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Strategy for Ukraine 2005-2007

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Strategy for Ukraine 2005-2007 Strategy For Ukraine 2005-2007 As approved by the Board of Directors on 17 May 2005 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.............................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined. 1 THE BANK’S PORTFOLIO ........................................................................................................7 1.1 OVERVIEW OVER BANK ACTIVITIES TO DATE....................................................................7 1.2 IMPLEMENTATION OF PREVIOUS COUNTRY STRATEGY..........................................................9 1.3 TRANSITION IMPACT OF THE BANK’S PORTFOLIO AND LESSONS LEARNED........................10 1.3.1 Financial Performance ..................................................................................................10 1.3.2. Mobilisation of Co-financing........................................................................................10 1.3.3 Transition Impact ..........................................................................................................10 1.3.4 Lessons Learned............................................................................................................11 1.4 PORTFOLIO RATIO..............................................................................................................11 2 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ..........................................................................................13 2.1 THE GENERAL REFORM ENVIRONMENT................................................................................13 2.1.1 Political developments ..................................................................................................13 2.1.2 Regional Integration......................................................................................................14 2.1.3 Social Conditions and Labour Issues ............................................................................15 2.1.4 Integrity issues ..............................................................................................................15 2.1.5 Legal reform..................................................................................................................16 2.2 PROGRESS IN TRANSITION AND THE ECONOMY'S RESPONSE................................................16 2.2.1 Macroeconomic conditions for Bank operations...........................................................16 2.2.2 Transition success and transition challenges.................................................................19 2.3 ACCESS TO CAPITAL AND INVESTMENT REQUIREMENTS......................................................24 3 STRATEGIC ORIENTATIONS ................................................................................................25 3.1 BANK’S PRIORITIES FOR THE STRATEGY PERIOD .................................................................25 3.2 SECTORAL CHALLENGES AND OPERATIONAL PRIORITIES ...................................................26 3.2.1 CORPORATES......................................................................................................................26 3.2.1.1 Agribusiness..................................................................................................................26 3.2.1.2 Manufacturing...............................................................................................................27 3.2.1.3 Property and Tourism....................................................................................................28 3.2.2 FINANCIAL SECTOR AND MICRO, SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISE FINANCE ............29 3.2.2.1 Banking Sector..............................................................................................................29 3.2.2.2 Microlending.................................................................................................................31 3.2.2.3 Non Bank Financial Institutions....................................................................................33 3.2.3 ENERGY ..............................................................................................................................34 3.2.3.1 Nuclear Safety and K2R4..............................................................................................35 3.2.3.2 Energy Efficiency..........................................................................................................37 3.2.3.3 Power ............................................................................................................................38 3.2.3.4 Natural Resources: Oil, Gas and Mining.......................................................................39 3.2.4 INFRASTRUCTURE...............................................................................................................40 3.2.4.3 Telecommunications .....................................................................................................43 4 OTHER IFIS AND MULTILATERAL DONORS ...................................................................45 4.1 IMF, THE WORLD BANK AND IFC .........................................................................................45 4.1.1 The IMF ........................................................................................................................45 4.1.2 The World Bank............................................................................................................45 4.1.3 IFC ................................................................................................................................46 4.2 MULTILATERAL DONORS .......................................................................................................46 4.2.1 European Union ............................................................................................................46 4.2.2 European Investment Bank ...........................................................................................47 4.2.3 United Nations ..............................................................................................................47 ANNEX 1 POLITICAL ASSESSMENT ...............................................................................................48 ANNEX 2 ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND PROSPECTS..............................................................54 ANNEX 3 LEGAL TRANSITION.......................................................................................................58 ANNEX 4 ENVIRONMENTAL DEVELOPMENTS...............................................................................67 ANNEX 5 SELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS .............................................................................70 ANNEX 6 SIGNED BANK PROJECTS AND PIPELINE.......................................................................71 I Signed Bank Projects as of 31 March 2005 – By Total Project Value..........................71 II Pipeline Stock as of 31 March 2005..............................................................................75 ANNEX 7 BILATERAL ASSISTANCE ...............................................................................................76 ANNEX 8 TC PROJECTS LINKED TO BANK ACTIVITIES IN UKRAINE..........................................81 2 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AIDS Auto Immune Deficiency Syndrome AML Anti Money Laundering BAS Business Advisory Service CEE Central and Eastern Europe CES Common Economic Space CIDA Canadian International Development Agency CPI Consumer Price Index CSF Chernobyl Shelter Fund EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development ED Environment Department of the EBRD ESCO Energy Services Company EU European Union EUR Euro FAO Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations FATF Financial Action Task Force of the OECD FDI Foreign Direct Investment FI Financial Institution FIG Financial and Industrial Group FUIB First Ukrainian International Bank GDP Gross Domestic Product G8 Group of eight Nations (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, UK, US) HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus IFC International Finance Corporation IFI International Financial Institution IMF InternationalMonetaryFund INOGATE Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe K2 The second reactor at Khmelnitsky Nuclear Power Plant MIS ManagementInformationSystem(s) MSE Micro or Small Enterprise NAK Ukraine Naftogaz NBU National Bank of Ukraine NPP Nuclear Power Plant NSA Nuclear Safety Account OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development OHS Occupational Health and Safety OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe PB Participating Bank PPP Purchasing Power Parity R4 The fourth reactor at Rivne Nuclear Power Plant SBA IMF Stand By Agreement SIMEST Italian Financial Institution for the development and promotion of Italian business abroad SIP Shelter Implementation Plan SME Small or Medium sized Enterprise TAM Turnaround Management TC Technical Co-operation TFP Trade Facilitation Programme TNK Tyumen Oil Company UAH Ukrainian Hryvna UMC Ukrainian Mobile Communications UMLP Ukraine Micro Lending Programme UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunications System USD United States Dollar VAT Value Added Tax WHR Warehouse Receipt WTO World Trade Organisation 3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Ukraine has come through a difficult political test and now stands at a critical juncture in its transition. The democratic election of President Viktor Yushchenko has re- affirmed Ukraine’s adherence to the principles of multiparty democracy and pluralism contained in Article 1 of the Agreement Establishing the Bank. The core institutions of democratic governance
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