DOCSLIB.ORG

Britain, France and West Germany Takeshi Yamamoto L

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Britain, France and West Germany Takeshi Yamamoto L The Road to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1969-1973: Britain, France and West Germany Takeshi Yamamoto London School of Economics and Political Science PhD International History UMI Number: U615509 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI U615509 Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 lH £ S € S V. r 3 S 3 S British Library of Political and Economic Science Declaration work presented in the thesis is the candidate’s own. Takeshi Yamamoto Abstract The purpose of this thesis is to examine European international politics towards the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) from 1969 to 1973. The importance of the CSCE is widely recognised by historians and political scientists, but the pre-diplomacy of the Conference is poorly understood. Based on the British, French and West German archive documents, and focusing on international political dynamics, this study explores how multilateral European detente represented by the CSCE was realised in the early 1970s. The four-year period leading up to the opening of the CSCE was also highly significant, because these four years saw the crucial transformation of the nature of European detente. When the Soviets proposed the European Security Conference in 1969, their aim was to consolidate the status quo in Europe. However, the West Europeans were the leading actors in convening the Conference, and between 1969 and 1973, they made the CSCE meaningful and substantial in two ways* its procedure and its content. The idea of a three-stage Conference, which was developed by the Europeans during the pre-conference diplomacy, made it possible to negotiate thoroughly on the text of the Helsinki Final Act and steer it in the direction the West wanted. More significantly, the West succeeded in incorporating the human rights and human contact agenda into the Conference. This study will thus examine how the ideas of the constructive procedure and humanitarian subjects were developed. It will further argue that multilateral European detente was uncontrollable by the superpowers, and a transformation of detente was possible in the context of multilateral diplomacy. Britain, France and West Germany respectively played an important role in the opening up and development of the CSCE. As a result, multilateral European detente went beyond the status quo. 2 Table of Contents Abstract.................................................................................................................p.2 Table of Contents..................................................................................................p.3 Acknowledgements ..............................................................................................p .4 List of Abbreviations........................................................................................... p.6 Introduction- ........................................................................................................ p. 7 Chapter 1- Detente in the 1960s....................................................................... p.22 Chapter 2- NATO’s Commitment to a European Security Conference, January 1969 - May 1970............................................................................. p.64 Chapter 3: Increasing Priority of an ESC, June-December, 1970................. p. 120 Chapter4- Berlin, MBFR, and a European Security Conference, 1971........ p. 159 Chapter 5- Emergence of European Political Cooperation, 1971-1972.........p.198 Chapter 6- The Battle for a Good Start, January 1972 - July.............. 1973 p.227 Conclusion- Organising Multilateral European Detente............................... p.262 Bibliography..................................................................................................... p.280 3 Acknowledgements Just ten years ago, I came to have interests in European history after the Second World War. In particular, my former supervisor in Japan, Takahiko Tanaka, invited me to study European history - both European integration history and cold war history in Europe. Since then, he has kindly and continuously supported my research even after my leaving from Japan. What I learned under his supervison is the deep foundation of this dissertation. I would like thank him. More directly I owe a great deal of thanks to Piers Ludlow, my current doctoral supervisor. His comments and advice were always invaluable, and his encouragement gave me power to argue bravely. The way in which he guided me to go ahead chapter by chapter perfectly suited me, and made me feel that my project progressed — a very important sense during the tough PhD years. The Internatioanl History Department of the LSE is amicable. I would particularly like to thank Odd Arne Westad, Antony Best, and Kristina Spohr Readman. A special thank gose to Kristina, whose current research topic is close to mine; therefore, I extremely benefited from exchanges of opinion with her. Various arguments of this dissertation were also developed through many discussions with friends. They provided me stimulating comments and feedback. I am especially grateful to the following people- Garret Martin, Ryo Ikeda, Niklas Rossbach, Ken Nannichi, Tomoki Kuniyoshi, Toshihiko Aono, Hirofumi Takase, Ko II, and Yoshitaka Katayama. I must also express my appreciation to the archivists and staff of The National Archives, KewJ theMinistere des Affaires Etrangeres, Paris; the Archives Nationales, Paris; the Bundesarchiv, Koblenz; and the Politisches Ajcchiv, Auswartiges Amt, Berlin. Without their help, I would have been at a loss in foreign archives. 4 During the final stage of this research, Hiraly Parker proofread all chapters. With her help, this dissertation was truly completed. I appreciate her wonderful corrections of my poor English. Above all, I would like to thank my mother, Takako. Without her support, I could not have continued to study abroad. One month before my writing up the dissertation, my grand mother, Shizue Shinoda, died. She always worried about me living abroad, but very unfortunately I could not attend her funeral. It is a source of great regret that I was not able to complete this dissetation sooner. I will miss her greatly. 5 List of Abbreviations AAPD • Akten zur A uswartigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland ABM^ Anti Ballistic Missile AN: Archives Na tionales CBM'- Confidence Building Measures CDU: Christlich Demokratische Union CBS: Conference on European Security CPSTJ: Communist Party of the Soviet Union CSCE: Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe CSU: ChristlichSoziale Union DBPO: Documents on British Policy Overseas DNSA: Digital National Security Archives EC: European Community EEC: European Economic Community EMU: Economic and Monetary Union EPC: European Political Cooperation ESC: European Security Conference FO: Foreign Office FCO: Foreign and Commonwealth Office FDP: Freie Demokratische Partei FQP- Final Quadripartite Protocol FRG: Federal Republic Germany FEUS: Foreign Relations of the United States series GDR: German Democratic Republic HMG: Her Majesty Government LTBT: Limited Test Ban Treaty MBFR: Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions MAE: Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres MFN: Most Favored Nation MLF: Multilateral Force MPT: Multilateral Preparatory Talks NAP: Non*Aggression Pact NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NLF: National Liberation Front NPT: Non-Proliferation Treaty NSC-' National Security Council NSDM: National Security Decision Memorandum PAAA: Politisches Archiv, A uswaertiges Am t PRC: People’s Republic of China SALT: Strategic Arms Limitation Talks SCEWR: Standing Committee on East-West Relations SPC: Senior Political Committee SPD: Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands TNA: The National Archives (previously Public Records Office) UK: United Kingdom US: United States USA: United States of America USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics WEU: Western European Union Introduction In the first years after the Second World War, Europe was divided into two blocs. Mistrust between the United Kingdom/United States and the Soviet Union over ideology and security in Europe and other regions gradually increased, and the Cold War conflicts between them were reflected above all in the European continent. Indeed, America’s European Recovery Programme of 1947, the so-called Marshall Plan, was a landmark in the division of Europe; West European countries joined the Programme, but East European countries rejected it or were forced by the USSR to reject it. The Iron Curtain fell; two camps appeared. Economic, cultural, and human contacts between the two sides were restricted politically and practically. The Eastern regimes implemented and then strengthened their oppressive one-party dictatorships, becoming suppressive on their people. The defeated Germany was also divided in two. The Allies’ enemy had been occupied by the Four Powers - the United States, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union —, but eventually the three Western sectors
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Construction Civil Works Civil Engineering
    PROUDLY SUPPORTED BY PROUD MEDIA PARTNER CONCRETE INSTITUTE of AUSTRALIA APR/MAY 2021 V7.01 CONSTRUCTION CIVIL WORKS CIVIL ENGINEERING PRINT POST APPROVED - 100001889 APR/MAY 2021 contents Volume 7 Number 1 2 Editorial 4 Industry News Published by: Editorial and Publishing Consultants Pty Ltd 10 Cover Feature: AllPrep Flooring ABN 85 007 693 138 PO Box 510, Broadford Victoria 3658 Australia LATICRETE® SUPERCAP® 7 Phone: 1300 EPC GROUP (1300 372 476) Int’l: +61 3 5784 2210 www.epcgroup.com 18 ACRS Feature Publisher and Managing Editor Anthony T Schmidt Phone: 1300 EPCGROUP (1300 372 476) 22 News Brief Mobile: 0414 788 900 Email: [email protected] Business Development Manager 26 Product Focus: Aussie Pumps Lawrence Whiter Mobile: 0418 543 821 Email: [email protected] Trash Pumps 18 National Advertising Sales Manager Yuri Mamistvalov 28 Corrosion Protection Phone: 1300 EPCGROUP (1300 372 476) Mobile: 0419 339 865 Email: [email protected] 30 National Precast Feature Advertising Sales - SA Jodie Gaffney - AmAgo Mobile: 0439 749 993 Email: [email protected] 38 Project Brief: Melbourne Square Advertising Sales - WA 32 Licia Salomone - OKeeffe Media Special Feature: LAPP Australia Mobile: 0412 080 600 40 Email: [email protected] Graphic Design 44 Product Feature: Air Springs Annette Epifanidis Mobile: 0416 087 412 Hearing Protection TERMS AND CONDITIONS This publication is published by Editorial and Publishing Consultants Pty Ltd (the “Publisher”). Materials in this publication have been cre- ated by a variety of different entities and, to the extent permitted by 46 Digital Technology - The digital law, the Publisher accepts no liability for materials created by others.
    [Show full text]
  • Moscow Summit Meeting and the Post Detente International Law, 6 IND
    DATE DOWNLOADED: Sat Sep 25 03:27:50 2021 SOURCE: Content Downloaded from HeinOnline Citations: Bluebook 21st ed. Edward McWhinney, The Moscow Summit Meeting and the Post Detente International Law, 6 IND. L. REV. 202 (1972). ALWD 6th ed. McWhinney, E. ., The moscow summit meeting and the post detente international law, 6(2) Ind. L. Rev. 202 (1972). APA 7th ed. McWhinney, E. (1972). The moscow summit meeting and the post detente international law. Indiana Law Review, 6(2), 202-219. Chicago 17th ed. Edward McWhinney, "The Moscow Summit Meeting and the Post Detente International Law," Indiana Law Review 6, no. 2 (December 1972): 202-219 McGill Guide 9th ed. Edward McWhinney, "The Moscow Summit Meeting and the Post Detente International Law" (1972) 6:2 Ind L Rev 202. AGLC 4th ed. Edward McWhinney, 'The Moscow Summit Meeting and the Post Detente International Law' (1972) 6(2) Indiana Law Review 202. MLA 8th ed. McWhinney, Edward. "The Moscow Summit Meeting and the Post Detente International Law." Indiana Law Review, vol. 6, no. 2, December 1972, p. 202-219. HeinOnline. OSCOLA 4th ed. Edward McWhinney, 'The Moscow Summit Meeting and the Post Detente International Law' (1972) 6 Ind L Rev 202 -- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license agreement available at https://heinonline.org/HOL/License -- The search text of this PDF is generated from uncorrected OCR text. -- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your license, please use: Copyright Information THE MOSCOW SUMMIT MEETING AND THE POST-DETENTE INTERNATIONAL LAW EDWARD MCWHINNEY* I.
    [Show full text]
  • Diplomatic Negotiations and the Portrayal of Détente in Pravda, 1972-75
    A Personal Affair : Diplomatic Negotiations and the Portrayal of Détente in Pravda, 1972-75 Michael V. Paulauskas A thesis submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department of History. Chapel Hill 2006 Approved by Advisor: Donald J. Raleigh Reader: David Griffiths Reader: Chad Bryant ABSTRACT MICHAEL V. PAULAUSKAS: A Personal Affair: Diplomatic Negotiations and the Portrayal of Détente in Pravda, 1972-75 (Under the direction of Donald J. Raleigh) This thesis explores how diplomatic relations between the US and the USSR changed during détente , specifically concentrating on the period between the 1972 Moscow Summit and the enactment of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the 1974 Trade Bill . I employ transcripts of diplomatic negotiations to investigate the ways that Soviet and American leaders used new personal relationships with their adversaries to achieve thei r foreign policy goals. In order to gain further understanding of the Soviet leadership’s attitudes toward détente, I also examine how the Soviet government, through Pravda, communicated this new, increasingly complex diplomatic relationship to the Soviet public in a nuanced fashion, with multilayered presentations of American foreign policy that included portrayals of individual actors and not simply impersonal groups . ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction………………………………………..…………………………………………. 1 A Cautious Beginning: Soviet -American Relations before the Moscow Summit ..…………...9 The Lifting of the Veil: The 1972 Moscow Summit …………………………..…………….16 The High -Water Mark of Détente: The 1973 US Summit …..………………………….……30 “Nixon’s Last Friend”: The Watergate Scandal …………………………………………..…37 Détente in Crisis: The Jackson-Vanik Amendment ……………..…………………………..45 Conclusion…………………………………………………..……………………………….53 Appendices ……………………………………………..……………………………………57 Bibliography …………………………………………..……………………………………..65 iii Introduction Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin greeted the news of Richard M.
    [Show full text]
  • Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: the Origins of Iranian Primacy in the Persian Gulf
    Roham Alvandi Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: the origins of Iranian primacy in the Persian Gulf Article (Accepted version) (Refereed) Original citation: Alvandi, Roham (2012) Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: the origins of Iranian primacy in the Persian Gulf. Diplomatic history, 36 (2). pp. 337-372. ISSN 1467-7709 DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-7709.2011.01025.x © 2012 The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/32743/ Available in LSE Research Online: March 2012 LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research Online website. This document is the author’s final manuscript accepted version of the journal article, incorporating any revisions agreed during the peer review process. Some differences between this version and the published version may remain. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. roham alvandi Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: The Origins of Iranian Primacy in the Persian Gulf* On the morning of May 31, 1972, the shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, received U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • About the Results of the Moscow Summit and Their Impact on U.S
    About the Results of the Moscow Summit and Their Impact on U.S. Foreign Policy and Soviet-American Relations. As experience shows, final results of such events as the Soviet-American summits become apparent over more or less extended period of time. So far, we can only talk about preliminary results. Among them, the following are the most significant. First of all, the summit brought substantial political and diplomatic results. It is important that we did not allow any breaks in the process of dialog, even though it was possible and even probably due to the U.S. political calendar (the electoral campaign, the situation in which the outgoing administration now finds itself—according to the American political terminology—the state of “lame duck”). Thanks to the summit, the year 1988 did not fall out of the process of normalization of Soviet-American relations; to the contrary, it already became an important marker in their development, which help ensure the continuity: both most likely presidential candidates are simply forced by the logic of events itself to speak positively about Soviet-American relations, about disarmament and other important issues, which were on the agenda. Thus it is as if they are “taking the baton” from Reagan. Furthermore, the preparation for the summit, the summit itself, and the subsequent realization of those agreements, which were achieved or outlined there, do not just cement the constructive changes in Soviet-American relations, but also give them a new impulse for further development in all the spheres— disarmament, resolution of regional problems, and improvement of bilateral relations.
    [Show full text]
  • THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT: General Secretary Brezhnev's Visit to the United States, June 18-25, 1973
    THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT: General Secretary ~rezhnev 1 s Visit to the United States, June 18-25, 1973 DEPARTMENT OF ST ATE Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Com­ mittee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, arrived in the United States on June. 16 for an official visit June 18-25, 1973. This pamphlet consists of documentaJion, reprinted from The Depcirtrnent of Stcite Bulletin of July 23, relating to that visit. Contents June 18 ____ Welcoming Remarks, White House 1 Exchange of Toasts 2 .Tune l9____ Agreements 5 Agriculture 5 Studies of World Ocean 7 Transportation 8 Contacts, Exchanges and Cooperation 9 June 20 ____ Convention on Matters of Taxation 13 June 2L ___ Agreements 17 Strategic Arms Limitation 17 Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy 18 Dr. Kissinger's News Conference, Washington 19 Exchange of Toasts at the Soviet Embassy 26 June 22 ____ Agreement on Prevention of Nuclear War 30 Dr. Kissinger's News Conference, Washington 31 Protocols 3 7 U.S.-U.S.S.R. Chamber of Commerce 37 Commercial Facilities 3 7 June 23 ____ Protocol on Expansion of Air Services 38 Remarks at Reception, San Clemente 40 June 24 ____ Departure Remarks, San Clemente 41 General Secretary Brezhnev's TV and Radio Address 43 June 25 ____ Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Communique 49 Dr. Kissinger's News Conference, San Clemente 53 Cover: President Nixon greets General Secre­ tary Brezhnev at the White House on June 18. Standing behind the General Secretary is V .M. Sukhodrev, Counse­ lor and Interpreter of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
    [Show full text]
  • Rhetoric of Richard Nixon
    Madman 1 Running Head: Madman The "Madman" Rhetoric of Richard Nixon: An Alternative Means to Establish Geopolitical Ethos. David K. Scott Department of Communication Arts Northeastern State University Tahlequah OK 74464 A Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the 2005 Central States Communication Association (Kansas City, MO April 6-10). Madman 2 Abstract In a geopolitical context, the means of establishing deterrence is premised on the military capability of a country and the perceived willingness of a leader to use force as a means to achieve policy goals. A key function of rhetoric is to establish the personal ethos of a leader regarding their willingness to use force. During the Cold War the rhetorical context of geopolitical discourse was premised on a rational choice model of decision-making based on a strategic calculation of the relative strength of each country. This paper argues that rhetorical strategies need to change relative to the strategic situation facing each leader. Further, the rhetorical burden of building and maintaining strategic credibility inversely increases relative to a country's military power. This paper explores Richard Nixon's innovative rhetorical strategy of cultivating irrationality and uncertainty as a means to maintain and enhance "deterrent credibility" during a period of national decline. Madman 3 Introduction Aristotle identified "ethos" or speaker credibility as a key component of successful rhetoric. One particular context of ethos can be referred to as "geopolitical credibility." Geopolitical credibility concerns the reputation of countries and leaders in relation to one another. In this context, credibility can be defined as a form of power and deterrence.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 Conversation No. 670-13 Date: February 14, 1972 Time: 1:04 Pm
    1 Conversation No. 670-13 Date: February 14, 1972 Time: 1:04 pm - 2:25 pm Location: Oval Office The President met with H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman. Monday -Recent issue -Julie Nixon Eisenhower [?] -The President’s Vietnam peace plan -Democrats -Vietnam -Edmund S. Muskie statements form 1968 -Peace talks -Possible endangerment -Chicago -John A. Scali -The President’s 1968 statement Julie Eisenhower [?] Attorney General’s [John N. Mitchell] resignation An unknown man entered at an unknown time after 1:04 pm. Item -Delivery to residence -Thelma C. (“Pat”’) Nixon The unknown man left at an unknown time before 1:27 pm. Ronald L. Ziegler Portraits -Autographs -Rose Mary Woods -Older photographs -Milling -View -Family -Serious -Oliver F. (“Ollie”) Atkins -Candid shots Press 2 -Forthcoming trip to the People’s Republic of China [PRC] -Ziegler -Meeting with the President -Possible movie shown to the press -News -Hawaii -Movie -The President’s briefing -Contents of movie -Henry A. Kissinger -Inclusion -Ziegler’s concern -Stories -Pressure on the press corps -Hawaii -Ziegler -Concern Kissinger -Talk with Haldeman -Scali -Alexander M. Haig, Jr. Briefing books -Mrs. Nixon -Press -Ziegler -Chinese -Questions to Mrs. Nixon -President’s instructions -Brief -Kissinger -Sending a briefing book to Mrs. Nixon -Instructions to Haldeman -Guiding points and suggestions -Patrick J. Buchanan -Questions and answers [Q&A] -Things to be said in contrast to things not to be said -Kissinger -Buchanan -Press conference -Guiding points -Length -Kissinger -Ziegler -Scali 3 -Kissinger -Examination Ambassadors -Joseph S. Farland -Kissinger -Martin J. Hillenbrand -West Germany -Kissinger -Peter M. Flanigan -Hillenbrand -Kissinger -Possible rejection -Foreign Service -[David] Kenneth Rush -President’s support of Hillenbrand -William H.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 the Great Communicator and the Beginning of the End of the Cold War1 by Ambassador Eric S. Edelman President Ronald Reagan Is
    The Great Communicator and the Beginning of the End of the Cold War1 By Ambassador Eric S. Edelman President Ronald Reagan is known as the “Great Communicator,” a soubriquet that was awarded to him by New York Times columnist Russell Baker, and which stuck despite Reagan’s disclaimer in his farewell address that he “wasn’t a great communicator” but that he had “communicated great things.” The ideas which animated Reagan’s vision were given voice in a series of extraordinary speeches, many of them justly renowned. Among them are his “Time for Choosing” speech in 1964, his “Shining City on a Hill” speech to CPAC in 1974, his spontaneous remarks at the conclusion of the Republican National Convention in 1976 and, of course, his memorable speeches as President of the United States. These include his “Evil Empire” speech to the National Association of Evangelicals, his remarks at Westminster in 1982, his elegiac comments commemorating the 40th anniversary of the D-Day invasion and mourning the Challenger disaster, and his Berlin speech exhorting Mikhail Gorbachev to “Tear Down this Wall” in 1987, which Time Magazine suggested was one of the 10 greatest speeches of all time.2 Curiously, Reagan’s address to the students of Moscow State University during the 1988 Summit with Mikhail Gorbachev draws considerably less attention today despite the fact that even normally harsh Reagan critics hailed the speech at the time and have continued to cite it subsequently. The New York Times, for instance, described the speech as “Reagan’s finest oratorical hour” and Princeton’s liberal historian Sean Wilentz has called it “the symbolic high point of Reagan’s visit….
    [Show full text]
  • The Cuban Missile Crisis and Its Effect on the Course of Détente
    1 THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS AND ITS EFFECT ON THE COURSE OF DÉTENTE 2 Abstract The Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union began in 1945 with the end of World War II and the start of an international posturing for control of a war-torn Europe. However, the Cold War reached its peak during the events of the Cuban Missile Crisis, occurring on October 15-28, 1962, with the United States and the Soviet Union taking sides against each other in the interest of promoting their own national security. During this period, the Soviet Union attempted to address the issue of its own deficit of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles compared to the United States by placing shorter-range nuclear missiles within Cuba, an allied Communist nation directly off the shores of the United States. This move allowed the Soviet Union to reach many of the United States’ largest population centers with nuclear weapons, placing both nations on a more equal footing in terms of security and status. The crisis was resolved through the imposition of a blockade by the United States, but the lasting threat of nuclear destruction remained. The daunting nature of this Crisis led to a period known as détente, which is a period of peace and increased negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union in order to avoid future confrontations. Both nations prospered due to the increased cooperation that came about during this détente, though the United States’ and the Soviet Union’s rapidly changing leadership styles and the diverse personalities of both countries’ individual leaders led to fluctuations in the efficiency and extent of the adoption of détente.
    [Show full text]
  • Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions Collection
    http://oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/tf3s2006vg Online items available Guide to the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions Collection Processing Information: Arrangement and description by Deborah Kennedy, David C. Tambo, Yolanda Blue, Louisa Dennis, and Elizabeth Witherell; also student assistants Elizabeth Aburto, Julie Baron, Marisela Bautista, Liz Bittner, Michelle Bowden, Chris Caldow, Jacqueline Chau, Alison Church, Hubert Dubrulle, Sivakumar Elambooranan, Richard Frausto, Michael Fry, Joseline Garde, Joseph Gardner, Tim Hagen, Arlene Hebron, Kara Heerman, M. Pilar Herraiz, Ain Hunter, Sandra Jacobs, Derek Jaeger, Gisele Jones, Julie Kravets, Annie Leatt, Kurt Morrill, Chris Shea, Robert Simons, Kay Wamser, Leon Zimlich, and other Library and Special Collections staff and student assistants; machine-readable finding aid created by Xiuzhi Zhou. Latest revision D. Tambo. Department of Special Collections Davidson Library University of California, Santa Barbara Santa Barbara, CA 93106 Phone: (805) 893-3062 Fax: (805) 893-5749 Email: [email protected] URL: http://www.library.ucsb.edu/speccoll/speccoll.html © 2000 The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Guide to the Center for the Study Mss 18 1 of Democratic Institutions Collection Guide to the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions (CSDI) Collection, 1950-1991 [bulk dates 1961-1987] Collection number: Mss 18 Department of Special Collections Davidson Library University of California, Santa Barbara Contact Information: Department of Special Collections Davidson Library University of California, Santa Barbara Santa Barbara, CA 93106 Phone: (805) 893-3062 Fax: (805) 893-5749 Email: [email protected] URL: http://www.library.ucsb.edu/speccoll/speccoll.html Processing Information: Arrangement and description by Deborah Kennedy, David C.
    [Show full text]
  • Wirtschaftlicheerholunginsicht
    MesseOffizielle Messezeitung der Daily Herausgeber Vogel Business Media GmbH &Co. KG www.maschinenmarkt.de mittwoch, 21. april 2010 Wirtschaftliche Erholung in Sicht INHALT 3Energy Efficiency Award verliehen 4 Industriepreis ging an Eaton Deutsche Automatisierungsindustrie gibt sich vorsichtig optimistisch 6 Abenteuerliche Wege zur Messe 7 Contitech setzt auf Nachhaltigkeit m Jahr Null nach der Wirt- ersten Halbjahr die Auftragsein- 8 Leichtbauroboter sofort einlernen schaftskrise zeigt sich die deut- gänge der wichtigsten Abnehmer- 9 Bonfiglioli erwartet Wachstum Ische Automatisierungsindus- branchen zusammenbrachen. Der 10 Steckverbinder rasten hörbar ein trie wieder vorsichtig optimistisch. Umsatz der Prozessautomatisie- „Es gibt noch keinen Grund in Ju- rung sank 2009 um 17% auf 14,2 ■ IndustrIal automatIon bel auszubrechen, trotzdem Mrd. Euro. „Einen solchen Rück- 11 Modulares Konzept für FTS stimmt die aktuelle Situation sehr gang hatten wir noch nie, seit wir 12 Nachhaltige Automationsanwendungen positiv“, erklärte Dr. Gunther Kegel, diese Statistiken führen“, berichte- 13 Individuelle Lösungen Vorsitzender des ZVEI-Fachver- te Michael Ziesemer, im Vorstand 14 Neuer Standard für Ventilatoren bands Automation auf der gestri- des Fachverbands zuständig für 15 Unverwechselbares Design für Gehäuse gen Pressekonferenz. Für 2010 dieses Segment. Doch er hatte 16 Mehrwert Leistungsdichte erwartet die Branche ein Umsatz- auch eine gute Nachricht:„Wir re- 17 Wireless-Hart-Standard besteht Feldtest wachstum von 7 bis 9% im Ver- gistrieren in den ersten drei Mona- 18 Komplexe Aufgaben einfach lösen gleich zum Vorjahr. „Das hohe ten 2010 eine deutliche Erholung Umsatzniveau von 2008 wird je- des Geschäfts. Wenn sich dieser ■ dIgItal Factory doch nicht vor 2011 wieder er- Trend fortsetzt, kann bis zum Jah- 20 Best Practice am Messestand reicht“, ergänzte Kegel.
    [Show full text]