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1 Personal Details Principal Investigator Prof. A. Raghuramaraju 1 Personal Details Principal Investigator Prof. A. Raghuramaraju Department of Philosophy, University of Hyderabad Paper Coordinator Prof. Raghunath Ghosh Department of Philosophy, University of North Bengal Content Writer Prof. Ranjana Mukherjee Retired Professor of Philosophy, Rabindra Bharati University Content Reviewer Prof. Pradeep Gokhale Central University of Tibetan Studies, Sarnath Language Editor Mr. Raghavendra Harnoor Freelancer, Hyderabad Description of Module Paper Name Epistemology-II Subject Name Philosophy Module Name/ Title The Concept of Vyāpti in earlier Nyāya Module Id 6.26 Prerequisites General understanding of the invariable relation technically called vyāpti in Indian form of Inference. Objectives To generate an awareness among scholars regarding Indian concept of vyāpti and its importance in Anumāna. Key words Sāhacaryaniyama, avyabhicārī sambandha, sadhyavadanya, kevalānavayī 2 The Concept of Vyapti in earlier Nyaya The general meaning of Vyāpti is the state of pervasion. It implies a co-relation between two facts of which one is pervaded (vyāpya) and the other pervades (vyāpaka). One is said to pervade another when it accompanies the other. And one is said to be pervaded by another when it is accompanied by the other. In this sense, smoke is pervaded by fire as it is always accompanied by fire but all the fiery objects are not smoky. This relation of vyāpti (i.e., the relation of invariable concomitance between the hetu and the sādhya) is the logical ground of anumiti (inference). In inference, our knowledge of the sādhya (the thing to be inferred) as related to the pakşa (the subject of inference), depends on the cognition of the hetu (the smoke) in the pakşa (the hill). That there is fire in the hill is a conclusion which we can know only if we know that there is an invariable concomitance between smoke and fire. Annambhatta opines that the invariability remaining in the coexistence between hetu (smoke) and sādhya (fire) in the form: ‘wherever there is smoke there is fire’ is called vyāpti or invariable concomitance (yatra dhūmastatravahniriti sāhacaryaniyamo vyāptih). Between fire and smoke there is no doubt coexistence called sāhacarya, but it has not become a niyama, i.e., invariable having vitiated by one or two exceptional cases which are called vybhicārī cases, e.g., red-hot iron ball, electric heater etc. The Vyāpti relation is called avyabhicārī sambandha, i.e., a relation not vitiated by deviation. Vyāpti is otherwise called by the Buddhists ‘avinābhāva’ which also shows an affinity between vyāpti and avinābhāva. The term ‘vinābhāva’ means ‘remaining without the other’ and 'avinābhāva’ means ‘not remaining without the other’. For example, smoke cannot remain without the association of fire and hence an invariable relation called vyapti. Viśvanātha has given the following preliminary definition of vyāpti. The first definition (lakşaņa) of Vyāpti is sādhyavadanyasminnasambandha, i.e., the invariable concomitance is described as the absence of relation of the mark (hetu) to anything which is different from the substratum of the thing to be inferred (sādhya). For example, ‘The hill has fire, because it has smoke’, ‘fire’ is the thing to be inferred, ‘a kitchen’ etc. are objects having the thing to be inferred, ‘a lake’ etc. are objects other than the kitchen etc., ‘smoke’ is the mark and ‘the hill’ is the subject of inference. Now the smoke is absent in the lake, etc., which are objects other than the thing to be inferred. Hence the definition is applicable.1 1 ParvatahVahnimāndhūmāt.Pakşa = parvatah Sādhya = vahni hetu = dhūmah Sādhyavat = mahānasa etc. Sādhyavadanya – jalahrada. Now dhūma, i.e., hetu,is absent in jalahrada which is other than the places like mahānasa(sādhyavat). The definition is applicable, as it is a sathetusthala. 3 Let us take another fallacious inference like ‘The hill has smoke, because it has fire’, ‘smoke’ is the thing to be inferred; ‘kitchen’ etc. are objects having the thing to be inferred; ‘a heated iron ball’ is the object other than the kitchen etc. ‘fire' is the mark and ‘the hill’ is the subject of inference. Now fire is present in objects other than the thing to be inferred, viz., in a heated iron ball, i.e., smoke is absent and fire is present. Hence the definition is good enough to exclude such fallacious cases.2 Now the question before us is: how should we interpret the expression the locus of the thing to be inferred (sādhyavat)? Should we accept any and every relation by which the thing to be inferred abides in its substratum? If we do so, then the definition would be too narrow. For example, ‘The hill has fire’, because it has 'smoke’. We can take parts of fire as the substratum of fire, because fire as a whole abides in its parts by the relation of inherence.3 In order to avoid this defect it is essential to interpret ‘locus of sādhya’ (sādhyavat) in a different manner. The locus has to be taken through the limiting relation of sādhyatā (sādhyatāvachhedakasambandha),andnot arbitrarily. The relation remaining in between sādhya and pakşa is called limiting relation of sādhyatā. In this context such relation is contact or samyoga, but not inherence or samavāya, because between fire and hill there is the relation called samyoga. If it is so, then ‘a part of fire’ cannot be taken as a locus of sādhya. As a locus we can take kitchen, field etc. and different from is water, lake, etc., and hence there does not occur any defect of avyāpti. The meaning of the term ‘sādhyavadanya’ is difference4 or mutual non-existence, the counter positiveness5 of which is characterized6 by the possession of just the thing to be inferred. Otherwise, the definition would be too narrow. Let us explain this with the help of an example. ‘The hill has fire, because it has smoke’, if in this case, by the expression ‘things other than the possessors of the thing to be inferred’ we mean just what is different from the substratum of the thing to be inferred, then we can take cowshed etc. as things other than the substratum of the thing to be inferred. But smoke is present there. Hence lake etc. would be the things other than the possessors of the thing to be inferred, because here the 2 ParvatahdhūmavānvahnehPakşa = parvatah Sādhya = dhūma hetu = vahni sādhyavat = mahānasa etc. sādhyavadanya = taptaayahpinda Now vahni (hetu) is present in tapta ayah pinda which is other than the sādhya. The definition is not applicable as it is an asathetusthala. 3 Since according to Naiyāyika the relation between parts and the whole is the relation of inherence. 4 That is, a broad distinction of the form ‘It has not the thing to be inferred’ (sādhyavān na) 5 An attribute of the counter positive 6 Having the thing to be inferred as such, neither more nor less, otherwise definition would be futile. 4 counter positiveness of the non-existence is characterized by the possession of just the thing to be inferred and the definition is intact7. Now in the inferential cognition of the form ‘The hill has fire, because it has smoke’, the parts of smoke can be taken as the things other than the thing to be inferred8 because here the counter-positiveness of the non-existence is characterized by the possession of just the thing to be inferred. But the smoke is present by the relation of inherence in its parts and as a result the definition becomes too narrow. In order to remove the extreme narrowness of the definition it is suggested that the absence of the mark in objects other than those having the thing to be inferred is to be understood in respect of the relation that the mark bears to the subject of inference. Smoke (the mark) is present in the hill (the subject of inference) by the relation of conjunction. So the absence of smoke in things other than the thing to be inferred is to be understood by the relation of conjunction. Although smoke is present by the relation of inherence in its parts, there is no harm as smoke is not present in its parts by the relation of conjunction. Here lake etc. are the things other than the possessors of the thing to be inferred, for smoke is absent in lake by the relation of conjunction. The absence of mark in objects other than those having the thing to be inferred is to be understood not only in respect of particular objects, but only in respect of objects in general. Otherwise, the definition would be applicable to the fallacious inference, ‘The hill has smoke, because it has fire’. Fire is not present in a lake etc which are objects other than those having the thing to be inferred, the definition is too wide. But this is not correct. Although fire is absent in a lake, it is present in a red-hot iron ball which is also an object other than the thing to be inferred, smoke. Hence the invariable concomitance between fire and smoke is vitiated. Again the definition of invariable concomitance (vyāpti) is not applicable to inferential cognition of the form ‘It is a substance, because it has existence possessed of difference from that of qualities and actions.9 ‘Substance-hood’ is the thing to be inferred and ‘existence possessed of difference from that of qualities and actions is the mark and it inheres in substance only. Substance is the substratum of substance-hood and things other than the thing to be inferred are quality and action. As qualified existence (existence possessed of difference from that of qualities and actions) and pure existence are one, so existence (mark) inheres in quality and action as well as in substance.
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