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Secession, Sequence, and the State: South Carolina's Decision to Lead the Secession Movement in 1860
Lawrence Anderson Department ofPolitical Science McGill University, Montreal
July2001
A thesis submitted to the FacultyofGraduate Studies and Research inpartial fi,dfillment orthe requirements ofthe degree ofDoctorofPhilosophy. • © Lawrence Anderson 2001 National Ubrary BmIiothèQue nationale 1+1 ofC8nada du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibliographie Services services bibliographiques 315 WeliaglDn SIr_ 315. rue WeIingtDn 0IawaON K1A 0N4 OI-.ON K1A0N4 c.nada c.n.da
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0-612-75603-3
Canadl •
• @ Lawrence M. Anderson •
For my parents
• ii •
"As it is, we have the wolfby the ears, and we can neither hold him nor safely let him go. Iustice is in one scale, and self-preservation inthe other." -Thomas Jefferson on slavery
"Our Federal Union-it must be preserved." -AndrewJackson
"The Union-next to ourliberty mostdear." -John C. Calhoun responding to Jackson
"The only question...is can the Union and Slavery exist together?" -William Henry Trescott
"1 believe this Union and slavery cannot stand together." -Armistead Burt
'~om the gods would destroy, they fust make mad." -Euripides
• ili CONTENTS • Abstract vii Résumé viü
Acknowledgements ix
L An Introduction to the Project 1 A. Introduction 1 B. South Carolina and Secession 4 C. Methodology 6 D. Chapter Outlines and Conclusion 10 II. Chapter 1: The State, Secession, and the Framework 12 A. Introduction 12 B. Literature Review: the State and the States 13 1. The European State 14 2. The State in the United States 16 a. Institutions Maintaining Limited Government 19 b. Compact Theory 20 c. Threats to the Maintenance ofLimited Govenunent 26 C. Literature Review: Secession 28 1. Secession: Effectand Cause 30 2. Theories ofSecession 31 a. Wood's Preconditions ofSecession 31 b. Hechter's Dynamic ofSecession 39 c. Dion's Model 46 d. Bartkus's Dynamic ofSecession 52 e. Other Relevant Theories ofSecession 58 D. A Framework for the analysis ofSecession 60 1. Grievance: Losses Loom Larger 64 a. A Theory ofGrievance 64 2. Leadership 68 3. Institutional Design ofthe State 72 4. Clear, Established Boundaries ofGrievance 76 S. The Sequence ofSecession and Host State Intervention 77 E. Conclusion 82 ill. Chapter2: The History ofChallenges to Central State Authority inthe Union 84 A. Introduction 84 B. EarlyChallenges to Central State Authority 86 1. The Articles ofConfederation 86 2. The Kentucky and VirginiaResolutions 87 • 3. The Election of1800 90 iv 4~ The Hartford Convention 90 C. States' Rights in South Carolina 92 1. Nullification 92 • 2. The Concurrent Majority as Solution? 111 3. Nullification in Context 113 4. The Bluffton Movement 117 5. The Origins ofthe First Secession Crisis 118 a. Popular Sovereignty: AnEnd-run Around Anti-extension 121 b. The Nashville Convention of1850 and the Compromise of1850 123 6~ South Carolina's Attempt at Cooperative Secession 131 a. Timing Strategies 139 7. Institutional Explanations for Radicalism in South Carolina 141 D. Conclusion 150 IV~ Chapter 3: South Carolina Secedes 157 A. Introduction 157 B~ Beginnings ofSecession 158 1. Rhett's Fourth ofJuiy Speech 160 2. John Brown's Raid 164 3. Making Virginia "Take the Lead" 168 4. Alabama Makes a Move...and an Issue 175 5. Democratic Convention(s) of1860 176 6. Govemor Gist Plumbs the Depth ofSouthem Sentiment183 7. The Mercury Plan 189 C. Fear, and Momentum, and Secession 191 1. The Election ofLincoln 191 a. Consequences ofa Republican Victory 192 b. The South Loses its Last Veto Point 195 c. Lincoln's Election and the Abolition ofSlavery 196 2. An Early Convention Bill Passed 199 3. "Hammond's Defection" and the Paradoxical Position ofthe South 207 4. A Counter-revolution? Gist's Threat 214 5. A 116-dayWindowofOpportunity: Buchanan's Guarantee 216 6. The Convention Campaign in South Carolina 219 7. The Convention Election in Charleston 222 8. The Strategy orunilateral Secession 225 9. The Convention Meets: Secession is Accomplished 230 D. Explaining Non-slaveholders' Support for Secession (and Slavery) 235 E. Conclusion 241 1. The Case in Perspective 244 • 2. From South Carolina to the Restofthe South 246 v V. Chapter 4: The Three Souths 248 A. Introduction 248 B. The Early Seceders 254 • 1. Mississippi 255 2. Florida 259 3. Alabama 261 4. Georgia 264 5. Louisiana 269 6. Texas 272 C. The Late Seceders 272 1. Virginia 274 2. Arkansas 279 3. Tennessee: Unconventional Secession 282 4. North Carolina: The Last State Secedes 285 D. The Non Seceders: Border South States Look North 289 1. Missouri 290 2. Kentucky 293 3. Maryland 294 4. Delaware 296 E. Conclusion 298 VI. Conclusion 301 A. Summing Up and Looking Ahead 301
Bibliography 313
• vi Abstract • In the United States, the transition from aristocratic agriculturalism to liberal democratic industrialism was distinguished from instances of this transformation in other countries by a threat to the territorial integrity of the Union. In this dissertation, 1 provide novel insight into this unique challenge and its link to American political development. Drawing on recent worles on the process ofsecession, 1 have developed an innovative framework for the analysis of secession in which the institutional design ofthe state plays a central role in facilitating this act of territorial and political withdrawaL This framework specifies five factors that contribute to the development, timing, and success ofa movement for secession: grievance, the institutional design of the state, boundaries, leadership, and sequence. My framework is generalizable and can he used to illuminate the desire for secession in other regions ofthe world. In order to provide a thorough analysis ofthis case ofsecession, 1examine the historical background of the decision to secede, with an emphasis on the nullification crisis and the tirst secession crisis. Without the steps and missteps taken in these moments, secession would have been unlikely. In addition, 1 examine the actions of the other states of the South: the early-seceders of the Deep South, the late-seceders of the Upper South, and the non-seceders of the Border South. 1 conclude that secession in South Caralina was the result ofa nomber of dynamically interacting factors, beginning with the grievance experienced by the elites and the rest of the white, male population of South Carolina. This grievance was produced by demographic changes in the Union that allowed Republican Abraham. Lincoln to he elected president without needing electoral support in the South. The grievance Cfear) wrought by these changes animated the desire for secession, but secession was politically feasible because of the institutional design. ofthe American state. Central to my argument is the notion that federal states are bath easier to enter, because they facilitate the maintenance oflocal autonomy, and easier to exit (than other states), because the maintenance of state capacity and a high degree of autonomy at the state level makes withdrawal from the federai state possible with minimal dismption. The very sequence by which secession was accomplished provides essential insight into the dynamics of secession. The South did not secede simultaneously, but sequentially-with South Carolina seceding unilaterally, and forcing the hand ofthe remaining states. Given the divisions present inthe South, this strategy of seeking sequential exit through unilateral secession in South Carolina was the best possible strategy to realize the goal of a Southem Confederacy. • vii Résumé • Aux Etats-unis, la transition d'une société aristocratique de l'agriculture à une société démocratique, libérale, et industrielle est dinstincte du phénomène en d'autres pays par la menace à l'integrité des frontières de l'État. Cette thèse est une aperçu nouvel du défi unique américan. Les œuvres récentes sur la sécession servent comme point du départ, et je developpe une théorie innovatrice pour l'analyse de la sécession. D'après ma théorie la structure de l'état joue un rôle central en facilitant cet acte de retrait politique et territorial. Ma théorie spécifie cinq facteurs qui contribuent au développement, la syncronisation, et le succès d'une mouvment pour la sécession: un grie~ la structure institutionnelle de l' éta~ les frontières, la direction, et la séquence. Ma théorie se généralise et se prête à illuminer le désir pour la sécession à travers le monde. Afin de bâtir une analyse approfondie du cas particulier de sécession, j'examine les antécédents historiques de cette decision à faire sécession, soulignant la crise de "nullification" et la première crise de sécession. La sécession aurait été Peu probable, saufpour les décisions prises pendant ces deux moments de crise. De plus, j'examine les démarches d'autres états du Sud: les premiers à faire sécession, les secondaires, et ceux qui n'ont pas fait sécession. Je conclus que la sécession du Caroline du Sud était le résultat d'un nombre de facteurs, commençant avec le grief de la population blanche contre l'Etat fédéral. Ce grief s'est produit par les changements démographiques dans l'Union qui ont permi l'éléction d'Abraham Lincoln sans le soutien éléctoral du Sud. Ces changements ont produit un grief qui a animé le desir de faire sécession, mais la sécession était possible dans le sens polititique à cause de la structure institutionnelle de l'Etat Américain. Au fond de la théorie est la notion que l'état fédéral est en même temps le plus facile à joindre et le plus facile à quitter. Les états fédéraux maintiennent l'autonomie locale et la sécession de l'Union est possible parce que cette autonomie équilibre les coûts de la sécession. La séquence par laquelle la sécession a été accomplie illumine la dynamique de la sécession. Le Sud n'a pas fait sécession simultanément, mais parordre--avec le Caroline du Sud qui a fait sécession unilatéralment, forçant la main des États du Sud qui restait dans l'Union. Supposé que les divisions entre les États du Sud soient tout présent, cette stratégie: celle de rechercher la sortie de l'Union par ordre via la sécession du Caroline du Sud était la meilleure stratégie pour réaliser la rêve des États Confédérés.
• vili Acknowledgments
The origin of this project cannot be separated from my experience of • living in Quebec for almost six years. Secession fust came to interest me because this act of political withdrawal was discussed, debated, and even attempted by Quebec while 1 attended McGill University. The near miss in the 1995 referendum was fascinating to witness as an outsider. Some looked toward secession with hope; others saw it with dread. Seeing the effect the prospect of secession had on the citizens of Quebee and the rest of Canada, 1 became interested in the history ofthe movement for secession in my own country. In the short term, the prospects for secession in Quebee appear dim, but the prospects for secession must bave also appeared dim in the United States at the end ofthe first secession erisis in South Carolina. The lesson ofthe events in the Southem United States is that circumstances can change very quiekly. Canada and Quebee were never more than a temporary home for me, but 1 am still passionately interested in their fates. Whatever those fates may be, 1 hope they bear no resemblance to the ordeal suffered by my country. It is probably impossible to thank all ofthe people who have bad a hand in helping me complete this project. First, 1 would like to thank the members of my committee: Professors Christopher Manfredi and Hal Waller of MeGill University's political science department and Professor Gil Troy of the history department bave provided me with excellent comments, feedback, moral support, and innumerable letters of recommendation. 1 would like to thank my advisor, Professor Hudson Meadwell, also from McGill's Political Science Department, for bis academic support, bis fiscal support, and bis patience. His guidance in this project bas been invaluable. 1 could not have asked for a better advisor. 1 would like to thank Professor Barry Weingast of Stanford University and Professor John Coleman of the University of Wisconsin for providing me with insightful comments regarding the proposai for this project. [ would like to thank the entire political science department at the University ofWisconsin-Madison. Although 1 was not one oftheir own students, they treated me as if1 were, and made me an honorary fellow in the department. These kindnesses allowed me to use aIl ofthe facilities at that wonderful university. [ would like to thank the Institute for Southem Studies at the University of South Carolina-Columbia for giving me office space and access to that university's excellent libraries. [ would like to thank the librarians and staff at the libraries and historical societies in which 1 conducted my research: the South Carolina Historical Society, the manuscript Collection at Perkins Library at Duke University, the Southem Historical Collection at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, the South Caroliniana Library at the University of South Carolina at Columbia, and the manuscripts collection at the Library ofCongress. 1 would like to thank the Fort Atkinson Community Foundation for their generous support during much ofmy graduate education. 1 would like to thank the McGill University Faculty of Graduate Studies for awarding me with. a McGill Thesis Research Grant that allowed me to undertake a research tour of the South. that proved crucial in the completion of this project. In addition, 1 • would like to thank Jean Merrill of the Writing Center at the University of ix Wisconsin-Madison and friend Steve Barlament. Their editing and proofreading abilities proved invaluable inthe last portion ofthis project. My deepest thanks must go to my parents, Jerry and Shirley Kutz, whose • financial and moral support made all of this possible. 1 would like to offer a special thanks to my siblings and their familles. 1 can only hope that another one ofthem attempts to eam a doctorate degree so that 1 can bother them in the same way my brother Jeffbothered me: "Are you done yet?" Finally, 1 would like to thank Jennifer Draeger for her love and support over the years.
• x •
An Introduction to the Project
Introduction
One important tradition in political science conceives of the Civil Warin
the United States as the functional equivalent of the English and French
Revolutions, bringing with it the victory ofliberal democratic industrialism over
aristocratic agriculturalism. l However, surprisingly little attention has been paid
to the distinguishing features of this historic rupture in American politics. In
other cases with which the United States is often comparéd-Britain and France
in particular- revolutionary breaks with the past involved fundamental changes
in political regime while holding territorial boundaries constant. By contrast, the
American instance of this larger liberal democratic pattern involved the
attempted (and, for a time, successful) withdrawal ofconstituent states from the
Union itself. These events constituted far more than a process ofregime change
primarily because they challenged the territorial integrity of the emerging
American state.
The historical instances of secession and Civil War:-arguably the MOst
formative set ofpolitical events in the establishment ofa territorially secure state
and liberal republican regime in the United States after the American
Revolution-are the subjects of this dissertation. Through primary source • 1 Ashworth (l99S); Beard (1927); Moore (1966). l research and the re-analysis ofrich historical literature about the antebellum era • and the causes of the Civil War, this dissertation situates the case ofsecession, tirst, in the literature on the institutional design of states and, second, in the
literature ondynamic models ofpolitical mobilization-in this case, secession.
Using this literature, 1 develop a framework for analyzing secession and
apply it to the South Carolinian case. In order to accomplish this, 1 examine the
political choices and political strategies ofthe landed elite and the political class
in South Carolina; 1do so because secession, in this case, occurred in a particular
sequence-with radical South Carolina acting tirst and alone, forcing the band of
the remaining Southem states.
1 hope to make secession better understood and better explained, not just
in antebellum America, but also in other parts ofthe world and in other historical
contexts. The framework developed in the tirst cbapter offers compelling new
insight into the dynamics of secession, focusing not only on grievances that
explain the tise in support for secession, but on the institutional design of the
state itself as a factor that can facilitate or forestall the creation of a successful
movement for secession.
1 also hope to force a re-evaluation ofthe role of federalism in secession:
Federalism cannot simply be viewed as a means of reducing, mitigating, or
eliminating the sorts of conflicts that Iead to calis for secession; under certain
circumstances, federalism can significantly increase the possibility that secession
will be attempted and will he successfuL
Lastly, 1 hope to contribute to the solution of an interesting puzzle in • American political development: Why did South. Carolina secede, why did some 2 states fol1ow, and why did others refuse to follow? In answering this series of • questions-interesting in themselves-this dissertation can aIso lay claim to answering one ofthe most puzzled-upon, enigmatic, and controversial questions
inall ofAmerican history and politics: What caused the Civil War?
In fact, the answer to this question is quite simple. The Civil War was
caused by the secession of most of the Soutbem states of the Union and the
refusal of the new Lincoln administration to aIlow these states to "depart in
peace." The puzzle that must he explained, then, is not what caused the war, but
what caused secession.
In the simplest tenns, secession was the result ofa perception ofa serious
threat to slavery experienced by the political class of South Carolina and the
Deep South. This threat culminated in the election of Abraham Lincoln to the
presidency in 1860, which was made possible by a series of economic and
demographic changes in the antebel1um Union that contributed to a relative
decline ofthe politicaI power ofthe South. That said, the contours ofsecession
ofthe Southem states ofthe Union cannot be explained simply by reference to
the threat to slavery, although that threat does provide a sufficient terminological
abbreviation for the grievance felt by the Soutbem states.
Witbout slavery, it is true that there would have been no secession and no
Civil War. However, secession in the Southem states had it roots in the very
structure of the American State. The institutional design ofthe American state
assured the existence of vastly different political, social, and economic
institutions at the state level. This design meant that the separate states of the • Union could and did have economies and interests based on fundamentally 3 different organizing principles, and it gave each of the states a high degree of • state capacity. An aggrieved constituent unit was more likely to see secession as politically feasible under these circumstances than ifthe state had been designed
according to different principles--such as the principles of the unitary state.
Sorne have cautiously argued that adopting federalism could mute the centrifugai
forces of secession.2 This project demonstrates how this "solution" may end up
contributing to the very movement it is designed to prevent.
South Carolina and Secession
The actions ofa single state, South Carolina, played a decisive role in the
secession of the states of the Deep South and the creation of a Southem
Confederacy. From the nullification controversy in the early 18305 through the
tirst secession crisis in the early 1850s to December 1860, South Carolina
Persistently pressed states' rights claims and challenged the expansion offederal
authority. This state's crucial role, however, remains generally undervalued and
under-examined. It is widely known that this small, radical state was the tirst to
secede, but less attention is given to the manner in which this state's precipitous
action was integral to the realization of disunion among the states that would
become the Confederate States of America.3 Secession occurred in a unique
sequence, like dominoes falling one by one. Thus, the first state to take the leap
to îndependence was of unique importance, because it provided the impetus that
encouraged other states to pull out ofthe Union. IfSouth. Carolina had not been
willing to secede unilaterally, the dreams ofa Southem Confederacy would not • 2 Horowitz (1985); Premdas (1990); McGarry and O'Leary (1993); Buchanan (1995)• 4 bave been realized. The actions of this Ione state forced the band of the • remaining Southem states by altering the strategie context in which they were acting. This didn't just make secession more Iikely; it made secession necessary
for most ofthe other states ofthe South.
Secession is more likely in the presence ofthe following conditions: First,
there must he a serious grievance or series of grievances with the host state that
an identifiable region is having little success in ameliorating;4 second, the
institutional design of the host state must structure politics in such a way that
secession is Perceived as a feasible political option; third, there must he
significant support for secession within the political class; and fourth, the
boundaries of the secessionist unit must be conventionally recognized. These
conditions are mutually reinforcing and increase the likelihood that the act of
secession will occur. They say nothing directiy, however, about whether this act
will he successful.
Understanding the process ofsecession means understanding the sequence
of secession. In Most cases of secession, the sequence is a process of political
mobilization within a compact territory or region. The elites and mass public of
this single territorially-demarcated population interact with each other and agents
ofthe central state in order to achieve secession. In the case at hand, however,
the sequence and process were enormously affected by the jurisdictional
complexity ofthe American Union. More specifically, there was no one political
3 Dumond(1931); Potter (1976); Freebling (1994).
4 The host state need not he the cause ofthe grievance, but it must he seen as unwilling, • orunable, to do anything about it. 5 voice or set of political institutions that spoke for the South. Ironically, this • complexity ended up being an advantage for those seeking secession. It meant the states ofthe South would have varying degrees ofsupport for secession. This
meant South Carolina would he willing to take a calculated risk and secede
unanimously.
The framework that 1will develop in Chapter one does not assume that all
secessionist units will secede simultaneously when there is no single compact
territory. In fact, the framework allows that secession can occur dynamically,
with more radical regions leading the charge ofsecession, eventually convincing
or compelling less radical regions to secede from the bost state. In other words,
secessionist leaders must muster support for secession, but there are dilemmas
(and benefits) of mobilization peculiar to a region that includes multiple,
conventionally-recognized political boundaries.
By seceding first, a more radical sub-state unit can coax other aggrieved
sub-state units ioto seceding. Initial secession by a more radical sub-state unit
May work to fundamentally alter the strategie context of choice for the initial
non-seceders, forcing their band-and forcing them out of the host state
sometimes for reasons different from the rationale ofthe initial seceder.
Metbodology
The narrative ofthis project focuses on three central moments ofchoice in
South Carolina that describe the process ofpolitical mobilization for secession.
Without the steps and missteps taken in these moments, and the lessons leamed
from them, secession in 1860 would have been unlikely. During the nullification • crisis of 1832-33 South Catolina forcefully reiterated the concept of state 6 sovereignty through its nullification offederal tariffs. Abandoned by a South that • refused to adopt such a radical stance, South Carolina backed down from its extreme position, but only after the federal govemment passed a compromise
tarif[ During the tirst secession crisis of 1852, following the passage of the
Compromise of 1850 in the U.S. Congress and the failed conference ofSouthem
states, South Carolina approached the point of secession, but eventually backed
down. During this crisis, the state convention of South Carolina could only
muster an affirmation of the right to secede, the existence ofwhich few in this
state (and in the South as a whole) doubted by 1852. Finally, in 1860 with the
election of Republican Abraham Lincoln, the political class of South Carolina
(the planters) believed that the political standings of their state and the South
within the union were in a steep and irreversible decline. In this single most
important moment of choice, palpable fear of the consequences of Lincoln's
election, in conjunction with the lessons drawn from the past, led South
Carolinian political actors to pursue a strategy that assured the secession ofthis
state and forced the band ofmost ofthe remaining slave states.
The methodological approach 1 employed in the dissertation necessitated
the examination ofthese three moments of choice-particularly the last one
from a number of different perspectives. First, 1 examined the importance of
individual political actors (particularly the committed secessionists of South
Carolina) to the eventual outcome. Second, 1 situated these actors in their
capacity as political leaders within the institutional structure of the American
state. In so doing, this project utilizes elements ofthe "new institutionalism" to • explain the relevance of the institutional design of the American State for 7 secession.5" From the formal institutional design ofthe state proceeded a variety • of formai and informal institutions, or a "set of shared understandings," within the American union that "affect[ed] the way problems are perceived and
solutions are sought.,,6 Secessionists acted within the context of national and
state institutions that helped to develop states' rights and contributed to the belief
that secession was a right that could be invoked with just cause. The institutions
within which Southem politicians acted played a large, and perhaps a definitive,
role in the success of the movement for secession. This institutional context
meant, in the presence ofa powerful grlevance, secession would be sought at the
expense ofother means of redress. Third, 1 examined the unique strategies used
by political elites in South Carolina to achieve unilateral secession and thereby
force the issue upon their own state and the remainder ofthe South. This portion
ofthe project relies on an emerging literature in political science that approaches
American political development from a rational choice perspective.7 Given the
institutional context within which they were acting, secessionist actors
considered their options and adopted the strategy that they believed had the best
chance of achieving their desired-tbough admittedly shortsighted-ends. By
approaching this case from a variety of perspectives, 1 hope to provide a more
complete account of secession in South Carolina and, indeed, the rest of the
South.
s Hall (1986); Hall and Taylor (1996); Kato (1996); March and Oison (1984); Skocpol (1995); Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth (1992). • 6 Thelen (1999: 371)• 8 The principal means by which 1have accomplished my explanatory task is • through the exarnination ofprimary sources. For each moment ofchoice, 1 have consulted state records of South Carolina and the federal govemment. This
includes an analysis of official documents of the three state conventions South
Carolina held in the antebellum period. 1also studied the records ofthe Nashville
Convention of 1850. Perhaps most importantly, 1 examined the personal papers
of the central actors in South Carolina, including-but not limited to-United
States Senator John C. Calhoun, Govemor of South Carolina William Henry
Gist, United States Senator Robert Bamwell Rhett, and United States Senator
James Henry Hammond. Equally important are certain South Carolinian
newspapers and periodicals, as weil as pro- and anti-secessionist pamphlets, as
these documents both retlected and shaped political opinion and events in this
state. Of particular import are the pamphlets of the "1860 Association," which
outlined the strategies and rationale for secession in South Carolina and the rest
of the seceding South. However, it is insufficient to rely ooly upon subjective
accounts of these moments provided by "interested" actors. Successful
completion ofthis project requires an examination ofobjective measures ofthe
shape and trajectory of the union found in census data, congressional
apportionment, and the patronage power and influence ofwhat was to become a
Northem presidency. 1 also consulted selected election results for South
Carolina, the rest of the seceding South, and the entire Union.8 Finally, a re
exarnination ofthe secondary work on the secession ofSouth Carolina proved to • 7 lillson (1988); Knigbt and Epstein (1996); Riker(l996)• 9 be immeasurably important in the successful completion ofthis project. Through • an examination of all such documents, 1 hope to provide a complete picture of the actors, institutional context, and strategies employed by the political actors of
South Carolina and ofthe remainder ofthe South to redress their grievances.
1would like to malee one note on the primary sources that 1 have used for
this project: Given that 1have relied heavily on hand-written sources to complete
this project, and given that grammar and spelling have changed considerably
since the Civil War era, 1have nonnalized all sPelling and grammar.
Chapter Outlines and Conelusion
The chapters of the dissertation are organized in the following fashion:
The fust chapter reviews the literature on state-fonnatïon in the United States
and the literature on secession. The former literature review helps to establish the
central role the institutional design ofthe state plays in secession. In that chapter,
1 also develop a framework for analyzing secession that structures my narrative
and analysis of secession in South Carolina. The second chapter begins with a
brief examination of the long tradition of challenging central state authority in
the United States. This chapter also included an extensive examination of the
nullification crisis and the tirst secession crisis, two central moments on the road
to secession in South Carolina. The third chapter examines the third moment of
choice: why, when, and how South Carolina seceded from the Union. 1elaborate
upon the grievances precipitating secession, the actors involved, and the
institutional context that helped to malee secession politically feasible, as weil as • 1 Elections in South Carolina tend ta be insignificant. Mostelections went uncontested. lO the political strategies used to accomplish secession and the sequence by which it • was accomplished. The fourth chapter extends my analytical horizon to include other states ofthe slave South. l examine the rationales behind secession (or oon
secession) in the states that foUowed South Carolina out ofthe union early, in the
states that foUowed South Carolina out of the Union only after the shelling of
Fort Sumter and Lincoln's proclamation, and in the states that never seceded
from the Union. This dissertation ends with a short, concluding chapter
swmnarizîng the fmdings of this study and pointing to directions for future
research.
Understanding secession in South Carolina bas to do with understanding
the way the American Union was put together in the tirst place and
understanding what its brief history implied about the future. The South was
deeply and reasonably concemed that the North would come to dominate the
union. To answer this fear, the South fell back on a remedy that had a long
history within the union and the South: the state's right to secede. Under these
conditions, as stated by Shearer Bowman, "A POlitical revolution was necessary
to avert a social one.,,9 That is, the South sougbt to alter the territorial reach of
the federai govemment in order to avert the risk of the eventual abolition of
slavery.
9 Bowman (1980: 807)- • 11 •
Cbapter 1 - Tbe State, Secession, and tbe Framework
Introduction
In this chapter, 1reviewand evaluate two literatures in the field ofpolitical
science and develop a framework for the analysis of secession. First, 1examine
the literature on the state and political development in the United States. In the
second part of this chapter, 1 examine the literature on secession. [ begin by
defining the term and distinguishing it from other methods ofthe proliferation of
states. Following this, 1 explore the literature on political mobilization for
secession. Taking into account the strengths and weaknesses of these two
literatures, the final section of this chapter consists of the development of a
framework for understanding and explaining secession. This framework
structures my examination ofsecession in South Carolina and the other states of
the South. This framework is original and generalizable. That is, it May prove
useful inunderstanding secession in other places and atother times.
In this chapter, two subjects do not get the attention a work on secession
might seem to require: nationalism and normative theories of secession. The
purported link between nationalism and secessionism bas led to the conflation of
these two concepts.l Conventional wisdom suggests that when one exists, the
1 Alter (1994); Anderson (1983); Bookman (1992); Gellner (1983); Hobsbawm (1990); Mayall (1993); Mill (1991). Works on secession are guilty orthe same conflatioD. See Emizet and Hesli • (1995). 12 other also exists, but this is false. There is no seam1ess web running from • nationalism to secession; one can exist without the other. For instance, in the Confederate States ofAmerica, nationalism was a consequence ofsecession, not
a cause.2 Conceptual clarity requires the separation ofthese two concepts.
The vast literature on normative theories of secession presents a greater
dilemma.3 While there will he some discussion ofthe morality of secession, the
framework for the analysis of secession that 1 develop does not address the
morality of secession; rather, its purpose is to illustrate the conditions that
contribute to the mobilization, timing, and success of secession. However,
morality must play sorne role in the calculations ofboth the secessionist unit and
the host state: Both sides hope to have the legitimacy that cornes with following
the moral course ofaction, but determining the morality ofa course ofaction is
not an exact science. Both sides, following diametrically opposed courses of
action, May correctly share the claim to possessing morallegitimacy, depending
upon which moral compass that they use--<>r we use when examining their
actions.
Literature Review: The State and the States
The central and novel proposition that l make in my discussion of
secession is that the institutional design ofthe state plays a central role in the
success or fallure of a movement for secession.. Given the centrality of this
1 Escott (1978).
J The most welL-known and thorough. example of the normative literature on secession is undoubtedly Allen Bucbanan's (1991) wodc. Other examples of this literature: Binder (1993); Buchanan (1995) and (1997); Ewin (1995); Kmylicka (1989) and (1995); Sunstem (1991); and • Tamir(1993). . 13 institution to my argument, 1 would first like to offer a definition ofthe state. 1 • detine the state as the '~organization with a comparative advantage in violence, extending over a geographic area whose boundaries are determined by its power
to tax constituents.',4 State formation describes the process by which (and the
context in which) astate is constructed. The process of state formation in the
West is defmed as "constitution making, involvement in wars, electoral
democratization and bureaucratization."s The institutions that arise from the
process of state formation differ according to the context in which the state's
formative moments occur, accidents of history, and the intentions of those
designing the state.
The European State
There is a consensus in the field ofpolitical science that the exigencies of
war-making were the primary motivating factor behind state formation in
Europe.6 This means the origin, development, expansion, and strengthening of
the state can be traced to the cycle of interstate competition and war among the
proto-states of EuroPe. Every war-making advance made by one state had to be
duplicated and improved upon by all the others. Implementing and improving
upon these advances to remain militarily competitive required a substantial and
regular source of revenue. Regular taxation of the inhabitants ofthese political
4 North (1981:21). See also lessop (1990) and Weber (1968). For furtherdiscussion oftheories of the state, see Mann (1984), (1993a), and (1993b).
s Skocpol (1992: 568).
6 See, especially, Tilly (1975). But aiso see Barker (1966); Meadwell (1995) and (2001). For • criticisms and qualifications, see Ertman (1997) and Spruyt (1994)• 14 units provided such a source. Bureaucracies formed or were rationalized in order • to facilitate the regular collection oftaxes. In Europe, this cycle ofcontlict was exacerbated by the geographic contiguity of competing states. From these
begjnnings a strong, functionally differentiated, territorially bounded,
centralized, and unitary state came into being.
This state was confronted with a number ofchallenges. On one hand, there
was the ever-present threat ofwar, which meant that every state was at risk of
being conquered by its neighboring state-competitors; on the other hand, this
state was confronted by intemàl threats (what J.P. Nettl called "anti-system"
movements).' These intemal threats were primarily threats to the state's regime.
That is, after the threat ofbeing conquered by a foreign power, the MOst common
threat to this state concemed the domestic political ordering of the regime.
Unique to this state was that it was not generally subjected to the threat of
territorial dismemberment from the inside.
The European state was and is characterlzed by a high degree of
"stateness," or state "saliency."s The concept of"stateness" refers to the ex/en/ to
which the institutions ofthe state are centralized, differentiated, and autonomous
from society. In addition, this term must also include the capacity and autonomy
of state institutions. Capacity and autonomy refer to the ability ofactors within
state institutions to tum their poticy preferences into reality, and to do so
independent of social forces within the state. Stateness must also include a
1 Nettl (1968)• • 8 Nettl (1968: 579). lS territorial element: The state is not only the centralized, differentiated, and • autonomous institution that taxes, protects, and makes war; it is also, in one fundamental respect, the territory itself. Michael Mann wrote, "The state is
indeed a place-both a central place and a unified territorial reach.,,9 Thus, a
high degree of stateness assumes a stable territorial reach within which state
institutions extract resources and provide services. Therefore, when the territorial
integrity ofthe state is challenged, the state itselfis challenged.
The State in the United States
In Europe, the states that emerged typically had a clear center of
sovereignty and clear boundaries. To alter Tilly's familiar formulation: War
made astate that was centralized, rationalized, territorialized, and unitary, and
this state made war. lO The circumstances surrounding the formation of the
American union were distinct from the pattern of state formation in EuroPe in a
number of critical ways, which helped to contribute to the unique institutional
design ofthe American state: InNorth America, there was no history ofabsolute
monarchy and centralization; there was a lack of extensive experience with
interstate war; and there were no significant regional competing state
challengers. Furthermore, the creators ofthe American state were familiar with
the pathologies ofthe European state and state system, and they purposely set out
to avoid them.ll Without the imperative to create a strong state to protect citizens
9 Mann (1984:: 198). Sec aIso Mann (1993).
10 Tilly(197S). • 11 Deudney(l99S)• 16 and territory from extemaI predation, the founding fathers created a federaI state • in which sovereignty was divided between the states ofthe union and the federai govemment and in which the authority of the central state was limited by a
variety offormai and informal mechanisms.
The unique design of the American state meant that this state would he
characterlzed by relative "statelessness." Nettl claimed that "no truly federaI
regime can incorporate any adequate notion ofthe state, s~ce both functions and
powers involved in this concept are-by almost any definition-coordinated
with the regional units, and the necessary overall superordination ofsovereignty
does not therefore exist.,,12 Not surprisingly, a number of analysts of the
American state have claimed that prior to the Civil War, ''there was no state.,,13
This claim is rhetoricaIly useful insofar as it suggests the extent of the
dissimilarity between the American and European contexts, but it overstates the
point. White it is true that the coercive power ofthe state in the American Union
was divided between constituent units (or "states") and the federai government-
and that the state of the American union, more generally, was "unsettled" and
characterlzed by relative "statelessness"---effective state structures at the center
were in place, even if they were designed to he both limited and weak. The
federal govemment both participated in a variety of state activities and
established what amounted to the superordination ofits sovereignty. The United
12 Nettl (1968: 568).
13 Keohane (1983:84). See also Bimbaum (1988); De Tocqueville (1990); Deudney (1995); • Nordlinger (1981). Foran a1ternate view, see Vincent (1987). 17 States sueeessfullyengaged in a number of wars, and, during the nu1lifieation • erisis, it affirmed its right to enforee its own laws-suggesting, though not detinitively proving, that it possessed the superordination of sovereignty. (The
primacy ofthe federal govemment is also found in the Supremacy Clause ofthe
14 Constitution of the United States. ) Furthermore, numerous eourt cases, the
most notable of which is McCulloch v. Maryland, established federal law as the
supreme law of the land. From a functional standpoint, it was the federal
government that "maintained the eurrency, funded the national debt, eollected
the customs, [and] registered patents."lS Although this state was structurally and
functionally distinct from the state found in Europe, it was, nevertheless, astate.
The claim that "there was no state" may be exaggerated, but those who
have made it are actually pointing to a central characteristic of the early
nineteenth century state in America. Balance between the sections ofthe Union,
which was institutionalized in the Senate, thanks to the equal representation oÎ
states, established a political equilibrium in the federal govemment that made it
nearly impossible for the federaI govemment to accomplish anything beyond the
very limited scope ofaction outlined in the Constitution. That is, thanks, in part,
to the balance rule, the central state could not he an activist state. This long
standing, but ultimately precarious, balance, meant the American state had very
little room for autonomous action and was astate distinguished by a severely
limited capacity.
14 Constitution orthe United States. Article VI, Clause 2; Goldstein (1997)• • IS Brightand Harding (1984:121-122). 18 Institutions Maintaining Limited Government A variety of formal and informai • institutions proved effective in maintaining the relative statelessness of the American state. The balance mie in the Senate, in which the slave- and free
states were admitted to the union in pairs, maintained equal representation of
slave- and free-state Înterests. This iIÏformal institution allowed one section to
veto the policies ofthe other and effectively prevented the center from passing
laws that either section saw as detrimental to its interests. Specifically, this meant
that anti-slavery legislation would have virtually no chance of being passed.
Even as Northem representation in-and dominance of.-the House of
Representatives grew (See Chart 1.0), passing a law required the approval of
both the free and the slave sections of the Union. In bis analysis of the crisis
leading up to the Civil War, Barry Weingast describes the maintenance of the
"balance rule" as a central component ofthe second-party system, the breakdown
ofwhich facilitated the creation ofsectional political parties, thus contributing to
the crisis that led to the Civil War. 16
The second-party system featured the Whig and Democratie parties
contesting elections. Unlike the party system that would replace il, in the second
party system, both parties had constituencies in the North and South whose
interests they had to represent in order to remain competitive in elections. Thus,
the parties were forced to adopt moderate positions on a variety of issues to
prevent supporters in one section or the other from defecting to another political • l6 Weingast(l996} and (1998). See alsa Marx (1961)• 19 • •
Chart 1.0--Free State Representation in the House of Representatives
7~
~
~
40'6
30~
2QlJfI
10"
0IMa 1790 1800 1810 1820 1830 1840 1850 1860 Source: Martis and Elmes (1993: 146). party. For example, if Northem Democrats wanted the Democratie Party to • continue to win the presidency, theyhad to continue to adopt a moderate position on slavery, because a radical position on slavery would have alienated the party's
Southem constituency. Likewise, a position seen as radically pro-slavery had the
potential to alienate the Northem wing of the Democratie Party. Even while
Northem anti-slavery was in check, Many in the South desired the creation ofa
political party that had an exclusively Southem constituency in order to more
effectively provide them with the policies they sought. Northem members ofthe
Whig and Democratic political coalition knew that a political partyplatform built
rigidly on anti-slavery would have guaranteed the creation of a pro-Southem,
pro-slavery party to counterbalance it. Fearing this, the Whig and Democratic
parties were at great pains to adopt a largely pro-slavery stance throughout the
second party system. The perception that the Democratic Party in particular was
excessively pro-Southem eventually lead to the creation ofthe Republican Party
in the North.
Compact Theory The state in the United States differed from a "real state.,,17 It
was not a single, coherent, unitary state in which sovereign power Was
hierarchically organized, peaking at a single point that possessed ultimate
sovereignty; rather, this state was the product of a compact between the
sovereign and independent separate states that had withdrawn, fust, from British
authority and, second, from the Union created by the Articles ofConfederation.
That the Union was conceived ofas a compact between constituent units helped • l7 Deudney(1995: 192). 20 to maintain a sense within the constituent units ofthe American state that they • had not surrendered sovereignty to the federal govemment, but had retained ultimate sovereignty for themselves. In the early days ofthe Republic, adherence
to the theory of state sovereignty was prevalent in the both the North and the
South. Generally, the heliefin the sovereignty ofthe states was made possible by
the extent and import of the powers reserved to these constituent units by the
constitution.
According to the central principle of the compact theory of the state,
sovereign power did not reside in Congress, the presidency, or the Courts; rather,
sovereign power resided in the people of the separate states through their
separate state govemments and, occasionally, through state conventions. In their
sovereign capacity, the people ofthese states delegated certain specifie powers to
the federal government in Washington. The central state created through this
compact had no intrinsic power; rather, it exercised power by virtue of being
granted such authority by the people of the separate states of the Union.. The
Union was not perpetuai; it would only he maintained as long as its principles
and limits were maintained.. Thus, perhaps the most important formal institutions
maintaining limited govemment in the American Union were the powers
reserved to the separate states ofthe Union in their capacity as sovereign parties
to the Union compact and the very design ofthe state..
This govemment's power was not llnlirnited; the Constitution of the
United States granted the federai govemment a series of enumerated powers. • According to the Tenth Amendment, ~'The powers not delegated to the United 21 The compact theory ofthe American state was dominant within the Union, • especially in the South, during the antebellum period, but this was not the only theory of the state held by citizens of the United States at this time. Some
believed the Constitution created a single sovereign people, not a union of
several sovereign states. The Union was, from this perspective, an unbreakable
whole-not a collection ofseparate sovereignties. That this union was approved
by the states in their separate, sovereign capacity did not detract from the organic
unity of the Union. In the Articles of Confederation, each memher-state was
listed individually. According to the Constitution, '4We the people ofthe United
States...do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of
America.,,20 This shift in wording was not lost on those who saw the Union as a
national, unbreakable whole in which the people, not the states, were
sovereign.21
There is evidence to support the validity ofeach position. In bis argument
in favor ofa national interpretation ofthe Union, Samuel Beer claimed that there
is "much blank space" in the Constitution, meaning that a definitive answer to
this question cannot he had by examining the Constitution itself.22 No authority
could be greater than that ofJames Madison, who, in Federalist 62, argued that
20 Emphasis mine.
21 See the Hayne-Webster debates for a debate between the national and confederal attributes of the Union. See the tirst two speeches by Hayne and Webster respectively in Register ofDebates 1830. Senate, 21th Congress, Ist Session, pages 31-35 and Register ofDebates 1830. Senate, 21th Congress, Ist Session, pages 3541. Fora contemporary articulation orthe national view, see Beer (1993). • 22 Beer(1993: 23)• 23 the state created by the Constitution had both "national and federal character." • The "Great Compromise" between the large states and the small states provided the Union with a House of Representatives that derived its authority from the
will ofthe people and a Senate that gave the states, in their capacity as "political
and coequal societies,,,n equal political representation regardless of size. The
institution ofthe Senate was, Madison further claimed in Federalist 62, "at once
a Constitutional recognition of the portion of sovereignty remaining in the
individual states and an instrument in preserving that residuary sovereignty."
Maintaining this residual sovereignty was further enhanced by the fact that the
Constitution stipulated that state legislatures, and not a given state's electorate,
were to elect United States Senators.24 The election ofmembers ofthe House, in
districts of relatively equal population, suggested that the people, not the
constituent states, were sovereign. Despite assertions on both sides, from its
inception, the Union had both national and federal attributes.2S For the most part,
it was practical, rather than philosophical, considerations that determined on
which side of this debate one sat. The balance of political power in the federal
govemment largely determined adherence to one interpretation or another. While
Southem politicians' voices enjoyed (virtually) unrivaled dominance within the
23 Federalist Papers, page 244.
24 The Seventeenth Amendment provided for direct election ofSenators by astate's electorate. Even before the passage ofthe Seventeenth Amendment, many states gave theircitizens a voiee in the election oftheirSenators, but itwas not uotil the passage ofthis Amendment that tbis rule was formalized and nationalized. By 1860, South Carolina was the only state in which the state legislature selected its United States Senators without inputfrom the people. • 2S AIden (1969)• 24 Union, they were content to adopt a political stance consistent with a national • interpretation of the Union. It was only once the South was relegated to a secondary status within the Union that Southem politicians began to question the
federai government's nationalizing tendencies and adopt a position more
consistent with the federai orcompact interpretation ofthe Union.
Whether seen as a compact among states or as an organic whole, this state
was intentionally hobbled via a series of institutional innovations. The
Constitution clivided the power ofthe state fust between the central state and the
separate states and then between the three branches ofgovernment. The checks
and balances and separation ofpowers established by the Constitution limited the
power of the state by requiring the approval, support, or cooPeration of more
than one branch in the passage and implementation of laws; proper exercise of
Constitutional authority Permitted any one branch to check the power ofanother.
The institutional design ofthe American state assured that it would be weak and
have enforceable limits on its power.26
In EuroPe, threats to the territorial integrity of the state tended to come
from outside state boundaries. The exigencies of war facilitated the creation of
the state, and contributed immeasurably to its strengthening. One unique feature
ofthe American state was that the threat to the state's territorial integrity came
from within. In. North America the state was created in a context from which war
26 While there May be a distinction drawn between the idea of limited govemment and weak govemment in the political science literatuœ, [ take these terms to mean the same thing. While interpretations varied, what Americans in a position to make such choices wanted was- limited national govemmen~ though Dot so limited as thegovemmentunderthe Articles ofConfederatioD. To meet this expectation, the framers ofthe constitution purposely created a weak govemmen~ • with limited powers. 2S was largely absent, at least in comparison to Europe?7 Without being constrained • by the structurai requirements ofthe European context, the United States divided sovereignty between the branches of the federal govemment and hetween the
federal and state governments, making the ultimate location of sovereignty
contestable. This contestability assured the continuai invocation ofstates' rights
against the center, which eventually facilitated the invocation of the right to
secede. Thus, it was the lack ofan extemal threat to the territorial integrity ofthe
Union that allowed the founding fathers to create a Union designed according to
principles that facilitated the invocation of the right of secession, itself a
fundamental threat to a state's territorial integrity.
Threats to the Maintenance of Limited Govemment Balance in the Senate, the
bisectional nature of the party system in the antebellum period, and the
institutional design of the American State were the formai and informai
mechanisms employed for arriving at one end: the maintenance of limited
govemment. Although the Constitution could be changed to reflect new realities
within the Union, the amending process was arduous. As long as the North was
far short ofa constitution-amending majority, it could very easily he argued that
remaining inthe Union posed no danger to the South.
Although Many Southemers never saw a danger in remaining in the
Union, there were those, especially in the Deep South, who came to believe that
27 This rs not to suggest that war was wholly absent in North Ameri~ or that the United States did not engage in wars during this period. They did: the warofindependence, the warof1812 and the war with Mexico. Rather, my point is that there was a relative absence ofwarin North American compared to Europe. See, for example, Goldstein (1992) and Smalt and Singer (1982). Riker • (1964) disagrees• 26 remaining posed a fundamental risk to Southem institutions. The presence of • strong, enduring political parties had the potential to weaken the Constitutional separation ofpowers that limited national govemment. A president and Congress
dominated by a single party that was hostile to Southem interests-the
Republican Party, for example-could conceivably act in concert, making an
end-run around the constitutional separation of powers, and tum their vision of
American society into reality. This concem was not particularly prevalent under
Democratic administrations, because, at this tinte, the Democratic Party had a
more hands-off philosophy ofgovernance and a constituency that required them
to keep certain issues offthe agenda. These formai and informallimits on central
state authority would be unable to perform their intended function ifthe same
sectional political party dominated Congress and the Presidency.
The South, in other words, needed balance in the Senate as a specific
check on Northem anti-slavery leanings or, at a bare minimum, a president in the
White House who had a Southem constituency. Without at least one of these,
Southem institutions were not safe in the Union. Under unified Republican rule,
it was feared that the federal govemment would become the consolidated,
European-style state that those who desired limited govemment had always
feared. While balance in the Senate and the institutional design ofthe American
state were not directly intertwined, maintaining this balance was perceived by
Southemers as an essential. part ofmaintaining limited govemment. Ifbalance in
the Senate were eliminated and the president and congress controlled by a party • with no Southem constituency, itmight appear as ifthe institutional design ofthe 27 Union had changed, even ifno formal alteration in its design had occurred. Thus, • Southem apprehensions about the power of the state were magnified by demographic changes within the Union that permitted the North to rule without a
Southem coalition partner, which threatened, in essence, to alter the design ofthe
state and turn it over to Northem hands..
Literature Review: Secession
Despite an ever-growing literature on secession in the field of political
science, not to mention the increasing incidence and threat ofsecession, this act
of political withdrawal remains contested at ils core.. This is true not only in
terms of causes, which are always difficult to outline, but also in tenus of
definitions, and whether, or under what conditions, secession is morally justified.
Not surprisingly, then, the field of political science lacks agreement on the
conditions and factors contributing to secession. There is, in other words, no
common framework for examining secession.. Outlining such a framework is one
ofthe central tasks ofthis chapter..
To assure conceptual clarity in this discussion of secession, l will fust
dispense with definitional issues. Secession is not just any instance ofpolitical
withdrawal. Withdrawal ftom a political convention, such as occurred in
Charleston, South Carolina in April 1860, is not the kind of secession this
dissertation concems.. For the purposes ofthis work, secession is defined as "the
formal withdrawal of a constituent unit ftom an established, intemationally • 28 recognized state and the creation of a new state.,,28 Not explicitly stated, but • nonetheless important, is the fact that the withdrawing group must seek to create a new state by taking territory and people from an old, extant state. That is, the
political and territorial link between the seceding unit (the people and the
territory) and the host state must he severed and fundamentally recast. The
population and territorial sC0Pe ofan old state must be reduced, and a new state
must be created. Before secession, the relationship between the host state and the
secessionist unit faIls under the category of domestic politics. There is an
established, hierarchical relationship between them. After secession, the
relationship between the host state and the new state becomes "international"
politics. Secession is constituted both by the recasting of the relationship
between the secessionist unit and the host state and by the diminution ofthe host
state's territory and population. Secessionists do not necessarily seek to destroy
or alter the regime ofthe host state,29 although its alteration or destruction May
come as a result ofa secession attempt, he it successful or not.30
21 Bartkus (1999: 9). See also Buchanan (1991: 22); Dion (1996); Hechter (1992); Hor"oNitz (1985); Wood (1981).
29 The tenns Uhost state" and Ucenter'~ are used to denote the state from which secession is attempted.
30 Also according to Nettl (l968)~ threat to regime is the primary challenge found in the more statist societies ofEurope. See Rueschmeyerand Skocpol (1996). lnNorth Americ~ especiallythe United States~ the regime was rarely subjeet ta challenge. The mixture of democracy and republicanism outlined in the Constitution ofthe United States was almost universally accepte~ something unheard of in the countries of Europe. What was chaIlenged in the United States, however, was the territorial scope of the regime. Many Southem states, after Many years of sectional strife, determined that the Union of 1789 would no longer include them, even as they • adopted a constitution that was modeled on the U.S. Constitution• 29 Secession presents a significant challenge to the current international state • system.31 On one hand, it affirms the state-as-norm reality of the international system and promotes the much-misunderstood norm ofself-determinatioD. At the
same time, however, it threatens the equally important norm of territorial
integrity of the units within the system. Secession is a unique phenomenon
precisely because it both undermines and reinforces dominant norms of the
international system.32
Seeession: Effeet and Cause
nie effects of secession are widely known: War and other conflicts often
result from this attempt atterritorial diminution ofexisting states. The legitimacy
ofthe secessionist attempt is often challenged by nearly all but those who seek to
secede. Even within the population on whose behalf the secessionists act, the
legitimacy of secession may he questioned.33 Given the prevalence of barriers,
both internal and extemal, that confront the secessionist movement, not to
mention the violence that can follow, one must wonder why secession would
ever be coosidered. Why is if desired by sorne, but not by others? Why is it
successful, even ifooly for a short time, in sorne locales and oot inothers? What,
31 Boniface (1998); Buchanan (1995).
32 These norms were not in place when South Carolina and the South seceded in 1860 and l86L
33 Quebecois secessionists believe they have a right to secede from Canada, but they question the legitimacy ofanglophone West Island Montrealers or aboriginals in northem Quebec who might seek to secede from Quebec in order to remain in Canada. Partition in the event ofsecessiolL is supported by Ottawa. As Doran (1996) notes, "Ottawa has reversed that poliey by stating that if Quebee separated, Anglophone Montreal would have an incentive to secede and indeed would secede." This division within the larger secessionist population was also seen in the Southem United States priorto the Civil War. Many ''true'' Soutbem men believed that secession was not a • legitimate solution to the grievances confronting the South. 30 in other words, explains the decision ofa sub-state unit to attempt to reconstitute • themselves as a new state'f4 The authors reviewed below consider these questions.
Theories ofSecession
Predictive theories and analytical frameworks for understanding and
explaining secession remain in their infancies. Few of either have been
developed, and even fewer have been tested. One explanation for this lacuna May
lay in the complexity and idiosyncratic nature of the phenomenon itself: This
uniqueness lends itselfmore to single case studies, than to the creation ofgrand,
generalizable theories or frameworks. Still, general models and frameworks do
exist. They are reviewed below.
Wood's Preconditions ofSecession In one ofthe tirst contemporary attempts to
take up secession as a general phenomenon, John Wood noted:
Despite the vital importance ofthe outcome ofcurrent secessionist attempts for both the wide array of states in which they are occurring and intemational politics at large, there is at present no coherent, systematic way ofanalyzing the origins ofsecession, the conditions which make it succeed or fail, or the consequences of various secessionist strategies or governmental responses..3S
Rather than being content with "ad hoc explanations of the secessionist
impulse," Wood wanted to facilitate the development of a theory that would
"possess both cross-cultural and cross-temporal applicability.." "Ideally," he
J4 Notice the judicious avoidance of the word "cause." While fmding the cause of whatever phenomenon being examined ought to be the task of the social science practitioner, a more modest, and indeed realistic task is attempting to descn"be the conditions in which a particular phenomenon is more or less likely to occur.. • 3S Wood (1981: 107).. 31 noted, "it should he valid for polities ofany size or ideological type.n36 Wood's • attempt was much needed, and his words remain true to this day: Secession is a problem for both the intemational system and the individual states ofwhich it is
comprised, and still it remains under-explained.
The first precondition Wood identified is geographical. That is, there must
be a "separable territory which contains the bulk ofthe potentially secessionist
population.,,37 He noted the "crucial determinant of separability is whether
territory cao he detached from the larger state without doing unacceptable harm
to its or the secessionist territory's military security or access to markets and
oatural resources.,,38 The boundarles along which a secession movement seeks to
secede are ordinarily "existing provincial or regiooal boundaries.,,39 Wood
explained this as being the result of "movement oetworks" that are created by
such boundaries.40 Thus, this precondition is as much about geographic
separability as it is about the institutiooal design of the state, although Wood
oever elaborated upon this point. Existing provincial or regional boundaries are
36 Wood (1981: 108).
37 Wood (1981:112).
38 Wood (1981: 112).
39 Wood (1981:114).
40 Wood (1981: 1(4). Hechter (1992) and Yarbrough and Yarbrough (1998), impliciûy, bave a different explanation for why secession might occur along existing provincial or regional boundaries. On the one band, these boundaries might also bound grievances, such as when a region is discriminated against by the host state. On the other, the border in question migbt constitute the boundary of a certain type of belief, discourse or institution, where altering boundaries would make a certain group or ioterest, previously a powerless minority, ioto a • majority. 32 not simply geographic characteristics-they are linked to the structure of the • political system. The second precondition Wood identified is the social pre-condition.
While the social pre-condition is customarily related to ethnicity, the more
general point is that "group solidarity," however the group is defined-be it
through ethnicity, some common producer or consumer interest, language, or
religion-"is an essential precondition for secessionist alienation.,,4l
A third precondition Wood identitied is the economic precondition of
secession. According to Wood, this is "the frustration ofexpectations raised by
continued economic progress and then dashed by a sudden reversal.,,42 Wood
wrote that this "may push a potentially secessionist group to the brink of
rebellion.,,43 A "changing pattern of access to modemization benefits such that
the potentially secessionist group perceives or anticipates deprivation of its
'rightful' sbare" is, according to Wood, another precondition of secessionist
activity.44 Wood noted that secession is the response ofa group trying to prevent
or remedy actual or potential losses, rather than being the action of a group
boping to increase gains.
Fourth, Wood identified the political precondition ofsecession. For Wood,
this precondition centers mainly on "the absence or decline, at least in the
4L Wood (1981: 116).
41 Wood (1981: 116).
43 Wood (1981: 116-117). • 44 Wood (1981: 121)• 33 perception of potential secessionists, of the legitimacy of the political system • and/or incombent central regime.',4S According to Wood, the perception of declining legîtimacy ean be brought about by developments both at the center or
the (potentially seeessionist) periphery. A decline in the perception of the
center's legitimacy will, in Wood's view, create the "belief among potential
secessionists that the costs ofsecession are less than the cost ofremaining in the
larger state.,,46 Wood points to a number of possible sources of regime
delegitimization. Among them are "the failure ofthe state to engender feelings of
group identity, to proteet and insure a minimum ofwelfare for its citizens, or to
cope with global demographic, economic, and social problems.,,47 Increasing
centralization in astate May work to decrease state legjtimacy, but an increase in
state decentralization may "whet...the secessionist appetite',4S because the move
for decentralization May come as a result ofdeelining state legitimacy.
While noting the importance of regime delegitimization, Wood fails to
specify the link between this and the institutional design of the state. The
devolution of state functions to local units May whet the appetites of
secessionists because creating or strengthening state-lîke institutions al the sub
state level may contribute to the perception that the host state is not
indispensable to the secessionist unît. ft also gives the potentially secessionist
4S Wood (l981: 118)~
46 Wood (l981: 122)~
47 Wood (1981: 118)• • ... Wood (l981: 119)• 34 unit its own increasingly independent source ofpower. The development ofstate • capacity at the level ofthe secessionist sub-state unit glves the secessionist group the institutional capacity it will require if it seeks to withdraw from the central
state. Finally, Wood noted that an increase in participation in institutions unable
to accommodate new demands might threaten central state legitimacy.49
Regardless of the source, a decline in the legitimacy ofthe host state decreases
the cost ofsecession.
The fifth precondition Wood identified is the psychological precondition
of secession. This precondition '''galvanize[s] all other preconditions of
secession."so He described it as the "emotional elements of the desire for an
independent homeland on the part of the secessionists."Sl Wood noted that the
"basic underlying motivation for secession May be a need for security or self-
preservation."Sl This means that secession is, at its foundation, motivated by
fear: specifically, a fear of being excluded from the enjoyment of some set of
goods, a fear ornot being able to determine one's destiny, or, most importantly, a
fear for one's survival. Without this emotional element, the other secessionist
preconditions lack salience to compel an individual or a group to pursue a risky
course of action. If we accept fear (for survival) as a primary condition for
49 For instance, where political participation bas enjoyed an upsurge, but where political parties bave not formed to aggregate and cbannel citizen preferences, political participation May take unconventional ordestructive forms.
SO Wood (1981: 120).
St Wood (1981: 120). • 52 Wood (1981: 120)• 35 secession, then the desire for a homeland must be seen as Iittle more than a • means toward eliminating that fear. Even ifwe grant that people desire to live in political units where people like themselves rule, such a desire will not lead to an
increase in secessionist sentiment unless a strong fear is aIso present.
Having established the preconditions for secession, Wood then considered
explanations for the rise of secessionist movements, because secession is ooly
possible if a secessionist movement arises to take advantage of these
preconditions. Wood identified "three movement-defining criteria-ideology,
leadership, and organization."SJ For Wood, the "ideological content of virtually
every secessionist movement's appeal is some fonn ofnationaIism,,,S4 but more
important than ideology for Wood, however, are the leaders orthe movement for
secession. After ail, he argues, these secessionist entrepreneurs "bring
secessionist preconditions to life."ss For Wood, the most important tasks of the
secessionist entrepreneur are "gaining publicity for the secessionist cause
and...wearing down the resolve ofthe central government."S6
Finally, a secessionist movement May take on a variety oforganizational
forms. Wood noted tbat a movement May take the form of ad hoc gro~ps with
little coherence, or it May take the fonn of highly fonnalized political parties.
Each organizational fonn has its advantages and disadvantages: "Small, poorly
53 Wood (1981: 122).
54 Wood (1981: 122).
sSWood(1981: 123). • 56 Wood (1981: 124)• 36 coordinated cells...may gain in spontaneity of action, but lose through • noncumulativeness of impact and vulnerability to repression."S7 If the secessionists are organized into a political party and regularly participate in
elections, they gain legitimacy but may be forced into the trap ofthe moderating
electoral compromise that has neutralized radical movements in the past.S8 Thus,
as Wood noted, winning and keeping office might soften secessionists' demands
and comPeI them to alter ultimate goals.S9
The host state's response to the secessionist challenge cao have a
"conclusive effect on the outcome of a secessionist attempt.,,60 For Wood, the
center cao choose one of two possible alternatives: it can either violently
suppress the secessionist attempt, or it can attempt to establish a constitutional
compromise that will satisfy the secessionists' demands. Each alternative has its
disadvantages. Repression of the secessionist movement May actually result in
strengthening and expanding support for secession. Likewise, every
constitutional compromise may he met with another demande Whatever the
action taken, the center's ultimate goal is to augment the perception of its
legitimacy, but every effort to increase its legitimacy May actually decrease it
and increase the legitimacy of those making secessionist demaods.61 Given the
S7Wood (1981: 124).
sa pzeworski and Sprague (1986) examine the decision to participate and the consequences ofthat participation in the context ofEuropean socialism. Participating in. the politics ofthe center may pose a similar dilemma to secessionists.
S9 Wood (1981: 124-125).
60 Wood (1981: 125)• • 61 Wood (1981: 125-127). 37 dilemmas ofeach possible path, establishing and maintaining legitimacy will he • diffi~ult-especiallyin the face ofdetermined secessionists with a broad base of popular support.
Next, Wood examined the immemate precipitants ofsecession, wmch are
present when "a secessionist crisis May be said to exist.,,62 For the secessionists,
this is the point at which "the secession attempt is actually carried out.,,63 For the
hast state, this is where the decision ''to defeat the secessionists in armed
confrontation" is made.64 Wood concluded that it is almost impossible to
predetermine what combination of elements would push one side or the other
beyond the point ofno retum.
Whatever the precipitating event, each side must seek ta maximize the
moral legitimacy of their decision. For the secessionists, a victory in a
referendum or sorne similar election held on the question of secession could
provide them with the legitimacy required. For the center, the legitimation of
repression will he harder to come by, but nonetheless can he found in the
appropriate circumstances. If the secessionists seek to create a society that is
unjust by contemporary moral standards, then the center might he able to
maintain the moral upper band by preventing the secessionist attempt-even if
through violent, repressive measures. Existing states seeking moral legitimacy
62 Wood (1981: 128).
63 Wood (1981: 128)." • 64 Wood(l981: 128)• 38 are buttressed by the fact that few norms are more entrenched than that of • maintaining the territorial integrity ofexisting states. Finally, Wood considered "the resolution of secessionist crises byarmed
conflict.,,65 In this case, there is no established set ofcircUntstances that leads to
an established set of outcomes. One ofthe fundamental conclusions of Wood's
work is that the success or fallure· of an attempt at secession or of a war of
secession cannot he predicted. There are too Many idiosyncratic variables to
permit reliable prediction. The central government May have the advantage in a
traditional war; ifthe war is unconventional, secessionists May be able to tip the
balance of advantages in their favor. Additionally, outside intervention in the
secessionist conflict May prove crucial: If the secessionist group has support
from abroad, the balance of advantages can be tipped in its favor. However,
given that the centrifugai forces of session are a source of territorial insecurity
potentially confronting aU states, external state actors are typically reluctant to
offer support to any secessionist group;66 in general, external support is given to
the existing state.67
Hechter's Dynamic ofSecession Wood sought to establish the preconditions of
secession. He demonstrated little interest in the dynamic of secession or the
linkages among the various preconditions. Michael Hechtel proPOsed an
6S Wood (1981: 128).
66 Sec, however, Heraclides (1990). • 67 Wood (1981: 129-133)• 39 "analysis of secession based upon rational choice premises,,68 in which the • linkages between preconditions and the dynamic ofsecession is established and examined. The creation of states through secession, Hechter noted, is different
from Mere political fragmentation, because secession is the result of choices
made by a secessionist population on one hand and by host state leaders on the
other. For Hechter, that secession is the result ofchoices made by individuals or
groups ofindividuals makes it ripe for rational choice analysis.
Hechter claimed that secession is "the outcome of four separate
processes.,,69 The first process concems the presence of group identification.
Low group identification hampers secession, while high group identification
creates a context in which secessionist sentiment can flourish-though ooly
certain groups will have the necessary requirements for developing a high degree
of group identification. Among the interests that will lead to a high degree of
group identification are common production and consumption înterests. In
general, this means that diversified economies will lead to diverse political
preferences within a single region, and, therefore, a low level ofcommon interest
and low level of group identification. However, when the economy is not
diversified, the regional population will have common interests, common
political preferences in regard to the reguiation ofthe economy, and a high level
of group identification. Common consumption habits among a population can
have the same effect. Hechter noted, "To the degree that regions have unique
61 Hechter(1992: 267)• • 69 Hechter(1992: 271). 40 economic specializations and cultural compositions, their chances ofdeveloping • secessionist movements are enhanced. Further, regions that have both distinctive economic interests and distinctive cultures have the best prospects ofdeveloping
such movements.,,70 Communication also contributes to the development of
regional identity. Hechter noted, "In order to develop such identification,
individuals with common objective interests must he able to communicate with
each other.,,71 The group, in other words, will speak the same language and
idiom. Perhaps the most important source ofgroup identification is also the most
subjective: Hechter noted, "People having common interests must recognize
themselves as members of a particular group.,,72 Thus, when an individual
perceives a common interest between himself and another individual, he will
believe that they are part of the same group and, therefore, have a common
interest.
Even with a high degree of group identification, however, dilemmas of
collective action remain. Sorne theories of group identification suggest that
groups based upon a primordial attacbment do not face the same collective action
problem as other groupS.73 According to Hechter, this is false. He noted, "Once
70 Hechter(1992: 271).
71 Hechter(1992: 271).
72. Hecbter (1992: 271). • 73 Hecbter(1992: 272-273)• 41 individual rationality is countenanced...then group identification can no longer • be regarded as a sufficient condition ofcollective action.",4 Thus, second, political institutions that facilitate collective action are
crucial elements that turn on regional identification, making these institutions the
basis for individual participation in a collective project. For Hechter, successful
collective action is linked to political party formation. For him, institutions that
facilitate the creation ofpolitical parties may, under certain conditions, increase
the possibility of secession. The institutions to which he refers are, at the very
least, established norm of freedom of speech and association. However, for
party-formation to successfully take place, there needs to he more than simply a
facilitative political context. Successful political party formation dePends upon
the ability ofa party to provide constituents with a variety ofgoods-patronage
(or jobs) being the Most obvious and important example. The ability to provide
patronage is aided by the institutional design of the state itself: More regional
autonomy means more state capacity at the regional level, meaning a winning
regional party will have more jobs to fill at the regionalleve1.75
Third, Hechter examined the social bases of the secession movement.
According to Hechter, those who are more inclined to support secession are
those who believe that they have something to gain economically from secession.
Supporters of secession, he argued, are more likely to be middle-class, white
collar bureaucrats whose economic well-being is not dependent upon remaining
74 Hechter (1992: 273). • 75 Hechter(1992: 274-275). 42 in the confines ofthe host state. Because the patronage positions available to a • secessionist party are finite, the economic benefits of secession must extend beyond the creation and distribution of these positions alone. A region whose
dependence on the host economy is low is more likely to be secessionist, because
it would have less to lose by severing the POlitical ties between state and sub-
state than a region whose dependence on the host economy was high. In addition,
Hechter claimed that perception of host state strength affects the 'POssibility of
pursuing secession. He noted, "Weakness ofthe host state is encouraging for two
quite different reasons...it reduces the economic benefits of regional
incorporation...[and] it reduces the host state's capacity to repress secessionist
mobilization.,,76 Conversely, a host state that is perceived as strong is less likely
to suifer from secessionist pressures.
The fourth and final element in Hechter's model ofsecession concems the
willingness ofthe host state to part with the secessionist territory. This portion of
the process ofsecession centers on the reaction ofthe host state to the sub·state
unit's calls for secession. Host state reactions can range from attempting to
compromise with the secessionists, to repressing the movement, to allowing
secessionists to depart with what was formerly the host state's territory. Perhaps
the least costly response is, in effect, buying the secessionists off:
Assuming, as Hechter does, that secessionists are primarily concemed
with economic gains, buying them off is not ooly the least costly course of
76 Hechter (1992: 276). This same weakness, however, could also work to militate against secession. Ifthe state in question is weak, it cannot pose the same threat to a sub-state unit tbat a • strong statecouId. 43 action, but aIso the one most likely to meet with success. ConstitutionaI reforms • are more costly and unlikely to convince the secessionists to abandon their agenda. Concessions granted to secessionists May increase support for secession,
orencourage secessionists to press the center for more concessions. Buying them
off appears to have no such drawbacks, but May lead ta more requests that will,
in turn, cast more money.
Repression of the secessionist movement, Hechter noted, "is likely to he
the state's last resort.,,17 The hast state's decision to follow this path depends
upon three factors: the nature of the territory, the military capacity of the hast
state and the secessionist region, and the reaction of other states in the
international system. Simply put, when the cost of repression appears ta he too
high, this option will not he selected by the hast state.
The unlikely prospect that all these factors will converge makes secession
an unlikely outcome. Hechter concluded, "few regions bave the structural
requirements for the development of a secessionist movement.,,78 Even if they
did, other factors would continue ta make it unlikely. Perhaps the strongest
inhibitor of secession is the international, self-enforcing norm of territorial
integrity, which would discourage any state in the international system from
supporting a movement to which they themselves could faIl victim.. Finally,
existing states seem ta have the upper band in preventing secession..'9 According
77 Hechtel' (1992: 278).
78 Hechter (1992: 280)• • 19 Pegg (L999).. 44 to Hechter, secession, unlike political fragmentation, will remain rare in the • international system~ Hechter outlined a very useful model ofsecession, one that simplified the
preconditions outlined in Wood's article and clarified the dynamic among the
given variables, helping us to better understand the processes at work; yet, the
model is still t1awed~ Filst, Hechter, like Wood, fails to offer any account ofthe
manner in which the institutional design of the state influences mobilization for
secession and contributes to its ultimate success or failure~ Second, Hechter's
discussion ofgroup identification and interest is insufficient: He does not explain
why common identity in the region would lead the group to seek to secede from
the host state. 1 will argue later that there must be sorne grievance or threat
against which secessionist entrepreneurs can mobilize secessionist support, but,
in this model, the role of grievance is not developed~ Given the central raie
grievance plays in mobilization for secession, this factor requires elaboration~
The fundamental problem with Hechter's model is that, while every element he
describes May he present, it does not necessarily Mean that secession will result.
A high degree of group identification and a high potential for collective action
can exist, and there are always those who will benefit, or believe they will
benefit, from an alteration ofthe territorial status quo. Yet, a necessary level of
support will he unattainable unless secessionist entrepreneurs make the
population aware of a profound threat to the secessionist unit. Calculations of
potential benefits will not suffice because ofthe considerable stock ofresponses • possessed by the hast state. Any perceived benefit has a chance of being 4S mitigated by the potential cost the host state can impose. For secession to occur, • a region must be confronted with the reality or inevitability ofa catastrophic loss brought on by the action or inaction ofthe host state. The grievance experienced
by the secessionist unit.need not be caused by the host state, but the host state
must he seen as unwilling or unable to do anything about it.
Dion's Model Secession, Hechter concluded, is difficult to accomplish. Stephane
Dion's work arrives at a similar conclusion, but reaches it in a different way.
Dion's goal is to explain why secession is difficult in well-established
democracies. According to the model ofsecession he develops, the requirements
for secession are typically absent in well-established democracies. Dion's
immediate referent is Quebec, the sub-state unit in the West furthest along on the
road to secession.so His model is parsimonious and generalizable, and it May
prove to be simpler and more useful than the models previously examined. While
Dion does not examine the process of secession in the way Hechter does, for
instance, he distills the elements ofthe rise ofsecessionist mobilization in a more
parsimonious fashion than either of the previous works. Dion's model cao. be
summarized in the following fashion: "Secession movements are rooted in two
types of perceptions: the fèar înspired by the union and the confidence inspired
by secession." He argues that "secessions are improbable in well-established
democracies because these two perceptions are unlikely to exist simultaneously
at a high level ofintensity."SL Simply put, for secession to he likely, the sub-state
sa Meadwell (1995). • Il Dion (1996: 271), italics in original. 46 unit must have a sufficiently high level of fear of remaining in the union and a • high level of confidence in the success of secession. The very nature of democratic political systems means this necessary combination will rarely exist.
Dion defines fear as the "sense among members of a regional group that
their cultural, economic or political situation will deteriorate within the existing
union. Confidence is the sense among the group that it can perform hetter on its
own and that secession is not too risky."S2 Unlike the model developed by
Hechter, Dion considers fear a necessary element of secession and secessionist
mobilization.
Secession remains difficult, according to Dion, because "the fear ofbeing
weakened within the union and the confidence of increasing the group's well
being outside the union are two types of perceptions that are unlikely to he
simultaneously strong. When one is high, the other tends to he 10w.,,83
Confidence in the success ofsecession tends to coincide with a low level offear
in the union. Likewise, a high degree of fear in the union tends to he related to
low confidence in secession. Dion outlines the "antithetical" effect ofthese two
variables across "three dimensions of nationalism outlined by Gellner: cultural
distinctiveness, economic and educational skills, and political power.,,84
Cultural distinctiveness can lead to a cultural fear-generally, a fear of
assimilation. Fear of assimilation is operative particularly when a significant
82 Dion (1996: 271), italics in originaL
Il Dion (1996: 273). • 14 Dion (1996: 273). 47 portion of the population within a POtentially secessionist region is culturally • similar to the majority population of the union. The secessionists May see the group similar to the majority population as a cultural fifth column. This
intermingling of secessionist and non-secessionist populations, each oriented
toward a different cultural center, May contribute to a sufficientiy intense level of
fear, but confidence in a smooth secession will continue to he absent hecause of
the likelihood that the minority population within the secessionist region will he
opPOsed to secession. When a region bas no fear of cultural assimilation, high
. confidence in secession will not lead regional actors to pursue a secessionist
path, precisely because fear is absent.8s
Economie fear and confidence operate in a similar fashion. A region that
is economically dominant May feel confident in the prosPects of secession, but
will not feel a level offear sufficient to compel it to secede. Likewise, where a
region is economically dependent uPOn the center, this dependence can create a
considerable amount of fear of remaining in the union, but there will he little
confidence in the prospects ofsecession.86 For example, ifa region depends upon
the center for investment oras a market for goods produced in the region, fear of
remaining in the Union May easily develop, but the structure orthe relationship
undermines the possibility ofanyconfidence in secession.
Political fear and confidence centers on state centralization. While a high
degree of state centralization May lead to a high level of fear, the state's
Ils Dion (1996 273-214)• • 86 Dion (1996: 274). 48 This model of secession outlines the essential elements of secessionist • mobilization, but the model itselfremains problematic for a numher ofreasons. Dion notes that the "fear-confidence antithetical effects associated with one
dimension can also influence the other two,,,90 but he fails to specify the
significance of this dynamic. The antithetical dynamic within each separate
dimension does not necessarily have to he operative between the dimensions.
Thus, a high level of fear of remaining in the Union present in one dimension
will not necessarily adversely affect the level of confidence in another. For
example, should a threatened group mobilizing for secession based upon fear of
cultural assimilation from sorne actual or perceived threat enjoy the benefits of
decentralized political power, confidence in secession will not necessarily he
undermined. Thus, fear along the cultural dimension and confidence along the
political dimension may make secession more likely, even as the antithetical
effects within each dimension are operative.
Furthermore, Dion's model seems to he more static than he claims. That
is, Dion demonstrates Iittle appreciation for the speed at which a secessionist
region could shift from a low level offear to a high level offear, increasing the
likelihood of secession.91 In explaining the relevance of political issues ta
secession, Dion writes that the fear inspired byunion might be increased "ifthere
is a further move toward centralization," but that, in "such a case, however,
secession entails surmounting some big obstacles which undermine confidence • 90 Dion (1996: 275)• 50 in the success of secession" because of4 need to take over public services.92 • On the other hand: [I)n a case of high decentralization, where the regional group's public institutions already dispense Many services, it becomes easier to develop a confidence that political sovereignty is within reach; but, then, secessionist leaders face difficulties convincing a majority of the regional group to fear an accommodating central govemment and to breakwith it.93
Dion fails to note the obvious connection between these two conditions. SimpLy
put, in astate characterized by high decentralization, where confidence in
secession would be high and fear of union would be Low, a sufficiently intense
level offear could be created by the threat ofincreased centralization. Given the
fluctuating nature of a POlitical equilibria, especially in democratic political
contexts, the mere threat of increased centralization could quickly change the
strategic context of choice from one in which secession is unlikely to one in
which it is probable. A requisite Level of fear of union could develop rather
quickly, but confidence in secession must deveLop over an extended period of
time. This confidence May best be achieved in a decentralized political context,
making a decentralized political union riper for secession than any other context.
An added limitation built ioto Dion's model is that he concentrates on
contexts where secession is voted on in a referendum or some other election.
This means that for secession to be brought about, a majority-if not a
9L Dion (1996: 271). Confidence in secession will not occur suddenly; it must be developed over time. Fear, however, can develop as suddenly as the circumstances that prompt il.
91 Dion (1996: 274).
93 Dion (1996: 274). This condition makes secession unlikely in this context. The necessity of • accommodation betweertthe hoststate and the regional unit makes the status quo self-enforcing. 51 supermajority-must support secession. Despite Dion's empbasis on the • electoral process, elections are ooly one among many defining cbaracteristics of a democracy.94 Secession bas occurred in otherwise-democratic contexts where
the question of secession was not subject to a referendum. And even if there
were a vote cast on the question of. secession, the vote itself would not
necessarily provide an accurate representation of the will of the people
especially if secessionist leaders were successful at demobilizing opposition to
secession. Thus, sufficiently entrepreneurial secessionist entrepreneurs May be
able to accomplish secession in the absence ofmajority support for secession.
Finally, Dion's theory of secession lacks a proper understanding of the
state. It is, after all, the state from which secession occurs-and astate that the
secessionist group seeks to create. The centrality ofthe state can he inferred from
the central elements of secession that Dion identifies. However, the important
role the design of the state plays requires extensive and explicit consideration.
The past, present, and future design of the state are vital factors in the
development offear and confidence in a secession movement.
Bartkus's Dvnamic ofSecession In a recently published study ofsecession, Viva
Ona Bartkus writes that "the timing ofthe decision to secede can he understood
within the framework structured around four primary variables: (1) the benefits
ofcontinued membership in the larger existing political entity; (2) the costs of
such membership; (3) the costs ofsecession; and (4) the benefits ofsecession.,,95
94 Schmitterand Karl (1996). • 9S Bartkus (1999: 4). 52 Secession occurs, Bartkus notes, "ooly when the distinct community detennines • that there has been a shift in the balance of these four variables..,,96 Bartkus identifies "four necessary elements for secession: a distinct community, territory,
leaders, and discontent.,,97
Distinct community, the tirst necessary element, refers to the group that
seeks to secede from the host state and must be associated with an identifiable
territory-the second necessary element-that the distinct community wishes to
withdraw from the original political community to create a new state..
Secessionist entrepreneurs (leaders), the third necessary element, focus group
demands, leading them toward secession. Discontent, the fourth necessary
element, refers to the grievance felt by the distinct community. The presence of
sorne discontentment compels the distinct community to attempt to alter the
political and territorial status quo.
Bartkus's tirst primary variable, the benefits ofcontinued membership in
the larger existing political entity, refers to what Bartkus calls the "potential
services provided by the state.,,98 She writes that "communities gain security,
economic and social advantages by maintaining their position within the larger,
existing state.,,99 Furthermore, she indicates that"calculation ofsnch benefits has
dissuaded sorne communities from the secessionist path" and, inversely, that
96 Bartkus (1999:4).
97 Bartkus (1999: 8).
98 Bartkus (1999: 19). • 99 Bartkus (1999: 50)• S3 The benefits of secession are generally regarded as given by those who • seek to secede. AIl else being equal, it is better to be ruled by members ofone's own group, however defined, than by members ofa different group. This is the
essence ofthe nationalist argument "that the political and national unit should be
congruent.,,103 Thus, despite the cost ofsecession and the benefit ofremaining in
the union, there is always a benefit associated with secession. The cost of
secession and the benefits ofcontinued membership usually mitigate the benefits
ofsecession.
Bartkus employs the useful metaphor of "motion on a scale" to describe
the dYQamic between the above variables. On one side are the factors that
prevent secession: the benefits ofmembership and the costs ofsecession; on the
other are the factors that facilitate secession: the costs of membership and the
benefits of secession. A change in one or more of these variables cao tip the
scales and prevent secession from occurring or greatly increase its likelihood.
For example, a reduction in the benefits ofmembership in the existing state cao
be brought about if the state no longer provides the services the distinct
community believes it ought to provide or has provided in the past. A shift along
this variable might compel the region to consider secession. Similarly, a sudden
rise in the cost of membership might provide impetus for secession of "last
resort."l04 rt: for example, a ruling regime becomes physically or culturally
102 Bartkus (1999: 79).
103 Gellner(1987: 1). • 104 Bartkus (1999: 21). 5S and which weigh less. For example, does the cost of secession generally figure • more into the calculation ofwhether to secede than the benefit of membership? If, as she claims, the success or failure ofsecession depends upon some shift in
the balance between costs and henefits ofseceding and maintaining membership,
then she ought to specify the influence a shift in the level ofany given cost or
henefit would have in prompting or inhibiting secession.
Bartkus is equally guilty of complicating her analysis of secession: She
separates the cost and benefit of membership (or secession) ioto discrete
variables. Each variable can be either high or low, but certain combinations of
variables are, with few exceptions, mutually exclusive. For example, it is
unlikety that a given distinct community will perceive a high benefit of
continued membership in a community white simultaneously perceiving a high
cost ofmembership. Can a state he seen as both providing the necessary services
to a distinct community as well as endangering the lives of a community's
members orculture? The cost or henefit ofmaintaining membership ina political
community comprises a single variable: When one is high, the other is low,
almost by definition. Despite the fact that Bartkus claims that there will he
instances when both cost and henefit are high, 107 the types ofhenefit and cost she
is at pains to descrihe (respectively, security in a war-prone international system
and state-sanctioned genocide) will almost never exist simultaneously. In the
unlikely event that they do, the threat posed by the state's malfeasance will
certainly supercede any benefit the state provides in protecting the region from • 107 Bartkus (1999: 34). 57 external threats. The same state will not be seen as both providing a security • umbrella to the group and committing genocide against it. Finally, as with the other models ofsecession l have examined, Bartkus virtually ignores the role the
institutional design of the state plays in territorial and political outcomes. As
with other models, the central importance of the design of the state is inferred,
but there is no explicit discussion ofit.
Bartkus does, bowever, acknowledge the limitations of ber framework.
She advocates moving from the realm of models to the realm of historical
instances ofsecession, where the examination ofindividual cases is structured by
the rules of thumb provided by ber model. As the author notes, "this theoretical
limitation can be overcome through the supplementary investigation of
individual cases ofsecession crises."108
Other Relevant Theories of Secession Emizet and Hesli's model of secession
was developed for the specifie purpose ofexamining and explaining secession in
the former Soviet Union. They "address the general thesis that secession
movements are undertaken for the purpose of emancipation from economie
exploitation, for the purpose ofmaintaining or preserving an endangered cultural
identity, or for the purpose of achieving redress from sorne form of political
grievance."l09 They find a high degree of support for the first hypothesis and
much less support for the second and third hypotheses, suggesting that economic
considerations were a decisive element in the "disposition to secede" in the
IDa Bartkus (1999: 24)• • 109 Emizetand Hesli (1995: 498-499). 58 former Soviet Union. Equally interesting is the moderate support for the idea that • the disposition to secede can be related to a "historical memory of independence.,,110 This suggests that the constituent units offederal systems May
be more inclined to secede if these regions have historical experience with
sovereignty or the beliefthat they are sovereign. In other words, the model they
develop implicitly recognizes the importance of the institutional design of the
state. Despite this implicit reco8lÙtion, the relevance of the state for secession
remains under-theorized and under-explained. This model, therefore, remains
flawed in much the same manner as the others examined.
Beth and Robert Yarbrough have developed a new and fascinating model
of secession and unification that identifies the rationale for secession as a desire
to "escape tock-in," or an "inferior equilibrium of a Coordination Game.n111
According to this model, secession or unification will he sought when
fundamental political and economic refonn within a country is desired but
impossible to implement simply by announcing an alteration in the behavior of
individuals. Alterations in the nation's political economy May ooly appear
unpopular because of the unwillingness of any given individual to change their
behavior without assurances that others will do the same. Altering the size, and
therefore the composition, ofthe population May create a critical mass ofpeople
supportive of the proposed change, thus permitting the desired change to take
place. Changing the size ofa group, either by reducing it through secession or
110 Emizet and Hesli (1995: 518)• • lU Yarbroughand Yarbrough(1998: 172). 59 increasing it through unification, bas the same effect as successfully launching a • new reronn that ail citizens voluntarily follow. Thus, secession or unification may actually work better than mere "announcement-based strategies" of
reform. 112
Yarbrough and Yarbrough's model ably predicts "when unification or
secession could accomplish the task of switching the group to a more-preferred
equilibrium," but it offers little in the way of predicting the timing ofsecession,
except to c1aim that there is a link between secession or unification and
"fundamental economic, political, and social refonn."113 Furthermore, these
authors fail to recognize that the boundaries of divergent preferences might
coincide with administrative or constitutive boundaries within a state. Secession
will not simply occur where one preference structure stops and another begins.
The boundaries ofpreferences may aIso prove to he administrative or constituent
boundaries within a state. As they note, "history matters,,,1l4 but, as they fail to
note, so too does the state.
A Frameworkfor the Analysis ofSecession
The frameworks and models of secession examined above provide
excellent grounding for an analysis ofthe factors contributing to secession, the
timing of secession, and the dynamic of secession. Because there is no pr0Per
appreciation of the manner in which the institutional design of the state can.
contribute to or detract from the success or failure of the secession projec~
112 Yarbrough and Yarbrough (1998: 184). • 113 Yarbrough and Yarbrough (1998: 191)• 60 however, ~ gap remains in each ofthe models examined. To reiterate, secession • is the political and territorial withdrawal ofa sub-state unit from a pre-existing, intemationally recognized state. The state is bath that which the secessionist
group seeks to withdraw from and that which the group seeks to create. As noted
above, secession presents a unique challenge to the current international system
because it threatens the system even while it upholds its principles. Thus, the
failure to give the state a central role in explaining secession limits our
understanding of secession. 1 seek to avoid this snare ofanalyzing secession by
demonstrating the manner in which the institutional design of the state plays a
necessary central role in secession.
In general terms, a framework for explaining secession must he able to
accomplish three tasks: First, it must he able to expIain the process ofsecession;
second, it must he able to expIain the justification behind the decision ofa sub
state unit to secede; and third, it must be able to accurately predict when
secession will occor and when it will not. That is, a framework must have
descriptive, analytical, and predictive value. 1 do not assume that even the best
framework will accuratelyand foUy predict and describe a given phenomenon
every time, but recognizing this should not dissuade us from attempting to
develop frameworks ofpolitical behavior; itshould simply make us aware ofthe
limits ofthese efforts.
The complexity and uniqueness ofthe events onder scrutiny in this project
prove this point. Indeed, so important is my case for the development of this • 114 Yarbrough and Yarbrough (1998: 190). 61 framework that the study ofthe case and the development ofthe framework were • accomplished simultaneously. General principles about secession were developed deductiveLy, as rigorous social science demands, but developing a
framework that actually works is more important than the method by which 1
arrived at the modeL Thus, the model developed in this chapter was refmed in
conjunction with my analysis ofthe case under study.115
The framework 1have developed for describing, analyzing, and predicting
secession uses a variety ofvariables to accomplish its task: grievance, leadership,
institutional design of the state, boundaries, and sequence. The fullest
understanding of these elements provides an explanation for the cise of the
secessionist movement, the justification behind selecting secession instead of
other modes of redress, the timing of secession, and the sequence by which it
occurs.
My analysis builds on frameworks aIready developed, but it will do so in a
critical and constructive way. Implicitly or explicitly, grievance plays a part in
just about every analysis of secession so far examined. Although 1 use the term
"grievance" to descnëe the rationale behind the motivation to secede, 1 believe
the main contributing factor ofsecession to be something more specific than can
be explained by this sterile concept. The variable most likely to drive support for
secession is fear for physical, institutional, or cultural survival.116 Thus, 1use the
term "grievance" to denote a contributing factor that approaches fear for
U5 ln her contnbution to Analytic Na"atives, Levi (1998) descnbes a similar- process oftheory refinement concurrent with case study in heranalysis ofconscription in France, the United States, • and Prussia. 62 survival. Note how attention to this variable modifies an analysis of secession. • To focus on fear for survival is to introduce a time dimension into the political support for secession. First of all, an emphasis on grievance per se misses this
dynamic element that is central te the calculations of leaders and followers in
secessionist movements. From the point of view of a secessionist leader,
moreover, perhaps the key to success is an ability to frame "grievances" in such
a way that they canhe credibly presented as a threat to a fundamental aspect ofa
society and poUtics in a region-be that an institution, a culture, or, ultimately,
physical survival.
Incorporating the institutional design of the state into a framework that
helps us understand and explain secession is the primary original contribution
this project makes to the analytical literature on secession. Simply put, holding
other conditions constant, secession is more likely in astate designed according
to federal principles than in astate designed according to unitary principles.
Perhaps the Most interesting, and, for secessionists, the most troubling aspect of
the manner in which the institutional design ofthe state plays a part in secession
is that the same design that May make secession more likely also makes
secession less necessary. This paradox is present in states with other institutional
designs, such as astate designed according to unitary principles. The unitary
state May facilitate the development of secessionist sentiment, but the cast of
secession remains prohibitively high in such astate, because constructing state
institutions is inherently costly; thus, secession is less likely. ActoIs within such • 116 See Carmentand James (1997) and Lake and Rothschild (1996) and (1998). 63 astate may desire secession, but their efforts will he thwarted by the very design • of the state. Thus both types of states inhibit and facilitate secession, but in different ways.
Grievance: Losses Loom Larger
A Tbeory of Grievance Wood and Hechter both argued that one of the
background requirements of secession is common identity, or interest, among a
potentially secessionist population, but they fail to note the most obvious source
ofthat common identity: a grievance or threat. The development ofthis identity
or interest is unproblematic when a tenitorially concentrated group is confronted
with a common threat. l17 This threat will help to activate and strengtben group
identity, which, in tum, can facilitate secession, especially if secessionist
entrepreneurs are successful in their attempts to use this fear to mobilize support
for secession.
Robert Jervis claimed, "Iosses loom larger than the corresPOnding
gain.,,1l8 That is, the prospect oflosing something will compel someone ta accept
risk in order ta avoid a loss, but the prospect ofan equivalent gain will not make
a persan accept the risk. An individual, in other words, is more willing ta take
risks ta avoid the loss of $10 than to gain the same amount ofmoney. 1 propose
that the same model of individual behavior can he applied ta secessionist
IL7 Hechter (1992), referring to Van Dyke (1985), suggested that interest commonality can be imposed upon groups by policies put in place by the state-in this case, corporate rights. [ would also suggest that interest commonalitycan be imposed upon groups by a common threat from the state or sorne other source. This alternative source ofinterest commonality and group identity can serve as a strong source for secessionist mobilization.
1I1 Iervis (1992: (87). See also Taubrnan (1997). For the manner in which loss-avoidance relates • specificallyto secession, see Emizet and Hesli (1995). 64 behavior. Following Jervis, l contend that fear of 10ss is more likely to prompt • secession than is the prospect of gain. Groups do not secede in order to gain some as-yet-unrealized benefit; rather, a group will seek secession in order to
prevent a significant loss.
The loss around which secessionist sentiment is mobilized, generally
speaking, must he profound. For instance, a mere defeat in an election would not,
in itself: provide the kind ofgrievance around which support for secession could
be developed-unless losing the election had some greater significance for the
group. An election loss could, for example, augur a change within the existing
state's social and political context that poses a threat to the PQtentially
secessionist unit. In the case of South Carolina and the South, the election of
Lincoln signaled such a change.
The loss ofdominant cultural institutions-or the fear that such a loss will
occur-will not necessarily lead to secession, but if secessionist entrepreneurs
can frame the 105S of a particular institution as heralding the destruction of the
culture or as posing a risk to the lives ofmembers ofthe culture, then relatively
minor losses can be llnked to a much graver set of losses. Successfully
establishing the link between minor losses and profound losses will increase the
likelihood ofsecession. Secessionist sentiment is more likely to build up around
profound losses linked, either by perception or manifest fact, to the survival of
the group. Using the deteriorating circumstances in a current political union,
secessionist leaders must convince their populations that their continued survival • 6S as a distinct group, culture, or nation is in jeopardy. In this way, the shadow of • the future plays a significant role in a movement for secession. In general, the desire to secede will be grounded in fear for survivaL This
does not Mean that a necessary condition of secession is a literal threat to the
lives ofgroup members, but that there must at the very least he a threat to some
defming cultural institution, the absence of which signais the death of the
particular culture. For instance, while it would be immoral, unadvisable, and
illegal to do so, ifthe Canadian government declared that the French language
was no longer an official language of the state, Quebec secessionists would
undoubtedly receive a significant boost in support for secession, because the
separatist movement would finally be able to convince the population ofQuebec
that the only way to protect the French language was to secede from Canada. As
the Canadian state is currently constituted, one of the factors preventing
secession is the protection the federal government provides to the French
language and culture, especially in the form of official bilingualism. Ending
official bilingualism and adopting English as the language ofthe state would not
result in the death ofa single person, but it might signify the death ofa culture,
or at least the death of such an important part of that culture that i15 continued
existence as a culture is tbreatened. In a similar vein, ooly the most radical of
Southem elites saw the 1860 election of Abraham Lincoln as direct Northem
aggression against the Southem people. Rather, what MOst Southem elites
perceived in this election was a threat to an institution that defined them. Then • secessionist entrepreneurs successfully linked opposition to slavery by the 66 victorious Republican Party to a threat to the social, economic, and political • interests ofthe South. Consequently, this relatively minor threat was effectiveLy linked to the personal safety ofail Southemers.
By itselt: a strong grievance (or fear) will not necessariLy lead to a rise in
secessionist sentiment or help secessionist entrepreneurs mobilize support for
secession. There must be the sense among the potentially secessionist population
that there is Little chance ofameliorating the grievance by maintaining the current
political relationship with the host state. That is, there must he a perception that
secession is better than the territorial and political status quo. Furthermore,
blame for the presence and persistence ofthe grievance must he placed squarely
on the shoulders ofthe host state, even ifthe host-state is not responsible for the
grievance. The host state must he seen as being unwilling or unable to remove
the grievance. The grievance could he coming from the actions and attitudes of
actors within another sub-state unit or from some external actor or force, but
regardless of the source of the grievance, the host state must be seen by the
secessionist sub-state unit as shirking its responsibility to provide security for the
sub-state unît. Thus, while the source ofgrievance May he exogenous to the host
state, the aggrieved unitwill see the grievance as endogenous to the host state.
From the perspective of the secessionist sub-state unit, there is little
difference between host state aggression against the sub-state unit and an
unwillingness to prevent aggression from a third party against the sub.state unit.
In bath situations, the host state is complicit in the grievance. Ifthe grievance • was not present when the state was initially formed, its introduction will make 67 the sub-state unit believe that the host state has changed, and that this change is a • danger to the survival ofthe sub-state unit.. Given the risks associated with secession, the only change that would
compel a regÎon to attempt secession would have to he perceived as a
fundamental and inexorable threat to the continued survival ofthe region.. There
must be a change in what the state does, who controls it, and what is considered
the legitimate exercise of state power. Sensing a fundamental shift in what the
state is, what the state does, and what the state can do (and sensing that the shift
is detrimental to the survival of the group) compels the potentially secessionist
group to seek sorne form of redress for its grievances.. (A regionally indistinct
threat to the entire population of astate May lead to state fragmentation or an
effort at regime alteration.) That the grievance is selectively felt explains why
secession îs selectively sought. The form of redress sought, whether it occurs
within the realm of normal politics or whether it entails an alteration of the
political and territorial status quo, will depend upon what the group believes will
solve their problems and what actions they believe have a chance ofsucceeding..
If the institutions of the state are designed such that administrative boundaries
have more than mere administrative significance, and if the boundary of
grievance coincides with these administrative boundaries, secession is more
likely.
Leadership
A powerful grievance (or fear) provides the motivation to act. Tuming a • grievance into a motivation to secede from an existing state dePends upon a 68 South Carolina, to seek election was to be unsuitable to hold office. South • Carolinians expected what one observer called "passive office seeking." 120 The avowed "disinterestedness" of South Carolinian politicians contributed to their
legitimacy.
Once in place and committed to secession, legitimate leaders can use their
offices and positions to promote their agendas. Whether representing the
secessionist region in the political institutions ofthe center or ofthe region, this
leadership can fol1ow a course of action that helps to strengthen secessionist
support. Secessionist speeches given in the center or the region that are reported
by the local media can help to increase support for secession. Negative reactions
to those speeches by those who oppose secession, especially by those seen to be
responsible for the grlevance, will further increase support for secession. The
commingling of unionists and secessionists in the center provides ample
opportunity for the precipitation ofconflict that May convince those in the region
of the necessity of secession. (If it is serious enough, this conflict may even
provide a pretext for secession.) The well-timed resignation ofthe secessionist
leadership from POlitical positions within the host state may further increase
support for the secessionist movement: In South Carolina the resignations of
United States Senators Chesnut and Hammond and Federal Judge A..G .. Magrath
and others increased supportfor secession..
A strong tradition ofdeferential politics in the secessionist region will help
the secessionist movement, assuming secessionists or their sympathizers have • 120 Greenburg (1976: 104). 70 captured positions ofauthority within the regional state structures. Secessionists • who occupy these positions can use the resources of the state to promote their agenda. This will decrease many of the difficulties associated with mobilizing
support for secession and demobilizing opposition.
Division among a sub..state unit's political elite is poisonous for the
movement. There must he a consensus among the leadership that secession is the
best means to redress the region's grievances with the center. Ifthere is division
among the leadership, 121 the anti-secessionist view must he delegitimized.
Making secession appear to he inevitable---and morally and legally justified-
will help make the opposition to secession appear irrelevant and illegitimate. If
secessionist entrepreneurs can frame the issue in such a way that the group's
survival appears to he at stake, then opposition to secession can he treated as
treason, thus muting a considerable portion ofthe opposition to secession.
Leadership and legitimacy cut both ways. The henefits derived from
holding office, especially ifthat office is in the POlitical center ofthe state from
which secession is desired, May mute the desire for secession among these
legitimate leaders. Those elected to public office on a platform ofsecession May
be subject to the same electoral dilemma that was outlined by Wood above and
that faced electoral socialism.l22 Thus, even leaders elected on a platform. that
favors secession May he unwilling or unable to bring about that end result.
l2L Treisman (1997) examines therole ofrival leadership in allowing forthe mobilizatioD.ofethnic identity• • lnPrzeworski and Sprague (1986). Treisman (1997) also takes up tbis question. 71 Institutionsl Design ofthe State • The institutional design of the state ought to play a central role in any analysis of secession. However, in the literature on secession examined above,
the state plays no part, or a very limited part, in explaining the process. Because
secession involves the territorial dismemberment of a state, and because the
design ofthe state significantly influences the success ofsecession, it is essential
to bring the state into any analysis of the process. In particular, 1 refer to the
constitutional distribution of state authority within astate. 1 examine two
different variations on the distribution of state authority. In the unitary state,
sovereign authority is concentrated; in the federal state, it is distributed among
constitutionally recognized state units. An examination of federal states Yields
the MOst interesting results, but, ironically, the role played by federalism in
contributing to secession is almost wholly ignored as a factor contributing to
secession in literature examining its preconditions and causes. If federalism is
recognized at all as plaYing a role in secession, it is usually regarded as a means
of muting calls of secession by satisfying secessionists' desires for local
autonomy, rather than as a factor that May contribute to secession.l23
The state is the political institution from which secession occurs. As such,
the design of the state will play a definitive role in the success or faUure of
secession.l24 Certain designs inhibit secession, while others May promote it.
123 Buehanan(l995); McGarryandO~J..eary(L993);Premdas (1990).
124 In explaining ethnie activism in Russi~ Treisman (1997: 228) notes that "a region's • administrative status (ines up almost preeisely with its level ofactivism." 72 Unitary states may give cause for secession, because sovereign power is • concentrated inthe center with no constitutional recognition ofregional sub-units as anything more than administrative outposts of the center.125 This
concentration ofpolitical authority-and the accompanying deniaI ofregional or
local autonomy-has the potential to create the sort of grievance that would
normally promote secessionist activity. However, secession will continue to he
unlikely within the unitary state because ofthe hurdles that need to be overcome
and the high costs that would have to he borne. Part ofthis cost centers on the
nature ofthe secessionist project itself: The cost ofsecession is always high, and
in the confines ofa unitary state, it will remain prohibitively high, because ofthe
costs associated with creating a new state.
It is primarily the concentration of sovereign state structures at the center
and the relegation oflocal political structures as mere outposts ofthe center that
make secession difficult in unitary states. In a federal state, in which sovereignty
is divided between a constitutionally recognized center and constituent units,
secession will rarely he sougbt. The division ofsovereignty between the center
and the constituent units that enjoy sovereign, constitutional, and administrative
status means that secession will be much less costly and more feasible, but also
much less likely.126
125 Beer(1993).
l26 Raeder (1991) round that the federaI divisions eventually helped secessionism in the Soviet • Union• 73 In a federal state, constituent units are not Mere outposts of the center; • according to the contested compact theory ofthe federal state, these constituent units are the sovereign units of the state that have delegated some of their
sovereign power to the center. Beer bas argued that ''the distinctive thing about a
federal system is that the authority of these bodies is assured by a law which is
superior to the statutory law ofthe center and which indeed is aIso the authority
of that law.,,127 Despite Beer's assertion to the contrary, the institutional design
of the American state made it easier to argue that the constituent unit's
sovereignty was never surrendered to the center. If the federai state can he
thought ofas a contract between the constituent units ofthe state, or between the
center and its constituent units, then it is reasonable tbat a unit that agreed to
become part of the federal state can revert back to ilS sovereign position by
withdrawing from the agreement. Thus~ the federal state provides the potentially
secessionist unit with a claim to moral and legal legitimacy that cannot be made
within the institutional context ofunitary states.
Perbaps even more important than the character of sovereignty in the
federai state is the manner of its exercise. A constituent unit in the federal state
bas an existence independent of the central govemment, bath theoretically and
practically. Part ofthis independence comes from the state functions for which it
is responsible. Rather than simply carrying out the political wishes ofthe center,
the constituent unit bas a set offunctions independent ofthe central government.
These independent functions and this independent authority provide the • 117 Beer(1993: 23). 74 constituent unit with functional, independent state structures. The existence and • independent power and authority of these structures decrease the costs of secession. In a unitary state, secession would require the full-scale construction
of new state structures, but in a federaI state, constituent units already possess
Many requisite state structures. Furthermore, constituent units May already
possess the most important structures, such as those conceming the defense of
the territory and the regulation of the economy. These units may aIso possess
representative political institutions that tax citizens and pass and execute taws.
This would further decrease the cost of secession while working to tend the
necessary element oflegitimacy to the secessionist unit-assuming secessionists
or POtential secessionists control the offices ofgovernment.
The institutional design of the federal state facilitates entry ioto !bis
political arrangement because of the extent of power and authority retained by
the member-units of the system. In the absence of a powerful grievance, the
potential for secession in the federaI state will not be realized. In fact, the
accommodative nature of the federal state and the structure of the political
relationship between the center and constituent units of the states Mean that
secession will he very rare in federaI states.
However, once there is a grievance perceived as threatening the existence
of one of the constituent units, the sarne design that rnalces the jêderal state
easier to enter makes it easier to exit. In the presence of a sufficiently strong
grievance, the insurmountable obstacles that confront secessionist movements in • unitary states are comparatively easy to overcome in the federal state. For the 75 would...be secessionist, the problem in the federai state is not that the costs of • secession are too high-the cost of secession is always high-but that, in the federaI context, there will rarely he a grievance strong enough to justify
secession. When the grievance is" strong enough, however, the federal state is
uniquely susceptible to secession.
Given decreased impediments to secession in this context, it might seem
that federal systems should he rife with secession and secession movements. This
is not at all the case. The accommodative nature ofthe federal state, the limited
powers of the central state, and the retention of sovereignty by the constituent
units make secession as unnecessary in the federal state as it might appear
necessary in a unitary state. The most unique and least understood aspect ofthe
federal state is that, while Many of the institutional barriers to secession are
absent in this institutional context, so are most ofthe reasons to secede. Even if
feasible, secession ,vill continue to he rare in federal states.
Clear, Establisbed Boundaries ofGrievanee
Another condition of secession is the existence of clear, legjtimate, and
established boundaries. Secessionist attempts can be expected to occur along the
lines ofastate's administrative sub-units. As the above argument indicates, the
prospects for secession are greatly improved ifsub·state unit boundaries are a1so
boundaries of sovereignty, as are found in the federal state. Attempting to
achieve secession along established administrative or federaI boundaries May
provide the secessionmovement with a veneeroflegitimacy. • 76 In the American South, boundaries were multiple and reinforcing. First • and foremost, secession occurred along the boundaries ofthe constiÛlent states of the Union. As Fehrenbacher noted, "The South, ofcourse, did not secede. It was
South Carolina that did s Mississippi, Florida, and Alabama; then Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas.,,128 Reinforcing the boundaries between the separate states of the Union was the sectional boundary that separated slave states from free states. Thus, the boundaries in the United States separated one sovereign unit from another, while also separating different institutions of labor, the economy, and the household. These mutually reinforcing boundaries made the boundaries between the sections and the states more salient, established, and legitimate, making secession more likely. Events in the Union, such as the election of Lincoln (perceived by Many as a threat to the institution ofslavery-a territorially bounded and concentrated institution) led to a perceived grievance along the jurisdictional boundaries established by the federal system in the United States. This election had a vastly different significance in the North than it did in the South. For the North it was merelyan electoral victory; for the South, it was perceived as a disaster. Given the presence and salience of these mutually reinforcing boundaries, it is not surprising that secession occurred along the lines it did. The Sequence ofSecession and Host State Intervention The final component of my framework centers on the sequence in which secession takes place. Analyzing the sequence of secession is a separate task • 128 Fehrenbacher (1980) quoted in Meinig (1993: 47S). 77 from examining and determining the necessary conditions for secession. • Sequence refers not only to the order by which secessionist units secede from the host state, but also to the strategy employed by secessionist entrepreneurs. The elements 1 have examined above-boundaries, leadership, institutional design, and grievance--are the necessary conditions ofsecession; they must be present if secession is going to take place. My examination of the sequence of secession focuses on the importance ofinitiating action. The initiator May he able to force the band ofthose who are aggrieved but would, ail else being equal, not follow a course ofradical, risky, and sometimes-dangerous action. l call those willing to fol1ow, but not willing to lead, the soft-secessionists. As strategie action by the most radical secessionists can force the band of the soft-secessionists, then a successful movement for secession need not have the overwhelming support ofthe entire aggrieved population. Thus, ifsecession does occur, it cannot be expected to occur simultaneously in all aggrieved groups. It May take place in sequence, with those who are more adamantly secessionist initiating the movement, thus forcing the band of the soft secessionists. This is not only applicable to federal states where discrete political units cau secede in sequence. My general claim is that a successful movement for secession May require that a risk-taking sub-set of the aggrieved population to followa course ofaction that will make the less precipitant population follow. Assuming that there is a sub-set of the secessionist population that is willing to initiate a movement for secession, other potentially secessionist groups • will tip toward secession thanks to the demonstration effect that the initiating 78 group provides. l29 An aggrieved group uniquely positioned to feel and react to • the grievance May possess the requisite internai cohesiveness to allow them to initiate radical action. This group will secede, tirst, when its members are confident that secession will help them redress the grievances they have with the host state, and, second, when they believe that their action will precipitate the secession ofother similarly situated groups in the hast state. In other words, the actions ofthe first group May be able to force the hand ofthe similarly aggrieved soft-secessionists because these soft-secessionists are only willing to secede from the host state after the fust group bas already seceded. The secession ofthe follower could he prompted by a desire ta redress the grievance through secession but not to be alone in secession or by a desire to protect the original seceder from ensuing host-state aggression. Successful secession by the tirst group May provide followers with the confidence that they will not be alone in secession. The grave "risks associated with secession gÏve pause to the moderate secessionists and the aggrieved non-secessionists, but the movement ofa uniquely situated secessionist unit that is prepared to accept the risk associated with secession increases the likelihood ofcultivating followers in the collective project. Signfficant to the dynamic ofsecession is that soft-secessionists may seek to secede for reasons that are somewhat unrelated to those driving the initial group ofsecessionists. Hoststate intervention, orthe threat ofsame, May compel 129 Horowitz (1985:: 279) noted that ''the success of one movement cannot create secessionist sentiment where it does not exi~ but can malee others see their success as more plausible." This • logie was operational when South Carolina seceded from the United States. 79 state unit May tom soft-secessionists into seceders. For these later seceders, the • grievance that was formerly tolerable becomes intolerable once the host state takes action ta thwart the attempt to remedy grievance. Host state non-intervention poses sunHar problems. Not intervening can have the same effect as intervening-strengthening the resolve of those who have seceded or who might secede, convincing them they can act with relative impunity. If one unit secedes from the host state and the host state offers no coercive response, other units that share an identity or grievance with the seceded unit may come to believe that the single greatest danger posed by secession (military intervention by the hast state) will not occur. However, the very absence ofcoercion by the host state could convince the non-seceders ofthe amity ofthe hast state. Why secede if the host state is not the malevolent force that the seceders claim it is? Non-intervention, like intervention, in other words, can greatly help or hUIt either the cause of the secessionists or the cause ofthe host state. The host state clearly holds the advantage in its ability to respond to secession, but it is not clear that there is any good response to attempted secession. Attempting ta coerce a seceded sub-state unit May affect the decision making of the leaders and the followers, but there may he unintended consequences in whatever decision is made. A course ofaction followed by the host state to prevent secession may actually increase its likelihood. This ambivalence or uncertainty can he used to the advantage ofthe secessionist unit• • contlict. 81 To avoid this "catch-22," host states need to prevent secession from ever being • attempted; even this effort May result in a rise in support for secession, as the region demands more and more concessions from an accommodative center. Conclusion This chapter bas examined and evaluated the literature on states and on secession. As the literature on secession points out, this act of political and territorial withdrawal continues to constitute a threat to the international system, yet it continues to remain under-explained. The models and frameworks previously used to analyze secession all fail to incorporate the essential role played by the institutional design of the state in the process of secession. Examining the literature on the state, [ have demonstrated the distinctiveness of the political development of the American state-în particular, during the antebellum period. The unique institutional design ofthe American state created astate with a relatively weak center and relatively strong constituent units, contributing to the development ofsecession in the United States. Using the strengths of the literature on secession and the state, 1 have developed a novel and innovative framework for explaining the process of secession. Grievance must play a central role in the presence and development of secessionism, but so must the very design ofthe state, as some states are more prone to secession than others. According to the framework 1 have developed, the possibility of secession depends upon five key factors: first, and most • importan~ is the presence ofa sufficiently strong grievance relt by a regionally- 82 concentrated population; second, a cadre of leaders is required to help the • potentially secessionist population understand the grievance and convince them that secession is the best response; third, a facilitative state structure is needed; fourtb, boundaries must he established and widely regarded as legitimate; and fifth, a certain sequence ofaction can assist the more radical in leading the less radical along. Action sequenced in a certain fashion can force the issue where it May not have otherwise been forced. • 83 • Chapter2 History ofChallenges to Central State Authority in the Union Introduction Secession does not occur in a historical vacuum. The roots of secession are found in the history ofthe relationship between the secessionist unit and the state from which that unit seeks to secede. Both the institutional design of the state and the grievance experienced by the potentially secessionist unit play a central role in the development of secessionism and the success of the movement. The primary purpose ofan ahistorical analysis ofsecession-such as the framework outlined in the previous cbapter-is to provide critical insight ioto a particular past or future instance of secession. The past provides us with a laboratory in which social scientists can devise, compare, and utilize models and frameworks ofpolitical behavior. More importantly, analysis ofthe past helps to make sense ofthe present and the future. In this study, l bope to accomplish two goals simultaneously: first, l hope to provide a novel understanding ofSouthem secessiOD-a central moment in American political development; second, l link this case, which has received little attention in contemporary literature on secession, to this larger comparative literature on political mobilization for secession• • 84 The history ofsecession in the United States is a long one. South Carolina • and the rest ofthe seceding South were the tirst and last to exercise the right of secession, but they were notthe fllst to invoke it. Other parts ofthe United States had previously challenged the authority of the central state and the territorial integrity of the Union. Past confrontations with the central authority of the Union, inside and outside South Carolina, constitute South Carolina's learning curve on the road to secession. Without the steps, missteps, and lessons leamed from the past, secession would have continued to remain an improbable outcome. This chapter examines the central moments in which the meaning, authority, and territorial reach of the Union were challenged. First, 1 offer an overview of the history, rationale, and design of the American State. 1 brietly examine the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions, the institutional significance of the election of 1800, New England's purported secession threat at the Hartford Convention, and Robert Bamwell Rhett's abortive Bluffton Movement in South Carolina. These moments represent some of the lesser-known challenges to central state authority, and they provide the context in which South Carolina's movement toward independence is best understood. Obviously, the secession tradition in the United States was not limited to the South a1one. 1 In addition to these comparatively minor cases, 1 provide a detailed examination of the nullification controversy of 1832-33 and the fust secession crisis of 1850-52. Given the unique political, economic, and social makeup of l Livingston (1998) descnees the existence ofa "secession tradition'9 in the United States. Writing from an anti-statist perspective, Livingston believes this tradition should he used to provide an • effective checkon the authority ofthe central state. 8S South Carolina, it is not surprising that two ofthe most profound challenges to • the authority of the central. state originated in this state. These instances of substantial challenges to central state authority and the territorial scope of the United States provide the immediate historical context for South Carolina's successful bid for secession in 1860. Early Challenges to Central State Authority The Articles ofConfederation The United States under the Articles of Confederation was a true confederation. The central govemment lacked fondamental authority over the states ofthe Union. The sovereignty ofthe separate states under the Articles was not residual, but primary. Article II stated, "Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled." The institutional design of the state created by the Articles, moreover, assumed the sovereign status of the separate states.. Under the Constitution of 1787, both population and the sovereign capacity of the state were factors in the distribution ofpolitical power; the Articles contained no such provision. Article V stated, "In determining questions in the United States in Congress assembled, each State shaH have one vote." According to this design, the smallest state of the Confederation enjoyed as much power as the largest state. The separate states were sovereign; the people were not.. Central. govemment onder the Articles was weak and inetTective: The • separate states had all the power, and the center had none. Under these 86 sovereignty maintained that in the absence of an institution explicitly charged • with determining the constitutionality oflaws, it was the states that had this right. A state, in other words, had the authority to declare a law passed by congress unconstitutionaL The best-known challenge to the Alien and Sedition Acts was round in the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions of 1798 and 1799, prepared by Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. The principles outlined in these resolutions were 50 widely accepted that they enjoyed almost constitutional authority for a time. The resolutions contained two essential elements: First, the United States was held to be a union ofstates or sovereignties, brought together through a compact between the states (The federaI govemment was the creature ofthese states and had no authority apart from the specifie powers granted to it in the Constitution); second, because no independent authority was given the power of determining the constitutionality oflaws, judgments ofwhether a lawpassed by congress was unconstitutionaI were within the competency ofthe separate states ofthe Union. The Kentucky Resolutions of16 November 1798 asserted: That the govemment created by this compact was not made the exclusive or final judge of the extent of the powers delegated to itself; since that would have its discretion, and notthe Constitution, the measure ofits powers; but that as in ail other cases ofcompact among parties having no common Judge, each party has an equal right to judge for itseij; as weil ofinfractions as ofthe mode and measures ofredress. 2 According to the 1799 Resolutions, the "righttùl remedy" ofan infraction ofthe Constitution was through a "nullification...of ail unauthorlzed acts done under • 2. Commager (1963: 178-179)~ italics in original. 88 the color of that instrument.n3 The theory of state interposition was fully • consistent with beliefs that were dominant in the early republic, but what state interposition meant in practice was disputed. The lack of clarity on what the practice of state interposition wouId look like became apparent once South Carolina attempted to nullify federallaw. In the Federalist Papers, Madison wrote that the Union was both federaI and national in character. That is, both the center and the states shared the attributes of sovereignty. Despite this equivocation, Madison, with Jefferson, made an essential-perhaps critical-contribution to the theory that the separate states were the sovereign units ofthe Union. The moral authority ofthe authors of state interposition did not prevent the assertion of state sovereignty with the concomitant powerofconstitutional interpretation from sitting ill with some. The legislature of Delaware, a slave state, claimed that the resolutions were "a very unjustifiable interference with the General Govemment.',4 The state of Rhode Island declared that the power of determining the constitutionality of acts of Congress lay within the Supreme Court.s Massachusetts denied Virginia's right to determine the constitutionality oflaws passed by Congress, even going so far as to claim that the Alien and Sedition Acts were not only constitutional, but also '~expedient and necessary.,,61n spite ofthese rebukes, the compact theory ofthe 3 Commager(1963: 184). 4 Ames (1970: 16). sAmes (1970: 17). • 6 Ames (1970: 19)• 89 Union at the core of state interposition took hold in the North and the South. • While the balance of power between the sections was maintained, each section resPected the limits on federai power assumed by state sovereignty. Once balance tipPed in favor of one section, however, the power-depleted section defensively adopted the theory ofstate sovereignty.7 The Eleetion of1800 The election of 1800 was an important moment for the doctrine of state sovereignty. In this election, the centralizing tendencies of the Federalist Party were defeated in favor of the states'-rights-oriented Jeffersonian Republicans. The anti-statist (or, at least, limited-statist) principles of this party formed the basis for the Democratie Party, founded in the late 1820s, initially led by Andrew Jackson and dominant in the Union through the presidential election of 1856. It was in this POlitical context (ofjealously guarding states' rights against federaI encroaehment), which itselfwas an artifact ofthe colonial experience, that South Carolinian political attitudes toward the federal state were initially devel0Ped. The Hartford Convention The War of 1812 interrupted the intemational trade that was essential to the economic livelihood ofthe trading states ofNew England. In response, the NewEngland states called a convention to consider how to have their grievances redressed. In December 1814, representatives from the states of Massachusetts, Connecticut,. Rhode Island, New Hampshire, and Vermont met in Hartford, Connecticut. The resolutions passed by the convention did not explicitly refer to • 7 Marx(1961); Weingast (1996) and(1998). 90 secession, but they did state that ifno action were taken toward reaching peace • with Britain (among other issues), a similar convention would meet in June 1815 "with such powers and instructions as the exigency of a crisis so momentous May require.,,8 It seems that the members of the convention were more concemed with the perceived failure ofthe federaI govemment to defend these states from enemy action than with seceding from the Union. Members of this convention also wanted to limit the power of the federal govemment to tax its citizens, admit new states into the Union, place embargoes on ships owned by U.S. citizens, and interdict commerce. Ultimately, the convention's efforts were approved by only two states: Massachusetts and Connecticut. Other states, even those represented in the convention, met the convention's efforts with mild remonstrance. In the early years ofthe Republic, the doctrine ofstates' rights held sway in Northem and Southem sections of the Union. Eventually, Northem areas became more closely associated with the nationalist view, while the South became more associated with states' rights. Late antebellum Northem nationalism, historian David Potter noted, "consisted...partly in its controlover federal policy, and in the ability to keep it in alignment with sectional interests, while the South's ~isectionalism" was, at least initially, an expression ofthe lack ofsuch a capacity.,,9 As power within the Union shifted from a balance between the sections toward Northem dominance, adherence to states' rights shifted with 1 Ames (1970: S5). • 9 Potter(196S: 75-6). 91 it. As the North and the old Northwest formed a political coalitions that allowed • them to determine (or at least dominate) the political path of the Union, states' rights became the foundational tenet ofthe weaker section ofthe Union. Except for a few Southem fire-eaters (radical defenders ofSouthem rights), adherence to states' rights was not ideological. In the period examined in this project, Southem attachment to states' rights can be explained by the graduai weakening . of Southem strength within the Union:10 The doctrine of states' rights was adopted by Southem leaders as a defensive position. This doctrine provided a coherent and familiar position from which these leaders could challenge Northem and federal encroachment. States' Rights in South Carolina NuUifi~atioD In 1827, Thomas CooPer, president of South Carolina College, remarked that should federal encroachments persist, South Carolina would be forced "to calculate the value ofthe Union." While the antebellum era was rife with state resistance to federal authority,ll South Carolina devel0Ped and acted upon the idea of state sovereignty more than any other state. South Carolina's actions in the nullification crisis provide the best evidence of the strength of this state's 10 Bensel (1990: (3) noted that the Southem states' rights bad to he pragmatic, rather than ideological, given the strong central state created by the Confederate States of America. My general claim, that states' rights discourse was not unique to the South and that it was a position defensively rather than ideologicallyadopted, does not preclude the faet that there were those Southemers who were ideologically infused with a doctrine ofstates' rights. These ideologically anti-federalist tendencies remain inthe Union to this day~ Il Goldstein (1997) noted that no less than 10 Northem states had, in. effect, nullified the fugitive slave element of the Compromise of 18S0. Northem states' actions exacerbated the existing • tension between the slave and thefree states, further settingthe stage for the coming confliet. 92 early adherence to the theory that the separate states of the union retained • sovereignty and had an obligation to check federal power when the center tried to exercise power beyond its constitutionally mandated limits. In this section, 1 provide a brief outline ofthe elements of the Tariffs of 1828 and 1832, and 1 examine in detail South Carolina's official and unofficial responses to these tariffs. In addition, 1 discuss the Compromise Tariff that helped to diffuse the conflict, the Force Bill, in which the federai govemment affirmed its right to enforce its laws, and South Carolina's nullification of the Force Bill, which provided the uneasy denouement ofthe crisis. The power to levy duties on imported goods has been a contentious issue since the inception of the Union. Under the Articles of Confederation, the separate states often imposed tariffs on goods imported from other states disrupting interstate trade. Attempting to avoid sunHar problems, the ftamers of the Constitution transfonned the local economies of the separate states into a single national economy. The states of the Union, therefore, did not have the right to put tariffs on imports from other states or other nations. According to Article one, Section eight of the United States Constitution, Congress bas the powerto "lay and collectTaxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to paythe debtand provide for the common Defense and general welfare of the United States." In the same section, Congress is given the power to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations." In short, the powers given to Congress include coUecting dulies to raise revenue and regulating commerce. The question at the base ofthe • debate over the tariffwas whether the powers granted to Congress included the 93 ability to impose tariffs to proteet nascent domestic industries, or whether the • tariff power granted to congress was only for the purposes of collecting revenue.12 According to a strict interpretation ofthe Constitution, the power granted to congress to regulate commerce did not include the power to protect domestic industry. As time went on, however, and industrial forces became more politically powerful, Congress appeared to be more willing to flout its limits and pass laws that were inconsistent with a strict reading ofthe ConstitutiOD.. Despite its eventual opposition to protection, a tariff bill, passed in 1816 and supported by South Carolina, provided protection to American industry. South Carolina member of Congress John C. Calhoun justified bis state's support for this measure by claiming that the primary purpose ofthe bill was to raise revenue; he claimed the protection it provided was merely incidental.. 13 While Northem and industrial forces within the Union became more powerful and Southem influence within the Union began to wane, South Carolina grew increasingly sensitive to Congress overstepping its authority.. The traditional story ofnullification centered exclusively on the economic aspect of the Tariff of 1828 and 1830.14 According to this perspective, South Carolina nullified protectionist tariffs because it felt that such tariffs interfered with Southem economic proSPerity by increasing the cost of goods South 12 A tariffcoUeeted for revenue purposes will be lower than a tariffcolleeted for protection. The purpose oraprotective tariffis not to collect revenue, and c~ therefore, be prohibitively high.. 13 Register ofDebates. L833. Senate, 22nd Congress, 2nd Sess.. Pages 519-553• • t4 Bancroft(1928); Boucher (l916b).. 94 Carolina and the South were obliged to purchase while, at the same tinte, • generally suppressing the international market upon which they relied and increasing the °likelihood that South Carolina's products would he subject to tariffs in foreign ports. Many actors in the South would suffer financially from increased tariffs: Because as much as 75 percent ofSouthem cotton went abroad during the antebellum era the maintenance ofinternational markets was essential to South Carolina.lS Indeed, cotton was an essential element of the entire American export economy, eomprising approximately 60 Percent of all U.S. exports.16 As Hardy Wickwar wrote, the "raw material producers of the mid nineteenth century reaeted as consumers instead of organizing as produeers. They felt that a marginal change in the cost of manufactured goods turned the terms oftrade against them. Henee the violent reaction of a considerable party among them against the tariff of 1828.,,17 The North, on the other hand, would reap the benefits of protected markets, allowing their goods to compete with foreign products. Noting that there were actors in South Carolina whose interests were not adversely affeeted by the tariffs, yet who supported nullification, Freehling and others found it neeessary to look beyond pure eeonomic interests to explain nullifieation.18 Aceording to this novel interpretation, South Carolinian nullifiers 15 Genovese (1967: 159). 16 Keohane (1983: 61); North (1966: 76, 233). L7 Wickwar (1970: 89). • 11 Faust(1982: 46); Freehling (1966: 48). 9S • • Ch~rt 2.0-Slave State Representation ln the United States House of Representatives 5OC)f. -045" 35" 30" 25" 20" 15" 10CM» 5" 00f' 1790 1800 1810 1820 1830 1840 1850 1860 Source: Martis and Elmes (1993: 146), • • Chart 2.1-Populatlon of States in 1860 4,500,000 4,000,000 3,500,000 3,000,000 2,500,000 2,000,000 1,500,000 1,000,000 500,000 o j·'l~~~:/Â~///.//.I:////~/Y..e~/~//:~'I~U/ ~ , #v y ~e #' r ~ ~'" ,""' "§' ,""' ~e cY~ ~ cr ~ ~JJ ~ v q ~" ~ eJ' ~; . ~ Source: United States Historical Census Browser (http://fisher.lib.virginia.edulcgi-locaVeensusbinleensuslcen.pl?year=860) Accessed January 3, 2001. where the South would have had to fight alone. According to biographer Daniel • Wallace, Rhett argued that: [Ilf the South did not check the govemment on this issue, we would have to face it on the far more difficult, delicate, and dangerous question of slavery; he maintained that this was an easier, safer and less aggravating issue on which to reform the govemment-for that here there was an identity of interest between the South and the laboring classes and mercantile interests ofthe North; while on slavery the separation would he broad, and the struggle more sectional and bitter. He foretold that the sectional contest was unavoidable, and that on the heels ofour acquiescence in an unconstitutional Tariff, a tenfold more baneful and irreconcilable agitation must ensue on the slavery question. He argued that upon this question the strife would be purely sectional, and must end in the dissolution of the Union, or the min of the South?O This statement and this interpretation May seem to beg the question: Was South Carolina trYing to protect states' rights? Orwas ittrying to protect slavery? In the South-in South Carolina, in particular-there was no distinction between these two goals; protecting slavery and protecting states' right were the same. If the South was not the dominant force within the federai govemment (and clearly this was the direction in which things were heading) maintaining states' rights and maintaining the institution ofslavery meant providing a strong check on the expanding power of the federaI government. From the South Carolinian perspective, it was better to establish limits on the federai government on an issue for which supporters could he round in all sections ofthe Union than onan issue in which the interests at stake were those ofone section atone. South Carolinian elites reasonably hoped thatNorthemers and Southemers alike would • 20 Wallace (N.d.: 19). See a1so~ Edgar (1998: 330)• 97 support their ann-tariffefforts, butthey were never so deluded that they believed • that the North would aetively support their pro-slavery efforts. On the eontrary, there were many in South Carolina who believed that neither Northemers nor the majority ofSoutherners could he trusted on the slavery issue.21 Ironieally, the Tariff of 1828 (also known as the "Tariff of Abominations'') was passed as a result of a eomplieated politieal game devised by Calhoun and other anti-proteetionists. They purposely created an exeessively proteetionist tariffbill that put items that were not desired by proteetionist forces on the tariff sehedule, hoping the bill would win the support of only the most thorough-going proteetionists--but not of a majority of Congress..22 The anti- tariff forces made a strategie miscaleulation in their assessment of what the moderate protectionist forces were willing to tolerate. The bill passed in the House and the Senate, thanks to support in the middle and west states and the stalwart protectionists in New England. The bill gathered little more than a sprinkling of votes from the South. As one author noted, "The aet of 1828 had thus been passed in a form approved by no one.,,23 Those who supported the tariff bill did 50 not to colleet revenue, but to proteet naseent Ameriean manufaeturing. The willingness of a vast swath of Northemers to support protection piqued the fears of Southemers who were interested in maintaining strict limits on federal power as mandated by their 1l The questiooable comminnentofnon-slaveholding Southemers to slavery played a large raie in Freehling's (1994) accountofsecessioo. 12 Southem tariffstrategies are outlined in Taussig (1962: 88-89). • 23 Taussig(1962: lm). 98 interpretation of the Constitution. After ail, the Constitution did give Congress • the power to regulate commerce, but it did not give it the power to protect American industry from foreign competition. The willingness of Northem members of Congress to tlout the letter of the Constitution disconcerted Southemers who relied on a strict interpretation of the Constitution for the protection ofthe institution ofslavery. IfCongress could pass a protective tariff (something that it did not technically have the power to do), then there was nothing that Congress could not do, including passing legislation that was unfavorable to the constitutionally acknowledged institution ofslavery. At least a simple majority ofthe voting population-and ofthe legislators ofSouth Carolina-desired action on the Tariff of 1828. How~ver, according to Article XI ofthe 1790 Constitution ofSouth Carolina, calling a convention ofthe people of the state required the support oftwo-thirds ofeach House in the state legislature.24 Although nullifiers did not have enough support in the legislature to caU a convention, nullification forces were encouraged by Calhoun's revelation that he was an ardent nullifier. Indeed, John C. Calhoun was the author of nullification in South Carolina. Although Hofstadter's described Calhoun as the "Marx of the master class,,,25 Calhoun was more "the last of the Founding Fathers, the last ofa generation ofcreative constitutional statesman, than anearly Marxist.,,26 His vision of limited government and of the protection of local 24 In convention, each district and parish.- had a delegation equal in size to the district~s total representation in the State House ofRepresentatives and State Senate. 2S HofStadter(1962)• • 26 Maier(l981: 1s). 99 interests-both of which were consistent with bis support of nullification • affirms this. Calhoun was, at this time, Andrew Jaekson's vice president. His support for nullification put him and Jackson on vastly different sides ofa controversial issue, contributing to the already considerable personal antipathy between them.27 At a 13 April 1830 celebration, Jackson proclaimed in a toast (and in response to nullification talk): "The Union, it must he preserved." To Jackson's toast, Calhoun replied, "The Union-after our liberty most sacred." This exchange, however briet: summarizes the divergent views between the North and South that would eventually lead to secession and Civil War. For many Northerners, the Union had to be maintained regard1ess ofone's displeasure with any partieular poliey. For Southemers, the maintenance ofthe Union was desired only as long as the Union helped to maintain Southem liberties-in this case, slavery. Once the Union became destructive to this end, Southemers increasingly sought to separate themselves from the Union in order better to proteet their liberty. Using ideas outlined by Jefferson and Madison in the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, Calhoun's Exposition and Protest of 19 December 1828 (published anonymously and distributed by the legislature of South Carolina) outlined what became a foundational set ofbeliefs in South Carolina. According to this wode, every state of the Union maintained its sovereignty, and as a sovereign entity, every state had the right to determine whether acts ofCongress • 17 Edgar(1998: 332); Remini (1967: 120). 100 state (even the other slave states of the Deep South), and because the • slaveholding class's power was more firmly entrenched in South Carolina than it was elsewhere-was in the oost position to attempt to check this usurpation of power. In 1830, because they did not have the level ofsupport necessary to calI a convention to interpose state sovereignty against congressional action, the nullifiers and states' rights men satisfied themselves by developing and defending the theo'ry of state sovereignty and state interposition. During this perlod, the consequences of the theory of state sovereignty were more fully elaborated and firmly entrenched in the psyche of South Carolina. Calhoun publicly coming out in support ofa doctrine that he had supported privately for ' some time contributed to a transformation in South Carolinian politics. As he stated in bis Fort Hill Address ofJuly 1831: [T]he naked question is whether ours is a federal or a consolidated government; a constitutional or absolute one; a government resting ultimately on the solid basis ofthe sovereignty ofthe States, or on the unrestricted will ofa majority; a form ofgovernment, as in all other unlirnited ones, in which injustice, and violence, and force must finaUy prevaiL Let it never he forgotten that, where the majority ru/es, the minority is the subject; and that if we should absurdly attribute to the former, the exclusive right of construing the Constitution, there would be, in fact, OOtween the sovereign and the subject, under such a govemment, no Constitution; or, at least, nothing deserving the name, or serving the legitimate object ofso sacred an instrument?8 For Calhoun, clearly, the argument that the Constitution had created a consolidated govemmentdid notring true. From bis staunchly states' rights point • 21 Calhoun quoted in Lence (1992: 383-384), italics in originaI~ 102 of view, states were not simply pennitted to question and challenge the • constitutionality oflaws passed by Congress; rather, they were obligated to do so in orderto ensure that free govemment.he maintained. The TariffAct of 1832 superseded the Tariffof 1828. While many of the "abominations" of 1828 were eliminated, the Tariff of 1832 remained a "distinctly protectionist measure.,,29 It placed high duties on cotton, woolens, iron, and other products produced in the United States that were seen as being in need of protection. Articles not produced in the United States had lcw duties attached to them-and in some cases, there were no duties at ail. The duties on some articles were reduced to a more modest 25 Percent, with an average duty of 33 percent on dutiable items.JO Despite the modifications, the protectionist system was firmly in place in a manner in which proponents of the "American System" hOPed would he permanent.JI South Carolinians feared that protectionism had become "the settled policy ofthe country.,,32 South Carolina was unwilling to sit idly by as the industrial forces ofthe Northeast ran roughshod over constitutionallimits. Fearing that this usurpation offederal power would lead to a challenge that was more fundamental than the tarlft: South Carolina initiated the first significant formal skirmish in the 29 Taussig(1962: 109). 30 Taussig (1962: 110). 31 The "American System" referred to a set ofpolicies advocated by the Whig Party. It included proteetive tariffS, internal improvements, a strong national bank, and distribution ofproceeds nom federalland sales ta the states. Those who opposed this system were concemed that a strong and active federal govemmentwould reduce the independence ofthe states. 32 State of South Carolina (1832-33: 28). For more on the link between the American System, • protectionism, and consolidation, see Calhoun's South Carolina Exposition in Lence (1992). 103 protracted conflict between the adherents of a strict states' rights doctrine in • South Carolina and those who wanted to consolidate political power in the bands of the Northem states through the institutions of the federal govemment. This confrontation provided a first giimpse at the conflict between the sections that would lead to the Civil War.33 The starting point of South Carolina's efforts to check federal power was winning two-thirds of the seats in the state legislature required for the passage ofa bill calling for a state convention. Elections to the state legislature, the Rouse of Representatives, and the occasional state convention were the only opportunities in which the citizenry of South Carolina exercised the right to vote; almost ail ofthe important offices of the state were filled by the state legislature. This was true of everything from statejudges, to the govemor, to members ofthe state's Electoral College. On the relatively few occasions in which South Carolinians were permitted to cast a ballot, one should not assume that there was actually a choice in the election. More often than not, the voting population simply ratified the choice made by the planter politicians that directed state poUtics. These political leaders assured unanimity in elections by allowing only one name on the ballot.34 Dit is no surprise that Freehling's (1966) seminal work on this episode is titled "Prelude to Civil War." This was SouthCarolina's first majorconfrontation with the Union, and the lessons learned from it would he referred to until the point of secession. For many, mobilization for secession really began with this dispute overtarifflevel in the 18205. • J4 Greenberg (1976: 174)• 104 During times ofcontroversy, however, distinguishable parties formed and • real choice was possible.3s The legislative election offall of1832 served as proof of this general maxim. Unlike later contests in South Carolina, where the fight was generally over a variation of a single theme (e.g., unilateral versus cooperative secession), the contest in 1832 was between fundamentally different schools of thought~ On one side were the Unionists who supported unconditional adherence to the Union; on the other side were the nullifiers who lacked a sentimental attachment to the Union. In the fall 1832 elections to the state legislature, the Nullifiers won an overwhelming victory. A significant Unionist showing marred this victory, however, indicating that there were fundamental divisions within the state about the future state-federal relations. In future elections where fundamental issues were at stake, Unionist forces were unable to duplicate the same strong electoral showing. Although they were far from dominant in this episode, the nullification era was the last occasion in which Unionist forces played a central role in South Carolinian politics. In future contests, the conflict would he between unilateral secessionists and cooPerative secessionists. The 1832 legislative elections saw an overwhelming victory for the forces ofnullification in both the Low Country and the Up Country. In this election, the nullifiers won "80 percent ofthe seats in the house and 75 Percent ofthose in the 35 However, as McCurry (1995: 297) note~ the election for the convention that finally accomplished secession was nearly devoid ofcontroversy. See also Kibler (1938). Largely absent • were the divisions experienced by South Carolina during nullification and the first secession crisis• 105 senate,,,36 although they won only S9 percent of the popular vote. With • overwhelming support in both bouses, on 2S October 1832, the state legislature passed a convention bill thatcalled for a convention to meet in November for the consideration ofnullification. Thanks primarily to the clarity ofthe radical program and divisions among the radicals' opponents, radical forces in South Carolina generally enjoyed an organizational advantage over moderate forces. Although Many ofthose opposed to nullification were also opposed to the tariffs and the expansion of federai power, they lacked a coherent program to defeat the tariff. The same organization that helped the nullifiers to win a strong victory in the elections to the state legislature helped give them a strong victory in the Convention election held 12 and 13 November 1832. In order to delegitimize the outcome of the convention, sorne unionist groups in the state boycotted the convention election; the extent of this boycott, however, is not known. A number ofPOpular unionists also reiùsed to stand for election. They wanted to avoid the "odious fame" of participating in the convention itself.37 Because support for nullification was so strong in the state at this time, and given the strategie concentration ofthis support inthe more radical and better-represented Low Country, the nullifiers would have won overwhelming support in the convention even with full unionist participation. 36 Edgar(1998: 335). • 37 Hayne (1901: 750). 106 The course taken by this convention recalled the doctrine outlined in the • Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions: state interposition. Shortly before the Civil War, Postmaster Alfred Huger pointed out South Carolina's conceit at adopting and using the principles of Madison and Jefferson during the nullification episode. He wrote, "The conclusion is irresistible that what they-Jefferson & Madison meant as simply declaratory, the South Carolinians determined to he operative...,,38 According to the documents produced by the convention, protectionism is the "striking characteristic in the operation of a simply and consolidated govemment.,,39 Fearing that the poliey of protection had become "the settled policy of the country,,,40 South Carolinian political actors sought to check political power with a method that had authoritative historical precedent. Harkening back to the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, whicb provided the foundation for South Carolina's action, the Report of the Committee in the convention stated, "[I]t cannot he denied that the Govemment of the U. States possesses inherent powers. The States called it into being. The States not ooly created it, but conferred upon it aU its POwers, and prescribed its limits by a written charter called the Constitution of the U. States.,,41 According to the ordinance ofnullification produced by the convention, the tariffacts of1828 and 38 Alfred Ruger ta Wickham, 2 June 1858, Alfred Ruger Papers, Manuscript Collection, Duke University, Durham, North Caralina. 39 State ofSouth Carolina (1832-33: 58). 40 State ofSouth Caralina (1832-33: 28)• • 41 State ofSouth Carolina(1832-33: 33). 107 1832 "are unauthorized by the Constitution ofthe United States, and violate the • true meaning and intent thereof: and are null, void, and no law, nor binding upon this State, its officers, or citizens.,,42 The right ofnullification is not a pre-political, revolutionary right; noris it an explicitly constitutional right in the sense that the right to free speech is constitutionally granted. Rather, astate possesses the right ofnullification on the basis of it being "one of the PARTIES to the compact..,,43 The right of nullification, like the right of secession, is a reserved right to he used when the constitutional compact is violated and when the normal means ofchecking state power are unavailable. The convention passed an ordinance of nullification in November 1832. The convention, however, was not wil1ing to wade into the murky waters of nullification immediately. Rather than having the ordinance of nullification go into effect immediately, the convention allowed two months to pass before it would go into effect, permitting the fonnulation ofa compromise. President Andrew Jackson's response to nullification on 10 December 1832 was unequivocaL He stated that '~The power to annul a law ofthe United States, assumed byone State, [was] uncompatible with the existence of the Union~ contradicted expressly by the letter ofthe Constitution~ unauthorized by ils spirit, inconsistent with every principle on which it was fôunded, and destructive ofthe great objectfor which it was jOrmetl" He concluded that 'vrhe 42 State ofSouth Carolina(l832-33: 48)• • 43 State ofSouth Carolina(l832-33: 60), emphasis in original. 108 laws of the United States must be executed.',44 Jackson was willing to • compromise on the fonn the tariffwould take, but he would not compromise on the principle. Although he had many de·nationalizing tendencies, Jackson had succinctly articulated the nationalist interpretation of the Union. According to this view, the Union created by the Constitution ofthe United States was singular and unbreakable. The separate states did not have the exclusive right to determine the constitutionality of laws passed by the center. Jackson promised the people of South Carolina that if this pretence were maintained, war would certain1y follow.4s In spite of the initial pessimism of prominent nullifiers,46 the House and Senate passed a compromise tariff in February and March 1833. This measure eliminated the despised 50 percent duties, and moved many unprotected items to the free list. Calhoun had hoped for a standard rate of 15 or 20 percent; the compromise established a 20 percent duty on all protected items. On the surface, it seemed that protectionists had given up on the principle of protection. However, they did not give up on the practice ofprotection until 10 years later. According to the Compromise of 1833, the 20 percent rate would only be reached through a graduai reduction in the tariff ending in 1842. As Freehling 44 Commager (1934: 262-268), italics in original. 45 In analyzing the conflicts between the center and the state ofSouth Carolin~ one cannot rail to notice the difference between Iackson's and Buchanan's responses to South Carolinian challenges. Both round the South Carolina doctrine to be unconstitutiooal; however, the manner in which each perceived their duty was radically different. Jackson declared that he would oot consent to the destruction ofthe Union. Buchanan believed he had no power to alter the course of events he witnessed. 46 George McDuffie to Armistead Burt, 19 February 1833, George McDuffie Correspondence, • ManuscriptCollection, Duke University, Durh~ NorthCarolina. 109 noted, "The tariff would he highly protective for almost nine more years; the • bulkofthe reductions would take place in the last six months.,,47 Sixty percent of the reduction, to a 20 percent rate, was to occur between 31 December 1841 and 30 June 1842. In spite of the apparent willingness of the congress and the president to compromise on the tariff issue, there was no compromise on the theory of nullification. Accordingly, along with the compromise taritI: Congress passed a law that was commonly referred to as the Force Bill that gave teeth to Jackson's assertion that "the laws of the United States must be executed." This law empowered Jackson to enforce the collection of duties wherever that power might be challenged. South Carolina was successful in compelling the federal government to agree, at least in princîple, on a tarifffor revenue alone,48 but the state was less successful in checking consolidation because it provided the federal government with the opportunity to assert the superordination of its sovereignty in the Force Bill. The crisis closed with South Carolina's nullification ofthe Force Bill. From the perspectives of the center and of the moderate actors in the South, the Compromise Tariff was a smashing success. Indeed, the moderate South's Moderation was justified by the willingness of the center to pass the Compromise Tariff. The center could be sure that, should they have continued their clamoring, the radicals of South Carolina would he abandoned even by 47 Freebling (1966: 293)• • 110 those with whom they had the MOst in commoo. Because the tarif[ issue had • been solved, if South Carolina wanted to continue to defend its way of life against federai encroachments it would have to do it with a different issue. While there was a deeply divisive test-oath controversy within the state, and gag-rule controversies and more tarif! controversies in Washington, South Carolina did not find an issue that would so grip the public mind until the territorial question reared its head in the aftermath of the war with Mexico, fundamentally threatening the longstanding territorial balance ofthe Union. The nullification controversy was a central moment in the development of South Carolina's theory ofstate sovereignty. The state ofSouth Carolina asserted its sovereignty in the forro of a state convention on a specifie question and successfully nullified a federallaw, compelling the center to alter a law passed through the political proeess outlined by the Constitution. This historical moment provided South Carolina with a glimpse ofthe successes possible by falling back uPOo state sovereignty. To gain the ultimate victory of states' rights and state sovereignty, however, South Carolina's internal divisions-and the South's interstate divisions-would have to he rninjrnized or eliminated. The Concurrent Majority as Solution? The episode descrihed above provided statesman and philosopher John C. Calhoun with an opportunity to develop a political theory ofminority protection consistent with. both. republicanism and democracy. Bydeveloping the concept of 41 FogeL (1989: 297) wrote, the nullification controversy udemonstrated that southem militancy • could win victories in Congress." III the concurrent majority (Calhoun's Most important contribution to political • philosophy), Calhoun sought to establish principles and institutions that protected minority populations from tyrannical majorities by altering the way in which legislation was passed.49 Under the rule of concurrent majority, simple majorities in bath houses of Congress could no longer pass laws. In bis Disquisition on Government, Calhoun argued that, while the "numerical majority, perhaps, should he one ofthe elenlents ofa constitutional democracy," to make it the only element of constitutional democracy "is one of the greatest and most fatal ofpolitical errors."so A republic based on the concurrent majority is not based on the consent ofsimple majorities. According to the principle ofthe concurrent majority, govemment ought to be based upon the consent of a majority of minority ïnterests. That is, local interests, such as those interests dominant within the separate states of the union, must have some way to resist the sometimes-irresistible influence of majorities. In practice, this meant that each state must have the power to veto legislation detrimental to its interests. This simple alteration in the legislative process would guarantee Moderation in govemment and check the potentially tyrannical power ofunadulterated national majorities. Moreover, putting the concurrent majority inpractice would force the sections ofthe Union to compromise with each other in order to get legislation passed. This would have the benefit of developing and deepening the bonds of 49 Calhoun~s defense ofminority rights bears little resemblance to the current politics ofminority rights. The minority interests he wished to proteet were those ofthe planters and slave-owners in the South. This group was a minoritywithin the states in which they lived and within the Union as a whole• • SO Calhoun quoted in Lence (1992: 35). 112 the larger community.Sl Thus, adopting the principle ofthe concurrent majority • would protect local wterests, while also developing the national community. One sPecifie institutional innovation that Calhoun recommended was the creation ofa dual executive, comprised ofa president from both sections ofthe Union.52 For a law to he passed, each "president" would have to sign it.53 While the concept of the concurrent majority was not taken seriously anywhere but in South Carolina, the foundational assumption of the concurrent majority-state sovereignty-was widely accepted in the South. It was upon this foundation that Southem states laterj ustified secession from the Union. Nul1ifieatioD in Context While the nullifiers won a victory against the center, at home there were greater questions looming, most ofthem centering on the deep divisions created during the nullification episode. The South Carolinian desire for unanimity54 that was so evident during the 1860 secession crisis can probably trace its development to the disastrous effect division had in the state during nullification. At no tinte in the past, and probably at no tinte in the future, was South Carolina so deeply divided. Indeed, at this juncture intrastate civil war was possible.55 TemPers were so inflamed during this Period that a South Carolinian newspaPer 51 Kuic (1983). 52 Alexander(1981). 53 Calhounts ideas are presented inLence (1992: 275-277). 54 Rogers (1970). • 55 Edgar(1998: 336); Freehling (1966: 278-279)• Il3 recounted the story of a citizen of the state defending himself against the • "accusation" that he supported and engaged in the enterprise of manufacturing, which bad prompted the episode in the tirst place.56 Defending the interests ofthe state was, obviously, centrally important to tbis state's political actors. During the nullification episode, differences coalesced around the question ofwhether this defense could best he made inside or outside the Umon. In the future, the unionist element in South Caralina was reduced, and most of the state's political actors would begin to "calculate the value ofthe Union," detennining once and for all that South Carolina was better off outside the Union. Before this improbable outcome could he realized, however, the citizens of the state would have to be brought in line.. A large portion of the population supported the radical position, but any permanent change in the relationship between the state and the federal govemment would require virtual unanimity among the South Carolina citizenry.. The radicals, in other words, would have to become the mainstream political group inthe state, if they wished to accomplish their revolution.57 A second problem looming for South Carolina during this episode was the Southem response to its radical actions.. Although the state enjoyed moderate S6 Boucher(l916a). S1 The tenu 'revolution' is used advisedly. There were two ways to understand the position ofthe South Carolina secessionists. One was that they were acting according to an implicit or explicit constitutional right. By this view, the actions undertaken were not revolutionary butconstitutional, strictly understood. The second view is that the actions taken by South Carolina were not founded in a constitutional right, but rather a revolutionary right ofthe people to replace one government for another. According the Declaration ofIndependence, "whenever any govemment became destructive ofthese ends [the security ofthe rights ofLife, liberty and the pursuit ofbappiness] it is t • the rightofthe peopleto alterorabolish it. , 114 success in this episode, the state was punished for attempting to put Jefferson and • Madison's principles into practice. For most ofthe anteheUum period, the North, as weil as the South, regarded South Carolina. as a pariah. Although the other states of the South despised the tariffs of 1828 and 1832, they did not condone the actions ofSouth Carolina. In late December 1832, the legislature ofGeorgia declared that it "abhor[red] the doctrine ofNullification as neither a peaceful, nor a constitutional remedy, but, on the contrary, as tending to civil commotion and disunion."s8 The legislature of Alabama claimed that "nullification...is unsound in theory and dangerous in practice; that as a remedy, it is unconstitutional and essentially revolutionary, leading in its consequences to anarchy and civil discord, and finally to the dissolution of the Union."S9 The North Carolina legislature maintained that nullification "is revolutionary in character, subversive of the Constitution of the United States and leads to a dissolution of the Union.,,60 Similar lack of support prevented South Carolina from seceding in 1852 and made the state act cautiously-and alone-in 1860. The nullification episode left South Carolina deeply divided and the rest of the South deeply suspicious ofSouth Carolinian leadership. Suchaninauspicious beginning to South Carolina's radical debut on the national scene temPOrarily took away its penchant for leading. But through. the steps and missteps of this episode, the politicalleaders ofSouth Carolina began to ascertain what would he required iftrue radical action was ever to be taken. IfSouth Carolina were ever 51 Ames (1970: L80). • 59 Âmes (1970: L81)• ilS nationalists, and they were ooly conditional unionists. This conditional unionism • was slowly transformed into support for cooperative secession and, eventually, into support for unilateral secession. The Bluffton Movement Between 1833 and 1846, mobilization for a radical states' rights position was absent or muted. Toward the latter end of this period of relative quiet, however, prominent secessionist Robert Bamwell Rhett unsuccessfully attempted to jump-start a secession movement. In July 1844, this uncompromising radical and career secessionist initiated the "Bluffton Movement" for unilateral secession. The issue behind which Rhett hoped to mobilize the population centered on the annexation of Texas, which he supported, and the latest tariff bill, which he opposed. In July 1844, he recommended a state convention to consider the question of "secession or nullification.,,62 Given bis state's and bis own reputation as radical agitators, Rhett knew that the rest ofthe South would not rush to support South Carolina, but he hoped that they would lend their support once South Carolina created a sufficiently important issue. Anticipating an argument that foretold South Carolinian actions in 1860, in 1844, Rhett said: It May be nen to impossible, as 1 fear it is, to obtain any cooperation amongst the Southem States, to make the proper issue with the General Govemment, while it will he very easy to obtain their aid and cooperation (incase it should be needed bythe action • 62 Boucher(1919b: 18)• 117 ofthe General Govemment), after the proper issue ;s made by the conduct ofa single State..63 • Thus, Rhett is credited with the early recognition ofthe necessity ofhaving one state force the issue upon other states in order to force their cooperation.64 Re noted that a single state made the issue at the start ofthe American Revolution 6 by throwing tea overboard. 5" He hoped that a single state could initiate the coming "revolution," as weiL For Rhett, the ooly thing needed to defend Southem institutions properly was proper Southem leadership. Rhett was an ideologue, and he failed to understand that successful action required more than an ideological commitment to secession. In 1844, bis caUs for secession feU on deafears. The quiet that South Carolina had enjoyed for a few years following this was permanently shattered after a member of the Rouse of Representatives from Pennsylvania suggested that slavery should he forbidden in newly acquired American territory.. Origins ofthe FintSecession Crisis In August 1846, Rouse Democrat from Pennsylvania David Wilmot attached an amendment to an appropriations bill, created for the purposes of negotiating a treaty with Mexico, which denied slavery any access to territories gained in the war. Using the language ofthe Northwest Ordinance of 1787 that forbade slavery in the Old Northwest, Wilmot and bis Northem allies wanted the following: 6~ Barney(1972: 117), italics inoriginal. 64 Walther(1992)• • 65 Barney (1972: 117). 118 That, as an express and fundamental condition to the acquisition of any territory from the Republic ofMexico by the United States, by virtue of any treaty which may be negotiated between • them,...neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall ever exist in any part ofsaid territo~, except for crime, whereofthe party shall flI'St be duly convicted. 6 The proviso passed the House on a number ofoccasions, but it never passed the Senate, primarily because balance between the sections provided the South with a veto against this sort ofhostile legislation. The Wilmot Proviso was the tirst volley in a crisis that shook the Union to its core and eventually provided South Carolina with a grievance level sufficient to take this state to the brink of secession. The flI'St secession crisis was a dress rehearsal for things to come. At the conclusion ofthe war with Mexico, over 500,000 square miles of territory were added to the union-the single largest addition of territory to the union after the Louisiana Purchase. With the territorial expansion ofthe union came a new source of instability. The source of the conflict over territories was simply this: would slavery be permitted in the new territories, or would it he excluded? Responses varied more or less according to section. In the North, the common opinion went something like this: because the laws of Mexico already prohibited slavery, the United States ought to respect the laws already in place and forbid slavery from expanding ioto the territorial addition ofthe Union (this was Wilmot's view ofthe situation). Wilmot and the North were onlyasking that "free territory should remain free...." "We demand," Wilmot said, "neutrality of th • 66 Congressional G[obe~ 29 Congress, lst Sess., page 1217. 119 this Government upon the question ofslavery.,,67 Southemers must have bristled • at conceiving ofneutrality as radicallyanti..Southem. For the South, not aUowing slavery to spread into new American territories was not neutral, but radically anti..Southem. Ooly federal attempts at abolition could constitute a more aggressive attack on slavery. More alanning, from the Southem point of view, was that Northem versions of anti..slavery were increasingly taking moral, rather than political, overtones. While the political and moral opposition ta slavery appeared similar, Southem political leaders were particularly offended by Northem moralizing on the question ofslavery. It challenged the notion that slavery was a positive good, and indicated to the South that the North believed it had some moral claim on Southem institutions-that it cOuld, on moral grounds, impose its will on Southem domestic institutions ifit so desired. For its part, the Southem view ofwhat to do with the territories was quite simple: Southem (that is, slave) labor must have the same access to the territories as Northem (free) labor. The South felt that it was owed this-not only because they were equal partners in the Union, but also because they had contributed the vast majority ofsoldiers to the war that had provided the United States with this territorial windfall.68 According to Southem standards of justice to deny the South access to the territory won with Southem blood was unacceptable, an affront to Southemhonor. 1h 67 Congressional Glohe, 29 Congress, 2nd. Sess., appendix page 315• • > 6& Wallace (1934: 1(6). 120 Popular Sovereignty: an End-nm Around Extension Politicalleaders in the South • were unwilling to allow the federai government to decide the future of slavery. Political leaders in the North wanted to limit or eliminate the possibility of extending the institution ofslavery. Elaborated by Senator Stephen Douglas from Illinois, the principle of popular sovereignty~ derisively called "squatter sovereignty," was a compromise between congressional establishment and prohibition of slavery. According to the principle of popular sovereignty, the presence or absence ofslavery in a territory was to be detennined by the people living in that territory, expressed through the will of the territorial legislature. The territorial legislature, however, derived its power from Congress. Thus, a territoriallegÏslature forbidding slavery in a territory was tantamount to Congress forbidding slavery in a territory. According to the Southem viewpoint, this was another example of Congress overstepping the constitutional bounds of its authority. This argument meant that there was no way to prevent slavery from entering a territory while it was in the territorial stage. Accordingly, Southem politicalleaders argued that all territories had to be open to slavery. According to the logic ofthis argument, slavery could be excluded only once the territory took on sovereign status-that is, only once it became astate. Northemers reasoned that once slavery was established in a territory, it probably would not he removed. The South was, in effec~ stating "that slavery spread over the territories with the Constitution",69 and that al1 territories were slave territories by default. • 69 Fite (1911: 92). 121 Southemers believed they were demanding only that they be given the • same freedom to bring their property to a territory as everyone else: Could anyone conceive ofail individual being prevented from bringing bis livestock to a new territory? Southemers thought the movement of what they believed to he their property ought to be free. Furthennore, they believed that in the absence of a heroic effort to bring actual slave property to these territories (not flDancially prudent given the risks), these new states would become free states. With the exception of the southem portion of Califomia, many people believed that slavery simply could not thrive in the newly acquired territories.70 Among the many ironies of this period was that the one thing slavery required for its survival-positive congressional protection of the institution- was the one thing the most ardent supporters ofthe institution believed Congress was constitutionally proscribed from providing. Positive protection of slavery was as much out ofreach for Congress as the prohibition ofslavery. As lifelong- secessionist Robert Bamwell Rhett noted while asserting that the fugitive slave element ofthe Compromise of 1850 (which was generally regarded as favorable to the South) was unconstitutional, '''A law to have its practical effect must move in harmony with the opinions and feelings of the community where it is to operate.,,71 The best protection for slavery did not come from Congress or laws, but from the attitudes ofthe society in which it existed. 70 This claim is based on the assumption that slave labor was best suited for certain agricultural enterprises, but not for industriaL work, and that industrialization was a threat to slavery. Barney (1972: 29) formulated it this way: "The price ofindustrialization seemedto he the end ofslavery." st M • 71 Congressional Globe, 31 Congress, 2 Sess., Appendix, page 317. 122 During this period, Calhoun and the rest ofthe outraged South focused on • the related issues ofthe organization ofthe territories with respect to slavery and on the admission of Califomia into the Union. Admitting Califomia as a free state would immediately tip the sectional balance in the Union in favor of the free states, but the status ofthe other acquired territories was ofequal concem. States formed in these territories could either re-establish the balance between slave and free states or further tip that balance in favor offree states. California was eventually admitted to the Union as a free state, but the other territories acquired could be divided into any number of states, leading to a potentially radical imbalance in sectional power. To make matters worse, the newly acquired territories were generally considered to he inhospitable to slavery, meaning that ifthe South put forth no specifie, concerted effort, the territories would be free and would eventually become free states. In addition, the much maligned Missouri Compromise line placed a northem limit on the extension of slavery, meaning that, even ifslavery would spread to the new territories, there were still more territories to the North that would eventually become free states. With these fears in mind, Southem political leaders attempted to formulate a response to Northem and federal encroachments into what they perceived as their rights. The Nashville Convention and the Compromise of 1850 Calhoun's fourth of March speech in the Senate set the stage for Southem reaction to the Compromise of 1850. In il, he argued that the shape ofthe American state was • undergoing fundamental change, and that this change, if taken to its logical 123 conclusion, would end in disunion. The balance between the sections that had • protected both sections by providing each with a veto was about to he thrown off balance by the introduction ofCalifomia into the Union. Having both a majority of the states and a majority of the Union's population meant the North would enjoy ''the exclusive power of controlling the govemment."n This was not a simple matter of the power of one side waxing while the other side waned, Calhoun argued; rather, this set ofchanges threatened, in effect, to alter the very "character ofthe govenunent.,,73 Ifthings kept going as they had been, the South would have had no alternative but to secede from the Union. Ifthe Union were to he saved, the North would have to recognize the South as an equal partner in it and give them equal access to the territories. From the Northem point of view, the federai govemment had no obligation to make it easier for the South to bring their "properti' into the new territories. After all, by supporting the admission of new free states, the People ofthe North were not violating the letter ofthe lawor ofthe Constitution. To respond to rising fears of Northem dominance and federaI consolidation, and to determine what method of redress ought to he employed, Southem legislators attending a bipartisan convention in Jackson, Mississippi, in November 1849 vowed to meet in convention in Nashville, Tennessee, in June 1850. Sorne South Carolinian politicalleaders hoped this meeting would he the st 72 Congressiona/ Globe 1850. 31 Cong.~ 1st sess.~ page 451. • 73 Congressional Globe 1850.31st Cong.~ 1st sess.~ page 452. 124 tirst step toward secession, but for most, it was to he a tirst step in unifying the • South so it could press the center and the North to maintain Southem interests. Unfortunately for the South, this convention was neither a tirst step toward secession nor an important step in unifying the South behind a common program. Many Southem states sent no delegates to the convention, and most states that did send delegates to the convention sent ooly a handful. Only South Carolina sent a full delegation to the convention; Virginia, Georgia, Mississippi and Texas elected a partial slate of delegates; Florida, Alabama, Arkansas and Tennessee sent irregularly selected delegates; Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, Missouri, North Carolina and Louisiana sent no delegation. As constituted, it could hardly be called a Southern Convention-it hardly counted as a legitimate realm in which binding decisions could he made. The convention did not unify the South behind some common response to Northern usurpation. It only demonstrated the extent to which serious divisions within the South prevented any collective action from being pursued. The North leamed that the South was rife with internai divisions and did not have to be taken seriously. While the South revealed, in essence, that there was no "South," in Washington, politicians were working out the Compromise of 1850, which, supporters hoped, would settle the territorial issue once and for aU. The Compromise was constituted by five separate elements: tirst, Califomia was to be admitted as a free state; second, the boundary dispute between Texas and the Federal govemment was solved with Texas agreeing to cede territory in retum • for the federai govemment assuming Texan debt; third, a very strong fugitive 125 slave law was passed; fourth, the existence ofslavery in the District ofColumbia • was affirmed, but the slave trade in it was ended; and fifth, the territories ofNew Mexico and Utah were established without restrictions on slavery. Henry Clay's original effort was to include each separate compromise element in a single omnibus bill, using the theory that each section would be more likely to grant concessions if the other side were forced to grant concessions simultaneously. Clay's efforts failed, but thanks to the tireless efforts ofSenator Steven Douglas from minois, each element ofthe compromise was passed separately. From the Southem perspective, the admission ofCalifornia into the Union as a free state was the most problematic element of the Compromise of 1850. Most states were admitted to the Union ooly after having gone through a territorial phase. Califomia did not go through this phase. Furthermore, it was admitted without providing for a paired admission of a slave state. Paired admission was established at the time of the Missouri Compromise. With the admission ofCalifomia, and without preparations for a slave state to he admitted to balance it, the balance between the free and slave states was pennanently altered in favor ofthe free states, with 16 free states and 15 slave states. Northem numbers had long dominated the House ofRepresentatives (See Chart 2.0), and after the admission of California, even the Senate, long the bulwark against Northem anti-slavery leanings, was in the bands of ufree-soilers" (See Table 2.0). Still, as long as political parties had constituents in both. sections, Northem dominance ofgoveming institutions would not translate into the implementation • of anti-slavery policies. The ooly factor mitigating the South.'s minority status 126 Table 2.0-Free State and Slave State additions to the Union • Free Slave Connecticut Delaware Massachusetts Georgia New Hampshire Maryland New Jersey North Carolina New York South Carolina Pennsylvania Virginia Rhode Island Kentucky (1792) Vermont (1791) Tennessee (1796) Ohio (1803) Louisiana (1812) Indiana (1816) Mississippi (1817) Illinois (1818) Alabama (1819) Maine (1820) Missouri (1821) Michigan (1837) Arkansas (1836) Iowa (1846) Florida (1845) Wisconsin (1848) Texas (1845) California (1850) Minnesota (1858) Oregon (1859) Source: Martis and Elmes (1993: 142). • was the Southem-dominated bisectional coalition called the Democratie Party. • As long as the Democratie Party remained powerful, and the South powerful within it, Southem institutions were safe. Efforts to re-establish balance in the Senate failed spectacularlyand served as a wedge issue to divide Northern and Southem politicians. Southem politieians attempted to force the admission of Kansas as a slave state with the Lecompton Constitution both against Northem wishes and against the wishes of the majority of Kansas's population, merely confinning Northem fears of a Southem slaveholders' conspiracy. With the admission ofMinnesota in 1858 and Oregon in 1859, Southem hopes of restoring balance to the Senate were shattered: Organizing a single slave state proved difficult enough. Organizing three more slave states was an insurmountable barrier to Southem safety in the Union. For the South, this meant permanent minority status in both the House and the Senate, whieh, in tum, meant that policies unfavorable to the South could he passed at wilL Ifthe addition offree states ioto the Union continued unabated, the North would eventually have the super-majority required to pass a constitutional amendment abolishing slavery. Although the Compromise actually succeeded in slightly alleviating the conflict between the North and South, the manner in which it was passed suggested that the compromise was nothing more thau an '-armistice" between the two sections.74 Separate seetional majorities passed each element of the compromise. That is, all or MOst Southemers voted for the elements MOst • 14 Potter's (1976: 90) cbapterabout the Compromise of1850 is tided the "Armisticeof1850." 127 favorable to the South, while aU or most Northemers voted for the elements most • favorable to the North. Potter noted, "In the Senate, four Senators voted for the compromise measure every time, and eight others did so four tintes while abstaining on a fifth measure; in the House 28 members gave support five times and 35 did so four out of five.,,75 Furthermore, the "final settlement" enjoyed sectional interpretation. Stephen Douglas, for example, claimed that the compromise meant slavery could be forbidden in a territory, while Robert Toombs ofGeorgia claimed that the "right of people ofany state to hold slaves in common territories" had been aftirmed.76 Both positions, obviously, could not be simultaneously true. While "compromise" was being established at the center, sorne Southemers were entreating South Carolina to secede alone. Virginian professor and secessiomst Nathaniel Beverly Tucker wrote to James Henry Hammond, "Secession must begin somewhere, or absolute subjugation must ensue. H.If she [South Carolina] alone can act with unanimity then she alone can save herself and us.,,77 Despite Tucker's confidence in South Carolina's leadership, most Southemers were fearful ofthe effect this state's leadership would have. 75 Potter (1976: 113). 76 Potter(l976 : 116). 77 Natbanie1 Beverly Tucker to lames Henry Hammond, 17 luly 1850, 21 September 18SG, Nathaniel Beverly Tùcker Correspondence, Manuscript Collection, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina. In the second letter, Tucker argued that South Carolina cao secede because ofthe homogeneity of its population. Moreover, the states bordering South Carolina would not allow anything bad to befall the state ifit decided to secede. In addition to aU oftbese arguments, Tucker suggested tbat action should be taken immediately, because times were good. He wrote, 'vrhe time ofaction is not when you are fasting, but when you are fulL" South Carolina was "full" at this point, and Tuckerbelieved that ifshe remained'in the Union, the federai govemment would make • sure that the state would neverbe full agam. 128 The Nashville Convention had agreed to reconvene in November 1850~ • With moderate forces boycotting the convention, the radicals controlled the convention that reconvened. Although it would be unable to convince the South to secede from the Union, the convention did manage to assert the existence of the right of secession~78 Because cooperative action was impossible, South Carolinians began to consider unilateral action~ In the meantime, however, events in Georgia, the Deep South state with the most national importance, prevented the possibility of radical action for the next decade. These events would serve to make the unilateral secession ofSouth Carolina almost suicidal~ Given that Califomia was admitted into the Union as a free state under irregular circumstances (not having gone through a territorial phase), the state of Georgia, like most other Southem states, felt obliged to caU a state convention. Concemed that calling the convention was fust step toward secession, Up Country Unionist asked in bis diary: "How much of Califomia will she have after secession?,,79 Georgia's state convention met in December 1850, more than three months after the passage ofthe final Compromise measure. This lag time gave whatever resentment there was surrounding the passage ofthe Compromise measures an opportunity to subside. In part because of this lag time, Georgia Unionists won a massive victory in the convention election. The convention that 78 Potter(1976). 79 The Diary ofBenjamin Franklin Perry, volume 2, 14 September 1850, Benjamin Franklin Perry Papers, Southem Historical Collection, University ofNorth Carolina-Cbapel Hill, Chapel Hill, • North Carolina. 129 eventually met produced the "Georgia Platform," a conservative document that, • Holt notes, "ended the threat ofsecession throughout the South for 10 years."so Echoing the sentiment of Calhoun's toast ("The Union-next to our liberty, most dear''), the platform stated that the Union "is secondary in importance...to the rights and principles it was designed to perpetuate." While this was not a radical document, conditions were attached to Georgia's continued adherence to the Umon. According to the fourth resolution of the Georgia Platform, The State ofGeorgia, in the judgment ofthis Convention will and ought to resist, even (as a last resort) to a disruption ofthe Union, any future Act of Congress abolishing Siavery in the District of Columbia, without the consent and the petition ofthe slaveholders thereof; or any Act abolishing Slavery in places purchased by the United States for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock yards, navy-yards, and other like purposes; or in any Act suppressing the slave-trade between slave-holding States; or in any refusal to admit as aState 80y Territory applying because of the existence of slavery therein; or in 80y act prohibiting the introduction of slaves into the Territories of Utah and New Mexico; or in any Act repealing or materially modifying the laws now in force for the recovery offugitive slaves. SI In conditionally supporting the Compromise, Georgia alone guaranteed that the Southem states ofthe Union would not secede from the Union. But, ifthe words of the Platform are taken to be true, it put the Georgia on a hair trigger for secession, because any future threat to slavery essentially committed the state to secession. 10 Holt(1999: 60S). • 81 Cornmager(1963: 324)• 130 Despite the threats and posturing-which had by now become customary • in the face ofperceived Northem encroachments on their rights-the document was still conservative: Georgia promised to "abide byn the elements of the Compromise of 1850 "as apermanent adjustment ofthe sectional controversy.,,82 IfGeorgia was going to abide by the Compromise of 1850, there was little else for the rest ofthe South to do, except fall in line behind this state. South Carolina's Attempt at Cooperative Secession South Carolina, once again adopting its usual role as hotspur, was not deterred from taking action against Northem and federal threats to its survival. On 20 December 1850, less than one week after Georgia adopted the Georgia Platform, the legislature of South Carolina passed a bill calling for astate convention and a southem convention to determine the state's course of action. By calling for a Southem convention and a state convention to follow, South Carolina was attempting to encourage cooperative (rather than unilateral) secession. South Carolina's plan was to initiate a Southem-wide convention, which would meet in January of 1852, in order to determine the exact path the separate states ofthe South would take. After the convention met, and a path was decided upon, state conventions throughout the South would meet in February of 1852 to put the decision ofthe Southem Convention into effect. South Carolina, however, was out oftouch: Southemers did not wish to hold another convention, and they certainly did not wish to secede. from the Union at this rime. Nonetheless, South Carolina pressed its plan for radical action. • 82 Commager(1963: 324) italics added. 131 The forces in favor of unilateral secession in South Carolina put their • superior mobilizing machine to work and trounced the cooperationists in the February 1851 elections for the state convention that was to he held following the Southem Congress. While no official results ofthis election remain, it was widely reported that the unilateral secessionists won 127 ofthe 169 Convention seats.83 The Southern Patriot, newspaper for the Up Country district of Greenville, claimed that no more than 50 or 60 of the delegates were "even qualifiedly against secession.,,84 Recent historiography of this election suggests this outcome was a result oflow or depressed voter tumout: In sorne historically conservative (cooperationist) districts, the polis did not even open.8S Although it was clear that other Southem states had no intention of participating in another Southem convention, South Carolina went through the motions of electing delegates to the Southem Congress. Confident that a conservative reaction had finally taken hold in South Carolina, and fearful that the radical majority in the state convention would choose to unilaterally withdraw the state from the Union, South Carolinian cooperationists successfully tumed the election for the Southem Congress into a referendum on the state convention's actions.86 With the tide of public opinion finally tlowing in their direction, the cooperationists mobilized voters and defeated the unilateral 83 Bamwell (1982: 14S)~ 84 Boucher(l918: 116-117)~ Ils Edgar (1998: 344). 86 Diary Entry~ 13 October 18S1~ Matthew J. Williams Information and Papers~ Manuscript • Collection~ Duke University~ Durb~ North Carolina. 132 secessionists on 13 and 14 October 1851, by a vote ofapproximately 25,062 to • 17,617.87 Despite the over-representation of the more radical sections of the generally more radical Low Country, supporters of unilateral secession were "grievously cast down.,,88 Even in defeat, members of the state convention (elected primarily from the radical ranks in the February election) recognized that, although the recent defeat at the poUs meant they could not secede, the convention had to accomplish something-lest South Carolina once again damage its reputation by engaging in "bravado and submission.,,89 While formalIy free to secede, ifthe convention bad followed a radical path, the movement for a Southem Confederacy would have been ruined. Georgia, after all, had rejected secession, and this rejection was supported by the ather states of the South. If the convention did nothing, Northem actors would he more certain that Southem threats, even those emanating from South Carolina, did not need to be taken seriously. Ultimately, the fonn ofresistance adopted departed little from the resolutions passed at the reconvening ofthe Nashville Convention and the Georgia Platform. Members of the convention affirmed the right to secede, but they rejected it for the time being. There were, however, other plans ofresistance in the works. 87 Bamwell (1982: 181). 88 Diary Entry, 15 October 1851, Matthew J. Williams Information and Papers, Manuscript Collection, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina. E. W. Rhett to Robert Bamwell Rhett, Robert Bamwell Rhett Papers, 17 October 185l, South Carolina Historical Society, Charleston, South Carolina. 89 David Flavellamison to unknown, 8 June 1860, David Flavellamison Papers, Manuscript • Collection, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina. 133 Sometimes-cooperationist, sometimes-radical James Henry Hammond • devised a plan ofresistance according to which South Carolina was to withdraw its participation in ail federai politics. According to "The Plan," as it came to he called by bis apprentice A.P. Aldrich, South Carolina would cease sending Senators and Congressman to Washington, cease participation in presidential elections, and officially deprive all those who took federaI offices ofcitizenship ofthe State.90 This plan offered de facto secession from the union that would, for the time being, avoid aIl the problems associated with de jure secession; "the plan," however, smacked too much of South Carolina's repudiated radicalism, and it was not adopted by the convention. There were, in effect, two groups in South Carolina at this time. With the Unionist forces all but decimated, there were the unilateral secessionists, like Robert Bamwell Rhett, who wanted secession regardless of the cost. On the other hand there were the cooperationists who desired secession, but only if it was accomplished in conjunction with other states ofthe South and linked to the creation of a Southem confederacy. A.P. Aldrich fit comfortably ioto the latter category. During this crisis, the cooperationists were the dominant force within the state. Although the preference structure of the political elite in South Carolina was largely unchanged between the 1852 and 1860, the outcome of these two crises is vastly different. The difference in outcomes is linked to the differing levels ofgrievance. The perception ofa lower grievance level in 1852, compared • 90 Bamwell (1982: 163). 134 to 1860, meant that, in 1852, South Carolina could not be certain that it would • have a sufficient level ofinternal unity and a sufficient level ofsupport abroad in the South. In 1860, these concerns were largely absent because ofthe strength of the grievance experienced and the speed with which action was coordinated. Support for unilateral secession--even if it would mean that South Carolina would exist as an independent republic-was demonstrated in a series of articles that first appeared in the Edgefield Advertiser, penned by an individual calling himselfRutledge.91 These articles provide an excellent glimpse into the strategies of those seeking the immediate and unilateral secession of South Carolina. According to this perspective, every evil that befell South Carolina, from anti-slavery to the redistribution of Southem wealth to the North, would be remedied ifSouth Carolina seceded from the Union. Rutledge wrote, "The sole danger is while we are in the Union.,,92 [fSouth Carolina seceded, the problems confronting it would be removed. This was true, Rutledge suggested, whether the rest ofthe South joined South Carolina or not. Any effort to force South. Carolina back in the Union would result in the dissolution of the Union, and any effort to cut off South Carolina's foreign trade would unite "half of Europe" in waging war against the United States.93 Similar arguments were 91 This series ofarticles by Rudedge was reproduced in pampblet form in 1851. See also Hamilton (l851). 92. Rutiedge (l851: 26). 93 Rutledge (l851: 23). Similar confidence was seen in the second secession crisis. Robert Bamwell Rhett indicated South Carolina's desire to fonn an alliance with Great Britain, and if Great Britain did not wish for one, they would look for another European partner. Rhett's confidence is related in a letter from British Consul Robert Bunch to Lord John Russell found in • the American Historical Review (1913: 783-787). 135 provided by other South Carolinian planter-politicians: Lewis Malone Ayer, • member of the South Carolina lcgislature, and member of the secession convention elected in 1860, argued in favor ofunilateral secession in 1851. In a speech given in Bamwell district, he argued that by seceding unilaterally, South Carolina would gain peace, quiet, happiness, independence, and the glorious privilege of living entirely under laws ofour own choice. We gain $5,000,000 of revenue now annually imposed on us by our enemies for the benefit of their section. We gain entire exemption from the impudent, offensive and dangerous intermeddling of Northem Abolitionists with our domestic affairs.94 This perspective did not win the day in South Carolina's secession convention of 1852. Although the state had come to be dominated by those who supported the creation of a Southem Confederacy, conventional wisdom held that unilateral secession in 1852 would prevent, rather than facilitate, this objective. Armistead Burt, member of the House of Representatives for South Carolina, wrote, '~As God is the judge of my sincerity, 1 believe this Union and slavery cannot stand together," but he nonetheless opposed unilateral secession unless the cooperation ofother Southem states was absolutely guaranteed.9S The convention itself was a fascinating example of the strategic action employed by tbose whose ultimate desire was the creation of a Southem Confederacy, but who were willing to wait for more favorable circumstances. Robert Bamwell Rhett would nevet oppose secession--even if it meant that 94 Ayer(lS51: 20). • 95 Burt(N.d.: 6)• 136 South Carolina would he separated from the rest of the South, as weIl as the • North. (Disgusted with President Davis's leadership during the course ofthe war, Rhett may have even wished to have South Carolina secede from the Confederacy.96) Although they held the majority ofthe convention's seats, Rhett and the unilateral secessionists did not hold sway in that body. Regardless ofthe argument in favor ofsecession, those able to bring it about saw the existence of South Carolina as an independent republic as an unmitigated disaster. Hammond protégé A.P. Aldrich desired the eventual creation of a Southem Confederacy, but he opposed secession in 1852 because he was certain that unilateral action by South Carolina at that time would have devastated the movement for a Southem Confederacy. During the fust secession crisis, in other words, Aldrich helieved he had to oppose secession in order to realize its eventual success. Eight years hence, Aldrich played a central role in silencing opposition and assuring South Carolina's unilateral secession.97 South Carolinian member of the House of Representatives W.W. Boyce played a similar role in opposing secession in 1852. The purpose of secession, he wrote, had to be to protect slavery. If South Carolina followed a course of action that put the institution ofslavery at risk, he wrote, "We accomplish nothïng.,,98 Under these circumstances, the 1852 Convention was another Southem non-starter: James Henry Hammond, disgusted with belated efforts to consider 96 White (1931: 239). 97 A.P. Aldrich to James Henry Hammond, 11 November- 1851;t James Henry Hammond Papers, Manuscript CollectioD;t Library ofCongress, Washington, D.C• • 98 Boyce (18521). 137 bis plan ofnon-intercourse with the North, recommended to Aldrich that the tirst • order ofbusiness in the convention ought to be to adjourn sine die.99 It met, but accomplished little. Knowing they were defeated bath abroad and at home, the radicals did not force the convention to take action that would further isolate South Carolina. A course ofresistance amenable to all parties was impossible to find. With 19 votes in the negative, the state convention of 1852 could ooly muster the following declaration: South Carolina, in the exercise of ber sovereign will, as an independent State, acceded to the Federal Union, known as the United States of America; and that in the exercise of the same sovereign will, it is berright, without let, hindrance, or molestation from any power whatsoever, to secede from the said Federal Union ... That the frequent violations ofthe Constitution ofthe United States by the Federal Government, and its encroachments upon the reserved rights ofthe Sovereign States ofthe Union, especially in relation to slavery, amply justify this state, so far as any duty or obligation to ber confederates is involved, in dissolving at once all political connection with ber co-States; and that she forbears the exercise of this manifest righl of self-government from considerations ofexpediency only. LOO This was nothing short of another bumiliating defeat for Southem radicals. By this time no one doubted the existence ofthe right to secession. In effect, South Carolina barely went beyond what the resolutions of the Nashville Convention and Georgia's convention offered in late 1850. 99 Bleser(l988: 251-252). 100 State of South Carolina (1852: 18), italics in original. See Cole (1914) for more on the South • beliefin the rigbt ofsecession• 138 Timing Strategies This episode highlights the centrality of timing in the • movement for secession. 101 The beginning of the first secession crisis can he traced to the conclusion of the war ·with Mexico and the introduction of the Wilmot Proviso, which occurred in 1846. As part of the Compromise of 1850, Califomia was admitted to the Union and the slave trade was made illegal in the District ofColumbia. More than three months passed between the passage ofthe Compromise measures and the passage ofa convention bill in South Carolina. In the meantime, the people of Georgia assembled in Convention and provided an alibi for conservative citizens of the South. The Georgia Platform immediately closed whatever window ofopportunity for cooperative secession had been open, successfully providing political cover for anyone in the South who did not wish to secede or who was not yet ready to do so. IfSouth Carolina wanted to secede, the state would have had to have gone it alone. The POlitical preferences ofthe planter-politicians remained little-changed from 1850-52 until secession was accomplished in December of 1860. Most wanted secession, but they were unwilling to go it alone. Those who had the power to make such a move would not support secession unless they were certain they had the support oftheir own population and at least a minimum of support from the other states ofthe South. Short ofthis, any forward action was seen as being suicidal. Ifthere was a lesson learned from this episode, it cao. he 101 See Barney (1974) for the manner in which timing resulted in the failure orthe movement for • secession in 1850-52. L39 summarized as fol1ows: act quickly. To wait is to wait for second thoughts, and • second thoughts are clisastrous to movements that put a great deal atrlsk. The creation of a Southem Confederacy depended on an issue against which secession could be mobilized and the willingne5ts to take prompt action before any conservative reaction inside or outside the state could take boldo Upon examining the falI and winter of 1860, it becomes evident that this important lesson was taken to heart by those seeking to create a Southem Confederacy. Preparations for secession had begun long before the issue upon which secession was justified occurred. Once that issue did occur, South Carolina did little more than respond to it(the election ofLincoln), as it promised it would. According to the framework for the analysis of secession developed in chapter one, the central factor leading to a secessionist movement is the presence· ofa grievance. The central element preventing secession in 1850-52 was the lack ofsuch a grievance. The South lost California, even though more Southem than IO Northem blood was shed winning that land. ! The admission ofCalifomia as a free state tipped the balance in the Senate in favor of free states. However, the Compromise of 1850 gave slavebolders the opportunity to take their institution to other territories gained from the war with Mexico. Though impracticable, the extension of slavery was theoretically possible, giving the South at least a glimmer ofhope that the institution remained safe within the Union. There was, 102 Echoing what MOst ofthe South relt about the admission of Califomi~ unionist B. F. Perry stated, 'vrhe admission ofCalifomia is wrong...but in itthere is no violation ofthe Constitution or point ofhonor.n This is round in The Diary of Benjamin Franklin Perry, vol. 2, 14 September 1850, Benjamin Franklin Perry Papers, Southem Historical Collection, University of North • Carolina atChapel Hill, Chapel Hill, North Carolina• 140 in other words, no real grievance behind which support for secession could he • mobilized. In 1852, the grievance experienced by the South was too distant and too uncertain to activate the other conditions in the Union that tended toward secession. That is, it did not matter that the institutional design ofthe Union gave the separate states a high level of institutional capacity at the state level (thus lowering the cost of secession), or that the federal govemment's minimal function meant that secession could be undertaken with minimal disruption; nor did it matter that the borders of South Carolina were long-established, or that there was a (challenged) POlitical leadership in place that supported secession. The Compromise of 1850, especially after the passage of the Georgia Platform, did not present an immediate, palpable menace to slavery. To achieve sufficient mobilization to accomplish any radical action, it was clear that there would have had to he an immediate, palpable threat to slavery. There was not, in other words, a sufficiently strong grievance leading to a sufficiently strong fear among citizens ofthe South to provide fodder for mobilization for secession in 1850-52. The next time South. Carolina confronted the Union encroachments on its rights, circumstances would he vastly different. Institutional ExplanatioDs for RadieaUsm in South Carolina The extent and uniqueness of South Carolina's radicalism is an oft examined historical puzzle; yet this phenomenon bas never satisfactorily been explained. Not only in 1860, when secession was brought about, but 30 years • earlier during the nullification crisis, South Carolina proved itself to he more 141 radical than the other states of the South. Radicalism in South Carolina-from • nullification, to the affirmation ofthe right to secede, to secession itselt=-has no single cause. Ifone were to look for a single factor influencing South Carolina's decisions in the antebellum period, one would (more than likely) examine the influence of slavery and slaveholders in this state. Slavery was the dominant social institution: First, as a proportion ofthe population, there were more slaves in South Carolina than anywhere else in the South (See Chart 2.2); there were more large-scale planters in South Carolina than in any other state, and, in addition, almost halfofSouth Carolina's population (at least those who were not enslaved) belonged to slaveholding families (See Chart 2.3).103 Perhaps most importantly, thanks to South Carolina's traditions and fiiendly legislative apportionment, slaveholders were more politically dominant in South Carolina than in other states of the South (See Chart 2.4 and Chart 2.5). It is no exaggeration to claim that this group single-handedly controlled this state's politics. South Carolina was imbued---economically, politically, and culturally with the institution ofslavery. Still, asserting the centrality and importance ofslavery in South Carolina is not a sufficient explanation for South Carolina's radicalism. Other slave states, particularly those ofthe Deep South, were almost as imbued with the institution ofslavery as was South Carolina. Thus, South Carolina's radicalism cannot be explained by the political, economic, and cultural importance of slavery and slaveholding alone. These elements tell most of the story, but not aIl of il. In • l03 Edgar(l998: 311)~ 142 • • Chart 2.2--Slave Population as Percentage of Total Population in Slave States in 1860 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 o ~ ~ (b (b ,." 'Ii (b & .(b '1:t~ '.b~ 0 ~ ~ (6 ~'1:t~b ~t§ c!~ .~J'~' ~/ ~/' rt>~>t' ..s.~~ -\(bof l:-G:Î (041 i:)U' rP.::i <;/ ç/C3 ci" ~tti -\,j"~6 *-0~ ~1Ij ~~ Chart 2.4-Percent ofSeats Held by Planters· in Southem Legislatures, 1850 and 1HO 40 1850 30 1..1860 1 20 10 o M~pp1 MIssOUri" Kentucky Arkansas Tennessee TelCSS Maryland Florida loulsiana Virglnia Georgla North Alabama South Carollna Carollna Source: Wooster (1969) and (1975), -Planter refers to an indlvidual owning 20 or more slaves, "1860 Value for Missouri is approximate, • • Chart 2.5-Percentage ofsec-Ion Convention (or etate leg.elature) Seata Occupled by Plantera*, 1860·1861 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% ~ ~. ~ .~ ~ ~ b'b .~ ~ 'bt!J ~~ ~~ ~0 ~~ ~~ ~q ~~ .~~ n~ ~~ ~ro'l1 , ~'li If' .. ~0~ o ûtl'- ut§. . ~(,j ~(Q ~Cj ~~ Source: Wooster (1962), ·Planter is defined as an indivldual ownlng 20 or more slaves, order to provide the fullest account ofradicalism in South Carolina, l propose an • examination of the formal and informal political institutions within South Carolina. In large part, South Carolina's radicalism is explained by the institutional factors that gave slaveholders a larger share ofpolitical power than their aIready considerable numbers would warrant. ûther factors aIso belPed to eliminate the impact of two-party competition within South Carolina, which, in tum, removed a POwerful moderating force from within the state. While white male suffrage came to South Carolina comparatively early, the offices filled by South Carolina's electorate were limited. South Carolinians elected members ofthe State House ofRepresentatives and members ofthe State Senate, United States Congressmen, and little else. Political power in South Carolina, for the most part, was vested in the state legislature: It was the legislature that chose United States Senators, Govemors, Presidential Electors, and Judges. 104 As member of the South Carolinian political elite James Henry Hammond noted, the Legislature of South Carolina "bas ail the power. The executive bas none. The people bave none beyond electing members of the legislature, a power very negligently exercised from tinte immemoriaI.,,10S Those elected to the legislature, for ail practical purposes, controlled every political movement of the state. In comparison, the executive was weak. 106 Wooster wrote: 104 South Carolina's Constitution can be round in. Tborp (1909: 3258-3269). lOS James Henry Hammond to Edmund Ruffin, 10 October 1845 quoted in Freehling (1990: 223). .U16 This interesting trait ofSouth Carolina is more than likely a holdover trom the Colonial Era, • \Yhen the executive was conceived of as the office of govemment MOst likely to transfonn to 143 In no other state ofthe region did the govemor have fewer powers than in South Carolina. In the Palmetto state, the legislature's authority was complete, and the govemor was a mere figurehead. • Chosen by the legislature for a two-year period, the chiefexecutive in South Carolina could grant pardons and reprieves, remit fines and forfeitures, make recommendations to the assembly, convene the assembly on special occasions, and command the militia; but he had no appointive power, could not veto legislation, and was ineligible for re-election for four- years after his term ofoffice.107 Davidson claimed, "The Govemor of South Carolina, like the king of England, reigned but did not rule."IOS The position of Govemor in South Carolina was more a gift ta the state's most important planter-POliticians than a political position in which one was expected to exercise leadership. The weak executive and strong legislative branch was an artifact of the South Carolinian experience under Colonial rule. Like most Americans, South Carolinians had a healthy fear of a strong executive authority and wanted an executive that would he weaker than the legislature. The Low Country ofSouth Carolinawas the flIst section ofthe state to be settled. It is, therefore, little surprise that representation in the legislature was skewed toward the Low Country.l09 In South Carolina, the legislature controUed the state and the slaveholders ofthe Low Country dominated the legislature. As the state's population began ta spread to the Up Country, political representation tyranny, while the legislative element was seen as being closest to the wishes of the people. Making the executive beholden to the legislature would eliminate the possibility ofthe tyraDnical executive. 107 Wooster(l969: 49). IDa Davidson (1971: 75). • 109 Greenberg (1977)• 144 did not necessarily follow. Only after regions ofthe middle and up-country were • "sare" on the question ofslavery (which was only after the institution was firmly entrenched-that is, after the slaves constituted a majority ofthe population) did the Low Country consent to extending ta those regions a somewhat more equitable share ofthe political power ofthe state.110 For example, by 1860, areas with majority black populations controlled 40 of45 seats in the State Senate and 101 of124 seats ofthe State House. Despité the eventual dispersal ofpolitical authority to other regions ofthe state, the Low Country remained politically dominant. In 1860, the Low Country contained ooly 22 percent of the white male population (those eligible to vote) but controlled 48 percent of the Senate and 38 percent of the House. The Up Country contained 78 percent ofthe white male population, but controlled ooly 52 percent of the Senate and 62 percent of the House.lll As one dissatisfied member ofthe Up Country noted during the nullification crisis, "4,402 voters of one district had no more influence than 53 voters in one ofthe parishes [a Low Country district]." 112 The Low Country dominated the politics ofSouth Caralina, 110 Schaper (1901: 436). 111 These figures include those ineligible to vote because ofage. 112 Schaper (1900: 446). Representation in the South Carolina Legislature and, by extension, any South Carolina Convention, was distributed not only by population, but al50 by wealth. The Constitution ofSouth Carolina, as amended in 1808, stated, "The house ofrepresentatives shall consist of one hundred and twenty-four members, to be apportioned among several election districts ofthe State, according to the number ofwhite inhabitants contained, and the amount of taxes raised bythe legislature•..In assigning representatives to the several districts ofthe State, the legislature shall allow one representative for every sïxty-second part ofthe whole number ofwhite inhabitants in the State; and one representative also for every sixty-second part ofthe whole taxes raised by the whole legislature of the state" (Thorpe 1909: 3258-3269). This gave wealth, • including slaveholding, as much representation in the House as white, voting population. With the 145 competition. Specifically, South Carolina operated under a system ofconsensus • rather than contlict. In states where two-party contlict was common-and that was most ofthem-there was a dualistic approach to policy formation: Whatever the position taken by one party, the opposite position would he taken by the other party. Parties had an incentive to distinguish themselves from each other in order to appeal to different elements ofthe electorate. Without this incentive in South Carolinian politics, the State presented a politically unified front that gave it the power, the opportunity, and the domestic support to challenge the center when it felt its rights were at risk. Thus, while other states ofthe Deep South were aImost evenly divided on the question of unilateral versus cooperative secession in the crisis of 1860, South Carolina supported unilateral secession virtually unanimously. It was not uncommon for South Carolinians to refuse to participate in presidential nominating conventions.115 Those who were elected to participate in these conventions, especially during times of intense anti-partyism in South Carolina, did so at their own political periL Political parties, after all, were merely interested factions that mbbed South Carolinian aristocratic disinterestedness the wrong way; furthennore, South Carolinian elites round little difference between the existing political parties. 116 In 1847, Calhoun characterized the leaders ofpolitical parties this way: "The leaders on bath sides 115 According to Congressional Quarterly, ine. (1975), South Carolin~ perhaps stinging trom the success of the Compromise of 1850 and its own failure to secede, did not participate in the Democratie Convention of1852. 116 Laurence M. Keitt to unknown, 19 September 1855, Laurence Massillon Keitt letters, • Manuscrip~ Collection, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina. 141 are thoroughly rotten-incorrigibly so-mere spoils men, & hollow hearted • hypocrites, without a particle ofregard for principles, & perfectiy indifferent to country."117 Anti-partyism was always strong in South. Carolina, but the memory ofthe potential destructiveness of the divisions created during nullification deeply entrenched the desire for unanimity in the state.118 This desire for unanimity, in tum, helPed to establish the unique pattern of politics in this state.119 Antî- partyism and the concomitant absence of party divisions served South Carolina well during the second secession crisis. As the radical Charleston Mercury noted, while trying to convince the citizens and politicians ofthe state to secede alone, "ûther States are tom and divided, to a greater or less extent, by old party issues. South Carolina alone is not.,,120 Historian ofSouth Carolina Lacey Ford claimed that South Carolina had a unique "penchant for concealing its internai divisions from the eyes ofthe world.,,121 Thus, the lack oftwo-party comPetition in South Carolina allowed the radicalism ofthe state to flourish without being checked by a Persistent moderate alternative. Ll7 John C. Calhoun to Joseph W. Lesesne, 19 July 1847, Joseph W. Lesesne Papers, Southem Historical Collection, University ofNorth Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, North Carolina. liS Although the immediate source for this desire for unanimity was the South Carolinian experience during the nullification crisis, this state always engaged in a unique forOl ofpolitics that was distinguished by widespread consensus on fundamental political issues. Central to the South Carolinian political philosophy was the desire ta maintain. what Weir (1969:474) called "personal independence." 119 Banner(1974). 120 CharlestonMercury, 3 November 1860. • 121 Ford (1988: viii)• 148 Elections were still somewhat common in the state, but when they did • occur, they tended to he uncontested and won by acclamation. Indeed, more than 66 percent ofail elections to the House of Representatives in the state of South Carolina between 1824 and 1860 for which there are reHable results were uncontested,l22 and the actual percentage is probably much higher. A similar patter was followed in elections for the state legislature. Kenneth Greenberg noted, "Elections to the state legislature generally followed earlier no contest patterns except for a few exceptional crisis points," such as nullification and the tirst secession erisis-but even these produced no permanent party organization.l23 South Carolinians did not want the competition for POlitical office that eharaeterlzed the political experienee in other states; instead, South Carolinians expected "passive office seeking.,,124 Educational institutions aIso played a role in developing and maintaining radicalism in South Carolina. Virtually every member of the slaveholding elite was educated at South Carolina College (now the University of South Carolina) in Columbia. As Henry Lesesne wrote, "South Carolina's leaders saw the new coUege as a way to bring together the sons of the elite from the upcountry and the lowcountry, in order to 'promote the good order and hannony' of the state."l25 In conjonction with the other unique forces in South Carolina tending toward radicalism, South Carolina College provided fertile ground for the l22 Congressional Quarterly, iDe. (1975). 123 Greenberg (1976: L74). • l24 Greenberg (1976: LM). See also Rogers (1970)• 149 development and maintenance of a radical political culture characterized by a • high level ofconsensus on fundamental issues. Slavery was an essential element of South Carolina's radicalism, but slavery alone does not account for the differences between this state and the other states of the South. Rather, an account of radicalism in South Carolina must include an examination of the institutions in place that gave the slaveholding interests a dominant (unchallenged?) voice in South Carolinian politics. In South Carolina, representative political institutions were structured in a manner that gave slaveholding interests (planter interests, in particular) better representation than in any other state in the Umon. These institutions-an overwhelmingly dominant legislature dominated overwhelmingly by slaveholders, a lack of two-pany politics, and a penchant for unanimity-made South Carolina both uniquely sensitive to threats to slavery and threats to the political power of the slaveholding class and uniquely able to respond to any perceived threat. With these institutions in place, the politics of South Carolina were more radical, and this state was more able to act-and act quickly. CODelusioD South Carolina went a long way toward establishing its radical credentials; no other state in the South was willing to press for Southem rights to the same extent. Some ofthe reasons for this thoroughgoing radicalism are outlined above. Yet, we must wonder what, ifanything, South Carolina had accomplished in its years of pushing for states' rigbts: Protective tariffs were still passed; Northem • 125 Lesesne (1998: 1). See aIso Davidson (1971) and Rogers (1970). 150 challenges to slavery were growing with each year; abolitionism, while still on • the fringes of Northem society, was enjoying ever-increasing support; South Carolinian nullification was repudiated by both the North and the South; secession, either cooperative or unilateral, was proscribed for the foreseeable future. Had South Carolina made any lasting contnoution to the Southem figbt within the Union? Despite the state's obvious failures, South Carolina helped to keep states' rights and state sovereignty on the national agend~ making the South sensitive to perceived wrongs committed against it. From the moment Thomas Cooper suggested that bis state might he compelled to "calculate the value of the Union," South Carolina's political elite gradually convinced its population that secession, May be necessary at some time in the future. In 1852, South Carolinian elites recognized that the time for secession had not yet arrlved. Accordingly, Robert Bamwell Rhett, the rest of the fire-eaters, and South Carolina in general faded into the woodwork for the next few years. Rhett resigned bis Senate seat in disgust, believing that he was not the oost person to represent bis state. Democrats regained the White House in 1852 and won it again in 1856. During the latter election, a new party opPOsed to the extension of slavery contested the Presidency and came dangerously close to winning with a Northem, sectional vote. In spite of this obvious danger, it seemed that Southem power was once again on the rise. The Kansas-Nebraska Act repealed the Missouri Compromise line, opening territory above this line to slavery. The Supreme Court's Dred Scott decision affirmed the actions taken by • Congress, and even went so far as to imply that there were very few places that 151 slavery could actually be excluded. Between 1852 and 1858t the future of the • Union (with South Carolina in it) did not seem in doubt. Southem safetywithin it seemed more certain than it had toward the end of1850, for example. Up County Unionist B.F. Perry put it this way in 1857: "[B]efore our enemies can reach us, they must fllst break down the supreme court-ehange the Senate & seize the Executive & by an open appeal to revolution, restore the Missouri tine, repeal the fugitive slave law & change in fact the who government."l26 For Perryt and others confident in the future of the Union, the enemies of the South had insurmountable obstacles in their way. As one South Carolinian noted after the end ofthe tirst secession crisis, "We must either be in a political fury, or else be asleep."l27 Forthe time being, South Carolinaslept. In this chapter, 1 have examined the historical background ofthe secession crisis of 1860, concentrating in particular on the numerous occasions in which constituent states challenged central state authority. One unique feature of the American political landscape is that challenges to central state authority were ori8Îllally common in both Northem and Southem states. Given the extent and nature ofthe demographic and political changes within the Union, challenges to central state authority eventually became associated with the South-and, in particular, with South Carolina. The foundation of this challenge was the sovereignty ofthe separate states ofthe Union, a theory to which South Carolina had long since adhered. 126 B.F. Perry to F.W. Pickens, 27 June L857, Benjamin Franklin Perry Papers, Southem Historical • CoUection, University ofNorth Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, North Carolina• 152 The more powers the separate states exercised, the more tenable the theory • ofstate sovereignty. As an extension ofstate sovereignty, South Carolina, and, to a lesser extent, the rest ofthe Deep South, gradually developed a theory ofstates' rights that provided them with a means of defending themselves against encroachments on their rights. The South Carolinian defense ofstates' rights, in particular, eventually came to include the right to secede from the Union. Ifthe Union was a compact between sovereignties, and the separate states were sovereign, then each party to the compact had the right to withdraw from it ifits terms were violated. From the South Carolinian point ofview, secession was the "ultimate states' right.,,128 As demographic changes within the Union were translated ioto Northem political dominance, the theory ofstates' rights that had a long tradition in both sections ofthe Union became associated with the South alone. South Carolina's commitment to states' rights and secession was, essentially, a defensive position adopted by a weakened political coalition partner that was consistent with one ofthe dominant interpretations ofthe Umon. Not surprisingly, South Carolina was at the forefront ofthe movement for Southem rights and, eventually, the movement for secession. The nullification controversy was the tirst extended crisis between South Carolina and the center, and it was there that the idea ofstate sovereignty came to take its central role in the maintenance of Southem Rights. If the states were indeed sovereign, each state was competent to determine the constitutionality of laws passed in the 127 Boucher(l918: 138)• • 121 Borrowed ftom the ritle ofCraven's (1986) book. 153 center. While President Jackson maintained that the federal govemment's laws • would be enforced, South Carolina enjoyed a victory in forcing the center to back away from the principle of protection. This victory, however, was bittersweet: South Carolina was convinced that itcould not COllOt on sympathetic Northemers or fellow Southemers to provide a strong check on federal govemment encroachments on states' rights (or a check on the overextension of federal authority). Although it was attempting to protect Southem Rights, South Carolina's leadership, came to be regarded with suspicion in the South. Northemers, not surprlsingly, regarded Southem Carolinian efforts with suspicion as welt South Carolina's effort to nullify federal tariffs was supposed to he an easier confrontation than one that openly centered on the much thomier issue of slavery. Opposition to protection and tariffs was supposed to provide the state with coalition partners who were, like South Carolina, committed to maintaining strict restrictions on federal power. The coalition partners they sought in this fight could not be counted on if their purpose was to defend slavery. Though they succeeded in getting tariffs reduced, South Carolina's effort to establish a coalition that was willing to check the expansion of federal authority failed. In their next confrontation with the Union, South Carolina did not misrepresent the source oftheir concem. In the first secession crisis, the issue over which South Carolina fought was the power the federal government had over the institution of slavery. By openly challenging federal authority over the institution ofslavery, • South Carolina abandoned any efforts at finding sympathy among Northem 154 voters who had come to view slavery as an immoral institution. South Carolina • was ultimately hoping for strong support among its fellow Southemers; in this, they were partly successful, but the.y continued to be looked upon with suspicion. No state was willingto go as far as South Carolina in protecting slavery. After the passage ofthe Georgia Platfonn, the possibility ofemploying a strategy of either simultaneous or sequential secession was eliminated. Despite this, South Carolina went through the motions of holding its convention. In convention, political elites who were committed to the eventual creation of a Southem Confederacy were forced to defeat unilateral secession for the time being. All the convention could muster was an assertion of the existence of a right to secede at a time when few in the state doubted that it existed anyway; South Carolina waited so long to act that other more conservative and more influential states ended up committing themselves (and a large portion of the South) to the Union until a new issue arose. The lessons learned by South Carolina were hard ones: The North could not he trusted to oppose the consolidationist tendencies of the federal govemment; although it vehemently opposed Northem anti-slavery, even the South. eould not he trusted to press for Southem rights strongly enough to successfully proteet them. The only state willing to go as far as necessary to proteet Southem rights (South Carolina) was looked upon askance. After the secession convention had affirmed the right to seeede and eschewed actual secession out of"expediency" only, the radical faee ofSouth Carolina withdrew • from the national stage. (South Carolinian politicians even played a role in 155 national political parties, with James L. Orr accepting the role ofSpeaker ofthe • House during the 35th Congress.) Once it became clear that a Republican might actually win the presidency, South Carolinians and other Southem secessionists began to work toward making a Republican victory the issue that would precipitate and justify secession in South Carolina and the South. As the next chapter demonstrates, political actors in South Carolina were fmally successfu1 in achieving their radical ends. • 156 • Chapter3: South Carolin8 Secedes Introduction The previous chapter provides the general historical context of secession by examiiùng the extensive tradition ofchallenging central state authority in both the North and the South. It concentrates on two cases in which South Carolina was poised for confrontation with the federal governmenl, only to back down. [n this chapter, 1 provide a narrative ofthe immediate events surrounding secession, beginning with John Brown's raid and ending with the decision to secede on 20 December 1860. The framework developed in Chapter one is used to structure the narrative ofevents. A cadre of influential and persuasive leaders is always necessary for a successful secessionist movement. In South Carolina, a secessionist leadership, with Robert Bamwell Rhett at the helm, had an established and occasionally influential presence. Because the radicals were distrusted within the state and outside il, the radical program would only be implemented once the moderate leadership converted to secession. A tipping effect occurred in the state, and in late 1860 support for immediate secession became widespread among the state's political class. It was the moderates-in particular the cooperationists of1852 that successfully implemented the plan for unilateral secession. In this chapter, 1 • examine the influence ofthis leadership and the shift inattitude toward secession 157 that took place between the tirst and second secession crises. Finally, l examine • the strategy of secession employed by the secessionist entrepreneurs in South Carolina and the manner in which that strategy lead to the sequential exit ofmost of the remaining Southem states. Secession did not occur simultaneously (or cooperatively)-as Many had hoped; it occurred sequentially, with the most radical state leading other less radical states. Recognizing the need to employa sequential exit strategy, the state of South Carolina followed a course of action that radically altered the strategie context ofchoice in other states. The secession of South Carolina forced the band of other states, making secession nearly inevitable in the states ofthe Deep South. South Carolina's secession also set up an inevitable confrontation with the federai government-one that eventually forced the band ofMost ofthe Upper South states. Beginnings ofSecession "Can the Union and Slavery exist together?"l This was the question that Southemers asked themselves as they contemplated the Union and their place within it. As the antebellum era progressed, Southem opinion began to shift. Despite mild threats to the institution ofslavery, there bad been a consensus that maintaining the Union was the best way to maintain slavery. As conflict between the sections became more severe, and as changes within the Union made Northem political dominance more thorough, however, Southem opinion on the compattDility of the Union and slavery shifted. No longer was maintaining the 1 William Henry Trescott to William Porcher Miles, 8 February 1859, William Porcher Miles Papers, Southem Historical Collection, University ofNorth Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, • North Carolina. 158 Union the best way to maintain and protect slavery. The Union had come to • constitute a fundamental threat to slavery. William Henry Trescott, Under- Secretary ofState in the Buchanan administration, answered the above question, his own, with the foUowing assessment: "1 do not believe they cano Slavery our institution of it at least-is scarcely half a century old. It is just beginning its career and to develop naturally will require freer people than is allowed by the bondages ofthe Federal Constitution.,,2 Thanks to an electoral realignment over the issue ofslavery that decimated the Whig Party, the second-party system in the United States ceased to exist.3 In the North, the Republican Party rose from the ashes of the Whig Party and, by the late 1850s, began to malee great electoral strides toward promoting an activist federal govemment and opposition to the extension of slavery. The Republican Party made its tirst significant showing in the presidential election of 1856, in which Democratie candidate James Buchanan narrowly defeated the Republican candidate, Southem-bom and educated John Frémont (See Table 3.0). Recognizing the effect a Republican victory would have on the willingness of Southemers to pursue a radical course of action, sorne Southemers actually hoped that Frémont would he victorious in the 1856 election so that the issue 2 William Henry Trescott to William Porcher Miles, 8 February 1859, William Porcher Miles Papers, Southem Historical Collection, University ofNorth Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NorthCarolina. • J Poole and Rosenthal (1997). 159 Table 3.0-PopularVote ln the 1856 Presidential Election (winner in bold) Free States Buchanan Fremont Fillmore Total Vote 0A» for Fremont • Califomia 20,704 36,195 110,255 19% 53,342 Connecticut 35.028 42.717 2.615 80.360 53% Illinois 105.528 96,275 37.531 239,334 40% Indiana 118.870 94.375 22.356 235.401 40°A» Iowa 37.568 45.073 9.689 92.310 49°,{, Maine 39.140 87.279 3.270 109,689 61% Massachussetts 39.244 108.172 19.626 170.048 64°,{, Michigan 52,138 71.762 1.660 125.558 57°,{, New Hampshire 31.891 37.473 410 69.774 54% New Jersey 46,943 28.338 24,115 99,398 29% New York. 195.878 278.004 124,604 596.486 46% Ohio 170,874 187,497 28.121 386,640 48% Pennsylvania 230,772 147.983 82.202 460.937 32% Rhode Island 8.680 11.467 1,675 19,822 58% Va.mont 10.569 39.561 545 50.675 78°,{, Wisconsin 52.843 67.090 580 120,513 56% Total 1,227,106 1.341.750 395.174 2,967,198 45% Slave States % for Buchanan Alabama 46.739 0 28,552 75.291 62% Arkansas 21.910 0 10,732 32.642 67% Delaware 8.004 310 6.275 14.589 55% Florida 6.358 0 4.833 11.191 57% Georgia 56.581 0 42.439 99,020 57°A, Kentucky 74.842 0 87.416 142.058 53°,{, Louisiana 22.164 0 20.709 42.873 52% Maryland 39.123 285 47.452 86.860 45°A, Mississippi 35.456 0 24.191 59,647 59°,{, Missouri 57.964 0 48.522 106.486 S40,{, Nortt-. ~arolina 48.243 0 36.720 84.963 57% 10--- South Carolina Presidential Electors are selected by the State Legislature Tennessee 69.704 0 63.878 133.582 52% Texas 31.995 0 16.010 48,005 67% Virginia 90,083 0 60,150 150.223 60% total 608.986 595 477,879 1.087.430 56°,{, Source: Austin (1986: 136-137)• • between the sections would come to a head sooner.4 Gaining strength, the • Republicans faired well in the congressional elections of 1858. While the Demoerat Party continued to hold sway in the Senate (with more than 55 percent ofthe seats), Republicans held a plurality ofseats in the House (occupying 116 of 238 seats). Ongoing Democratie dominance of other national political institutions mitigated some orthe effects ofthe 1858 congressional eleetion, but these mitigating forces were shattered along with the Democratie Party in 1860. Rhett's Fourth ofJuly Speech Some claim that longtime radical Robert Bamwell Rhett initiated the movement for secession on 4 July 1859, with a speech given in Graham.ville, South Carolina.s In this speech, Rhett noted that the same condition that brought the Umon into existence (fear of domination by foreign power) was no longer present. Thus, the rationale for the Union's continued existence was absent. Affirming the prineiple of state sovereignty, Rhett paralleled the relationship between the separate states ofthe Union and the relationship between the United States and the rest of the world. He said the purpose of the Union was for the American people to "he so united as to be one people, in relation to foreign nations for self-protection-and yet, in relation to one another, he separate, ~ Brooks (1856: 8). The pamphlet in which this speech appears was published in the North inorder to demonstrate the extent to which Southemers are responsible for the troubles confronting the Union. Brooks, thanks ta his caning ofSumner, is caUed an. "assassin." s Perritt (1954: 293-294) noted that the Southem secessionists' "plans for a campaign ta bring on secession in 1860.•.included an opening speech by Rhett." This speech cao he round in the • Charleston Mercury 7 July 1859 and in Wallace (N.d.)• 160 distinct and independent States.,,6 This meant that Southemers and Northemers • were to see each other as members ofseparate sovereignties, not as members of the same nation. The only people who should look upon Americans as a single people or members ofthe same nation were those who viewed the United States from beyond its borders. According to Rhett, Americans shared the same foreign poliey and the same curreney, but nothing more. Through its depredations, the North had violated the solemn compact between the states and between two very different peoples. Rhett claimed that: The sectional majority from the North grows stronger and more resolute every day. They have the power of controlling the legislation of Congress. They failed in controlling the executive, aIso, in the late Presidential election, but by a few votes. They expect, confidently, to succeed at the next Presidential election. Having mastered these two great departments of the govemment, they openly declare their determination to command the third-the Judiciary ofthe United States-and to sweep away every obstacle to their sectional domination and the consolidation of the govemment.7 FinaIly, Rhett claimed, the Northem goal "is to mIe the South."s Northemers, in other words, refused to look upon the borders between the states in the same manner in which they looked upon the borders between the United States and a foreign country. For Rhett, the solution to the problems facing the South had a1ways been clear. Indeed, this solution was written, aIbeit implicîtly, into the structure ofthe Constitution itself: secession. Rhett needed to convince the populace of the 6 Wallace (N.d.); Charleston Mercury 7 July 1859. 7 Wallace (N.d.); Charleston Mercury 7 July 7 1859• • 1 WaUace (N.d.); Charleston Mercury, July7, 1859. 161 rectitude of this solution, and he needed to provide the South with an issue • behind which secession could he mobilized. He recommended that his state "meet the contest in the next Presidential election~" Although Rhett had desired sorne form of separation from at least the time of nullification, he knew that secession was not inevitable: "Ifour rights are victorious in the next Presidential election, we may consider it as a kind augury ofa more auspicious future. Ifthey are overthrown, let this election be the last contest between the North and the South; and the long, weary night ofour dishonor and humiliation be dispersed at last, by the glorious day..spring ofa Southem confederacy.,,9 Rhett's preferences were always clear. He wanted secession, even if it meant going it alone. Given the Union's (meaning the North's) "fatal tendency toward deSPOtism," he wanted South Carolina to "dissolve her connection with the North, and...establish...a Southem confederacy."lO Rhett's failing was that he had never been able to convince others ofthe need for this remedy. We cannot be certain that this speech was anything more than yet another ofRhett's plea to dissolve the connection between North and South. Rhett, after all, was hardly more popular in South Carolina than in the rest of the South, and it was not Rhett's support for the secession movement that led to its success; bis support always could he counted on. Despite bis unpopularity and bis persistent support ofunilateral secession, in July 1859, Rhett told bis state to meet the issue in the next presidential election, and that is exactly what it did. Moreover, once the 9 Wallace (N.d.); Charleston Mercury, July 7, 1859. • 10 Wallace (N.d.); Charleston Mercury 7 July 1859. 162 event drew nearer, Rhett's Charleston Mercury described the eventual path of • secession in South Carolina perfectIy. Rhett may not have been the instrument of secession he had long fancied himself, but by late 1860, bis state had finally adopted bis standard ofresistance. The issue upon which a successful movement for secession could be mobilized had always eluded those who sought it. Between 1828 and 1832, there was talk ofmobilizing secession on the tariffquestion, although nullifiers denied that secession was their goal. In 1844, Rhett initiated a failed movement for secession over the tariff issue in the Bluffton Movement. In 1850-52, South Carolinians attempted to mobilize support for secession around a cluster of issues relating to slavery and the territories won from Mexico. Tariffs and distant territorial issues were never able to provide sufficient fodder for successful secessionist mobilization; they were a grievance, but as long as these issues remained distant and abstract, they would never create a level offear sufficient to mobilize secession. The only true national election in the United States, the election of the presidency, which was determined by a majority of the population, would ultimately provide such an issue. Many years before Rhett determined that the state "meetthe contest in the nen presidential election," James Henry Hammond prophesied in a letter to Georgian scholar and friend William Brown Hodgson: • 163 "[T]he Executive is the rock on which our Institution will split when they • split."u Hammond predicted the issue; Rhett found the time. Long before 1860, South Carolinians had established themselves as those who would cry foui at ail affronts, real or imagined, early and often. Sadly, Northemers had become so accustomed to South Carolinian "bravado and submission,,12 that they ignored it at a time when listening to it had become essential. When South Carolinians claimed that the election of a Republican president would precipitate a crisis, most Northemers assumed that South Carolinians were merely up to their old tricks, and they were confident that this potential crisis would pass, just as had all the rest. After all, Northemers reasoned, how could anyone in the South justi:fy seceding in response to the constitutional election of a President? But for the South, particuJarly South Carolinians, the election of 1860 satisfied only the thinnest form of constitutionality; it was not constitutional in substance. This made all the difference, and it made this supposedly constitutional election justification for South Carolina's action. What came next, however, was even more terrifying than the consequences ofa Republican victory. John Brown's Raid John Brown fust became known as an abolitionist radical in an attack on a pro..slavery faction in Kansas. It was thanks to this event, and others like it, that 11 James Henry Hammond to William Brown Hodgso~ 24 January 1847, James Henry Hammond Letters, ManuscriptCollection, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina.. 12 David FlaveL Jamison to unknown, 8 June L860, David Flavel Jamison Papers, Manuscript • Collection, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina.. 164 the territory came to be known as "Bleeding Kansas." Brown's most famous • escapade was bis raid on Harper's Ferry, Virginia (nowin West Virginia), during which he attempted to incite a slave rebellion that he hoped would spread throughout Virginia and the South, ultimately leading to slave freedom. On 16 October 1859, John Brown and bis followers captured the govemment arsenal at Harper's Ferry. After the successful fust phase of the plan, Brown and bis followers waited for word to spread and for the slave uprising to follow. Word spread, but the rebellion failed to materialize. Potter noted, "[W]hite abolitionists believed that the Negroes were all on the brink of a massive insurrection, yet they seldom consulted anyNegro for corroboration and they conducted their own abolitionist activities.,,13 Without a widespread uprising, the plan was doomed to failure because Brown did not have enough men to hold off troops that would inevitably come to capture them. A Mere dayand a halfafter the beginning ofthe raid, Robert E. Lee and bis troops captured Brown and bis supporters. Later the same year, Brown was tried and hanged.14 Brown's mission had failed, but not before it had increased tensions between the sections and convinced Many Southemers that the North was committed notjustto anti-slavery, but to a violent fonn ofabolition that included literai war upon the slaveholder. The larger implications of this incident presented a common threat to the South, but, tellingly, did not unify the South behind a common program for its protection. Even in the face ofJohn Brown's 13 Patter(1968: 204)• • 14 Potter(1976). 165 attack on Southem institutions, the South did not have the requisite unity to • develop and implement a program for its protection. Ironically, it was the presence, persistence, and extent of this very disunity that helped to convince political leaders in South Carolina ofthe need for unilateral secession. Additional concerns were wrought by Brown's selection ofHarper's Ferry as the starting point for the slave rebellioD. Brown did not select the Deep Soutb-where slavery was finnly entrenched, where the population had a unique vigilance regarding tbreats to the institution, and where any such plotting would surely become known and quashed, as it had in the past;lS instead, he focused ms efforts on the most vulnerable slaveholding area in the United States: the Upper South. In particular, bis efforts were centered upon a portion ofthe Upper South that did not have a large slave population-a portion ofthe Upper South where he thought the population might he sympathetic to bis plan. In the MOuntainS of Virginia, the institution of slavery was not as finnly rooted as it was in South Carolina or in the tobacco growing areas of Virginia. The Deep South had a higher proportion of slaves in its population; in some areas, slaves constituted more than 90 percent of the population. This demographic fact made the slave owners in these areas constantly vigilant for conspiracies. In the Upper South, there were fewer slaves and fewer vigilance committees looking for potential slave rebellions. Brown reasoned-incorrectly as it tums out-that this made the Upper Southripe for abolitionist activity. • IS Sec Freehling (1994) for an interesting interpretation ofthe Vesey case. 166 Despite the obvious failure ofBrown's mission, it was, on larger canvas, a • resounding success. Brown's failed efforts forced the South to question two ofits most fundamental beliefs-heliefs that many knew to be erroneous: one, that the slave actually enjoyed being a slave; and, two, that the Upper South was safe for slavery. This threatened helief set meant that even the smallest challenge to slavery would have to be met with the nineteenth century equivalent of"massive retaliation." Thus, mere Northem anti-slavery would have to have to he treated like the MOst venomous abolitionism. Many Southemers, especially South Carolinians, would not or could not distinguish between Brown's radical, abolitionist views and the moderate anti-slavery felt by the typical Northemer or the Republican Party. This inability or unwillingness to distinguish between these vastly different forms of anti-slavery meant that there was POtentiai for a violent reaction against any fonn ofanti-slavery, no matter how innocuOUS. 16 It is difficult for early twenty-first century analysts to fathom Southem fears surrounding the prospect ofabolition. In the Southem world-view, a threat to slavery was a threat to survival. Freedom for slaves meant mortal danger for the whites who remained in their midst. According to one author, "Carolinians had come to helieve that the MOst immediate response by the slaves to emancipation would he a violent, murderous uprising.,,17 Any form of anti slavery, therefore, put Southemers on the defensive, but Southem divisions over what could or should he done inresponse to the potential anti-slavery leanings in 16 Rutledge (lS51)• • 17 Channing (l970: 58-59). 167 the North meant that a single comprehensive program for Southem protection • could not he developed. It was under these circumstances that South Carolina made one last effortto bring abouttrue cooperative secession. MakiDg Virginia "take the lead"?18 South Carolina saw the aftermath ofJohn Brown's raid as an opportunity to unite the whole South behind sorne measures for their common defense. The raid was fresb in the minds of South Carolinians when the state's legislative session began in the faIl of 1859~ Fearing further Northem encroachments, Christopher G. Memminger, a member of the South Carolina House of Representatives from 1836-1851 and 1854-1859, and an opponent of bath nullification in 1832 and unilateral secession during the 1850-52 secession crisis, tabled a number ofresolutions pertaining to South Carolina's relationship to the federal union and the rest of the South.19 While "still deferring to ber Southem sisters," Memminger recommended that the "slave-holding States should immediately meet together to concert measures for united action.,,20 He also recommended that the resolutions he communicated to the state of Virginja sa that South Carolina and Virginia could "unite with them in measures of lB William Porcher Miles to Christopher G. Memminger, 1S January 1860, Christopher G. Memminger Papers, Southem Historical Collection, University ofNorth Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina. 19 Forevidence ofMemmingers cooperationist credentials, see the following document: Speech of Mr. Memminger at a Public Meeting ofthe Friends ofCooperation in the Cause ofSouthern Rights,. held in Charleston,. September 23,. 1851,. for the purpose ofnominating delegates to the Southern Congress. Charleston, sc: Steam Power-Press of Walker and James. 1851. See also Harry Hammond ta James Henry Hammond, 9 December 1850, Hammond~ Bryan and Cummïngs Families, South Caroliniana Library~ University ofSouth Carolina, Columbia, SouthCarolina. • 20 Resolutions ofthe South Carolina Legislature quoted in Capers (1893: 241-242)• 168 defense.,,21 For the immediate defense of South Carolina, he recommended that • "one hundred thousand dollars be appropriated for military contingencies.,,22 His resolutions were passed unanimously, and Memminger was selected as South Carolina's commissioner to the State of Virginia to eommuüieate the substance ofthese resolutions to it. Memminger seleeted Virginia as the starting point for two reasons: First, Brown's raid oceurred within the territory of Virginia, and South Carolinians hoped that Virginia's experience with radical abolitionism might prompt it to support a Southem Convention; second, many individuals inside and outside of South Carolina thought that Virginia's support was essential to any united or coordinated effort defending the South against Northem aggressions. Forees opposed to secession condemned Memminger's efforts as nothing nlore than an attempt to force secession. Memminger, however, like most South Carolinian moderates, sought ooly to develop a plan that would assure the safety of Southem institutions. It mattered little ifthis safety was had in the Union or out ofit. Memminger wrote: The legislature of our State seems to have been persuaded that if we could get the Southem States to meet in Congress, considerable progress would he made towards a Union of the South.. AlI ofus are persuaded that in this Union there is no seeurity-and either there must be new terms established or a Southem Confederacy is ouronly hope ofsafety.23 21 Resolutions ofthe South Carolina Legislature quoted in Capers (1893: 241-242). 22 Resolutions ofthe SouthCarolina Legislature quoted inCapers (1893: 241-242).. 23 Christopher G. Memminger ta William Porcher Miles, 27 December 1859, William Porcher Miles Papers, Southem Historical CollectioD, University ofNorth Carolina, Chapel Hill, North • Carolina• 169 Southem hopes often centered on creating a union of interests among the • Southem states in order to press Southem interests within the Union more effectiveLy. These conservatives initially pinned their hopes on a Union with new terms-a Union in which slavery would be assured of its safety. Without new terms, the creation ofa Southem Confederacy was essential for Southem safety. "My own opinion and 1 think the opinion of our State," Memminger wrote to South Carolina member ofthe United States House of Representatives William Porcher Miles, "is that the Union cannot be preserved; and that a sectional Government such as we now have is not worthy of preservation. New terms, fresh constitutional guarantees might make another Union desirable. But in this, we will soon he deprived ofevery defense against the Northem section.,,24 Memminger delivered his speech to the Virginia Legislature on 19 January 1860. By this time, Memminger knew that Virginia could not be compelled to take the lead. Despite both the fears that had been created by John Brown's raid and South Carolinian pleas to take sorne action in defense of Southem institutions, Virginia refused to support a Southem Conference at this time.2S There is considerable historiographical debate about the motive behind Memminger's mission to Virginia. Even though Memminger was widely regarded as a conservative, some have claimed that his mission was undertaken 24 Christopher G. Memminger to William Porcher Miles, 3 January 1860, William Porcher Miles Papers, Southem Historical Collection, University ofNorthCarolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina. • 25 Text ofhis address can be round inMemminger (1860). 170 to mobilize support for secession among the conservatives of Old Dominion.26 • (Who better to convince conservatives of the need for action than a fellow conservative?) Whatever the true motive, what the mission did accomplish was just as important as mobilizing support for a convention or for secession. The failure ofthis mission proved that, even in the face ofegregious crimes against the South, the conservative states ofthe Upper South could not he counted on to join the other states ofthe South to defend Southem interests. The fact that Virginia would not be compelled to take the lead, or take any other forward movement-including support for a Southem Conference-was hardly surprising to South Carolina. Still, it hardly matter that the mission was a failure. South Caro1ina's interests were served, because the very attempt to facilitate cooperation had the added benefit of aIlowing the state to credibly claim that it had abandoned its more extreme tendencies. The missions failure aIso helped South Carolina to ascertain what steps would need to be taken to provide needed protection to Southem interests. The persistently unreliable states ofthe Upper South would not take any action in defense of Southem interests; nor would they work to help create a united South. Even in the aftermath ofthe egregious crime comtiutted against it, Virginia was "rapidly cooling down" on 26 Crenshaw (1942) considered this question, but determined that it cannot be definitively answered. Memminger May have gone to Virginia to attempt to save the Union, butthe conditions under- which it could be saved would oever- have been acceptable to the North. Unionist proclamations May have betrayed an uitetior- secessionist motive. Boucher (l919a: 133) noted that it is difficult to determine what South Carolina wanted when it passed resolutions sending a commissioner- to Virginia and calling for fimds to protect the state. In the latter instance, the state • failed to mention whether protecting the state would be done inside or- outside the Union. 171 followed) a course of action that would pull these states out of the Union, • reticent Virginia would he forced to make a decision that it appeared unable to make voluntarily. Memminger, a true cooperationist as late as early 1860, gradually began to recognize the necessity ofunilateral secession. At the conclusion ofbis mission, while still in Virginia, Memminger wrote to South Carolinian member of the United States House of Representatives and recent convert to separate state secession William Porcher Miles that he was "brought to the opinion that we farther South will have to he compelled to act, and to drag after us these divided states.,,30 He wrote that he knew "of no remedy but secession and that ofcourse must be at home.,,3l Although bis previous commitments were to cooperative sece.ssion, Memminger was now committed to unilateral secession, a position that had formerly been adopted by ooly the most radical citizens of South Carolina. Miles reluctantly agreed with Memminger's contention that the other states of the South would have to be dragged along. He wrote of bis disappointment that the movement to defend Southem interests was to he placed in the hands ofSouth Carolina once again: 1 am deeply pained and mortified to hear that Virginia is so utterly apathetic. You are right in your views. We further South must act and "drag her along." 1 was, as you know, opposed to separate secession ofour state in ' 51-but in the event of the election ofa 30 ChristopherG. Memmingerto William Porcher Miles, 24 January 1860, William Porcher Miles Papers, SouthemHistorical Collection, University ofNorth Carolin~ Chapel Hill, North Carolina. 31 Christopher G. Memminger10 William PorcherMiles, 6 February 1860, William Porcher Miles • Papers, Southem Historical Collection, University ofNorth Carolin~ Chapel Hill, North Carolina. 173 Black Republican President 1 would he inclined to advise South Carolina to go out of the Union at once and end the present govemment. It is very certain that the withdrawal of any single • state must break up the Union. However 1 would much prefer to see Alabama or Mississippi lead off. Our state would certainly follow.32 Fearing that the politicalleaders of South Carolina were "behind the people," Miles concluded this letter with a request for Memminger to indicate what "practical action" should be undertaken in order to press forward in the movement for Southem safety. In South Carolina, politicians were supposed to lead, not follow. He hOPed that sorne "practical action" would put South Carolina's politicians ahead ofthe people--or at least equal with them. The disappointment experienced in Virgh.;;..l vorked to push actors, like Memminger, who were origjnally moderate into a Rhett..like position in support of unilateral action. Without John Brown, and the failed mission to Virginia, support for unilateral action may have remained outside of the political mainstream. Thanks to these events, support for unilateral action was no longer the provenance ofthe state's original extremists; moderates had begun to see the necessity of unilateral secession. In one of the Many ironies oftbis episode, the deep entrenchment of Upper South Moderation was fortuitous for supporters of unilateral secession. That this Moderation was confirmed long before the November election presented the issue upon which secession would he ultimatelyjustified further aided the cause ofunilateral secession. IfUpper South reticence had not been confirmed early, there was a risk that Deep South states 32 William Porcher Miles to Christopher G. Memminger, 3 February l860, William Porcher Miles • Papers, Southem Historical Collection, University ofNorth Carolina, Chapet Hill, North Carolina. 174 that were ready to act would have waited too long to accomplish secession. • Upper South Moderation and Deep South reluctance to lead guaranteed that South Carolina would make the tirst move toward protecting Southem interests. Given this state's predilection for radicalism, this meant that the movement to defend Southem interests would Most likely proceed according to a strategy consistent with South Carolina's interpretation of the Union-a strategy involving secession. Thus, an Upper South that would not act and a Deep South that would not lead foisted the obligation ofleading upon South Carolina. Alabama Makes a Move•.•and aD Issue Surprisingly, it was not South Carolina that made the first formal move toward secession, but Alabama. Recognizing the probability that a Republican would he elected president, and that such an election would pose a threat to the institution of slavery, in early 1860, the Alabama legislature passed a law requiring the state to calI a convention within forty days ofthe election in order to consider actions necessary for the safety ofSouthem institutions. Accordingly, the convention was charged to "consider, determine, and do whatever in the opinion of said convention the rights, interests, and honor of the State of Alabama require to he done for their protection.,,33 The forward movement of Alabama provided sorne relief for South Carolinians fearful of taking the mantle of leadership in the rnovement for a Southem Confederacy. However, when the time came for action, Alabama's forward movement was tempered by Alabama Govemor A.B. Moore's 33 ACiS ofAlabama 1859-60 pages 658-97 quoted in Denman (1933: 79). • t t 175 unwillingness to initiate the movement for secession. Moore defended bis • position br referring to a procedural issue: Did the election ofthe president take place when the popular vote was cast, or when the Electoral College exercised its constitutional duty and selected the next president of the United States? On 5 December 1860, Govemor Moore claimed that "[T]he election ofLincoln could not constitutionally take place until a majority ofelectors had voted for him.,,34 Thus, the constitutional election of Lincoln would not take place until mid December, more than a month after the popular election took place. This put the brakes on what originally looked like a promising first move, and the fear that this might lead to a delay in the movement for secession helped to further strengthen South Carolinian resolve in the waning days of 1860. Recalling that it was delay that had ruined the movement for secession in 1850-52, South Carolina was determined not to allow caUs for delay to put the current movement at risk. The Democratie Convention(s) of1860 Currently, national conventions held by the political parties are comprised ofdelegates who are, for the MOst part, committed to a specific candidate. This commitment is based upon votes cast in primary elections orcaucuses. Thanks to the system ofholding primary elections, conventions have become more or less superf1uous in the nomination ofcandidates. They have become mere pep rallies for the parties, the nominating decision having been made at the poUs long before the convention takes place. • 34 Denman(l933: 92). 176 Long before the nomination process had reached its eurrent level of • demoeratization, however, party conventions were central to the selection of a presidential candidate. In 1860, the party convention held real power and had real funetions. It was fortuitous for secessiomst entrepreneurs that the Democratie nominating convention of 1860 was held in Charleston, South Carolina. This gave the radical forces, from both within and without, a suitably radical baekdrop in front ofwhieh to press their views. Thanks espccially to the machinations of secessionist William Yancey. and the rest of the Alabama delegation, the Charleston Convention was a dress rehearsal for secession.JS In the Charleston Convention ofApril 1860, there were two related issues that increased the already considerable tension between the sections. First, tbere was the question of a candidate. Northem Democrats would accept no one but Stephen Douglas, whereas Southem Democrats had long since soured on Douglas-thanks to ms support for the doctrine of popular sovereignty and his opposition to the Lecompton Constitution that would have paved the way for admitting Kansas as a slave state. With Northem Democrats unwilling to aecept anyone other than Douglas, and the Southem Democrats unwilling to accept Douglas under any circumstances, the stage was set for a showdown.36 35 See Venable (1942) for an account of events. Yarwood (1970: 226) wrote that "effective secession" can be dated from the time the delegates from the Southern states bolted trom the convention in Charleston. 36 In bis unpublished autobiography, Robert Bamwell Rhett claimed that he otTered the foUowing deal to Col. John Richardson ofIUinois, confidante ofDouglas: "[Glive us an endorsement ofthe decision ofthe Supreme Court ofthe United States, in the Dred Scott case, and we will give you the whole South for Mr. Douglas; but fail to do this, and the South leaves you, the democratic party will be divided, and Mr. Douglas defeated." This quote is found in "Political Writings: Fragments and appendix to Robert Bamwell Rhett's- Autobiography," Robert Bamwell Rhett • Papers, South Carolina Historical Society~ Charleston, South Carolina. Robert Bamwell Papers. 177 The second issue was the platfonn the convention would adopt. The • proximate cause of the withdrawal of Southem delegates was the convention's adoption of a platfonn that did not conform to the wishes of the Southem members ofthe Democratie Party. Central to the dispute, ofcourse, was slavery. In general, Northem Democrats wanted a reaffirmation of the Cincinnati Platfonn of 1856, in which the doctrine of popular sovereignty was adopted- though they were willing to compromise on this by agreeing to defer to the Supreme Court on the question of Congress's and territorial governments' authority over slavery.37 Believing the selection of a platform would be less controversial than selecting a candidate, the convention took up the question of platform first. A platform was thought to be easier to adopt because it merely required a simple majority of the convention attendees for adoption, rather than the two-thirds of the entire convention required to nominate a candidate. While the Southem delegation lacked the numbers to dominate the whole convention, the platform was developed in committee, where each state had a single vote, allowing the Southem delegation (with the support of California and Oregon) to hold sway over the committee's work. The "majority platfonn" created by this committee contained the provisions demanded by the Alabama delegation as the condition This story may be true, but it Îs doubtful that Rhett could deliver on his offer. He was hated in the South almost as much as Douglas. 37 As always, the Cincinnati Platform was subject to sectional interpretatÎon, wÎth each section • reading it În a way that was consistentwith their wider political commitments. 178 for their remaining in the convention. These provisions were known as the • Alabama Platform. The Alabama delegation and other Southemers sought the positive protection of slavery in the commonly held territories. They demanded a re- affirmation of the specific principles outlined in the Dred Scott deeision that made it difficult to prevent the spread of slavery. Provisions outlined in the Alabama Platform mandated positive protection of slavery in a manner that would establish slavery in all territories of the United States. What the South demanded in the platfonn ofthe regular Democratie Party, but could not have, was stated clearly in the platfonn eventually adopted by the Southem Democratie Party: Resolved, That the Platfonn adopted by the Democratie Partyat Cincinnati be affirmed, with the following explanatory Resolutions: 1. That the Government of a Territory organized by an aet of Congress, is provisional and temporary; and during its existence, all citizens of the United States have an equal right to settle with their property in the Territory, without their rights, either of person or property, being destroyed or impaired by Congressional or Territoriallegislation.38 In Charleston, the Southem delegates maintained that neither the citizens of a territory nor Congress had the power to prevent the institution of slavery from being established. The North--even Northem Democrats who were deeidedly moderate on the question of slavery-was unwilling to oppose popular sovereignty and support the extension ofslavery into a territory ifit were against the wishes ofa majority ofthe territory's population. • 38 SouthemDemocratie Platform of1860 round in Commager(1963: 366). 179 Northem supporters of popular sovereignty believed a territory's • population ought to be able to prevent slavery from being established just as it could allow slavery to be established. From the Southem perspective, Douglas' doctrine of popular sovereignty and the "compromise" proposed by Northem Democrats was just another way to exclude slavery from the territories: it was, in other words, the Wilmot Proviso in practice. Although the Supreme Court had already appeared to resolve this specifie controversy in the Dred Scott decision, the platform adopted by the Democratie Party in 1860 retumed the question ofa territorial govemment's power to forbid or establish slavery to the Supreme Court. The Democratie Party Platfonn adopted in April 1860 resolved: That it is in accordance with the true interpretation of the Cincinnati Platform, that, during the existence of the Territorial Governments, the measure of restriction, whatever it May be, imposed bythe Federal Constitution on the power ofthe Territorial Legislature over the subject ofthe domestie relations, as the same has been, or shaH hereafter be, fmally determined by the Supreme Court ofthe United States, shall be respected by all good citizens, and enforced with promptness and fidelity by every branch ofthe General Govemment.39 Unsatisfied with the effort at compromise, and having been instructed by their state to withdraw from the convention if its demands were not met, fire- breather William Yancey and the Alabama delegation withdrew from the convention as the results ofthe vote on the platform was announced. FoHowing • 39 Democratie Party Platfonnof1860 round in Commager (1963: 365-366)• 180 the Alabama delegates out of the Convention were delegates from Mississippi, • Louisiana, South Carolina, Florida, Georgia, Arkansas and Delaware.4o The convention leadership decided that two-thirds of the entire original convention was required to nominate a candidate. Thus, the withdrawal of delegates did not make the llomination of a candidate any easier. Under these circumstances, the successful nomination of Douglas would require virtual unanimity among the remaining delegates. While Douglas had the support of a majority ofthe remaining delegates, he did not have support oftwo-thirds ofthe entire original convention. Thus, no nomination was made in Charleston. Those remaining in attendance decided that the convention would reconvene in Baltimore on 18 June 1860, in an effort to secure a nomination. In the meantime, those who withdrew from the convention agreed to meet in Richmond, Virginia on Il June 1860. Closing the door on the possibility of party reunion, South Carolina and Florida permitted their states' delegations to attend the Richmond convention only.41 As the regular convention reconvened in Baltimore, controversy arose over who would be authorized to be seated in the convention. Delegates from Louisiana and Alabama were eommissioned by their states to participate in both the regular Democratie convention in Baltimore and the Southem Democratie 40 Potter (1976: 410). Surprising as it may be, the entire South Carolina delegation to the Charleston Conventiondid not boitthe convention with the rest orthe Southem states. This makes more sense when it is madecleartbatthe South Carolinadelegation to the convention was actually strongly unionist. B.F. Perry, one orthe only Unionists left in 1860, was one orthe three who did not secede with the rest. See Channing (1972: 2040.) and Nichols (1948). • 4l Fite (1911: lOS)• 181 convention in Richmond, but members of the Baltimore Convention refused to • allow them to participate in the regular convention. This refusal precipitated the withdrawal ofdelegates from twenty states. The rump convention (composed of the delegates who did not withdraw) was finally able to nominate Douglas onthe Democratie ticket, while the withdrawn and reiùsed delegates from the Baltimore Convention met and nominated John Breckenridge, James Buchanan's vice president from Kentucky, as a candidate for President on the Southem Democratie ticket. Awaiting the result of the Baltimore Convention, the Richmond convention affirmed Breckenridge's nomination. This split in the Democratie Party established and illuminated the battle lines between North and South and helped to aggravate the already tense relationship between the sections. The split in the Democratie Party, however, was neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of the election of Lincoln. Abraham Lincoln and the Republican Party enjoyed a strategie concentration of support in enough states to win a majority in the Electoral College in 1860, even though he poUed less than 40 percent ofthe vote nationally. Former Whigs in the North who were "resistant to supporting any Democrat',42 played a central role in Republican victory. Seymour Martin Lipset credited the victory of the Republican Party in the North to the fact that uaU northem anti-Democratie votes were gathered together under one party for the first time since the Whig victory • 42 Alexander (1981: 20)• 182 of1848.,,43 That is, "this victory did not suggest a sea cbange in Northem opinion; • rather, circumstances simply happened to be fortuitous for the Republican Party. Govemor Gist Plumbed the Depth ofSouthem Sentiment The movement for secession began in eamest in the faIl of 186Q, wben South Carolina's Govemor, William Gist, wrote a series ofletters to Deep South and Upper South govemors-asking them wbat they would do in the event ofa Lincoln victory and informing them of the path South Carolina would take in that eventuality. On S October 1860, Gist wrote letters to the govemors ofNorth Carolina, Louisiana, Mississippi, Georgia, Alabama, and Florida. Gist's brother, appropriately named States Rights Gist, delivered them. These letters were both an effort to mobilize support for secession and an effort to plumb the depths ofradicalism in the other states. Unfortunately, Many ofthe letters are either not possessed by public archives or were destroyed; but given the wording ofthe responses he received, each letter seems to have been identicaL 1 refer here to the letter Govemor sent to Govemor Moore ofLouisiana in order to provide an illustration ofthe sentiments they contained. Gist wrote: [t is the desire ofSouth Carolina that sorne other State should take the lead, or at least move simultaneously with ber. She will unquestionably caU a convention as soon as it is ascertained that a majority of the electors will support Lincoln. If a single State secedes, sbe will follow her. Ifno other State takes the lead, South Carolina will secede (in my opinion) alone, if she has any assurance that she will saon be followed by another or other States; otherwise it is doubtful.44 43 Lipset (1959: 346). 44 William Henry Gist to Govemor Thomas Moore, 5 October 1860, William. Henry Gist Papers, • South CarolinianaLibrary, University ofSouth Carolina, Columbia, South Carolina.. L83 This letter provides a perfect enunciation of the preference structure of • most political elites in South Carolina. Their tirst hope was that another state would take the lead. Ifthis was not possible, they hoped that another state (or group ofstates) would act in concert with South Carolina. Third, as a last resort, if South Carolina had assurances that another state would soon follow, South Carolina would secede alone. This signaled the state's willingness to take a calculated risk; the state could, after ail, never be certain of the reaction other states would have to its secession. That South Carolina was willing to accept this risk virtually assured the establishment of a Southem Confederacy. If the state received assurances that its unilateral secession would be followed by the secession of another state or other states, then South Carolina could initiate actions that would result in the creation ofa Southem Confederacy. The responses that poured in during the following weeks ranged from somewhat encouraging to devastatingly discouraging. Govemors John Ellis of North Carolina, Thomas Moore of Louisiana, and Joseph E. Brown of Georgia wrote that secession would not and should not follow the election of Lincoln. Govemors John J. Pettus of Mississippi, A.B. Moore of Alabama, and M.S. Perry of Florida wrote that while they would not secede alone, they would he influenced by the actions of one or more other states. Given the importance of these letters to the eventual realization of secession, 1 would like ta quote the respooses from each govemor at length. From John W. Ellis ofNorth. Carolina: Upon the whole 1 am decidedly ofthe opinion that a majority of • our- people would oot consider the occurrence ofthe event referred 184 and if subsequently ratified and adopted by each state by proper authority, will present the south in united and harmonious action.47 • JohnJ. Pettus ofMississippi wrote: Our friends in this state are willing to do anything they May have the power to do to prevent the State from passing under the black Republican Yoke. Our people know this and seem to approve such sentiment, yet 1do not believe Mississippi can move alone. 1 will cali our legislature in extra session as soon as it is known that the black Republicans have carried its election. 1 expect Mississippi will aska council ofsouthem States, and ifthat council advises secession, Mississippi will go with them. If any state moves, 1think Mississippi will go with her.48 Joseph E. Brown ofGeorgia wrote, "Should the question be submitted to the people of Georgia, whether they would go out of the Union on Lincoln's election without regard to the action of other States, my opinion is they would determine to wait for an overt act.,,49 Brown did, however, indicate that the "action of other States May greatly influence the action of.the people of this State."SO A.B. Moore ofAlabama wrote: My opinion is that the election of Lincoln alone is not sufficient cause for a dissolution of the Union; but that fact when taken in connection with. the avowed objects and intentions of the party whose candidate he is, and the overt acts already committed bythat party in nullifying the fugitive slave law, and the enactment of personalliberty bills in Many ofthe non·slave holding States, with 47 Thomas Moore ta William Henry Gist, 26 October 1860, William Henry Gist Papers, South Caroliniana Library, UniversityofSouth Carolina, Columbia, South Carolina. 41 John J. Pettus to William. Henry Gist, 260ctober 1860, William Henry Gist Papers, South Caroliniana Library, University ofSouth Carolina, Columbia, South Carolina. 49 Joseph E. Brown to William Henry Gist, 31 Oetober 1860, William Henry Gist Papers, South Caroliniana Library, UniversityofSouth Carolina, Columbia, South Carolina. so Joseph E. Brown to William Henry Gist, 31 October 1860, William Henry Gist Papers, South • Caroliniana Library, University ofSouth Carolina, Columbia, South Carolina. 186 other acts of like kind, is sufficient cause for dissoLving every tie which binds the southem States to the Union. It is my opinion that Alabama will not secede aLone but iftwo or • more States will cooperate with her she will secede with them; or if South CaroLina or any other southem State should go out aLone and the Federal Government should attempt to use force against her, Alabama will immediateLy rally to her rescue. Should Lincoln he elected 1 shall certainLy caU a convention under the provisions ofthe resolutions ofthe last general assembly ofthe State. The convention cannot he convened eartier than the tirst Monday in February next...1 regret that earlier action can not be had, as it May he a matter of much importance that alL the States that May determine to withdraw from the Union should act before the expiration ofMr. Buchanan's terms ofservice.sl M.S. Perry ofFlorida wrote: We are in the midst of grave events, and 1 have industriously sougbt to learn the public mind in this State in the event of the election ofLincoln, and am proud to say Florida is ready to wheeL into fine with the gallant Palmetto State or any other cotton State or States in any course which she or they May in their judgment think proper to adopt, looking to the maintenance of the rights, interests, honor, and safety ofthe south. Florida May be unwilling to subject herself to the charge of temerity or immodesty by leading off; but will most assuredly cooperate with or follow the lead of any cotton state which may secede. Whatever doubts 1 May have entertained upon this subject have been entirely dissipated bythe recent elections in this state. Florida will most unquestionably caU a convention as soon as it is ascertained that a majority of the electors favor the election of Lincoln, to meet most likely upon a day to be suggested by sorne other state.52 Three of the six govemors' responses were not encouraging for radical South Carolina, but three others were at least moderately encouraging, with Florida's govemor promising that bis state would "follow the lead ofany cotton 51 AB. Moore to William Henry Gist, 2S October 1860, William Henry Gist Papers, South Caroliniana Library, University ofSouth Carolina, Columbia, South Carolina. 52 M. S. Perry to William Henry Gist, 9 November 1860, William Henry Gist Papers, South • Caroliniana Library, University ofSouth Carolina, Columbia, South Carolina• 187 state wbich may secede" and the Govemor of Mississippi claiming that "Ifany • state moves, l think. Mississippi will go with her." While Gist may not have received the full support ofperhaps the most important state ofthe Deep South, Georgia, he did get enough assurance ta convmce himself and ms state that if they led the secession movement, their actions would be followed in sequence by at least one or two other states, wbich would set in motion a chain ofevents that would lead (Gist hoped) to the secession of aU (or at least most) of the other states ofthe South. Furthermore, Brown ofGeorgia indicated that "the action of other States May greatly influence the action of the people" of Georgia. This statement appeared to leave open the possibility that the unilateral secession of South Carolina could prompt the secession ofeven Georgia. Despite the encouraging news received from some of the states, Gist received no assurance that bis tirst preference, that another state take the lead, would be realized; however, he did receive enough promises ofa sequential exit, upon which a forward movement could be based. South Carolinians became resigned to the fact that their state would lead, but they also knew that, even ifno state followed South Carolina, their state would he protected bythe non-seceding Southem states in the event that the federal govemment would attempt to coerce South Carolina.. For a South Carolinian attempting to map out a strategy of secession, the promise to resist coercion was almost as important as the promise to secede. The conditions outlined by Rutledge in 1851 were still Iargely present; that is, Many were convinced that, even ifno state immediately followed South • Carolina out of the Union, any attempt at coercing South Carolina would 188 Moreover, the paper attempted to convince South Carolinians that the • institutional imPediments to cooperative secession made unilateral secession not ooly necessary, but also consistent with the South Carolinian interpretation ofthe Union: ''These States are separate sovereignties, each must act separately." Thus, South Carolinians should not be unnerved bythe need to secede unilaterally. In its endeavor to convince its reading public to support ils plan, the Mercury offered six arguments in favor of early unilateral secession. First, the agricultural products of the South were about to go on the market; seceding at this moment would give South Carolina a great deal of leverage over both the North and the rest of the world. Second, immediate action would reduce the economic consequences of însecurity. Third, acting quickly would provide an important demonstration effect for the rest of the South once they had determined what path to follow in this crisis. Fourth, South Carolina ought to act quickly, because the Republicans would take office in four short months. Fifth, the actions the South would take had to be presented to Congress and the President as soon as possible. Sîxth, seceding would precipitate a conflict with the center that would go a long way towards compelling the other states of the South to secede. The author of the Mercury editorial wrote that, for these reasons, "prompt action" by South Carolina would "tend to unite the Southem members of Congress" and ''unite and stimulate state action in the states we represent." The Mercury and its patrons had advocated separate state secession at • 190 least since the first secession crisis; in November 1860, with the support and • guidance offormer moderates, the Mercury plan was about ta become reality.S4 Fear, Momentum, and Secession The Election ofLincoln On 6 November 1860, Abraham Lincoln won 1,866,452 votes, compared ta Douglas's 1,375,157 votes, Breckenridge's 847,953 votes, and Bell's 590,631 votes (See Table 3.1). Lincoln was elected president with less than 40 percent of the 4,680,193 votes cast, and virtually every vote cast for Lincoln came from the Cree states. Strategic concentration of Republican support virtually guaranteed the Republican Party victory in 1860. Lincoln won a simple majority in states that gave hint 169 of 303 presidential electors. Including the states in wmch he received a plurality augmented ms Electoral College total ta 180 votes, bringing him a comfortable-albeit sectional-victory. Lincoln needed neither the split in the Democratie Party nor a single vote in any slave state (in 10 ofthe 15 slave states he was noteven on the ballot) to snatch victory from the Democrats. While it is unlikely that the split at the Charleston convention was initiated for the purpose ofdenying Lincoln an Electoral College majority, a small shift in votes in a small number ofstates could have done just that. If Lincoln had lost New York, which would have been possible with a shift ofooly 3.7 percent of the voting population, or ifthe Democratic fusion ticket had defeated Lincoln in Pennsylvania and California (as the regular Democratie ticket had in the 1856 election) the eleetion would have been thrown into the House ofRepresentatives. • 54 Ali quotes are taken trom Charleston Mercury~ 3 November 1860. 191 Table 3.1-Popular Vote ln Presidentlal Election in 1860 (winner in bold) FreeStat•• • Uncoin Douglas Breckinridge Bell Total Vote winner% Electors Califomia 31,173 38,516 34,334 6,817 118,840 33.0 4 Connecticut 43,172 15,522 14,641 3,291 n,426 56.8 6 Illinois 172,111 160,215 2,404 4,913 339,693 50.7 11 Indiana 131,033 115,509 12,295 5,306 272,143 51.1 13 Iowa 70,401 55,111 1,048 1,748 128,316 54.9 4 Maine 12,811 26,693 6,368 2,046 97,918 64J 8 Massachussetts 101,353 34,372 5,939 22,331 168,995 62.9 13 Michigan 88,410 65,057 805 405 154,747 57.2 6 Minnesota 22,011 11,920 748 62 34,799 63.4 4 New Hampshire 37,511 25,881 2,112 441 65,953 56.9 5 New Jersey· 51,3~ 30,000 30,000 2,801 121,125 48.2 7 New York 353,804 203,329 50,000 50,000 657,133 53.8 35 Ohio 231,110 187,232- 11,405 12,194 442,441 52.3 23 Oregon 1,270 3,951 5,OOe 183 14,410 36.6 3 Pennsylvania 2",030 78,871 100,000 12,n6 459,677 58.3 . 27 Rhode Island 12,244 4,000 1,000 2,707 19,951 61.4 4 Vermont 33,1. 6,849 218 1.969 42,844 78.9 5 Wisconsin Il,110 65,021 888 161 152,180 56.6 5 Total 1,831,180 1,128,049 279,2-11 130,151 3,368,591 54.4 183 Slave States Alabama no ticket 13,651 48,831 27,875 90,357 54.0 9 Arkansas no ticket 5,227 281732 20,094 54,053 53.2 4 Delaware 3,815 1.023 7.337 3,864 16,039 45.7 3 Florida no trcket 367 81M3 5,437 14,347 59.5 3 Georgia no ticket 11,590 51,889 42,886 106,365 48.8 10 Kentucky 1,364 25,651 53,143 68,058 146,216 45.2 12 Louisiana no trcket 7,625 22,881 20,204 50,510 44.9 6 Maryland 2,294 5,966 42,482 41,760 92,502 45.9 8 Miss~ippi no ticket 3,283 40,797 25.040 69,120 59.0 7 Missouri 17.028 Il,101 31,317 58,372 165.518 35.5 9 North Caralina no ticket 2,701 48,531 44,990 96.230 50.4 10 South CaraUns Presidential Electors are selected bythe State Legislature 8 Tennessee no ticket 11,350 64,209 81,274 144,833 47.8 12 Texas no ticket no ticket 47,548 15,438 62,986 75.5 4 Virginia 1.929 16.290 74,823 74,181 167,723 44.5 15 total 26,430 163,525 570,871 515,973 1,276,799 120 1521303 ta win Source: Richard McPherson. 1865. The Political History ofthe United States ofAmerica during the Great Rebellion. Philp & Solomons: Washington. D.C., page 1. *New Jersey gave 3 electors to Douglas and 4 to Lincoln• • In the Rouse, each state delegation had a single vote, which would have given • the South a greater influence than. its population warranted. Rhett, for one, had hoped that the election would faU into the bands of the House, so that "more justice" could guide the selection ofthe president than ifit were allowed to be a simple majoritarian exercise.ss The Democratie Party had dominated the national politics of the United States during the antebellum period of 1829 to 1861. During this time, this party occupied the White Rouse for 24 of32 years and enjoyed unified govemment for 18 ofthose years. During the same period, the Whig Party held the White House for only eight years and bad unified govemment for only two. Prior to the presidential election of 1860, it is no exaggeration to claim that the Democratic Party was the single dominant political party in the national realm. (The Republicans matcbed this dominance during the Civil War and reconstruction, enjoying unified Republican govemment from 1861 until 1875.) This election was the end of the Democratic Party's dominance in the Union and finally provided proponents ofsecession with an issue behind whieh support for it could he mobilized. Consequences of Republican Victorv According to the classical tradition in political economy, the primary purpose of the state is to proteet property and maintain the contracts that permit the free use and accumulation ofproperty and 55 Robert BamweU Rhett" N.d., Robert BamweU Rhett Papers, Political Writings (caU number • 111357/6), South Carolina Historical Society, Charleston, South Carolina. 192 One ofthe first principles outlined in the 1860 platform was the approval • of an idea expressed in the Declaration of Independence: that "all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life liberty and the pursuit of happiness...." Moreover, the platform asserted that these principles were "'essential to the preservation of our Republican institutions."s7 Southemers were uneasy about the principles outlined in the Declaration ofIndependence because ofthe tension between the Declaration's assertion of fundamental equality and the inequality that lay at the base of the institution of slavery. For Republicans, "all men" included men of all races; for Southemers, the Declaration was meant only for white men. The Southem insistence that slavery was a "positive good" meant that the Declaration had to he racialized, despite the fact that this document was significantly sHent on race. For Republicans opPOsed to the extension of slavery, even Douglas' popular sovereignty conceded too much to the slave power. The Republican platform declared, "the normal condition ofail the territory ofthe United States is that of freedom...and we deny the authority of Congress, of a territorial legislature, or of any individuals, to give legal existence to Slavery in any Territory of the United States."S8 Even their recognition that "the maintenance inviolate ofthe rights ofthe States, and especially the right ofeachstate to order and control its own domestic institutions according to its own judgment 57 Republican PartyPlatfonn of1860 in Commager(1963: 363-364)• • 51 Republican PartyPlatfonn of1860 in Commager(1963: 363-364). 194 exclusively" did not assuage Southem fears.. Slavery's long-term survival • depended not only on the continued existence of slavery in the current slave states, but also upen spreading to the common territories in order to maintain the Union's delicate political balance. Even ifthe Republican Party maintained that it did not wish to ,abolish slavery, preventing it from taking root in the territories would have eventually accomplished that very goal. Innocuous as the platfonn was on the surface, a Republican Party v.ictory was as much a threat to the South as were John Brown and immediate abolition. The South Loses ils Last Veto Point Southemers occupied the presidency for 17 of the 32 years between L829 and 1861.59 Even when a Northemer was president, the South could he confident that the bisectional nature of the dominant political parties in the Union would prevent any administration from taking action contrary to its ÎDterests .. Under these circumstances, Southemers knew that congressional encroachments on Southem rights and institutions would he met with a presidential veto. Southem strengili in Congress-even ifit was waning-meanta president's veto could not he overridden. Although Congress was the dominant institution ofthe federal govemment during the antebellum, the fonnal powers ofthe presidency provided the South with a sense ofsafety for their institutions. Southem confidence in the institution was augmented when the president himselfwas a slaveholder.6o The election of Lincoln was a double tragedy for the South: He had no Southem constituency to 59 The total proportion would have been bigber had not zachary Taylor, ofLouisiana, by wayof • Virginia and Kentucky, died aftera fittle overone year inoffice.. 195 influence and moderate bis policies, and the policies he did advocate--though • not necessarily abolitionist-were a direct threat to Southem înterests. With Lincoln in the White House, the South had lost its final veto point to an individual (and a party) fundamentally opposed to the extension ofslavery. Lincoln's Election and the Lincoln Mean the immediate abolition ofslavery? Scholarship on what effect, if any, Lincoln'selection would have on the institution ofslavery is divided. Some thought Lincoln's election posed an immediate threat to slavery.61 Fogel and Engerman argued that "Hard-headed business" drove the decision to secede, because the threat of abolitionism was real and would significantly damage Southern economic prosperity.62 According to others, Lincoln's election posed no significant danger to the institution ofslavery. Those looking for an excuse to secede simply used the election to justify the actions that they already wanted to take.63 But for Many in the South, there was simply no difference between the anti-extension Republican Party and the Most radical abolitionist. The ooly difference, if any, was timing: What the radical abolitionist would do immediately, a Republican Administration would do gradually. Although these fears were very real, Lincoln had neither the authority nor the stated desire to abolish slavery where it existed. He was, after all, a plurality 60 Bamwell (1976). 6l Dumond (1939) and Hamilton (1932). 62 Fogel and Engerman (1974: 243). • 63 Cole (1931); VanDeusen (1928)• 196 president. This did not provide him with an electoral mandate or the moral • authority to vigorously pursue abolition. The Republican Party did not enjoy a majority in the House or the Senate, which, made anti-slavery policies difficult, ifnot impossible, for Lincoln to implement. Notwithstanding these impediments ta the vigorous pursuit ofanti-slavery politics, the election of 1860 was not without dangers to Southem institutions. Although the immediate abolition ofslavery was quite unlikely, Lincoln had the authority to take actions that would facilitate its eventual demise. Over the long term, a commitment to anti-extension was the best way to accomplish fuis, but there were aIso a number of short-term actions that could significantly weaken the institution ofslavery. Southem fears focused on the possibility that, through the distribution of party patronage positions, Lincoln would preside over the creation of an indigenous Republican Party in the South.64 An indigenous Republican Party that appeaIed to non-slaveowning Southemers would be capable of challenging slaveowning elites for control ofthe politicaI institutions ofthe state. Thus, even if Lincoln'selection did not pose an immediate threat to the institution of slavery, the long-term consequences of a Republican administration were devastating to its long-term. viability. One ofthe specifie fears that Southemers had concemed the appointment of local POstInasters general. John Co. Calhoun had been so concemed about the dangers posed by the content of the mail that he advocated state rather than • 64 Fish (1899)7 (1902), and (1905). L97 federaI control ofthe post office.65 A Republican appointed postmaster general • might open Southem mails to Northem abolitionist writing.66 Many Southemers feared that allowing abolitionist tracts (pamphlets, etc.) to make their way through the mail and into the bands of non-slaveholding citizens of the slave states--or into the bands of the slaves themselves--would seriously weaken support for the institution. Thus the Mere dispersal of patronage positions might pose a grave danger to the South. As evidenced by the conflict over territories during the fust secession crisis, the eventual threat to slavery posed by Lincoln's election would not, most likely, help mobilize support for secession; however, Southem secessionist entrepreneurs realized that Republican Party policies-most imPOrtantly, the refusal to allow slavery access to the territories-would ultimately result in the eventual abolition ofslavery. More free states and a proportionate decline in the number of slave states meant that the forces against slavery would eventually have the numbers required to pass a constitutional amendment abolishing slavery. In order to succeed in their mission to establish a Southem Confederacy, Southem secessionist entrepreneurs saw a need to collapse the time frame ofthis threat to slavery. Ifthe threat was not seen as an immediate one, the grievance felt might not he strong enough to mobilize secession. For South Carolina and the other radicalized states ofthe South, the issue after the election of Lincoln 6S Eaton (1943). • 66 Cullinan (1968). 198 was a matter of deeiding between eonsenting to the destruction of the South's • defining institution (slavery) or taking action that would protect it. The South, in ather words, was confronted with ehoosing resistance or submission.67 Thanks to the threat-both real and pereeived-posed by the eleetion of a Republican president, Southem secessionist entrepreneurs were able to reduce the range of options available to the South to proteet themselves; the middle ground was eliminated. Under these circumstances, South Carolina and the rest of the seceding South were forced byfearto seeede from the Union ofstates. An Early Convention Bill Passed As earlyas the presidential eleetion of1832, every state inthe Union gave the people the power to eleet presidential eleetors-every state, that is, except South Carolina.68 Living up to its long-standing aristocratie and anti-democratic tradition, in South Carolina, it was the legislature that chose the state's presidential electors. This unique aspect of South Carolinian politics meant that the state's legislature would he in session to select electors once it was known that Lincoln had been elected President. This gave the most radical state ofthe South a unique opportunity to take decisive action long before any other state. Even before the legislature was able to consider any action for the defense ofthe state, federal Judge A.G. Magrath and federal District Attorney James Connor 67 [Townsend] (1860). • 68 Department ofCommerce. Bureau ofthe Census (1989: 1071)• 199 resigned their federal offices after receiving word ofthe election, indicating their • support for the establishmentofa Southem Confederacy.69 Because leaders of the secession movement throughout the South saw South Carolina as the lynchpin state in the movement for secession, professional secessionists from other Southem states converged on South Carolina to gjve the state the assurances it needed to guarantee the success ofthe movement. Edmund Ruffin, a Virginia planter and a lifelong secessionist, arrived in Columbia, South Carolina on 7 November 1860. Knowing Virginian conservatism, Ruffm could not make the claim that bis native state would secede from the Union immediately after South Carolina, but he did manage to bolster the argument of those who had long advocated the unilateral secession of South Carolina by claiming that the attempted coercion of South Carolina by the federal govemment would bring other states to South Carolina's defense--in turn defeating coercion and dissolving the Union.70 Although he played a significant role in precipitating secession in South Carolina, Rufïm's role was largely informai. He watched the legislature debate and pass the convention bill, but he did not address the legislature. His articles inthe Mercury and the conversations he had with South Carolinian politicians helPed to convince these South Carolinians of the rectitude of their actions. Although he left South Carolina during the convention campaign, Ruffin returned to the state in time to watch it 69 Rogers (1992: 43). According to Chesnut (1980), Magrath was one ofthe people sent to the state legislature to pressure it into taking action. • 70 Scarborough (1972: 485n). 200 secede. Five years later, when the Confederacy was on the verge of collapse, • Ruffin committed suicide rather than live under Yankee mie again. In the South Carolina legislature, there was a strong cooperationist presence that initially hobbled efforts for an earller secession convention. George A. Trenholm, House member from Charleston, attempted to adjourn the special session ofthe legislature immediately after the presidential electors were selected and a special commissioner to Georgia whose purpose would be to facilitate simultaneous action by Georgia and South Carolina had been chosen.'l Supporters of an early convention feared that closing the special session ofthe legislature without tirst providing for a convention would delay the movement- perhaps fatally. Trenholm's resolution was put aside in favor ofa debate between those who preferred an earlier convention date and those who preferred a later one. Although there were a few who sought to prevent it, most people believed that South Carolina would cali a convention upon the election of Lincoln. The date the convention would be held appeared to be crucial to the success of the movement. Supporters of an early convention wanted it to be held as saon as possible, zeroing in on a mid-December date.. Supporters of a late convention thought a January convention was more appropriate.. These late-conventioneers wanted the Deep South to have time to decide upon its course of action before South Carolina put them in a position to act. Supporters ofthe tate convention 7l Cauthen (1950: 54); Slale afSouth Caralina House Journal, called session.. November 1860, • page 18-19• 201 undoubtedly boped that another state would initiate unilateral secession, or that a • number of states would secede from the Union cooperatively. For sorne, the prospect ofseceding before it was certain that other states would join them was simply revisiting (and going well beyond) the mistakes of the past: The late conventioneers feared that an early convention date would guarantee that South Carolina would lead the charge out ofthe Union, potentially subjecting the state to ignominy, humiliation, abandonment, and unopposed coercion. The dilemma confronting South Carolina was simply this: If the state seceded unilaterally, and if no other state joined them, South Carolina would once again be humiliated and abandoned; however, if the state did nothing, the dream of a Southem Confederacy might never he realized. South Carolinians recognized that, first, no other state was as uniquely positioned to act early, and, second, that waiting for other states to act first would ultimately he as fatal to the movement as it had been in 1850-52. If the late conventioneers had had their way, sorne feared the movement for a Southem Confederacy would be killed by the contemporary equivalent ofthe Georgia Platform or by a general cooling of the population's passions. Initially, it appeared that the late conventioneers had the upper band inthe state legislature. This is not to suggest that they had more support than the early conventioneers, but that the early conventioneers did not want to provoke what could be a divisive and potentially fatal fight over timing. Calls for an early convention were still quite strong. M.W. Gary, member of the state Rouse of • Representatives from Edgefield, argued against waiting for the other states ofthe 202 Deep South and for anearly convention, stating, '~It is too late to wait for counsel • with your neighbors when the destiny ofour property and familles are in periL It is too late to wait for concert of action, when the blow of dishonor bas been stricken.,,72 Gary worried, like many others, that the purpose of delaying the convention "was calculated to throw coldness upon the immediate action ofthis State.,,73 After little debate, in the interest of unanimity, the early conventioneers relented, and the convention bill, calling for a January rather than a December convention, passed the Senate by a vote of 44 to one. South Carolina's desire to achieve virtual unanimity obviously played a part in the decision to support the late convention. According to professional secessionist Edmund Ruffin, all but eight of the 44 who voted for the January convention bill desired an earlier convention, i'But to conciliate & secure these 8 votes, & for harmony, this later time was agreed upon.,,74 As matters stood on 9 November 1860, South Carolina was going to hold a January convention. As the South Carolina legislature was in the process of passing the late convention bill, a number of events occurred more or less simultaneously to force the legjslature to reconsider the earlier date. While debates over convention timing were raging, a large contingent of Georgians arrived in Charleston to celebrate the completion ofthe Charleston-Savannah Railroad, the tirst direct rail 72 Gary (1860: 7). 7J Gary (1860: 7). • 74 Scarborough(1972: 487)• 203 the Senate after Lincoln became president. A telegraph sent to South Carolinian • Lawrence Keitt officially encouraged Keitt and the state of South Carolina ''to act at once,,,79 and before it was known that the rumor was faise, "all hesitancy was ended."so Those desiring an early convention were energized and pressed forward. AlI that remained for South Carolina's legislature to do was to change the dates for the convention; before it could do this, however, it had to convince those who were afraid of being abandoned by the states ofthe South that South Carolina's unilateral secession would be followed sequentially by secession in the other states ofthe South. Memories ofabandonment in 1832 and 1852 were fresh in the minds ofthe South Carolinian leadership. Furthennore, members of many Up Country districts wanted to make sure that their constituents were informed and prepared for action. They believed that an early convention would not give district leaders the opportunity to convince the conservative citizens of the Up Country that unilateral secession was necessary and that it would he fol1owed by secession in other states. They thought that ifthe state waited for a later convention, actual unanimity could be achieved. On the other band, those who desired immediate, unilateral secession believed that delay, even of only a few weeks, was fatal to the movement and to the creation of a Southem Confederacy. For them, it did not matter ifall ofthe Up Country was with them. This perspective was revealed in a speech given in the state Rouse of 79 McPherson (1865: 37)• • 80 Cauthen (1941: 369)_ 205 Representatives by John Cunningham ofCharleston; in this speech, Cunningham • argued that it was "better to lose York District [of the South Carolina Up Country] through haste than Alabama through delay." He asked, "When they invoke us to lead, is there a cooperationist on the floor that will ask us to wait until cooperation is tendered, orwill he not tender it by taking the lead?"sl With virtually imperceptible sleight of hand, Cunningham and the other unilateral secessionists transfonned unilateral secession ioto cooperation. With this, the Up Country cooperationists were challenged to accomplish cooperation by agreeing to secede unilaterally. This argument was obviously successful, because on Saturday, 10 November 1860, the South Carolina House altered the convention bill passed by the state Senate, changing the date the convention would meet to 17 December 1860, and changing the date of the election to December 6. Later that same day, the South Carolina Senate approved the changes made in the Rouse and passed the altered convention bill unanimously-though sorne, like Senator McAliley from the Up Country District ofChester, abstained from voting after the third reading ofthe bill, probably out of disapproval of it.82 Even Trenholm, who had initially wanted to adjoum the legislature so a convention bill could not be passed, had come to support unilateral secession. As he put it, the tinte had come to "Acquiesce in the 81 Speech of John Cunningham in the South Carolina Rouse of Representatives, 10 November 1860, reported inCharleston DailyCourier, 12 December 1860. 82 Siaie ofSoulh Carolina Senale Journal, ca/ledsession. November 1860, page 22; Siaie ofSoulh Carolina House Journal. ca/led session. November 1860; Cauthen (1941); McCarter's Journal, • ManuscriptCollection, Library ofCongress, Washington, OC. 206 common sentiment of 'Immediate Secession.",83 With the passage of this bill, • South Carolina moved closer to unilateral secession, though there were still those whose concerted action could put the movement at risk.84 "Hammond's Delection"ss and the Paradoxical Position 01 the South Given the devastation that Many thought would be wrought by divisions within the state, the legislature ofSouth Carolina took every effort to increase the legitimacy of the decisions it had made and was about to make. Part of this entailed getting prominent South Carolinians to support unilateral secession. If South Carolina's elites were behind secession, the tradition ofdeference to elites among the population would compel them to follow. Few South Carolinians were more prominent than U.S. Senator James Henry Hammond. Believing that Lincoln was about to be elected president, in late October, 1860, a number of members ofSouth Carolina's legjslature wrote Senator Hammond and asked him to provide them with bis perspective on Lincoln'selection and the advisability of secession. For these members, it was especially important to have Hammond's support, because they believed he was one of the few people in the state who could initiate an effective cooPerative movement for secession that would stail plans for unilateral secession. Hammond's support was that much more important, because, despite bis former radicalism, he had taken to making 83 McCarter's Journal~ Manuscript Collectio~ Library of Congress, Washington, DC; Sec aiso Charleston Mercury, Saturday~ 10 November 1860. 84 John Berkley Grimball to Elizabeth Grimball, [2 November 1860~ John Derldey Grimball Papers~ Manuscript Collection~ Duke University~ Durham~ North Carolina. as Maxey Gregg to Robert Bamwell Rhe~ 14 September 1858, Robert Bamwell Rhett Papers, • South Carolina Historical Society, Charleston~ South Carolina. 207 conservative speeches around South Carolina since 1858, including bis Beech • Island and Bamwell Court House speeches of 1858.86 Hammond was the perfect candidate to take the mantle of leadership in the state, because his recent conservative speeches gave him the credibility to lead the current movement for secession. After all, if the movement could convince newLy conservative Hammond ofthe rectitude ofunilateral secession, there was no one in the state it could not convince. For a Long time, James Henry Hammond was an advocate of disunion if other states would follow;87 now, Hammond was, perhaps, the only eLite in South Carolina whose preferences shifted away from secession. It is probably no coincidence that Hammond's viewon secession changed once he acquired a long-coveted seat in the United States Senate. Despite this, Hammond's transformation seemed to have had at least as much to do with bis position in the Senate as it did with his developing opinion that the career of anti-slavery was waning, and, more importantLy, bis ongoing concern that the South was not unified enough to take àny collective action, let alone secede. In bis last, and potentially most important, antebeUwn wode, Hammond wrote that he was convinced that if this election could be endured, the South would be able to remain in the Union and control it as it had in the past. At the very least, Hammond argued, the South ought to see what a Union under Northem control 86 Hammond(1978)• • 87 Bleser(1988: 206). 208 would look like, given that the North had long endured a Union onder Southem • controL The statement Hammond produced for the legislature was not the confirmation of radical opinions desired by the members ofthe South Carolina legislature, however. He wrote that "it would probably require for four years more the oppression of a sectional administration and the disaster of a second defeat, to bring the South up to the point of secession."s8 Despite bis earlier position, especially in bis voluminous correspondence with Virginian professor and secessionist Nathaniel Beverly Tu~ker, Hammond now indicated that secession should ooly he undertaken cooperatively. Divisions in the South over how to confront Northem aggressions did not bode weil for the success of secession in the South. Hammond wrote, "Such disunion among ourselves augurs ill for dissolving our union.,,89 Moreover, the perception that South Carolina was radical, and that the state was scheming to dictate the path ofthe rest of the South, had not abated. Because of this, South Caralina risked abandonment once again. If South Carolina were determined to secede, he reasoned, the state should at least let Alabama lead matters off. Although nearly every other elite in South Carolina would disagree, Hammond claimed that he Il James Henry Hammond to Legislature of South Carolina, November 1860~ James Henry Hammond Papers? South Caroliniana Library~ University of South Carolina, Columbi~ South Carolina. 19 James Henry Hammond to Legislature of South Carolina, November 1860~ James Henry Hammond Papers, South Caroliniana Library? University of South Carolina, Columbi~ South • Carolina• 209 did oot regard "circumstances in the Union as desperate oowand [he] would • oot...advise rash and desperate remedies.,,90 According to Hammood, the South was stuck in a "catch-22." He argued that the South should not secede because it was not unified, but ifit were unified, it would not need to secede, because it could then rule the Union as it once had. Hammond did otIer some good news: The trials and tribulations facing the South, thanks to abolitionism in the North, were coming to an end, because the career of abolitionism was at an end. Hammond believed the South had only to endure one Republican administration-by the end ofwhich abolitionism would exhaust itselt:-and the Umon would be able to go on as it had, with enlightened and disinterested Southem statesmen at its helm. Ail he had to do to end the talk of disunion was convince his fellow citizens of the possibility of continued Southem safety in the Umon. Hammond, however, lacked the courage of bis convictions: He was unwilling to make an appearance at the legislature to present bis letter; former political allies suppressed bis conservative letter, and he did nothing to make bis views known in an. alternative medium; in addition, rather than keeping bis position in the United States Senate, where he could provide a moderate Southem voice from astate where moderation was desperately needed, he resigned once it was known that the other Senator from South Carolina, James Chesnut, had resigned bis post in preparation for secession. 90 James Henry Hammond to Legislature of South Carolina, November 1860, James Henry Hammond Papers, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina, Columbia, South • Carolina. 210 Hammond's decision to refuse to make a public appearance at the state • legislature and to resign bis senate seat can probably he attributed to the self- destructiveness that he sometimes nurtured and sometimes conquered. In a letter to bis brother, in which he explained bis decision to resign bis Senate seat, Hammond likened bis action to the Japanese tradition ofdisemboweling oneself in order to avenge an insult)l-beggÏng the question ofwhich insult Hammond was referring to: the election of Lincoln or the willingness ofthe legislature of South Carolina to silence bis views? Regardless of bis motivations, Hammond's unwillingness to provide a moderate voice in South Carolina has been called one ofthe greatest tragedies in the history of the pre-Civil War era.92 But despite this late shift away from secessionism, Hammond "never entirely lost hope" that the confederacy could thrive.93 The story of Hammond's movement away from supporting secession cannot he told but in conjunction with the attitudinal shift ofHammond protégé A.P. Aldrich. Aldrich's attitude toward secession shifted aImost imperceptibly between 1852 and 1860. In 1852, he opposed the unilateral secession of South Carolina because he believed that it would not accomplish cooperation. In 1860, the situation had transformed enough that he DOW supported unilateral secession 91 James Henry Hammond ta Marcellus Hammond, 12 November 1860, James Henry Hammond Papers, Library afCongress, Manuscript Collection, Washington, OC. 92 Wakelyn (1974). See McDonnell (l983) for a compelling account ofHammond's decision not ta fight secession. • 93 Rosser(1937: 348)• 2U because he though it would precipitate secession in other states. In perhaps the • single most important letter written during the course ofthe secession movement, on 2S November 1860, Aldrich wrote Hammond to explain why bis conservative letter to the state legislature had to be suppressed, and why secession had to he started by the few in South Carolina rather than the Many in the South as a whole. In the letter, Aldrich admitted that he showed the letter to four of bis fel10w politicians, including Governor Gist. Gist recommended against publishing or revealing the contents ofthe letter in any way. Aldrich himselfwas convinced that "the publication would have been serious injury to [Hammond], and might have bad the effect of organizing an ineffectual opposition to the secession movement.,,94 Aldrich was convinced that Hammond was simply out of touch with the wishes of the state and was unaware that South Carolina's unilateral secession would he met by secession in other states, making the long- sought cooPeration a reality. Aldrich wrote, "Ifyou had been in possession ofthe telegraphic news that we had, l felt certain that you would not have desired its publication." Indeed, Aldrich claimed that if Hammond had all of the information that Aldrich had, "[He] would not have spoken as [he] did.,,9S In an odd exchange of roles-which illustrated the central role of state politics- Aldrich, a Mere state Senator, was in a position to know more than the state's 94 A.P. Aldrich to James Henry Hammond, 25 November 1860t James Henry Hammond Papers, Manuscript Collection, Library ofCongress, Washington, D.C. 95 A.P. Aldrich to James Henry Hammond, 2S November 1860t James Henry Hammond Papers, • Manuscript Collection, Library ofCongress, Washington, D.C. 212 United States Senator, and he acted in order to protect Hammond from the • damage bis views might bring to himself and the movement. Aldrich believed that by concealing the letter, he acted as Hammond's "true friend.,,96 Like most of South Carolina's elites, Aldrich was convinced that "the right path of South Carolina is to go right ahead in the direction in which she is now moving.,,97 That direction, of course, was toward unilateral secession, which meant forcing secession in states that were unwilling to initiate the movement. In the quintessential statement ofSouth Carolinian aristocracy and paternalism, Aldrich asserted, "1 do not think the common people understand it; but whoever waited for the common people when a great move was to be made. We must make the move and force them to follow. This is the way of all revolutions and all great achievements, and he who waits until the mind of every body is made up, will wait forever and never do any thing.,,98 This certainly describes South Carolina's previous experiences. Thus, Aldrich argued, South Carolina had to secede unilaterally and force the common people to follow. Aldrich did not want Hammond to simply fade away; rather, Aldrich saw Hammond as the proper leader of the movement. Aldrich wrote, "men as (Senator] Chesnut, [member ofCongress] Keitt, [member ofCongress) Bohnam are not the men for the times, you are the man, all the States and ail the South 96 A.P. Aldrich to James Henry Hammond~ 25 November 1860~ James Henry Hammond Papers~ Manuscript Collection, Library ofCongress~ WashingtOD~ D.C. 97 A.P. Aldrich to James Henry HammoDd~ 25 November 1860~ James Henry Hammond Papers~ Manuscript Collection~ Library ofCoDgress~ WashingtOD~ D.C. 98 A.P. Aldrich to James Henry Hammond~ 25 November 1860~ James Henry Hammond Papers~ • Manuscript Collection~ LibraryofCongress, Washington, D.C. 213 looks to you." Aldrich continued, "Here is Rhett, discoursing to midnight crowds • sorne good things, with many undigested ideas, but he is no prophet, and people will not believe him to be a prophet. You have the ear ofthe state, and the sense to tell them wbat is right, and what is wrong, why not speak and throw off the lethargy which bas kept you back so 10ng.,,99 Hammond was oot persuaded to lead the movement or to make bis opposition to the present movement known. Thus, the movement proceeded in South Carolina with virtually no opposition. A Counter-Revolution? Gist's Threat Even though the passage ofthe early convention bill clearly indicated the intention of South Carolina's POlitical leader to withdraw their state from the Union unilaterally, the possibility that a conservative movement would arise and sabotage unilateral secession still existed. After all, the convention still had to vote for secession, and it could be influenced by a change in opinion in the state. As South Carolina's experience in 1852 illustrated, even a slate of delegates committed to secession might not vote to secede. Between the beginning of November and the meeting of the Convention, a movemeot sprung up, apparentlyon the initiative ofBuchanan's Treasury Secretary Howell Cobb from Georgia, to encourage South Carolina to postpone its passage ofan ordinance of secession until 4 March 1861, in conjunction with secession ordinances from Georgia, Alabama, and MississippL100 Upon hearing of this movement from 99 A.P. Aldrich to James Henry Hammon~ 25 November 1860, James Henry Hammond Papers, Manuscript Collection, Library ofCongress, Washington, D.C. • 100 Nichols (1948: 375). Sec also NicolayandHay(l890: 317-318). 214 South Carolina Congressmen Milledge Luke Bonham, Govemor Gist threatened • to force secession by precipitating a conflict with the federal government over the forts in Charleston Harbor. Gist wrote to Bonham that he told a prominent player in the delay movement, '~If the convention postponed the ordinance unill the last of February, 1 would go to Charleston [to] make a speech & advise the taking ofthe forts at once & 1 will do it." Any action that was intended to slow the movement was futile, according to Gist: "Tell those from other states in favor of delay; that attempt to delay action would only precipitate it in this state & force us to do what we would prefer not doing before the ordinance is passed." Finally, Gist described bis plan to prevent South Carolina from re-entering the Union: My plan is to pass the ordinance of secession [and] send a commissioner or commissioners to the President to inform bim of the fact, direct the Legislature to take the necessary steps to carry out the movement & adjourn sine die, without providing for any other meeting ofthe convention. The door will then be locked & the key lost and it will take two thirds of both branches of the l Legislature to fmd it; ifthey want to go in again. 10 Although secession would be difficult to accomplish, coaxing South Carolina back into the Union would he impossible, because of the leveL of support required to caU a convention. Like other unilateral secessionists, Gist was willing to do almost anything to assure unilateral secession, including precipitating a 101 William Henry Gist to Milledge Luke Bonham, 6 December 1860, Milledge Luke Bonham Papers, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina, Columbia, South Carolina. Gist's detennination that the ordinance not be delayed May have come from an exchange between he and Govemor Pettus ofMississippi. GovemorGist ofSouth Carolina wrote Govemor Pettus of Mississippi, asking him whether secession should be effected immediately or only after Lincoln took power. Appreciative ofthe importance ofimmediate action to the movement for secession, Pettus telegrammed Govemor Gist, insisting that the ordinance take effect immediately (Davis • 1972: 391-392). 215 contlict with the federaI govemment over the forts. The resolve of South • Carolinians like Gist and Bonham convinced those who wanted concerted action that South Carolina would leave the Union regardless ofwhat other states were doing. 116-Day Window ofOpportunity: Buchanan's Guarantee On 6 November 1860, Abraham Lincoln was only elected President; due to the peculiarities ofthe political system in the United States, Lincoln would not officially take office until 4 March 1861. The Charleston Mercury insisted, "Before that time all that South Carolina or the other Southem States intend to do, should he done." l02 This gave secessionist leaders 116 days to act before Lincoln took office. Any action that took place before Li:.coln took office would not he based on any "positive action" by the Republican president-elect, but would rather be based upon the fear of what a Republican president might be able to accomplish. This gave the Southem secessionists -a clear window of opportunity for action and virtually destroyed any effort at compromise. What, after all, could there he to compromise when Lincoln had only been constitutionally elected to the position ofpresident? (Efforts at compromise did actually fail thanks to the intransigence of Deep South secessionists and Northem supporters ofthe Republican Party.) The peculiarities ofthe American political system were designed to lead to stable transitions ofpower, but they worked to the advantage ofthe secessionists in 1860 and 1861. Between November 1860 and March 1861, the South could • l02 Charleston Mercury 3 November 1860_ 216 coercion were constitutionaL Thus!t while Buchanan was president!t the Southem • secessionists knewthey couldact without fear ofcoercion. According to Buchanan!t the North was to blame for everything going wrong in the Union: "The long continued intemperate interference of the northem people with the question ofslavery in the southem States has at length produced its natural effects.n106 He continued: They [Northemers]!t and they alone!t cao do it [settle the slavery question forever]. Ali that is necessary to accomplish the objec~ and aIl for which the slave States have ever contended!t is to he let atone and permitted to manage their domestic institutions in their own way. As sovereign. States!t they and they alone are responsible before God and the world for the slavery existing among them. For this the people ofthe North are not more responsible!t and have no right to interfere!t than with similar institutions in Russia or BraziL107 This is an essential point. The United States had a national economY!t a common defense!t and a common currencY!t but when it came to the domestic institutions ofthe separate states, one state had no more right to interfere with the institutions ofanother as the United States had a right to interfere with the domestic politics offoreign countries. This demonstrated the extent to wbich the compact theory of the Union and state sovereignty pervaded the United States. Despite their differences on the advisability and constitutionality ofsecession!t when Buchanan stated that the North bad no rightto interfere with the domestic institutions ofthe Southem states!t he was echoing an assertion made by Rhett in bis Fourth ofJuiy speech. These statements and others like it illustrate the extent to which the 106 Moore (1910: 7)• • 107 Moore (1910: 8). 218 [T]he [separate state] secessionists were all somewhat united on one clear program; but the cooperationists represented a spectrum of positions ranging from genuine secessionism, firmly linked to • the belief that action through a southem convention was the best poliey, to strong Unionism masquerading as cooperative secessionism for tactical reasons. 109 Not ooly did unilateral seeessionists have the organizational advantage, but they aiso enjoyed the advantage of having a clear program behind which support could be mobilized. Opponents ofunilateral secession lacked both organizational power and a clear program. They were aimost completely ineffectual in mounting a campaign. There were, perhaps, two prominent Unionists in all of South Carolina at the end of1860. Up-Country politician Benjamin Franklin Perry ailowed himself to he placed on the Unionist ticket in Greenville in an effort to stem the tide of secession, but this ticket was announced ooly three days before the eleetion. Even with Perry on it, the unionist ticket performed miserably in comparison to the secessionist ticket, wbich was elected.110 Unlike the convention elections of 1832 and 1851, in wbich there were deep divisions within the state, inNovember 1860 unilateral secessionism dominated the state. Unionist B.F. Perry demonstrated bis feaity to bis state by giving bis ultimate loyalty to il, rather than to the Union. Life-Iong Unionist James Louis Petigru never supported secession and was a Unionist until the day he died. As Petigru himselfsadly noted, once it appeared that secession couldnot be stopped, 109 Potter(1916: 494-5). • 110 Gettys (1981); Ktbler(l946: 343); Wooster(l962: 15)• 220 "We shall he envied by posterity for the privilege that we have enjoyed ofliving • under the benign rule of the United States."lll After secession, Mary Chesnut, antebellum diarist and wife of United States Senator James Chesnut, wryly noted, "Mr. Petigru alone in South Carolina bas not seceded.,,112 Petigru himself famously remarked that "South Carolina is too small for a republic, but too large for an insane asylum.,,113 Generally, once secession was accomplished, the few unconverted Unionists remaining in the state supported the convention's actions.1l4 B.F. Perry's willingness to accept radical Southem action is indicative of the movement toward secession in South Carolina as a whole. The shift in attitude in South Carolina from 1852 to 1860 was almost imperceptible, but it was large enough to assure the state's secession from the Union. There were not many like Rhett, who had supported secession regardless of its consequences and the actions ofother states. The greatest movement occurred among those who were formerly cooperative secessiomsts; Aldrich, Miles and others like them were DOW willing to support unilateral secession with little more than a promise of cooperation among other Southem. By 1860, this group saw unilateral secession as the means through which cooperation could he accomplished. lit James Louis Petigru to Susan P. King, 10 November 1860, Vanderhorst Papers, South Carolina Historical Society, Charleston, South Carolina. A similar sadness can be round in Hampton (1980). lI2 Chesnut (1980: 63). III Ford (1988: 37t). • 114 Cauthen (1950: 75). 221 The Convention Election in CharlestoD • Results for the convention election are not readily available (nor are they especiaUy significant), but an examination ofone ofthe districts for wmch there are results will help outline the forces at work in the convention campaign and election. In the Charleston District, there were 22 seats available in the state convention, equal to the city's total representation in the South Carolina House and Senate. There were 47 men in the race for those seats. (lt was not uncommon for more men to run than seats available in Charleston. That there was competition for seats can he attributed to the desire of the prominent men ofthe state to participate in the historic convention. Edgefield was more typical of South Carolina: There were seven seats available, and there were seven men who llS ran for them. ) In typical Charleston Mercury form, in an article penned by "Secession," the newspaper asked each candidate to respond to the following statements in the affirmative: 1. That the Convention, when assembled, should withdraw South Carolina from the Confederacy ofthe United States, as soon as the ordinance ofsecession can he framed and adopted. 2. That after South Carolina withdraws from the Confederacy of the United States, she would Dever be reunited with any ofthe non slaveholdinf States of the Union in any form of govemment whatever. LL Charleston District elected three types ofcandidates: in the first category were 17 who responded to both statements in the affirmative; in the second group there were three who answered the questions, "but not according to the Mercury's liS Edgefield Advertiser 12 December 1860• • 116 Charleston Mercury, 26 November 1860. 222 The 1860 Association ofSouth Carolina, formerly known as ''the Society • of Eamest Men,,,U9 was instrumental in bringing about secession in South Carolina. This group's electoral ticket performed especially weil, with 13 ofthe 14 people on it winning a seat in the convention.120 Although it supported the radical position, the group's background was conservative. It was constituted by "the conservative lawyers, the Cooperationists who opposed secession in 1852,,121 More than simply providing an electoral ticket for the convention election, this group was responsible for providing both the raison d'etre and the strategy for the secession movement. Members ofthe 1860 Association sought to take the secession movement out ofthe bands of South Carolina's radicals and put it in the bands ofa trusted group ofcitizens wbo would be more effective at producing'unanimity in the population than the radicals ever could be.1ll The main output of the 1860 Association was a series of pamphlets that argued for the sovereignty of the separate states ofthe Union, formulated responses to the possibility of federal coercion, and communicated the necessity of the South governing itself. In addition to the pamphlets they distributed within South Carolina and to other states in the South, this group corresponded personally with other Southemers in an effort to bring them up to the South Carolina 119 Ringold (1971). 120 Rogers (1992:- 43). 121 Rogers (1992: 42). See also Ringold (1971: 502). • 122 Rogers (1992: 41-45)• 224 standard ofsecessionist sentiment. Using events at the ballot box in Novemher, • this group successfully mobilized the state for secession. While it is impossible to detennine the exact influence exerted by the 1860 Association and the other organizations within South Carolinian civil society, the arguments used in their pamphlets were the same arguments used in the political realm to justify South Carolinian actions. For example, the first 1860 Association pamphlet was a reprint of a speech given by South Carolinian planter and politician John Townsend on June 7, 1860. In this speech, Townsend argued that the South ought not "to wait in fuis Union a single day after it shall he ascertained that a Black Republican President has been elected; but that we should proceed forthwith to organize a govemment for ourselves, and withdraw from the fatal connection."l23 Obviously, this argument resonated with the citizens and elites ofSouth Carolina. The Strategy ofUnilateral Secession The antebellum South Carolinian political ideology was dominated by republicanism. 124 In South Carolina, this meant that politicalloyaltywas owed to the state more than the federaI government, and it was consistent with those who sougbt the "etemaI separation" of South Carolina from the Union.ilS From the moment Thomas Cooper first recommended that the South "calculate the value 123 [Townsend] (1860: 15). 124 Ford (1991); KaplanotT(1986). 125 Whitemarsh B. Seabrooke to Govemor lohn Quitman, 14 luly l851, Whitemarsh B. Seabrook: Papers, Southem Historical Collection, University ofNorth Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, North Carolina. Similar words are used in W.C. Daniel to Robert Gourdin, 9 December 1860, • RobertN. Gourdin Papers, ManuscriptCoUection, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina. 225 of the Union,n a number of actors in South Carolina sought the unilateral • secession ofthe state without any promise ofcooperation from other states. The foundational tenets of the small republicans tlew in the face of the received wisdom ofthe American republic. According to their perspective, freedom was not more easily enjoyed in a large republic, as Madison famously argued in Federalist 10, but in a small republic. The "vice offaction" that Madison thought would he controlled in the large republic was, according to the small republicans, actually its primary danger. The danger that Madison and other advocates ofthe Constitution claimed a large republic would alleviate-a majority faction able to establish tyranny over a minority of the population-was the danger that the South confronted.126 Only in the confines of a small republic-such as South Carolina-eould the vice offaction be controUed and freedom he guaranteed. Despite the constitutional and legal protections afforded to slavery in the United States, South Carolinians became convinced that a republic dominated by the institution, even if it were a republic ofone state, would be able to provide better protection for the institution than a republic in which slavery was not the dominant social institution. Ifthis assumption were indeed correct, the unilateral secession ofSouth Carolina would provide the necessary protection for slavery even ifno other state left the Union to create a Southem Confederacy. Given this belief, secession was an obvious response to the threat to slavery. Those who held this position, while not a majority in the state, were consistent in their opinions and clear in the end that they sought. The small republicans who desired • 126 Ford (1988a). 226 to protect slavery had been seeking the immediate, permanent, and unilateral • secession of South Carolina for some time. With the election of Lincoln, they finally had an issue behind which they could mobilize the state and achieve their long-sought goal ofindePendence. In the end, however, it was not just this unique group ofsecessionists that led South Carolina out of the Union. South Carolina would ultimately bave to secede alone--something the small republicans bad desired for some time-but it would ooly do so once it was certain that its secession would force the band of other Southem states, compelling them to aIso secede from the Union. Unlike Rhett, Rutledge, and the rest ofthe small republicans, a majority in South Carolina (and an even larger majority in the Deep South) appeared to bave desired secession for some time, but they were only willing to support it in the context of simultaneous action in the slaveholding states of the Union; that is, they desired cooperative secession or no secession at alL Supporters of simultaneous action felt cooperative secession would have two possible effects: the South would either find safety within the Union, or it would find safety outside of it. If Southem states could move simultaneously, they could successfully indicate to the North that they were unified in their demands. This unity might prompt the North to agree to the creation of a new constitutional compact that would provide more certain protection for the institution ofslavery; ifnew constitutional assurances were not forthcoming, the united South could create its own confederacy, which would, aImost by definition, assure the safety • ofSouthem institutions. Thus, regardless ofthe outcome, he it new terms within 227 the Union or the creation ofa Southem Confederacy, cooperative action would • assure Southem safety. The primary drawback of this scenario was that simultaneous action required prior Southem unity. Making action dependent upon the prior approval ofthe whole South would accomplish little more than a repetition ofthe mistakes of the past at a most inopportune time. Because prior unity of the South was unachievable, there could he no simultaneous secession. Ifthere were to he any action, it would have to occur sequentially. South Carolina was uniquely situated to act unilaterally and early. The South occupied a uniquely paradoxical position: If the South were unified, there would he no need for secession, because its institutions would be protected; but without unity, cooperative secession was impossible, and Southem institutions were in danger. Because there was no unitY in the South, the ooly way Southem institutions could he protected was through the secession of a single state, and the ooly state in a position to take this risk and secede alone was South Carolina. By the time South Carolina seceded, there was a slight reduction in the risk level associated with unilateral secession, because the state had received assurances that its actions would be followed by similar actions in similarly situated states. The initial seceding state needed to choose a path that would facilitate action in states that were inclined to secede, but that would not secede alone- while also forcing the states ofthe South that were not inclined to secede to take • sides in the inevitable conflict hetween the seceding state(s) and the host state. 228 Promises to resist coereion enuneiated in the letters from the Southem govemors • to South Carolina's Govemor Gist were essential to the eventual success ofthis strategy. South Carolinian leaders assumed that at least the promises to resist coercion contained in these letters were true, and so South Carolinian leaders acted accordingly. The strategie brilliance of the South Carolinian strategy was that the preferred outcome of the state's elite was not dependent upon the eventual precipitation of confliet. Ifconflict were precipitated, the South would mUy to support the seceded state(s). If there were no conflict or coercion, South Carolinian elites believed the other states of the South would elect to secede anyway, because, in the absence ofcoercion, there would be nothing to lose and everything to gain by seceding. It was this fundamental belief that detennined South Carolina's actions in 1860. South Carolina's actions were driven by the grievances 1 have elaborated upon, but the specifie path it followed was dictated by the strategie thought of South Carolinian secessionist entrepreneurs. Given South Carolina's unique preference structure, regardless of the courses of action followed by the center and the other Southem states, secession remained the best path to follow. As South Carolinian Congressman William Boyce pointed out, if South Carolina seceded alone, "[Ü]nly two courses remain to our enemies. Fust they must let us alone; secondly, they must attempt to coerce us...[S]uppose they attempt to coerce us; then the Southem states are compelled to make common cause with • 229 US.,,127 The absence of coercion by the central state was an equally positive • scenario, because it meant the central state conceded secession. The Convention Meets: Secession is Accomplished While the legislature of South Carolina cleared the way for unilateral secession, the convention actually had to carry it out. Shortly before the secession convention assembled, John Elmore, commissioner from Alabama, and C.E. Hooker, commissioner from Mississippi, arrived in South Carolina with instructions to advise South Carolina to secede without waiting for action from other states.128 Both commissioners addressed the convention on the tirst day of its meeting, publicly promising its members that their home states would secede as soon as their conventions were held. 129 Thanks to the actions of these individuals, members of the South Carolina convention felt confident that the actions oftheir state would he duplicated in other states ofthe South. Soon after the convention convened in Columbia on 17 December 1860, a smallpox scare comPelled its members to move it to Charleston for the formal declaration of secession. On 20 Decemher 1860, South Carolina rePealed the 1788 ordinance that ratified the Constitution, and, by doing so, seceded from the United States. In typical South Carolinian fashion, the secession ordinance was passed unanimously, and the citizens ofthe state were not given the opportunity to approve the actions of the convention in referendum. Using the distinction 127 Patter(1976: 513). 128 Denman. (t933: 112) wrote, "[T]he ostensible purpose of these commissioners was to advise and consult with the otherstates, buttheir real mission was to influence them ta secede." • 129 Denman (1933: 112); Dumond (1931: 13940). 230 created by James Madison in Federalist 10, South Carolina was a republic-not • a democracy; that is, the population of South Carolina, including slaves and women (who together constituted the vast majority of the state's population) were represented, but they did not mie directly. South Carolina's promise to defend Soutbem rights and institutions to the last extremity, first made in 1828, then in 1832, and fmally in 1850-52, was fmally kept. What South Carolinians now needed to do was to defend their actions to themselves, the South, the United States, and the world~ They hoped that such a defense would drive the other Southem states out ofthe Union and prevent the federal govemment from attempting to coerce them. (Despite the strategie benefits of coercion, South Carolinians undoubtedly preferred that a Southem Confederacy he created without the use offederal force. South Carolina's official justification for its actions was contained in two documents produced by different forces within the convention.. One document, titled the "Declaration of the Immediate Causes which Induce and Justify the Secession ofSouth Carolina from the Federal Union" and written in a committee headed br C.G. Memminger, outlined the immediate causes of secession. The justification for secession outlined in this document presented a familiar argument. It stated: On the 4th of March next, this party will take possession of the Govemment. It has announced that the South shall he excluded from the common territory, that the judicial tribunals shall he made sectional, and that a war must he waged against slavery until it shall cease throughout the United States.L30 • IJO State ofSouth Carolina (1862: 46l-466)• 231 According to the "Declaration ofImmediate Causes," secession was caused and • justified by Northem agitation against slavery. The compact theory ofthe Union made secession a legitimate response to the threats confronting South Carolina and the rest ofthe South. The other document, tided "The Address ofthe People ofSouth Carolina, Assembled in Convention, to the People ofthe Slaveholding States ofthe United States," and written in a committee headed by Robert Bamwell Rhett, presented a more complicated case. Secession, it claimed, was not a result of Northem agitation against slavery, but a result of the incompatibility of Northem and Southem cultures within the same govemment. Rhett bad long believed that the American experiment that combined these two ultimately incompatible peoples was a failure. From this point ofview, action did not have to be taken against the evil ofNorthem anti-slavery, as Memminger argued, but in order to prevent what Rhett called "the overthrow of the Constitution of the United States.,,131 According to this document, Anti-slavery sentiment in the North was nothing more than evidence ofthe Northem intention to accomplish its own revolution and overthrow the Constitution. The history of tariffs and discriminatory redistribution provided even better evidence of Northem and Southem incompatibility. As the Address noted, it was "by graduai and steady encroachments on the part ofthe people ofthe North, and acquiescence on the part ofthe South, the limitations in the Constitution have been swept away; and • 131 StateofSouth Carolina (1862: 467-476)• 232 the Govemment ofthe United States bas become consolidated, with a claim of • limidess powers in its operations." Later, the address stated, "The agitations on the subject of slavery are the natural results of the consolidation of the Govemment." l32 It was not anti-slavery sentiment per se, but Northem consolidation that threatened-and had always threate~ed-the South. The remedy this documentjustified was nothing more controversial than invoking the rights implied by a compact theory ofthe Union. From Rbett's point of view, the North and the South had always been incompatible partners in a political union, but the maintenance of a political balance between the two sections prevented one section from imposing its policy preferences upon the other. This balance between the sections had ooly recently been destroyed. Still, the fundamental incompatibility between the sections posed a mortal threat to the South. For Rhett, the original and enduring incompatibility between the sections provided the groundwork for secession. Thus, while South Carolinians appeared to have eliminated most of the divisions within the state and silenced opposition where it still existed, the documents produced by the Convention betrayed an ongoing division in the state; in each, secession was invoked as a right that existed by virtue of the institutional design ofthe state, but the proximate cause ofthe invocation ofthe right was clifferent. For Rhett, the general incompatibility between the North and South, coming to a head in the election of Lincoln, justified secession. For Memminger, secession was justified entirely by the immediate threat to slavery • 132 State ofSouth Carolina (1862: 467-476). 233 the election posed. Regard1ess ofthe difference in justification, secession was the • proper course ofaction for the state. In 1855, South Carolinian politician, joumalist, and eventual member of the 1860 secession convention L.W. Spratt claimed, in an article written for the Charleston Standard, "There are no such thing as masses at the South.,,133 Spratt was asserting what supporters of slavery had long been convinced of: slavery was not only a positive good for the enslaved blacks-the patemalism of the institution, according to this argument, rescued blacks from their own savage nature-but it played the role ofreducing fonnerly inevitable conflicts between white haves and have-nots. Even if a white Southerner was poor, worked with his hands, and did not own slaves, he remained a member ofthe privileged class in South Carolina by virtue ofthe color ofhis skin. He was white, and he was not a slave. Although confident that poor whites were content with their position, Southem elites seemed as interested in keeping abolitionist pamphlets and books outofthe hands ofpoor whites as they were in keeping them out ofthe hands of slaves. There May have been no masses in the South (as understood by Southem elites), but these elites knew that the maintenance ofslavery depended upon the continued support of non-slaveholders, and the presence of class-consciousness would have put this support at rlsk. (Hinton Helper's The Impending Crisis ofthe South was an attempt to create this class-consciousness.134) In South Carolina, in which about half of the white population belonged to slaveholding familles, 133 Spratt (1855: 8). According to Starnpp (1956) one ofthe central purposes ofslavery was to • controllabor• 234 elites appeared to he successful in maintaining support for the institution of • slavery among non-slaveholders. The politicalleaders ofSouth Carolina sougbt secession primarily in order to protect the institution of slavery. People like the radical Rhett may have had an ideological opposition to remaining in the Union, but this opinion had aLways been in the minority. Southem elites were concemed with their ongoing ability to maintain their slaves as property and were distressed at what seemed like the increasing likelihood that abolition would he brought about, with disastrous etIect to Southem society, culture and economy. Memminger's cooperationist views were always looked upon more favorably than Rhett's radical views. Given the clear link between secession and providing protection for the institution of slavery, and given that the benefits of secession appear to accrue to slaveholders alone, what is it that explains the willingness of non-slaveholders to support secession? Why, in other words, would the "poor and envious neighbors of the 'slaveholding lord' [vote] as he desired,,?13S Explaining Non-Slaveholders' Supportfor SeeessioD (and Siavery) Stephanie McCurry suggested that both the large-scale planter and the self-fanning yeoman had a stake in maintaining Southem society as it was then constituted, because the prerogatives ofmastership did not end at the boundaries established by race. Concurring with McCurry on this point, William Freehling 134 Helper(l968 [1857) • • 135 Thomas (1911:: 222). 235 claimed, "[a]lthough poor white males did not own blacks they loved to • dominate their wives.,,136 Likewise, South Carolina historian Walter Edgar wrote, "A Yeoman farmer might not be a slaveholder, but he could understand this role as head ofhis household.,,137 Patemalistic domination ofthe female was qualitatively similar to patemalistic domination ofthe black slave, bath ofwhich occurred within the inviolate space ofthe household. In other words, the culture of master and slave did not stop at the relationship between black slaves and owners. The qualitative similarity between the master-slave relationship and the man-wife relationship can best be appreciated when one considers that South Carolina was the only state in the Union in which divorce was outlawed. 138 The wife, like the slave, was not a contractual part ofthe household, one that could depart freely, but an organic part ofthe household, one whose membership in it was detennined by what white, male South Carolinians regarded as the natural order ofthings. Like the slave, the wife could not choose to leave. When a slave was sold, organic membership was transferred from one household to another. That wives could not be sold did not alter the qualitative similarity between the institutions ofslavery and marriage (in the South). Despite the fact thatthe life of the slave was more appalling, and that the relationship between the master and slave was outlined ùi law, the end result was the same: both the slave and the 136 Freehling(1994: 1L6); McCurry(l995). 131 Edgar (1998: 294)~ • 138 Basch(1999); McCurry (l992)~ 236 wüe were in a permanent position ofdependence upon the master ofthe house. • The yeoman farmer, the laborer, and the planter-politician all had a common interest in maintaining their qualitatively similar positions within their households. Northem ideas of freedom centered on free labor and a household consisting of contractual agreements between equals. These ideas posed a challenge to anyone who had a stake in South Carolinian (or Southem) society. The people who had the most to lose (white, male adults) were the ooly individuals permitted to cast ballots conceming the future of South Carolina's relationship with the federal government. Not surprisingly, these voters decided to support a course ofaction that would guarantee their place ofprimacy in their households. South Carolinian non..slaveholders were also concemed about the prospect ofslave insurrection, which some argued was a sure consequence ofabolition.139 According to this common line ofthinking, once freed, the slaves would proceed to rise up against everyone who had either owned them, or who had done nothing to prevent the institution ofslavery from being maintained. Despite the professed confidence that slaves were content to be slaves, everyone in the South had similar fears regarding the consequences of abolition. Nowhere were these concems more acute than in South Carolina, where a greater proportion of the population thananywhere else was enslaved. 139 Paskoffand Wilson (1982). Henry William Ravenel Journal Entry, 8 November 1860, Henry William Ravenel Journal, South Caroliniana Library, University ofSouth Carolina at Columbia, • Columbia, South Carolina. 237 Southemers were not unconcemed about the political implications of • abolition. South Carolina was one ofthe few states in the Union in which slaves were the majority of the population; ifslaves were freed, they would hold the balance of political power in the state. (This, of course, assumed that blacks would be given the right to vote, but ifabolition were to be accomplished, what would prevent slaves from receiving political rights as well?) With their numerical advantage, political equality would put poor whites on a lower footing than freed slaves. Abolition, combined with the electoral franchise, would put free white males in the dreaded positions ofdependence, a condition that South Carolinians endeavored to avoid. 140 On 4 March 1858, James Henry Hammond, United States Senator from South Carolina, famously argued that every society needed "mud-sills" to do the menial labor, a1lowing others to enjoy true independence.141 As long as slavery existed, even those who did not own slaves were free from menial, dirty, and dangerous work. The whites ofthe South were formally free in the same way as whites in the North, but Southem formal freedom was enhanced by the recognition that poor free whites were, by definition, raised above those who did menial, degrading labor. For whites ofall economic levels, freedom in the South was, for lack ofa hetter wor~ larger. Furthermore, South Carolina's poor whites were not in economic competition with the slaves; however, iffreed, the slaves would he able to compete for and hold sorne-of the same jobs that the poor 140 Ford (1988)• th • 141 Congressional Globe. Senate. 35 Congress~ 1st sess.~ page 962. 238 whites held. Thus~ slave freedom was a direct economic threat to the mass of • poor~ free whites. Maintaining the institution of slavery also held out hope to non slaveholders that they~ too~ could one day free themselves and their familles from menial labor by purchasing one or more slaves and joining the slave-owning class. The abolition of slavery would also eHminate the possibility of a poor white becoming a member of what was generally understood to be the ruling class ofthe South.142 Indeed~ cal1s to re-open. the foreign slave trade-a wedge issue used on occasion by the pro-slavery movement-were often couched in populist language aimed at the common (white) man, giving him the opportunity to own slaves.143 (Sorne even hoped that re-opening the slave trade would eventuallyeliminate non-slaveholding in the South, which would further enhance Southem security.l44) In addition~ non-slaveholders often benefited from the slaveholders various kindnesses~ such as access to the slaveholders~ cotton gin~ providing them with another direct "economic stake in the regime.,,14S Finally, poor whites had reason to fear the abolition ofslavery for the very real reason that the wealthier class of South Carolinians could choose to leave South Carolina for a state in which blacks would not hold the balance ofpolitical 142 Thomas (1911). [43 White (1931: 140). 144 Boucher(1919a). • [45 Freehling (2001: 21)• 239 . power.146 Poorer South Carolinians did not have the means to leave the state and • would have to remain even ifpolitical power were to he help by the majority of the POpulace-the freed slaves. No single factor completely explains why poor, white, i1cn-slaveholding South Carolinians supported the slaveholding class's experiment with secession, but taken together, these motives provide an illustration of why the South Carolina's non-slaveholders supported the actions that were taken for the specifie purpose of defending slavery (an institution in which they had no immediate interest). While abolition would not have eliminated sorne of what they considered to be their property (as it would have for the slaveholders), it would have immediately threatened their way of life and their future prospects in a variety of ways. Indeed, it seems that the poorest of South Carolina's citizens would have had the MOst to lose were slavery to have been abolished. The wealthiest South Carolinians possessed land, homes, capital, and other possessions (apart from their slaves), while the poorest possessed ooly the advantage ofwhite skin. In. the absence ofthat single advantage, there was little else to distinguish the poor, white, male South Carolinian from the slave population. Being white would no longer be synonymous with holding political power by virtue of the electoral franchise; being a poor white would he no different from being a freed slave, with the exception being that freed slaves would hold the political powerofthe state in their bands. • 146 Barney(1974: 229)• 240 Conclusion • The crisis of 1860 situated secessionist entrepreneurs in a radically different context than past crises. Long before the decision to secede was made, and long before the event that would justify secession had occurred, secessionist entrepreneurs had successfully established the issue that would justify secession: the perception of a real and immediate threat to slavery. For once, South Carolina's forward position in the crisis was an asset rather than a liability. But exactly how was 1860 different from 1852 (when many in South Carolina desired secession) and 1832-33 (when South Carolina asserted the sovereignty of the state, only to retreat from the brink-thanks, in part, to the willingness ofthe center to compromise)? During the nullification controversy of 1832-33, two forces---<>ne within the state and one outside the state-had hobbled South Carolina's forward action. Within the state, Unionist forces (while not enjoying a majority of support) had enough support to make sustained radical action difficult. South Carolina found itselfon the verge of its own civil war over the issue. For sorne, nullification meant secession at a time when secession was not infavor. Unionist leaders had been brought up on a love for the Union that transcended any particular law or policy-even anti-slavery. For South Carolina's unionists (reversing Hammond's famous phrase) the Union was a principle, not a POlicy.L47 l41 Hammond recounted that in "a speech made at Bamwell C.H. sorne two years ago, [ said that '[ regarded this union as a policy and not a principle.'" This quote is taken ftom Hammond's November 1860 letter to the South Carolinian legislature. James Henry Hammond to Legislature ofSouth Carolina, November 1860, James Henry Hammond Papers, South Caroliniana Library, • University ofSouth Carolina, Columbia, South Carolina. 241 That is, the Union was something to be maintained even when conceding it • posed some risk-not something to be discarded once its utility had expired. One could not, from this point ofview, calculate the value ofthe UDion; its value was incalculable. The second force that had mitigated the action South Carolina desired to take during the nullification controversy was the lack of support for radical action in the rest of the South. While other Southem actors may not have endorsed the protectionist tariffs of1828 and 1832, they were not willing to go to the extremes that South Carolina was. These states did not condone South Carolina's actions, and their declamations against South Carolina were as severe as those ofNorthem states. Radical action was also mitigated by the actions of the center-specifically, Congress's willingness to compromise on the tarif{ issue. This compromise had eliminated the ostensible point of conflict between South Carolina and the federal govemment. If South Carolina had wanted to continue the fight, it would have had to de so over the highly contentious issue of slavery-not over the less contentious tarlff: Finally, unlike James Buchanan, Andrew Jackson had determined that the laws of the United States would be enforced no matter what the local circumstances. Were this state to have continued its agitation, it would have had to do so without support from other Southem states, with declining support at home, without an issue upon which to mobilize support, and against the wishes ofa detennined executive_ This episode taught South. Carolina a number oflessons: first, its leadership would always be • suspect in the North and the South; second, action could only be undertaken in 242 the presence ofa more serious issue, and ifsustained radical action was desired, • the issue must be perceived as irresolvable; and finally, a strong Unionist presence inthe state would make any action difficult. In 1852, the situation confronting South Carolina was vastly different, but the outcome was remarkably similar to the state's experience in 1832-33. Unlike the nullification controversy, the first secession crisis did not feature considerable Unionist strength. (Unionist forces were not absent from the state, but these forces were largely subsumed within and neutralized by the C00Perationist camp.) This weakening of the Unionist position meant the differences of opinion in the state during the fust secession crisis were less extensive than they were during nullification. By 1852, many in the state had arrived at the conclusion that secession must occur at sorne point, but they were also convinced that 1852 was not the appropriate time. Thus, the state was not divided on the question of the ultimate necessity of secession; rather, division was present over the necessary preconditions of secession. The unilateral secessionists won a significant victory in the first referendum on secession, thanks in large part to the movement afoot to prevent slavery from having access to the territories and thanks to the unorthodox admission ofCalifornia as a free state. As time went on, however, a conservative reaction set in, allowing cooler heads to prevail in South Carolina. Cooperationists won the second referendum on secession in 1851. IfSouth Carolina were going to act, it would have had to do so hefore conservative reaction had had a chance to set in. Preventing cooler • heads from prevailing would go a long way toward taking the wind out ofthe 243 cooperationist's sails. Ultimately, South Carolina realized that its leadership was • both necessary and despised. Selecting the proper issue upon which to justify action would prove to he central to the success ofthe movement. In these earlier episodes, Northem dominance in national institutions was far less established than it was about to be. Southemers even disagreed on the depth of the conflict between the sections; for sorne, there were no incommensurable divisions between the sections. In 1860, Northem dominance within the political institutions ofthe Union was reaching its aPex, and the issue that would ultimately be used to justify Southem action had been established long in advance. Sincere cooperationists gradually became convinced that unilateral secession was the best way, if not the only way, to accomplish the dream. ofcooperative secession. Learning the importance oftiming from the first secession crisis, the political actors ofSouth Carolina guaranteed that any action would he taken immediately, which would allow no time. for a conservative reaction to set in. Having gone to Virginia and failed to accomplish true cooperation among the states ofthe South, South Carolina decided not to risk the collapse ofthe movement by waiting for another state to take the lead. Thus, this state seceded unilaterally. The Case in Perspective The institutional design ofthe American state meant that, in the presence ofa sufficiently strong grievance, secession would be more likely than in astate designed according to different principles. This (federai) design contributed to • secession in at least three ways: first, it meant that a high Level ofstate capacity 244- would exist at the locallevel; second, a high level ofstate capacity in the states • meant the center was comparatively weak (The center did not have many functions that were considered crucial or irreplaceable by the separate states); finally, the federal design of the Union contributed to the development, establishment, and entrenchment of a djscourse of states' rights in the United States that eventually dominated the Southem perspective on the Union. The South defensively adopted a strong states' rights stance in the face ofperceived Northem and federal encroachments on Southem rights. The South was not the only region in the United States to adopt the principles ofstates' rights and state sovereignty; but it was the only region that turned the theory ofstate sovereignty into reality, if only for a short time; the design of the state, therefore, played a fundamental role in the success of the movement for secession in the South. Establishing and eventually invoking the right of secession was consistent with the perception ofstate sovereigntyand states' rights. Secession would not have been possible without a sufficiently strong grievance experienced by the political elite ofthe South. A variety ofinterrelated changes, culminating in Northem political dominance, meant that Southem institutions were no longer safe within the Union. For a group of Southem political elites, the election of Lincoln was established as the issue that would justify Southem withdrawal from the Union. With Lincoln'selection, Southem secessionists established a sufficiently strong grievance against which support for secession could he mobilized.. Finally, once the decision to secede was made • by South Carolina, the centrality oftiming and sequencing strategies came into 245 play. South Carolina knew that there was a high. level ofsupport for secession in • the Deep South, but they also knew that, regardless ofthe level ofsupport among the Deep South states, none of these states would ever initiate the movement, and, as history had shown, simultaneous secession was nothing more than an unrealizable dream-the hoPe of which had actually crushed an earlier movement for secession. Thus, with the knowledge that cooperation was impossible and with assurances from the Deep South that they would follow South Carolina's lead (or at least defend the state against coercion), South Carolina seceded from the Union unilaterally. It took more than South Carolina's willingness to lead to compel the states of the Upper South to secede from the Union, however. The action of South Carolina and the states of the Deep South set the stage for a confrontation between the newly formed Confederate States ofAmerica and the United States of America. It was this confrontation, and the imPerative to take sides that followed from it, that compelled the states of the Upper South to join South Carolina and the Deep South in getting out ofthe Umon. First among the states of the Deep South, and then among the states of the Upper South, South Carolina's actions played a central role in altering the strategie context for choiee. From South Carolina to the Rest ofthe South With South Carolina's secession established as a fait accompli, the rest of the South was forced to take action.. Would it follow South Carolina out ofthe • Union? Would itremain inthe Union to tight for Southem rights without radical 246 • Cbapter 4: Tbe Tbree Soutbs Introduction On 4 March 1861, Republican Abraham Lincoln was to be inaugurated as the sixteenth president of the United States. This transfer of power from the until-recently Southem-dominated Democratie Party to the Northem-dominated Republican Party meant different things for the various states of the Union. Endogenous forces within the states of the South made the difference between seceding and not seceding. The more slaveholding interests thoroughly dominated a state, the more likely that state would secede from the Union (See Chart 2.4 and Chart 2.5). Where slaveholding interests were less dominant, and where slavery was less established, secession was either more difficult to accomplish, accomplished for different reasons, or not accomplished ataiL Given the rise ofsectionalisrn in the Union in 1860, it is not surprising that Lincoln's election was subject to sectionaI interpretation. For the North, Lincoln's election signified Northem victory over Southem parties and politicians. For once, the North could rule without being baIanced or hobbled in sorne way by Southem powers and interests. For the South, the election of Lincoln signified the unfettered hostility ofthe North against the South. This coopter is organized in the following fashion: first, l provide a brief • review ofthe relevant events outlined in the previous chapter; second, l divide 248 the remaining states ofthe South into three analytically distinct categories (the • early-seceders, the late-seceders, and the non-seceders), providing an examination of the forces at work within each section of the South, and how these forces contributed to early secession, late secession, or remaining in the Union. In the tirst section, l examine the secession of the states that withdrew from the Union more or less immediately after South Carolina. These six states-Mississippi, Florid~ Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas constitute the group l calI the early seceders. The forces operative within each one ofthese states were qualitatively similar to those in South Carolina, although planter dominance was sIightly less complete in these states than in South Carolina.1 However, while there was virtual unanimity on the question of secession in South Carolin~ there was a Iack ofunanimity among the other early seceders. Despite this lack of unanimity, support for s~cession was strong enough to allow secession to take place. The second group of states l examine are the late-seceders: Virginia, Arkansas, Tennessee, and North Carolina. These states seceded ooly after the shelling ofFort Sumter and Lincoln's proclamation calling up oftroops to quell the rebellion. The logic of secession for the late seceders was profoundly different from the logic ofsecession among the early seceders. Planter-politician dominance was less thorough in these states and slavery was less common, compared to South Carolina and the early seceders. (Sec Chart 2.2 and Chart • 1 Greenberg (1977). 249 2.3). Incidence of slaveholding was considerably less widespread among the • delegates and representatives in the conventions and legislatures of the Upper South than in those of the Deep South (See Chart 2.5). These states did not secede because of the potential threat to slavery posed by the election of Abraham Lincoln-if protecting themselves against this potenlial threat had been the primary goal of the decision-makers in these states, they would have seceded at the same time as the states ofthe Deep South. Instead, the states ofthe Upper South seceded only once the Lincoln administration demonstrated that it was an actual threat to the interests, identity, and freedom ofthe South by calling troops to participate in an invasion ofthe soil ofthe South to coerce the seceded states. After Sumter and Lincoln's proclamation, the potential confrontation between North and South became very real. While Upper South political actors did not consider the election of Lincoln alone a justification for secession, they would neither provide troops to put down the Southem "rebellion," nor consent to the coercion of the seceded states. The overt act of which so Many spoke before and during the secession crisis had finally taken place, prompting these states to follow the seceded states in withd.rawing from the UDion. Although slavery was not the issue thatjustified secession, this institution played a role in establishing a common identity between the Deep South and UPPer South states. At the end ofthis chapter, l examine the slave states that did not secede: Maryland, Missouri, Kentucky, and Delaware. Even more than the states ofthe UpPer South, the Border States were precariously balanced between North and • South.. These four states were Northem in many respects; the attitudes and 250 orientations oftheir populations and their industrial capacities indicated a certain • ''Northem-ness,'' but they were also slaveholding states. While Deep South cotton went overseas, the importance of Northem markets for Border South products gave these states a strong stake in maintaining ties with the North. Political and economic forces within each ofthe non-seceding states snuffed out the desire for secession and kept them safe for the Umon. These states were so populous, and their industrial output so large compared to the Deep South and the Upper South, that William Freehling has recently argued that the failure of these states to secede and vigorously support the Confederate cause was fatal to the prospect of maintaining the Confederate nation from its inception.2 (Ironically, had South Carolina and the Deep South industrialized, they May have been more successful in their execution ofthe war, but ifthe Southem economy 3 had diversified, the war may oever have come. ) Finally, the slaveholders of these states did not hold sway in the halls of these state's governments, and the institution of slavery affected a comparatively small proportion of the population. In South Carolina and Mississippi, nearly 50 percent of the white population belonged to slave-owning familles. In Delaware, it was less than five percent. The limited extent of slave-ownership had the added effect of eliminating the fear ofdependence and the fear of political dominance offreed slaves that was 50 common in high-slaveholding areas. 2 Freehling (200 L). • 3 Stavinsk.y(1951). 25L The previous chapter examined the forces that compelled South Carolina • to secede and the strategie sequencing by which secession was accomplished~ This chapter examines the fruits of South Carolina's labors by examining the sequence of secession in the remaining slave states (and the forces operative within the rest ofthose states that determined the path they won1d follow in the aftennath ofLincoln's election, South Carolinian secession, the shelling of Fort Sumter, and the subsequent proclamation by Lincoln, which called up troops to quell the rebellion). For South Carolina, the institutional significance ofthe election ofLincoln provided a sufficient grievance level to justify secession. The state's political leaders followed a path that led, first, to the secession of South Carolina, and, second, to the secession of the other states of the Deep South. This dissertation centers significantly on the sequence ofsecession in the Southem states. Thus, in this chapter, 1 examine the course followed by all the slave states ofthe Union: those that seceded early, those that seceded late, and those that never seceded at alL The breadth ofthe subject matter in this chapter requites that 1do not go into the same depth as the previous chapters. However, 1 hope to significantly illuminate the process, sequence, and timing of secession in the Southem states ofthe Union. Byexpanding my analytic gaze, 1provide a more complete account ofthe contours ofthe decisions to secede or remain in the Union and the timing of those decisions. This, in tum, provides analytical leverage that will help us understand the process ofsecession in other contexts, even in the contemporary • world. 252 Unlike my analysis of South Carolina, in which 1 relied on qualitative • rather than quantitative evidence, my examination ofthe course followed by the rest of the South examines the available quantitative data in election results, the dates of elections and other significant decisions, and the demographic characteristics ofthe states. This reHance on election results, in particular, May seem peculiar--especially because the story of South Carolina's secession was told with relatively few such results. As 1 pointed out in earlier chapters, the vast majority of political positions in South Carolina were made by legislative appointment, not by election. Compared to other states in the Union, there were simply fewer elections in South Carolina. Second, given the lack of two-party competition within South Carolina and the relative unanimity on fundamental issues among the population and politicians of South Carolina, the election results that do exist for South Carolina are essentially meaningless. In general, the elections that did take place are not significant because they do not represent two or more divergent perspectives vying for popular support. Finally, uncontested elections were common in South Carolina. Thus even when there was an election, there was usually no particularly useful data to he examined. For example, more than 66 percent ofail elections to the House ofRepresentatives in the state ofSouth Carolina between 1824 and 1860 were uncontested.4 With few exceptions, the same is true of other elections held within the state. Political elites, who were also the state's economic elite, selected who would run for office, and the electorate had oolyto ratify thatdecision. • " Congressional Quarterly, iDe. (1975). 253 This distinctive characteristic of South Carolinian poütics demonstrates • the extent to which South Carolina had achieved virtual unanimity ofopinion on poütical questions and the extent to which the political elites were the sole movers ofPOlitics within the state. Unlike South Carolina, election results in the other states are significant, first, because, they were widely contested, and, second, because there is a connection between votes cast for Southem Democratie presidential nominee John C. Breckenridge and support for secession. McCrary, et al, wrote, "[T]wo thirds of the secessionist vote came directIy frOID Breckenridge supporters."S Thus, examining the extent of support for Breckenridge may help to account for the support (or lack thereot) for secession in the convention elections that eventually took place in many of the states of the South. It is, therefore, imperative to make use of the widely available election results for elections in the pre-secession South. The Early Seceders The factors contributing to secession among the early seceders were similar to the factors operating within South Carolina. The states of the Deep South were institutionally similar to South Carolina in the extent ofthe power of the legislature, the weakness ofthe govemor, and, most împortantly, the strengtb ofthe slaveholding interests.6 In each there were strong--even overwhelming- pressures to secede onc~ properjustification could be made ofit. Despite a range of similarities, these states differed frOID South Carolina in their willingness to 5 McCrary etaL (1978: 457). This article was a reaction to Lipset (1959) who claimed that support for secession came predominantly from supporters of presidential candidate John Bell of the • Constitutional Union party• 254 delegation to the convention.8 Mississippi even made preparations for astate • convention during the latter crisis, but a late convention date was ultimately decided upon-much to the chagrin of South Carolinian secessionists.9 Thanks to the passage of the Georgia Platform, the possibility ofcooperative secession had passed; only the most foolhardy state would have considered unilateral secession after December 1850. As the agitation surrounding the compromise measures waned, there appeared to he a sea change in public opinion, moving away from secessionism, demonstrated by the 1852 election of unionist Henry Foote to the position ofgovemor. When the Mississippi convention finally met, its members committed the state to abide by the Compromise of 1850, which had been passed 16 months earlier.10 Cotton and slavery were dominant forces in Mississippi, just as they were in South Carolina, but there were important differences. Though a slave state, Mississippi had moved much further along the road to democratization than South Carolina. Citizens were able ta vote for a much larger variety ofpolitical positions within the state, and- MOst notably-its citizens were permitted ta participate in the election ofthe president. Thus, not only was there a stronger tradition of citizen input ioto the government, but two-party competition was present to a significant degree.. 11 Although there was strong support for secession 8 Potter(l976: 104). 9 Potter(l976: 125); White (1931: 112). 10 Potter(1976: 129). • Il McCormick(1966)• 256 in 1860-61, the Mere presence of a two-party competition meant Mississippi • would never have unanimity on the question ofsecession. In the 1860 presidential election, Southem Democrat John C. Breckenridge won 40,768 votes to Bell's 25,045 votes and Douglas' 3,282 votes. But because the selection of presidential electors was given to the people, and not to the legislature, the state's goveming body was not in session once it was known that Lincoln had been elected, and it was not scheduled to meet in regular session until the beginning ofJanuary. For the state to take full advantage ofthe excitement caused by Lincoln'selection and the opportunity presented by the prospect of South Carolina's unilateral movement, Mississippi would have to make a number of important decisions before the legislature met in regular session. On 14 November 1860, Govemor Pettus exercised bis executive authority, calling the legislature into special session beginning 26 November 1860. On November 29, the legislature approved a bill calling for a 20 December 1860 election of a convention that would meet beginning 7 January 1861. The secessionists won this election, with 16,800 of the 29,018 of the votes cast for candidates whose positions were publicly known. The cooperationist candidates received 12,218 votes, and there were approximately 12,000 votes cast for candidates whose positions were not known. 12 Even ifevery unknown vote was cast for a candidate who supported secession, Mississippi did not enjoy the same unanimity on secession thatappeared to exist in South Carolina. • 12 Patter(1976). 257 The debate over secession in Mississippi was a debate over how best to • protect slavery. Some felt that slavery was best protected outside ofthe Union, where the South could manage its own domestic affairs. üthers felt slavery was best protected by staying in the Union. As Rainwater noted, "Both of these groups regarded the benefits of the Union as secondary to the preservation of slavery, which was the support ofthe state's social and economic system."l3 By the time the Mississippi secession convention met on 7 January 1861, South Carolina had been an independent republic for over two weeks. Although the state was willing to follow South Carolina out ofthe Union, Mississippi, like many states in the South, long desired true cooperative secession; it had supported a Southem Convention in the aftermath of John Brown's raid. Once the time for secession drew near, and it seemed that Mississippi was on the verge ofinsisting upon true cooperation, which was the same error that had devastated earlier movements, Govemor Gist ofSouth Carolina cautioned Govemor Pettus ofMississippi against seeking a Southem Convention. Gist argued, ''the Border and non..acting States would outvote us and thereby defeat action."l4 Despite the comparatively narrow victory for the secessionists in the convention election, the state heeded Gist's advice: The ordinance ofsecession was passed in convention on 9 January 1861, bya vote of 85 to 15. With South Carolina and Mississippi now out ofthe Union, the conceit that unilateral secession equaled cooperation had become a reality. l3 Rainwater(l938: 219). • l4 Dumond (1931: 137). 258 Florida • In 1860, Florida was a minor state playing a minor role in national politics. Among the slave states, Florida's population was largerthan Delaware's alone. Typical of other Southem states, Florida representatives supported the elements of the Compromise of 1850 that were favorable to the South and opposed the elements that were favorable to the North. Generally, though, political actors in this state desired to get beyond the divisiveness ofthe debate over the Compromise and agreed to support its principles.ls Florida sent delegates to the Nashville Convention, but only in an unofficial capacity.l6 Perhaps due to its small population, or due to its shorter history, or because it sits on the geographic periphery of the United States, there was little interest in Florida's actions. The path ofFlorida was not looked at with the same interest as the path of Georgia or Virginia. There was little doubt that Florida would follow South Carolina out of the Union; indeed, in bis reply to Govemor Gist's lener, Florida's Govemor was the only govemor to claim that the secession ofa single state was a sufficient condition for the secession ofFlorida. With South Carolina and Mississippi already existing outside the Union, it was virtually inconceivable thatFlorida would remain in the Union. Like Mississippi, and in fact like every other state of the South, Florida had moved further along the road to democratization than had South Carolina. Florida gave the selection of members of the Electoral College to the voting 15 Tebeau. (1971: l75-6). • 16 Potter(l976: 104). 259 population of the state, which helped to establish and maintain two-party • competition within the state. Traditionally, the second party was the Whig Party, but in the 1860 presidential election, the Constitutional Union Party (the most recent incarnation of the Whig Party) played that role. The existence of two party competition in Florida meant that Florida, like Mississippi and unlike South Carolina, would not enjoy unanimity on the question ofsecession. Like the other states of the Deep South, Floridians cast their ballot overwhelmingly for the Southem Democratic candidate, John C. Breckenridge, giving him all of the state's presidential electors. Although the Whig Party had virtuaUy no chance to win, it still garnered substantial support in the presidential election getting 4,736 votes to Breckenridge's 8,157 votes. 17 Without the obligation to select presidential electors, the Florida legislature would not meet in regular session until 26 November 1860. This proved to he early enough to take advantage of public excitement over the outcome of the election. On 30 November 1860, the legislature passed a bill calling for a convention election to he held on 22 December 1860, for a convention to meet beginning 3 January 1861. Historian David Potter claimed that support for cooperationist candidates in the convention election was between 36 percent and 43 percent.18 Despite this strong showing by cooperationist forces, on 10 January 1861, a Mere one day aftel Mississippi's ordinance of secession was passed, and more than 20 days 17 Wooster(1962: 68). • 18 Potter(1976: 496). 260 that declared that, ifthe Republican Party candidate were elected president bythe • No~ a convention ofthe state would he assembled ''to consider, determine, and do whatever in the opinion ofsaid convention the rights, interests, and honor of the State ofAlabama require to be done for their protection.,,22 The convention law passed both bouses of the state legislature and received the governor's approval on 24 Febroary 1860. But by the time it was clear that Lincoln was to be the next president, the state backed down from what would have been an action in advance ofeven South Carolina, justifying its pause on a technicality.23 Although there was a national election on 6 November 1860, in which Lincoln was clearly victorious, Alabama's govemor claimed that the election would not take place constitutionally until members of the Electoral College cast their ballots more than a month after the popular electioo. Despite the fact that it backed down from initiation, Alabama signaled its intention to take the election of Lincoln as a significant threat. (Moreover, Alabama's backing down from its original forward position may have actually worked to strengthen South Carolina's resolve to secede separately, which, in ail probability was a necessary condition ofthe creation ofa Southem Confederacy.) Not surprisingly, Alabama voted for Breckenridge in the presidential election. Of90,503 votes cast for the president, Breckenridge received 49,019 of them, or approximately 54 percent ofthe vote. Bell received 27,827 votes, and Douglas received 13,657 votes (approximately 31 percent and 15 percent ofthe 22 Denman (1933: 79); Rogers etaL (1994: (81)• • 262 Cooperative action-not unilateral secession-was the only way to guarantee the • market's continued availability.2S In convention, recognizing the futility ofopposing secession, supporters of cooperation agreed to support unilateral secession to maintain the appearance of unanimity. Moreover, events in other states ofthe South, and secession in South. Carolina, Mississippi, and Florida, convinced those who were initially committed to cooperation to support unilateral secession. On Il January 1861, Alabama's ordinance for immediate secession passed by a vote of61 to 39. Fifteen ofthe 39 who voted against the ordinance eventually attached their signature to the document.26 Unilateral secession inthe South. saw three victories in three days. Georgia Georgia exhibited typical Southem ambivalence about the 1828 and 1832 tariffs and South Carolina's remedy to them. Like MOst Southem states, Georgia opposed protective tariffs, believing they were detrimental to the free trade upon which the agricultural states depended. Still, this state saw nullification as "rash and revolutionary.,,27 They condoned neither the tariffs nor the remedy proposed by South Carolina.28 This ambivalence came out again during the 1850 crisis. Playing perhaps the MOst important role in the crisis, at the end of1850, the state 24 Rogers (1994: (83). 25 Denman (1933). 26 Wooster (1962: 59n.). 27 Freehling (1966: 265). • 21 Coleman(1991: 134)• 264 convention of Georgia passed the Georgia Platform, which effectively • demobilized secessionist sentiment in the South. This platfonn stated that while Georgia would adhere to the Compromise of 1850, it would meet further encroachments on Southem rights with vigorous opposition-with "a disruption ofthe Union," ifnecessary. 29 Conservatism in Georgia was more entrenched than in any other of the Deep South states. Tuming unilateral secession ioto cooperative secession and a Southem Confederacy was only as strong as the least willing state; that is, the successful creation of a Southem Confederacy depended upon states less committed to secession than South Carolina. The momentum for secession seen in December 1860 and January 1861 could easily be stalled by the caution ofa single state.. If there was one state that could produce a meaningful and significant pause in the process of secession, it was Georgia. There was no expectation that the states of the Upper South would secede during the winter crisis. The Deep South states had, after all, agreed to meet in Montgomery, not Richmond, to form their new nation. In fact, the Deep South strategy of sequential exit dePended upon the unwillingness of the Upper South to secede for sorne time. The mass of unseceded states would provide the seceded states with. a territorial cordon sanitaire between the North and the Deep South, as weil as a moderate voice in Washington to preventthe federal govemment from doing • 29 Commager(l963: 324).. 265 something rash,30 but ifGeorgia decided to adopt a conservative position during • the winter of 1860-61, the movement for a Southem Confederacy would he fatally wounded. Febrenbacher speculated, "if only three or four states had seceded, such a feeble effort might well have ended peaceably in failure.,,31Thus, Georgia's secession May weIl have been crucial to the success ofthe movement. Divisions between unionism and secessionism in Georgia can he seen in the election results ofthe 1860 presidential election. Ofthe 106,717 votes cast in the presidential election of 1860, 52,176 (or 48.9 percent) were cast for Southem Democrat John C. Breckenridge. There were 42,960 votes cast for the Constitutional Union ticket, and 11,581 were cast for Stephen Douglas. In other words, more than half of the votes cast in Georgia went to so..called "conservative" candidates. Although Georgia's legislature convened relatively early in the movement (7 November 1860), it was never assumed that this early convening would translate ÎDto an initiation of the movement for secession; Georgia was too divided to initiate the movement. Soon after assembling, news reached the capital of Georgia that Lincoln was elected president of the United States. The same Georgia Platfonn that demobilized secession in 1850 pledged the state to resistance in the event of further Northem encroachments on Southem rights. Would they live up to their promise? If so, could the state be relied upon to JO Charleston Mercury, 10 March. 1860; S. L. Bum to C. L. Hum, 12 November 1860, Oum Family Papers, South Caroliniana Library, University ofSouth Carolina at Columbi~ Columbia, South CaroLina. • 3l Fehembacher(l980: 5)• 266 commit itself to secession, as it had promised? Or would the state seek sorne • form ofresistance short ofsecession? At the foundation of these debates was a question of whether or not the constitutional election of a president could he considered justcause for secession. The path Georgia followed guaranteed it would secede unîlaterally. On 20 Novernber 1860, the legislature passed a bill designating a 2 January 1861 election for a convention that would meet beginning 16 January 1861. In the election for the convention, 44,152 of the 85,784 votes-or oo1y 51 percent of the votes-were cast for candidates supporting immediate secession. The cooperationists had 41,632 votes (or slightly less than 49 percent of the total vote). There is, it should be noted, considerable historical debate over who actually won the election: In response to an inquiry, Govemor Brown ofGeorgia claimed that "the delegates to the convention who voted for the ordinance of secession were elected by a clear majority...of 13,120 votes.,,32 This claim. is deceptive, however, because in the seceding states of the South, there was a tendency for those who ran as cooperationists to support secession once it seemed inevitable in order to maintain the veneer of unanimity. Reading back election results does not provide a good indication of the level of support for unilateral secession or cooperation during the campaign. Despite this controversy, Georgïa's convention adopted an ordinance of secession on 19 January 1861, by a comparatively close vote of 166-130. The most important • 32 Potter(l976: 4960.)• 267 consequence, so far as secession was concemed, which set ofcandidates received • the majority of votes.,,34 Cooperation originally meant some form of Southem Convention, but thanks to the unilateral secession of South Carolina-followed by Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, and Georgia-eooperation now meant unilateral secession. By this time, to fail to secede unilaterally was to fail to cooperate. Despite the close presidential vote and the close convention vote, under these new circumstances, the convention voted to secede from the union by a lopsided vote of113 to 17. Texas Although Texas was one ofthe few states to actually send a full slate of delegates to the Nashville Convention, and despite the fact that a portion ofthe passed compromise measures constituted a reduction of Texas' territory, the citizens and leadership ofthe state supported the Compromise of 1850.35 Then senator Sam Houston of Texas was one of a select few who voted for all elements of the compromise.36 Houston was govemor of the state during the 1860-61 secession crisis, and in spite of bis steadfast unionism, the state managed early secession from the Union. In the 1860 presidential election, Texans voted overwhelmingly for the Breckenridge ticket. The Republican and Northem Democratie tickets ofLincoln 34 Dumond (1931:: 208). 3S Protter(L962: 74). • 36 Hanulton (1964: 192)• 269 and Douglas did not even appear on the ballot. Breckenridge received 47,548 of • the 62,986 votes cast, or a full 75.5 percent ofthe vote.37 Being on the periphery ofthe Union, the path ofTexas, like the path of Florida, was not regarded as being as important as the path followed by astate like Georgia. Still, the path followed by Texas shows the extent to which supporters ofsecession were willing to go in order to achieve their political ends. Up to this point, even Deep South governors who did not support secession recognized the necessity ofcalling a convention ofthe people to keep apace of events and avoid the ire of citizens desiring immediate action. Govemor Sam Houston of Texas was the exception to this general mIe; displaying an uncommon devotion to the Union, Houston did not and would not caU the legislature into special session to consider a convention law. Secessionists, however, were unwilling to concede Houston's attempt to stail the movement. Because of Houston's opposition, Texan secessionists were forced to follow a path outside ofnonnal politics to caU a convention ofthe people. Asserting the right of the people to meet in convention in a number of public speeches held throughout the state, Texan secessionists declared that a convention would meet beginning 28 January 1861. Elections were to he held 8 January 1861, though sorne counties held their elections earlier.38 Results for this election appear to he as inconsequential as the election in South Carolina. Cooperationist candidates 37 McPherson (1865:1). • 311 Wooster (1962: 124). 270 were, for the most part, not up for election to the convention~39 Thinking that the • legislature would resent the secessionists' usurpation ofits authority, and to put the brakes on the secession movement, Houston called the legislature into session in January. Rather than putting the brakes on secession, however, the legislature gave quick approval to the convention, stipulating only that the convention's decision he affirmed by a popular referendum.4o Once the convention met, it declared, by a vote of 1S2 to 6, that it was "the deliberate sense ofthis Convention that the State ofTexas should separately secede from the Union.,,41 On 1 February 1861, after the ordinance ofsecession was drafted, the convention voted 166 to 8 to secede from the Union~ Overwhelming support for secession among the citizens of Texas convinced Govemor Houston to lend bis symbolic support to secession by attending the ratification of the ordinance~ In the February referendum, of the 57,337 votes cast, fully 44,317 (or 77 percent) were for secession~ Ooly 13,020 votes (less than 23 percent) were cast against the actions ofthe convention. Nowhere else in the South, expect perhaps South Carolina, was secession as popular~42 That it occurred later than the other states ofthe Deep South can probably be attributed to Houston's opposition to it~ 39 Fomell (1961: 290); Potter(1976: 497). 40 Fomell(1961:29O-291); Wooster(l962: (24). 4L Wooster(1962: 129). • 42. Donnelly (1965). 271 Lincoln saw Houston's opposition to secession as an opportunity to stem • the tide of secession and keep Texas in the Union. After ascending to the presidency, Lincoln offered Governor Houston 70,000 troops to help keep Texas in the Union. Following the advice ofhis advisors, Houston declined the offer.43 Although he disapproved of the actions of bis state and even tried to prevent it from seceding, his ultimate loyalty was to Texas and not the Union. Following the secession of Texas (the last of the Deep South states to withdraw from the Union), the momentum of the movement was spent. At this point, the Upper South, which eventually seceded, did not have an issue behind which a successful movement could be mobilized. For the time being, the pressing issue shifted from secession to the creation ofa new govemment for the seceded states. They met in Montgomery, Alabama, to prepare a constitution and select a president. The Late..Seceders The Upper South had long been the home of the moderate advocates of Southem rlghts. The Upper South had ties to the North profound enough to moderate what, in the Deep South, had, by late 1860, become profound anti Northem paranoia. Perhaps the central difference between these two groups of states was the importance of the institution of slavery and the extent to which slave interests dominated these states. While the Upper South states ofVirginia, Arkansas, Tennessee and North Carolina were slave states, slavery was not the critical institution there that itwas in the Deep South. In 1860, Virginia had more • 41 Beunger(1984: 3); Creel (1928: 331-332); Dayand Ullom (1954:: 270). 272 slaves than any other state, but slaves accounted for less than 31 percent ofthe • state's total population. Slaves in these four states accounted for only slightly more than 30% of ail slaves in the United States. Furthermore, incidence of slaveholding was far less extensive in the Upper South as in the Lower South (See Chart 2.3). While the slaveholders of these states still held a disproportionately large share ofpolitical power, political power was shared with the non-slaveholder to a greater extent here than in the Deep South. In South Carolina, for example, only 16 of 169 secession convention delegates Oess than 10 percent) held no slaves; in Arkansas, 30 of77 convention delegates (or almost 40 percent) held no slaves (See Chart 4.0).44 Because the institution and its advocates were less influential in Upper South states, because the link between political power and slavebolding was less finnly established, and because ofeconomic links to the North, the Mere election of Lincoln did not convince the political elites of these states of the need for secession. To be sure, the slaveholding interests pressed for early radical action, but these interests did not enjoy the near-monopoly of power enjoyed by the slaveholding interests in the Deep South; thus, these efforts could not he successfuL For most ofthe political eUtes, and for the populations ofthe Upper South states, Lincoln's constitutional election did not provide justification for secession. Where the as-yet-unrealized threat to slavery did not mobilize the population, coercion of a seceded state might. While Upper South politicians tended to believe that the election of Lincoln, in and of itseIt: provided no • 44 Wooster (1962: 20~ (61). 213 • • Chart 4.0-Percentage ofConvention Sea" Held by Non~laveholders, 1860-1861 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 5 o .~ .AIb '~'b ~'b .A'b ~ ·blb .~'b 'b~ • ro'b~ ~' .ro4-~ fi'~ .~'Ii #"' :.Q,fI «:{>~ ~.$f A...e~ ",'b~ ~ ~ û'li ~'Ii ~d' ~~~ ,,0 A...e~/ rJ'~ ~o~ Source: Wooster (1962). *Secesslon was accompllshed ln Tennessee's leglslature, not in convention. actions prompted South Carolina to send a commissioner to Virginia in an effort • to convince Virginia ofthe need for concerted action against current and future Northem encroachments on Southem rights and safety, Virginia welcomed the commissioner (the former moderate Christopher Memmïnger), but ultimately refused to participate in the Southem Conference that South Carolina proposed, fearing that its goal was disunion.47 The two...party system remained much stronger in Virginia than in the Deep South. The state was one ofonly three states to gives its Electoral College votes to Constitutional Union candidate John Bell (who won bya narrow margin, getting 74,681 votes to Breckenridge's 74,323 votes). Douglas only received 16,290 votes, and Lincoln received a handful ofvotes~48 Acting on pressure from legislators, Govemor Letcher agreed to caU the legislature ioto special session on 7 January 1861. Among the legislature's first actions was the passage of a resolution opposing coercion.49 The state also promised that "if all efforts at redress failed, Virginia would go with the South,"so but it was not about to take the decision to secede lightly. Before Virginia would secede, every effort at peacefully resolving the dispute between the sections had to he made.. On 19 January 1861, the Virginia legislature passed 46 Craven (1953: l03). 47 Shanks (1934: 97-99). 41 Shanks (1934: ll7). 49 Shanks (1934: l44). • 50 Shanks (1934: l45)• 275 a law calling for a 4 February 1861 election for a convention that would meet • beginning 13 February 1861. Although proposed, the effort to allow the people to decide whether to hold the convention failed. However, the people were given . the option of deciding whether the decision of the convention should he submitted to the people for ratification. Unlike the convention election in South Carolina, in which opposition to secession was weak or absent, the convention election in Virginia was heavily contested because of POckets of enduring Unionism within the state. Unionism was so strong in the western counties of this state that they eventually seceded from Virginia and formed the state of West Virginia, which was, surprisingly, admitted as a slave state.S1 In the early February elections, the secessionists won only about 30 of the 152 seats in the convention. The question ofputting the decision ofthe convention to the people passed by 100,536 votes to 45,161 votes. On the same day that the states orthe Deep South were in Montgomery, Alabama fonning the Confederate States of America, the people ofVirginia made it clear that they would not he joining the Confederate states any time soon. Prior to Lincoln·s proclamation, Virginia's convention acted with caution. As long as the status quo was maintained, convention members saw no reason to secede. At the same time Virginia was preparing to hold a convention, it recommended that all of the states of the Union meet in order to fonnulate a compromise that would establish new terms for the Union, bring the seceded states back into the Union, and avert the possibility of war. Although the • SI Riccards (1997). 276 Crittendon Compromise had already failed, hopes were high that some sort of • compromise could be approved. The same day the seceded states of the Deep South met in Montgomery to form a new country and the same day the citizens ofVirginia voted for convention delegates, delegates from 21 of33 states met in Washington to save the Union. The recommendations of the Conference departed little from what Crittendon recommended.S2 Not surprisingly, Congress did not consider them. On 4 April 1861 (one month after Abraham Lincoln had taken office, and two months after the CSA was formed), Lewis Harvey, a pre...proclamation secessionist, moved that the convention submit an ordinance ofsecession to the people in the up...coming May elections. This motion was decisively defeated by a vote of90 to 45.53 After this defeat, secessionists were resigned to the fact that Virginia would not secede unless external events forced a revolution in this state's thinking, or unless the other Upper South states seceded-an event that may have compelled Virginia to leave the Union.54 On 10 April 1861, South Carolinian political e~te Langdon Cheves wrote that Virginia "will do nothing until there is declared war & she has no choice but 52 The Crittendon Compromise was a compromise measure proposed by Senator Crittendon of Tennessee. Ifsuccessful, the compromise would have added an unamendable amendment to the Constitution that would have reestablished the Missouri Compromise line, and that would have "prohibited" slavery above the line and "recognized [slavery] as existing" below the line. Congress did not approve the Compromise, and even ifit had, Lincoln wou[d not bave supponed the extension of slavery. The Crittendon Peace Resolutions cao be round in Commager (1949: 369-370). 53 Wooster (1962: 147); Shanks (1934: 190). • 54 Shanks (1934: 198)• 277 to he friend or enemy."ss On 15 April 1861 the prospect ofwar became a reality. • Three days after Confederate forces initiated the shelling of Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor, President Lincoln issued a proclamation that called up 75,000 troops from the state militias to quell the Southem insurrection. Before the proclamation, conservative Virginians could argue that a Republican administration could he endured by the slaveholding states of the South. The proclamation not only proved that remaining in the Union was inconsistent with the maintenance of slavery, but that remaining in the Union was inconsistent with a commitment to Southem rights, honor, and dignity, and that the UDion POsed a threat the very principles it was created to uphold. The precarious middle ground, which the Upper South and Border South states were content to occupy while the status quo was maintained, was no longer tenable. As delegate to the Virginia secession convention James Dorman noted, "issue presented is ofa figbt and the question simply is 'which side will you take?",S6 Virginia picked sides two days after the proclamation was issued: On 17 April 1861, Virginia's constituent convention voted to secede from the Union by a vote of 88 to 55. The convention's action, however, as mandated in the convention election more than two months eartier, would have to be ratified by a popular referendum. The transformation ofopinion on secession had changed so thoroughly that after the ordinance passed, a South Carolinian in Virginia wrote 5S Langdon Cheves to Charlotte McCord Cheves" 10 April 1861, The West Manuscripts, South Carolina Historical Society, Charleston, South Carolina. Emphasis in original. • 56 Crofts 0989: 337)• 278 that he did "not believe one thousand votes could be obtained in the state to • remain in the Union."S1 On 23 May 1861, the people ratified the convention's actions by a lopsided vote of 125,950 to 20,373.58 Ominously, opposition to secession was concentrated in the northwest counties ofthe state, a mountainous up-country region in which the institution ofslavery was not deeply entrenched. Even at this late date, secession was driven by interests and identity tied to the institution of slavery. The proximate cause of secession in Virginia was the grievance associated with the prospect of coercion in the Southem states; Virginia did not secede in order to provide protection to slavery. With the issuance of the proclamation, Southerners, even those who initially opPOsed secession, became convinced that Lincoln and bis Republican Party meant to wage war on the South. Virginia (and the rest of the Upper South) would not consent to this and decided to secede from the Union. Still, the Southem identity that they were trying to protect was inextricably linked to the institution of slavery. Arkansas Like Many states in the South, Arkansas experienced divisions within the state between moderates, who supported remaining in the Union, and radicals, who supported secession. During the 1850 crisis, despite a detennined set of actors who wished to see the state secede from the Union at this time, the 57 James. M. Schreckhise to unknown,20 April 1861, James. M. Schreckhise Papers, Manuscript Collection, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina- • 51 Wooster (1962: 149). 279 political leadership of Arkansas supported the Compromise.S9 Arkansas was • represented in the Nashville Convention, but not by a full, regularly elected delegation. During the 1860 presidential election, the voting population of Arkansas voted predominantly for the Southem Democrat, Breckenridge. He received 28,732 (or 53.2 percent) ofthe 54,053 votes cast. Bell received just over 20,000 votes, and Douglas received just over 5,000 votes. The state legislature of Arkansas met in regular session on la November 1860. Given the strong divisions within the state, this early meeting would not be translated into early secession. As elsewhere, upon the election of Lincoln, the state's slaveholding interests were quick to cali for secession, but the balance of power in the state was oot in the hands ofthe radical, slaveholding interests. For the majority ofthe state's population and POlitical actors, the election ofLincoln did not provide a sufficientjustification for secession. Still, the forces in favor of protecting Southem interests, if not through secession, were strong enough that on 22 December 1860, the state Rouse of Representatives passed a bill calling for a convention. After some balking, the Senate followed suit on 15 January 1861. The election for the convention was to be held on 18 February 1861 and the convention was to meet beginning 4 March 1861. The convention law passed by the Arkansas legislature allowed the citizeos of Arkansas to vote for or against holding a convention at the same time they elected delegates to il. This provision put a Unionist in the somewhat awkward position of "opposing the • S9 Woods (1987: 4849). 280 convention and advocating bis own election to it.",60 Notwithstanding this' • awkwardness, there was a strong desire on both sides to hold a convention ''to express the will of the people.,,61 Convention advocates won with a vote of 27,412 to 15,826. The vote for delegates was slightly closer: Unionist candidates received 23,626 votes, while secessionist candidates received 17,927 votes.62 On 4 March 1861, the Arkansas convention assembled to determine the state's path. In general, the convention was conservative, voting down the Hanly Plan, according to which the convention would pass an ordinance of secession and submit it to the people in referendum, by the comparatively close vote of35 to 39. Rather than attempting to thrust secession on the people ofthe state ooly to have them vote it up or down, the convention tried a different tack. Soon after the defeat of the Hanly Plan the convention passed a motion to determine "the sense ofthe people ofthe state onthe question of'cooperation' or 'secession.",63 The state was to hold a referendum on secession on 5 August 1861. Arkansans did not have to wait until August to decide the fate of their state and its relationship to the Union, however. Following the shelling of Sumter and Lincoln's issuance ofthe proclamation, the President ofthe Arkansas convention ordered the convention to reconvene on 6 May 1861. 60 Woods (1987: 122). 61 Wooster(l962: 157). 62. Rhodes (1953: 381-382); Wooster(1962: 157). • 63 Wooster(l962: 164)• 281 Opposition to coercion was stronger than loyalty to the Union; thus, on the • tirst day ofreconvening, the convention passed an ordinance of secession by a lop-sided vote of 65 to 5. Seeking unanimity, the President of the convention asked the opposition to reconsider their vote. Four of the five votes against secession decided to throw their support behind the move. With this, Arkansas became the second state from the Upper South to join the Confederacy. Tennessee: Unconventional Secession Over the course ofthe antebellum period, Tennessee acted like a typical Upper South state. This state could not condone Northem encroachment on Southem rights, but it would not adopt the radical standard of resistance. Members ofCongress from Tennessee tended to support most ofthe elements of the Compromise of 1850 and to oppose the radical factions in the Nashville Convention, desiring instead "that secession talk be ended and the compromise be accepted.,,64 Politicalleaders in Tennessee hoped that the sectional mistrust that plagued the Union since the introduction of.the Wilmot Proviso would subside; they were aware, however, that it probably would not.6S Tennessee was caught between North and South in its devotion to the Union, but the Union to which they were devoted was undergoing a number of fundamental transformations that would alterthe state's calculations. In the 1860 presidential election, Tennessee was one ofonly a handful of states in which the Constitutional Union Party won a plurality ofthe votes cast. 64 Corlew (1981: 273)• • 6S Corlew(l981: 272-273). 282 Ofthe 146,106 votes cast, 69,728 (or almost 48 percent) were cast for John BelL • Breckenridge was in a close second, with 65,097 votes, while Douglas won only Il,281 votes. Two-party competition was obviously a1ive and well in Tennessee. Nowhere in the Upper South was the path of secession as interesting and unorthodox as in Tennessee. Although there were great differences in timing, aImost every seceding state followed a fundamentally similar path: a convention bill was passed by the state legislature, elections were held, and the members of the convention voted, either before the shelling ofFort Sumter or after, to adopt an ordinance ofsecession from the Union. In Tennessee, the secession ordinance was passed, not in convention, but by the state legislature. On 7 January 1861, the Tennessee legislature convened in special session to determine the state's course of action. By this time, South Carolina had aiready seceded, and the Deep South states were poised to secede. Tennessee was in the typical Upper South position. Political actors in this state did not want to secede from the union over the Mere election of Lincoln, but Tennessee was not willing to condone the coercion of the Southem states that had aiready seceded. Recognizing thatthe rights ofthe South needed to be protected, and that sorne practical measures had to he taken to proteet them, on 19 January 1861, the Tennessee legislature passed an act calling for a convention ofthe people ofthe state. As in Arkansas, the law that was passed stipulated that the election of delegates to the convention would he accompanied by a referendum on the question ofwhether the convention should meet at alL The convention bill aIso • 283 stipulated that the convention's actions would he subject to the approval ofthe • people in a referendum. Unlike Arkansas, however, the people of Tennessee voted 69,387 to 57,978 against holding a convention during the February election. Although there appears to have been general opposition to holding a convention at this time, the decision not to do so was aided by the nearly unanimous opposition to it in the eastem portion ofthe state. The voting citizens ofTennessee cast 88,803 votes for Unionist candidates, while votes cast for secessionists numbered only 24,749. To say the least, the prospects for secession in Tennessee appeared bleak. It was not until Fort Sumter was fired on and the issuance of Lincoln's Proclamation that popular opinion in Tennessee shifted from conditional unionism to immediate secessionism. Indeed, the shift was so swift and thorough that the state rejected the convention as the means by which to accomplish secession. After receiving Lincoln's Proclamation calling up state militias, the Govemor ofTennessee sent a formalletter refusing to allow the state's militia to coerce South Carolina and declared that the state legislature would reconvene on 25 April 1861 .. Once in session, the legislature proceeded in secret. On 6 May 1861, in secret session, the legislature passed an ordinance ofsecession, subJect to ratification by the citizens ofTennessee in a June 8 referendum. On May 7, the legislature approved a military alliance with the Confederate States of Americ~ essentially securing secession prior to the people's ratification ofit.. While the citizens of eastern Tennessee continued their opposition to • secession, the middle and western section of Tennessee came out strongly for 284 Platform. North Carolinians believed that the compromise was not perfect, but t that itwas sufficient forNorth Carolina to remain inthe Union.70 or the 96,712 votes cast in the presidentiaL election of 1860, John C. Breckenridge won a majority ofthem, with 48,846 (or 50.5 percent ofthe vote). John Bell came in second place, with 45,129 votes, and Douglas won only 2,737 votes. Long after the states of the Deep South had seceded, or taken the necessary steps to secede, North Carolina only managed to make a first attempt at secession. On 29 January 1861, the state legislature called for a convention election to he held on 28 February 1861. The convention law contained provisions similar to the laws passed by Arkansas and Tennessee. In the election, the people would elect members of the convention while deciding whether the convention should be held at all. The law also provided that anything decided by the convention had to he submitted to the people for ratification. Thanks to the initial optimism surrounding the Washington Peace Conference, the people voted narrowly against holding a convention, with 47,323 against the convention and 46,672 for (a difference of merely 651 votes out ofmore than 90,000 votes). 71 The supertluous election for delegates sawa decided victory for Unionist candidates. According to Joseph Sitterson, "Ofthe one hundred and twenty delegates chosen, forty-two were secessionists, twenty- 10 SÎtterson (1939: 74). • 71 Potter(1976: 509)• 286 eight conditional Unionists, and fifty unconditional UnionistS.,,72 As in other • states, citizens ofregions in North Carolina with the highest proportion ofslaves were more likely thanothers to vote for delegates supporting secession, but these counties were still evenly divided on the question.73 Unionist victories in the UpPer South, MOSt notabiy in Virginia, undoubtedly influenced actions in North Carolina. Sitterson claimed, "The election of a Union majority to the Virginia Convention strengthened Union influence, for Many were convinced that the action of Virginia would determine the course to he followed by North Carolina.,,74 Both states appear to have assumed that there was a way to fmd new tenns in the Union. In the aftermath of Fort Sumter and Lincoln's Proclamation, not to mention the failure of Congress to take up the proposais of the Washington Peace Conference, the govemor ofNorth Carolina, incredulous at the request for troops to put down the Southem rebellion, called the state legislature ioto sPecial session beginning May 1. Making bis intention to have North Carolina side with the Confederacy ciear, this request was accompanied by a cali to capture federaI forts and armories within the state. Because external events radicaUy altered the relationship between North and South and made coercion a virtual certainty, when the Iegislature conv~ned on 1 May 1861, it moved quic1dy to pass a bill to caU a convention of the people. Unlike their fellow Southemers in Tennessee, 72 Sitterson (1939: 223). 73 Sîtterson (1939). • 74 Sitterson (1939: 222)• 287 North Carolinians relt that the state convention was the proper forum in which • secession should occur. Attempts to amend the convention bill to require a ratification ofthe convention's decision by the people failed. The convention bill passed unanimously in the Rouse; there were only three dissenters in the Senate, and this mild dissent seemed to have been based upon a desire to submit the decision to the people, not upon opposition to secession.75 The convention election was held on 13 May 1861, and the convention assembled 20 May 1861. In both, secession triumphed. Given the altered political context after the shelling and Lincoln's proclamation, political divisions within the state no longer centered on secessionism versus unionism; unionism had perished. Instead, division centered on the character ofthe action North Carolina was preparing to take. At issue was whether there was a right ofsecession or whether secession should he considered revolution (the pre..political right ofthe politically wronged). The revolutionists were not willing to concede that secession was constitutional and the secessionists did not believe the course of action they intended to follow was revolution. Although commonly referred to as revolution in the South, supporters of secession believed there was a right to secede implicit in the constitution, meaning that it was not, strictly speaking, revolution. Ultimately, North Carolina decided against "revolution" and instead seceded from the Union according to the implicit principles ofthe constitution: it rescinded the state's ratification of the Constitution ofthe United States. • 7S Wooster(1962: 195). 288 This tier ofstates held in common the view that the election ofLincoln did • not in itself provide justification for secession. They were conservative and willing to wait until the Lincoln administration committed an overt act against Southem interests before acting. Every state in this tier, however, was united behind a refusal to consent to the coercion ofthe seceded states. They would not secede while there was no need to take sides. Once the choice was changed from the option of either unionism or secessionism to fighting against the North or against the South, however, the choice this group ofstates felt they had to malee was obvious, and they acted quickly. South Carolina had been right all along: any attempt to coerce a seceded state would dissolve the Union. The Non-Seeeders: Border South States LookNorth The states of the Deep South had an interest in maintaining slavery that was so profound that the Mere election ofa president who might pose a threat the institution (by not consenting to its expansion, for example) justified secession. In the Upper South, the issue was not slaveryper se, but with (or against) wbom the states would fight once the simmering sectional conflict boiled over. The Border South had neither the same interest in slavery as the Deep South nor the same connection to the Deep South that the Upper South had. Its cultural .compass pointed North rather than South in the conflict between the sections. Most importantly, slavery was not as indispensable an institution in this part of the South as it was in the Deep South and in parts of the Upper South.'6 Furthennore, the industriaL capacity ofthe Border South states was comparable • 16 Dumond (1931). 289 to that of the Old Northwest, rather than the South (See Chart 4.1). The • economies ofthe Border South. were more diversified than the Upper South and the Deep South. The Border South produced more industrial goods than the states of the Deep South, which were primarily agricultural. In addition, commercial ties to the North were stronger in the Upper South simply by virtue of geography. The following section brief1y examines the path followed by the non..seceding states ofthe South in the secession winter and spring of1860-61. Missouri From the beginning, Missouri was a battleground over which (and in which) the pro- and anti-slavery forces fought. Missouri's application for admission into the Union as a slave state precipitated one of the early conflicts over slavery in the Union. This conflict led to the establishment of the balance rule according to which slave state and free states were admitted to the Union in pairs in order to maintain equal representation of each section ioto the Senate, which would allow each section to have veto over policies unfriendly to its interests.77 The state played no part in South Carolina's earHer confrontations with the Union. Missouri was the ooly state in which a plurality ofthe electorate voted for Douglas, which under the winner..take-all mIes ofthe American electoral system gave Douglas this state's entire slate of Electoral College votes. (Although Lincoln won the plurality ofthe vote inNew Jersey, New Jersey gave a portion of its Presidential Electors to Douglas.) Of the 165,518 votes cast in the 1860 • n Weingast (1998). 290 • • Table 4.1-Per Capita Value ofManufactured Goods Produced in 1810 (in dollars) 250 200 150 100 50 o ~~#~#~~##~~~~~~#$~~#$#~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~_.~~~~~~~~~~~~#~~~~#~~~~~#~&#~&~~-~~ &~ ~..:j _" ~ votes. The actions ofMissouri's state legislature in the face ofLincoln's election demonstrate the state's conservatism. On 31 December 1860, the radical controlled state legislature met. Given the significance ofthe recent election, the legislature's highest priority was determining an appropriate course of action. Deep South radicalism and Upper and Border South conservatism certainly informed the decision that was about to be made by the Missouri legislature. On 21 January 1861, the govemor ofMissouri signed a bill into law calling for 18 February 1861 electioos for a convention that would meet beginning 28 February 1861. The bill stipulated that the people of Missouri approve any movement made by the convention ina refereodum. Radicals may have held sway in the legislature, but radicalism did oot dominate the state.. Of the approximately 140,000 votes cast for convention delegates, ooly 30,000 of them went to radical candidates. The unionist votes were split between unconditiooal unionists, who would never have supported secession, and conditional unionists, who might have thrown their support behind secession if circumstances warranted. According to one estimate, conditional_ unionism dominated the state.78 Given this~ Missouri was not about • 78 Wooster (1962: 226)• 291 to he compelled to secede from the Union by the election of Lincoln or by the • secession ofDeep South states. What remained to he seen was whether Missouri would consent to the coercion ofthe seceded states ofthe South. The convention passed a number of resolutions (drawn up by the committee on federal relations) that affirmed Missouri's conservative position. They stated that Missouri had no cause to secede from the Union, that the conflict between the sections ought to be solved according to the principles outlined in the Crittendon Compromise, and that any attempt at coercion would result in civil war. On the last point, they were careful not to say whether the state would fight should hostilities arise.79 An effort by a radical in the convention to promise Missouri to the South was soundly defeated.8o After adopting these resolutions, the convention adjou..~ed, agreeing to meet again in December, but subject to recall, should events require it. Unlike states ofthe Upper South, Lincoln's proclamation did not strengilien secessionist , support; nor did it lead to the immediate recall ofthe convention. The convention finally met again on 25 July 1861, but by this time the secessionists had withdrawn from il, leaving it more firmly in the hands ofUnionists than before. Members voted to depose a number ofelected officiais in the state and replace them with those more favorable to the Union. While pro-union forces were placed in govemmental positions, a pro-southem government 0Perated inexile in the Confederacy for the duration ofthe war. Like other Border States, Missouri 79 Ryle (1931: 221). • 80 Wooster (1962: 233). 292 existed hetween the extremes ofeach section. For these states, the war was not • only a savage conflict between the sections, but also a conflict that took place among the citizens ofthe state. Kentucky Henry Clay, the autbor of the Compromise of 1850, was frOID Kentucky. With Clay, Kentuckians supported the Compromise of 1850.81 Straddling North and South, Kentucky relt the interests ofboth slavery and free labor. Prior to the commencement of the War Between the States, Abraham Lincoln is supposed to have said that, while he hoped to have God on bis side, he must have Kentucky. No state that remained in the Union was more evenly divided between North and South than Kentucky. Birthplace of both American Presidents, Abraham Lincoln and Jefferson Davis, and bordered by three slave states and three free states, Kentucky relt the conflict between North and South in a way that could not he comprehended by states that sat at the extremes of either side ofthe Mason-Dixon line. In the 1860 presidential election, Kentucky was one ofonly three states in which Constitutional Union candidate John Bell won a plurality ofthe votes cast. Ofthe 146,216 votes cast inKentucky, 66,051 votes (or 45 percent) were cast for Bell. Douglas was in second place, with 53,163 votes, while Breckenridge eamed a somewhat surprising third place with 25,638 votes. Kentucky's Legislature met on 17 January 1861, after Many of the Deep South states bad seceded,- and 20 March 1861, after Lincoln was inaugurated. • 8t Clark(l960: 308). 293 Ultimately, Kentucky never called a state convention to consider secession. • Although Lincoln's proclamation ultimately precipitated secession in the states of the Upper South, the calling up oftroops did not galvanize secessionists in Kentucky. In this state, the conflict was not between secessionists and unionists, but between those who desired that Kentucky remain neutral and those who thought Kentucky should choose sides. Wooster noted that "the majority ofthe former [pro-neutralists] were unionists," and "the majority of the latter [anti- neutralists], secessionists."S2 After the legislature convened, it adopted neutrality. For bis part, Lincoln facilitated the maintenance of neutrality by promising to refrain from invading or occupying the st~te while it remained neutraL The strategy worked, and as the war progressed Kentucky's unionism also progressed. Maryland In the 1860 presidential election, Maryland's presidential electors went for John C. Breckenridge, but a majority of the votes were cast for conservative candidates Bell and Douglas. Of the 92,502 votes cast, 42,482 (or 46 percent) were for Breckenridge; Bell received 41,760 votes, Douglas received 5,966 votes, and Lincoln received 2,294 votes. Maryland was unique among the Border South states, ifooly in regards to the geographical positions of the state and the capital of the United States. 82 Wooster (1962: 216-217). Wooster (1962) felt that the pro and con position on neutrality was analogous to unionism and secessionism. McPherson (1988: 294) noted~ "[I]n theory~ neutrality was Iittle different from secession-'~ The neutralist position was, liIee secession, based upon the proposition ofstate sovereignty. Further, in practice, the Confederates were given a considerable about ofroom to operate within the state ofKentucky, bath in terms ofrecruiting soldiers for the • confederate cause and in terms offimneling trade ta the Confederate States through its territory. 294 Maryland's future was inextricably intertwined with the future of Virginia. If • Maryland's position on secession could be summarized, it was simply this: "Wait for Virginia.,,83 The prospect ofthis state's secession put the Union in a peculiar position: If Virginia and Maryland left the union, Washington, OC would be surrounded by Confederate territory. Obviously, both states could not he permitted to secede from the Union. In the immediate aftermath of secession in the Deep South, Maryland's unionist govemor, Thomas Hicks, stubbomly refused to can the legislature ioto session. After Sumter and the Proclamation, however, he relented. Consequently, the legislature of Maryland met on 26 April 1861. On the same day that the legislature met, however, federaI forces initiated their occupation of the state. Under these circumstances, it was inexpedient and unadvisable for the legislature to consider calling a convention. Occupation did not, however, prevent legislators from initiating a failed movement to limit the power of the unionist govemor of the state.84 Both Houses of the legislature passed resolutions advocating Northem recognition of the Confederacy and decrying the military occupation ofthe state. Because keeping this state in the Union was central to maintaining and protecting the federaI capital, Maryland had to remain in the Union regardless of the preferences of its citizens. Lawrence Denton claimed that the "secession movement in Maryland probably would have been successful ifMarylanders had 113 Denton (1995: 60)• • 295 been free to choose, because a majority of her people favored the South.,,85 Or, • as another noted, the "state ofMaryland was kept in the Union, largely because the people who wanted to take itoutofthe Union were thrown into jaiL,,86 Given the path followed by the rest of the Border South, it seems more likely that Maryland would have decided to remain inthe Union. (Eventually, the people of Maryland did choose the Union, but this choice was constrained by the knowledge that choosing otherwise might result in imprisonment.) Delaware Suspicion in Delaware of ideas and actions originating in South Carolina had an extensive history. To Delaware, the South Carolinian doctrine of nullification was dangerous. Unlike most ofthe other slave states, Delaware did not even pay lip service to anti-tariff sentiment during the nullification crisis. Manufacturlng was an increasingly important element in the American economy, and Delaware was part ofthis larger trend. Thus, the principle ofprotection was not inimical to the interests of this state.87 In the crisis of 1850, Delaware supported the Compromise and refused to attend the Nashville Convention.ss In the 1860 presidential election, Breckenridge won a plurality, receiving 7,337 ofthe 16,039 votes cast; Bell came in second, with 3,864 votes; Lincoln 84 There were extra-Iegislative efforts of the sort seen in Texas to force the holding of a convention, but these efforts ceased once it became evident that the govemor would have ta call a convention ofthe people. as Denton (1995: 113). 86 Catton (1982: 33). 17 Scharf(l888: 317)• • 81 Potter(l976: 104). 296 came in third, with 3, 815 votes, while Douglas eamed a surprising fourth place • with 1,023 votes. While Delaware was a border state and a slave state, the certainty with which the political leaders of Delaware confronted the secession crisis contradicts what we have come to expect from the slave states-especially those whose Electoral CoUege votes went to Breckenridge. When Delaware's legislature convened on 1 January 1861, it passed a motion expressing "unqualified disapproval" ofsecession as a remedy to the grievances which the South confronted.89 Perhaps the best demonstration of its position as a Border South state was its enthusiasm for the failed (and largely ignored) Washington Peace Conference: Delaware sent a full slate ofdelegates to this failed attempt at saving what remained ofthe Umon and bringing the seceded states back into the Umon.90 When a commissioner from the seceded state of Georgia spoke in Delaware's legislature and asked the state to join the Confederate States of America, the legislature responded by passing a resolution asking Georgia to reconsider its actions.91 After the legislature adjoumed, not even Lincoln's proclamation comPeUed the govemor to ask it to reconvene. As Wooster noted, 89 Wooster(l962: 254). 90 The Washington Peace Conference was an effort to save the Union initiated by Virginia. The Conference recommended a series of constitutional amendments that were virtually identical to those recommended brCrittendon. Congress failed to act ofthese recommendatioos. • 91 Wooster(l962: 255)• 297 strategie context in which the Upper South. states seceded was markedly different • from the context in which the Deep South states seceded. In both cases, however, South Carolina's actions were crucial. Without this state's action, the dream ofa Southem Confederacy would never have become a reality. This is, in fact, the waythe state saw itself(See figure 4.1-the secession banner).93 The states ofthe Deep South did not need guns trained in one direction or another order to support secession. In fact, secession in these states occurred shortly after the commander-in-chiefof the armed forces promised them that no force would he used. Political actors within these states found the justification for secession in the significance ofthe election of Lincoln. For the Upper South seceders, the Mere fact of Lincoln's election did not provide justification for secession. Once Lincoln revealed he was willing to coerce a seceded state, the states ofthe Upper South were prepared to choose sides in the conflict. The divisions that the Upper South experienced on the question ofunion versus secession were even more pronounced in the Border South; this group of states was unwilling to secede upon the election ofLincoln, and while there was some outrage at the anticipated coercion ofthe seceded states, that outrage did not translate iuto a grievance level sufficient to justify secession. Secession (or non-secession) occurred in each group for very different reasons. In one, it was the threat to slavery; in another, it was the threat ofwar. 93 The secession banner hung in Institute Hall in Charleston when the ordinance ofsecession was adopted. It now bangs in the South Carolina Historical Society. The image orthe Banner is taken from C. Patton Hash's (1994) article on the banner in the Carologue. The representation orthe Southem Republic is built from 15 blocks. This iIlustrates the confidence that South Carolinians • had thattheirefforts would compel the entire slave Southto secede• 299 :l ".. -' "~!!,--:' .. .. \ ~~C4~ ~ ~ ~t·~)D4 .... :. ._~ '(1)r~'- ~ 't~ .. _.. ' ..: -~-' ~.a-_...... ~-----:-a~ .:f .' ,. :~ .. ' ...... .. , .. ,:;-, .:;~.. -.. :'": :.. .. :- , ... ~j#~"; ...... :- .... uree: Rash (1994: 13) For the Border South, neither the threat to slavery nor the threat of war was • enough to push them out ofthe Union. The outcome ofthis was multi·faceted: There was a war that resulted in the death ofover 600,000 Americans, and four million Americans who were in bondage were given a freedom that was not fonnalized untillate into the twentieth century. The United States bad previously been pulled in different directions, one section favoring agriculture and a limited state, the other section favoring industry and an activist state; the outcome ofthe Civil War was a decided victory for free labor, industrialism, and an activist state. It was this transformation that bas led observers to cali the Civil War the second American Revolution.94 94. Moore (1966); Greenberg (1916)- • 300 • Conelusion Summing Up and Looking Abead Between the formation ofthe American Union and the beginning of the Civil War, the American state was transfonned from being a limited state whose institutional capacity was restricted by a variety of formal and informai mechanisms to a consolidated state controlled by a single section and a single political party. This transfonnation was marked by a change in the political economy of the nation. This second American Revolution signaled a new dominance ofan industrial economy over the older agricultural economy, ofthe North overthe South, and offree labor overslave labor. In this dissertation, l have constructed, flIst ofall, an account ofhow the institutional design of the state contributes to the likelihood of secession. A design that provides constituent UDÎts with a high level of institutional capacity and autonomy, and that coniers separate constitutional sovereign status to constituent units, is more prone to secession than a design in which the center maintains a monopoly on constitutional authority and where the location of sovereignty is relatively uncontested. Simply pu~ the costs of secession are lowered when state institutions are in place and carry over to the new state after secession. AlI of these conditions were present in the pre-Civil War American. • state(s). The federal state was so weak, it is hardly an exaggeration to claim that, 301 during the antebeUum period, the most significant function of the federaI • govemment to the separate states ofthe Union was assuring the delivery ofthe mail. However, 1 have aIso incorporated other factors into an explanatory framework that treat the decision to secede, the timing of the decision, and the sequence by which secession w~ accomplished. 1 have focused on five factors: grievance, leadership, boundaries, the institutionaI design of the state,. and sequence. First, there must he a strong grievance against which secessionist sentiment can be mobilized. The development ofthe framework and the analysis of the case illustrate that a threat to the literai survivaI ofa discrete group will provide a sufficiently strong grievance, but less serious threats May he able to induce secession as weiL For example, in the late antebellum United States, Southem secessionist leadership linked the Mere election of the president to the litera! survival ofSouthemers. According to their worldview, Lincoln's election meant abolition, and abolition meant race war. Second, leadership is required to mobilize secessionist sentiment against the grievance. A well-placed and unchallenged politicalleadership committed to the alteration ofthe territorial status quo will facilitate secession. Third, secession is more likely to occur along established and legitimate boundaries, such as those separating constituent or administrative units in federaI states. These boundaries help to establish "movement networks" within distinct, territorially-bounded populations. They May aIso reinforce existing divisions • between sections ofa political union. AU ofthese factors May work to make the 302 boundaries of these political units the boundaries of grievance as weIL Thus, • secession will tend to occuralong these boundaries. The institutional design ofthe state is the fourth factor that can contribute to (or prevent) secession. Where there is a sufficiently strong grievance, and dim prospects for a resolution of the grievance, federai states are more prone to secessionist dismemberment than unitary states. The division of sovereignty between the center and constituent units that is unique to the federai state allows the federal state's constituent units to establish and invoke the right ofsecession against the center. Finally, the framework 1have developed examines the sequence by whicll secession occurs. Secession need not occur simultaneously. Nor does the eventual success of a secession movement mean that secession needs to he the detennmed poliey of an entire aggrieved population. My framework explains how secession can he forced upon a region or a group by the actions of a comparatively small sub-set of that group. Groups willing to risk leading off a movement for secession May be able to force the band ofthe soft-secessionists those willing to secede under sorne circumstances, but unwilling to lead.. Furthermore, subsequent confrontations between the seceded unit and the center May draw out secessionist support among groups originally unwilling to secede. That these confrontations cao. be precipitated by actions taken by the initial seceders gives them significant control over events, potentially aIlowing them to force secession elsewhere• • 303 1have examined the secession ofSouth Carolina and the other states ofthe • slave South through this analytical framework. 1 have attempted to account for the decision of South Carolina to secede, the timing of that decision, and the sequence by which secession was accomplished. A strong grievance level explains the decision to pursue remedial action, but the decision to pursue secession rather than another solution is explained by the institutional design of the state. This design accounts for the long history of state challenges to central state authority, and the gradual development of a belief in the right to secede. Thus, limited central state functionality combined with expansive constituent state functionality explains the long tradition of challenging central state authority and maintaining limited government. Federalism in the United States meant that the locus ofsovereignty would be contested. States could, and often did, claim that they were sovereign and that the Union was a mere compact between the states to be adhered to or abandoned as circumstances merited. Moreover, the very practice offederalism meant that political withdrawal from the central state could occur with minimal disruption. 1 concentrated on South Carolina's challenge to central state authority in two central moments ofchoice prior to the successful movement for secession in South Carolina: the nullification crisis of1832-33 and the tirst secession crisis of 1850-52. Through these moments, South Carolina developed and attempted to ·implement its radical. program to proteet and maintain states' rights and to limit the power and the extentofthe federal govemment's authority. • 304 Although some politicalleaders during the tirst crisis advocated secession, • the issue in 1832-33 was not really secession, but rather state interposition. Because South Carolina felt it was the victim of the federal govemment's protective tarif! policies that resulted in depressed intemational trade, higher prices on goods required by South Carolinians, and the discriminatory redistribution of federaI monies, and because the political actors of the state believed that the foundation of federaI tarif! policies was a federaI government overstepping its established constitutionaI authority, the state ofSouth Carolina attempted to nullify the law that established the tariff: Better to challenge the center over tariffs, an issue on which South Carolinians hoped they could fmd allies in both sections of the UDion, South Carolinians reasoned, than over the much more contentious issue ofslavery. South Carolina's victory in getting tarif! rates reduced came at a cost: states of the North and South widely regarded South Carolina as excessively radical and desiring ofthe destruction of the Union. South Carolinians realized they could not necessarily count on the other states of the South to c00Perate with them in a confrontation with the center. The nullification crisis was followed by years of simmering contlict between the center and South Carolina. Sectional contlict did not bail over, however, until the crisis over the territories acquired from Mexico. At issue was whether these new American territories would be open to slavery. While compromise measures were being debated and passed in the center, the South-significantly, not the whole South-met in • 30S be done. South Carolina's efforts at bringing about true cooperative secession • failed early eno.ugh in the movement that the state recognized that it could not rely on the other states ofthe South to act in cooperation with it. With Lincoln's victory-made possible by demographic changes inthe Umon that contributed to relative decline in the power ofthe South-8outh Carolina, uniquely situated to perceive a strong level ofgrievance and to act early, followed a course ofaction that assured the unilateral secession of the state. Though risky, the action followed by South Carolina was strategically sound: South Carolinian and other Southem elites believed unilateral secession was the only way to guarantee the creation ofa Southem, slaveholding Confederacy. Demonstrating the soundness of this logic, South Carolina's unilateral action was soon followed by the unilateral secession ofthe other states ofthe Deep South. The timing of secession among the states ofthe Deep South indicates that these states seceded for reasons that were qualitatively similar to the reasons behind South Carolina's secession; the timing of secession in the Upper South indicates that these states seceded for different reasons. The threat to slavery posed by Lincoln'selection, combined with South Carolina's willingness to initiate the movement, determined the path followed by the Deep South; the Upper South would not secede to protect slavery, but would secede once the likelihood of war between North and South was demonstrated.. In each case, secession was determined by a grievance, but each case had different grievances that detennined secession.. The states ofthe Border South never felt a grievance • strong enough to warrant secession; thus, theynever seceded. 307 The construction of an issue that could justify secession explains the • timing ofsecession by the political elite of South Carolina. That issue was the election of a Republican president. Once Lincoln bad been elected, South Carolinians merely bad to fulfill the promise they made: to secede fust and alone. Thanks to the impending threat of war following the sbeUing of Fort Sumter and Lincoln's proclamation calling up troops to quell the Southem rebellion, the states of the Upper South followed suit and seceded from the Union, though the logic of secession was different in these states than in the states of the Deep South. The Border South states never seceded, despite the threat ofwar and the perceived threat to slavery. In this dissertation, therefore, 1 have explained the decision to secede, the timing of that decision, and the sequence by which secession was accomplished in the South following the election ofLincoln. The factors that 1 bave incorporated into my framework allow comparison and analysis of other cases of attempted (or actual) secession. To conclude, let me use the arguments and results ofthis research to brietly consider two other cases ofsecessionist movements inQuebec and Scotland and Wales. In Canada, the institutional design of the state bas influenced the development and expression ofsecessionist sentiment in the province ofQuebec. A compact theory of govemment forros part ofthe justification for secession in Quebec, although the normative justification for secession bas shifted from secession as astate's right to secessionjustified by the principle ofnational self- • 308 detennination? Like the states of the antebellum American South, the Quebec • state today bas relatively a high degree of institutional capacity, giving it the ability to secede ,vith minimal disruption. Events in Quebec imply that its citizens and its political leaders believe that there is a right to secession. Furthermore, there is a legitimate leadership in place, at both the provincial and federal levels, who are firmly committed to secession. This leadership, however, is challenged by a federalist..nationalist alternative at every leveL As long as this condition is maintained-that is, while there are persistent divisions among Quebec elites-secession will continue to be clifficult to accomplish. With institutional structures in place that make secession feasible, the most important missing element in the quest for secession in Quebec is a grievance strong enough to mobilize a sufficient level of secessionist support. Such a grievance must be serious enough to convince a clear majority (possibly a super-majority) of Quebeckers to support secession via a referendum. Despite the razor-thîn margin of victory by the federalist forces in the 1995 referendum on secession, secessionist forces in Quebec seem to be unable to gamer the support ofeven a simple majority of Quebeckers. The case of Quebec proves the point made earlier in this dissertation: when local autonomy is provided by the federal state, secession is more unlikely. As long as the federal govemment tries to accommodate Quebec by helping it to maintain its cultural and linguistic identity, secessionism will he unsuccessfuL Ooly once the population ofQuebec perceives a sufficiently high. grievance level will secession he possible. l argued • 2 Meadwell (1999). 309 earlier that nothing animates secession like a threat to survival. While the • decimation of the French language will, most likely, not endanger the life of even one individual, it is the most essential element ofQuebec cultural identity. A threat to this institution May convince a clear majority of Quebeckers that secession is necessary. Until such time that a strong enough grievance is developed, the threat of secession will continue to be used as a negotiating tool to wrest concessions from the center. Unlike the Southem states ofthe Union, Quebec is a single province; thus my discussion of sequencing in secession May not apply-at the very least, it will not apply in the same way it did in the South. However, there may he something to be gained by examining the potential for clashes among the hard Une secessionists ofQuebec and the federaI govemment (and the influence such a conflict could have in brining about sequential exit). Were a small, secessionist subsection ofQuebec's population to provoke a confrontation with Ottawa soft secessionists could come out in support of the radicals. Thus, sequencing May still play a role in the success or failure ofsecession in Quebec, but that role will he markedly different in Quebec than it was in the slave states of the United States. As suggested earlier, this projectcao also provide insight into the potential for secession in Great Britain. Of particular import are the institutional and constitutional changes that recently took place in Scotland and Wales. The devolution ofsorne political authority to local parliaments ~ Scotland and Wales • signals a significant alteration in the institutional design ofthe British state. This 310 state May not be federal, but neither is it wholly unitary. Granting limited • autonomy to the two regions through their local parliaments May he a first step in the development ofsubstantial state institutional capacity at the regionallevel in Scotland and Wales. Ifthis institutional capacity grows over time, it will malee it easier for secession to he accomplished, should there ever be a grievance strong enough to animate support for secession among the population. Ironically, the same institutional innovations that are intended to maintain the territorial integrity ofGreat Britain May help to dissolve it along national boundaries. While not unchallenged, there are secessionist activists in place in both Scotland and Wales in local, national, and supranational political institutions. Those advocating outright independence have significant, but not overwhelming, support, especially in Scotland. The boundaries of Scotland and Wales are currently finnly established; ifthe movement for secession matures, however, we May begin to hear about partition among the unionists in these regions. What is lacking in these two regions is a strong grievance that could animate secessionist sentiment. (It is difficult to see how granting more local autonomy to Scotland and Wales could bring about a rise in secessionist sentiment, and in the absence of a strong grievance, it MOst certainly will not.) However, should a future govemment attemptto limit orremove that autonomy, and ifsuch limitations can he framed in a way that make them look like a threat to Scotland's or Wales's cultural survival, then a recentralizing movement could provide a grievance strong enough. to bring about secession, especially now that each region bas • representative institutions in place. Like Quebec, sequencing May not play as 311 important a role in Great Britain as it did inthe Southem United States; however, • it May be possible for secessionist groups to precipitate a conflict with the center that would increase support for secession among the populace. As in the Southem United States, the successful secession of one unit might have the effectofstrengthening the resoLve orthose in another to pursue secession.) Thanks to the persistence of the threat of secession in the current international system and the violence that so often accompanies the threat and the act, secession remains an important subject of political research. This dissertation bas attempted to fill in a number ofgaps in our understanding ofthe process and dynamic of secession. 1 have accomplished this task through an analysis of an under-studied, but historically important, case of secession. Despite the efforts of this dissertation, there is still a great deal of work to be done on the causes ofsecession. l have only sought ta provide a framework for analyzing secession and to explore its usefulness in a single case. The results, l beLieve, are promising. The case-specifie analysis of the American South is persuasive and, at the same time, bas generated novel insight into the process of secession wherever (and whenever) it might occur. l The Uimitation effect" described here is much different fram the "bandwagon effect" that took place in the South• • 312 • Bibliography Primary Sources Manuseripts Department, Perkins Library, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina Robert Bamwell Rhett Papers Nathaniel Beverley Tucker Papers James Henry Hammond Papers Wade Hampton Papers Alfred Huger Papers Thomas Ellison Keitt Papers George McDuffie Papers James L. Orr Papers Armistead Burt Papers Richard Singleton Papers William D. Williams Papers H.W. DeSaussure Harry L and Mary K. Dalton Collection Ellison Capers Papers Francis W. 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