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World Bank Document ICR00003501 Public Disclosure Authorized IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IBRD -4836-UA AND 8089-UA) ON LOANS Public Disclosure Authorized IN THE AMOUNT OF US$304.5 MILLION TO THE JOINT STOCK COMPANY “THE STATE EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF UKRAINE” WITH THE GUARANTEE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF UKRAINE FOR A SECOND EXPORT DEVELOPMENT PROJECT Public Disclosure Authorized JUNE 2015 Public Disclosure Authorized Finance and Markets Global Practice Europe and Central Asia Region 2 CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective May 18, 2015) Currency Unit UAH 1.00 = USD 0.0449 USD 1.00 = UAH 22.2472 FISCAL YEAR 2015 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AF Additional Financing CAR Capital Adequacy Ratio CAS Country Assistance Strategy CPS Country Partnership Strategy EDP2 Second Export Development Project EU European Union FIL Financial Intermediary Loan GDP Gross Domestic Product GOU Government of Ukraine IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ICB International Competitive Bidding ICR Implementation Completion and Results Report IFI International Financial Institution IFRS International Financial Reporting Standards ISR Implementation Status Report IT Information Technology M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MOF Ministry of Finance NPL Non-performing Loan PAD Project Appraisal Document PDO Project Development Objectives PBs Participating Banks PIU Project Implementation Unit ROA Return on Assets ROE Return on Equity UAH Ukrainian Hryvnia UAS Ukrainian Accounting Standards UEB Joint Stock Company The State Export Import Bank of Ukraine USD United States Dollar Vice President: Laura Tuck Country Director: Qimiao Fan Global Practice Manager: Aurora Ferrari Project Team Leader (at closure): Alexander Pankov ICR Team Leader: Colleen Mascenik 3 Ukraine Second Export Development Project Contents Overview Tables 4 Main Report 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design 9 1.1 Context at Appraisal 9 1.2 Original PDO and Key Indicators 11 1.3 Revised PDO 11 1.4 Main Beneficiaries 12 1.5 Original Components 12 1.6 Revised Components 13 1.7 Other Significant Changes 13 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 13 2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry 13 2.2 Implementation 15 2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation Design, Implementation and Utilization 19 2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance 20 2.5 Post-Completion Operation/Next Phase 21 3. Assessment of Outcomes 21 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation 21 3.2 Efficacy for Achievement of PDO 22 3.3 Efficacy of PDO 24 3.4 Overall Performance Rating 26 3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes, and Impacts 27 3.6 Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts 28 3.7 Summary Findings of Beneficiary Survey 28 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome 28 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance 29 5.1 Bank Performance 29 5.2 Borrower Performance 30 6. Lessons Learned 31 7. Comments on Issues Raise by Borrowers, IA 32 Annex 1. Additional Information 34 Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing 38 Annex 3. Outputs by Component 39 Annex 4. Beneficiary Enterprise Survey Results 40 Annex 5. Bank Lending and Implementation Support 44 Annex 6. Summary of Borrower’s ICR 46 4 A. Basic information Country Ukraine Project Name Second Export Development Project Project ID P095203 L/C/TF Number(s) IBRD-48360, IBRD- 80890 ICR Date April 29, 2015 ICR Type Core ICR Lending instrument FIL Borrower Joint Stock Company The State Export Import Bank of Ukraine Original Total USD 154.50 M Disbursed Amount USD 304.5 M Commitment Revised Amount USD 304.5 M Environmental Category: F, Financial Intermediary Assessment Implementing Agencies: Joint Stock Company The State Export Import Bank of Ukraine Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: B. Key Dates Process Date Process Date Concept Review 7/14/2005 Appraisal 3/10/2006 Board Approval 7/27/2006 Effectiveness 3/20/2007 Project Restructuring 5/29/2009 Board Approval of 8/25/2011 Additional Financing Project Restructuring 10/24/2011 Original Closing 12/31/2011 Revised Closing 12/31/2014 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes Satisfactory Risk to Development Outcome Substantial Bank Performance Satisfactory Borrower Performance Satisfactory C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings Quality at Entry Satisfactory Government Moderately Satisfactory Quality of Satisfactory Implementing Satisfactory Supervision Agency/Agencies Overall Bank Satisfactory Overall Borrower Satisfactory Performance Performance 5 C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators Implementation Indicators QAG Assessments Rating Performance (if any) Potential Problem No N/A Project at any time (Yes/No) Problem Project at No N/A any time (Yes/No) DO rating before Satisfactory Closing/Inactive status D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Banking 100 100 Theme Code (as % of Bank financing) Original Actual Export development and competitiveness 50 50 International financial standards and systems 25 25 Other private sector development 25 25 E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President Laura Tuck Shigeo Katsu Country Director Qimiao Fan Paul Bermingham Sector Manager Aurora Ferrari Gerardo Corrochano Project Team Leader Alexander Pankov Lalit Raina ICR Team Leader Colleen Mascenik F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objective (from Project Appraisal Document) The project’s development objective was to serve as a catalyst to support export and real sector growth in Ukraine during the EDP2 implementation period and beyond by a) providing medium- and long-term working capital and investment finance to private exporting enterprises to assist the Guarantor’s private exporting sector; and (b) further improving the ability of the banking sector through development of intermediation by expanding private financial institutions’ lending products. Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) N/A 6 (a) PDO Indicator(s)1 Indicator Baseline Value Original Target Formally Actual Value Value (from Revised Target Achieved at approval Values Completion or documents) Target Years Indicator 1. Volume of Bank lending cumulatively disbursed Value 0 USD154.5 mln USD304.5 mln USD304.5mln2 Date achieved 3/20/2007 6/30/2011 12/31/2014 12/31/2014 Comments (incl. Fully achieved: This project disbursed 100% of Bank financing by project % achievement) closing. Indicator 2. Outstanding loan portfolio Value 0 USD150 mln USD300 mln USD278.78 mln3 Date achieved 3/20/2007 6/30/2011 12/31/2014 12/31/2014 Comments (incl. Fully achieved: gross loan portfolio was USD300mln, fully disbursed less % achievement) front end fees. Due to repayments, the outstanding portfolio at project closing is USD 278.78mln. Indicator 3. Portfolio-at-risk of the Borrower Value 0% 0 2.00% Date achieved 12/31/2006 12/31/2014 12/31/2014 Comments (incl. Partially achieved: During most of the implementation period, EDP2 % achievement) portfolio achieved target of zero non-performing loans4. At end-2014 there were 2% of EDP2 outstanding loans categorized as portfolio-at-risk according to IFRS. Banks were taking more conservative approaches in 2H2014, although it is possible that repayment problems may become evident in 1H2015. Indicator 4. Financial sustainability of the Borrower (ROA) Value 2.34 1.00 -10.38 Date achieved 12/31/2006 12/31/2014 12/31/2014 Comments (incl. Not achieved: Due to prolonged financial and economic crisis in Ukraine, % achievement) banking system’s profitability has been under pressure. However, UEB’s ROA that was slightly stronger than the system’s average during most of implementation period, but finished 2014 worse than system average.5 1 Indicators for volume of lending disbursed, outstanding loan portfolio, and range of financial intermediaries’ participation were revised upon approval of Additional Financing on 8/25/2011. 2 Last disbursement from the Loan account (in amount of USD3,887,024.10) was done within grace period, on January 6, 2015. Indicator 1 includes: financing to exporters, IBRD front-end fees & UEB institutional development. 3 The outstanding loan portfolio is net of repayments by beneficiary enterprises. 4 In 2011 and 2013, by volume there were 0% NPLs in all three categories (Sub-standard, doubtful and loss), in 2012 there were 0.8% sub-standard and zero in other categories. 5 UEB’s ROA exceeded system average during most of recent years: Ukrexim’s ROA was 0.18, 0.17 and 0.22 percent at year-end 2011, 2012 and 2013, respectively. By comparison, the average for the banking sector during the same years was -0.76, 0.45, and 0.12. The system’s average ROA at end-2014 was -4.07. 7 (b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s) Indicator Baseline Value Original Target Formally Actual Value Value (from Revised Target Achieved at approval Values Completion or documents) Target Years Indicator 1. Export multiplier: Incremental average aggregate annual exports generated (measured over 3 years for all sub-borrowers) / total credit line disbursed Value 0 1.7-2.0 2.78 Date achieved 3/20/2007 12/31/2014 12/31/2014 Comments (incl. Fully achieved: Export multiplier exceeded target at end-2014 and during % achievement) most of the project implementation period, fell within target value range. In 2011 it was 1.76, in 2012 it was 2.02, and in 2013 it was 2.69, exceeding the target. It is important to consider these positive export dynamics against the overall country background: due to economic contraction in 2014, Russia’s restrictions on imports from Ukraine, and impact of conflict, Ukraine’s overall export revenues contracted by 37% in 2014. Indicator 2. Range of financial intermediaries’ participation: Number of PBs participating in EDP2 and their individual and combined market shares (revised under Additional Financing as: Increasing share of number of subprojects and amounts disbursed through PBs participating in EDP2 / total number of sub projects and total credit line disbursed) Value 100% wholesale 70% wholesale 40% wholesale PBs financed lending initially lending through lending through 41.79% of planned.
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