s position at the heart of the British state and society.618

The dynamic of the naval balance in 1919 does not therefore fit the stereotype. It was not a case of the rich, powerful Americans bullying the exhausted, bankrupt British over this matter. Very few people on either side saw the other as a threat, or wanted a naval race. The issue was not existential. Seen from another perspective, in 1919 the RN was more powerful at sea than at any time since 1815, and the US in a weaker position compared to Britain than since 1890 – and the British plausibly could boost that power more easily than the US. Many of Benson’s memos of this period, far more so than

Wemyss, reveal real fear that his country could not compete with its rival. Compromise would be required on both sides to resolve the matter satisfactorily and prevent a break which would damage the prospects for a new order. Given that the 1918 programme faced a difficult path to being sanctioned, American political leaders – if not their naval officers – were prepared to accept compromise. More surprisingly, Britain was also willing to accommodate a growing USN, so long as it did not seek to rob Britain of its naval

617 Neilson has stated the importance of willpower: ‘being a great power requires not just the capacity to be one, but also the will’. See: Neilson, ‘‘Greatly Exaggerated’’, 725 618 Memorandum for War Cabinet by Admiral Sir William Lowther Grant, 25th February 1919, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 592 145

dominance.619 Meanwhile senior American officials such as Roosevelt told the British public ‘‘The United States has no intention of challenging anybody’s supremacy’’.620

Anglo-American naval co-operation continued into the peace conference. When concerns arose that Germany had not handed over all the submarines that it was supposed to, British and American leaders worked together effectively to resolve the matter.621

Competition had flared. Both states had interests which were distinct, and no longer submerged by the exigencies of war. Yet this competition was checked by the need to achieve a peace which suited both British and American interests for a liberal new order, over the other victors. The French and Italians must be mollified, but restrained. An Anglo-

American front was required at the peace conference to fulfil the dream of a league. Naval disagreements could not ‘stand in the way of such a union’.622

4.5: The Naval ‘Battle’ of Paris, March – April 1919

The so-called ‘Naval Battle of Paris’ was ‘fought’ between March and April 1919, when maritime matters came to the fore in Anglo-American discussions. It was a battle neither literally nor figuratively. Daniels coined the term after the fact. Many naval historians have seized on the phrase, which is taken as the moment when Anglo-American relations, supposedly fraught since the armistice, splintered, marking the start of a new

619 Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 357-8; Marder, Dreadnought to Scapa Flow Vol. V, 228 620 ‘United States Navy Strength: The Views of Mr Franklin Roosevelt’, 23rd January 1919, in The Daily Mail, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 587 621 Wilson to Lloyd George, 25th January 1919, in Wilson Papers Vol. 54, 273-4 622 This was House’s opinion of Wilson’s thoughts on the subject. See: Lord Derby to Arthur James Balfour, 6th January 1919, in Wilson Papers Vol. 53, 634 146

naval rivalry.623 Yet in naming the discussions a ‘battle’ the Secretary of the Navy made melodrama of an isolated if heated affair, which reveals the desires of sailors to dominate the seas, and diverging national interests, yet was still solved by compromise, like all

Anglo-American naval disagreements since 1917. These discussions boiled down to one issue: what would the future size of the USN be in relation to the RN? Britain possessed 42 capital ships to the American 16. The 1916 programme would take the US to 27 capital ships by 1923-24, whereas no British building and the decommissioning of obsolescent vessels would see its strength decrease to 30, theoretically, almost parity. If the 1918 programme became law, American strength would reach 35 capital ships, requiring a

British response.624

Since these calculations did not account for additions from the HSF, the future of those German capital ships had to be tackled. The British played this bargaining chip in

March, in an effort to make the Americans reduce their building programme. If they did not, then Britain, and France, would take German capital ships for themselves, and expand their fleets overnight. On 6th March House replied that if Britain did not consent to sinking the German ships, then the US would build.625 A compromise quickly was reached. Lloyd

George and Clemenceau told House that the ships must be sunk by the three greatest naval powers: Britain, the US, and Japan. The Anglo-Americans even agreed ‘to sink their shares

623 For example: Sprout, H. & M., Toward a New Order of Sea Power, 57; Braisted, United States Navy in the Pacific, 412, 440; Trask, Captains and Cabinets, 185; Safford, Wilsonian Maritime Diplomacy, 199; Egerton, Great Britain and the League of Nations, 161; Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, ix; Jones, ‘The Naval Battle of Paris’, 77, 82 624 Figures from Marder, Dreadnought to Scapa Flow Vol. V, 247-8 625 Marder, Dreadnought to Scapa Flow Vol. V, 263-4 147

simultaneously in the middle of the Atlantic’.626 This generous act of co-operation by

Britain pleased the Americans, particularly Benson and Daniels. Yet the matter dragged on, because the lesser naval powers, France and Japan, preferred to keep their shares of the

HSF, as a cheap way to expand their power.627 No comprehensive Allied agreement was reached on this point, but it demonstrates clearly that Anglo-American relations on naval affairs were cordial, co-operative, and more aligned with each other than the rest of the

Allies.

The next issue quickly came to the fore: the American building programme. The discussion started badly, when Wemyss unorthodoxly questioned Daniels in his hotel on

26th March over the details of the American building programme.628 Wemyss asked: ‘‘Why are you so intent on increasing your Navy, and to what extent do you propose to carry it out?’’ Benson arrived at this juncture, annoyed that Wemyss had circumvented traditional diplomacy, and told Daniels not to respond. He challenged Wemyss, and their exchange became heated, prompting Daniels to calm the pair down.629 Much has been made of this unbecoming incident, but it must not be taken out of proportion, as some historians have done.630 The servicemen were overexcited, not surprisingly given their backgrounds. On the British side, Cecil later admitted ‘that the point of view of the fighting services made any accommodation between nations very difficult’.631 Moreover, in terms of protocol

626 Tillman, Anglo-American Relations, 168 627 Daniels to Wilson, 30th March 1919, in Wilson Papers Vol. 56, 430; Memorandum, 28th April 1919, P-4- B-1 628 Jones, ‘Naval Battle of Paris’, 82 629 ‘Memorandum by Benson on Anglo-American Talks on Naval Building at the Paris Peace Conference, March 1919’, 16th May 1921, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 597 630 For one example, see Jones, ‘Naval Battle of Paris’ 631 Memorandum by Cecil, 10th April 1919, in Arthur S. Link and others, The Papers of Woodrow Wilson Vol. 57 (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1987), 217 148

Wemyss certainly was wrong to visit Daniels in order to raise this point, giving Benson’s reaction a better rationale than a supposed dislike of Britain.632 Nor does this exchange show that Anglo-American naval relations had changed or deteriorated. Wemyss and

Benson had never shared the warm relations exhibited at operational levels during the war.

After this, the greatest Anglo-American naval contention in 1919, rather minor in reality, the cooler heads of British and American politicians prevailed. Diplomatic discussions returned to the pattern of co-operation and compromise. Thus after the incident, while agreeing in principle with Benson that the US should seek parity with Britain, House

‘believed that the United States could safely discontinue the [1918] naval building program provided Great Britain made certain concessions’.633 This programme was a chip to be cashed in, not a real aim. The question was when, and how.

That work remained to be done became clear when Daniels met his political equivalent, the First Lord of the Admiralty Sir Walter Long, on 27th March.634 Long expressed concerns over US shipbuilding, warning that Britain would not accept ending the war as a second rate naval power. Benson tried to allay these fears, stating that construction was aimed initially against Germany, and now Japan.635 London could not accept this claim, and Long presented the British bargaining chip: if the US persisted with its naval programme, Lloyd George would withdraw British support for the League of Nations.636

632 ‘Memorandum by Benson on Anglo-American Talks on Naval Building at the Paris Peace Conference, March 1919’, 16th May 1921, Benson Papers Box 36 633 Klachko, Benson, 144 634 Long had replaced Geddes on 10th January 1919. 635 ‘Memorandum by Benson on Anglo-American Talks on Naval Building at the Paris Peace Conference, March 1919’, 16th May 1921, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 597-9. See also: Jones, ‘Naval Battle of Paris’, 92 636 This was a bargaining chip decided upon by Lloyd George in a conference with Philip Kerr, Lloyd George’s private secretary, and Sir Maurice Hankey, Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence, at 149

Daniels and Benson challenged this logic, querying why Britain would not share the trident with the USN. Benson then got overexcited, stating that for British policy to attempt to retain naval mastery at any cost would eventually cause ‘“war between Great Britain and the United States”’. This statement shocked Long, but Daniels supported his admiral. Talks consequently broke down, with Long telling the pair: ‘“you had better talk to your

President, and I will talk to my Prime Minister”’.637

As with the earlier argument between Wemyss and Benson, too much must not be read into this. Benson, again fired up, heated the debate, making threats which failed to intimidate Long, hence his cool response. Despite these sharp words, Benson and Daniels simply meant that Britain must accept the USN as an equal partner in the future, not an enemy (which in fact it had not been for 50 years). The US wanted co-operation and parity, not war. Britain wanted co-operation too, but not a USN of equal size, without the 1918 and ideally the 1916 programme. When Benson recalled these events in a memorandum given to American representatives preparing for the Washington Naval Conference, two years on, whom he hoped would attain the formal acceptance of parity with Britain which had eluded him at Paris and thereafter, he admitted: ‘The long time that has elapsed makes it impossible for me to remember it in detail’.638

The events of 26th and 27th March were anomalous in the Anglo-American naval relationship of 1919, rather than its microcosm as historians have tended to suggest. The

Fontainebleu on 24th March 1919, Egerton, Great Britain and the League of Nations, 158. Also see: Tillman, Anglo-American Relations, 290 637 Jones, ‘Naval Battle of Paris’, 82 638 ‘Memorandum by Benson on Anglo-American Talks on Naval Building at the Paris Peace Conference, March 1919’, 16th May 1921, Benson Papers Box 36 150

servicemen, particularly Benson, let pride master them. Both Wemyss and Benson yearned to wield what Theodore Roosevelt had term the biggest ‘stick’. Yet just two days later the same three men cordially discussed the future of the German fleet, and agreed it must be sunk. Obviously relations had not atrophied significantly. The next discussion over US naval construction occurred on 31st March, without service members present. Daniels, concerned following Benson’s outburst on 27th March, did not want controversy over

American naval construction to stall agreement over a league.639 Wilson shared these fears, and told Daniels: ‘“Do not leave this matter in the hands of naval officers. Take it up with

Lloyd George. You are both civilians and will understand the situation better than men who belong to the profession of arms”'.640

Relations between British and American politicians and heads of services had never been as warm as those of naval officers working at the operational level during 1917-1919, but they wished to achieve a mutual end. Daniels told Long that the 1918 programme would be abandoned once the League of Nations had been established.641 The league was the key to which all else must be subordinated. Long, seeing that his threat had worked to a significant degree, replied that it would ‘not be difficult for us to agree’. However, he warned, London had to hold firm regarding the naval balance because ‘public sentiment in

Great Britain was very much alarmed by [the US] building programme’.642 The meeting adjourned cordially, but inconclusively.

639 Klachko, Benson, 147. However, despite providing the evidence, Klachko misses this point in her analysis. 640 Jones, ‘Naval Battle of Paris’, 83 641 From the Diary of Josephus Daniels, 31st March 1919, in Wilson Papers Vol. 56, 482 642 ibid 151

As April arrived Wilson decided that the matter must be settled quickly so to enable the completion of plans for a league. He turned to his trusted lieutenant, House. Meanwhile,

Lloyd George stepped in personally. He could not abandon the British policy of naval supremacy, so on 1st April the Prime Minister tried to persuade Daniels that the US must drop its naval construction, which directly contradicted the logic of the league and naval disarmament. Daniels reasoned that this construction could not be halted until the league was a reality, but Lloyd George reiterated that British acceptance of a league – and therefore the reality of the league – depended on Washington halting the naval programme.643 The discussions were deadlocked. Lloyd George stated that he wanted a deal which could be presented to Parliament and Congress, but as with the freedom of the seas, the Americans must compromise first.644

When Daniels returned to Paris on 7th April after visiting Italy, he met with Long again. Their stances had not shifted. Daniels recognised that it was now ‘very questionable whether a conference between Mr Long and myself could reach any result that will be satisfactory to Mr Lloyd George’.645 Only the heads of the two governments could resolve this matter of high policy.646 Wilson consequently played a new card: the old trick of threatening to walk out of talks.647 Much has been made of this threat with regard to the impasse over the naval balance, yet there was a broader context. In early April the

Americans faced numerous problems with the Allies, chiefly France, as Clemenceau was

643 Daniels to Wilson, 7th April 1919, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 600; Jones, ‘Naval Battle of Paris’, 83 644 From the Diary of Josephus Daniels, 1st April 1919, in Wilson Papers Vol. 56, 519 645 Daniels to Wilson, 7th April 1919, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 600 646 Klachko, Benson, 149 647 Jones, ‘Naval Battle of Paris’, 83 152

obstinate over French boundaries, national interests, and the future of Germany.648 The

Americans were frustrated over the naval issue, but Wilson’s actions were aimed against

France as much as Britain, and from his realisation that his hand was far weaker than he had imagined it would be. This threat was a bluff, but it did enable a mutually acceptable compromise over naval issues

Lloyd George admitted on 8th April ‘that he was in a mess’ over the issue, as

Wemyss and Long harried Daniels and Benson without result.649 The Americans were yet to bend. Hence, Britain must compromise too; ‘neither can retreat without a certain amount of loss of face’. Lloyd George played a card of his own in response to Wilson’s ploy, in the form of Cecil. Despite the fact that Lloyd George and Cecil loathed each other, the latter could deliver a powerful and unique message. Thus Cecil was sent to House to resolve the impasse.650 The pair, committed to the League of Nations project, had been working closely from March. Some historians have seen them as ‘two men of good will’.651 Such views must be tempered: House had been forthright over the US’ growing ambition. Cecil was an idealist but also a ruthless and able operator, having directed the hunger blockade to its crushing conclusion, and also largely ran the Foreign Office during 1917-1918. These were serious men, not liberal pushovers in negotiations. However, they trusted each other and believed that the League of Nations must be accomplished, which would require

648 From the Diary of Vance Criswell McCormick, From the Peace Conference Diary of Thomas William Lamont, Tasker Howard Bliss to Newton Diehl Baker, all on 3rd April 1919, Wilson Papers Vol. 56, 579-83 649 From the Diary of Josephus Daniels, 7th April 1919, in Wilson Papers Vol. 57, 92-3 650 From the Diary of Lord Robert Cecil, 8th April 1919, in Wilson Papers Vol. 57, 142. Also see: Klachko, Benson, 150 651 Marder, Dreadnought to Scapa Flow Vol. V, 233; Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 491; Tillman, Anglo-American Relations, 291 153

concessions of national interests.652 Lloyd George was correct to entrust them to solve the naval deadlock. Hard negotiations were required to do so.

There was outside pressure to reach a solution rapidly. Public patience for the dragging talks at Versailles was running thin. The pair saw ‘the world crumbling about our feet, and we both see the need not only for peace but the lifting of all trade restrictions and bringing the world back to normal’.653 Side lined, Benson pestered House to little avail.654

House had grown weary of the admiral, nor did he care to make the USN as strong as the

RN in the immediate future. To insist on this aim could wreck co-operation.655 He overrode the Navy Department, which later earned him vitriol from American naval officers.656

Cecil, meanwhile, had to overcome Lloyd George. The Prime Minister remained

‘anxious to use his assent to the League of Nations as a lever to compel Wilson to give up increased naval construction’.657 He proposed not to accept the Monroe Doctrine in the

Covenant of the league, which would wreck its prospects of passing through Congress.658

As Lloyd George was ‘“obdurate”’ on this point,659 in order to catch Wilson’s attention

Cecil sought to reason with House.660 He explained that Britain relied on the sea, whereas the US could ‘“laugh at any blockade”’. He understood Lloyd George’s position and public opinion. If he were Prime Minister he too ‘would “have to recommend to my fellow countrymen to spend their last shilling in bringing our fleet up to the point which I was

652 Jones, ‘Naval Battle of Paris’, 83 653 From the Diary of Colonel House, 4th April 1919, in Wilson Papers Vol. 56, 486 654 Jones, ‘Naval Battle of Paris’, 83 655 From the Diary of Colonel House, 3rd April 1919, in Wilson Papers Vol. 56, 558-9 656 Jones, ‘Naval Battle of Paris’, 84 657 From the Diary of Lord Robert Cecil, 8th April 1919, in Wilson Papers Vol. 57, 142 658 Jones, ‘Naval Battle of Paris’, 84 659 ibid 660 Cecil to House, 8th April 1919, in Wilson Papers Vol. 57, 143-4 154

advised was necessary for safety”’.661 Playing on their good relationship, he asked House not ‘to accept these views, but… to recognise their existence’, and asked if House ‘could do anything to reassure us on that point’ (of American naval construction). Cecil’s compromise was for the US ‘to say that when the Treaty of Peace containing the League of

Nations has been signed you would abandon or modify your new naval programme’. He proffered the carrot of a reciprocal compromise from London: ‘I am sure that the British

Government would be only too ready to give corresponding assurances’. The two states could then ‘consult together from year to year as to their naval programmes’.662 This proposal was a shift in British policy: London still wanted an agreement, but would allow its formal statement to wait until after the League of Nations had been formed – a prospect which Wilson could accept.663

House ran his response past Wilson. House would agree to ‘“abandon or modify our new naval programme”’, which he hinted meant only the 1918 programme.664 The 1916 programme had become law, and could not be revoked. The compromise therefore was to cancel the 1918 programme in return for British support of the Monroe Doctrine with the league.665 Thus the British had curtailed the prospect of the USN surpassing or even matching the RN, while the US kept intact its plans to build toward British naval strength.

Both sides would enter a league satisfied with the naval balance, and ultimately settle the matter once an international organisation for future co-operation had been established.

661 Jones, ‘Naval Battle of Paris’, 84 662 Cecil to House, 8th April 1917 in Wilson Papers Vol. 57, 143-4. Also see: Jones, ‘Naval Battle of Paris’, 84 663 Klachko, Benson, 150 664 House to Cecil, 9th April 1919, in Wilson Papers Vol. 57, 179 665 Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 491 155

Lloyd George initially was upset: he wanted not only the 1918 but the 1916 programme cancelled.666 While this latter programme was less a threat, it still would give the USN close to parity. Long previously had stated that the 1916 Programme must be stopped, offering the trade-off that Britain would sink its allocation of the German fleet and would not expand either. This would maintain the status quo, Lloyd George’s aim.667

However, this position was unsustainable, Britain would have to compromise if an agreement was to be made, and the League to continue.668 Cecil warned Lloyd George that the American leaders had little leeway, as Congress had already authorised the 1916 programme.669 House told Cecil on 10th April the Americans would push for the Monroe

Doctrine at the League of Nations meeting that night, and that the 1916 programme would not be cancelled.670 The British had leveraged as much as they could, and must compromise, by accepting an outcome short of having the US declare an unaltered continuation of the status quo. Cecil could merely obtain further assurances from Wilson, via House, that they were not building against the RN: ‘there was no idea in the mind of the

President of building a fleet in competition with that of Great Britain’.671 House reassured the British that only certain US naval officers harboured such ideas.672

Recognising that Wilson could not cancel the 1916 programme, Lloyd George accepted the American assurances. Given the concession of the 1918 programme, and

666 From the Diary of Colonel House, 10th April 1919, in Wilson Papers Vol. 57, 215. Also see: Jones, ‘Naval Battle of Paris’, 84-5 667 Daniels to Wilson, 7th April 1919, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 600-1 668 Braisted, United States Navy in the Pacific, 426; Tillman, Anglo-American Relations, 293 669 Klachko, ‘Anglo-American Naval Competition, 1918-1922’, 149 670 From the Diary of Colonel House, 10th April 1919, in Wilson Papers Vol. 57, 215 671 Memorandum by Cecil, 10th April 1919, in Wilson Papers Vol. 57, 216; Jones, ‘Naval Battle of Paris’, 84- 5 672 Klachko, ‘Anglo-American Naval Competition, 1918-1922’, 149 156

promises for future discussion, Lloyd George ‘felt unable to accept responsibility for the defeat of the United States’ on the Monroe Doctrine amendment to the Covenant.673 The

Anglo-American naval agreement was

‘that we might fully rely on the intention of the President not to build in competition with us; and that [House] thought that some arrangement as to the relative strengths of the fleets ought to be arrived at; and that conversations with that object might well be begun as soon as the Peace Treaty was signed.’674

The problem of the naval balance was resolved in a spirit of co-operation. Both Lloyd

George and Wilson acknowledged that further discussions were needed for a long-term solution, which would be conducted in the light of a new liberal order headed by Britain and the US, through a strategic alignment based on the League of Nations and a joint guarantee of French security.675 In essence, only the ships of the 1916 programme not yet laid down would be up for debate after the League of Nations came into effect.676 In planning for these naval discussions, both Washington and London sought to obtain a league first, as with this achieved ‘nearly all the serious difficulties would disappear’.677

Lloyd George and Balfour held ‘this would ease other matters, such as the questions of the

“Freedom of the Seas,” the disposal of the colonies, [and] economic issues’.678 Lloyd

George met his side of the bargain, supporting the Monroe Doctrine amendment that night.

673 Klachko, Benson, 151 674 Memorandum by Cecil, 10th April 1919, in Wilson Papers Vol. 57, 217 675 Cecil to House, 10th April 1919, in Wilson Papers Vol. 57, 217 676 Jones, ‘Naval Battle of Paris’, 85 677 From the Diary of Colonel House, 14th December 1918, in Wilson Papers Vol. 53, 390 678 A Memorandum, Imperial War Cabinet 47, 30th December 1918, in Wilson Papers Vol. 53, 559 157

The document was accepted at last, with the only trouble coming from the French, as

Britain and the US presented a united front on the Covenant.679

The reassurances over the 1916 programme were vague promises rather than a formal offer.680 However, these sufficed for London, and fit the nature of naval bargaining between these sides for several months. Their relationship over naval matters remained sufficiently good that Lloyd George was ready to take the Americans at their word.

Britain’s needs for maritime security were met, for the USN was not a probable threat.681

Lloyd George and Wilson treated each other’s state as an equal and essential partner for post-war security, but also as competitors for some scarce goods, especially prestige and seapower. Neither really knew how to measure the latter in technical terms. Each knew his mind on major matters, such as the ‘freedom of the seas’, but not on questions like how significant at sea really was the 1916 programme. On that last point, American and British sailors had uncertainties of their own, which made it possible for both sides to rest content with the compromise. The 1916 programme, while big, would not make the USN as powerful as the figures suggested. These ships were pre-Jutland types. Only the British truly understand the lessons of Jutland, particularly with regard to the importance of armour. Sims speculated on these matters, and urged his views on the General Board, but there was confusion over what exactly the USN needed. Even Benson and his Planning

Section had no clear idea as to what types of capital ships to build. The quandary of the

USN was no secret to the RN, which deemed the battle cruiser design for the 1916

679 From the Diary of Colonel House, 11th April 1919, in Wilson Papers Vol. 57, 237. See also: Klachko, ‘Anglo-American Naval Competition, 1918-1922’, 151 680 Jones, ‘Naval Battle of Paris’, 85 681 Ferris, ‘Symbol and Substance’, 74-5; Tillman, Anglo-American Relations, 293 158

programme ‘a grave mistake’.682 Sims called it a ‘stupendous military, political and economical error… to proceed with the construction of the 35-knot Battle Cruisers with only 5-inch armor and only partial torpedo protection’.683 Given the lack of direction in the

Navy Department, the 1918 programme could only duplicate the capital ship types of the

1916 programme with no reference to the post-Jutland debate. The other 156 ships proposed remained ‘“undefined types”’ in November 1918.684 In early 1919 Benson came around to Sims’ views, but the Navy Department could not determine what Britain was doing with its new Admiral-class capital ships.685 Even months after the agreement with

Britain in April 1919, the USN was unclear what capital ships to build.686 Lloyd George and his advisors, with the threat of the 1918 programme dissipated, could rest easy, knowing that British naval supremacy continued in 1919, even with the 1916 programme seemingly untouchable in Washington.

Daniels, ‘as have most historians since’, deemed the ‘battle’ a draw.687 In fact, there was no battle, nor winner or loser. These discussions, frank yet largely cordial, have been misinterpreted purely as a confrontation rather than a continuation of earlier patterns of co- operation and negotiation over naval power. Heat was restricted primarily to admirals, prone to look at one another now that their mutual foe was vanquished. There were disagreements in Paris, but they were resolved quickly via compromise on both sides.

682 Sims to Benson, 14th November 1918, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 568-70 683 Sims to Benson, 14th November 1918, Benson Papers, Box 42 684 US Planning Section Memorandum: Building Programme, 21st November 1918, Benson Paper. See also: Braisted, United States Navy in the Pacific, 419 685 US Navy Department Memorandum: British and American Naval Strength, probably early 1919, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 577 686 Cablegram from Opnav, 7th June 1919, in Benson Papers, Box 42 687 Jones, ‘Naval Battle of Paris’, 85 159

Neither was willing nor able to bully the other. Britain and the US needed to support each other so to force through a peace programme which would produce a new liberal order.

The nature of the naval balance was shelved, but was intended to be discussed to produce an official Anglo-American understanding. This aim was fundamental to British strategic planning in the summer of 1919, but collapsed when the Wilson administration began to implode.688 This issue was settled only at the Washington Naval Conference of

1921.689 In the meantime, both navies were optimistic over the prospects of continued co- operation at sea. The USN believed that no arms race would be needed:

‘Once the principle of two equal naval Powers within the League is made clear to our own people and to the British public, a means will be found to maintain a parity of the two fleets with the minimum burden to the taxpayer…. The resulting mutual respect of Great Britain and the United States would go further than anything else toward the establishment of just maritime law upon the high seas both in peace and in war’.690

In a visit to the House of Commons, Daniels hailed the end of competitive naval building, and told Parliament:

‘Americans want naval co-operation, not naval competition, with Great Britain – co-operation in the maintenance of human liberties the world over, such co- operation as they carried out in European waters during the Great War, and such co-operation, under God’s providence, as they will carry out again wherever and whenever freedom is assailed by the powers of evil and tyrannical aggression’.691

688 Ferris, Men, Money, and Diplomacy, 41 689 Jones, ‘Naval Battle of Paris’, 85 690 Memorandum by US Naval Advisory Staff, 7th April 1919, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 604-5 691 ‘America’s Navy’ – Mr. Daniel’s Speech, in The Daily Telegraph, 2nd May 1919, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 610 160

Daniels’ summary of naval relations in Paris was that ‘our visit has not only been profitable but has strengthened the ties of friendship forged during the war between our two countries’.692 In light of this comment, his later use of the word ‘battle’ must not be taken too literally. The Anglo-American relationship had not broken down; it had hardly atrophied.

4.6: The Continuation of Co-operation and Compromise

Meanwhile, other Anglo-American contentions were solved in tandem. Merchant shipping remained the most significant problem outside of naval construction and the freedom of the seas. In early 1919, the US Planning Section listed it as a potential casus belli against Britain. The US had set a course to become ‘the greatest commercial rival of

Great Britain on the seas’, but as with the naval balance, Britain was reluctant to share its maritime power and prosperity.693 The development of the US merchant fleet, however, was a less dramatic process than the announcement of hefty naval expenditure.

Consequently, the matter was a slow burner. The key issue at the peace conference, therefore, was not US expansion, but what to do with German merchant ships seized by states at the outbreak of war. The US had seized an enormous quantity of German shipping in its harbours in the spring of 1917. As with the HSF, there was pressure within each state to keep these ships, as a free shot in the arm to merchant fleets. There was no question of sinking them, but how to distribute them was a controversial topic.

692 Daniels to Walter Long, 8th May 1919, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 614 693 US Planning Section, early 1919, London, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 579-60 161

The simplest solution was to leave these ships in the hands of those who had seized them. Naturally, Washington favoured this proposal.694 The British government was appalled, as ‘some of the States which [had] suffered least from the War, such as the United

States and Brazil, [would] gain most’.695 For instance, the US would gain nearly twice as much tonnage as it had lost, meanwhile, states which had suffered heavily in shipping, principally Britain and France, would lose an opportunity to remedy their losses. Britain had lost 7,748,000 tons of ships, and would keep a mere 45,000 tons. This was no trivial matter for Britain, as the empire ‘lived on ships’, and Britain must be compensated.696 This was not a solely Anglo-American dispute and Lloyd George was annoyed that Brazil would gain 216,000 tons when it had lost only 25,000 tons. President Wilson accepted Lloyd

George’s argument, but was determined to hold on to the ships the US had seized.697

Compromise resolved the problem. Lloyd George offered Wilson a deal: if the US was determined not to relinquish the ships, then they could keep them at the price of making ‘an appropriate payment into the reparations fund’, which would help to ensure that Germany repaid what the Allies claimed it owed them. An agreement was struck on 3rd May, forcing states to pay for the tonnage it kept over the amount it would have received if the ships had been divided up based on war losses.698 Moreover, these states would ‘not make any claim for a share in other ships and boats ceded under the Treaty of Peace’. This was a British concession. Britain would not receive its due share, but it would receive compensation via

694 Tillman, Anglo-American Relations, 170 695 Memorandum by Economic Section of the British Delegation, 7th April 1919, ADM 1/8555/96 696 Hankey’s Notes of a Meeting of the Council of Four, 23rd April 1919, in Arthur S. Link and others, The Papers of Woodrow Wilson Vol. 58 (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988), 38 697 Hankey’s Notes of a Meeting of the Council of Four, 23rd April 1919, in Wilson Papers Vol. 58, 38 698 Tillman, Anglo-American Relations, 171 162

German reparations, which made the American gain of the merchant ships look insignificant.699 Moreover, as it had a net loss, it was entitled to lay claim to ‘the enemy ships which remain’.700 London recognised that the British merchant marine was comparatively stronger than before the war.

Britain and the US also worked through their disagreements regarding the future of

Germany’s naval bases and waterways. The US was more lenient on the fate of the German forward naval base at Heligoland and the Kiel Canal. Lansing claimed that these were defensive fortifications, so ought to remain. This would be consistent with allowing

Germany to retain a coastal defence force. Wilson concurred, stating that they would be of little use to a diminished German navy, and he did not favour gratuitous violence. Balfour disagreed, arguing that Heligoland was a threat to Britain, and the canal was similarly offensive in purpose.701 The deadlock did not last long: Wilson relented on Heligoland – the greater danger given its geostrategic location.702 It was agreed that the fortifications and breakwaters of the base would be destroyed. The islands would remain German, however.703 In turn, Balfour bowed to Wilson on the matter of the Kiel Canal, and agreed it would not be touched.704 The canal was the issue closer to American interests as the

Panama Canal was critical to the US’ ability to deploy its navy in both the Atlantic and

Pacific. Wilson was wary of ‘precedents for international management of waterways’, although he ultimately accepted regulations in the final articles of the Treaty of

699 Tillman, Anglo-American Relations, 187 700 Three Memoranda of Agreement, 8th May 1919, in House Papers Vol. IV, 557-8 701 Tillman, Anglo-American Relations, 169-72 702 A Report by Arthur James Balfour, 15th April 1919, in Wilson Papers Vol. 57, 367 703 Margaret MacMillan, Paris 1919 (New York: Random House, 2001), 177 704 Tillman, Anglo-American Relations, 170 163

Versailles.705 During these discussions, British and American leaders accepted that on these issues, it would be beneficial for each to concede the one of greatest importance to their partner.

Co-operation on maritime affairs remained in place throughout the peace conference, being left aside for further discussion after a league had been formed.706 The problem of the HSF solved itself.707 On 21st June the German crews scuttled their own ships at Scapa Flow. While an infuriating act of defiance, ‘British and American naval leaders were not disappointed’ once they had calmed down, Wemyss called it ‘“a real blessing”’.708 The peace treaty was signed one week later. By the end of the year a deal was struck to divide the remaining ships, but only France and Italy would keep any in service.709

The mutual goal of defeating Germany had been accomplished. Germany was reduced to a third rate naval power ‘for the indefinite future’.710 A League of Nations was agreed upon; all that remained was for the proposals to be accepted at home.

705 MacMillan, Paris 1919, 177 706 Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 492 707 Benson to Wilson, 5th May 1919, in Wilson Papers Vol. 58, 456 708 Herwig, Luxury Fleet, 257 709 Marder, Dreadnought to Scapa Flow Vol. V, 294-5 710 Tillman, Anglo-American Relations, 175 164

CONCLUSION

The story of Anglo-American naval relations did not end with the Paris peace conference. In the summer of 1919, questions remained to be answered. Britain and the US had navigated the peace conference, and were ready to start bilateral negotiations about the naval balance. Matters which could have produced an Anglo-American break had vanished.

President Woodrow Wilson did not bring up the freedom of the seas, nor even the volatile questions of independence for Egypt or Ireland. Marder is wrong to suggest that naval issues eclipsed their mutual interests.711 In fact the latter became greater and seemingly permanent. Anglo-American naval co-operation was set to continue, anchored by the

League of Nations and the joint guarantee of French security, announced on 6th May. The guarantee, widely underrated by historians, aimed to provide mutual security for the liberal powers, and to bolster the diplomatic system in Europe and the world. This was a sea change in European affairs, and ‘a revolutionary innovation’ for the US.712

Meanwhile, the RN and USN were brought to heel by their political masters. The war over, service leaders became increasingly irrelevant in Anglo-American naval relations. The tendency of seniors British officers to find danger where there was none annoyed the Prime Minister, David Lloyd George. The Admiralty could not be allowed to exploit USN construction so to gain service funding. ‘Britain was secure at sea’, and arms races must be avoided.713 The US took a similar stand; Wilson consoled a frustrated

711 Marder, Dreadnought to Scapa Flow Vol. V, 236 712 Tillman, Anglo-American Relations, 176, 180, 197 713 Ferris, Men, Money, and Diplomacy, 18-26 165

Benson, explaining that compromise on naval matters had been necessary.714 Britain planned to work out a formal naval limitation agreement. ‘Lloyd George wished to dominate the formulation of all government policy’ rather than leave it to debate, and to close the deal struck by Robert Cecil and Colonel Edward M. House.715 Trans-Atlantic relations must be cultivated, not poisoned. Sir Edward Grey was sent on a mission to

Washington to guarantee these ends, bolstered by the imposition of the ‘ten year rule’ and

Treasury control over military spending. The RN’s position declined. The Admiralty read the Cecil-House negotiations to mean ‘that another strong diplomatic stand could force

America to accept British sea supremacy’, but was impotent to influence British policy.716

It did not want to reduce the size of the fleet until a formal agreement was reached with the

USN, but it was struggling against the realities of peace. Officers and men left the service at a rate which left the fleet unsustainable.717 Worse difficulties of this sort soon wrecked the USN.718

In order for the future of the naval balance to be solved, the Treaty of Versailles and the guarantee of French security needed to be accepted in both the US and United

Kingdom. Parliament was not a problem: ‘The Admiralty and the Navy had every right to be pleased with the Treaty of Versailles. Britain's larger naval interests had been well secured’.719 Congress was a different matter. Wilson attempted to sell his programme to the

714 Wilson to Benson, 6th May 1919, in Simpson, Naval Relations 1917-1919, 613; Ferris, ‘Symbol and Substance’, 63 715 Ferris, Men, Money, and Diplomacy, 18-26 716 Ferris, ‘Symbol and Substance’, 68 717 ibid, 66 718 Ferris, Men, Money, and Diplomacy, 18-26 719 Marder, Dreadnought to Scapa Flow Vol. V, 295 166

American public, warning that if collective security failed, then the US must build the world’s greatest navy. He underwent a public speaking tour to promote his vision, but the strains of war leadership and building peace in Europe took its toll on the president. In

September 1919, Wilson collapsed and with him any ability to formulate American policy.

No longer a commanding presence, the Republicans defeated Wilson, more for personal revenge against political slights than for reasoned policy. The Senate refused to assent to the Treaty of Versailles or the League of Nations, and the US returned to the isolation of pre-1917. Even before Wilson’s demise, Lloyd George no longer read the pulse of Washington correctly. He still trusted House, who hinted in August that a strategic entente could be achieved between the two states. Lloyd George ‘failed to realise that

[House] was no longer his master’s voice’, and therefore irrelevant.720 The White House was politically paralysed. With Wilson’s wife, Edith Bolling, serving as gatekeeper for the sick leader, and refusing Grey access to him, the accord reached in Paris fell apart.

The story of Anglo-American naval co-operation between 1917 and 1919 has no conclusion. The loose co-operation of that spring died in the autumn, the navies resurged, and the only tangible result was the eventual agreement for parity in 1922 through the

Washington Naval Treaty. Contrary to a conventional view, that Treaty was not the natural outcome of those earlier discussions. This was a purely naval agreement, produced through multilateral negotiation, and without the strategic alignment sought in 1919. Had Wilson pushed his treaty through Washington, as well as the guarantee of French security, the world may have taken a different path through the 20th century. While the liberal world

720 Ferris, ‘Symbol and Substance’, 69 167

order which Britain and the US worked toward in 1919 did not come to fruition, the consistent Anglo-American co-operation and compromise over maritime issues between

1917 and 1919 suggests that this greater failure was not inevitable. Mutual aims in peacetime had proven sufficient to drive co-operation forward. Thus Anglo-American naval relations at the end of the Great War are not as simple as is often perceived. They were complex: there were elements of competition, but above all co-operation continued as common goals remained to be pursued.

The relationship began because of the mutual threat of Germany. At its conception, the partnership was fuelled by the exigencies of war. When these lessened, it proved more difficult to smooth over differences and compromise, yet Anglo-American disagreements over naval matters during the war were fairly minor, and mostly resolved. With the defeat of Germany, historians have argued that fractures in naval relations drove a wedge between

Britain and the US. Historian John Gooch claims that the 1918 programme was the result of

‘a dozen years of Anglo-American rivalry’.721 Certainly there were tensions. Yet there was more co-operation than is often believed, and it generally prevailed. After the mutual goal of defeating Germany was achieved, both London and Washington saw in the other a necessary and possible partner with whom to build a new liberal world order. If either side had wanted to wage a diplomatic (or real) war, or commence a building contest, both

Britain and the US had powerful tools with which to do so. Their power was not equal, but each possessed valuable strengths over the other. Instead, each side revealed its potential

721John Gooch, ‘‘Hidden in the Rock’: American Military Perceptions of Great Britain, 1919-1940’, in War, Strategy, and International Politics, ed. Lawrence Freedman, Paul Hayes, and Robert O’Neill (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 159; Halewood, ‘What Explains the Effective Anglo-American Naval Co-operation during the Second World War?’, 11 168

tools, and promptly discarded them. The pressures of achieving a secure peace were weaker than the exigencies of war, leading to a looser partnership, but it sufficed to keep the maritime powers together and promote continued collaboration. The way was not straightforward, and conflicting national aims caused heated debates. Yet these problems were overcome to reach a compromise which attained their mutual goal. By summer 1919, the maritime powers left Paris in the knowledge that a League of Nations was to be established, and the door was open for bilateral negotiations to resolve outstanding naval issues.

This future never occurred. Wilson’s collapse, and the US’ return to isolation, scuppered any chance of a long-ranging strategic alignment. A naval compromise was eventually reached, but not in the vein hoped for by advocates of the League of Nations in

1919. The Anglo-American partnership of the Great War-era ended, but long after the naval battle of Paris, and not because of naval rivalry, but rather the collapse of Wilson’s administration. From the US’ entry into the war until Wilson’s collapse, the Anglo-

American naval relationship centred not on rivalry and confrontation, but on co-operation and compromise.

169

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