Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies Vol. 39, No. 2, March 1991 Two Types of Vikalpa asserted by Jnanarimitra Kyo KANO 0 Since the publication of the works edited by Prof. A. Thakurl), not much study has been dedicated to the works of Jnanasrimitra, who flouri- shed in the monastery of Vikramasila in the early 11th century and was one of the great masters of later Indian Buddhism. Among the twelve works attributed to him, the Isvaravada is one of his major works, along with the Ksanabhangadhyayah and the S'akarasiddhisastram. That he devoted such a long work to Isvaravada was not only because Isvaravadins were inescapable and perpetual opponents of the Buddhists, but also because logical problems concerning the establishment of the existence of God (Isvara) presented fundamental problems for Buddhist epistemology and logic. Jnanasrimitra, in fact, has pointed out some logical fallacies in the assertions of the Naiya- yikas, and furthermore, taking this opportunity, he concretely elucidated how invariable concomitance (vyapti) is determined. This topic is mentioned only abstractly in other works such as the Vyapticarca. In other words, logical and epistemological problems of the Isvaravada served as an object of one important application of the basic logical and epistemological the- ories of Buddhism, such as pratyaksa, anumana, vyapti, apoha, and so forth. Hence the value of the basic theories was judged through its application to the Isvaravada. Jnanasrimitra's criticism of Isvaravada consists of three parts. 1) purvapaksasamksepah (pp. 233-242) 2) isvaravadadhikare samksepadusanam (pp. 243-262) 3) varttikasaptaslokivyakhyanam (pp. 265-316) In the present paper I would like to take up one specific theory found in 2) and 3). 1 The Naiyayika's view, which Jnanasrimitra's refutation presupposes, is -1020- Two Types of Vikalpa asserted by Jnanasrimitra (K. KANO) (36) crystallized in the following syllogism: (assertion) Mountains and other things, which are the objects of our discussion, presuppose the existence of an intelligent creator, (reason) because they are effects. (example) Whatever is an effect presupposes the existence of an intelligent creator, like pots2). <This creator is God.> What kind of logical fallacy do the Buddhists find in this syllogism? Before Jnanasrimitra, Dharmakirti had already exposed the errors in this kind of argument in the second chapter of his Pramanavarttika and the third chapter of his Pramanaviniscaya. Dharmakirti stated as follows: As to the fact that is established (respectively) in differentiated things, knowle- dge by inference based upon an undifferentiated (element) expressed by a common word is not true. Like (knowledge of) fire based upon a white thing. (PV 2.14) Dharmakirti's argument is that mountains and the like really have "effectness (karyatva)", but this does not imply invariable concomitance between effectness and the presupposition of the existence of an intelligent creator. In other words, as Ratnakirti clearly declared", some effects have invariable concomitance with the presupposition of the existence of an intelligent creator, but not all effects. Jnanasrimitra followed this idea of Dharmakirti. However, Dharmakirti's argument contains some more important problems. Following Dharmakirti's idea, Jnanasrimitra presented his own arguments against the Isvaravada in his commentary to the verse above and in his original statements. In this paper I shall take up one of Jnanasrimi- tra's points, namely, the two vikalpas. 2 The two types of vikalpa are mentioned where he stated the process of invariable concomitance (vyapti). Jnanasrimitra stated as follows: The activity of understanding a causal relation, namely perception and non-perce- ption, refers to some specific species of effect, not to aspecies of effect in general. That is to say, immediately after the activity of perception and non-perception, the verbal expression of the causal relation is given, referring to two specified species through rejecting other species of cause and effect, something which is white and makes our eyes or throat change by attaching to them (=smoke) -1019- (37) Two Types of Vikalpa asserted by Jnanasrimitra (K. KANO) comes from such a specified thing the nature of which in is blaze up and be bright (=fire).4) This statement seems to be a natural explanation, but it contains some important problems. With reference to this problem, Jnanasrimitra continues: ... Therefore, it is not to be objected that the understanding of invariable con- comitance is concerned with a restricted realm of objects like the experience of deviation. Pure identification (suddhaikapratyavamarsa) is performed by discri- minating (objects other than the object in question). And just for this reason pure identification is relevant to the understanding of causal relations, but limi- ted (discrimination] is not.5) After these statements, Jnanasrimitra explains "suddhavikalpa" and "aupa- dhikavikalpa" in detail. He says: There is, in fact, discrimination common to children and animals, which depends only upon knowledge obtained through a pure observation of objects (without any preliminary judgment), and on the basis of which animals also ascertain some efficiencies in an object and come to act on or to avoid it. We call such (discrimination) pure (discrimination) or natural (discrimination).6) On the other hand, there is an other discrimination, which arises from observa- tion supported by recollection of verbal convention (samketa). For instance, a man looking at lampblack which comes from a lamp discriminates that this black substance can be applied to the eyelashes. This kind of discrimination arises from a direct experience accompanied by recollection of efficient operation (arthakriya) experienced before. We call this type (of discrimination) limited (discrimination) (discrimination of limited aspect).7) Given the case that we see a pot produced by a man, in the same way that we discriminate "this pot is produced by us," it is easy for us to discriminate that "this effect is produced by us," but (the latter) is not a natural (discrimina- tion)...8) Pure identification (suddhadhyavasaya) fulfills a purpose by expressing the species itself without conceptual consideration of the other aspects such as effec- tness or whiteness which inhere also in the other species, (and without conceptual consideration) which is accompanied by recollections of previous actions such as a understanding. of the relation (of the word and object) by verbal convention (samketa) and so forth. Like (the discrimination of) babies and the like.) -1018- Two Types of Vikalpa asserted by Jnanasrimitra (K. KANO) (38) In short, the judgment which operates at the time of deciding invaria- ble concomitance must be pure discrimination, and the judgment made between effect in general and the presupposition of the existence of an intelligent creator is not a pure one. Therefore, Jnanasrimitra argues that in this case invariable concomitance cannot be rightly applied. 3 Then, on what point do these two discriminations fundamentally differ from each other? The above statements of Jnanasrimitra can be arranged as follows: A) Pure discrimination (suddhavikalpa, svabhavikavikalpa, naisargika) <example> 1) This pot is made by a person. (This pot is (produced) by us) 2) Something which has such-and-such appearance comes from such-and-such a specified thing. <character> 1) It depends only upon knowledge obtained through a pure observation of an object. 2) It is common to children and animals. 3) It is accompanied by verbal convention (samketa), but this is not a primary factor10). 4) It is without conceptual consideration of the other aspects such as effectness or whiteness which inhere also in the other species, without conceptual consideration accompan- ied by recollectious of previous actions such as grasping the relation Cof the word and object) by verbal conve- ntion (samketa), and so forth. B) Limited discrimination (aupadhikavikalpa) <example> 1) This white thing arises from fire. 2) This effect is produced by us. 3) This black substance is applied to the eyelashes. <character> 1) It is accompanied by recollections of verbal convention. 2) It is accompanied by recollections of "arthakriya" experi- enced before, which is concerned with the limited aspect of the object in appearance. 3) It possesses conceptual consideration of the other aspect -1017- (39) Two Types of Vikalpa asserted by Jnanasrimitra (K. KANO) such as effectness or whiteness which inheres also in the other spiecies, accompanied by recollections of previous actions such as grasping the relation Cof the word and object) by verbal convention (samketa), and so forth. The difference between the characters of the two discriminations may be summed up as follows: A) Pure discrimination 1) It -arises after perception. 2) It depends. only upon the thing in question, which appears as the object of the observation and is acting to fulfill a purpose. 3) It presupposes no conception besides a defining conception. 4) It identifies the species itself, and to this extent it is accompanied by recollections. 5) It decides invariable concomitance (vyapti) as a causal relation, and leads us to effective action. B) Limited discrimination 1) It recollects and discriminates a limited aspect common to the other species, which concerns itself with the other causal efficiency rather than intrinsic (essential) efficiency of the species of the object under observation, by means of verbal convention recollected thro-