The Maritime Compromise: British and American Naval Co-Operation, 1917-1919
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University of Calgary PRISM: University of Calgary's Digital Repository Graduate Studies The Vault: Electronic Theses and Dissertations 2015-08-06 The Maritime Compromise: British and American Naval Co-operation, 1917-1919 Halewood, Louis Halewood, L. (2015). The Maritime Compromise: British and American Naval Co-operation, 1917-1919 (Unpublished master's thesis). University of Calgary, Calgary, AB. doi:10.11575/PRISM/28242 http://hdl.handle.net/11023/2385 master thesis University of Calgary graduate students retain copyright ownership and moral rights for their thesis. You may use this material in any way that is permitted by the Copyright Act or through licensing that has been assigned to the document. For uses that are not allowable under copyright legislation or licensing, you are required to seek permission. Downloaded from PRISM: https://prism.ucalgary.ca UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY The Maritime Compromise: British and American Naval Co-operation, 1917-1919 by Louis Marc Halewood A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS GRADUATE PROGRAM IN HISTORY CALGARY, ALBERTA JULY, 2015 © Louis Marc Halewood 2015 ABSTRACT Historians have portrayed the Anglo-American naval partnership during the Great War as a fleeting oddity. It began under the pressure of the German submarine campaign, endured through to victory, and rapidly collapsed. Even in 1917-1918, that relationship was dominated by rivalry. The natural product was the so-called ‘naval battle of Paris’ in 1919. In fact, this thesis demonstrates that between 1917-1919, the maritime relationship between these states always was characterised by co-operation and compromise, tempered by rivalry. This partnership was driven by the mutual aim of defeating Germany, and spurred by the exigencies of war. When that goal was accomplished, both Britain and the United States recognised in the other a useful partner in constructing a liberal post-war order. Consequently they worked together, postponing discussions over their naval differences so not to obstruct the Treaty of Versailles and the creation of a League of Nations. The failure of the peace caused naval rivalry, not the other way around. ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS A significant debt of thanks is owed to Dr. John Ferris for his tireless support and guidance. I am extremely grateful for his patience and persistence as a supervisor; it has been a privilege to work with someone so dedicated to his students and their betterment. I cannot thank the Department of History at the University of Calgary enough, not least for its generosity in funding. Without this, and the support of its first-rate students and academic staff, this thesis would not have been completed. I also owe my gratitude to the many staff I reached out to at archives during my research for their kindness. On a personal note, I am greatly appreciative for the warm welcome and hospitality I have received from the many wonderful people I have met during my time in Calgary, especially Anita. To my parents: thank you for your unwavering support in this endeavour, several thousand miles from home. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................ ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................... iii TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................... iv INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 1 CHAPTER 1 ...................................................................................................................... 16 1.1: The Historical Relationship .................................................................................... 16 1.2: The Outbreak of War .............................................................................................. 20 1.3: The Test of American Neutrality ............................................................................ 22 1.4: Forcing Wilson’s Hand ........................................................................................... 35 CHAPTER 2 ...................................................................................................................... 42 2.1: Forging a Partnership .............................................................................................. 42 2.2: Into Battle ............................................................................................................... 48 2.3: The Timetable of Co-operation .............................................................................. 58 2.4: Financial Difficulties .............................................................................................. 63 2.5: Taking Action ......................................................................................................... 65 CHAPTER 3 ...................................................................................................................... 75 3.1: Problems of Communication and Direction ........................................................... 75 3.2: The House Mission ................................................................................................. 81 3.3: Maintaining the Maritime Highways ...................................................................... 82 3.4: Taking the Offensive .............................................................................................. 95 3.5: Harmony in the Grand Fleet ................................................................................. 101 3.6: The Mediterranean ................................................................................................ 106 CHAPTER 4 .................................................................................................................... 113 4.1: Toward a New World Order ................................................................................. 113 4.2: American Shipbuilding and the Geddes Mission, August – October 1918 .......... 117 4.3: The Pre-Armistice Negotiations, October – November 1918 .............................. 123 4.4: To the Peace Conference, December 1918 – February 1919 ............................... 139 4.5: The Naval ‘Battle’ of Paris, March – April 1919 ................................................. 146 4.6: The Continuation of Co-operation and Compromise ........................................... 161 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 165 BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................ 170 iv INTRODUCTION On 4th May 1917, with the underwater German guerre de course at its peak, the first United States (US) destroyers ordered to serve with the Royal Navy (RN) arrived in European waters. The Mayflower had returned, an event immortalised in an iconic painting of the Great War at sea, ‘The Return of the Mayflower’, by Bernard F. Gribble. Over the next eighteen months, a close and effective partnership was forged between the British and American navies, particularly among the officers and men at sea. With the foe vanquished in November 1918, American ships sailed back to the Western Hemisphere, with goodwill toward their British counterparts, and vice versa. The commander of the Grand Fleet, Admiral Sir David Beatty, told the senior American officer serving under his command, Admiral Hugh Rodman: ‘We trust [your departure] is only temporary and that the interchange of Squadrons from the Two Great Fleets of the Anglo Saxon Race may be repeated… come back soon’.1 Rodman replied: ‘We all hope to serve again under your command’.2 Such warm words are easily dismissed as sentiment, but this was not the case. Genuine friendships had grown up. The United States Navy (USN) replaced the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) as Britain’s ‘closest sister service’.3 Such friendships were not the whole of Anglo-American relations. The First World War damaged the British Empire, and boosted the US financially. Now holding the second largest navy in the world, senior American naval officers wanted more: a navy second to 1 Beatty to Rodman, 1st December 1918, ADM 137/1964 2 Rodman to Beatty, 1st December 1918, ADM 137/1964 3 Andrew Gordon, ‘The Admiralty and Imperial Overstretch, 1902-1941’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 17:1 (1994), 65 1 none. The decline of Britain and the RN and the rise of the US and the USN was one of the central events of the 20th century. Seapower was one of its key levers. It was critical to the outcome of both world wars. Despite the lack of fleet actions when compared with the Second World War, seapower mattered as much to victory in the First World War. Britain’s ability to isolate Germany and exploit the resources of the empire and the world – especially the finances and manpower of the US – ensured that Germany could not resist its grinding down by the Allies and Associated Powers.4 Seapower remains a vital, if undervalued, element of international relations today. Two-thirds of the earth is ocean. Seas divide the greatest powers on earth, and maritime highways remain critical to global trade. Naval power demands further study, especially naval co-operation, a part of maritime operations which has grown in importance through the joint