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MAAPSS Update 13 May 2021 Upper State

What’s new in ? • The Padang Dinka administration of Upper Nile is controlled by Deputy • As MAAPSS previously reported in Governor James Tor Monybuny, a former February 2021, the beginning of the year governor of Central Upper Nile state. saw the appointment of a Shilluk Budhok’s weakness relative to governor for Upper Nile, Budhok Ayang Monybuny is indicated by Monybuny’s Kur, and his Padang Dinka deputy, James continuing use of gerrymandering to Tor Monybuny. Their appointments have arrogate the east bank of the sent shockwaves through the state, and to the exclusive control of the Padang greatly increased instability in Dinka; Budhok has done nothing to halt and the surrounding area. these tactics. Most recently, in March 2021, the Padang Dinka, with the • On 27 March, the day that Budhok was connivance of Minister of Cabinet Affairs to arrive at the airport in Malakal for his Martin Elia Lomuro, attempted to official entrance as governor, Abu redistrict Malakal out of Makal county, Shoq—a Padang Dinka militia force and make Wau Shilluk the county capital. recruited and organized in Baliet This would place Malakal town within an county—attacked Shilluk community area of exclusive Padang Dinka control. members at three different locations in This latest administrative attempt to Malakal. The Shilluk were heading to the push the Shilluk from the east bank of airport to meet the governor; the attacks the White Nile is worrisome because of a were designed to stoke fear in the proposed census that should be held in community. Six Shilluk were confirmed 2022; the Padang Dinka administration is dead, with another six sustaining hoping to lock forced-demographic shifts gunshot injuries. These attacks are only into county- and state-level populations, the latest in a line of attacks on the in anticipation of future elections.1 Shilluk by Padang Dinka militias, which have largely displaced the Shilluk from • Budhok’s weakness, relative to the east bank of the White Nile. As of Monybuny, is also indicated by his failure May 2021, the only hold the Shilluk still to appoint a mayor of Malakal. On 15 have on east bank is the Protection of March, Budhok chose Francis Nynyang Civilians (PoC) site, which the United Awok Ajang, but in a blatant show of the Nations Mission in substantive power-relations dictating (UNMISS) plans to downgrade to an politics in Upper Nile, Monybuny blocked Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camp the appointment. controlled by the government—in this case, the Padang Dinka administration • In the context of continuing unrest, that have displaced the Shilluk, and political contention over territories pushed them into the PoC. 1

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between the Padang Dinka and the humanitarian assistance. Despite the Shilluk, and the massive displacement enormous housing, land, and property that has occurred during the South (HLP) issues involved in government- Sudanese civil war, Kiir’s government is organized movements of people, the supporting the intensification of returns operations of international of Padang Dinka groups into politically organisations—including the United contentious territories. These population Nations High Commissioner for Refugees movements are an attempt to create (UNHCR)—are helping the government durable Padang Dinka majorities in these achieve its political goals by moving contested counties. Padang Dinka populations into . The UNHCR provided trucks and • Padang Dinka groups from the Ngok Lual buses to move the IDPs and organized Yak subsection are being moved into the delivery of humanitarian assistance Baliet county, with a majority of them when the IDPs arrived at three selected relocating from . Deputy Governor sites in Baliet: Adong, Baliet town, and Monybuny is also from the Ngok Lual Yak Riangnom. The UNHCR organized these subsection, as is Chol Thon Balok, the returns despite disquiet among much of most powerful Padang Dinka in the the humanitarian community due to the government, who currently serves as political issues involved. Once again, the deputy minister of defence and veteran’s government of South Sudan is affairs. Support for Padang Dinka groups’ instrumentalizing aid to serve its political movement into Baliet can be understood interests. as Monybuny—and his boss, Balok— rewarding their constituency with land Why does it matter? and resources (as well as creating ethnic majorities in politically contentious • Johnson Olonyi, the leader of the Shilluk counties, as indicated above). This Agwelek, is already feeling alienated scheme commenced in April, and by mid- from a Sudan People’s Liberation Army in May, 5,654 people had moved to Baliet Opposition (SPLA-IO) leadership county; 2,500 remain in Melut. increasingly beholden to Kiir’s regime in . In his latest act of rebellion, Olonyi • The large numbers of people moving into appointed himself 1st lieutenant general, Baliet represent a substantial proportion in a fit of pique at being passed over in of the county’s population. At the last the latest round of opposition rank- census in 2009, Baliet only had a inflation in Juba. Functionally, Olonyi’s population of 48,010. Since then, Akoka forces will no longer be part of the SPLA- county was created, split off from Baliet IO under Machar. However, without the (population: 9,833), and the Shilluk possibility of Sudanese support—which, population were displaced from the thanks to Tut Kew Gatluak’s role in Kiir’s county. administration, will not be forthcoming—Olonyi’s forces do not • One of the most important rewards that have the capacity to offer military Balok and Monybuny can give to their resistance to the continuing Padang Dinka constituency is consolidation of Padang Dinka power

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over the east bank of the White Nile. Malakal PoC. Two minimum conditions Continuing violence against the Shilluk for the PoC site becoming an IDP camp may still force Olonyi’s hand, however, should be: and push him back to outright war, even if it is a war he cannot hope to win. o The police force responsible for IDP protection should not be composed of • Should UNMISS close the Malakal the very people who displaced the Protection of Civilians (PoC) site as Shilluk population into the PoC site. (If planned, the security of the Shilluk UNMISS were to withdraw from the population there will hinge on the Malakal PoC tomorrow, these are actions of a state government hostile to precisely the people who would it. determine the fate of the Shilluk.)

• With a census scheduled for 2022, o There should be a far-reaching and government-organized population sustainable package of measures taken movements are likely to lock-in Padang to addresses HLP issues in Malakal and Dinka majorities in contentious counties elsewhere on the east bank of the and give sanction to the civil war’s White Nile. campaigns of ethnic displacement. However, considering UNMISS’ • Coupled with population transfers, the withdrawal of force protection from the gerrymandering of Makal county will Rubkona PoC, which subsequently left deepen ethnic tensions between the overall security for the newly designated Shilluk and the Padang Dinka, further IDP camp to John Bul Mayik––who as undermining the possibility of a commissioner of Mayom County raised sustainable solution to the political and the Terschuong militia that displaced ethnic problems of Upper Nile. southern Nuer into the PoC––and given that no substantive HLP work has been What now? done in (where land has rather been ‘acquired’ by Governor Nguen • Before returns to contested territories in Monytuil), it is likely that an UNMISS Upper Nile can be countenanced, a withdrawal from the Malakal PoC will robust HLP program anchored in serious not meet the two conditions above, and Shilluk-Padang Dinka dialogue is needed, will increase insecurity among Shilluk with an emphasis placed on community- PoC residents. driven resolution to conflicts over land and politics.2 Without a formal Main Developments in Upper Nile agreement between the Shilluk and the Padang Dinka on these matters, any State politics humanitarian assistance with returns is premature. For Machar, Budhok’s appointment as governor continues a pattern of appointing • The conditions are not in place for a people within his family clique; Budhok is drawdown of force protection at the from , as is Angelina Teny’s mother.

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Rather than building alliances via his by subsection and are ultimately appointments, Machar is increasingly answerable to Chol Thon Balok. Monybuny invested in maintaining the little power is so closely aligned with Balok that each that he has: survival, not growth, is the time he is given a government order of the day. appointment, the other Padang Dinka sections in Upper Nile decry nepotism— Appointing Budhok was one of the few the original reason he was removed as moves available to Machar. A Shilluk from governor of Central Upper Nile in 2019. Olonyi’s camp, he was palatable to the Shilluk population—witness the crowds Monybuny’s aims as deputy governor are that were to come to welcome him when to consolidate de jure control of the east he arrived in Malakal. Relatively powerless bank of the White Nile by using when placed within an extant Padang gerrymandering and administrative Dinka political administration, Budhok was decrees to separate Malakal from Makal also acceptable to the Padang Dinka elite. county; appoint a Padang Dinka as mayor His acceptability was due to the of Malakal; and use a combination of low- appointment of James Tor Monybuny as level violence and intimidation to force the his deputy.3 Shilluk in the Malakal PoC onto the west bank of the White Nile. In these objectives, Monybuny’s predecessor as governor it can be expected that Monybuny will (then-acting governor of Eastern Nile), exploit the potential withdrawal of the Chol Thon Balok, was thought the hard- UNMISS protection force from the PoC, liner of the two, having previously enabling him to instill further fear in the overseen the purging of the Shilluk from remaining Shilluk population on the east the east bank of the White Nile. But bank of the White Nile. In this context, Monybuny has demonstrated an equally returns into Baliet County are not neutral, hard-line approach towards the Shilluk.4 As but are being used to bolster political governor (Central Upper Nile state, 2017– claims made through demographic 19), Monybuny organized the same militias movement, which risk being sanctified by among the Ngok Lual Yak subsection as the 2022 census. Balok and continued with the same strategy of using gerrymandering and What is occurring administratively is also administrative decrees to arrogate total occurring violently. During the period Padang Dinka control of the east bank of 2016–17, Padang Dinka militias and the White Nile. His current strategy of government forces infiltrated the west separating Malakal from Makal county was bank of the White Nile, as a means of one that Monybuny first attempted in trying to push the Shilluk into Sudan, 2018. cutting them off from vital fishing resources and links to the rest of the Monybuny is in substantive control of country. Such campaigns continued at a Upper Nile, and in particular, of the east much-reduced level in 2020. In July and bank. The three extant Padang Dinka August, Padang Dinka militias, supported militias (the Renk oil field defence force, by the South Sudan People's Defense the Mathloum force of Akoka county, and Forces (SSPDF), used heavy artillery to Abu Shoq in Baliet county) are organized

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attack Shilluk fisherman on the west bank and around the PoC site, on 3–5 February of the White Nile. 2021, Jikany Nuer youth clashed with Padang Dinka militias near Akoka and This harassment should be understood as Melut. All three Padang Dinka militias were part of a totality. Administrative involved in these clashes. Subsequently, gerrymandering, harassment, demographic both Jikany Nuer and Padang Dinka were movements, and assassinations (see reportedly mobilizing in Ulang and Nasir, below) are all part of an active campaign and Baliet county, respectively. to push the Shilluk off the east bank of the White Nile and make it as hard as possible There are also tensions elsewhere in the for the population to sustain life. state. On 19 April, security forces and local civilians clashed at the Ketbek cantonment Continuing tensions site. In Maban, conflict continues involving communities presumptively loyal to the The murder of the civilians welcoming SPLA-IO, as evidenced, for instance, in the Governor Budhok in Malakal on 27 March fighting that occurred in Liang around 20 follows on from a year which has seen the April. On 24 April, there was also conflict intermittent political killings of Shilluk between communities in Ulang. Each of figures, designed to put pressure on the these violent episodes have their own remaining Shilluk population on the east dynamics, largely unconnected to the bank of the White Nile, and push them out Padang Dinka–Shilluk contentions that are of the PoC site. Lam Akol’s brother, the subject of this report. However, they Thomas Aban Akol Ajawin, a public are indicative of the absence of legitimate prosecutor, was assassinated on 13 July state-level authority. In the absence of 2020 in Malakal. On 20 October 2020, a security provided by the government, Shilluk IDP was tied up and killed, and his communities are taking up arms and body dumped next to the PoC site. On 5 pursuing their own agendas throughout November 2020, two Shilluk men were the state. killed coming out of church: Brigadier General Arop Okeio (from Tunja) and Returns Juliano Ambrose, the coordinator of the South Sudan Council of Churches for Upper In 2019, the Upper Nile Solutions Working Nile state. The local authorities in Malakal Group (UNSWG), led by the protection subsequently imposed a nightly curfew in cluster, conducted a returns exercise with Malakal in order to curb the violence. This the approval of the Upper Nile state curfew disguised the true logic of these government’s Relief and Rehabilitation political dynamics, which is to create a Commission (RRC) office.5 A total of 3,324 climate of fear and insecurity amongst the IDPs were moved from to Shilluk, such that when UNMISS force Baliet county. Trucks to move the IDPs protection is withdrawn from the Malakal were provided by UNHCR, World Food PoC, the population will flee onto the west Programme (WFP), International bank of the White Nile. Organization for Migration (IOM), and UNMISS. NGOs then provided Non-Food In addition to the continuing persecution Items (NFIs), shelter, health, nutrition, and of the Shilluk by Padang Dinka militias in

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water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) in which there was active recruitment of services. militia forces, following clashes between Pandang Dinka and Nuer youth forces near No returns occurred in 2020, due to the Akoka and Melut in February 2021; about Covid-19 pandemic. On 8 December 2020, returning IDPs to an area classified as at the UN Office for the Coordination of IPC4;8 and about facilitating returns to an Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) received a area politically contested by two groups. request from the RRC of the Central Upper As set out by Small Arms Survey, amongst Nile state (the state that once again others, both Padang Dinka and Shilluk became part of Upper Nile state with the communities lay claim to parts of Baliet return to 10 states in February 2020: thus, County.9 Nagdiar, for instance, is included rendering this a request from a defunct within a 2019 Shilluk deposition to the state), asking for support for the return of Intergovernmental Authority on 36,000 IDPs from Melut to Baliet. This was Development’s (IGAD) Transitional Border despite the fact that, according to the Committee (TBC). The Shilluk were forcibly 2019 Inter-Agency Returnees Facilitated expelled from Baliet county in the current Movement Report, there were only 7,013 civil war. people in Melut who wished to return to their areas of origin, and there were no On 1 April 2021, the UNSWG conducted a major population movements into Melut in mission to Baliet county to assess the the intervening period. proposed sites for returns: Adong, Baliet town, and Riangnom.10 None of the On 25 March 2021, Monybuny wrote a concerns stated above were addressed in letter as ‘Deputy and Acting Governor of the report that was written following that Upper Nile State-Malakal’ to UNMISS, mission, which assessed the possibility of OCHA, and other UN agencies, facilitating returns to Baliet county. guaranteeing the safe passage of IDPs from Melut to Baliet county. On 26 March 2021, The report itself did not attempt to the Upper Nile Inter-Cluster Coordination substantively situate returns to Baliet Group (ICCG) decided to facilitate county within a conflict-sensitivity government-backed returns to Baliet framework and did not do any historical or County.6 Approval for these humanitarian- political analysis. Some humanitarians who facilitated transfers came from the RRC read the report thought it was a limited office of Upper Nile state and the office of exercise designed to provide a justification the deputy governor, not the office of the for facilitating returns. governor. National-level staff at the agencies that were supposedly involved in UNHCR drafted the report. It made a the ICCG at the local level reported feeling number of claims that were at best limited. strong-armed by the UNHCR in this process It stated that: and said that they were unaware of the transfers to Baliet until they were already “Relations within communities are underway.7 stable and cordial, including inter- ethnic relations with the Humanitarian organizations reported neighbouring Nuer community […]. concerns about returning IDPs to an area Overall security situation in the

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mentioned locations was observed Baliet county only recently, the report as calm. No heavy military presence makes it seem as if they were never observed in Adong and Baliet. there.14 Relations with neighboring communities are stable with no Thus, when the report claims that “the security incidents reported. There is relationships between communities in freedom of movement for all groups Baliet are stable and the community is of population, including to/from the ethnically homogenous…”, this is correct areas of Nassir, Ulang and Jonglei only insofar as ethnic displacement has with overall confidence by local made the area mono-ethnic.15 community peace would prevail.”11 On the basis of this report, an inter-agency Relationships between the Padang Dinka effort assisted returnees moving from and both Jikany Nuer and Shilluk Melut county to Baliet from mid-April to communities have been marked by mid-May 2021. A total of 5,654 people violence in 2021; the security situation is were moved. International agencies—both unstable; there were clashes between UN agencies and international NGOs— communities during the reporting period; provided vehicles for the movement, food there was not freedom of movement for and NFIs, WASH and other services. all groups. Further, the claim that there were no clashes in Baliet county not only In Upper Nile, a sustainable peace is only ignores recent clashes between the possible if the Shilluk also have the Padang and the Jikany Nuer but omits any possibility of returning to the land from mention of the displacement of the Shilluk which they were removed and have the from the county. It is notable that the capacity to construct meaningful and UNSWG report does not note Shilluk sustainable lives on it. That land includes claims to territory in Baliet county or Baliet county. International humanitarian acknowledge how, between 2015–18, the aid is being instrumentalized in Upper Nile Padang Dinka almost entirely displaced the to solidify the ethnic dislocation of the Shilluk from the east bank of the White Shilluk population. UNHCR and other UN Nile.12 (The word “Shilluk” does not appear agencies and international NGOs should in the report.) ensure that any programming around the return and reintegration of IDPs and The report further claimed that “[n]o HLP refugees is informed by adequate conflict- concerns were identified in the area […]. sensitivity and protection analysis to Land in Baliet county is ancestral ensure that aid is not used to reinforce community land and there is no land ethnic dislocation. dispute that has ever been reported.”13 This claim is neither consonant with the Shilluk submissions to the TBC, nor in agreement with the extant academic and humanitarian literature on the subject. The report gives fictional historical legitimacy to contemporary political developments: while the Shilluk were displaced from

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Acronyms and Abbreviations DRC Danish Refugee Council HLP Housing, land, and property ICCG Inter-Cluster Coordination Group IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development IDP Internally Displaced Persons IMC International Medical Corps IOM International Organisation for Migration NFI Non-Food Items OCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

PoC Protection of Civilians (site) RCC Relief and Rehabilitation Commission SPLA-IO Sudan People’s Liberation Army – in Opposition SSPDF South Sudan People’s Defense Force TBC Transitional Border Committee UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNMISS United Nations Mission in South Sudan UNSWG Upper Nile Solutions Working Group WASH Water, Sanitation and Hygiene

WFP United Nations World Food Programme WVI World Vision International

Disclaimer Information provided in this MAAPSS Update is sourced from field research conducted by Small Arms Survey and HSBA experts, including interviews with government officials – both local and state leaders – the SPLM, SSPDF, SPLA-IO, and others. In addition, international agency staff and other prominent officials both in and outside of South Sudan were interviewed. Where appropriate, in-text links are provided to access secondary source material and actors’ profiles on the MAAPSS website.

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Endnotes

also worked for Dar Petroleum and been 1 Then-leader of the SPLM/A, John Garang involved in organizing defence at the oilfields designated Makal county to be composed of in —was appointed governor. The Malakal town and the two Shilluk chieftaincies appointment of a northern Padang Dinka was of Lelo and Ogod in an executive order in 2004. also a concession to the community, which felt Recent redistricting proposed in March 2021 is marginalized within a larger Eastern Nile an attempt to strip Malakal town of its Shilluk region politically dominated by Dinka from identity. Akoka, Baliet, and Malakal. In Central Upper 2 A robust HLP program would, at a minimum, Nile state, the former Baliet county have to address conflicting claims to land and commissioner, James Tor Monybuny, was houses produced by the displacements and appointed as governor. Monybuny was sacked occupations of the war, to the satisfaction, or as governor of Central Upper Nile in May 2019, at least agreement, of the interested parties. and replaced by Peter Chol Wal, partly in Such a program would have to be run by a response to Padang Dinka anger about the party relatively neutral to the interested dominance of people from the Ngok Lual Yak parties. The limitation of current UNMISS subsection, close to Chol Thon Balok, in policy is that the mission expects the government. government to resolve such HLP issues, 5 The Upper Nile Solutions Working Group is a whereas it is the government itself, in Bentiu multi-agency body coordinating humanitarian and Malakal, that has benefited from responses in Upper Nile. The Protection displacement and occupation, and cannot Cluster co-ordinates humanitarian protection resolve issues arising from such displacement activities for IDPs on a range of issues. It is and occupation in a neutral way. Juba-based and currently co-led by the UNHCR 3 A full account of the political peregrinations and the NRC. that led to Budhok’s appointment as governor 6 The humanitarian community in South Sudan is available here. has largely organized itself into a cluster 4 Under pressure from the then-ascendant system, though some agencies do not Padang Dinka political elite in Juba, personified participate in this coordination effort. One by the minister of petroleum, Stephen Dhieu cluster, for instance, deals with protection Dau, Salva Kiir sacked the Nuer governor of issues, as previously noted. These clusters, in Upper Nile, Simon Kun Puoc on 16 August theory, co-ordinate the relief and 2015, and appointed Chol Thon Balok as acting humanitarian activities of different agencies, governor. After Kiir dissolved Upper Nile state alongside OCHA. The ICCG co-ordinates the on 2 October 2015, Balok became governor of clusters that coordinate the agencies. Eastern Nile, and continued to consolidate 7 Multiple interviews with humanitarian staff, Padang Dinka power. On 17 January 2017, Kiir April-May 2021. turned South Sudan’s 28 states into 32 states. His division was used as an excuse to dismiss 8 The IPC system describes the severity of food Chol Thon, whom Kiir feared was attracting emergencies, on a scale from one to five. international opprobrium following the Padang Five—the worst classification—is famine. IPC4 Dinka militia attack on the PoC. In his place, in means there is an emergency. Moving Northern Upper Nile, Deng Akuei Kak—the returnees into an area of already existing acute former commissioner for who had food shortages risks exacerbating the

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Historical Precedent and territorial Disputes situation. This problem is especially acute as Between the Shilluk and Dinka Padang. VISTAS the returnees to Baliet county were arriving Report. late in the year, relative to the planting season, 13 Upper Nile Inter-Cluster Pre-Assessment and so will be dependent on humanitarian Mission to Baliet County, p.3. assistance for the year ahead. 14 Since 2005, the Dinka Padang and the Shilluk 9 See Joshua Craze, Displaced and have contested a number of areas in Upper Immiserated: The Shilluk in South Sudan’s Civil Nile: Malakal, Doleib hills, the Nagdiar area in War, 2014-19. Small Arms Survey: Geneva. Baliet county, what is now known as Akoka 10 The agencies that took part in that mission, county (created in 2010), and Pigi county. and subsequently took part in drafting that These disputes led to intermittent violence report, were: UNHCR, IOM, HealthLink, World between 2005 and 2013. In May 2011, the Vision International (WVI), International Shilluk king, Reth Kwongo Dak Padiet, said: Medical Corps (IMC), Danish Refugee Council “Disputed border areas with (DRC). Multiple agencies, at the Juba-level, include: Piji, Atar, Khor Fulus and other areas. stated they were unaware of the contents of Disputed border areas within Upper Nile State the report. include borders between the following counties: and the newly 11 Upper Nile Inter-Cluster Pre-Assessment created Akoka County; Malakal and Baliet over Mission to Baliet County. 1 April 2021, p.2. Malakal town; Panyikang County and Baliet 12 See UN Panel of Experts, 2016. Final Report County over Nagdair payam, just to mention a of the Panel of Experts in Accordance with few.” Paragraph 18 (d) of Resolution 2206 (2015). 15 Upper Nile Inter-Cluster Pre-Assessment S/2016/70 of 22 January; The Sentry. 2018. Mission to Baliet County, p.4. Fueling Atrocities: Oil and War in South Sudan; Pritchard, Matthew. forthcoming. (Re)Drawing and (Re)Administering the Upper Nile:

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