“ China Gives and China Takes” African Traders and the Nondocumenting States
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“ China gives and China takes” African traders and the nondocumenting states Shanshan Lan Abstract: Based on ethnographic research in South China’s megacity Guangzhou, this article examines the gaps and contradictions in the central and local Chinese states’ eff orts to regulate migrant traders from Africa. I identify economic inter- ests, everyday racism, and ideological concerns as three major factors in shaping the nonrecording tactics of the Chinese states. Th e article argues that nonrecord- ing is a practical tactic pursued by both the central and local states in order to bal- ance multiple and confl icting interests at the regional, national, and international scales. Due to tensions between diff erent levels of state authorities, China’s policies toward migrants from Africa are marked by sporadic shift s between recording, nonrecording, and derecording, which contribute to the illegibility of issues of im- migration in state bureaucracy. Keywords: Africans, China, immigration, nondocumenting, racism, states Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China were oft en supported by favorable gov- China in 1949, the presence of foreigners in ernment policies. Aft er China’s accession to the the country has been strictly controlled by the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, the state. Th e increase of foreign population in volume and diversity of foreign population in China since the late 1970s has been the result China have signifi cantly increased. According of “a deliberate state policy to utilize foreign to the national census in 2010, which included technology and foreign investment to modern- foreign residents for the fi rst time, there were ize China and to help the country establish a 593,832 foreigners living in mainland China prominent position on the world stage” (Brady (Wang 2011).1 While Beijing and Shanghai are 2000: 946). In the early reform era, the majority noted for the concentration of Western profes- of foreigners in China were white Euro-Ameri- sionals and elites (Wang and Lau 2008; Wu and can professionals who came as investors or top Webber 2004), Guangzhou stands out as host- administrative personnel in multinational cor- ing the largest African diaspora communities in porations. Th ey were generally considered the the country. embodiment of wealth and prestige in popular African migration to South China has been Chinese eyes, and their business activities in boosted by the enormous growth of Sino-African Focaal—Journal of Global and Historical Anthropology 77 (2017): 50–62 © Stichting Focaal and Berghahn Books doi:10.3167/fcl.2017.770105 “China gives and China takes” | 51 trade relations and the increasing presence of gerian man in police custody (Beech 2012; Bran- mainland Chinese enterprises and small entre- igan 2012). On the other hand, Africans remain preneurs in Africa (Alden et al. 2008). Unlike largely invisible as immigrants and contribu- previous generation of Africans in China, who tors to the Chinese economy in offi cial media. were mainly students from elite backgrounds, Th is article attempts to tackle the paradox by this recent wave represents what scholars call examining the gaps and contradictions in the “globalization from below” (Mathews and Vega Chinese states’ eff orts to regulate migrants from 2012). Th e majority of them are individual Africa. It departs from existing literature, which traders and small entrepreneurs who purchase focuses on the repressive side of state immigra- cheap consumer goods in China and ship them tion control by highlighting the various non- back to Africa for sale. Since their transborder documenting strategies practiced by diff erent mobilities are not sponsored by states or trans- levels of state agents (Haugen 2012; Li et al. national corporations, most Africans traders are 2012). I identify economic interests, everyday subjected to intensifi ed immigration control by racism, and ideological concerns as three ma- the Chinese authorities. Only a limited number jor factors in shaping the nonrecording tactics of them manage to obtain long-term visas to of the Chinese states. Despite its resilience from conduct business in China. Th e African popu- the Mao era to the present, the Sino-African lation in Guangzhou is extremely diverse, and friendship discourse has largely been limited almost every country in Africa is represented to state-level interactions and exchanges, and it in the diaspora. According to Adams Bodomo can no longer refl ect the new realities of migra- (2012), the top fi ve groups are Nigerians, Sen- tion between China and Africa at the nonstate egalese, Malians, Guineans, and Ghanaians. and grassroots levels (Strauss 2009). In its ef- About 80 percent of the migrants surveyed by forts to promote a benevolent image of China in Bodomo were between 24 and 40 years old, and Africa, the Chinese state propaganda runs the close to 82 percent of them were men. Th ere are risk of perpetuating the asymmetrical nature of no available government statistics on the exact Sino-African economic relations. To a certain number of Africans in Guangzhou. According extent, the nonrecording strategies practiced by to some scholarly estimates, the number of doc- diff erent levels of Chinese government refl ect umented Africans in the city is probably around the tensions between political ideology, eco- 20,000, while the number of the undocumented nomic interests, and increasing antiblack racism remains unknown (Haugen 2012; Li, Ma, et al. at the individual and personal levels. 2009; Yang 2012). Compared to other foreigners, the African experiences in South China are marked by a Unpacking the Chinese state paradox of visibility and invisibility. On the one hand, Africans in Guangzhou are internation- It is a well-known fact that the perfect state is a ally visible due to sensational media reports of myth, and many states are in reality plagued with several protest events. In July 2009, an undocu- “implementation defi ciency,” that is, “an inability mented African was severely injured aft er jump- to put their policies into practice” (Kalir et al. ing from the second fl oor of a trade mall in 2012: 12). As noted by Kalir and Willem van order to evade a passport check by the Chinese Schendel in this issue, state recording practices police. Aft er that, around a hundred Africans are oft entimes “strategic and selective rather than protested in front of a local police station (Tang systemic and pervasive, episodic rather than con- and Gong 2009). On 19 June 2012, the African tinuous.” Th e temporary and selective nature of community was under the spotlight again, when recording practices may leave ample room for open clashes broke out between African traders nonrecording practices by state agents based on and the Chinese police over the death of a Ni- their shift ing priorities, political affi liations, and 52 | Shanshan Lan personal interests. Meanwhile, nonrecording toward migrants from Africa. I argue that ten- practices also serve important purposes for the sions between diff erent levels of state authorities states, be it economic, political, or ideological. constitute one of the key reasons for their vari- Following Kalir and Van Schendel’s call to treat ous nonrecording strategies in regard to immi- nonrecording as a deliberate strategy and an gration control. In other words, nonrecording important modality of state making, I want to is a practical tactic pursued by both the central suggest that nonrecording and recording strate- and local states in order to balance multiple and gies are not contradictory to each other. Rather, confl icting interests at the regional, national, and they complement each other in sustaining the international scales. As one of the fi rst provinces Janus-faced operations of modern states. benefi ting from China’s open door reform and Nonrecording may take many diff erent forms. market economy, the Guangdong government Gordon Mathews and colleagues (2014) note has been granted special privilege by the central the “informal ignoring of formal laws” by state state to try fi rst as an experiment region. How- agents in mainland China and Hong Kong, ever, as an important window for China’s reform who deliberately neglect some semilegal or il- and development, Guangdong is also consid- legal cross-border trade activities because they ered a role model for other provinces to follow. are not worth being prosecuted. Kalir and col- As a result of such intricate power relations, the leagues (2012) pinpoint the active involvement Guangdong state has to tread a fi ne line between of state agents in the production of illegal (in submitting to the central state’s leadership and the eyes of the state) but licit (in the eyes of the improvising its own solutions to local problems. migrants) activities, for example, by their em- Like Japan and South Korea, China is reluc- beddedness in informal transnational brokerage tant to admit its status as an emerging new desti- networks (see also Abraham and Van Schendel nation for immigrants (Seol and Skrentny 2004; 2005). Ananya Roy rejects the binary between Tsuda and Cornelius 2004). Th e Chinese state formal and informal state practices by arguing still treats foreign migrants as a temporary issue, that “informality exists at the very heart of the and there is no offi cial eff ort to integrate them state and is an integral part of the territorial into Chinese society. Following this logic, some practices of state power” (2009: 84). Th is article of the states’ nonrecording practices, such as questions a strict division of recording and non- neglect of the welfare of undocumented Afri- recording by identifying the intricate connec- cans and refusal to offi cially recognize their ex- tions and interactions between the two modes istence, can be interpreted as China’s deliberate of state governance. Due to tensions between tactics to avoid responsibilities toward interna- diff erent levels of state authorities, China’s pol- tional migrants.