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Norman H. Davis and the Quest for Arms Control, 1931-1938

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Norman H. Davis and the Quest for Arms Control, 1931-1938 This dissertation has been 64—6916 microfilmed exactly as received IRVIN, Thomas Casey, 1927- NORMAN H. DAVIS AND THE QUEST FOR ARMS CONTROL, 1931-1938. The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1963 History, modern University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan CHAPTER I PROM PARTISAN POLE MIST TO BIPARTISAN DIPLOMATIST The story of the part played by the United States In International efforts from 1931 through early 1938 to disarm the world cannot be adequately told without due regard to the efforts of Norman H. Davis. Under two admini­ strations, those of Hoover and Roosevelt, Davis provided the continuity of American representation at every disarmament conference during the seven year span. He served under Hoover as a Democratic member of the bipartisan delegation to the World Disarmament Conference in 1932 and under Roosevelt as Chief American Delegate to the same conference In 1933* Davis was present in Geneva in May 193i*» when the full conference assembled for the last time, and still occupied the post of America's primary disarmament negoti­ ator at the final meeting of the Bureau of the Disarmament Conference in May 1937. Between formal sessions at Geneva he worked either behind the scenes to reconcile international differences or under the spotlights to achieve settlements of specific arms control issues. He succeeded in convincing Germany to return to the conference table in December 1933> tut failed 1 91 nature of his cabinet." Hoover, placing considerable emphasis on timing, admitted the advantage of proceeding with Herriot's support, but stressed the necessity of English backing at all costs. Advised that Davis had an appointment with MacDonald that evening, Hoover left him to his own devices as regarded a meeting with Herriot, while Stimson added a note of caution on dealing with the French Premier because of the notorious reputation of the French for leaking stories to the press. The domestic and international political situations also hovered over the discussions of a potential postpone­ ment of the conference. Hoover told Davis and Gibson he would accept the responsibility for such a proposal, but Davis questioned the necessity for adjournment, if an agreement could be achieved in thirty days. Hoover's only fear centered around the question of re-negotiating the various national policies during the American election campaign. "If there is going to be an adjustment," the Chief Executive told Davis, ". with nothing in front of us, then Lord help them at Lausanne." In other words, if the European nations answered the Geneva proposals equivo­ cally and without a firm prospect of post-election success and then adjourned the Lausanne Conference with a recom­ mendation for cancelling both debts and reparations, American public reaction against the questions of both 92 debts and reparations could be disastrous. Davis Inter­ jected that the Europeans had been upset that these two issues were not a part of the Republican platform and Hoover replied that they had been omitted at his Insistence to avoid "difficulty for the whole world conflict." "I want to be indiscreet enough," Davis told him, "to con­ gratulate you on that platform. ^Verbatim transcript of telephone conversation between the President, the Secretary of State, Gibson and Davis, June 19* 1932 at I4.s30 PM (Geneva time); Davis Papers* The content of this message has been recorded at length here because of several discrepancies between it and the "Memorandum by the Secretary of State," FR, 1932, I, 189- 191. For example, Stlmson omits or mis-states the following important factors: a. The Presidents stress on American assumption of an "offensive position" at Geneva; b. The Presidents emphasis on the importance of Davis* position with respect to the lmnediate negotiations and to the prospective domestic acceptance of positive results; c. Davis' emphasis on the urgent necessity for MacDonald's support, although Stimson took credit himself for three years of constant effort to build up Anglo-American cooperation, the latest endeavor having been on his trip to Geneva; d. Davis scepticism about Herriot's cabinet is summed up in a statement that "the French were talking much more favorably about land forces," thereby conveying the impression that Davis suggested the French would be friendly to the American Plan, when the contrary was true. e. Rather than b^ing "guided somewhat by what happens with him LMacDonaldJ tonight," with respect to a contact with Harriot, the consensus is stated by Stimson that Davis and Gibson should go Lausanne, "even at the risk of creating comment, L r&the0 than to lose a day and to see Herriot there." Stimson did not leave the matter up to Davis as Hoover did. All these points are mentioned not to attack the accuracy 93 All in all, the leading Democratic delegate to Geneva wholeheartedly supported his Republican Chief Executive on the questions of separating the arms control issue from that of debts-reparations. It is difficult to conceive that either of them was naive enough to believe profoundly in the wisdom of the action. The President, however, was bound not only by his personal inclination toward pacifism, but more importantly by the force of public opinion. Davis, on the other hand, was possibly a prisoner of his official duties, yet this did not exonerate him of the responsibility for rendering constructive criticism of the idea. Nevertheless, Davis had considerable work before him, as did the whole delegation, because the President wanted all the details on the plan’s release worked out within forty-eight hours. The initial phase of negotiations involved accept­ ance by England and Prance of the general outline of the American plan, since Hoover had agreed originally to entertain some alterations of details, but he "did not want it whittled away too r a u c h . " U l MacDonald, when contacted by Davis and Gibson, grasped the significance of of the Secretary’s memorandum, which may have been written hours after the conversation, but merely to defend the initial premise of this study, namely, the significance of the role of Norman Davis at Geneva. the proposal immediately and approved the land and air reductions. As concerned the navy, however, he voiced concern because of both the delicate balance achieved in the London agreements and the ticklish nature of the Par East situation. He pleaded the necessity for further con­ sideration before offering a final d e c i s i o n . ^-2 Harriot, on the other hand, welcomed the consultation, but waa alarmed at the prospect of another difficult problem, when Germany and Italy with England’s support were pressing him for cancellation of reparations at Lausanne. On one point at least, the French Premier was candid and clear: he would accept no reduction of land effectives. Discussion of the Harriot talks between Stimson, Gibson and Davis, later the same day, cast a completely new light upon the Hoover Plan and its potential effect on both Geneva and Washington. French rejection of reduced land forces dampened Gibson’s enthusiasm, which had been pre­ dicated upon securing joint French-English support. He now questioned the value of even presenting the plan to the conference. "There is a new situation here," he advised Stimson. The Secretary recalled that this had been his initial fear: "You are now coming back to my original view--don’t you see? You must be able to understand the ^2FR. 1932. I, 19l|.. 95 situation as it is here." Perhaps Gibson and Davis did "understand," but then in a rather strange, somewhat in­ explicable remark, Stimson added: Now you know that we want to get a good reason to stop the conference. Did you understand that the other day? Hi* real purpose is to get a good reason for an adjournment. Consequently, Stimson relented and, at Davis' insistence, granted him one more day to confer with MacDonald in an effort to obtain English support.^-3 But at no juncture in this entire conversation did Stimson elaborate upon his highly opaque observation. Was the President really playing politics with world disarmament? Perhaps he had only become unnerved because of the European linkage of the debt-reparations questions to arras control. Or did he perceive a means to translate a Geneva failure into political gain? ^Verbatim transcript of telephone conversation between Stimson, Gibson and Davis, June 21, 1932 at 1:20 AM (Geneva time); Davis Papers. Note that in FR. 1932. I, 195* Stimson cites a telephone conversation '*this evening," although the memorandum is listed as not printed. The inconsistent dates, Stimson*s communication is dated June 20, while the transcript is dated June 21, result from the time differential between Geneva and Washington. The key to the identification lies in Stimson1s reference to Gibson's reversal of attitude with respect to presenta­ tion of the plan at Geneva. There may also be an error on p. 195 in a cross reference to an interview with Herriot, cited at pp. 171 and 172, since the transcript from the Davis Papers reported a conversation with Herriot in which he actually rejected the American Plan. 96 Unfortunately, Stimson spoke only in innuendoes. And Gibson and Davis diplomatically refrained from comment. The demeanor of all three raises still another question: Was Hoover making a grand gesture at Geneva, but, in so doing, forcing the conference into a position that Prance, at any rate, would find impossible to accept? The economic heart of the Hoover Plan was the saving of two hundred million dollars a year by the United States alone plus a saving to the world of some fifteen billion over a period of ten years.^ The popular effect of this might confront Prance with a decision between either accepting disarmament and then paying her United States debts out of the savings or refusing disarmament and then attempting to bargain on debts from a more vulnerable standpoint.
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