Theories of Inference : Some Critical Reflections on Bauddha- Nyaya Controversy

Theories of Inference : Some Critical Reflections On Bauddha- Nyaya Controversy Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Arts) in PhilosopHy' ~ a~ Submitted by Sm. Arati Banik Under the Supervision of Prof. Raghunath Ghosh University of North Bengal 2012 261456 1B AUG 2013 CONTENTS Acknowledgement i Preface ii-iii Chapter One : Introduction 1-47 1. Inference as a valid form of cognition 1 u. Classification of Inference 9 111. Utility of Inference in our daily life. 30 Chapter Two : The Nyaya Theory of Inference 48-90 i) Definition of Inference as given by Old & New logicians 48 ii) The first and second definition ofVyapti 53 iii) The Concept of Paramarsa in Nyaya Logic 71 iv) The Concept ofTarka 75 v) The Cont.ept of Logical Fallacies (Hetvabhasa) 79 Chapter Three: The Buddhists Notion of Inference 91-170 i) Refutation of Inference by the Carvakas 91 ii) Justification of Inference as a pramaJ)a from Sarhkhya, Jaina, Bauddha and Nyaya Standpoints. 100 iii) Buddhists Theory ofPerception 107 iv) Buddhistic Conception of inference 112 v) Inference for One Self 114 vi) Inference for Others 14 3 Chapter Four : Some Problems concerning the theories of Inference forwarded by the Naiyayikas and the Buddhists. 171-187 Bibliography 188-195 Acknowledgement I greatly acknowledge my indebtness to my beloved parents, teachers, colleagues and wellwishers whose constant encouragement has given me inpetus to complete the work. I am specially grateful to my supervisor Professor Raghunath Ghosh, Dept of Philosophy, North Bengal University for his constant inspiration and time to time much needed valuable guidances without which this thesis would not have come into existence. I would like to express my sincere thanks to Prof. Kantilal Das and Prof. Jyotish Chandra Basak of North Bengal University for their valuable suggestions. I express thanks to Dr. Manas Kr. Adhikary, Principal of my college for rendering his all types of co-operation and constant inspiration and encouragement for completion of my thesis. Special thanks to librarian of my college who time to time norture my work in supplying various important books and journals for upgrading my thesis. I express my thanks with gratitude to library section of North Bengal Unviersity from where I have collected many important books and up to date journals for incorporating them in the thesis. I really indebted to my son and daughter who constantly inspired me for completion of thesis and they greatly helped in the compilation, checking during the course of typing job. Preface In the present thesis the subject matter of the discussion is the comparative study between the Naiyayikas and the Buddhists regarding the nature of inference, its varieties and means for ascertaining vyapti etc. A general discussion about the Pramana and Anumana in general has made in this connection. There is a subtle distinction between the views of the Naiyayikas and those of the Buddhists regarding pramana and anumana. The Naiyayikas accepted four prama9-as. On the other hand Buddhist accepted two pramaqas, which are Pratyak~a and anumana, three characteristics of hetu. It has been shown that how the theories like momentariness, non-existence of a permanent soul etc. work behind the formulation of the nature of inference by the Buddhists. It can be said that there is the long-lasting debate between the Naiyayikas and the Buddhist Philosophers in the history of Indian Philosophy. Dignaga, the father of medieval Buddhist logic flourished in the fifth century A.D. and made a great effort to refute the Naiyayika's views. The systematic Buddhist logic comes from Dignaga and there after follows Dharmakirti, Santarak~ita, VinTti:ldeva, Kumalasila and other. The old Naiyayikas presented many arguments against the attack of Dignaga and other Buddhist logicians to establish the N~ayika' s views. Later Dharmakirti also flourished as the opponent party of the Naiyayikas. Among the Naiyayikas who tried to refute the views of Dharmakirti and other Buddhist logicians especially remarkable Is Jayanta BhaHa in the tenth century A.D. Uddyotakara and Vacaspati Misra in Nyaya mafijuri criticised the definition of Anumana and Prama':la (valid knowledge) as given by Dharmakirti and others. He also tried to refute the Bhuddhist' s 11 acceptance of only two means of right knowledge. The old Naiyayika Vacaspati Misra, the author of Nyiiya - Viirtika - tiitparya-tikii criticised Dharmakirti in the middle of ninth Century A.D. So it can be said that richness in Indian logic is a result of the long lasting debate among the philosophers like Naiyayikas and Buddhists. In the present thesis there will be an effort to present how the Naiyayikas have presented their views and how the Buddhist views may be refuted and what are their weak points. It is hoped that through investigation we will be able to provide much information which are not yet well known in the world of scholars. As the field of this research is very wide and I have to finish the work in a limited time, I have confined by investigation into the Naiyayikas and the Buddhists especially Dharmakirti about Anumiina and Pramiina.. Most of the Indian Philosophical texts are originally composed in Sanskrit. Many Sanskrit texts are not yet translated into English because of the lack of the understanding of its difficult terminology, such as Nyiiya- Viirtika tat - parya tikii of Vacaspati Misra is yet to be translated into English for its difficulty. My research work is mainly based on Sanskrit texts, for this reason I had to depend on Sanskrit teachers and I have tried to maintain the original meaning of text through the English translation with my little knowledge. I apologize for the fact that sometimes I had to overlook the proper way of English construction for keeping the original idea of the text. Jayanta Bhaga's Nyaya maiijuri helped very much for my research work. I acknowledge hereby that I have taken help from the translation of vartika by Ganganath Jhan. iii CHAPTER -1 INTRODUCTION Inference as a valid form of cognition According to Naiyayikas imperceptible condition that may be in case of the invariable relation between any kind of smoke and that of fire can be avoided with the help of Vipalcya Biidhaka Tarka related to causality. Vipa~a Biidhaka Tarka related to causality is such - if there is no invariable relation between smoke and fire, smoke will not be produced by fire. But smoke is produced by fire. So smoke must be invariably concomitant with fire. The invariable concomitance related to causality which is the base of Tarka is 'that what is produced by that is invariably concomitant with that' That condition which is apprehended in case of invariable concomitance, same kind of apprehension can be made in the case of the invariable concomitance which is the base of Tarka. If it is apprehended that smoke is produced without fire, satisfaction will come without food. But it is admitted, there will be practical obstruction in case of Pratyalcya Pramii1Ja. So this is possible to ascertain the invariable concomitance between smoke and fire and there is no apprehension of imperceptible condition. In the Nyiiya Maiijuri, Jayanta Bhatta has admitted the practical utility of inference. In any society all men infer at every step, though they are not aware that they infer. Such kind of spontaneous inference occurs in case of the child though they are not acquainted with any process of the 1 inference. Farmers also infer about paddy crops through the clue of a probans or reason. Even the child can infer the primary relation between the word and its meaning by observing the verbal usage of the old people. If there is no solid ground in the context of lecture, that lecture can never attractive to any man whether he is educated or uneducated. When we advise our relatives to do anything, we have to support that advice with the help of some arguments so that the advice can be effective. Now we shall determine the definition of inference. The word 'Anumana' is constituted with two words 'Anu' and 'Mana' The meaning of the word 'Anu' is 'after' and the meaning of the word 'Mana' is knowledge So the etymological meaning of the word 'Anumana' is the Knowledge which succeeds another knowledge. After perceiving the smoke in the hill the knowledge of fire is possible. Here the preceding knowledge is perceptual knowledge. 'The knowledge of fire'- this later knowledge is inference. Vatsyayana in his book 'Nyaya Bha$ya' describes inference in this way - 'Tatpurbakanumanam '. Here perception has been mentioned by the word 'Tat' Therefore it is said that inference always follows perception. The famous example of the inference of Naiyayikas is 'The hill is fiery as it has smoke' In this inference 'smoke' is probans. The probans is that by which something is inferred. Fire is inferred with the help of the probans named 'smoke' Fire is probandum. That which is inferred in the subject is probandum. Fire is probandum as it is inferred about fire. The place where fire is inferred is 'the hill'. 'The hill' is pak$a. The place where there is doubt about probandum is called pak$a. Because before inference there is doubt about fire which is the feature of the 2 probandum. So it follows that in the pak~a 'hill' is inferred the probandum 'fire' is inferred by the probans 'smoke'. Here there arises a question that we infer fire by perceiving 'smoke', but why do we not infer water? In response to this we may say that as smoke and fire always remain in the same place, we infer fire by perceiving smoke. That is as smoke and fire always reside in the same locus there is concomitance rule or the relation of universal concomitance between them.

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