The Rise and Fall of the Early ʿabbāsid Political and Military Elite

Hugh Kennedy The Rise and Fall of the Early ʿAbbāsid Political and MilitaryElite

Abstract: This paper explores the composition and role of the military and political elite of the early ʿ Abbāsid caliphate (750 –809) whose support enabled the caliphs to maintain sovereignty over theirfar-flungdomains. It considers the im- portance of different groups,includingmembers of the ʿAbb āsid family, military commanders from Khurāsānand members of powerful and wealthyfamilies like the Muhallabīsa nd the Shaybāni tribal chiefs.The paper concludes with adis- cussion of the reasons for the disappearance and effective extinction of this elite in the yearsafter the great civil warthat followed H ārūnal-Rashīd’s death in 809.

Keywords: Caliphs; armies; political power;Syria; Khurāsān

The governance of the early ʿAbb āsid caliphate was aremarkable political and organizational achievement.For half acentury, between the establishment of the dynasty in 132H/750 CE and the death of Hārūna l-Rashīdin193 H/809 CE, the area from Tunisia in the west to Sind and Central Asia in the east was governedeffectively and largely peacefullyfrom Iraq. From 145H/762 CE, the city of Baghdad served as the administrativecapital, though the distances which separated it from the far-flungprovinces wereenormous: it is over 2,000 kilometres from Baghdad to Merv,the political centre of the great province of Khurāsān, and 1,500 kilometres from the capital to the HolyCity of Mecca. The barīd postal system inherited from the Umayyads and Sasanians was surprisingly effective at communicatingurgent messages over these huge distances.¹ When the caliph al-Rashī ddied in the year 809 at Ṭū s(near Mashhad in north-east Iran) amessenger broughtthe news to Baghdadintwelvedays, trav- eling 1,900 kilometres at an averagespeed of 150 kilometres per day. Similar

Iwillnot be dealing withthe bureaucratic eliteofthe kuttāb or the religious eliteofthe fuqahāʾ and qādīsthatwould require awhole other study.For the general history of early ʿAbbāsid caliphate, Kennedy 2016; El-Hibri 2010, 269–304;Bennison 2009. For earlier studies of the ʿAb- bāsid elitewithfull referencestosources, Crone 1980, esp.173–189, and Kennedy 1981/2016, 73–86.

 On the barīd and the distances covered, see Silverstein2007, 191–193.

OpenAccess. ©2020 Hugh Kennedy, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the CreativeCommons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110669800-005 100 Hugh Kennedy speeds are recorded for the reportingofother crucial events. Not until the inven- tion of the electric telegraph in the late 19th centurywas such swiftness bettered. Information wasclearlyvery important. Enforcement was much slower.Evenwithout opposition or resistance, armies could travel no more than20kilometresaday, and usually managed less. That left plenty of time for aprovincial rebellion to gather support and mo- mentum before the forces of central government arrivedonthe scene. Exercising control and authority over such enormous distances was always going to be dif- ficult,and demands for provincial autonomywerecorrespondingly hard to re- sist. Despite these formidable obstaclesthe ʿAbbāsids maintainedtheirauthority and the cohesion of their caliphate for more than half acentury.Nolater Islamic dynasty established the same degree of authority over so wide and diverse an area. The achievement was not the result of absolutist authority,but of the devel- opment of astable political and military elite, or rather aseries of elites,which at the sametime represented the caliphal governmentinthe provinces and the provinces to the central government in Baghdad. While this must have been true for all large pre-modern empires in the Mid- dle East from the Achaemenids onwards, one factor that distinguishes the ʿAb- bāsid example is the wealth of information that survivesinthe sources about the governmentofthe caliphate. In al-Ṭabarī’sgreat Taʾrīkh al-rusulwa-l- mulūk (History of the Prophets and Kings),² there are enough details to build up adetailed prosopographyofthe ruling elite, of their origins,connections,suc- cesses and failures. This is supplemented by universal chronicles such as al- Yaʿqūbī’s Taʾrīkh (History),³ and provincial accounts such as al-Kindī’s Kitāb WulātMiṣr(Governors of Egypt)⁴ and al-Azdī’s Taʾrīkh al-Mawṣil (History of Mosul).⁵ Despite occasional contradictions, we can trace individual families through several generations in the evidence and getaclear idea of their influence. There is perhaps no other period in earlyIslamic history when so much attention was paid to the appointment of provincial governors and officials far away from the court and capital. It did not last.Bythemid-9th century,the caliphate was dominated by the Turkish and eastern Iranian military of Samarra. Hardly anyinfor- mationsurvivesregardingprovincial appointments and we cannot reliablytrace the names of governors, even of reallyimportant cities such as Basra. The care

 Al-Ṭabarī 1879 – 1901.  Al-Yaʿqūbī 1883.  Al-Kindī 1912.  Al-Azdī 1967. The Riseand Fall of the Early ʿAbbāsid Politicaland MilitaryElite 101 with which earlier annalists recorded this type of information clearlyshows how importantthese people and the offices they held werethen considered to be. The keytothese patterns of provincial power was the office of wālī,which is usually translated as governor.The richness of the sources means we can build up avirtuallycomplete fasti of the governors of all the major provinces of the caliphate from the ʿAbbāsid revolution to the reign of al-Maʾmūn, though (as is onlytobeexpected) thereare some confusions and ambiguities. The identities of the men who held these posts are an invaluable measure of the political com- plexities of the caliphate.The term ʿāmil was alsoemployed to designate this type of provincial official. The sources sometimes make adistinction between the office of wālī, in charge of leading prayers and the people in war,and the ʿāmil,incharge of taxation, but the terms wereoften used interchangeably and the distinction between the twoofficesblurred.⁶ If the annals superficiallymake the caliph appear as apowerful absolute ruler,further down the chain of power the governors displayeffective executive power over military and civil affairs in the province. These areas are often simply characterised as ḥarb and ṣalāt (war and prayer), but when sources like al-Kin- dī’shistory of Egypt allow us to peerbelow the surface, we find governors in a more complicated situation.⁷ The governors of Egypt werethe middle men between the caliph and his government in Baghdad, which was always seeking to extract more tax revenue from this rich province, and the local Muslim elites, who weredetermined to retain as much of the revenue as possible in the local dīwān to paytheir salaries and those of their followers.The governors’ position was made more precarious in thatthey wereusuallyoutsiders with few Egyptian connections;they had to cooperate with or at least not alienate the wujūh,the local Arab Muslim elite. The wujūh wereled by the ṣāḥib al-shurṭa,the chief of police. Unlikethe titular governor,the ṣāḥib al-shurṭa was always chosen from asmall circle of prominent local families and they oftenserved for longer than their ephemeral superiors. At one level this seems aweaksystem of government,ultimatelydependent on the consent of local notables.Inreality the system wasvery resilient: the local Egyptian Muslim elite, who never held office out- side their provinceand seldom left it,werestakeholders in the ʿAbbāsid rule that assured their high status. One of the main reasons for the collapse of the caliphate in the 9th century was the breakingofbonds between Baghdad and local elites by the influx of Turks and eastern Iranians to the topranksofcentral government.

 Foranoverview of the roleofprovincial governors,see EI2, “Amīr” (A.A.Duri).  Kennedy1981,26–38;Kennedy1998, 62– 85; Mikhail 2014,esp. 136–159. 102 Hugh Kennedy

The provincial elite was largely formed by the political genius of the second ʿAbbāsid caliph Abū Jaʿfaral-Manṣūr(136–158 H/754 – 775CE). This cadre governed the vast ʿAbbāsid Empire; its broad-based naturewas vital in keeping the caliphate together politicallyand its disappearanceafter the great civil war that followed the death of al-Rashīdin193 H/809 CE was amajor factor in the caliphate’sbreakup. It is sometimeseasy to forgethow exceptional this pre-war period was and how impressive was the political successthatkept this multi-ethnic, multi-cul- tural state together. In what follows, Iwill investigate some importantconstitu- ents of the elite of this time to determine the sources of its power and the dynam- ics of its political operation. The ʿAbbāsid familyformed an important elementinthis elite.⁸ The caliph’s numerous uncles, the Banū ʿAlī b. ʿAbdallāhb.al-ʿAbbās, and his cousins were appointed to governorates in the western part of the caliphate, notablyinSyria, Egypt and the prosperous and peaceful provinceofsouthern Iraq (most impor- tantlyinthe city of Basra). They did not,however,serveinthe Iranian provinces; al-Saffāḥ’sbrief appointment of one of his uncles as governor of Fārs was abrupt- ly terminatedbyAbūMuslim.⁹ Nor did they serveinthe Caucasus or North Afri- ca, areas likelytosee serious military activity and whereKhurāsānī soldiers were stationed in large numbers. In some cases these ʿAbbāsids formed sub-dynasties passing the title of governor from father to son, for example Ṣāliḥ b. ʿAlī (d. 152 H/769CE) and his sons al-Faḍl(d. after 163H/780 CE) and ʿAbdal-Malik (d. 196 H/811–12 CE) in Syria, and Sulaymānb.ʿAlī (d. 142H/759–60 CE) and his son Muḥammad(d. 173H/789 CE) in Basra. The grantingofthese prominent roles assured the loyalty of the wider ʿAb- bāsid familytothe ruling branch of the dynasty,discouraginginternecine rebellion or usurpation. Governors also provided afocus of dynastic loyalty for the people of the provinces. This is especiallyclear in the caseofSyria.Manyele- ments in this large and potentiallyturbulent provincefound themselvesexclud- ed from positions in the armywith the end of Umayyad rule, but the patronage of Ṣāliḥ and his sons assured the continuingloyalty of at least some of them to the ʿAbbāsids. Thiswas made very clear during the shortreign of al-Amīn, when ʿAbdal-Malik b. Ṣāliḥ was able to recruit large numbers of Syrians to support the caliph against the eastern Iranian armies of his brother al-Maʾmūn.¹⁰

 This section expands on Kennedy1981/2016,73–95,where Ifirst began to investigatethe elite of the early ʿAbbāsid caliphate.  Al-Ṭabarī 1879 – 1901, iii, 71– 72.  Al-Ṭabarī 1879 – 1901, iii, 841–845. The Rise and Fallofthe Early ʿAbbāsid Politicaland Military Elite 103

Members of the ʿAbbāsid familywerealso wealthyproperty owners; for example, Ṣāliḥ b. ʿAlī,who took over most of the extensive property in northern Syria developedbyMaslama b. ʿAbdal-Malik and other Umayyad princes. This meant that even when they held no formal governmentposition, the ʿAbbā- sids retained influenceintheirprovinces. Although they visited the caliphal court in Baghdad, it seems thatthey resided in their own districts most of the time. It is clear that al-Rashīd, or rather his Barmakid mentors,sought to under- mine the power of these sub-dynasties. Upon Muḥammad b. Sulaymān’sdeath in Basra, his house and vast fortune were confiscated by the caliph. Neither his brother Jaʿfar or anychildren he mayhavehad wereallowed to inherit his position in the city.Similarly, ʿAbdal-Malik b. Ṣāliḥ spent the lastsix years of Hārūn’sreign in prison because the caliphwas apprehensive about the power he wielded in Syria. Members of the familywerestill property owners in comfort- able circumstances but theirplace in the political elite was greatlydiminished. After the death of ʿAbdal-Malik b. Ṣāliḥ in 195H/811 CE no ʿAbbāsid remained who could rallythe Syrians to the support of the caliph as he and his father had been able to. During the 3rd century H/9th century CE, the role of the ʿAbbāsid familywas greatlyrestricted. No members of the dynasty governed provinces or commanded armies except for the caliph,those of his children designated as heirs, and occa- sionallyabrother—as in the case of al-Muwaffaq, brother of the caliph al-Muʿta- mid (r.256–279H/870 – 892CE) and leader of the campaign against the Zanj in southern Iraq. With these changes, the ruling dynasty became disconnected from the inhabitants of manyofthe provinces, for whom the ʿAbbāsid familybecame an absent and increasinglyirrelevant group. Some other families who had been important in Umayyad times continued to be powerful under the new regime,either because they opposed the later Umayyads or because they offered support to the new dynasty allowing their previous allegiance to the old rulers to be convenientlyoverlooked. The most nota- ble of these families werethe Muhallabīs.¹¹ Originallyfrom the Azd tribes of ʿUmān, the Muhallabīsrose to prominenceinUmayyad serviceand playeda major role in defeating the Khārijite rebellions that threatened the caliphate in Fārs and other areas of Iran. Al-Muhallab and his son Yazīdhad been major figures in Umayyad politics, but in the laterdecades of Umayyad rule they had been marginalised. However,they still retained power and influenceinthe

 Forthe general history of the family, see EI2, “Muhallabids” (P.Crone), and Crone1980, 133–35.For their roleinthe ʿAbbāsid elite, Kennedy1981/2016,82–3, 190 –2. 104 Hugh Kennedy city of Basra, and on the approach of the ʿAbbāsid armies in 132 H/749CEthey brought the city over to the cause of the new dynasty.Overthe comingdecades, they were rewarded with important provincial governorates and military commands, notablyinEgypt and North Africa and eventuallyinSind as well. In North Africa they formed aminor dynasty referred to manycenturies laterby the local historian Ibn ʿIdhārī (d. c. 712H/1312 CE)¹² as the dawlat al-muhāliba. If thingshad turned out differently, it might well have been the Muhallabīs rather than the Aghlabids who wereremembered as the first independent rulers of Muslim Ifrīqiya (Tunisia). In the event,their rule was terminatedbythe caliph al-Rashīdand their evanescent dawla disappeared. Nonetheless, the history of the familyshows clearlythat the ʿAbbāsidshad no qualms about making use of the talents and influence of these important supporters of the previous dynasty.The Muhallabīsbrought with them influenceinBasraitself and in the Basran trading networks thatled from North Africa through Egypt (where there wereMu- hallabī governors) to Basraand the Gulf and finallytoSind (wherethere were also Muhallabī governors). In return for governorships, the familybroughtthe caliph influenceinareas where ʿAbbāsid armies seldom reached. It could be ar- gued that the Muhallabīsmediated caliphal soft power in the southern fringes of the empire and among the merchant and commercial classes. The most importantsourceofmilitary power for the caliphswas the group known collectivelyasthe quwwād. The term qāʾid (pl. quwwād)isone of anumber of Arabic words for leadership used throughout Arabic historiography. In the early ʿAbbāsid period the term had an almost technical meaning,describingthe cadre of military officers who formedthe backbone of the contemporary ʿAbbā- sid army. By tracing the careers of members of some of these families, we can establish aprofile of the group and their trajectories. Among the well-known families werethose of Mālik b. al-Haytham al-Khuzāʿī,Musayyib b. Zuhayr and al-Ḍabbī, ʿUthmānb.Nahīkal-ʿAkkī, ʿĪsā b. Māhānand others. HereI have chosen to concentrate on two, the families of Khuzayma b. Khāzim al- Tamīmī and Qaḥṭaba b. Shabībal-Ṭāʾī.Ishall also discuss the familyofMaʿn b. Zāʾida al-Shaybānī,who though their origins weredifferent had much in com- mon with the other quwwād dynasties. Almost all the quwwād came from Khurāsān. The first known members of this elite joined the armies of the ʿAbbāsid revolution from 130 H/747CEon- wards.Manyofthem had served Abū Muslim, the leader of the revolution in Khurāsān, but changed their allegiance to the caliph al-Manṣūrafter Abū Mus- lim’sexecution. They all bore Arabic names and their nisbasshow that they

 Ibn ʿIdhārī 1948. The Rise and Fallofthe Early ʿAbbāsid Politicaland Military Elite 105 claimed to be descended from well-known Arab tribes. Whether this is actually true or they wereIranian mawālī who wanted to claim Arab origin is impossible to ascertain. They seem to have been Arabic speakingand the languageofthe armywas probablyArabic, though it is likelythat the Arabic-Persian hybrid lan- guagewenow know as New Persian wasdeveloped in their ranks at this time.¹³ The non-Muslim populations of the Jazīra werecertainlyaware of their eastern origins,and describe them as Persians.¹⁴ This elite had anumber of distinctive features.Firstlyitwas geographically mobile. Members typicallyserved in different provinces of the caliphate, return- ing to Baghdad between terms of office to be givennew appointments. Alterna- tivelythey might enjoy aperiod of office in the capital itself by serving as members of the elite military units attached to the caliphal court, the shurṭa (police) and the ḥaras (guard). When they were appointed to governorships or military commands, this wassymbolised by the handingoverofaliwāʾ or banner of office. They were, in fact,anelite who owed their loyalty to Baghdad and the caliphate rather than to the provinces they governed, atrulypan-imperial cadre. The leading figures among the quwwād retained contacts in the Khurāsānī places wheretheir families originated. They maywellhavereturned on visits and almost all the major families producedatleast one provincial governor. At the sametime they were alsogiven properties called qaṭāʾiʿ (sing. qaṭīʿa)in Baghdad.¹⁵ Typicallythese included dwelling houses, amarket,asquare (raḥba)and sometimesamosque. They settled their troops in these urban quar- ters,wherethe men could benefit from the commercial opportunities afforded by the expandingnew capital. It is likelythat the quwwād families recruited soldiers from theirnative Khurāsānand from those of Khurāsānī descent who had settled in Baghdad. They maywellhavebeen responsible directlyfor the payment of salaries to their men, but we have no clear information regarding this. The composition of the military following of the first familyofquwwād stud- ied here repays more detailed examination. The familyofKhāzim b. Khuzayma al-Tamīmī¹⁶ was closelyconnected with his town of origin: Marw al-Rūdh, a small city on the Murghābriver whose site now lies on the border between Uz- bekistan and Afghanistan. When he was sent to ʿUmānin751/2 to fight the Khāri-

 Bulliet 2009,140 –142, argues that New Persian emergedasalanguageused by cotton trad- ers to do business.Iwould arguethat it is at least as possible that it emergedamongthe Khurāsānī military contingents led by the ʿAbbāsid period quwwād.  The Chronicle of Michael the Syrian (1899–1910) makes this very clear.  Forthe distribution of properties in Baghdad, see al-Yaʿqūbī 1892, 140 – 55,now available in an English translation, al-Yaʿqūbī 2018, I, 73 – 87.  Crone 1980,180 –1; Kennedy1981/2016,81–2. 106 Hugh Kennedy jite rebels,his forces consisted of men from his ahl (family), his ʿashīra (tribe), his mawālī (freedmen), the people of Marw al-Rūdh and some Tamīmīswho joined him as he passed through Basra. All these men wereinsome waydepend- ent on or related to him. Four years laterhewas fighting Khārijite rebelsagain, this time in the Jazīra with 8,000 men of Marw al-Rūdh. In 758 – 759hewas or- dered back to Khurāsāntofight the governor,who had rebelled against the caliph. On his approach the people of Marw al-Rūdh rose up against the rebels, captured their leader and handed him over to Khāzim, showing that despite some ten years absenceinthe west he stillretained close links to his native town. When he died, his power and position passed to his son Khuzayma, who was able to raise 5,000 armed supporters in Baghdad on the night in 169 H/786CEwhen the caliph al-Hādī died. The familyowned aprestigious house in acentral part of Baghdad, strategicallyplaced at the east end of the city’s main bridge of boats. In 198 H/813 CE, though Khāzim himself was old and blind, this house became ameeting place for supporters of al-Amīnwho wished to negotiate his peaceful surrendertoṬāhir and the supporters of al-Maʾmūn.¹⁷ We are well informed about the familyofKhāzim because of the high-profile campaigns he fought in, but he was likelytypical of the qāʾid cadre. He raised the troops he commanded and he probablydistributed their pay. He was in fact not amere employee of the caliph, but (along with the rest of his family) acontractorwho needed to be rewarded and respected for his services.Without the loyalty of such figures, the caliph would have been unable to maintain control over his vast empire. Another typical familyofquwwād were the descendants of Qaḥṭabab.Sha- bībal-Ṭāʾī,¹⁸ but the trajectory of this elite familyisrather different from that of Khāzim. Qaḥtaba came from the same Arab-Khurāsānī background as Khāzim. He had been the leader of the armyAbūMuslim sent to the west to install the ʿAbbāsids as caliphs, and would certainlyhaveenjoyed aleading position under the new regime if he had not been killed crossingthe Euphrates in the final stages of the campaign. He left two adultsons, al-Ḥasan and Ḥumayd, who both enjoyed long but very different careers in the ʿAbbāsid imperial elite. Al-Ḥasan took over his father’scommand and joined the siegeofthe last Umayyad governor Yazīdb.Hubayrainthe old Umayyad garrison city of Wāsiṭ.Herehecame in contact with the caliph’sbrother Abū Jaʿfar,later caliph himself under the title al-Manṣūr. Together they forced the surrenderofthis last outpost of Umayyad resistance.

 Al-Ṭabarī 1879 – 1901, III, 916.  Forthis family, see Crone1980,188–189;Kennedy1981/2016,79–80. The Riseand Fall of the Early ʿAbbāsid Politicaland MilitaryElite 107

The bond the two menstruck up was the foundationofal-Ḥasan’ssubse- quent career.Hefollowed the future caliphwhen he became governorofthe Jazīra and provided him with crucial support in his final showdown with Abū Muslim in 755. He spent most of the rest of his long career on the Byzantine frontier and in Armenia. Hereheworked closelywith military leaders in the frontier districts(the thughūr),leading expeditions deep in Byzantine territory and leading projects like the rebuildingofthe frontier fortress of Malaṭya. Like all the leading quwwād he wasgiven property in Baghdad (includingastreet,a rabaḍ and houses) on which to settle his Khurāsānī followers.Hedied in 181 H/797CEatthe ageof84, full of years and distinction. By contrast, his brother Ḥumayd was in some ways the black sheep of the family. He made anumber of unwise career decisions thatwould normally have resultedindisgrace, if not execution. The fact that he survivedshows how dependent successive caliphs wereonthe support and loyalty of these Khurāsānī families. While al-Ḥasan attached himself to the future caliph al-Man- ṣūr, his younger brother took the side of the caliph’suncle ʿAbdallāhb.ʿAlī when he challenged al-Manṣūrfor the supreme title. However, ʿAbdallāhalso sought the support of the Syrian military elites who had supported the Umayyads. Deep-seated tensions between them and Ḥumayd’sKhurāsānī followers meant he desertedbefore the final battle thatsaw al-Manṣūrvictorious. Despite Ḥumayd’ssupport of al-Manṣūr’srival, he was appointed governor of Egypt just five years later in 142H/759 CE. He subsequentlyjeopardised his position yetagain at the time of the great ʿAlīdrebellion led by Muḥammad the Pure Soul in 145 H/762CE, when he fled the battlefield and almost caused adisastrous panic in the ʿAbbāsid army. Once more he was rehabilitated, serving as governor of Armenia and finallyinthe most powerful position open to anyof the Khurāsānī military elite: as governor of Khurāsānfrom 151 H/768CEuntil his death in 159 H/776CE. Likehis brother,hehad properties in Baghdad. Both al-Ḥasan’sand Ḥumayd’ssons carried on the family tradition. The third generation playedanimportant role in supportingal-Amīnagainst his brother al-Maʾmūninthe great ʿAbbāsid civil war after the death of al-Rashīd. Like most of these families, the descendants of Qaḥṭabab.Shabīblost everything during the long conflict.Their properties in Baghdad were destroyed and their connections with Khurāsāncut off.They werecompletelyexcluded from government office during the caliphates of al-Maʾmūnand al-Muʿtaṣim. Not all of the families who constituted the military elite wereofKhurāsānī origin and not all had supported the ʿAbbāsid revolution. The familyofMaʿn 108 Hugh Kennedy b. Zāʾida in fact brokemost of the rules that might lead to advancement.¹⁹ They werethe most prominent of the ashrāf (nobles) of the bedouin tribe of Shaybān, which dominatedmost of the northern Iraqi steppes.They had asubstantial following among their fellow tribesmenand could bring experiencedand hardy warriors to serveinthe ʿAbbāsid armies—but they also had fierceand deter- mined enemieswithin their own tribe. As tribal leaders, they wereopposed by Khārijite groups from Shaybānand by other tribes bitterlyhostile to the ashrāf who served both Umayyad and ʿAbbāsid caliphates. Maʿnb.Zāʾida had been aleading supporter of the last Umayyad caliphMar- wānII; he went so far as to claim that it was he who killed Qaḥṭabab.Shabībat time of the crossingofthe Euphrates.Those two facts would have made relations with the new regime strained, to put it mildly. With his record, it would seem most improbable that his familywould enjoy elite status under the ʿAbbāsid caliphs. Yetthat proved the case. Maʿnwent perfunctorilyinto hiding after the fall of the Umayyads but he was clearlyhovering,looking for an opportunity to in- gratiate himself with al-Manṣūr. His chance came with the rebellion of the Rāw- andiyya, agroup of radical Shīʿites,inBaghdad. It caught the caliph off his guard and Maʿnwas present to save his life. After this al-Manṣūrrecognised that Maʿn, along with his Shaybānī tribesmen, was avaluable supporter.He was sent on distant and unglamorous postingstoplaces likeYamanand Sīstān, and was killed in 152 H/772–773CEinBust(in the modernHelmand provinceof southern Afghanistan) when agroup of Khārijites dugthrough the flatroof of his house and surprised him. He seems to have left no sons. His position within the tribe and his feud with the Khārijites was inherited by his nephewYazīdb.Mazyad, whom Khārijites pursued to Baghdad and attempted to murder on the city’sbridge of boats. Yazīdb.Mazyad became aleadingmilitary commander in the reign of al- Mahdī but found himself on the wrongsideofamajor political conflict when the caliph was succeeded by his son Mūsā al-Hādī.Mūsāenjoyed strong support among military leaders and Yazīdplayedanimportant part in this. He is said to have been among those who urgedthe new caliph to removehis brother Hārūn from the succession and to execute his mentor and leading supporter Yaḥyā the Barmakid. In the event,the sudden death of Mūsā al-Hādī and Hārūn’saccession meant that Yazīd, like other quwwād,was in deep disgrace and perhaps lucky to escape with his life. Apart from ashort spell as governor of Armenia, Yazīdremained in the political wilderness for almost adecade until the caliph was once more in need of

 Forthis family, see Crone1980,169 – 170. The Rise and Fall of the Early ʿAbbāsid Politicaland MilitaryElite 109 his military abilities and tribal following.The Jazīra was disturbed by awide- spread Khārijite rebellion led by the charismatic and romantic figure of al- Walīdb.Ṭarīfal-Shārī,who was said to have been from the sameShaybānī tribe as Yazīd. The forces sentbythe Barmakid administration were unable to deal with these fast-moving opponents until, despite the advice of Yaḥyā b. Khāl- id, the caliphcalled on the services of Yazīd. He led his tribal following (ʿashīra) against the enemy, defeated the rebels and killed their leader al-Walīd, whose grief-stricken sister composed one of the greatest lamentsinclassical Arabic lit- erature on his death. Yazīdwas now firmlyback in favour with the caliph. His career prospered and he served HārūninKhurāsān, on the Byzantine frontier and in Armenia, wherehedied in 185H/801 CE. His son Asadinherited his tribalfollowing and it would seem his prestige. During the great civil war,hewas avigorous supporter of al-Amīnand was known as fāris al-ʿarab,the ‘knight of the Arabs’.Like his father and uncle, he was looked up to as an exemplar of the ancient bedouin virtuesofcourage and generosity.Unfortunately, the defeat of al-Amīnmeant that Asad lost power and influence. He had no place in the new ʿAbbāsid caliphate as it was reconstructed by al-Maʾmūnand al-Muʿtaṣim; Arab tribalfollowingswerenot al- lowed to participate in the new military organization of the time, dominated as it was by eastern Iranians and Turks. However,unlike manyofthe other quwwād families under discussion here, the Shaybānī ashrāf reinvented themselves, sur- vivedand prospered. In 171H/787 CE Hārūnhad appointed Yazīdb.Mazyad as governor of Azer- bayjan,aprovincerequiringafirm military hand to keep the locals peaceful whilst defending them from the Khazars to the north.²⁰ When he died in the provincial capital of Bardhaʿa, his son Asad was appointed to succeed him. It seems as if the family connection with the provincecontinued. In 245H/859–860 CE the caliph al-Mutawakkil appointed Yazīd’sgrandson Muḥammad b. Khālid as governorofBābal-Abwāb(Derbent) and its surrounding districts. “He rebuilt the city of Ganjaand was granted it and the estates (ḍiyāʿ)inthe area as heredi- tary possessions (irthan)”. With the assassination of al-Mutawakkil in the next year,caliphal control over the Caucasus effectivelycollapsed and left the familyincontrol. In the years to come the descendants of Maʿnb.Zāʾida changed theircollective identity and with it their familial claim to leadership.Instead of being ashrāf of Shaybān, they took the ancient Iranian title of ShirvānShāhand claimed descent from the

 Forthe complicated events takingplaceinAzerbayjan in the 3rd century H/9th century CE, see Madelung 1975,243 – 249. 110 Hugh Kennedy semi-mythical Sāsānian hero Bahram Gur.²¹ Beginning with Manuchehr,who succeeded in 418H/1028CE, the members of the familybore Persian rather than Arab names. The dynasty survivedinthe eastern Caucasusinone form or another until the mid–13th century,coincidentallydisappearingatalmost the same time as the ʿAbbāsidsfinally lost Baghdad. The Shaybānī elite survivedwhen other families of quwwād lost their status and identityfor anumber of reasons.The most important was their enjoyment of tribal support that was not necessarilydependent on salaries from the dīwān in Baghdad or revenues from Khurāsān. Though the tribe was clearly divided between supporters of the ashrāf and supporters of the Khārijites,there weretribes- men who had followed theirleaders and settled in Azerbayjan wherethe family established their power base in later generations, having an almosthereditary position in the eastern Caucasus before the death of Hārūnand the great civil war.Although they foughtonthe losing side that time, they had apower base beyond the reach of al-Maʾmūnand his victorious general Ṭāhir.Theydid not even suffer from the loss of their property in Baghdad after the civil war,because seemingly they never had any. As we have seen, the familysurvived, but onlyby adaptingthemselvestonew circumstances in new areas and adopting an entire- ly new political personality:asIranian shahs,not Arab ashrāf. The lastfamilyIwant to consider in detail is that of al-Ashʿath b. Qays al- Kindī.Their history illustrates another pattern of continuity and survival among the elite of the Umayyad and early ʿAbbāsid caliphates.Descended from the kingsofthe great south Arabian tribe of Kinda,the familyofal-Ashʿath came from the highest echelonsofthe pre-Islamic Arab nobility.Al-Ashʿath himself had pledgedallegiance to the Prophet but joined the ridda (apostasy) after his death. Despite this, because of their status as triballeaders the familystill remained influential among the Kindīswho settled in Iraq duringthe Umayyad period. Al-Ashʿath’sgrandson, ʿAbdal-Raḥmān, led the lastgreat,unsuccessful rebellion of the ashrāf of the Iraqi tribes against the Umayyads in 82 H/701CE. Under the early ʿAbbāsids, the Kindī leaders enjoyedamodest revival of their power,with several of theirmembers appointed as governors of Kufa. Unlikethe Shaybānīs, who could clearlymobilise anomad forcefrom their tribesmen,the influenceofthe Kindīsseems to have been urban and based in the city of Kufa. Though they never reachedthe top ranks of the ʿAbbāsid elite, they wereimportant in securing the loyalty of the people of Kufa to the ʿAb- bāsid cause, especiallywhen facedwith the ʿAlīdrebellion of Muḥammadthe Pure Soul in Medina in 145 H/762CE. Thefact that the city,soturbulent in

 See Vacca 2017,144–145. The Rise and Fall of the Early ʿAbbāsid Politicaland MilitaryElite 111

Umayyad times, was peaceful throughout the first ʿAbbāsid half-century must have been in part due to their influence. This was the family that produced the famous intellectual Yaʿqūbb.al-Sibāh al-Kindī,known as the ‘philosopher of the Arabs’.Like manyofthe leading figures in Kufa, he had movedtoBaghdad as the city lost economic and political status in favour of the capital. Yaʿqūbseems to have built up his famous library from the wealth he inherited from his illustrious family, but appears to have had no personal military or political ambitions himself. With his death, we lose touch with the family, but their story is an interesting one of elite survivaland progres- sive adaptation to the Rāshidūn, to the Umayyads and to the ʿAbbāsids. They moved from tribal leaders, to defeated rebels,tofunctionaries of the ʿAbbāsid state, and finally to the intellectual eminence that ensuredthe Kindī name was the onlyone of the early ʿAbbāsid elite families to remainwell-known in later centuries,asits reputation spread to the cathedral schools and universities of western Europe. The dominance of this early ʿAbbāsid elite was ended by the great civil war that followed the death of the caliph al-Rashīdin193 H/809 CE. His son al-Amīn enjoyed the support of most of the early ʿAbbāsid elite. LedbyʿAlī b. ʿĪsā b. Māhān, the quwwād of the Khurāsāniyyaweredefeated near Rayy in northern Iran by the much smaller armyofthe supporters of al-Maʾmūn. Although some figures of the elite remained at al-Maʾmūn’scourt, the armycommanders (notably Ṭāhir b. al-Ḥusayn) came from eastern Iranian families with no previous connection with the ʿAbbāsid court.They had been thoroughlyalienated from it by the harsh taxation policies of ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā. This defeat,and the subsequent siegeand ruin of Baghdad, destroyed the power base of much of the elite. The quwwād no longer enjoyed the financial support of the government to recruit and paytheir followers,and they were cut off and excluded from their ancestral homes in Khurāsān. None of the quwwād families who had dominated the military structures of the early ʿAbbā- sid caliphate playedany important role in the caliphate re-established by al- Maʾmūnand al-Muʿtaṣim. The onlymember of the group known to us is Naṣr al-Khuzāʿī—and not as asupporter of the caliphate, but as the man who led the rebellion in Baghdad protesting the enforcement of the doctrineofthe creat- edness of the Qurʾān. It was not onlythe quwwād whose power was destroyed by the comingofthe new order.The members of the ʿAbbāsid familywho had playedsuch important roles in the early ʿAbbāsid elite, representing the family(so to speak)inthe great cities of Basraand Kufa, in the sawād of Iraq, Syria and sometimes Egypt,dis- appear at this time from the political stage. It is asign of the changes in the early 3rd century hijrī that the sources no longer tell us the names of the governors of 112 Hugh Kennedy these great cities and provinces, except when they are involved in some disturb- ance or battle likethe defence of Basraagainst the Qarāmiṭa. When we are told their names, they are always members of the Turkish and eastern Iranian military,not members of the ruling family.Weare informed incidentallythat the descendants of the great ʿAbdal-Malik b. Ṣāliḥ,effective ruler of much of northern Syria,still livedinthe neighbourhood of Manbij where he had constructed a celebrated palace, but there is no indication they playedany part in the political life of the province. The provincial elites could no longer look to the patronage and protection of ‘their’ members of the ruling family, and this connection with the dynasty was lost. The elite of the early ʿAbbāsid caliphate is remarkable in Islamic history because of its variety,its broad base and its manycontacts.Wecannot understand the history of this great dynasty unless we look beyond the narrativeofthe ac- tions of the caliphs to thosewho supported and influenced them.

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