Expectant Immediatism: The South Carolina Secession Movement, 1859-1861

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Authors Harvey, Sean Parulian

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Table of Contents

Introduction: A Reputation for Disunion ...... 1

Part I: To Sow the Seeds of Disunion: Christopher Memminger’s Mission to Virginia ...... 10

Part II: The Ties that Bind: The Association of 1860, Circular Letters and Fort Sumter ...... 25

Conclusion: Expectations Fulfilled ...... 36

Bibliography ...... 38

Introduction: A Reputation for Disunion

In the fall of 1860, South Carolinians thought they were living in precarious times. A group of concerned citizens, ever‐fearful of the growing power of the Republican Party, met in the waterfront town of Charleston, South Carolina. Wary of the imminent Republican ascendancy which would lead to the installment of the dreaded “Seward Platform,” these denizens of the Palmetto state eagerly sought any way to avert the potentially disastrous anti‐slavery effects of a GOP administration.1 In order to combat the menace to slavery that Lincoln and his cronies presented, these common citizens banded together to voice their displeasure and to devise methods to thwart the incoming administration. The device by which these men decided to combat the Republican Party was an organization that they dubbed the “1860 Association,” whose primary stated goal was: “to conduct a correspondence with leading men in the South, and by interchange of information and views prepare the slave states to meet the impending crisis.”2 This association, instead of banding together to effect political change by persuading voters, was preparing for war and openly advocated for disunion.

To those familiar with the narrative surrounding South Carolina in the antebellum era, groups such as the “1860 Association” fit the prototypical conception of South Carolina as the paragon of disunionist sentiment. From the days when fiery Southern ideologue John C. Calhoun figuratively taunted the commander‐in‐chief over the tariff issue, South Carolina was viewed as the leader of the political fringe. South Carolina was filled with calculating characters eager to sever the ties with the federal government and concoct schemes and theories to justify a political and legal separation from the rest of the country. Due to the highly‐visible and salient rhetoric of people such as Calhoun,by 1859 the

Palmetto State cultivated a reputation for being precipitate, rash, and hot‐headed.

1 Steven A. Channing, Crisis of Fear: Secession in South Carolina, (New York: WW North and CO, 1974), 95. 2 Robert N. Gourdin, as excerpted from John G. Nicholay and John G. Hay, Abraham Lincoln: A History, (New York: The Century Co, 1914), 305.

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This radical image had its primary origins in the Nullification Crisis of 1832, in which South

Carolina boldly faced down the federal government. Emboldened by the rhetoric of John C. Calhoun, the South Carolina legislature declared a symbolically‐reduced tariff null and void within their state boundaries. South Carolina was abandoned by the rest of the South to face down the irascible Andrew

Jackson. The dearth of support from the rest of the South, coupled with the pressure from Washington caused South Carolina to ultimately retreat from its position. The nullifiers’ stance was ultimately untenable, so they decided to recede from its extreme rhetoric and remain within the Union. Even though the nullifiers ultimately receded from their position out of anxiety and a lack of Southern empathy, the dominant political view highlighted South Carolina’s propensity towards disunion. South

Carolina tentatively advocated secession several other times in the antebellum years and their proclivity towards disunion would eventually culminate in the Palmetto State’s “Ordinance of Secession” on

December 20, 1860. This decree formally dissolved any ties between the state of South Carolina and the federal government and was issued before any other Southern state even considered the secession.

According to the historiography, South Carolina’s rapid secession process symbolized the rashness and irrationality that dominated the political machinations of the Palmetto state. To the analysts that ascribe a reputation of unbridled disunion upon South Carolina, the narrative of disunion begins and ends in South Carolina. It was not a question of if but how South Carolina would secede. In this historiographical tradition, the reputation of South Carolina as a petulant disunionist preceded itself.

Whether this reputation is warranted or not, is a matter that has been largely ignored by historians. On the surface, Robert N. Gourdin and his coterie of disunionists appear to fit into the typical mold of South Carolina immediatists—or, as the parlance of the day would describe them, “separate‐ state actionists.”3 According to historians, an unseen cabal of powerful politicians and prominent citizens provided the impetus for disunion. Recent treatments of secession describe a secret network of

3 Charles Edward Cauthen, South Carolina Goes to War, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1950), 4

2 powerful individuals, most prominent among them Governor William H, Gist who, “by clandestine communication with other Southern governors… offered assurances, as early as October, that his state would secede immediately upon Lincoln’s election and solicited their commitment to follow.”4 In this view—which is typical of the historiography surrounding the subject—South Carolina had unequivocally decided to exit the Union alone, with the cooperationof other states merely serving as an afterthought, or perhaps an added bonus.

This framework posits a paradigm in which two opposing camps jostled to control the direction of secession in South Carolina and scholars tend to bifurcate secessionists into immediatists and coooperationists.5 Traditionally, people like Governor William H. Gist and the members of the 1860

Association are described as immediatists, since they advocated “immediate secession, alone if necessary.” In the typical narrative surrounding the secession movement, immediatists, or separate‐ state actionists comprised the overwhelming majority of secessionists, and were confined to the upper‐ echelons of the political elite. In contrast to that faction stood the cooperationists, who claimed to

“stand for secession ultimately alone if necessary, but only after an attempt had been made in a

Southern conference to enlist the cooperation of other Southern states.”6 The primary argument states that cooperationists comprised the majority of South Carolinians, and were largely coerced by immediatists into exiting the Union, or falsely‐informed that cooperation with other states was imminent.7

While the separation of secessionists into two discrete camps is a useful tool to understand the political tension among the Gulf‐Squadron states upon the eve of the Civil War, this starkly‐divided conception over‐simplifies the ultimate purpose that motivated both immediatists and cooperationists

4 Stephanie McCurry, Confederate Reckoning: Power and Politics in the Civil War South, (Harvard University Press, 2010), 51. 5 Charles Edward Cauthen, South Carolina Goes to War, 4. 6 Ibid. 7 McCurry, Confederate Reckoning: Power and Politics in the Civil War South, 51‐52.

3 to depart from the Union. Undeniably, the goal for both immediatists and cooperationists was the creation of an independent Southern nation, which inevitably required the collaboration of other slaveholding states.8 This goal remained foremost on the minds of immediatists such as Robert N.

Gourdin and the 1860 Association, which engaged in practices such as pamphleteering and circular correspondence directed at other Southern states to bolster support for “the cause of Southern Union and Independence.”9 Consistent with the goals of cooperationists, Governor William Henry Gist eagerly eagerly sought the assurance of other Southern states. The Governor declared: “It is the desire of South

Carolina that some other state should take the lead or move at least simultaneously with her… [i]f no other State takes the lead, South Carolina will secede…alone, if she has any assurance that she will be soon followed by another or other States; otherwise it is doubtful.”10 When examining the secession movement from its genesis in 1859 to its consummation in 1861, it becomes apparent that the movement was founded upon the notion that even if secession were undertaken separately, it required the eventual cooperation of other states.

In order to fully comprehend the secession movement in South Carolina, it is critical to understand that cooperationism and immediatism were not mutually‐exclusive. To be sure, leaders such as Gist felt that cooperation was a prerequisite for the secession movement’s eventual success.

The imposition of this artificial and stark dichotomy upon the past weakens our understanding of the complexity of the historical moment. Leaders such as Christopher Memminger and William Henry Gist did not awaken one morning and declare themselves to be one or the other; instead, these leaders selected a tack depending on the exigencies of the time. Cooperationism and immediatism fed each

8 While most cooperationists remained fearful of solitary secession, a number of political leaders who sought a Southern Conference may have in fact been closet‐unionists, who hoped to delay and ultimately derail secession by insisting upon the explicit co‐operation of other Southern states. Such a notion is intriguing and remains largely unexplored, but is worthy of its own analysis. 9 Robert N. Gourdin, as excerpted from John G. Nicholay and John G. Hay, Abraham Lincoln: A History, (New York: The Century Co, 1914), 305. 10 William Henry Gist to Thomas O. Moore, October 5, 1860, excerpted from John G. Nicholay and John G. Hay, Abraham Lincoln: A History, (New York: The Century Co, 1914), 306‐307.

4 other in the political discourse and helped to shape developments in their own right. The time was one of novel ideas and new dogmas, and any contention that these lines of reasoning stood in monolithic opposition to one another ignores the convoluted discourse in which both camps utilized each other’s rhetoric in order to persuade both the masses and the political elite in the Gulf Squadron States that secession and an independent Southern nation were viable political options. When analyzed in this light, South Carolina begins to shed its reputation for unabashed disunion, and acquires a more complex narrative for the decision for secession.

An integral but often overlooked component of the secession narrative was the overwhelming disapproval of the tactic of disunion. Political leaders such as Francis Pickens, Christopher G.

Memminger, and Benjamin Perry were staunch Unionists who vehemently opposed the voluntary dissolution of the Union. The primary reason for disunion’s unpopularity was the fear that a solitary

South Carolina would be forced to once again face down the federal government. Cautious in the wake of the Nullification Crisis, the Palmetto State attempted to cooperate with the rest of the South before unilaterally initiating secession. The Nullification Crisis demonstrated to South Carolina the danger of acting alone. In the debate over the tariff and nullification, South Carolina failed to garner the unwavering support of the South and as a result was left to suffer the wrath of Andrew Jackson alone.

This event remained salient within the state’s social memory. When the prospect of secession surfaced again in 1850 over the introduction of slavery into the Southwest Territories as well as the admission of

California as a free state, South Carolinians attempted to get other states to take the lead.11 To be sure, the Palmetto State was unwilling to face the federal government alone as it had in 1832. It is crucial to understand that this fear was the primary impediment to South Carolina’s instant separation from the federal government in 1850. Failure in 1832 served to frame the debate over South Carolina’s decision

11 David M. Potter, The Impending Crisis: 1848‐1861, (New York: Harper and Row, 1976), 83 and 94‐95.

5 to exit the union, and developed the sentiment that in order for South Carolina to secede it must have the support of Southern allies.

The secession movement’s formative stage were sparked by John Brown’s failed raid at Harper’s

Ferry in 1859. Frightened and startled by the radical abolitionist’s attempt to incite a massive slave rebellion, yet apprehensive about exiting the Union alone, the South Carolina legislature sent a delegate, Christopher G. Memminger to address the Virginia legislature. Memminger’s mission was designed to accomplish two goals. First, it was intended to convince Virginia to call a Southern

Conference that would deliberate the South’s collective response to John Brown’s raid—among such options was the prospect of cooperative secession. Second, Memminger sought to impart upon the

Southern public, a sense that secession was inevitable and needed to be coordinated amongst the

Southern states. South Carolina politicians were acutely aware that Memminger’s mission might be a failure, but hoped that Memminger’s address would: “sow seed which sooner or later must germinate and yield abundant fruit… hope[fully] you may find a fertile soil ready to view your grain of truth and that it may neither be doomed by vines or choked by thorns.”12 The South Carolina delegate’s speech was aimed towards two audiences; sympathetic Southerners across the region and, more specifically,

South Carolina Unionists and cooperationists. The selection of Memminger, a moderate Unionist who opposed secession at the Nashville convention was an attempt to garner the support of those apprehensive about the possibility of a Nullification Crisis redux. This mission linked secession with cooperation. It was an attempt to impart to secession opponents a sense that disunionists were composed leaders who sought to pursue secession rationally, with the support of other Southern leaders.

The conflation of cooperationism and immediatism reached a zenith in South Carolina’s debate over the creation of a secession convention in the fall of 1860. After the election of Abraham Lincoln,

12 William Porcher Milles to Christopher G. Memminger, 15 January 1860, C. G. Memminger Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina Library, Chapel Hill. Microfilm.

6 secession appeared imminent. Talk of secession in other states increased, but no state wanted to be the first to secede, especially South Carolina. Still apprehensive about the prospect of solitary secession, many South Carolinians attempted to avert the calling of a secession convention. In the debates, political leaders such as James Orr avowed that they would never support South Carolina’s dissolution of the Union without the confirmed support of Alabama, Mississippi, and Georgia.13 In order to appease skeptics such as Orr, South Carolina leaders and private citizens eagerly sought to enlist other state governors in the secession movement. Letters written by South Carolina secessionists traversed the

South in the hopes of spurring other Southerners to help South Carolina ‘inaugurate the ball.’14 Far from being clandestine, these messages were advertised in open debate to sway recalcitrant cooperationists that other states would follow them out of the Union. This tack was utilized so widely that in the minds of many South Carolinians “cooperationism and state action now amounted to the same thing.”15 South

Carolinians required the commitment of other Southern states, and politicians attempted to garner that support in order to assuage public worries. As a result, many South Carolinians expected the support of the Gulf Squadron if they were to embark on the path of secession.

Fully expectant of Southern support in the cause of secession, South Carolina rapidly made plans to exit the Union. A false report of Georgia Senator Robert Toombs’s resignation gave South Carolina the impression that Georgia was seceding and caused it to accelerate its timetable.16 Assured that other

Southern states would also depart the Union, South Carolina decided to seize upon the momentum and proceeded with plans to secede. Nonetheless, being in a tenuous position as the sole seceding state,

Governor Francis Pickens promptly asked D. F. Jamison, president of the Secession Convention, for an official ordinance of secession so that he could “issue a proclamation announcing at last to the world,

13 Cauthen, South Carolina Goes to War, 55. 14 States Rights Gist to John Pettus, 8 November 1860, GLC02266, Gilder‐Lehrman Collection, New York City. 15 Cauthen, South Carolina Goes to War, 64‐65. 16 Potter, The Impending Crisis, 490.

7 that we are a free & independent republic & are authorized to negotiate treaties & do all other acts that appertain to a free and independent republic.”17 Cognizant of the possibility of being left in the lurch yet again, South Carolina wanted to assure that it could succeed as a solitary state. This proclamation announced to the rest of the South and foreign observers that the secession movement was fully‐ underway. Having consolidated public opinion in the Palmetto State, South Carolinians undertook a diplomatic program to convince the rest of the South that secession was both imminent and inevitable.

This proposition required South Carolina to supplant Virginia as the unofficial leader by ignoring the Old

Dominion’s calls for a conference in Washington DC. Not willing to allow the enthusiasm for secession to wane, the Palmetto State sought to bind other Southern states into a new nation at a general convention at Montgomery, Alabama.

This thesis plots the development of the South Carolina Secession movement from the fall of

1859, until the early spring of 1861. It attempts to illuminate and elucidate the political and social processes that allowed “secession” to transmogrify from a fringe philosophical idea into an acceptable mode of legal recourse and finally, into political reality. While it focuses on events that directly concerned and involved South Carolina political actors, it defines these people and events within a national and historical context to reveal political and rhetorical strategies utilized by South Carolina secessionists to convince the public that disunion was a viable political option. Part one seeks to understand the methods by which South Carolina sought to expunge connotations of radicalism and demagoguery from the notion of secession, and thereby make the concept more amenable to moderates, by reforming the extremist image of South Carolina political culture through speeches and the exchange of state commissioners. Part two analyzes how a series of public and private diplomatic coopted the rhetoric of unionists in order to bind politicians from across the South to the idea of a

17 Francis W. Pickens to D.F. Jamison, 22 December 1860, GLC02269, Gilder‐Lehrman Collection, New York City.

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Southern Confederacy. The nature of secession and its meaning to both the historical actors who participated in the process, as well as to contemporary Americans is evaluated in the conclusion.

To be sure, the fear of being left to face down the federal government weighed heavily upon

South Carolina’s political leaders throughout the extent of the secession movement. This distrust of secession may best be exemplified by a European born diplomat, who undertook a mission to convince the South’s most powerful state that it needed to lead the South in its exit from the Union.

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Part I: To Sow the Seeds of Disunion: Christopher Memminger’s Mission to Virginia

In February 1860, a mild‐mannered South Carolina gentleman named Christopher Memminger arrived in Richmond, Virginia to deliver what many in his home state hoped to be an inflammatory and explosive address.18 Christopher Memminger was not a stranger to the people of Virginia, but as he made his way from Columbia, South Carolina to Richmond, Virginia, Memminger perhaps thought this trip would not be like the his previous sojourns into the Old Dominion. Just a few months before,

Memminger attended a convention for Episcopalians in Richmond, but was now visiting the city to carry a message of disunion and secession on behalf of the Palmetto State.19

As Memminger entered the Ballard House hotel in the heart of Richmond, he must have been gripped with apprehension about his impending speech to the state legislature. Many South Carolinians were anxious and eagerly hoped that Virginia would be willing to lead the Southern states out of the

Union, and hoped Memminger might convince them to do so. William Porcher Miles exhorted

Memminger to “induce [Virginia] to withdraw from the Union…[in order to ensure that] the South would have a glorious start on the path of independence which we all so ardently desire and which must come sooner or later.”20 Memminger was wary of preaching a gospel of open disunion to the Virginia legislature and did not want to impinge upon the Old Dominion’s sense of Southern leadership. As such

Memminger’s task was a difficult one of attempting to cajole Virginia into departing the Union, without seeming to be brazenly pushing Virginia in that direction. To be sure, Memminger needed to adopt a strategy of polite suggestiveness to the Virginians, in order to ensure that when the moment of secession arrived, Virginia would be willing to depart alongside the Palmetto State. Memminger hoped to soften Virginia’s resistance to the idea of secession. It was not to be an immediate plea for disunion, but instead the conception of an idea that would hopefully bear fruit within the coming months.

18Steven Channing, Crisis of Fear: Secession in South Carolina, (London: WW Norton, 1971), 114. 19 Channing, Crisis of Fear, 112. 20 William Porcher Miles to Christopher G. Memminger, January 10th 1860, Christopher G. Memminger Papers.

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South Carolina governor William Henry Gist appointed Memminger to deliver the message to the Virginia state legislature. Speaking on behalf of South Carolina, Memminger was charged with the task of convincing Virginia that the Southern states were no longer safe within the federal union.

Appointed as the High Commissioner of South Carolina to the state of Virginia, it was the intention of the political leadership in South Carolina to catalyze a unified Southern response to the growing anti‐ slavery menace of the North. However, it was clear to leaders such as Gist , Representatives William

Porcher Miles, and William Boyce that the attitudes of many Virginian and South Carolinians lacked the secessionist zeal possessed by the Palmettos State’s most ardent fire‐eaters. In the correspondence that surrounded Memminger’s Mission to Virginia, numerous South Carolina notables, decided to utilize the moment not to forcefully push Virginia into secession, but rather to gently nudge the state in the direction towards disunion. The goal of this mission was to build within Virginia a relationship of amity between the states and to implant an affinity for the notions of secession and a Southern Confederacy.

But most importantly, Memminger’s address was designed to minimize South Carolina’s role in leading the secession movement, and instead subtly inculcate Virginia with the notion that it was they that needed to lead the South. To curry favor for secession, South Carolina firebrands needed to cloak their message in the language of cooperationism and moderation. The odor of radicalism tinted many people’s perceptions of South Carolina. As such, it was Memminger’s mission to covertly disabuse them of the notion of South Carolina’s radicalism while gently steering them towards support for a radical policy. For this strategy to succeed, moderate politicians within the South Carolina legislature needed to prevail.

The South Carolina legislature was in the midst of a great panic in the fall of 1859 due to John

Brown’s failed raid at Harper’ Ferry. The legislature met and attempted to decide upon South Carolina’s response. Taking the lead, Governor Gist stated South Carolina had no choice but to secede if any

11 presidential candidate that ran on the “Seward Platform” was elected.21 The entire legislature remained unsure about what course to take. During the special session in the fall of 1859, the state legislature introduced numerous resolutions to confront the growing specter of Northern anti‐slavery sentiment and the possibility that abolitionists allegedly backed by the Republican Party, would engender additional slave revolts. Some resolutions definitively declared slavery and the South were no longer safe within the Union and openly called for Southern unity and the creation of a Confederacy. Other resolutions were more lukewarm towards the prospect of secession and sought to enjoin the other

Southern states in a conference where they would be able to deliberate and propose suggestions to the

North. But the most interesting resolutions were the ones that combined elements of earnest secessionism with a more cautious cooperationist approach. These resolutions pledged restraint by calling for a show of cooperative action on behalf of all Southern states while simultaneously creating a body with the power to withdraw South Carolina from the Union if a Republican were elected to the presidency. Some South Carolina legislators remembered the Palmetto State’s lack of support during the Nullification Crisis of 1832 and remained wary of any type of action that did not explicitly bind the futures of Southern states together as a whole.

These South Carolinians required an explicit agreement between South Carolina and other

Southern states on their mutual and simultaneous departures from the Union. Other resolutions balked at the notion that South Carolina should once again be forced to exit the Union alone and instead suggested that the state of Virginia assume the mantle of leadership and be the first to secede, with

South Carolina and others following.22 As a result, the legislature was badly divided between cooperationists, separate state actionists, and the rare unionist. Furthermore, a bulk of South

21 Channing, Crisis of Fear, 95. 22 Channing, Crisis of Fear, 95‐99.

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Carolinians still had faith that the South was still politically strong within the Union and were optimistic that they would be able to gain concessions from the North as part of the normal political process.23

The legislature was composed of two main factions. The first faction was known as the

Unionists. These people were adamant about engaging the North in political dialogue. On the opposite end of the debate lay the secessionists who sought to immediately depart the Union because they were convinced Southern institutions could no longer be protected. Secessionists were equally divided between those who wanted to take immediate and separate action, those who wanted to secede first, then hope for a conference among other Southern states, and those who wanted to take a wait‐and‐see approach in the hopes that the threat of secession would cause the South to draw together and defend slavery as a united whole. In this fractious climate, it was difficult for anyone to concede to opposing factions. Thus, while a majority of the legislature was appalled and unnerved by the events at Harper’s

Ferry and the subsequent Northern outpouring of support on behalf of John Brown, most legislators were still convinced that there needed to be a united bloc of Southern support to either gain concessions within the Union or to secede. The Legislature waffled on the prospect of secession in the months after John Brown’s Raid at Harper’s Ferry.24 In order for any action to be taken, the secessionist impulse needed to be disguised in a veil of moderation. Thus, moderate Christopher Memminger proposed a series of resolutions which synthesized an ardor for immediate action with the more cautious reservations of cooperationism and unionism.

Christopher G. Memminger was not a fire‐eater and was therefore the ideal person to deliver a message of disunion. Moderation and staunch unionism were the defining elements of his political career up to this point. Memminger first acquired a reputation during the Nullification Crisis of 1832.

Instead of supporting the Nullification Ordnance, Memminger instead published a satirical pamphlet titled the Book of Nullification, that lampooned the nullifiers and encouraged the federal government to

23 Channing, Crisis of Fear, 100. 24 Channing, Crisis of Fear, 100.

13 suppress the movement with military force.25 Memminger increased his moderate reputation by his refusal to discuss secession during the furor over the Compromise of 1850.26 In a peculiar departure from the norm of antebellum South Carolina politics, Memminger eschewed polemical political stances and instead decided to build his political reputation on administrative competence in the areas of finance and banking.27 As such, Memminger acquired a reputation for level‐headedness across South

Carolina and the rest of the South. His political reputation coupled with his public affiliations with the

Episcopal Church allowed Memminger to be perceived as moderate in both political disposition and temperament. Surely, many antebellum South Carolinians saw Memminger as the last person to engage in precipitate and rash actions, a voice of reason within a legislature that was unwilling to compromise and was rife with disagreement and riven between two very divergent camps proposing open disunion or more dilatory compromise tactics.

Christopher Memminger’s moderate reputation allowed him to dampen the ardor of both unionists and secessionists. Like the rest of the Palmetto State and its state legislature, Memminger was very disturbed by the events at Harper’s Ferry. Once a staunch unionist, John Brown’s failed raid forced him to undertake a dramatic political transformation. He was now firmly convinced that South Carolina was no longer safe within the Union.28 Though internally he may have already decided that exiting the

Union was South Carolina’s only viable option, his previous record of moderation allowed him to rise above the legislative fracas and propose a course of action amenable to cooperationists, but would surely direct South Carolina onto the path of disunion.

25 William L. Barney, “Christopher Gustavus Memminger,” American National Biography Online, www.anb.org, 03/17/2011. 26 Barney, “Christopher G. Memminger,” American National Biography Online. 27 Barney, “Christopher G. Memminger,” American National Biography Online. 28 Channing, Crisis of Fear, 103.

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On December 22nd 1859, Memminger proposed a resolution to placate both cooperationists and separate state actionists. Memminger believed the South was no longer safe within the Union and the only viable option was secession.29 But, he also remained wary of separate state action. Like many of his colleagues, he wanted a different state to assume leadership of the secession movement. On the floor of the legislature, Memminger stated that since the attack at Harper’s Ferry had occurred in

Virginia, it was imperative that the Old Dominion lead the secession movement. In order to accomplish this goal, Memminger suggested that the governor appoint a special commissioner to convey South

Carolina’s sympathies.30 The proposal put forth by Memminger was a brilliant synthesis of the nascent impulses within the South Carolina State legislature. Embedded within the proposal was a deep distrust of the North and its intentions for the protection of slavery in the South. But also present was the latent fear that if South Carolina acted on its impulse to bolt the Union, no other state would follow them out.

But most importantly, Memminger’s proposal contained no language that suggested that South Carolina would be leading a movement of disunion. Memminger’s proposal was acceptable to Unionists because it stated the commissioner was intended only to convey South Carolina’s sympathy to the Old Dominion.

However, in addition to condolences, the Commissioner was also charged with convincing the Virginia

Assembly to agree to a conference of Southern States. This conference however, would only be convened at the behest of Virginia and would conceivably only devise workable solutions within the

Union. Memminger’s proposal was palatable to the Unionists and cooperationists who opposed precipitate action and rash talk of secession. It seemed as if Memminger struck upon a bargain that all

South Carolinians could agree upon. However, as time passed, it became clear the intent of the

Commissioner was to instill within the Virginia Assembly a proclivity towards disunion and secession.

It appeared that a man such as Memminger, who had previously been a staunch opponent of secession did not advocate any action which promoted disunion or advanced the cause of secession.

29 Channing, Crisis of Fear, 102. 30 Channing, Crisis of Fear, 102.

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Newspapers believed Memminger’s character was above reproach, and as such, he would be the ideal candidate to fill the proposed post that he had, the High Commissioner to Virginia: “We have good reasons for believing that our distinguished fellow‐citizen, C.G. Memminger, will be clothed with the important and honorable office of representing South Carolina as a Special Commissioner to the State of

Virginia, according to provision made by the Legislature that has just closed. The Governor could not make a better or more acceptable appointment.”31

Memminger’s mission seemed to be wholly incongruent with the aims of Unionists and at least partially in conflict with the ideas of cooperationists. Ostensibly intended to display a shared sense of grieving with Virginia, the primary intention was to convince Virginia that the South could no longer effectively defend their cherished rights within the Union. The South Carolina press made the notion abundantly clear in an editorial from December of 1859: “South Carolina now sends to Virginia her sympathy as a sovereign sister, and her respectful invitation to a solemn and deliberate consultation as to the practical resources of a common defence [sic].”32

Memminger, like many South Carolinians, was firmly convinced that the institutions and freedoms of the South were under attack. John Brown and the Republican Party had mobilized every man, woman, and child in the North against slavery, and would utilize institutional methods to weaken slavery as well as the more fearful methods displayed at Harper’s Ferry. South Carolinians such as

Memminger thought that this moment represented an ideal moment by which South Carolina could galvanize the South into a cohesive political unit to defend slavery. The Raid at Harper’s Ferry and the subsequent displays of jubilation in the North allowed South Carolina to nudge Virginia towards disunion. The time was not yet ripe for secession, and the movement required a calm spokesman to encourage Southern unity.

31 Charleston Daily Courier, December 23, 1859. 32 Charleston Daily Courier, December 29, 1859.

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Memminger seemed to typify the breed of South Carolinian who was fearful of secession, but determined to stand up for State Rights.33 A unionist before John Brown’s raid, he now leaned towards secession. Memminger can be seen as the embodiment of the complex discourse occurring in South

Carolina throughout the secession crisis. Memminger was committed to taking drastic action, but remained apprehensive about the possibility of exiting the Union without affirming support from the rest of the South. Much like Memminger, most South Carolinians were sure that something needed to be done to defend slavery, but were unsure if secession was a viable option. Many South Carolinians opined that Memminger represented was a recent convert to secession who sought level‐headed and rational approaches on the topic of secession:

“He [Memminger], as is well‐known, is and was of that portion of our fellow citizens avowedly and earnestly committed to the doctrine and propriety of secession. Mr. Memminger has been a champion foremost of those who, advocating resistance and effectual remedies for the evils too long endured by the South, have yet steadily opposed and rejected secession.”34

Memminger represented moderation, an opponent of secession until the point he realized that compromise with the Union was no longer possible. But, as an initial opponent of secession, he still remained open to the prospect of secession. The selection of Memminger suggested to opponents that they too should try and re‐evaluate their position on secession, and attempt to bring their political beliefs in line with the exigencies of the current crisis. The apprehension over secession allowed

Memminger to serve as a stand‐in for many South Carolinians, who were eager to depart the Union, but were deeply unnerved about the prospect. In order for South Carolina to even consider secession, other

Southern states had to offer an implicit guarantee that they would consider leading the movement. And yet, many others in both Virginian and South Carolina remained unconvinced that secession was even an option.

33 Wallace Hettle, The Peculiar Democracy: Southern Democrats in Peace and Civil War, Athens GA:University of Georgia Press, 2001. 34 Charleston Daily Courier, December 29, 1859.

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The appointment of Memminger as South Carolina’s Commissioner to Virginia was intended to radicalize lukewarm secessionists and Unionists. Memminger’s Address was a feign towards moderation and suggested that secession was not an idea held exclusively by the extreme fringe of Southerners, but was a tenable position for level‐headed politicians as well. In this way, Memminger can be seen as an ideological Trojan Horse. South Carolina politicians intended Virginians and other Southerners to be more receptive to a message of disunion because of Memminger’s perceived moderation. As such, the message of ardent South Carolina secessionists, like William Henry Gist, could be conveyed to wavering

Southerners without the tint of radicalism and demagoguery. A reluctant secessionist was charged with the task of relaying a covert message of disunion in the hopes that his example may inspire defections to the more radical camp.

Many remained unconvinced that Virginia could be persuaded to meet with South Carolina and other Southern states in conference, let alone lead the lower‐half of the Union out of the country.

Headed by the moderate governor John Letcher, who renounced secession and fully‐expected to field at least three candidates in the next presidential election, it seemed as if Virginia was comfortable existing within the current federal framework.35 However, there were ample signs that Virginia would entertain the notion of a Southern conference, or even the assumption of leadership of the secession movement.

The politicians and laypeople of the Old Dominion were apt to lavish praise upon Memminger and his home‐state and offer their unswerving devotion to the cause of Southern liberty.36

Prior to his arrival in Richmond in January, Memminger corresponded with a member of the

Virginia Assembly by the name of D. H. London, who portrayed Virginia as eager to engage in a discussion of secession. He suggests that the denizens of the Old Dominion would be willing participants if South Carolina chose to depart the Union. In January of 1860, London urged Memminger to avenge

35 Ollinger Crenshaw, “Christopher G. Memminger’s Mission to Virginia, 1860.” Journal of Southern History 8, (August 1942): 334‐349 36 Channing, Crisis of Fear, 124.

18 the attacks at Harper’s Ferry and stated his unwavering support to South Carolina, even if Virginia was too timid to offer any aid. He wrote that a group of Virginias, himself included were willing to give their lives:

“and all he has to aid South Carolina in anything she may so or undertake, in vindication of the outrage honor of the Southern States, and people. If my own state won't move, if she is too craven‐ hearted…Virginia is willing … to bet South Carolina knows, that she can go out of the Union and do as she pleases, with my all at her services. One thing I can say I am sure that the people of Virginia will never allow any state of the South, to be trodden down by Federal force, or any other power.”37

More importantly he also suggested that Virginia was willing to aid South Carolina if it seceded and the federal government attempted to coerce her back into the Union. Messages of popular support emboldened many secessionists, who were convinced that other states would support South Carolina if they decided to depart the union. Among those that supported Memminger’s Mission were Virginia legislators such as London, who wrote to Memminger from his sick‐bed as well as numerous other visitors to his hotel, and suggested that he attempt to arouse the passions of the assembly in his address by suggesting that South Carolina would take the lead in the secession movement. These legislators suggested that most of their colleagues lagged behind the people in their support for secession, and that

Memminger’s Address needed to embolden or perhaps shame them into throwing their lot in with the

Palmetto State.38 To be sure, the support of Virginia’s political fringe emboldened Memminger to take a hard tack with the state legislatre.

In addition to the tough rhetoric being espoused by Virginians, fellow South Carolinians urged

Memminger to take a harsh tack in his address to the legislature. Congressmen William Porcher Miles urged Memminger to “impart some of the South Carolina spirit into her legislature.”39 William Boyce,

37 D.H. London to Memminger, January 18, 1860, Memminger Papers. 38 Channing, Crisis of Fear, 124. 39William Porcher Miles to Memminger, January 18, 1860, Christopher G. Memminger Papers.

19 another member of the South Carolina delegation suggested that the Commissioner describe the Raid on Harper’s Ferry as an affront to South Carolina “just the same as if Harper's Ferry was at the Long bridge over the Ashley River.”40 These two men represented the unabashed fringe of extreme conservatism in South Carolina. Boyce and Miles eagerly advocated disunion and implored Memminger to utilize a harsh tone that would stir an already receptive Virginia towards disunion. Miles hoped to coincide Memminger’s Address with a violent brawl in Congress over the election of John Sherman as

Speaker of the House and stated that his previous commitment to that plan prevented him from traveling to Richmond.41 The urgency and of the moment and zeal of observers suggested that this would be an ideal time for South Carolina to make a push for disunion. Exhortations for bold rhetoric were being pressed upon Memminger by citizens of his home‐state as well as Virginians. Inflammatory rhetoric was not Memminger’s strength and many South Carolinians sought to utilize Memminger’s demure reputation as well as Virginia’s desire to be the leader of the South.

There were several powerful voices of reason to balance the appeals of ardent secessionists.

Governor William Henry Gist of South Carolina decided to use Memminger’s perceived moderation as a rhetorical tool for two separate but related goals. First, Gist and others hoped that Memminger would be able to sway Virginians who were disdainful of South Carolina’s radical reputation. Second, Governor

Gist hoped that the Commissioner’s demure approach would allow Virginia to assume the mantle of leadership themselves, without a significant amount of cajoling. If South Carolina appeared overly eager to secede, it could harm the chances of a united Southern front with Virginia at the helm. Gist noted how vital it would be to get Virginia to assume command of the South on the issue of State Rights. He was assured that, “By [Virginia] taking the lead in the in resistance to this warfare upon our institution…Virginia can unite the South out of the Union. If we can establish a Confederacy with all the

40 William Boyce to Memminger, January 14, 1860. 41 Miles to Memminger, January 10, 1860, Memminger Papers. Governor Gist persuaded Miles to cancel his planned assault of John Sherman. For a more detailed account, see: Channing, Crisis of Fear, 112‐115.

20 elements of grace, strength and greatness that Virginia can offer, we can defy the world.”42 Gist averred that Virginia was the key to making secession a viable option. Without Virginia, South Carolina could expect a disunified South and a reprise of the Nullification Crisis. Virginia’s leadership was necessary for the South to forge a cohesive political destiny outside the Union. The success of the South Carolina secession movement depended upon the assurance that Virginia was a willing partner.

In order to achieve an implicit alliance with South Carolina, Memminger opted to implant within the Virginia Assembly a sense that it was up to them to lead the movement. Eventually, once ardent secessionists such as Miles began to realize that the political clout of Virginia necessitated a deferential tone. After being chastised by Governor Gist for his foolhardy plan to incite violence within the Capitol,

Miles suggested that a delicate tone needed to be struck to instill within Virginia the urge to secede:

“If Virginia could only now be induced to withdraw from the Union unless every demand of the South were satisfied and some absolute security given for the future… If you can only urge our Carolina view in such a manner as to imbue Virginia with it ( and at present she is in the best condition to be impregnated we may soon hope to see the fruit of your address in the sturdy and healthy offspring of whose birth would be so greatly proud‐‐a Southern Confederacy. This would indeed be a worthy heir of the joint glories of the two commonwealths to spring from the loins of the Palmetto State!”43

Miles suggested to Memminger that instead of asking for outright secession, he must coax Virginia into adopting a South Carolinia‐like point of view. South Carolina could not be seen as the leader of the movement, brashly exhorting Virginia to exit the Union. Instead, the Address needed to utilize subtle hints and suggestions that the conditions that allowed for the events at Harper’s Ferry to transpire would not cease to exist, but would be magnified with the growing prestige and popularity of the

Republican party. The attempt to link the Republican ascendancy and the election of a Republican president as justifiable causes of secession were made abundantly clear in Memminger’s Address.

42 William Henry Gist to Memminger, January 30, 1860, Memminger Papers. 43 Miles to Memminger, January 10, 1860. Memminger Papers.

21

Unconvinced that Virignia could be moved at this time, Miles recommended to Memminger that he should, “try to press upon the Assembly if a Black Republican President should be elected‐‐ then we should at once secede.”44 Seizing upon the raw emotion of the Harper’s Ferry and the adulation of

Northerners for John Brown, Memminger addressed the Virginia legislature with the following words:

“Suppose jurisdiction of the crime had been surrendered to the federal government, and judgment had been delayed until the 4th of March next, how think you that the culprits would have fared with a Black

Republican President intrusted [sic] with pardoning power?”45 Memminger explicitly referred to the inauguration date of the next president in an attempt to suggest that the Republican Party will dominate the government and cater to abolitionists. The political power of the Republicans will only create an atmosphere that would further endanger slavery. In this passage, Memminger attempted to lay a groundwork for the potential secession of Virginia after the election of a Republican president. These attempts to highlight possible events that warranted secession was vital because Memminger and others thought that Virginia had “cooled‐down” and was not going to be a receptive to leading a conference that could discuss secession or negotiate with the North to receive guaranteed protections for slavery. With three possible candidates for the presidency and a governor stating a solution was still workable within the federal Union, Virginia seemed to be unlikely to aid South Carolina anytime soon.

Thus the goal was not to obtain an immediate attachment to Virginia in the cause of secession, but instead to implant within Virginia the notion that disunion was inevitable, and that Virginia needed to lend its enormous political clout to the cause of a Southern Confederacy. The ultimate success of the mission did not rest upon Virginia’s immediate assumption of a leadership role in the secession movement, but instead relied upon the notion that Virginia needed to be nudged in the direction and would be able to assume that role at a later date after the impending election of a Black Republican.

44 Miles to Memminger, January 15, 1860, Memminger Papers. 45 The Mission of South Carolina to Virginia, [Baltimore: Press of J. Lucas and Son, 1860?], Library of Congress, Washington DC.

22

Miles wrote to Memminger suggested that his ultimate goal was to instill within Virginia a sentiment that secession was inevitable and unavoidable: “You [Memminger] will sow seed which sooner or later must germinate and yield abundant fruit… ‐I hope you may find a fertile soil ready to receive your grain of truth and that it may neither be devoured by the vines or choked by thorns.”46

But the notion that Virginia would one day realize the full‐extent of the crisis was not a reassuring one for many South Carolinians. Without an explicit guarantee that another Southern state would cooperate with the Palmetto State, a suggestion for secession might lead to ultimate failure.

Some suggested that in the event of an election of a Black Republican president, South Carolina should secede and “drag the others along.”47 However, this suggestion was inevitably followed by the lamentation that any state other that South Carolina should be the first to secede.48 To be sure, South

Carolina was unwilling to undertake a program of secession when the rest of the South was displaying lukewarm affection for the idea. Thus, in order to augment the support for secession, both private and public citizens of South Carolina attempted to cultivate support for disunion through the use of correspondence, pamphlets, and more commissioners.

Most importantly, Memminger’s Mission served to facilitate more communication within the

South about organizing for secession. His Address, published in newspapers and in a bound‐format was circulated across the South. Accustomed to the image of a radical South Carolina, Memminger’s reasoned approach impressed Southerners. But it remained unclear whether or not Memminger’s labors would bear any fruit.

Though Memminger’s Mission to Virginia did not prove to be an immediate success, its tangential effects proved to be very valuable. On the last day of Memminger’s Mission to Virginia, a

Mississippi delegate named Peter Starke arrived in Richmond. Appointed by his state legislature, Starke

46 Miles to Memminger, January 15 1860, Memminger Papers. 47 Miles to Memminger, January 30, 1860, Memminger Papers. 48 Miles to Memminger, February 3, 1860, Memminger Papers.

23 also intended to lobby Virginians to heed South Carolina’s call for a conference of Southern states. This occurrence proved to be an example of the South’s evolving set of interstate secessionist networks.

Within these networks, South Carolinians attempted to garner support from secessionists that resided in lukewarm states. These interstate communiqués proved vital in bolstering South Carolina’s confidence that they would be supported and aided in the secession movement by like‐minded Southerners.

24

Part II: The Ties that Bind: The Association of 1860, Circular Letters, and Fort Sumter

On November 9, 1860, a crowd gathered in downtown Charleston to celebrate the completion of a railroad connection Charleston, South Carolina to Savannah, Georgia.49 The congregated masses that autumn night were not explicitly motivated by the election of Lincoln or the prospect of secession, but the night’s festivities were inevitably steered in that direction by a coterie of well‐heeled secessionists. These boosters had been working behind the scenes to cooperate with both the South

Carolina government as well as politicians from like‐minded Southern states to form an implicit agreement that if any state were willing to depart the Union, it would be followed and supported by others.

In the previous months, Georgians and South Carolinians undertook correspondence on the topics of secession and the election of 1860. These men had reached a tenuous agreement upon the nature of secession and the relationship that would exist between the two states. Georgians and South

Carolinians were nervous about the prospect of a fragmented and piecemeal southern resistance and were unnerved by the prospect of each state departing the union separately and without the aid or support of other southern states. South Carolinians and Georgians hoped to goad each other and their respective states into taking the lead on secession. While these associations of correspondence undertook to rouse the masses to embrace the secessionist viewpoint, they also sought to assuage the concerns of both states that when the prospect of secession presented itself, they would not be the only group eager to seize upon the opportunity.

Nominally billed as a celebration signaling the completion of a railroad, the organizers of the festivities treated the crowd to a variety of events that were meant to rouse secession spirits. 50 A

49 William Frehling, “The Tortuous Path Toward Secession Part II: The Path Narrowly Opened, 1860‐186,” in North and South: The Official Magazine of the Civil War Conflict 10, No. 2 (July 2007), 22.

50 David M. Potter, Impending Crisis: 1848‐1861, (New York: Harper Colophon, 1976), 490.

25 marching band played a musical selection known as the “Grand Secession March” as speakers from

Georgia exhorted the crowd to take the lead on secession.51 The speakers chastised the crowd and sought to encourage their spirit for secession by stating that if they were not willing to be the first to do so, their state would have to be the courageous one to do so first. Upon hearing this challenge, the crown flooded into the nearest telegram house, where they sent messages that demanded that the

Secession Convention be moved up one month and that South Carolina move hastily to depart the

Union.52 The massive secessionist sentiment that was cultivated at a decidedly non‐political event was the result of careful management and cooperation on behalf of South Carolina politicians, prominent citizens, and their counterparts in other Southern states.

After Christopher Memminger failed to garner the steadfast support of Virginia in the secession cause, the movement to depart the Union entered into a new phase of backchannel interstate diplomacy. Politicians such as the Governor of the State, William Henry Gist, worked simultaneously with private citizens, such as Edward C. Gourdin and the “Association of 1860” to garner both implicit and explicit guarantees that a Southern Confederacy could be achieved through mutual cooperation.

For South Carolinians, these networks of correspondence led to a convoluted process of both goading other states to lead the movement and being prodded into taking the lead on secession.

The exchange of communiqués between South Carolina’s officials and prominent citizens of the

South ensured the Palmetto State they could expect the cooperation of their colleagues in the Gulf

Squadron. The process required a concerted effort on behalf of South Carolina politicians. Men such as

Gourdin as well as Governor Gist and his cousin, States Rights Gist, lobbied other Southerners to consider the possibility of departing the union simultaneously with South Carolina. However, instead of receiving explicit guarantees, Gourdin and his colleagues became certain of secession’s popularity and the commitment of other states to depart the Union. This tenuous process required South Carolina to

51 David M. Potter, Impending Crisis: 1848‐1861, (New York: Harper Colophon, 1976), 490. 52 Frehling, “The Tortuous Path Towards Secession,” 22.

26 rely upon implicit support from other Southerners, but served to bolster the Palmetto State’s confidence in the aid, affection, and allegiance of other Southern states.

South Carolinians worked feverishly despite their rebuke at the hands of the Virginia legislature.

Secession boosters in the piedmont and lowcountry attempted to bolster the flagging enthusiasm of secessionists across the state.53 Among the most prominent of these secession boosters, was Edward C.

Gourdin, a Madera connoisseur and well‐known fishmonger, who along with several other prominent

Charlestonians met at midnight to purportedly discuss their mutual interest in seafood and red wine.54

Initially known as the “Association of Eager Men” it acquired a reputation around Charleston of being ardently secessionist. How the content of their discussion shifted from viniculture and seafood to the disintegration of the Union remains a mystery but, by the beginning of 1860, the organization was a leading proponent of secession.

In late 1859, the Charleston Mercury circulated the Association’s ideas and other newspapers across the South duplicated the proclamations originally being published in Charleston. The “eager men” that comprised the Association became well‐known throughout their South for their ardent secessionism as well as their refined palates.55 In January of 1860, Edward C. Gourdin published a letter to prominent politicians in Southern states seen as amenable to South Carolina. This letter amounted to the Association of 1860’s mission statement of sorts and stated that the Association was a group of enterprising men intent on awakening the rest of the South to the dangers of federal and Northern aggression. In order to achieve these ends, the Association vowed to” conduct correspondence with leading men of the South in order to prepare the slave states to meet the impending crisis” as well as

“to prepare, print, and distribute in the slave States, tracts, pamphlets… designed to awaken them to a

53 Stephen A. West, “Minute Men, Yeomen, and the Mobilization for Secession in the South Carolina Upcountry.” Journal of Southern History 71, No. 1 (February 2005): 75. 54 May Ringold, “Robert Newman Gourdin and the ‘1860 Association’,” The Georgia Historical Quarterly 55, No. 4 (December 1971), 501. 55 Ringold, “Robert Newman Gourdin and the ‘1860 Association,’” 503.

27 conviction of their danger, and to urge the necessity of resisting Northern and Federal Agression [sic].” 56

Upon hearing or reading about the organization and its purpose, many secessionists in reluctant states were overwhelmed with joy. Men who were in states already leaning towards secession corresponded eagerly with Edward Gourdin and his compatriots and requested pamphlets to be distributed within their home states.57

Many of these men, such as James Mercer of Macon, Georgia, were upset that their home‐state politicians were not doing enough to aid the cause of secession. Correspondents that asked for materials to be distributed in their own states included legislators from North Carolina, a history professor from Alabama, as well as lawyers and doctors from Georgia and Tennessee.58 Among the most prolific correspondents was Dr. James Mercer, of Macon, Georgia, an ardent secessionist skeptical of his own state’s ability to depart the Union. Without a willing leader of the secession movement, Georgia would not be willing to take such a risk. Furthermore, Mercer told Gourdin that dampened enthusiasm for secession in South Carolina would delay or completely derail secession in Georgia. Thus, in order for secession to come to fruition, a single state needed to be brave enough to inaugurate the movement.

Men like Gourdin remained skeptical of such claims because of South Carolina’s previous experience in disunion and secession. However, the correspondence with Mercer and other Georgians reinforced his confidence that South Carolina would not be alone if they were to be the first state to depart the Union. Gourdin became convinced that men in Georgia were doing all that they could to garner support for secession. The Association was impressed by the fact that Mercer required them to print tickets to the Georgia Secession Convention, so as to pack the proceedings with radicals and was quite pleased when Mercer extended an offer to have South Carolinians attend and influence the

56 Robert N. Gourdin, as excerpted from John G. Nicholay and John G. Hay, Abraham Lincoln: A History, (New York: The Century Co, 1914), 305. 57 Ringold, “Robert Newman Gourdin and the ‘1860 Association,’” 504. 58 Ibid, 505.

28 outcome.59 Additionally, Gourdin’s collaborations with Georgia secessionists in planning the railroad celebration convinced the South Carolinians that men from other states were eager to see the secession process initiated. The realization that South Carolina could lead the secession movement, but still expecting support from the rest of the South was not completely confined to Gourdin. The Palmetto

State’s chief‐executive and his oddly‐named cousin, States Rights Gist, had arrived at the same conclusion and attempted to capitalize on the fervor of the moment and the promises of future cooperation.

South Carolinians were anxious in the weeks leading up to the Election of 1860. Wary of a

Republican triumph and unsure as to what path the rest of the South would take after Lincoln’s election, the future seemed ominous for the Palmetto State. While most had given up the idea that Virginia would assume the mantle of leadership for the rest of the South, people such as Governor Gist still clung to the notion that another Gulf State would be willing to depart the Union. In order to gauge the support of other Gulf state leaders, Gist issued a circular letter dispatched by his cousin, States Rights

Gist, to various chief executives across the lower South.60 Still unwilling to have South Carolina appear too eager to engage in secession, Gist made it abundantly clear that the Palmetto State “desired that some other state take the lead or at least move simultaneously with her.”61 Gist and other South

Carolina secessionists were unaware of how committed the rest of the South was to the idea of secession, and were desperate not to be left in the lurch again—as they had been in 1832. This request was intended to cajole another Southern state into supporting secession, and to offer their nominal backing of South Carolina. Gist was aware that without the implicit support of another Southern state,

59 Ibid, 507‐509. 60 Edward Cauthen, “South Carolina’s Decision to Lead the Secession Movement,” in North Carolina Historical Review (1942): 364. 61 William Henry Gist to Various Persons, October 5, 1860, excerpted from John G. Nicholay and John G. Hay, Abraham Lincoln: A History, (New York: The Century Co, 1914), 306‐307

29 any initiative to have South Carolina depart first would be futile. In order to placate the cooperationists,

Gist needed to obtain some basis of support from other governors.62

The replies from other Southern governors, while not steadfast guarantees for cooperation and mutual support during the process of secession, assuaged some of the concerns held by many South

Carolinians. While no state was willing to lead the Gulf States outside of the Union, all of them, except

Louisiana, were sure that if another “Cotton State” were to be the first move, then their state would be sure to follow. Governor Pettus in Mississippi assured Gist that “if any State moves, I think Mississippi will go with her.”63 Governor Moore suggested that if South Carolina were to exit the Union, Alabama would almost assuredly cooperate with her and would be more than willing to provide military aid if the federal government attempted to coerce them back into the Union.64 Governor Brown of Georgia coyly suggested that events transpiring in different states had a great effect upon public opinion within his state, and there were no guarantees that the Peach State would remain within the Union if another state were to depart or if the safety of Georgia or any other Southern state was threatened by the federal government.65

These replies were necessary to achieve the confidence of the legislature and the people of

South Carolina. Without the support of Georgia, Mississippi, or Alabama, most cooperationists within the state legislature were unwilling to consider the idea of secession.66 But the Georgia railroad organizers served to alter the perception of other states’ willingness to undertake secession. The fact that Georgians exhorted South Carolinians to accelerate the pace of secession so that their home‐state

62 Edgar B. Walter, South Carolina: A History, (Columbia SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1998): 350. 63 John Pettus to William Henry Gist, October 10, 1860, excerpted from John G. Nicholay and John G. Hay, Abraham Lincoln: A History, (New York: The Century Co, 1914), 308. 64 Moore to Gist, October 35, 1860, excerpted from John G. Nicholay and John G. Hay, Abraham Lincoln: A History, (New York: The Century Co, 1914), 309. 65 Brown to Gist, October 31, 1860, excerpted from John G. Nicholay and John G. Hay, Abraham Lincoln: A History, (New York: The Century Co, 1914), 310. 66 Cauthen, “South Carolina’s Decision to Lead the Secession Movement,” 367.

30 would be forced to organize and follow suit convinced many South Carolinians that Georgia was a willing ally in the project of secession.

Cooperationism initially floundered due to the slow pace of secession in other states, but was eventually bolstered by news that other states were eagerly pursuing secession. South Carolina had already committed to seceding, most other states had yet to confirm the dates for their secession conventions. Wary that South Carolina may yet again be left alone to face down the federal government, South Carolinians were eager to persuade other Southerners to expedite their secession process. States Rights Gist attempted to convince Mississippi Governor John Pettus that they were late for a date with history: “We [South Carolina] have opened the Ball; all our Federal officers have resigned. Federal Judge, attorney, marshals, collectors &c. I send you papers, indicating our action & sentiment…South Carolina leads the way, will not Mississippi stand by her side? The excitement here is intense, our people are all right”67 Fearful that the events of 1832 and 1850 were going to be repeated,

South Carolinians were overjoyed when their commissioners to various statehouses across the South reported very favorable situations. Legislatures in Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, and Alabama voted to convene Secession Conventions of their own and voiced their strong sympathies towards the people of

South Carolina and their actions. And, in the Palmetto State, the election of a Buchanan administrator helped to reinforce the perception of South Carolina’s moderation.

Francis Pickens was a Democratic party functionary and was not an ideological secessionist prior to his election as governor of South Carolina. In his early political career, Pickens was a close associate of John C. Calhoun. But, the two had a falling‐out when Pickens supported James K. Polk and the

National Democrat platform during the Mexican War, much to Calhoun’s dismay.68 Pickens’s rupture with Calhoun ended his political career for a brief period. Others interpreted his support of Polk and

67 States Rights Gist to John J. Pettus, November 8, 1860, Gilder‐Lehrman Collection. 68 John B. Edmunds, “Francis Wilkinson Pickens,” American National Biography Online, www.anb.org, April 15, 2011.

31 his moderate stance on secession as support for the National Democratic party, and he became known as a party hack after he was awarded the ministership to Russia in 1857. During his time as Minster to

Russia, he was very close to the Buchanan administration as well as the Democratic party. In September of 1860, Pickens resigned his post and returned to South Carolina to run for the governorship. On his return voyage, Buchanan counseled Pickens to remain moderate and to use his influence to quell the secessionist craze springing up in South Carolina.69 Pickens affirmed his loyalty to the Union and the

Democratic party and his opposition to secession in a letter to Benjamin Perry as late as August of

1860.70 Many South Carolinians characterized Pickens as an administration insider and a political hack, which was incapable of leading South Carolina out of the Union.

Pickens however, would change his tone once he arrived in South Carolina. While he was previously known as an opponent to disunion, in the campaign for governor he espoused an almost steadfast belief in secession.71 This dramatic change of heart was questionable to many hard‐line secessionists. Pickens extricated himself from the faction‐driven politics of South Carolina when he accepted his post at St. Petersburg and was thus amenable to many South Carolina legislators. The combination of his moderation, his political connections and his recent conversion to the secessionist viewpoint made Pickens the perfect compromise candidate. While a handful of unionists such as

Benjamin Perry thought they had a steadfast ally in their devotion to the Union, others thought that

Pickens would be an ideal choice to win concessions from Buchanan and to sway other Southern executives. Pickens’s relative obscurity assured that he would not overpower other Southern governors.

Furthermore, his history of moderation helped to convince other Southerners that South Carolina was not brashly leading the Gulf States out of the Union, but was instead carefully contemplating the concept of disunion. As a result, Pickens was selected by a majority of the state legislature to be the

69 Ibid. 70 Hettle, Peculiar Democracy, 111. 71 Ibid, 112.

32 next governor of South Carolina. Pickens began his term of governor on December 17, 1860, a mere three days before the passage of South Carolina’s Ordnance of Secession. The moderation and level‐ headedness that appealed to South Carolina legislators allowed the state to effectively navigate the Fort

Sumter Crisis and win the support of other Southern states in the cause of disunion.

Just a few weeks after his election, Governor Francis Pickens was forced to spurn an invitation to a conference called by Virginia to achieve a compromise with the Northern States over slavery. Instead,

Pickens recommended that the legislature send delegates to a convention in Montgomery, Alabama.

The purpose of this convention, according to Pickens was the formation of:

“a common Government for the States that have seceded: and by efficient organization to secure their permanent independence beyond the reach of any contingency. It would obviously be impolitic for this State to send delegates to a meeting at Washington City appointed for that same day, to meet the States of the North with a view to preserve or to reconstruct the Federal Union with them, when we have agreed first to meet our sister seceding States, to whom we our deepest obligations, and feel bound by every tie to make no compromises with any other Powers until we have first formed with them a separate and independent Union.”72

The expected cooperation of other Southern states rendered compromise with the North and conciliatory gestures towards Virginia useless. The stated goals of the South Carolina secession movement had been achieved and the Palmetto State could feel secure within the soon to be formal guarantee of mutual aid and support between the Gulf States who had also pursued secession independently, but with cooperation firmly expected. Pickens’s statement to the South Carolina legislature belied the confidence that many South Carolinians now felt about the prospect of secession.

Previously, the secessionists sought to enlist Virginia in their movement and have that state lead, but the strategy now shifted. With support secured from Gulf States such as Georgia, Mississippi

72 Francis Pickens to the Speaker and Members of the Hour of Representatives, January 27, 1861, in Confederate Imprints Collection 1861‐1865 Microfilm (New Haven CT: Research Publications, 1974) Reel 58, Microfilm 2099. P&W 4040, Boston Athaeneum Library, Boston.

33 and Alabama, South Carolinians felt comfortable departing first with the understanding that a Southern

Confederacy would be formed at the convention in Montgomery. A year prior to the convention at

Montgomery, South Carolina chose to send a delegate to the Virginia assembly in the hope that he would be able to convince Virginia to lend its political clout to the secession movement. Fearful that

South Carolina’s reputation for radicalism and extremism would deter many other states from joining the secession movement, the South Carolina High Commissioner was designed to impart the Virginia the image of a moderate South Carolina. Fearful that any secession movement would fail if it was led by their home‐state, South Carolinians desperately sought the cooperation of the Old Dominion. However, once support for secession had been secured from the important gulf‐states, South Carolina was confident that secession would be successful even if South Carolina was the first state to depart.

However, even with the implicit guarantee that other Southern states sought to join in a new confederate government some South Carolinians remained wary of the promised support. Newly‐ elected governor Francis Pickens delayed the inauguration of open hostilities with the North until the new confederacy guaranteed their support with men and materiel. While figures such as Robert

Barnwell Rhett and Edmund Ruffin implored Pickens to attack Fort Moultrie and later, Fort Sumter,

Pickens hedged his language and remained noncommittal in the use of military force to dislodge the military installation’s occupants.73 Pickens remained unconvinced that the rest of the South would aid

South Carolina if it attacked Colonel Robert Anderson’s troops. As a result, he instructed his delegates at the Montgomery Convention to introduce a resolution formally declaring the crisis at Fort Sumter as an issue that the new Confederacy needed to resolve.74

73John B. Edmunds Jr., “Francis W. Pickens and the War Begins,”Proceedings of the South Carolina Historical Association. (1970): 22. 74 Ibid, 28.

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When the Convention accepted responsibility for the crisis at Fort Sumter, Pickens became much more audacious in his tone and approach.75 Abandoning the dilatory language he had utilized up to that point, he now threw himself fully into the secession crisis. The transformation of Pickens’s language and approach to the Fort Sumter crisis revealed South Carolina’s true commitment to secession. While the Palmetto State had already seceded along with a handful of other states, it still remained hesitant to attack the federal government.

Men like Pickens remained apprehensive about the rest of the South and did not want to undertake such a task without the guaranteed cooperation of other states. The Convention’s assumption of responsibility at Fort Sumter, in a way represented the culmination of the South Carolina secession movement. The secession movement’s success relied upon the notion that eventually South

Carolina would be joined by other Southern states in both departing the Union and assuring that the federal government would not coerce them back into the union. The Fort Sumter crisis reshaped the secession movement from a theoretical initiative to a political reality. By forcing other Southern states to commit to the operation in South Carolina politically and militarily, Pickens and South Carolina had effectively produced what the Palmetto States expected; full‐fledged cooperation from other Southern states in the dissolution of the federal Union.

75 Ibid.

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Conclusion: Expectations Fulfilled

The South Carolina secession movement was not a headlong rush into disunion. Instead, it was a calculated and measured process that attempted to cultivate the eventual aid of a coterie of like‐ minded Southern states. The Palmetto state remained fearful that another attempt at secession would fail, but was also keenly aware that the political climate was ripe for disunion. Fully aware of its unsavory reputation for extremism, South Carolina sought to mute their harsh rhetoric in the hope of winning support and cooperation from other Southern states.

South Carolinians first implemented their strategy in the aftermath of John Brown’s Raid at

Harper’s Ferry. The first phase of the secession movement was defined by the formal request of a

Southern conference, a tactic that had been previously used. However, South Carolinians sought to ingratiate themselves with Virginia, the most politically‐prestigious state by deferring to the Old

Dominion. Commissioner Memminger stated the decision to call a conference rested entirely with

Virginia, since it was the state that had been attacked. Memminger, a former moderate and technocrat, was a selected by South Carolina to be the messenger in order to convince Virginians and South

Carolinians who still felt that secession was not a concept espoused only by the radical fringe. South

Carolina hoped to attract the support of lukewarm secessionists who would be turned‐off by a more vitriolic plea for disunion. While this formal request would come to naught, more informal methods reaped huge benefits for the Palmetto State.

The cooperation sought by South Carolina was first evident at the November 9th 1860 railroad completion celebration. The joining of these two coastal patrician Southern towns represented more than just a physical linkage between the Georgia and South Carolina, but could also be interpreted as the culmination of a tentative partnership between South Carolina and the rest of the South. While the iron bound the two states together in commerce, the crowd that gathered there also ensured that the political fortunes of these two states—and like‐minded Southern states— would be woven together

36 over the next few years. The extensive process of correspondence and negotiation between prominent men from the Palmetto and Peach states which had occurred in the preceding months culminated in a staged initiative to push South Carolina into secession, with Georgia not far behind.

The rapid exit of Southern states from the Union was deftly managed by a moderate and former opponent to secession. Pickens was selected as an ideal compromise candidate because of his moderate credentials and a newfound fondness for secession. His absence from Southern politics was a valuable tool in collecting the support of other governors, who would not be overshadowed by his reputation or personality. Additionally, his moderation served to cultivate support from Southerners who were not fond of South Carolina’s extreme reputation. His moderation proved invaluable in the

Fort Sumter crisis. Pickens’s Fabian strategy forced the newly formed Confederacy to assume the responsibility of removing Union troops from Fort Sumter and thus bonded the Gulf States to South

Carolina and the success of secession.

In the year and a half that preceded the Ordnance of Secession, ardent South Carolina tempered her radical reputation in order to acquire support from other Southerners who were wary of the radicalism that South Carolina represented. The assurances of cooperation and sympathy allowed the

Palmetto State to pull away from the Union with the understanding that she would not be jilted by the rest of the South. The Gulf States’ assurance that South Carolina’s secession would be met and followed by her colleagues made disunion a viable option. The expectation of a Southern cooperation was the only mechanism by which South Carolina entertained the prospect of secession. South Carolinians were able to achieve their expectation of cooperation through the use of High Commissioners, backchannel interstate diplomacy, and the leadership of a moderate governor who utilized the focal point of Fort

Sumter as the galvanizing mechanism of the new Confederate States of America.

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Bibliography:

Primary Sources:

Manuscripts Collections:

C.G. Memminger Papers. Southern Historical Collection. University of North Carolina Louis Round Special Collections Library, Chapel Hill. Microfilm Copy. National Historic Publications Commission, 1966.

Confederate Imprints Collection 1861‐1865 Microfilm (New Haven CT: Research Publications, 1974) Reel 58, Microfilm 2099. P&W 4040, Boston Athaeneum Library, Boston

Correspondence: Collected Correspondence. Gilder‐Lehrman Collection, New York City.

Hay, John and John Nicolay. Abraham Lincoln: A History. Volume 2. New York: The Century Co, 1914.

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The Charleston Daily Courier

The Richmond Enquirer

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Memminger, Christopher. The Mission of South Carolina to Virginia, [Baltimore: Press of J. Lucas and Son, 1860?], Library of Congress, Washington DC.

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Boritt, Gabor, ed. Why the Civil War Came. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.

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Cauthen, Charles Edward. South Carolina Goes to War, 1860‐1865. Columbia SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2005.

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Articles:

Cauthen, Edward. “ South Carolina’s Decision to Lead the Secession Movement.” North Carolina Historical Review, 18 (October 1941):360‐372.

Crenshaw, Ollinger. “Christopher G. Memminger’s Mission to Virginia, 1860.” Journal of Southern History 8, no. 3 (August 1942): 334‐349.

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Freehling, William. “The Tortuous Path Toward Secession Part I: The Path Blockaded, 1832‐1859.” North and South: The Official Magazine of the Civil War Conflict 7, No. 2 (March 2004): 12‐20. —. “The Tortuous Path Toward Secession Part II: The Path Narrowly Opened, 1860‐1861.” North and South: The Official Magazine of the Civil War Conflict 10, No. 2 (July 2007): 16‐28.

Ringold, May S. “Robert Newman Gourdin and the ‘1860 Association.’” The Georgia Historical Quarterly, 55, No. 4 (December 1971): 501‐509.

West, Stephen A. “Minute Men, Yeomen, and the Mobilization for Secession in the South Carolina Upcountry.” Journal of Southern History 71, No. 1 (February 2005): 75‐104.

Internet Sources:

Barney, William L. “Christopher Gustavus Memminger.” American National Biography Online. www.anb.org. 03/17/2011.

Edmunds, John B. “Francis Wilkinson Pickens.” American National Biography Online. www.anb.org,. April 15, 2011.

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