“ gives and China takes” African traders and the nondocumenting states

Shanshan Lan

Abstract: Based on ethnographic research in South China’s megacity , this article examines the gaps and contradictions in the central and local Chinese states’ eff orts to regulate migrant traders from Africa. I identify economic inter- ests, everyday racism, and ideological concerns as three major factors in shaping the nonrecording tactics of the Chinese states. Th e article argues that nonrecord- ing is a practical tactic pursued by both the central and local states in order to bal- ance multiple and confl icting interests at the regional, national, and international scales. Due to tensions between diff erent levels of state authorities, China’s policies toward migrants from Africa are marked by sporadic shift s between recording, nonrecording, and derecording, which contribute to the illegibility of issues of im- migration in state bureaucracy. Keywords: Africans, China, , nondocumenting, racism, states

Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China were oft en supported by favorable gov- China in 1949, the presence of foreigners in ernment policies. Aft er China’s accession to the the country has been strictly controlled by the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, the state. Th e increase of foreign population in volume and diversity of foreign population in China since the late 1970s has been the result China have signifi cantly increased. According of “a deliberate state policy to utilize foreign to the national census in 2010, which included technology and foreign investment to modern- foreign residents for the fi rst time, there were ize China and to help the country establish a 593,832 foreigners living in mainland China prominent position on the world stage” (Brady (Wang 2011).1 While Beijing and Shanghai are 2000: 946). In the early reform era, the majority noted for the concentration of Western profes- of foreigners in China were white Euro-Ameri- sionals and elites (Wang and Lau 2008; Wu and can professionals who came as investors or top Webber 2004), Guangzhou stands out as host- administrative personnel in multinational cor- ing the largest communities in porations. Th ey were generally considered the the country. embodiment of wealth and prestige in popular African migration to South China has been Chinese eyes, and their business activities in boosted by the enormous growth of Sino-African

Focaal—Journal of Global and Historical Anthropology 77 (2017): 50–62 © Stichting Focaal and Berghahn Books doi:10.3167/fcl.2017.770105 “China gives and China takes” | 51 trade relations and the increasing presence of gerian man in police custody (Beech 2012; Bran- mainland Chinese enterprises and small entre- igan 2012). On the other hand, Africans remain preneurs in Africa (Alden et al. 2008). Unlike largely invisible as immigrants and contribu- previous generation of Africans in China, who tors to the Chinese economy in offi cial media. were mainly students from elite backgrounds, Th is article attempts to tackle the paradox by this recent wave represents what scholars call examining the gaps and contradictions in the “globalization from below” (Mathews and Vega Chinese states’ eff orts to regulate migrants from 2012). Th e majority of them are individual Africa. It departs from existing literature, which traders and small entrepreneurs who purchase focuses on the repressive side of state immigra- cheap consumer goods in China and ship them tion control by highlighting the various non- back to Africa for sale. Since their transborder documenting strategies practiced by diff erent mobilities are not sponsored by states or trans- levels of state agents (Haugen 2012; Li et al. national corporations, most Africans traders are 2012). I identify economic interests, everyday subjected to intensifi ed immigration control by racism, and ideological concerns as three ma- the Chinese authorities. Only a limited number jor factors in shaping the nonrecording tactics of them manage to obtain long-term visas to of the Chinese states. Despite its resilience from conduct business in China. Th e African popu- the Mao era to the present, the Sino-African lation in Guangzhou is extremely diverse, and friendship discourse has largely been limited almost every country in Africa is represented to state-level interactions and exchanges, and it in the diaspora. According to Adams Bodomo can no longer refl ect the new realities of migra- (2012), the top fi ve groups are Nigerians, Sen- tion between China and Africa at the nonstate egalese, Malians, Guineans, and Ghanaians. and grassroots levels (Strauss 2009). In its ef- About 80 percent of the migrants surveyed by forts to promote a benevolent image of China in Bodomo were between 24 and 40 years old, and Africa, the Chinese state propaganda runs the close to 82 percent of them were men. Th ere are risk of perpetuating the asymmetrical nature of no available government statistics on the exact Sino-African economic relations. To a certain number of . According extent, the nonrecording strategies practiced by to some scholarly estimates, the number of doc- diff erent levels of Chinese government refl ect umented Africans in the city is probably around the tensions between political ideology, eco- 20,000, while the number of the undocumented nomic interests, and increasing antiblack racism remains unknown (Haugen 2012; Li, Ma, et al. at the individual and personal levels. 2009; Yang 2012). Compared to other foreigners, the African experiences in South China are marked by a Unpacking the Chinese state paradox of visibility and invisibility. On the one hand, Africans in Guangzhou are internation- It is a well-known fact that the perfect state is a ally visible due to sensational media reports of myth, and many states are in reality plagued with several protest events. In July 2009, an undocu- “implementation defi ciency,” that is, “an inability mented African was severely injured aft er jump- to put their policies into practice” (Kalir et al. ing from the second fl oor of a trade mall in 2012: 12). As noted by Kalir and Willem van order to evade a passport check by the Chinese Schendel in this issue, state recording practices police. Aft er that, around a hundred Africans are oft entimes “strategic and selective rather than protested in front of a local police station (Tang systemic and pervasive, episodic rather than con- and Gong 2009). On 19 June 2012, the African tinuous.” Th e temporary and selective nature of community was under the spotlight again, when recording practices may leave ample room for open clashes broke out between African traders nonrecording practices by state agents based on and the Chinese police over the death of a Ni- their shift ing priorities, political affi liations, and 52 | Shanshan Lan personal interests. Meanwhile, nonrecording toward migrants from Africa. I argue that ten- practices also serve important purposes for the sions between diff erent levels of state authorities states, be it economic, political, or ideological. constitute one of the key reasons for their vari- Following Kalir and Van Schendel’s call to treat ous nonrecording strategies in regard to immi- nonrecording as a deliberate strategy and an gration control. In other words, nonrecording important modality of state making, I want to is a practical tactic pursued by both the central suggest that nonrecording and recording strate- and local states in order to balance multiple and gies are not contradictory to each other. Rather, confl icting interests at the regional, national, and they complement each other in sustaining the international scales. As one of the fi rst provinces Janus-faced operations of modern states. benefi ting from China’s open door reform and Nonrecording may take many diff erent forms. market economy, the Guangdong government Gordon Mathews and colleagues (2014) note has been granted special privilege by the central the “informal ignoring of formal laws” by state state to try fi rst as an experiment region. How- agents in mainland China and , ever, as an important window for China’s reform who deliberately neglect some semilegal or il- and development, Guangdong is also consid- legal cross-border trade activities because they ered a role model for other provinces to follow. are not worth being prosecuted. Kalir and col- As a result of such intricate power relations, the leagues (2012) pinpoint the active involvement Guangdong state has to tread a fi ne line between of state agents in the production of illegal (in submitting to the central state’s leadership and the eyes of the state) but licit (in the eyes of the improvising its own solutions to local problems. migrants) activities, for example, by their em- Like Japan and , China is reluc- beddedness in informal transnational brokerage tant to admit its status as an emerging new desti- networks (see also Abraham and Van Schendel nation for immigrants (Seol and Skrentny 2004; 2005). Ananya Roy rejects the binary between Tsuda and Cornelius 2004). Th e Chinese state formal and informal state practices by arguing still treats foreign migrants as a temporary issue, that “informality exists at the very heart of the and there is no offi cial eff ort to integrate them state and is an integral part of the territorial into Chinese society. Following this logic, some practices of state power” (2009: 84). Th is article of the states’ nonrecording practices, such as questions a strict division of recording and non- neglect of the welfare of undocumented Afri- recording by identifying the intricate connec- cans and refusal to offi cially recognize their ex- tions and interactions between the two modes istence, can be interpreted as China’s deliberate of state governance. Due to tensions between tactics to avoid responsibilities toward interna- diff erent levels of state authorities, China’s pol- tional migrants. In addition, antiblack racism icies toward migrants from Africa are marked plays a critical role in infl uencing diff erent state by sporadic shift s between recording, nonre- attitudes toward Africans in Guangzhou. Since cording, and derecording, which contribute to the central state offi cially denies the existence of the illegibility of issues of immigration in state antiblack racism in China, there is a conscious bureaucracy. eff ort in state media to avoid discussions of un- Scholars have noted the nature of the mod- documented Africans in order to safeguard the ern state as a multilayered, contradictory, and benevolent image of China toward Africa. Th is translocal ensemble of institutions, practices, race-mute ideology not only fails to contain and people (Sharma and Gupta 2006). Th e Chi- everyday racism against black Africans among nese state is no exception. In fact, it consists of the general Chinese public, but tacitly endorses multiple levels of authorities whose interests the discretionary power of police offi cers, who may be in confl ict with each other (Xiang 2013). practice de facto racial profi ling in immigration Th is article distinguishes between the central control and law enforcement. Consequently, the and the local states in terms of their attitudes local state’s strategic neglect of undocumented “China gives and China takes” | 53

Africans refl ects both its concern with the polit- immigrant country, there is no immigration de- ically and economically sensitive nature of Sino- partment at the central state level. Guofu Liu African friendship and its lack of interest/care (2011: 12) counts at least 17 ministerial-level for a foreign population who are racialized as authorities in charge of immigration-related is- undesirable by public media. sues in China. Th e lack of division between im- Th e data for this research was gathered be- migration and public security has signifi cantly tween April 2012 and June 2014 through archival increased the power of the police, who are re- research (government legal documents, Chinese- sponsible for law enforcement in both fi elds. language newspapers and journals), participant With the diversifi cation of the foreign pop- observation, and open-ended interviews with ulation in China, the images of whites as priv- fi ft y African traders from various backgrounds. ileged foreigners are gradually being eroded in Th e author also interviewed forty Chinese who popular media. On 8 May 2012, a British man had various levels of interaction with Africans. was arrested for sexually assaulting a young Chi- Th eir backgrounds include real estate agents, nese woman near a subway station. On 14 May, small business owners, government offi cials, mi- a Russian cellist refused to withdraw his bare grant workers, and wives of African men. From feet placed on the seat of a female Chinese pas- July to August 2013 the author made a research senger on a train from Shenyang to Beijing, and trip to Lagos, , and conducted informal later even swore at her. Both incidents were vid- interviews with Nigerian traders who had trav- eotaped and posted online and aroused great eled to China for business. anger among Chinese civilians (Zhuang et al. 2012). On 15 May 2012, Beijing announced the 100-day campaign to crack down on sanfei for- A brief overview of China’s eigners in the city. Sanfei is a Chinese term that immigration laws and regulations literally means “triple illegal.” It includes three types of illegal immigrants: those who enter il- Until 2011, was mainly legally, stay illegally, and work illegally in China. governed by several key laws and regulations: On 30 June 2012, the Standing Committee of the Law on Control of the Entry and Exit of the National People’s Congress passed the new Aliens (1985), Detailed Rules on the Implemen- Exit and Entry Administrative Law, which took tation of the Law on the Entry and Exit of Aliens eff ect in July 2013. Th e implementation of the (1994), Regulations on the Employment of For- new law represents China’s eff orts to distinguish eigners in China (1996), and Regulations on the between desirable and undesirable foreigners. Examination and Approval of Permanent Resi- For example, while the new law contains tougher dence of Aliens in China (2004). According to provisions for sanfei foreigners, it also introduces one Chinese legal scholar, there is no offi cial no- a new visa category to facilitate the infl ow of for- tion of “Chinese migration law,” and the admin- eign talent (Bork-Huff er and Yuan-Ihle 2014; istration of international migrants in China is Haugen 2015). mainly regulated by statues governing exit and Although sanfei foreigners originate from a entry (Liu 2009: 312). Due to the lack of a clear variety of countries, in the Guangzhou context legal framework for immigration control, inter- they are primarily associated with Africans due national migrants are not offi cially recognized to the racialization of blacks as undesirable for- as “immigrants” or “migrants” by the Chinese eigners in local media.2 Zhigang Li, Desheng state. While rural to urban Chinese migrants are Xue, and colleagues (2009) note the key role of oft en labeled as “the fl oating population,” in- the local media in constructing a negative image ternational migrants are mainly referred to as of Africans as guilty of , drug “foreigners” or “aliens” in state laws and regu- dealing, sex off enses, and the spread of AIDS. lations. Since China still denies its status as an Th e media production of the “African threat” 54 | Shanshan Lan was achieved in several ways. First is the exag- diffi culties in business and personal life. Undoc- geration of the number of Africans in the city. umented Africans who date or marry Chinese In 2007, a report in Guangzhou Daily claimed women encounter many diffi culties in register- that there were 200,000 Africans in the city (Ke ing their marriage in China. Marriage to a Chi- and Du 2007). Since then, that number has been nese citizen cannot provide a path to permanent frequently quoted by news reporters and indi- residence. Children born out of common law vidual Chinese as the most popular estimate of marriages remain technically undocumented and the African population in Guangzhou. Th e “Af- are not entitled to benefi ts reserved for Chinese rican threat” discourse was also highlighted by citizens. Th e diffi culties in interracial marriage the demonization of black masculinity over the are coupled with growing antiblack racism at Internet. Th e Guangzhou Daily report ended up the personal level, which discourages Africans being reposted in diff erent websites, but with a from settling down permanently in China (Lan more sensational title, “Th ere Are 200,000 Blacks 2015b). in Guangzhou and Rape Cases Committed by Blacks Have Been Rapidly Rising.”3 Racist com- ments invoking such things as the black inva- Selective (non)recording practices sion, the fi ft y-seventh ethnic group in China, by the local state and the AIDS threat can be found among Chi- nese netizens from diff erent parts of China Interviews with Africans from various back- (Cheng 2011).4 Th e criminalization of Africans grounds show that China’s restrictive and arbi- as drug dealers in popular media also played an trary visa policy has been the major cause for the important role in the racialization of black iden- illegal stay problem. Th e temporal nature of state tity. Although several groups of foreigners are in- recording practices is best illustrated by China’s volved in drug-related crimes—Southeast Asians, tightening of visa policy before major national Middle Easterners, and — events, such as the Beijing Olympics in 2008, Africans are oft en singled out as the most visible the celebrations for China’s 60-year anniversary group (Liao and Du 2011; Qiu 2011). in 2009, and the Asian Games in Guangzhou in On 1 May 2011 the Interim Provisions of 2010. In the run-up to the Beijing Olympics, visa Guang dong Province on Administration of and extensions in mainland China, Hong Kong, or Services to Aliens took eff ect. It is the fi rst piece Macau were no longer possible for citizens from of local legislation in China concerning the ad- 33 countries (Bork-Hüff er et al. 2014). Th is has ministration of foreigners. Designed to specifi - negatively aff ected the business plans and activi- cally target sanfei foreigners in the Pearl River ties of many African traders. Suma, a 28-year-old Delta (PRD) area, the Guangdong Act promotes Gambian, told me, “Nobody decided to over- a reward and punishment scheme by encourag- stay. It’s China’s visa policy that forced people to ing ordinary Chinese civilians to report sanfei overstay. It’s easy to get China visa, but China foreigners to local authorities. It has also ex- visa only allows you to stay for a very short time, panded the power of the local police to stop for- for example, one month, two months, or three eigners for passport and visa verifi cation. Th e months.” Restrictive visa policies have given rise Guangdong Act highlights the PRD region as a to various types of semilegal or illegal brokerage fi eld of experiment for China’s immigration re- services. In Guangzhou, Chinese agents with form. In fact, some of its provisions concerning offi cial connections off er visa renewal services sanfei foreigners have been successfully incor- to African migrants as well as invitation letters porated into the 2013 national law (Lan 2015a). to business visa applicants in Africa. Some take Th e legally vulnerable status of some African their African clients to smaller cities in inland traders has severely limited their physical and China, where visa renewals are less regulated. social mobilities in Guangzhou. It has also led to Th e infl ation of visa fees on the black market “China gives and China takes” | 55 has become a huge fi nancial burden for some released by the police aft er being detained for African traders who wish to maintain their legal several months. Th e contradiction between rig- status in China. orous policing from time to time and the lack At the local state level, the temporal and spa- of a deportation scheme shows the sporadic cy- tial nature of recording practices are manifested cle of recording, nonrecording, and sometimes by selective and uneven enforcement of immi- derecording (in cases when the police offi cer grant control in diff erent neighborhoods in crosses out one’s visa to make it invalid) in the Guangzhou and in diff erent cities in the PRD local state’s regulation of migrants from Africa. area. According to my African informants, early To a large extent, the local state’s selective morning and noon are generally safe times to (non)recording strategies have been motivated travel because the police are either in bed or hav- by economic interests. Th e presence of African ing lunch. In Sanyuanli Market police surveil- traders in Guangzhou has revitalized the local lance is usually more relaxed on Tuesdays and economy and created business and job opportu- Th ursdays. Guangzhou neighborhoods where nities for petty Chinese entrepreneurs and mi- Africans are concentrated, such as Xiaobei and grant workers. According to both Chinese and Sanyuanli, are subjected to stricter police in- African informants, the local state’s tolerance spection than the rest of the city. Aft er the 2009 of the informal economy is manifested not only protest event, local landlords in Sanyuanli re- by its inactivity in enforcing copyright infringe- fused to rent to undocumented Africans un- ment laws, but also by some state agents’ active der pressure from the police. Many Nigerians involvement in informal social networks of cor- relocated to the nearby city of Foshan. Others ruption. One middle-aged Chinese trader told moved to smaller cities such as Dongguan, Shen- me that the underground banks in the Xiaobei zhen, and Zhongshan, where fewer Africans are area are controlled by some powerful Chinese concentrated and police surveillance is less rig- who have connections in the police department. orous. Echoing the central state’s anti-sanfei cam- Th ey regularly bribe the police so that they can paign, overstayers are more visible targets for get warnings before major police raids. Similar police inspection than illegal workers or traders corruptions exist in the Sanyuanli area as well. of counterfeit goods (cf. Mathews et al. 2014). If offi cials from the Industrial and Commerical Th is selective policing strategy has enticed some Bureau come to check counterfeit goods, the Africans to enroll in Chinese universities or to management in the Tangqi Market would fi rst marry Chinese in order to continue their busi- welcome them into the offi ce on the sixth fl oor ness activities in China. and send messages to African traders down- An interview with a city offi cial who used stairs to close their shops and leave. Both sides to work in the Xiaobei area shows that the lo- knew it was a game, yet they had to play it in cal government has been plagued with a lack order to keep up appearances. of resources and various kinds of corruption. Corruption in the local state is not the only As a result, the government policy toward Afri- reason for the existence of regimes of permis- cans is apparently stringent but actually relaxed. siveness in Guangzhou (Kalir et al. 2012). Th e He said, “Th e police only make arrests before intersection of internal and international mi- some major events. Most of the time, they turn gration constitutes another reason for the local a blind eye to the many sanfei Africans on the state’s ambivalent attitudes toward immigration street. For those who got arrested, they were control. Despite language barriers and cultural locked up for several days and then released. diff erences, the African and Chinese migrant Repatriation costs money, so the only solution populations in the Xiaobei and Sanyuanli areas is to turn them loose again.” Th is offi cial’s com- have formed an economically interdependent re- ment is partly confi rmed by a few cases I heard lationship. Collaboration with Chinese migrants about in Guangzhou regarding Africans being enables African traders to bypass some of the 56 | Shanshan Lan constraints imposed on their mobility in the paper. She pleaded with the police, “I am leav- city by state immigration control. For example, ing on the seventeenth. Th is is my ticket. I don’t some undocumented migrants oft en rely on their want to stay here.” One black man passed the Chinese friends, spouses, or business partners check and walked away. Two police emerged to rent shop spaces in trade malls, collect mar- from the Overseas Market, holding the arms of ket information, travel to other cities to make a black man. Th ey handcuff ed him from behind orders or collect goods, and provide other trade- and pushed him into the police van. Two more related services. During a national crackdown black men were ordered to climb into the back on drug traffi cking in 2013, most of the Afri- of the van. It was very dark inside, with two tiny can shops in the Sanyuanli area were forced to windows on each side. It looked like a van for close due to frequent police raids. One import- transporting prisoners. Th e woman was about ant mobility strategy for some African traders to cry. She kept pleading with the police for al- was to hire a Chinese employee to take care of most fi ft een minutes. I could not hear the con- business in the shop, with the African giving versation because of all the noise. Finally, the instructions behind the scenes. To a certain ex- police relented and let her go. Th e police then tent, interethnic collaborations contest the local locked the van and slowly drove away. state’s regulatory power by creating a liminal Th e whole arresting business lasted for about space between the legal and the illegal for the twenty minutes, yet it struck me rather like a daily survival of undocumented Africans. performance. Several messages were conveyed through the dramatic event. First of all, the po- lice only targeted black Africans. Besides ignor- Discretionary power of police offi cers ing traders from other countries, the police also ignored and Han migrants, who were It was 10 April 2012. When I walked out of the peddling fruits, food, and small gadgets with- Overseas Market in Xiaobei around 8:30 p.m., I out a license. However, the police waited for saw a police van with fl ashing blue lights parked over ten minutes before starting to check pass- nearby. Several police offi cers stood at a cor- ports. I suspect that they did it on purpose in ner chatting. One of the female street vendors order to allow the news to spread. In this vein, whispered to me, “Th ey are here to arrest visa Africans who have well-connected personal net- overstayers.” For over ten minutes, the police works may easily escape. Th e main goal of the chatted and laughed among themselves and police seemed to be stirring fear among Afri- paid no attention to people passing by. Th en cans rather than arresting more of them. Al- they started checking passports. Several Arab though the black woman was fi nally allowed to traders walked by and the police ignored them. leave, she had to endure the harsh treatment of Whenever a black person passed by, the police the police and make a lot of eff ort to plead her would stop him or her for a passport check. A case. It remains unclear to me why one black black woman was stopped. Aft er examining her was handcuff ed and pushed into the police van, passport, one offi cer said to her loudly, “You while the other two were ordered to get into the have violated Chinese law and you must go to van by themselves. It was also unclear why the the police station for punishment!” One black police chose to release the woman in the end. man was stopped. He did not speak English. Later, a Chinese Muslim trader in the Overseas He passed his phone to the police, who shouted Market explained to me, “Th e Canton Fair is just into it, “Tell your friend he needs to go to the a few days away. Th at’s why they are arresting police station for punishment!” As the scene got blacks. Th e police have to do their job. Th ey need more chaotic, a small crowd of Chinese and Af- to make some arrests in order to report back to ricans started to gather and watch. Th e woman their boss.”5 Th is trader’s testimony helps ex- dug into her handbag and produced a piece of plain why the police arrest black Africans ran- “China gives and China takes” | 57 domly and sometimes according to their per- For example, a three-part report in Guangming sonal preference. Daily, an infl uential newspaper operated by the Th e discretionary power of the police, which Communist Party of China Central Committee, is endorsed by the 2011 Guangdong Act, also is entitled, “Friends from Africa, How Are You led to various forms of corruption. Stanley, a Doing in Guangzhou?” (Ma et al. 2012). Th e 28-year-old Nigerian, explained to me how the report presents a sanitized depiction of African police extort bribes from undocumented Af- life in Guangzhou with some success stories, ricans. He said, “Th e overstaying money, they but there is no discussion of undocumented mi- have turned it into a business. For example, if grants. Besides highlighting the long history of I am arrested by the police, I’ll call my brother Sino-African friendship, the report also insists here and he will pay the money to get me out. that there is no racial discrimination in China. Sometimes you pay the police’s agent. Th ey will Th e politically sensitive nature of African mi- give you a number. You call the number and you gration in Guangzhou also compelled local me- bring the money to some place. Th ey take the dia to change the terms they used to describe money and pass it to the police.”6 Stanley’s testi- Africans: from racially coded language such as mony shows that the Chinese police sometimes “blacks” to more neutral or euphemistic refer- have a vested interest in nonrecording Africans. ences such as “Africans” and “foreigners.” Per- By deliberately looking away or neglecting their sonal communication with a staff member from duty, some police offi cers have turned African the Guangzhou Academy of Social Science re- overstayers into a convenient source of illegal vealed that one of the researchers had been income. Th e arbitrary power of the police is fur- warned by Beijing not to make public comments ther illustrated by the fear of some documented that may jeopardize Sino-African relations. Africans. Steve, a 33-year-old Ugandan migrant, At the international level, Beijing’s strategic explained to me, “Visa is not 100 percent guar- downplay of African “illegality” was closely re- antee here. When the police stop you to check lated to two Sino-African events. On 22 May passport and you do not look like a pleasant 2012, soon aft er the Beijing crackdown on san- person to them, they may draw a line on your fei aliens, the Nigerian immigration department visa and cancel it. Th ey would say: China arrested forty-fi ve Chinese traders in the north- gives and China takes. You can’t ask why.” Like ern city Kano (Yin 2012). Th e event was widely Mathews and colleagues (2014), I only heard interpreted as Nigeria’s retaliation for the Bei- of visa canceling cases, but never met anyone jing campaign. Meanwhile, the Fift h Ministerial who had such an experience. Nevertheless, sto- Conference of the Forum on China-African ries about negative encounters with the police Cooperation (FOCAC) was scheduled to open get so widespread within the African diaspora in Beijing in July 2012. With Sino-African rela- community that they discourage some Africans tions at stake, the Beijing campaign started with from renewing their visa. much fanfare but ended rather quietly. Th e in- visibility of undocumented Africans in central state media not only refl ects Beijing’s conscious Willful illegibility and political correctness move to suppress discussions on antiblack rac- ism, but also its eff orts to render issues of immi- Due to the prominence of the Sino-African gration illegible. While statements supporting friendship discourse in offi cial propaganda, the the offi cial rhetoric of Sino-African friendship Beijing government has been very cautious in can be openly released, instructions for more handling African-related issues. Diff ering from stringent immigration control are usually re- the local media’s negative portrayals of Africans, corded in confi dential government fi les and central state media tend to carry more positive distributed to diff erent levels of authority via reports that reaffi rm state political ideology. the party-state’s hierarchical power structure.7 58 | Shanshan Lan

Th ese complications have obliged the Guang- for exit visas without the risk of imprisonment, dong government to tread a fi ne line between and they could also get a discount for the over- tightening immigration control and protecting stay penalty. Instead of conveying the message Sino-African friendship. via offi cial channels, the local police depended Due to the various challenges in the imple- on the Nigerian Union and underground Pen- mentation of the Guangdong Act, the local state tecostal churches to pass the information to has developed its own strategies to meet the con- undocumented migrants (Haugen 2012). By voluted expectations of the central state, that is, maintaining informal communication channels to highlight its achievements in the regulation with undocumented Africans, the local state of documented Africans and to downplay the showed its unwillingness to offi cially recognize many problems and diffi culties in its regulation illegal migrants and its strategy of shift ing the of undocumented Africans. For example, Jinlu responsibility of care to the ethnic community. Villa, a residential area in Xiaobei where many It is worth noting that the local state’s trans- documented Africans are concentrated, has been ferring of responsibilities for control and care to chosen by the Guangzhou police as a model migrant organizations is not based on formal community for foreign tenant management. Th e recognition of and fi nancial support for the lat- neighborhood has been visited by high-ranking ter. Since there are no nongovernmental organi- offi cials from Beijing such as Mr. Zhou Yong- zations (NGOs) in China specifi cally targeting kang, head of the Central Political and Legislative foreign migrants, these ethnic organizations Committee, in September 2009, and Mr. Meng function as a self-supporting system outside Jianzhu, Minister of Public Security, in June 2010 the domain of the local state. Th eir interactions (Qiu 2011; Wang 2010; Xu 2009). By drawing with the local state are mainly based on infor- the central state’s attention to this documented mal personal networks cultivated by charismatic African community, the local state collaborates leaders, who usually are well-established busi- with the central state in rendering issues of ille- nessmen with legally registered businesses. By gal migrants illegible in offi cial discourse. informally recognizing ethnic leaders’ infl uence Another aspect of the local state’s nonrecord- and authority within the migrant community, ing strategy is its outsourcing of state control to the local state may, to a limited extent, delegate nonstate actors such as migrant organizations to them part of its responsibilities for immigra- and underground churches. Among the approx- tion control. Th is informalization of state control imately 30 unoffi cial ethnic organizations in (Mathews et al. 2014) is based on compromises Guangzhou (Castillo 2015), the Nigerian Union between several potentially confl icting interests: is the most infl uential. Besides its basic function the central state’s concern with China’s benevo- as an arbitrator of business disputes between lent image toward Africa, the local state’s desire Chinese and Africans, the Nigerian Union is an to revitalize its economy, the central state’s lack important yet informal channel of communica- of guidelines for the legal incorporation of for- tion between the Chinese government and the eign migrants into Chinese society, and the local African diaspora community. Aft er the 2009 state’s lack of interest and concern for the welfare African protest, the Nigerian Union reached an of undocumented Africans, who are racialized informal agreement with the Guangzhou gov- as undesirable foreigners by public media. ernment that no Chinese police would be al- lowed to go inside the Tangqi Market to make arrests. In return, the union promised to disci- What color is the Chinese dream? pline the behaviors of undocumented Africans. In December 2009, the Guangzhou police ini- Despite the rapid diversifi cation of its interna- tiated a voluntary repatriation scheme: for two tional population, China still denies its status as months, undocumented migrants could apply an immigrant country. Th ere is no clear path to “China gives and China takes” | 59 citizenship for foreigners in China. Th e exist- the West was constructed as the dominant Other ing green card system is reserved mainly for a against which the Chinese Self is formulated small number of professional foreign migrants (Zhao 2004). In terms of Sino-African relations, with exceptional qualifi cations. Instead of treat- scholars have noted that China’s emphasis on its ing immigration as a separate issue, the 2013 law continuous aid to Africa not only helps boost the combines two previous laws, which deal with the image of a benevolent China to the world, but regulation of entry and exit of aliens and citizens, also promotes feelings of national pride among respectively. While the new law contains tougher some of its citizens (Shen 2009). It is important provisions for sanfei aliens, it provides little guid- to note that the “Chinese nation” becomes an ance for the integration of foreign migrants. Due imaginary not only in the Andersonian (1983) to this willful illegibility of immigration issues sense but also through the deliberate nonrecord- by the central state, there is no public discussion ing practices of an exclusionary state. While Af- of immigrant rights and no immigrant advocacy rican migrants can be welcomed as friends and groups. As noted by Matthew Hull, “state con- guests, there seems to be little opportunity for trol can be extended not only through specifi ca- them to be considered part of the Chinese na- tion, but through ambiguity, by leaving matters tion. Th e various gaps and contradictions in the undocumented” (2012: 248). To a certain extent, implementation of the Guangdong Act reveal the Chinese states’ nonrecording strategies to- the tensions between central and local states in ward Africans in Guangzhou echo similar tactics terms of immigration control, economic devel- practiced in Romania and Holland, as depicted opment, anticrime campaigns, antiblack racism, by Ioana Vrăbiescu and Barak Kalir in this issue. and relations with Muslim minorities. To protect By deliberately keeping one specifi c group off the the offi cial rhetoric of Sino-African friendship, record, the states not only ignore their legal rights the local Guangzhou state has adopted a selec- and welfare, but tacitly endorse antiminority sen- tively nonrecording strategy and kept undoc- timents from the mainstream society. umented Africans in a liminal space between Aft er President Xi came into power in legality and illegality. However, there is no clear 2013, diff erent levels of the Chinese state have indication that Africans (and other foreign pop- launched numerous campaigns to promote his ulations) will be incorporated into the imagined vision of the “Chinese dream.” While the exact community of the Chinese nation. Instead of meaning of the “Chinese dream” remains eva- promoting the vision of a multicultural society, sive, Western media has noted a heavy dose of the Chinese dream remains a powerful political nationalism in Xi’s emphasis on the “Chinese propaganda to uphold the idea of an exclusive spirit” and the “great rejuvenation of the Chi- Chinese nation. nese nation” (Kuhn 2013; Patience 2013). As noted by Barry Sautman (1997), the idea of the Chinese nation is an ethnoracial construction Shanshan Lan is an assistant professor in the that draws heavily from cultural myths of de- Department of Anthropology at the University scent such as the dragon, the Yellow Emperor, of Amsterdam. Her research interests include and the Peking man. To a certain extent, Xi’s transnational migration, race and immigration vision of the Chinese dream contains a seed of policy, transborder trade activities and net- racial nationalism, which functions to reinforce works, the African diaspora in China, the global Han chauvinism while excluding ethnic mi- Chinese diaspora, and class and social stratifi - norities such as Tibetans, Uyghurs, and foreign cation in contemporary Chinese society. Her migrants from the national imaginary (Leibold monograph, Mapping the New African Diaspora 2010). It also resonates with the anticolonial and in China: Race and the Cultural Politics of Be- anti-imperialistic connotations of Chinese na- longing, is forthcoming with Routledge. tionalism in the late nineteenth century, when E-mail: [email protected] 60 | Shanshan Lan

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