Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies Vol. 39, No. 2, March 1991
Two Types of Vikalpa asserted by Jnanarimitra
Kyo KANO
0 Since the publication of the works edited by Prof. A. Thakurl), not much study has been dedicated to the works of Jnanasrimitra, who flouri- shed in the monastery of Vikramasila in the early 11th century and was one of the great masters of later Indian Buddhism. Among the twelve works attributed to him, the Isvaravada is one of his major works, along with the Ksanabhangadhyayah and the S'akarasiddhisastram. That he devoted such a long work to Isvaravada was not only because Isvaravadins were inescapable and perpetual opponents of the Buddhists, but also because logical problems concerning the establishment of the existence of God (Isvara) presented fundamental problems for Buddhist epistemology and logic. Jnanasrimitra, in fact, has pointed out some logical fallacies in the assertions of the Naiya- yikas, and furthermore, taking this opportunity, he concretely elucidated how invariable concomitance (vyapti) is determined. This topic is mentioned only abstractly in other works such as the Vyapticarca. In other words, logical and epistemological problems of the Isvaravada served as an object of one important application of the basic logical and epistemological the- ories of Buddhism, such as pratyaksa, anumana, vyapti, apoha, and so forth. Hence the value of the basic theories was judged through its application to the Isvaravada. Jnanasrimitra's criticism of Isvaravada consists of three parts. 1) purvapaksasamksepah (pp. 233-242) 2) isvaravadadhikare samksepadusanam (pp. 243-262) 3) varttikasaptaslokivyakhyanam (pp. 265-316) In the present paper I would like to take up one specific theory found in 2) and 3). 1 The Naiyayika's view, which Jnanasrimitra's refutation presupposes, is
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crystallized in the following syllogism: (assertion) Mountains and other things, which are the objects of our discussion, presuppose the existence of an intelligent creator, (reason) because they are effects. (example) Whatever is an effect presupposes the existence of an intelligent creator, like pots2).
between effectness and the presupposition of the existence of an intelligent creator. In other words, as Ratnakirti clearly declared", some effects have invariable concomitance with the presupposition of the existence of an intelligent creator, but not all effects. Jnanasrimitra followed this idea of Dharmakirti. However, Dharmakirti's argument contains some more important problems. Following Dharmakirti's idea, Jnanasrimitra presented his own arguments against the Isvaravada in his commentary to the verse above and in his original statements. In this paper I shall take up one of Jnanasrimi- tra's points, namely, the two vikalpas. 2 The two types of vikalpa are mentioned where he stated the process of invariable concomitance (vyapti). Jnanasrimitra stated as follows:
The activity of understanding a causal relation, namely perception and non-perce- ption, refers to some specific species of effect, not to aspecies of effect in general. That is to say, immediately after the activity of perception and non-perception, the verbal expression of the causal relation is given, referring to two specified species through rejecting other species of cause and effect, something which is white and makes our eyes or throat change by attaching to them (=smoke)
-1019- (37) Two Types of Vikalpa asserted by Jnanasrimitra (K. KANO) comes from such a specified thing the nature of which in is blaze up and be bright (=fire).4) This statement seems to be a natural explanation, but it contains some important problems. With reference to this problem, Jnanasrimitra continues: ... Therefore, it is not to be objected that the understanding of invariable con- comitance is concerned with a restricted realm of objects like the experience of deviation. Pure identification (suddhaikapratyavamarsa) is performed by discri- minating (objects other than the object in question). And just for this reason pure identification is relevant to the understanding of causal relations, but limi- ted (discrimination] is not.5) After these statements, Jnanasrimitra explains "suddhavikalpa" and "aupa- dhikavikalpa" in detail. He says: There is, in fact, discrimination common to children and animals, which depends only upon knowledge obtained through a pure observation of objects (without any preliminary judgment), and on the basis of which animals also ascertain some efficiencies in an object and come to act on or to avoid it. We call such (discrimination) pure (discrimination) or natural (discrimination).6) On the other hand, there is an other discrimination, which arises from observa- tion supported by recollection of verbal convention (samketa). For instance, a man looking at lampblack which comes from a lamp discriminates that this black substance can be applied to the eyelashes. This kind of discrimination arises from a direct experience accompanied by recollection of efficient operation (arthakriya) experienced before. We call this type (of discrimination) limited (discrimination) (discrimination of limited aspect).7) Given the case that we see a pot produced by a man, in the same way that we discriminate "this pot is produced by us," it is easy for us to discriminate that "this effect is produced by us," but (the latter) is not a natural (discrimina- tion)...8) Pure identification (suddhadhyavasaya) fulfills a purpose by expressing the species itself without conceptual consideration of the other aspects such as effec- tness or whiteness which inhere also in the other species, (and without conceptual consideration) which is accompanied by recollections of previous actions such as a understanding. of the relation (of the word and object) by verbal convention (samketa) and so forth. Like (the discrimination of) babies and the like.) -1018- Two Types of Vikalpa asserted by Jnanasrimitra (K. KANO) (38)
In short, the judgment which operates at the time of deciding invaria- ble concomitance must be pure discrimination, and the judgment made between effect in general and the presupposition of the existence of an intelligent creator is not a pure one. Therefore, Jnanasrimitra argues that in this case invariable concomitance cannot be rightly applied. 3 Then, on what point do these two discriminations fundamentally differ from each other? The above statements of Jnanasrimitra can be arranged as follows: A) Pure discrimination (suddhavikalpa, svabhavikavikalpa, naisargika)
-1017- (39) Two Types of Vikalpa asserted by Jnanasrimitra (K. KANO) such as effectness or whiteness which inheres also in the other spiecies, accompanied by recollections of previous actions such as grasping the relation Cof the word and object) by verbal convention (samketa), and so forth. The difference between the characters of the two discriminations may be summed up as follows: A) Pure discrimination 1) It -arises after perception. 2) It depends. only upon the thing in question, which appears as the object of the observation and is acting to fulfill a purpose. 3) It presupposes no conception besides a defining conception. 4) It identifies the species itself, and to this extent it is accompanied by recollections. 5) It decides invariable concomitance (vyapti) as a causal relation, and leads us to effective action. B) Limited discrimination 1) It recollects and discriminates a limited aspect common to the other species, which concerns itself with the other causal efficiency rather than intrinsic (essential) efficiency of the species of the object under observation, by means of verbal convention recollected thro- ugh the object in question. 4 The identification (ekadhyavasaya, ekapratyavamarsa) which is referred to in the statement of the "pure discrimination" is, as has already been pointed out by Prof. Katsurail), nothing but so-called "perceptual judgment." Dharmakirti did not regard this as a means of valid cognition (pramana), since it arises immediately after a perception and identifies the perceived object, so that it has a validity but it does not bring about new information. Prof. Katsura shows the main characteristics of perceptual judgment according to Dharmakirti to be as follows: 1) It is conceptual knowledge which arises immediately after perception. 2) It designates and identifies the objectt, taking the form: "This is A." 3) It has a general aspect (samanyalaksana) like 'potness' as a direct object.
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4) It leads us to effective action and prevents us from misjudgment. 5) It is regarded as recollection in the respect of re-recognizing the fact that is already grasped by perception. Pure discrimination apparently has some features in common with perc- eptual judgment. It is therefore natural that Jnanasrimitra used the word "ekadhyavasaya" in his statement of "suddhavikalpa". However, while perceptual judgment takes the form "This is A", and discriminates one aspect of the object, pure discrimination takes the form "This A is B", and decides the relation between one aspect and one character of the object. We may presume that the pure discrimination discussed by Jnanasrimitra is an idea of perceptual judgment somewhat developed from the identification of 'one factor to that of two factors. However, what does one and the same effective operation (ekarthakriya, ekasadhya, tatkarya, etc.) mean exactly in the case of perceptual judgment? In other words, "Limited discrimination" may also have characteristics in common with perceptual judgment depending on the content of the effective operation in question. Because the two discrimina- tions have in common the aspect of being accompanied by recollection. In this connection we encounter a problem of what kind of "rupa" is meant in the phrase "rupena kenacit"12), for instance, mentioned by Dharmakirti in PV, in reference to perceptual judgment. Dharmakirti's statement suggests that he may have had the idea that this "rupa" indicates one characteristic aspect of the object under observation. However, it is quite natural that in his idea of the perceptual judgment, B or the relation of A and B did not come into question, in so far as the perceptual judgment takes the form of "This is A" and not "This A is B". The essential difference of "suddha- vikalpa" and "aupadhikavikalpa" lies in whether both these two elements A and B are observed appearance (rupa) and an effective operation (arthakriya) of the object, and this appearance essentially deciding the relation of these two elements (in the case of suddhavikalpa), or whether one of them or both of them are related to a restricted or a limited aspect of the object under observation (in the case of aupadhikavikaapa). So long as the invariable conco- mitance (vyapti) of the causal relation must be based upon real facts
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(vastu), as Jnanasrimitra asserted himself, it is natural that these two eleme- nts are appearing aspects themselves of the object under observation. Thus we may rightly say that the two vikalpas explained by Jnanasrimitra are the developed and restricted ideas of perceptual judgment. Before Dharmakirti, Dignaga in his Pramanasamuccaya stated as follows: The inferential mark (linga) has many properties in itself, but it makes us recognize (the object which has an inferential mark (lingin)) only by means of a characteristic mark (rupa, dharma) which never deviates from the marked object. (PS 2.17) Jnanasrimitra's "suddhavikalpa" can be regarded as one response to the question of how the "rupa, dharma" in the verse above is correctly deter- mined in the context of causal relation by means of conceptual judgment (vikalpa). Jnanasrimitra clarified "pure discrimination" as the point of intersection between the decision of invariable concomitance in the causal relation and the theory of "apoha", and thus making clear the relation between these two theories, he sharply pointed out a logical fallacy of the Naiyayika's proof of the existence of God.
1) Jnanasrimitranibandhavalih (JNA), ed. by A. Thakur, Patna, Jayaswal Rese- arch Institute, 1959, 19872. 2) JNA p. 2335-6. 3) Cf. Ratnakirtinibandhavalih ed. by A. Thakur, Patna, Jayaswal Reseach Ins- titute, 19752, p. 5114, 16: iha khalu dve karyatve. karyamatram. visistam ca.... 4) JNA p. 2469-13 5) JNA p. 2482-4 6) JNA p. 2485-6 7) JNA p. 2488-10 8) JNA p. 24819-20 9) JNA p. 24826-2491 10) Cf. JNA p. 24823-24 na, tanmatravikalpane smaranasya aprayojakatvat. 11) Shoryu Katsura, "Chikaku-handan, giji-chikaku, sezoku-chi (perceptual jud- gment, pseudo perception, vulgar knowledge)" Fujita-Kotatsu-hakushi kanre- kikinenronshu, Indo-tetsugaku-to-bukkyo' 1989, pp. 533-553. See also S. Katsura, "Dharmakirti's Theory of Truth", Journal of Indian Philosophy, vol. 12, 1984,
pp. 215-235. Cf. Th. Stcherbatsky. "Buddhist Logic" Vol. 1, 1962, pp. 204-223. 12) PV. 1.69: taya samvrtananarthah samvrtya bhedinah svayam/ abhedina ivabhanti bhava rupena kenacit//
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