LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Cv^unicnted to the C.332.M.169 .1935 .VII. Council and Members of the League. Gene vs, September 4th, 1935.

DISPUTE BETWEEN. AND ITALY.

BEQUEST OF TEE ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT.

Note by the Secretary-General.

In accordance with the resolution adopted by the Council on August 3rd, the Ethiopian and Italian Governments have communicated to the Secretary-General, for the informa­ tion of the Members of the Council, a certified copy of the decision unanimously rendered by the It.aly-Ethiopian Arbitra­ tion Commission in Paris on September 3rd, 1935, with regard to the Walwal incident and other incidents having taken place on the Italo-Ethiopian frontier since December 5th, 1934.

I. Communication from the representative of Ethiopia;

II. Communication from the representative of Italy;

III. Docision of the Italo-Ethiopian Arbitration Commission.

I. Genova, September 4th, 1935.

To the Secretary-General. •

(Translation).

I have the honour to transmit to your Excellency, for communication to the Members of the Council of the Longue of Nations, a certified copy of the award unanimously ren­ dered by the Italo-Ethiopian Arbitration Comission in Pnris on September 3rd, 1935, regarding the Walwal and subsequent incidents up to May 25th,. 1935.

I have the honour, etc.,

(Signed) Gaston JEZE,

Agent of the Imperial Ethiopian Government.

II. Geneva, September 4th,1935. T- the Secretary-General.

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a certified copy of the decision rendered on September 3rd, by the Italo-Ethiopian Commission of Conciliation and Arbitration with regard to the Walwal incident and other incidents having taken plp.ee on the Italo-Ethiopian frontier since December 5th, 1934.

I have the honour, etc.,

(Signed) ALOISI. - 2 -

III.

ITALO-ETHIOPIAN COMMISSION OF CONCILIATION AND

ARBITRATION.

Award of September 3rd, 1955.

1. By an exchange of notes dated May 15th and 16th, 1935 between the Italian Minister at Addis Ababa and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, the Italian and Ethiopian Governments agreed to submit to the procedure of conciliation and arbitration provided for in Article 5 of the Treaty of Amity between Italy and Ethiopia of August 2nd, 1908, "the de facte circumstances of the incident which took place at Walwal on December 5th end 6 th, 1934, and the responsibilities in connection therewith." As it appears from Resolution No.l of the League Council dated May 25th, 1935, the cwo Govern­ ments also agreed to submit to the same procedure "incidents which have taken place on the Italo-Ethiopian frontier since December 5th, 1934."

It was also stated in this resolution of the League Council that the Italian Government, in view of the request which had been made to it, raised no objection regarding the nationality of the arbitrators appointed by the Ethiopian Government.

2. The two Governments accordingly appointed as members of the Commission, the former, Count Aldrovandi, Ambassador of H. M. the King of Italy ana M. Montagna, Counsellor of State of the Kingdom of Italy, and the latter M. A. de Gcouffrs| de la Pradelle, Professor of International Law at the Uni­ versity of Paris, Director of the Institute of Intornational Studies and Mr. Pitman B. Putter, Professor of .International Organisation at the Graduate Institute of International Studies of Geneva, a citizen of the United 3tates of America.

They also appointed as Agents attached to the Com­ mis si un, the former, M. S. Lessona, Professor at the Uni­ versity of Florence and the latter, M. G. Jeze, Professor at the University of Paris.

3. The Commission constituted as above held a first session at Milan on June 6 th and 7th, at which it laid down it5 procedure; its next meeting, which was to take place at Scheveningen (Netherlands) was postponed until June 25th to enable its members to take cognizance of the claims, argu­ ments, and evidence of the Parties.

4. On June 18th, 1935, the Ethiopian Government stated that it stood by the memoranda submitted by it to the League of Nations on January 15th and May 22nd, (C.4 9 .M.2 2 .1935.VII* and C.230.M.114.1935.VII ).

On June 22nd, the Italian Government submitted to the arbitrators a memorandum specially prepared for them. - 3 -

5. The Commission, which met at Scheveningen on June 25th, 1935, heard the statement of the Italian Government's Agent. The Ethiopian Government’s Agent having, in the course of his statement in reply, touched on the question of the "ownership” of the territory in which Walwal is situated, the Italian Agent objected to the examination of this question which, in his Government's opinion, did not come within the Commission's competence.

The members of the Commission disagreed as to their power to determine its competence, and regarding the recourse to the fifth arbitrator provided for by the Treaty of 1928.

The Commission was accordingly obliged to suspend its proceedings on July 9th, 1935.

6 . The interlocutory question thus raised was settled by the league Council, to which the two Governments applied in order to obtain an interpretation of their agreement regarding the precise scope of the mission entrusted to the Commission of Conciliation and Arbitration.

The Council was of opinion that the two Governments "did not agree 'that the Commission should examine frontier questions" and that consequently "the Commission must not, by its decision on the Walwal incident, prejudge the solution of questions which do not fall within its province, and that it would be prejudging that solution if it founded its decision on the opinion that the place at which'the incident occurred is under the sovereignty either of Italy or of Ethiopia".

It considered that "while it is always open to the Commission to take into consideration, without entering upon any discussion on the matter, the conviction that was held by the local authorities on either side as to the sovereignty over the place of the incident, the Commission has not to taka into account the circumstance that Walwal is under the sovereign­ ty of one or other of the two parties, but must concern itself solely with the other elements in the dispute relating to the Walwal incident’’.

It noted the declaration of the two parties to the effect that the four members of the Commission would proceed "without delay to designate the fifth arbitrator whose appoint­ ment might be necessary for the carrying through of their work".

Lastly, the Council, "confident that the procedure would have brought about the settlement of the dispute before September 1st, 1935, invited the two Governments to inform it of the result not later than September 4th, 1935".

7. The Commission met at Paris on August 20th, 1935, and proceeded to designate the fifth arbitrator. Its choice unanimously fell upon M. N. Politis, Greek Minister at Paris, member of the French Institute and the Institut de Droit inter­ national , former Minister for Foreign Affairs, ex-President of the League Assembly, Honorary Professor in the Faculty of Law of Paris University, who was requested to assist it in the event of disagreement. - 4 -

8 . After hearing on that same day the statement of the Ethiopian Agent, the Commission decided to proceed to Berne'" to receive the depositions of a number of persons called by the Italian Government.

9. The depositions were made on August 23rd, 24th and 25th, 1935. They were followed by the final statement of each of the two Agents.

10. On its return to Paris on August 26th, the Committee began its discussions on the questions submitted for its con­ sideration.

The four arbitrators were unable to agree either as to the actual circumstances of the Welwal incident or as to the responsibilities arising in connection therewith.

11. The intervention of the fifth arbitrator thus be­ came necessary. It took place on August 29th.

12. Having taken note of the general contents of the dossier, the various parts of which had been communicated to him on his appointment, the fifth arbitrator proceeded to dis­ cuss, in conjunction with the other members of the Commission, the pleadings on either side of the questions in dispute.

13. As a result of this discussion the Commission arrived at the following decision:

THE WALWAL INCIDENT

14. The Walwal district, situated in a desert country and frequented by nomad tribes under the authority of Britain, Italy or Ethiopia, is of special importance owing to the wells, some 300 in number, in the territory, the water of which is indispensable for the requirements of the tribes in question and their livestock.

15. This area has been controlled since 1928, and per­ manently occupied since 1930, by the authorities of the Colony.

16. The Italian occupation of the area is symbolised by the fortified post of Walwal, which is subordinate to that of Warder, about 12^ km. distant. Although it has not been officially recognised by the Ethiopian Government, it never gave rise to any official protest from that Government until the Walwal incident.

17. This occupation had given the Italian authorities the conviction that the Walwal area was under Italian a u th o rity and was recognised by Ethiopia and the United IT: ngdom, inas­ much as it was a constant practice for the tribes under their influence to use the Walwal wells under the supervision of the Italian authorities.

18. On the other hand, the Ethiopian authorities were convinced that the area formed, part of their national terri­ tory. - 5 -

19. In recent years, mutual suspicion and animosity had developed between the Italian and Ethiopian authorities/ The Italian authorities became convinced that the Ethiopians had hostile intentions, and the Ethiopian authorities had the same conviction about the Italians.

20. In such an atmosphere of suspicion and apprehension, the slightest incident might lead to a misunderstanding and degenerate into a serious conflict.

21. On November 22nd, 1934, an Ethiopian force of about 600 regular and irregular troops, under the command of Fitaurari Shi ferra, Governor of J i j i j a and , Fitaurari Àlemayehu, and Omar Samantar, an Italian deserter with a price on his head for the murder of an Italian officer, arrived in front of the Italian post at Walwal as the protective escort of an Anglo-Ethiopian Commission, which, having completed the demarcation of the frontier between Ethiopia and , and having instructions to make a grazing survey in Ogaden, was due next day at Walwal, where there was an Italian garrison consisting at that time of about 160 native soldiers (dubats).

22. The Ethiopian force, considering itself to be in national territory, advanced towards the wells ; its advance was opposed by an Italian force, commanded by a native N.C.O. who asserted that the Walwal area was Italian territory. Under the pressure of greatly superior numbers, the dubats were obliged to fall back, leaving the Ethiopians in posses­ sion of ten or fifteen wells.

23. Next morning, November 23rd, the Anglo-Ethiopian Commission arrived on the scene; at its head were, on the British side, It.-Col. Clifford, and on the Ethiopian side, Fitaurari Tessama Bante. The same day, they sent a letter to the officer commanding the Italian forces in the area, pro­ testing against the opposition to the advance of the Ethiopian force on the previous day, and against the forcible carrying- off of one of the Commission’s N.C.O.s with his rifle.

24. Next morning, the Italian Commanding Officer, Captain Cimmaruta, visited the members of the Commission; he declared that he was not competent to discuss the main subject of their protest, ”a problem which concerns only the political authorities”; but in explanation of the disappearance of the Ethiopian N.C.O. he stated that the latter was an Italian deserter who had voluntarily given himself up. He proposed to hold an enquiry into the matter, and offered, in order to avoid incidents, to establish a provisional line of separa­ tion between the Italian and Ethiopian forces. This offer, which, in form, appeared to the Anglo-Ethiopian Commission to be "sincere and opportune”, was not carried out. Captain Cimmaruta proposed to indicate the position of the two opposing lines by marks and signatures on tree-trunks; this proposal, however, was rejected by th Ethiopian Com­ mission, lest its acceptance of a provisional de facto situa­ tion might create a precedent favourable to the Italian view. Subsequently, however, the Ethiopian Commission agreed to the establishment of a provisional line of separation marked by twigs or thorns. - 6

25. To give the Ethiopians access to other wells in addition to the ten or fiftesn in their possession, the Italians were asked to withdraw a few metres ; Captain Cimma- ruta refused, but offered to allow the Ethiopians to draw"* water behind the Italian lines, under his supervision. ^he Anglo-Ethiopian Commission did not see its way to accent thi offer. ~ 13

26. During the conference between Captain Cimmaruta and the Commissioners, two Italian aeroplanes flew low over the Anglo-Ethiopian camp, where the British and Ethiopian flags were flying side by side, and the Commissioners had the impression that the machine-gun of one of these aeroplanes which was piloted by Major Porru Locci , had been trained upon them; they regarded this as a provocation, and protested indignantly. Giving evidence before the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission, however, Major Porru Locci declared on his honour as an officer and a gentleman that the machine- gun of his aeroplane was not trained upon the Anglo-Ethiopian camp, though a camera was. He explained that a wrong im­ pression might be gained because the machine-gun was mounted transversely on the fuselage, and consequently, when the aeroplane banked, the machine-gun would appear to be trained on the ground> He also added that his flight over the camp was in no sense a hostile demonstration: under orders from his superior officers, he was carrying out a reconnaissance in search of Captain Cimmaruta.

27. Moved by his ''great indignation” at this incident, which he regarded as a “provocative demonstration", Lt.-Col. Clifford decided to withdraw the British Mission to Ado, some thirty kilometres from Walwal, in order not to complicate the situation for the Ethiopian authorities, and to guard against any regrettable international incident; accordingly, next day, November 25th, the British and Ethiopian Missions left Walwal with their respective escorts of 30 and 50 men.

28. In the meantime Eitaurari Shi ferra* s force remained on the spot and its effectives, after receiving further re­ inforcements, ultimately attained a strength of 1400 to 1600 men ; i t s presence and the increase in its strength naturally added to the misgivings of the Italian authorities which they believed to have been justified in view of documents they subsequently found in the Ethiopian camp. The Italian authorities thereafter considered that the Ethiopian"troops' claim to be the escort of the Anglo-Ethlopian Commission was clearly untrue and that the reason why it did not, follow the Commission was that it was planning to attack the Italian garrison at the first opportunity with a view to seizing forcibly the Walwal wells ; in its report dated November 3 Cth, 1934, paragraph 20, the knglo-Ethiopian Commission explained that the "Ethiopian escort" remained in its position at Walwal in order to avoid the appearance of a retreat which might cause a rising among the population of Ogaden seriously compro­ mising the safety of the Commission; an the proceedings be­ fore the Commission it was further stated, on behalf of Ethiopia, that believing themselves to be in their own terri­ tory, the forces which had advanced as far as the wells could not retire without wounding the pride and lowering the prestige of the nation;; it should lastly be noted that on being asked by Captain Cimmaruta whether the troops which remained at Walwal and which the Commission continued to re­ gard as its escort really formed part of the Commission's Ethiopian escort, Lt.-Col= Clifford made no reply. 29. For ten days after the Commission's departure the Ethiopian and Italian troops remained in their posi­ tions, facing each other at a distance which in places was no more than 2 metres, their loaded rifles in their hands, challenging, insulting and provoking each other.

30. Nevertheless, in accordance with his Govern­ ment’s recommendations, the Governor of Italian Somaliland co n tin u ed to give the commander of the Warder-Walwal S sector formal written orders to refrain absolutely from any hostile act so long as the Ethiopians did not use their arms against the Italian posts ; and on his side the commander of the sector, Captain Cimmaruta, repeatedly approached the Anglo-Ethiopian Commission and the Ethiopian military chiefs urging that the necessary precautions be taken to prevent any incident. On November 26th, 1934 he felt uneasy as to the intentions of the Fitaorari Shiferra and warned him that, he would take such decisions as were required according to his reply. On December 4th having learnt that on the previous night his men had tried to force the Italian line by removing the brushwood which marked it, Captain Cimmaruta sent him word that any act of violence on his part would be countered by force.

31. At this juncture reinforcements arrived on both sides of the lines. On both sides, the men watched each other, and their nervousness increased owing to the fact that every day shots were heard - either accident si shots or shots at game.

32. Suddenly, on December 5t\, towards 3.30 p.m. ac­ cording to some and towards 5.30 p.m. according to others, following on a shot the origin of which is disputed, a general fight began. At the sound of the firing, Captain■Cimmaruta, who was at Warder, ordered two tanks and three aeroplanes to leave for Walwal immediately, he himself also proceeding thither in a light lorry. He arrived at Walwal shortly before 6 p.m., one tank and one aeroplane arriving a few minutes before him. The other tank and aeroplanes came up shortly after his own arrival. Captain Cimmaruta found his men, consisting at this time of about 500 dubats, having only native non-commissioned officers in command, forced back beyond the original line, with their ammunition practically exhausted. He had some cartridges found on disabled men distributed among them and called for ammunition to be sent from Warder. This ammuni tion arrived two hours later. Meanwhile night was falling the fighting became desultory and soon ceased altogether. On December 6 th at dawn fighting began again and soon the Ethiopians were routed and fled in the direction of Ado, leaving on the ground and in the neighbourhood 130 dead and a large number of wounded. The Italian dUbats lost 30 dead and 1 0 0 wounded. - 8 -

33. .Two diametrically opposite accounts are given,cf the origin of the first shot which caused, the fight. Accord­ ing to pne version this shot was fired from the Italian line after two orders clearly heard in the Ethiopian ranks had been given, namely first "A terra” and then ”fuoco”. Accord­ ing to the other version the shot was fired by an Ethiopian soldier, standing upright, in the direction of a little tree in which was sitting, on sentinel duty, an Italian dubat, who, wounded slightly in the cheek, immediately fell or let himself drop down. According to both versions the shot was the signal for firing from the same side.

34. The Ethiopian version is based :

1. On the aggressive intentions of the Italian forces as alleged by a number of dubat deserters who came/ before December 5th, to the headquarters of the Anglo-Ethiopian Commission, which took their evidence later;

2. On the report of Fitaorari Shiferra which, mentions the orders "A terra” and "fuoco" alleged to have been given in the ranks of the dubats, whereas, in the evidence given before the Commission of Conciliation and Arbitration and in particular according to Captain Cimmaruta’s statement, such orders are never given to dubats in Italian;

3. On the evidence of an Ethiopian sich-atfondant who was not an eye-witness of the beginning of th the fight, he himself declaring that, when lying in his tent, he heard 'threeshots one . _ after the other and seized his. rifle to pro­ ceed to the lines, during which time three " .bullets fell on his tent.

35. The.Italian version is based on the following :

1. The telegraphic ‘reports, dated December 6 th and 7th, 1934, from Commandant Montanari, the' military chief of the. area, to the Government of Somaliland, conveying the evidence of the dubats who were the only eye-witnesses of the . first events, and who state in particular that "an attack in for.ee, unexpectedly launched by the Ethiopians under the Fitaorari Tessamma, without any provocation on our part, compelled our dubats to fall back after a strenuous resistance”;

2. The report dated December l‘4th, 1934, from the Government of Somaliland to the Colonial Minis­ try at Rome, giving a summary of the information it had received by that date, according to which "an ascari of the Fitaorari Shiferra stood up and fired a shot in the air, which it seems was to serve as a signal, since it was immediately followed by a sharp fusillade on the part of the Ethiopians"; - 9 -

3.. The evidence, taken by the Commission of Con­ ciliation and Arbitration, in the absence of Italian officers and non-commissioned officers - since there were none on the spot at the time of the .engagement - of four dubats, all of whom are nos? non-commissioned officers but only one of whom was so at the time of the incident. They were at Walwal on December 5th, and state that they saw the first shot fired from the Ethiopian ranks, adding a new detail, namely, that the shot was fired at a sentry posted in a tree. These witnesses did not give their evidence until nearly nine months after the event; they did not specify whether the shot which they say they saw came from the Ethiopian ranks was fired intentionally or accidentally at the Italian sentinel or whether the latter's 'fall was due to a deliberate or an involuntary movement.

36. Consequently the Commission is inclined to think that this incident was due to an unfortunate chain of circum­ stances; the first shot might-have been accidental, like the numerous and frequent shots that preceded it. It is quite comprehensible that, in the nervous, excited and suspicious state of mind of the opposing troops, who had for two weeks been placed in a dangerous neighbourhood, this shot led to the regrettable results which ensued.

37. In these circumstances, the Comission, taking into account the limit of its powers under the resolution adopted by the Council of the League of Nations on August 3rd, finds :

1. That neither the Italian Government or its agents on the spot can be held responsible in any way for the actual Vfelwal incident; the allegations brought against them by the Ethiopian Government are disproved in particular b^* the many precautions taken by them to prevent any incident on the occasion of the assembling at Walwal of Ethiopian regular and irregular troops, and also by the absence of any interest on their part in provoking the engagement of December 5th; and

2. That although the Ethiopian Government also had no reasonable interest in provoking that engagement, its local authorities, by their attitude and particularly by the concen­ tration and maintenance, after the departure of the Anglo- Ethiopian Commission, of numerous troops in the proximity of the Italian line at Walwal, nay have given the impression that they had aggressive intentions - which would seem to render the Italian version plausible - but that nevertheless it had not been shown that they can be held responsible for the actual incident of December 5th.

INCIDENTS SUBSEQUENT TO DECEMBER 6th, 1934.

3R. From December 6th, 1934, to May 25th, 1935, various incidents occurred between the Italian and Ethiopian forces, seme following upon the Walwal incident, and others uncon­ nected with it. - 10 -

A careful examination of the facts alleged on-both sides shows that, of these incidents, the first-named, which followed upon the Walwal incident, were of an acci­ dental character, while the others were for the most part not serious and of very ordinary occurrence in the region in which they took place.

In these circumstances, the Commission is of opinion that in respect of these minor incidents no international responsibility need be involved.

In faith whereof the present decision has been done in duplicate and, after signature by the members of the Commission, has been communicated to the agents of the Parties.

Done and deliberated at Paris on September 3rd, 1935 .

(Signed) Politis.

Aldrovandi.

A. ue La Pradelle.

Montagna.

Pitman B. Potter.

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