The New Merchants of Canton:
Navigating Legal Practices and Religious Networks among Sub-Saharan African Muslims in Guangzhou
Qiuyu Jiang
Department of Anthropology
McGill University, Montreal, Canada.
August 2019
A thesis submitted to McGill University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Anthropology.
© Qiuyu Jiang, 2019
Abstract
In the past two decades, strengthening Sino-African ties have led to the emergence of a transnational African population in Guangzhou, China’s southern manufacturing center. Based on fourteen months of ethnographic research, this dissertation examines how African migrants navigate their lives in the city, with a focus on Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa. The majority of migrants studied work as small-scale business owners. They face racial, cultural, and legal challenges on a daily basis, and often have tense relationships with local residents, the Guangzhou police, and the Chinese state. Exploring the experiences of African Muslim migrants in Guangzhou opens up new discussions about globalization, urbanization, citizenship, xenophobia, ethnicity, and religion in contemporary China.
On one level, the dissertation looks at how China’s legal system (including a restrictive immigration system based mainly on ethnicity) attempts to control, mediate, and regulate African migrants’ experiences in Guangzhou, as well as Africans’ responses to Chinese immigration laws and their enforcement. It examines how immigration laws and their implementation, including through surveillance and strict border management, serve as exclusionary tools to prevent Africans from stable, long-term stays in the country. Simultaneously, it also shows how the lack of uniform enforcement of immigration laws creates spaces in which African migrants can negotiate and work around the formal legal system. Visa-partnership, an informal economic relationship between Africans and Chinese has developed to maximize the visa rights of Africans.
On another level, the dissertation examines Muslim Africans’ religious practices and supporting social networks based on a shared religion. I show how Guangzhou’s history and economy have combined to produce a vibrant, multi-ethnic Muslim community in the city. The dissertation attends to how religious conduct acts as a form of community-generated law that serves to enforce social order and regulate business conduct, as well as helping migrants transcend ethnic-national differences. This “religious common ground,” as I term it, also serves as a major basis for the provision of social aid and for community making.
ii Résumé
Depuis deux décennies, la consolidation des liens sino-africains a mené à l’émergence d’une population transnationale dans le Guangzhou, centre manufacturier du sud de la Chine. Cette dissertation s’inspire de quatorze mois de recherche ethnographique et analyse la manière dont les migrants africains – en particulier les migrants musulmans d’Afrique sub-saharienne – s’orientent face aux défis de la vie urbaine. Les migrants considérés dans le corpus de cette analyse sont majoritairement propriétaires de petites entreprises et commerçants. Ces individus affrontent quotidiennement des défis raciaux, culturels, et juridiques. Ils entretiennent des relations tendues avec les habitants et la police du Guangzhou, ainsi qu’avec l’État chinois. Un examen des expériences de ces migrants africains musulmans du Guangzhou nous permet d’entamer de nouvelles discussions sur la globalisation, l’urbanisation, la citoyenneté, la xénophobie, l’ethnie, et la religion dans la Chine contemporaine.
D’une part, cette dissertation considère le système juridique en Chine (ce qui inclut les règles d’immigration restrictives basées principalement sur l’origine ethnique) et ses efforts de contrôler, d’intervenir et de régler l’expérience des migrants africains dans le Guangzhou, ainsi que les façons dont les migrants africains répondent à ces lois sur l’immigration et leur mise en application. Nous démontrons comment ces règles d’immigration, ainsi que leur mise en œuvre par la surveillance ou la gestion rigoureuse des frontières, peuvent agir en tant qu'outils d’exclusion et, conséquemment, empêcher les migrants africains d’avoir un séjour stable et de longue durée en Chine. Nous soutenons en même temps que l’absence d’une application conforme des lois sur l’immigration crée des espaces propices pour les migrants africains pour négocier leur place et éviter un recours au système judiciaire officiel. Des partenariats relatifs aux visas – une forme de relation économique informelle entre les Africains et les Chinois – se sont développés afin de maximiser les droits de visa des Africains.
D’une autre part, cette dissertation examine les pratiques religieuses des migrants africains musulmans et leurs réseaux de soutien social formés sur la base de l’appartenance à une même religion. Nous démontrons que l’histoire et l’économie du Guangzhou ont mené à l’essor d’une communauté musulmane dynamique et multiethnique dans la ville. Nous tentons d’élucider la manière dont la conduite religieuse génère des règles communautaires permettant de garantir un ordre social, de régir les activités commerciales, et de permettre aux migrants de transcender les différences ethniques et nationales. Ces « points de convergence religieuse », tels que nous les définissons, contribuent significativement à l’apport d’une aide sociale et à la construction de liens communautaires.
iii Acknowledgements
I am grateful, first and foremost, to my supervisor Prof. Sandra Teresa Hyde for her tireless support of my research. I am also grateful to Prof. John Galaty, who offers me a warm and supportive environment during my writing phase. Many scholars at several institutions who have supported my studies and inspired my research in diverse ways: Prof. Leander Schneider, Prof. Kristin Norget, Prof. Colin Scott, Prof. Jeanne Shea, Prof. Ismael Vaccaro, Prof. Ronald Niezen, Prof. Katherine Lemons, Prof. Lisa Stevenson, and Prof. Allan Young. I thank several scholars in the field of Africa-China studies: Gordon Mathews, Tu Huynh, Shanshan Lan, Roberto Castillo, and Heidi Haugen, whose work has shed light on mine.
This project would not have come to fruition without the encouragement of my peers and friends at McGill and elsewhere. They include Justin Raycraft, Graham Fox, Darcie DeAngelo, Lisa Rail, Lara Rosenoff-Gauvin, Jacques Pollini, Catherine Larouche, Karen McAllister, Nicholas Barber, Jingzi Han, Jonathan Wald, Rine Vieth, Tristan Ivory, Emilio Dirlikov, Chelsey Cao, Daniel Murry, Anne-Elise Keen, Gillian Chilibeck, Julia Bailey, Nicole Rigillo, Katie Sinclair, Gabriella Djerrahian, Jennifer Glassco, Kathleen Godfrey, Daniel Ruiz-Serna, Nicole Anne, Kariuki Kirigia, Klerkson Lugusa, Caroline Seagle, Zhou Yang, Lin Dan, and Corey Wright.
While in Guangzhou, many of the women and men from both African and Chinese communities I spoke to showed me phenomenal hospitality and kindness. The knowledge and information they generously shared with me are the foundation of this dissertation. Especially, I would like to thank Bah and Bara, who looked after me like older brothers. I also would like to thank the people at the mosque and the family service centre where I volunteered, for taking me in as part of your community.
I also owe my gratitude to my editor, Matthew Wyman-McCarthy. I would not be able to accomplish this dissertation without his invaluable comments, which inspired me to think beyond anthropology and motivated me to move forward in my project.
I also would like to thank Gabriel de la Cruz, my closest friend and life partner. His belief in me provided a continual motivation for me to finish this writing project. Lastly, I owe an incredible debt of gratitude to my parents. Even though they do not know what anthropology is, they still offer their generous and continuing support in my education throughout my life.
Funding and institutional support for this project was generously provided by several organizations: The IDRC Doctoral Research Award (N° 107099-99906075-054) from the International Development Research Centre, Canada; Media@McGill Arts Graduate Research Fellowship from Department of Art History and Communication Studies, McGill; stipend from Prof. Sandra Hyde (SSHRC Faculty Fellowship); Harvard Yenching Institute Summer Training Program Travel Fund; The Arts Graduate Student Travel Award, McGill; The Abner Kingman Fellowship, McGill; McGill International Doctoral Awards; the Clifford C.F. Wong Graduate Fellowship, McGill; Provost's Graduate Fellowship, McGill; and Family Jiang’s Excellent Member Grant.
iv Table of Contents
Abstract ...... ii Résumé ...... iii Acknowledgements ...... iv Table of Contents ...... v Introduction ...... 1 Just Like That ...... 1 Recent Scholarship on Africans in Guangzhou/China ...... 8 Contextualizing Guangzhou...... 13 Xiaobei and the Surrounding Neighborhoods ...... 20 Field Sites and Methodology ...... 25 Overview of Chapters ...... 34 Interlude I ...... 37 Chapter 1 Business Cards and Smart Phones ...... 49 The FBI Lady ...... 49 Positionality in Migration Research ...... 52 Methodologies: Smart Phones, Social Media Apps, and Alternative Tools ...... 65 Trust Building and Truth-Construction ...... 69 Conclusion ...... 76 Interlude II ...... 78 Chapter 2 An Additional Tier of China’s “Floating Population” ...... 82 Post-Reform African Migrants ...... 82 Managing Foreigners: Chinese Immigration Laws since 1949 ...... 87 Chinese Citizenship: The Internal Divisions ...... 100 Urban Citizenship ...... 104 The Marginalization of “Floating Populations” in Guangzhou’s Urban Development ...... 108 Conclusion ...... 115 Chapter 3 Individual Strategies and Visa-Partnerships...... 117 Bah’s Departure at the Airport ...... 117 Visa Types and Overstaying One’s Visas ...... 120 The Complexity of Visa Problems in Practice ...... 127 Individual Strategies ...... 138 Visa Partnerships ...... 141 Conclusion ...... 148 Interlude III ...... 149 Chapter 4 Guangzhou's Muslim Community...... 151 The Demographic Myth ...... 151 Muslim Communities: from the Ancient Maritime Silk Road to Pre-Economic Reform ...... 156 Muslim Community: Diversity and State Involvement in the Post-Reform Era ...... 163 The Historical Legacy of Muslims in Guangzhou ...... 169 State Involvement and Economic Strategies: From Stability to Development ...... 177
v Conclusion ...... 189 Chapter 5 “New” Guests in the Old Fanfang ...... 190 The Mosque in a Trading Metropolis ...... 190 The “Religious Common Ground” ...... 194 The Economic Implications of Religious Common Ground ...... 204 The Limits of “Religious Common Ground”...... 214 Conclusion ...... 224 Conclusion: Transience and Mobility ...... 226 Bibliography ...... 238
vi Introduction
Those Who Don't Those who don't know any better come into our neighborhood scared. They think we're dangerous.
They think we will attack them with shiny knives. They are stupid people who are lost and got here by mistake. But we aren't afraid. We know the guy with the crooked eye is Davey the Baby's brother, and the tall one next to him in the straw brim, that's Rosa's Eddie V., and the big one that looks like a dumb grown man, he's Fat Boy, though he's not fat anymore nor a boy.
All brown all around, we are safe. But watch us drive into a neighborhood of another color and our knees go shakity-shake and our car windows get rolled up tight and our eyes look straight. Yeah. That is how it goes and goes.
(Sandra Cisneros, The House on Mango Street, Chapter 12)
Just Like That Esperanza, a character in Sandra Cisnero’s novel The House on Mango Street , discusses
how people of different ethnicities than her believe people from her community to be dangerous.
She explains how outsiders who arrive in her neighborhood are initially scared of members of
her community, and vice versa. I first read about Esperanza’s struggles in 2010, immediately
before I began my doctoral studies at McGill. The prejudices and segregation among different
ethnic groups that Cisnero chronicles made a vivid impression on me.
Two years later, while tracing the events that led to the start of my fieldwork as a Chinese
National working with Africans in the city of Guangzhou, I could not help but realize how
similar Esperanza and I were at that moment. Before starting my doctoral research, the limited
knowledge I had about Africans and Africa came mainly from Chinese news sources. Despite
having a population of 1.3 billion people and 56 officially-recognized ethnic groups, China’s
1 demography is rather homogeneous. Most Chinese, myself included, grew up in communities with minimal cultural and ethnic variations. The Chinese media created an “imagined African community” for the Chinese audience largely through negative reports focusing on drug trafficking, people overstaying their visas, or conflicts between African and Chinese residents
(G. Huang 2018; L. Li 2016; see Chapter 2 and 3 for further discussion). In China, Africans are frequently cast as entrepreneurially savvy but culturally “backward” and “uncivilized” (Lan
2015). In addition to the pejorative image conveyed by the media, a longstanding association of
“blackness” with diseases in China also contributes to negative stereotypes of the African population (Hood 2011). In many ways, these media constructions are manifestations of something similar to Edward Said’s notion of Orientalism— an ideological prejudice based on the racist construction of a foreign culture and population that depicts a diverse group as homogenous and ahistorical (Said 2003).
My preliminary trip to Guangzhou in June 2012 was the first encounter I had with the
African population there. I still remember how surprised I was at seeing such a high concentration of Africans when I first stepped outside of the Xiaobei metro station at the heart of one of the largest Sino-African business centres in the city. In the McDonalds next to the Xiaobei metro, I was surrounded by people of African origin speaking a number of different languages. I was definitely in China: the shop signs were written in Chinese characters (some with English and/or Arabic translations), the people serving me were Chinese, and the surrounding architectural style resembled that of a Chinese city. However, this part of town felt very foreign to me.
This research trip was the first time I had traveled somewhere within my country where
newcomers seemed to outnumber the local (ethnically) Chinese population. My “culture
2 shock”—or should I say, my unexpected fieldwork moment—was soon replaced by curiosity and excitement. I was eager to talk with people to understand why they came to China, where they came from, and how they lived— in other words, to try to get answers to the questions that first motivated me to study African migrants in China. What do they do? What countries do they come from? What are their lives like? At the same time, I was overwhelmed: I had grown up in an inland Chinese city with almost no foreigners, so the diversity within China that surrounded me was novel. Despite the fact that as a trained anthropologist I am supposed to be both sensitive to and aware of ethnic differences, I was ashamed to realize that I was not immune to the influence of some Chinese media representations that incite fear of Africans.
***
In the last two decades in particular, strengthening Sino-African ties have led to the emergence of large scale transnational migration between China and Africa. Guangzhou, one of the world’s largest manufacturing zones in Southern China, is now home to the largest African population in East Asia. The majority of Africans in the city are small-scale business owners, including traders and middleman who arrange for the export of Chinese manufactured goods to
African markets (see also Haugen 2012, 2013b; Mathews, Lin, and Yang 2017). There are also wage labourers (such as barbers and hairdressers), salaried personnel (such as teachers), students, and housewives. The majority of individuals studied in this dissertation are small-scale business owners, though I will occasionally draw examples from migrants outside of this category. Many scholars point out the transient character of Africans in Guangzhou (Niu 2018; Yuan and Pang
2018). The primary goal for African traders in China is to generate economic profit, so most demonstrate little interest in integrating into Chinese society (Mathews and Yang 2012; Niu
2018; Yuan and Pang 2018). In other words, the majority of the Africans featured in previous
3 research do not regard China as an ideal place to settle down (Lan 2016a); rather, they view the country as a springboard for more desirable destinations, such as Japan, Australia, and Europe
(Haugen 2012).
Although African migrants are Neither the first nor the only group of foreigners in the city following market reform since 1979, they occupy a special position among foreigners in
China for several reasons. Perhaps most significantly, unlike other groups of foreigners who are mainly employed by transnational and Chinese companies for their specific expertise, African small-scale business owners are mostly self-employed. Their migration has been supported by neither the national governments nor the local communities in which they reside (Bork-Hüffer et al. 2016; Li et al. 2009). Consequently, they encounter more difficulties with China’s immigration system than other foreign expatriates, such as Japanese employed by big Japanese firms (Mathews, Lin, and Yang 2017) and South Korean businessmen (Zhou and Zhou 2018).
Additionally, Black Africans usually face more social discrimination and racism than other foreigner groups such as East Asians and Westerners. Because of visa restrictions and other forms of discrimination, many Africans have to conduct frequent, short trips to China, which increase the cost of and risks to their businesses. Others choose to overstay their visas in China, which can negatively impact future visa applications.
Though the enforcement of immigration laws varies, Chinese authorities have a history of cracking down on Africans who overstay their visas. In July 2009, for example, a Nigerian man seriously injured himself from jumping out of the window in order to avoid a police visa check
(H. Wei 2009). Again, in June 2012, a 28-year-old Nigerian businessman died while in police custody after a dispute with a local motorcycle taxi driver in Guangzhou (Branigan 2012). Both incidents led to protests by hundreds of African migrants (mainly Nigerian Igbos) and
4 contributed to the worsening of relations between African migrants, the local police, and the state. The issues facing African migrants in Guangzhou open up new discussions about globalization, urbanization, citizenship, ethnicity, and religion—topics that are vital to contemporary urban China.
***
Drawing on over a year of field research, this project derives from my long-term interest in migrant groups in urban China, as well as the increasing importance of China’s relationship with the global South. 1 The dissertation situates African migration within the sociopolitics of contemporary China to understand the livelihoods and diverse experiences of African migrants in a growing commercial and manufacturing centre. In particular, I examine the ways in which global transnational migration both influences and adapts to structures of local social and political control. In doing so, I seek to understand how local contexts shape global patterns of border-crossing. How do the Chinese government’s policies on immigration, religion, and economy control, mediate, and regulate the lives of Africans in the context of post-reform
China? How does the paradox of Chinese governance, which involves both capitalist (in terms of promoting free market and economic development) and socialist (in terms of rigid population control) structure their lives? In turn, how do Africans in Guangzhou seek to circumvent these limits?
Further, this dissertation focuses on a specific group within the African population in
Guangzhou, African Muslims. First, while African Christians in Guangzhou have been well investigated (e.g., Mathews, Lin, and Yang 2017; Haugen 2013b), African Muslims have not.
Second, Guangzhou has a long history of Islamic influence and Muslim migration. Therefore, as
1 My undergraduate honour’s thesis was about rural-urban seasonal peasant migrants working as porters in the city of Chongqing. My Master’s thesis was on migrant female sex workers in Northern China.
5 part of a long history of African migration to China and more complex sets of relations between different Muslim groups in Guangzhou, it is important to explore African Muslims’ religious practices in order to examine the role that religion plays in the navigation of their daily lives. In this context, what kind of role does religion (Islam) play in African Muslims’ navigation within
Chinese society?
I show that while Chinese law is designed to deny Africans stable, long-term stays in the country, inconsistent law enforcement creates spaces in which African migrants can negotiate and sometimes work around legal structures. My work, therefore, highlights both the formal and informal strategies that African migrants use in navigating China’s rigid immigration system. for example, I argue that “visa partnerships,” an informal economic relationship between African migrants and Chines, has been developed to maximize Africans’ visa rights in China. I also explore how migrants engage in business and practice religion in trans-ethnic and trans-national ways while holding tenuous legal statuses. I argue that there is a shared Muslim identity and religious values called a “religious common ground” that regulates individuals’ social, economic, and religious conduct, which also serves as the foundation of networks that provide financial and social aid to African Muslims.
Africans in China, especially Guangzhou, offers an interesting case study of South–South migration for several reasons. First, growing foreign investment since the 1979 economic reforms has brought an increasing number of foreigners to China in search of better financial futures. This has resulted in the formation of urban enclaves where transnational migrants congregate (Ren 2011; Zhang 2008). However, China is not ready to embrace large flows of immigrants institutionally (it lacks the physical and bureaucratic infrastructure to cope with this influx of immigrants) or socio-culturally (xenophobia in Chinese society is still strong) (Pieke
6 2012). In other words, China has not yet developed “a clear legal and administrative framework and apparatus to deal with the entry, residence, and employment of foreigners” (Pieke 2012, 58).
In other words, while structural constraints in the Chinese immigration system have resulted in the concentration of undocumented African migrants in Guangzhou, the inconsistencies between local and the central governments’ immigration policy (Haugen 2019; Lan 2015) as well as the lack of systematic policies for administering and monitoring the activities of foreigners contributed to the thriving informal immigration activities in Guangzhou (Lan 2016a; Mathews,
Lin, and Yang 2014). Second, the recent wave of African migrants in China is not based on labour-demand but on trade. This means that the driving force behind migration is not the host country’s demographic need for low-wage labour, as it is in many Western nations (Gebrewol
2016; Hoggart and Mendoza 1999), but rather China’s position as the world’s leading manufacturer of cheap consumer goods (Lan 2016a). In addition, China’s own household registration system, known as hukou (户口 ), has institutionalized different sets of rights for
different classes of Chinese citizens, leading to a social context that distinguishes China from
Western countries that also host African migrants (e.g., L. Zhang 2001). Finally, the specific
features of Guangzhou itself make the study of African Muslim migrants in the city unique: it
has a history of entrepreneurial traditions, is a key hub in China’s Belt and Road Initiative, has a
unique religious history steeped in Islam, and is geographically located in the Pearl River
Triangle Economic Zone. Largely because of the city’s unique history and location, Guangzhou
offers a much more liberal environment for religious practice and greater ethnic diversity than
most places in China. This follows Aiwha Ong’s (2006:7) argument that the Chinese government
creates “zones of exception” which enable “new economic possibilities, spaces, and techniques
of governing the population” (Ong 2004, 70). These “zones” are exceptional spaces where
7 different orders of regulation are constructed for different groups of people through practices of inclusion and exclusion. For these and other reasons, Africans in Guangzhou have experienced and continue to experience different migration trajectories than those who have migrated to immigrant-receiving countries in Europe and North America.
Recent Scholarship on Africans in Guangzhou/China Through detailed ethnographic research, this dissertation examines African Muslim migrants’ experiences in Guangzhou, including how they conduct business, navigate China’s immigration system, and practice their religion. In focusing on African migrants, however, it also sheds light on post-reform Chinese society, especially China’s restrictive immigration system based on ethnicity and family ties, the state’s population control and management strategies, its economic and religious policies, and Guangzhou’s process of urbanization. The dissertation therefore speaks to the anthropology of law and religion, South-South migration, and China urban studies, among other fields of research.
Development of the Field
Although significant attention has been paid to the economic and political significance of
Sino-Africa relations, the direction of these relationships is frequently characterized as “from
China to Africa,” since so many Chinese investors are setting up businesses in Africa. In actuality, however, Africans are increasingly engaged in international border-crossings in pursuit of economic prosperity in China—a movement of people that until the past decade has been overlooked by scholars. As more and more Africans began travelling or relocating to China in the last ten years, there has emerged a growing literature analysing different aspects of African
8 migrant communities in China. In other words, academic scholarship is starting to keep up with events on the ground.
The experiences of Africans in China has drawn attention from scholars in various disciplines, including not only cultural studies (Roberto Castillo 2014; Adams Bodomo 2012), anthropology (Gordon Mathews, Dan Lin, and Yang Yang 2017; Shanshan Lan 2015; 2016a;
2016b; Yu Qiu 2016; Dong Niu 2018; Ding Yuan and Chi Ling Pang 2018; Yang Zhou 2016), sociology (Tu Huynh 2016; Jessica Wilczak 2018), and transnational studies (Guangzhi Huang
2018), but also scholars from geography (Zhigang Li et al. 2008; Heidi Haugen 2012) AND education (Huamei Han 2014), as well as photographers and filmmakers (e.g., Kathy Huang,
Dong Li, and Daniel Traub). Researchers from these disciplines employ various approaches: some such as Bork-Hüffer (2015) and Gilles (2015) use of quasi-scientific methodologies, some employ quantitative methods such as questionnaires (Bodomo 2012; Zhigang Li et al. 2008), and some like myself employs an ethnographic approach (Mathews 2015b; Haugen 2018).
Early research on Africans in China tended to come in the form of empirical, report-style work. In these reports, African migrant communities in Guangzhou were largely overlooked, and precise statistics about the make-up of these communities was unavailable (see also, “broad- based reports,” Mathews 2015a:7). Zhigang Li and his colleagues are among the first wave of academics to study Africans in China. Based on questionnaires completed by 45 African Traders and 43 local residents, as well as 46 semi-structured interviews, Zhigang Li et al. (2008) laid the basic information about African migrants. They placed Africans in Guangzhou into one of two groups based on the length of time they spend in Guangzhou: salesmen (characterized by regular mobility and crossing borders) and tradesmen (part of the African diaspora who have practically moved to China, many of whom have developed networks to conduct trade between China and
9 Africa). Based on this classification system, they argued as of 2008 that Xiaobei was becoming an ethnic enclave, within which the residents are characterized by both high mobility and diversity, but also by ethnic segregation. Four years after this research, Adams Bodomo (2012) published the first academic book on the African presence in China, Africans in China: A sociocultural study and its implications on Africa-China relations . Based on studying approximately 800 Africans across six Chinese cities—Guangzhou, Yiwu, Shanghai, Beijing,
Hong Kong, and Macau—he proposes a cross-cultural bridge theory of migrant-indigene relations, arguing that Africans in China act as socio-political, socioeconomic, and sociocultural bridges linking Africa to China.
Other scholars analyse specific aspects of African migrant communities in China. For example, scholars have analyzed the multiple linguistic strategies used by Africans interact and communicate with local merchants, what Han (2013) calls the grassroots multilingualism of
Guangzhou’s global trading markets. Others have emphasized diet and identity (Bodomo and Ma
2012); migration patterns (S. Xu 2012); everyday economic activities and visa struggles
(Mathews 2011); and how ethnic enclaves form and operate (L. Zhang 2008). Others focus on a subgroup within the African migrant population, such as African students pursuing higher education in China (Haugen 2013a) or Nigerian Christians who overstay their visas (Haugen
2012; 2013b). Collectively, this research has begun to show how diverse the experiences of
African migrants in China can be. Among other things, this research tries to understand why
Africans go to China, what they do there, how they interact with local society, what opportunities and difficulties they encounter, and how they are received by Chinese society and the state.
In the past five years, scholars have reached some consensuses regarding the basic features of this migrant group. Above all, they have demonstrated how African migrants are both
10 socioeconomically diverse and highly mobile. This conclusion has led scholars to look at particular aspects of the experiences of Africans in Guangzhou in relation to Chinese society. For example, recent studies have explored topics such as Nigerian-Chinese marriages (Lan 2015; Y.
Qiu 2016); place-making and precariousness among Nigerians in Guangzhou (Castillo 2016);
Africans’ access to healthcare in Guangzhou (Bork-Hüffer 2015; Lin et al. 2015); Africans as creators of new social spaces in Guangzhou (Bork-Hüffer et al. 2016); the Chinese media’s response to Ebola and its impact on Africans (Dirlikov and Jiang 2014); Africans’ adaptive strategies in response to China’s strict visa policies (Mathews, Lin, and Yang, 2014; 2017; Lan
2015; Haugen 2019; G. Huang 2018); commodity chains between China and Ghana (Haugen
2018), and Africans’ transient experience in Guangzhou (Niu 2018; Yuan and Pang 2018). The subjects of these studies have ranged from African migrants in general to African traders/businessmen to various sub-groups within the African population. This means, in addition to the most commonly studied African traders, cargo-business owners, and middlemen, other smaller groups have been included in scholarly work. These include African students
(Haugen 2013a; Ho 2018), female African traders (Huynh 2016), and African musicians
(Castillo 2015).
In 2017, Mathews, Lin and Yang (2017) published The World in Guangzhou: Africans and Other Foreigners in South China’s Global Marketplace, the most comprehensive study of
Africans in Guangzhou to date. This research brings depth and nuance to the complex experiences of Africans and other foreigners in Guangzhou but also highlights the contrasts, tensions, and intersections between class, gender, ethnicity, religion, and race. Through the lens of “low-end globalization,” contributors to the book discuss the role of African middlemen as
11 culture brokers, their economic and religious lives, and their law-breaking activities such as trading copied goods and visa overstays.
My dissertation builds on these previous research projects with a special focus on how politics, social relations, and culture structure the lives of Africans, especially African Muslims, who as mentioned earlier, are understudied in the current literature. The theoretical framework of my research lies at the intersection of citizenship, religion, law, as well as transnational migration studies. It combines theories about the changing nature of transnational migration and citizenship (Ong 1999, 2006) and ideas about the ways in which political identity, national identity, and social integration take shape in the context of post-reform China (Rojas and
Litzinger 2016; Greenhalgh 2005, 2016; Rofel 2007). Specifically, the changing global economy has led to new forms of border crossings and growing migrant populations that challenge the applicability of nation-state-based citizenship projects. In the context of China, the influx of
African migrants, both traders and students, has drastically altered the composition of the local population. African migrants also challenge the disciplinary and regulatory concept of citizenship that was built on a set of binary constructs, such as citizen and foreigner (Aas and
Bosworth 2013), as well as the idea of ethnic belonging (Mathews, Lin, and Yang 2017). While these migrants share social spaces with local residents, they are considered non-citizens.
However, transnational migration has given rise to a new category of citizenship, “urban citizenship,” that is not linked to nationality or legal residence, but rather to a right to live in a specific city (Bauböck 2003; Purcell 2003). It is within this context that I examine how social and political relations, rights, and responsibilities associated with governance and citizenship are changing as migrants introduce new kinds of political communication and participation into
Chinese society.
12 As Gordon Mathews beautifully and precisely points out in a special issue of Journal of
Current Chinese Affairs on Africans in China that he edited,
“[i]n a sense, this topical issue’s papers might remind the sceptical reader of the parable of the blind men and the elephant – we each to some extent use our own investigations of a particular part of the elephant’s anatomy to falsely generalise about the elephant as a whole. But I am more sanguine than this. Understanding the social world of Africans and African–Chinese interactions in Guangzhou, like any other social world, is an immensely complex undertaking, so complex that no single observer can comprehend the whole elephant. We who depict parts all add to the knowledge of the whole – we do things differently, but we need one another in order to acquire a full depiction (2015a, 13).”
My ethnographic research was much more fragmented, based on my long-term fieldwork process. Despite the diverse backgrounds of my interlocutors, they still do not represent the entire African Muslim population of Guangzhou. Indeed, when I use the term “African” or
“African Muslims” I do not mean it to refer to all Africans in the city. Neither do I intend to examine the experiences of all Africans in the city. Rather, I present the lives and stories of those with whom I had encountered in my daily fieldwork and, by doing so, offer a nuanced perspective on experiences and challenges of Africans, especially African Muslims, in modern urban China.
Contextualizing Guangzhou Guangzhou as a Commercial Centre
Formerly known as Canton, Guangzhou is the largest city in Southern China and the capital city of Guangdong province. Geographically, Guangzhou is located in the Pearl River
Delta Region and is close to other major commercial cities such as Hong Kong, Macau,
Shenzhen, and Zhuhai, with which it shares similar cultural customs and dialects, making it the entry point for foreign traders doing business with China. Historically, Guangzhou has been a key national transportation, financial, and commercial centre for more than 2,000 years. It was,
13 for instance, a central hub of the historical Maritime Silk Road, China’s ancient ocean trade, and cultural routes between China, South Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. For centuries, the merchants of Canton were central to the huge growth in China’s foreign trade and contributed to the development of both national and international markets and networks (Van
Dyke 2016).
Guangzhou’s historical legacy continues to influence the city today. Since 1957,
Guangzhou has been host to the biannual China Import and Export Fair (also known as the
Canton Fair). During my fieldwork in the autumn 2013, 189,648 foreign traders from over 200 countries and regions travelled to the conference; the contracts they signed there amounted to up to 31.7 billion US dollars, and the annual business turnover for 2013 was 67.2 billion US dollars
(Canton Fair Website n.d.). As a hub for international business, Guangzhou is also a contact zone where China’s internal migration converges with international migration. As one of the first cities to benefit from China’s market reform, Guangzhou is a popular destination not only for foreign traders but also for migrants from other parts in China, particularly from rural areas.
Indeed, the city’s thriving export markets have attracted migrant workers and entrepreneurs from different regions of China, many of whom find business and employment opportunities by trading with or providing trade-related services to the high concentration of Africans and other foreigners in the city.
Guangzhou as an Islamic Centre
Beyond its role as a modern-day commercial hub, the historical connection with maritime trade has also helped to shape Guangzhou’s religious identity. Guangzhou was among the earliest Chinese cities, for instance, to be introduced to Islam. As early as the Tang Dynasty
14 (618-907 AD), so-called Fanke (番客 , foreign guests/sojourners) lived in Guangzhou. 2 As I show in Chapter 4, Guangzhou continued receiving Muslim migrants from various places throughout its history. After the 1979 market reform and the re-opening of maritime trade in the southern coastal areas of China, the city experienced an increase in the migration of both domestic and foreign Muslims, making Guangzhou home to one of the largest international Muslim communities in China (see detailed discussion in Chapter 5).
As in the past, economic motives continue to drive Muslim migration into Guangzhou.
Today’s Muslim community is much more diverse in terms of ethnicity, country of origin, and occupation. There are currently three major Muslim groups in Guangzhou: local Cantonese
Muslims, who are descended from Islamic migrants from previous centuries; floating Chinese
Muslims, from the country’s northwest and central provinces such as Ningxia, Xinjiang, Henan, and Qinghai, with a few from Southwest regions like Yunnan; and a foreign Muslim population, which consists of Arab Muslims from the Middle East and North Africa, African Muslims from various Sub-Saharan African countries, and Muslims from South and Southeast Asia. In 2014, the total number of Muslims in Guangzhou was 60,000, of which 20,000 were Cantonese and
20,000 were from Arabian countries (Xinhua Net 2014).
Guangzhou as a Multi-Ethnic City
The history of African migrants in the People’s Republic of China (1949 onwards) dates back to the Bandung conference in 1955, the first Asian-African conference to promote economic and cultural cooperation. The first wave of African migrants was composed primarily of international students on Chinese scholarships, who came to China mainly for training and
2 In this case, most Fanke were foreign Muslims. See Chapter 4 for more details.
15 educational purposes. This means that these Africans were meant to go back to their home countries once their schooling was over. Since they were in China based on mutual agreements between China and their home countries, they did not face any visa challenges with Chinese immigration authorities during their stay. Previous research also shows that this wave of African migrants consisted of individuals who generally came from high-status African families and were on a Chinese government stipend that was above the average income in China at that time
(Brady 2003).
The second wave of African migrants during the communist era arrived in Guangzhou in the 1990s, after the Asian economic crisis (Bertoncello and Bredeloup 2007; L. Zhang 2008).
This group of migrants was extremely diverse, consisting of individuals from a number of different countries, ethnic backgrounds, and socio-economic statuses. Because of their diversity,
Castillo (2014) points out that “African migrants” is an umbrella term to cover individuals from various socio-economic and ethno-national backgrounds. Unlike members of the first wave of
African migrants, these migrants came principally for economic reasons.
Due to the high degree of mobility among African migrants and their inconsistent documentation, the actual number of Africans in Guangzhou has been a source of heated debate amongst scholars. Estimates vary from 10,000 (Castillo 2014) to 20,000 (Li et al. 2008) to as many as 100,000 (Bodomo 2012). Some Chinese journalists have inflated these numbers to suggest that the African population of the city as of 2011 was at least 200,000 (S. Xu 2012).
According to Bodomo (2012), the five most common nationalities among African migrants in the city are Nigerians, Senegalese, Malians, Guineans, and Ghanaians.
During the global Ebola outbreak in 2014, the number of Africans living in Guangzhou became once again a central concern for Chinese residents (Dirlikov and Jiang 2014). In October
16 of that year, the city’s deputy mayor announced that only 16,000 Africans were living in the city, in an effort to calm public fears about the possibility that the Ebola would strike in Guangzhou.
This was in contrast to some online rumors, which suggested the African population at the time was nearly half a million (Zhuang 2014). The deputy mayor’s figure of 16,000 was based on the number of Africans who have valid Chinese visas and are registered at the local police bureau in
Guangzhou. Echoing Sandra Hyde’s (2007, 37-38) discussion of the “aesthetic of the statistics” in China’s anti-HIV/AIDS movement, in which the statistics used were based mainly on the surveillance of a certain category of bodies, this figure of 16,000 alone does not capture the full picture of African migrants in Guangzhou. Although the number of Africans in the city is very small in comparison to the whole population of Guangzhou (13.08 million), most of them congregate in a small and densely populated geographic areas such as Xiaobei and Sanyuanli, making their presence quite visible to people in the neighbourhoods nearby, but not to other residents of the city. 3
It is still difficult to find accurate information about the actual number of Africans due to several factors: 1) some are registered in other Chinese cities but work and live in Guangzhou.
For example, many Africans live in surrounding cities, such as Foshan, and commute to
Guangzhou for work; some also register as students in other cities where it is easier to obtain a student visa but move to Guangzhou for business upon their arrival; 2) some are short-term visitors who arrive on international flights every day; and, 3) some overstay their visa. Therefore, it is highly likely that the African presence in Guangzhou is higher than 16,000 individuals.
Not only is the total number of the African population in Guangzhou ambiguous, but the
gender ratio is also unclear. Although no official statistics are available, previous researchers
3 The population of Guangzhou hukou holders by the end of 2014 was 842.42 million. The 1308.05 million figure includes Chinese internal migrants.
17 have concluded that males dominate Guangzhou’s African population (Bodomo 2012; Li et al.
2008). According to Bodomo (2012), about 80% of the migrants surveyed by him were between
24 and 40 years old, and close to 82% of them were men. Based on statistics collected in
Xiaobei, another quantitative research shows that the ratio of men to women among African residents in Xiaobei is 7:3 (Li et al, 2008). Drawing on only 70 samples from English speaking interlocutors, this study concluded that the majority of African migrants are men and has influenced how scholars have commonly portrayed Africans in China. However, sociologist Tu
Huynh (2016) questions this assumption of male predominance in Guangzhou. Through challenging the way African women and men are engaged in Sino-African trading, she argues that the marginalization of women in the scholarship ignores the history of African women in this trade and their roles in “developing postcolonial economic connections while it normalizes men’s displacement of a traditionally female role” (Huynh 2016, 502). Still, Huynh estimates a ratio of between 25:75 and 30:70 female to male traders in the city, similar to most scholarship.
This gender ratio also echoes my observation in my fieldwork.
Some affluent African traders bring their entire family to Guangzhou, including siblings, wives, and children. Many housewives (as well as single women), especially those from Islamic cultures, rely on their husbands or brothers for financial support in China, where they either go to school or stay home taking care of the family. Sita, who I met at a baby shower (see Interlude I), also has a younger sister who studied Chinese in the same school as her. Sita’s husband supported both of them. Among a large number of women living in Guangzhou who neither go to school nor participate in the business world, they are visible primarily in their houses, at grocery shops, at hair and nail salons, in shopping malls, in residential areas, at community parties, and/or at language schools.
18 The commercial products Africans trade varies greatly from small electronic items to furniture and building materials; from lipsticks to medicine; and from farming machines to used car parts. Although most Africans fall into the category of small scale business owners, I witnessed a range of socioeconomic statuses among the Africans I engaged with during fieldwork. For example, there were economically disadvantaged Africans who lived with friends or in hostels operated by more established Africans for 30 to 50 yuan (5 to 8 USD) per night.
There were small-scale business owners lived in budget hotels for approximately 200 yuan (32.4
USD) per night. Some wealthier African traders could stay in luxury hotels for 600-2000 yuan
(97.2-324 USD) per night. These differences in status were also reflected in the scale of business that African traders conducted. For instance, the smallest business order that I witnessed in my fieldwork amounted to 860 yuan (about 140 USD) and was made to purchase 40 watches to be carried in a single person’s suitcase. On the other end of the spectrum, one wealthy Nigerian businessman gave his local agents 5,000 USD in cash as a greeting gift.
Africans are not the only foreign group of foreigners in the city. As of October 15th,
2014, the total population of foreigners living in Guangzhou was 118,000, of which 47,000 hold long-term visas.4 Best estimates suggest that these include 57,000 Asians, 22,000 Europeans,
16,000 Africans, North 14,000 Americans, 5,000 South Americans and 4,000 Oceanians
(Guangzhou International n.d.). Koreans, Japanese, and Americans are the three most common nationalities among the foreigners in the city. Among the top twenty foreign nationalities, only two groups are from Africa—Nigerians take 14 th place and Egyptians take 17 th .
4 Defined as foreigners who had lived in Guangzhou for more than 6 months, including about 10,000 students from overseas.
19 Xiaobei and the Surrounding Neighborhoods
Up until the end of 2014, African communities were primarily located in two areas in
Guangzhou: Xiaobei, in the central part of the Yuexiu District, and Sanyuanli, in the Baiyun
District in the north of the city. Although both these neighbourhoods have a highly concentrated
African population, scholars conclude that there are two major differences between Xiaobei and
Sanyuanli: 1) Xiaobei is more Francophone while Sanyuanli is more Anglophone; and 2)
Xiaobei has more Western Africans who are predominantly Muslims, and Sanyuanli is a hub for
Igbo Nigerians and other Christian Africans (Mathews, Lin, and Yang 2017; Li et al. 2008).
Why do people from different regions in Africa congregate in these specific places?
According to my interlocutors, geography is a major factor. Sanyuanli and Xiaobei are both close to the Central Railway Station and its nearby commercial zone. The wholesale markets surrounding the train station have attracted businessmen from all over China for decades, such as
Liuhua Fair Centre, Meibocheng cosmetics wholesale market, Zhanxi Watch wholesale market,
Baima Wholesale Market, and Canaan market. Simultaneously, convenient access to the markets leads many Africans to live close by, as both Xiaobei and Sanyuanli are only one stop away from the Central Railway Station. Together, they form the Xiaobei – Central Railway Station –
Sanyuanli trading belt (Figure 1).
20
Figure 1 : Source: Liang, Kelly. 2009. “Black Ghosts in the Chocolate City: Perceptions and Experiences of African Migration in Guangzhou.” Bachelor Thesis, The University of British Columbia. The Chocolate city is a term some scholar and local people use to refer Xiaobei or Guangzhou at large.
Second, both Xiaobei and Sanyuanli used to be urban villages ( 城中村 , Chengzhongcun ),
and have now been “abandoned” by local residents. 5 Armstrong (2004), Noussia and Lyons
(2009), and Valenzuela (2003) show that the interactions between new migrants and host
societies imprint distinct spatial marks on host cities. Migrants typically occupy those spaces that
have been vacated by local residents. The Denfeng area in Xiaobei, for example, used to be a
5 Although Guangzhou’s urban villages are similar to slums in that both are sites of large amounts of informal and semi-illegal housing. However, slum is not exactly the right word to describe the urban village. While there are certainly problems with infrastructure and sanitation in the urban village areas, they are far from unlivable. See (D. Wang 2016) for further critiques and comparisons between urban villages and slums and shanty towns elsewhere in the world.
21 quiet urban village in the central Yuexiu District of Guangzhou. Over the past few decades, however, it has changed considerably due to migration by both Chinese internal migrants and migrants from Africa. High demand from both internal and international migrants led to a rental boom in Dengfeng area despite poor quality housing, and residents who originally lived in this area have already moved to other parts of Guangzhou and rented out their apartments for a significant profit.
I conducted my research with a focus on Xiaobei, a sub-district in Yuexiu district, where I resided for one year in 2013-14. The neighbourhood of Xiaobei is located in the heart of the old city’s business zone. Like the older parts of most cities, Xiaobei is very chaotic and colourful with lots of contrasts: high-rises, office towers, and hotels that were built in the 1980s and 1990s are located next to narrow alleyways and small streets. It is a dense, dynamic place that houses a mix of people: Africans, Middle Easterners, people from other parts of Asia, and internal
Chinese migrants. In addition, it is well-serviced by several major modes of transportation, such as the city express buses destined for Hong Kong and Macau, the Airport Express Line, the
Guangzhou Railway Station, and the city Metro (see also Hirsh 2016). All four of Guangzhou’s major mosques are located in Yuexiu district. Many of the Muslim Africans featured in this study chose to stay in Xiaobei not only for its strategic commercial location but also because of the mosques nearby.
Building Complexes: Tianxiu and Dengfeng-Yueyang
Nicknamed as “Guangzhou’s Chungking Mansion” because of its similarities to the
Chungking Mansion in Hong Kong, a destination for many international travelers and traders on a budget, but also a space where these communities congregate, network, and open restaurants,
22 Tianxiu Mansion is a building complex located at the crossing of Xiaobei Road and the Inner
Ring Road in the heart of Xiaobei (Mathews 2011). Built in the late 1990s, Tianxiu mansion consists of three independent building blocks: A, B, and C, all of which are thirty-five stories high. Blocks A and C are residential, while Block B is mainly commercial. Several cafés and restaurants are located on the first floor of Block B. From the first to the fourth floor is a trading centre featuring many retail and wholesale shops; the fifth floor and above consists of a mixture of offices and rental apartments. The Tianxiu Hotel, famous among Africans, opened in 2007 and takes up the top floors of Block B. For many African newcomers, the convenience that the
Tianxiu Hotel offer leads them to select it as their place of residence, despite it being slightly more expensive than similar hotels in different districts. In research conducted in 2007, Li, Ma and Xue (2009) noted that 400 Africans from 52 different countries lived in the Tianxiu. Tianxiu
Mansion’s central location and popularity among African migrants make it a major symbol of
Guangzhou for many Africans. Many people take photos with Tianxiu in the background and bring them home as souvenirs (Traub n.d.). As more Africans came to reside in Xiaobei, they also congregated in other apartment buildings on Xiatangxi Road in Dengfeng area on the other side of Inner Ring Road.
The area around Tianxiu Mansion on the south side of the Inner Ring Road feel modern and are filled with high-rise buildings. By contrast, the north side of the Inner Ring Road that connects to the Dengfeng area, where most Africans in Xiaobei live, is more of an urban village, with poor quality and crowded housing. The tunnel that leads to Dengfeng goes underneath a train bridge parallel to the Inner Ring Road. The U-shaped tunnel reminds me of the door through which Alice discovered her wonderland, as the environments on either side of the tunnel are so different. After passing through the tunnel, which was stuffed with all kinds of retailing
23 stands on both sides, I entered a small square surrounded by a trading mall sandwiched between dusty, run-down, two to six stories apartment buildings and inns. Among these, on the east side of the square, stands an eight-story building covered by grey and white paint: another famous building for Africans in town, the Dengfeng Hotel (New Donfranc Hotel). Established in 2004, it is a modestly priced three-star hotel (around 100-200 yuan per night), providing a good alternative to the often occupied and more expensive, four-star Tianxiu Hotel. On the second floor of Dengfeng Hotel is a recently renovated halal restaurant serving both Chinese and
Western style food owned by a Hui Muslim from Northwest China. Annexed to the Dengfeng hotel is the Yueyang (Oversea) Trading Mall that accommodates two floors of shops. These two buildings are interconnected, making it easier to commute. Except for residential apartments,
Dengfeng-Yueyang Complex is a smaller, yet similar, version of Tianxiu Mansion.
Only about 300 square meters in size, the square is a multi-purpose place. During the day, like the pedestrian bridge, the plaza is occupied largely by Chinese internal migrants conducting money exchange business and hopeful porters waiting for business. At night, it is filled with outdoor food stands selling fruits and barbecue chicken, people selling cheap clothes on coat hangers and counterfeit handbags on the ground. With the outdoor fruit and vegetable markets, food stands, grocery shops, restaurants, pharmacies, clinics, post offices, ATM machines and bank branches, this catering market make this area self-sufficient.
24
Figure 2: Dengfeng-Yueyang Complex (Photo by author)
Field Sites and Methodology This dissertation is based on 14 months of ethnographic fieldwork (June 2012, from
September 2013 to September 2014, and December 2014) in Guangzhou. My primary ethnographic field sites while in Guangzhou include a long-established mosque with a diverse group of adherents; a local family services centre in an area with a large African population; a shop operated by a Chinese trader inside Tianxiu Mansion’s trading mall; and the company
25 office of an established African businessman. I connected to these sites through various personal and professional connections.
The specific ethnographic sites are closely linked to my positionality in my fieldwork,
which I discuss in Chapter 1. As I outline in Interlude I, I first met one of my key interlocutors,
Bah, by chance on the street. As an active member of the Guinean community, Bah introduced
me to many of his friends. Indeed, Bah was key in enabling me to conduct snowball sampling—
asking my interlocutors to refer their friends or countrymen to me if they thought it was
appropriate. My initial experience with Bah made me comfortable talking to Africans on the
street, yet soon I realized this was a bad idea: since most Chinese do not greet strangers on the
street, many Africans assumed that I was flirting with them. Some even assumed I was a
prostitute and asked about possible services. This was a predictable response from men given the
context, which I realized over time. 6 After several failed attempts of meeting people this way, I
began to look for more specific places where I could meet African migrants where
misunderstandings would be unlikely.
I began attending Friday prayers at a mosque in Xiaobei with Bah during my first month
in the field, where I noticed there was a very large population of Africans. In the mosque, I was
separated from Bah, as men and women pray in different zones. But there were almost no
African women in the mosque we attended. I realized that although the mosque was a good place
for me to conduct research, I needed a better way to engage in the religious lives of African
migrants, who are mostly male. After several inquiries among my network, I found out that my
cousin’s acquaintance was a well-respected Imam in Beijing. He had a former student who was
working in the Islamic Association in Guangzhou. Through him, I got to know the Imam at the
6 Chinese prostitution targeting foreigners (especially Africans) boomed in the Xiaobei area during my stay in 2013 and 2014, as did African prostitution targeting both Chinese and African men.
26 mosque. Later, I became a part-time volunteer there (Monday and Thursday prayers, Jumu’ah prayers, and religious holidays). I was expected to participate in all aspects of the religious activities held by the mosque. My main duties were tidying the prayer room, putting the canvas on the ground, and cleaning up after each prayer session. During my volunteer work, I was allowed to be present while men were praying.
In addition to the mosque, I also spent much of my time at a family service centre in
Xiaobei. This family centre is an NGO from which the government purchases services. The centre offered free Chinese language classes to African residents living in the surrounding neighbourhood, and I was invited by a staff member to serve as a Chinese language teacher. I volunteered and ended up teaching at the centre four days a week for six months. Besides free
Chinese classes, it also offered free Saturday guitar classes and organized social activities like football matches, sightseeing trips, museum visits, and mountain climbing. 7
To complement the mosque and family centre, I also choose two smaller, less formal sites in which to conduct research. One of Bah’s friends, Mobby, had a retail business that sold fashionable clothes. During my fieldwork, I sometimes spent time with him and his Chinese girlfriend in one of his shops in the Yueyang Trading Mall. Next to his shop on the second level was a Chinese trader who ran a machinery business. Slowly, I became friends with his wife,
Rose, who later opened a shop selling cosmetics and small household items in the Tianxiu
Building where I helped her as a shopkeeper and translator once or twice per week. From spending time in both Rose’s and Mobby’s shops, I got to know some Chinese traders and observed Sino-African relations from their perspective.
7 There are other family service centres in different parts of Guangzhou where foreigners reside. Due to its location in Xiaobei, this family centre caters mainly to Africans.
27 Near the end of my fieldwork, I also had the opportunity to help out as the secretary at a trading company for two months. One of my students in the family centre, Bara, had an uncle who was an established businessman who owned the company and was married to a Chinese woman. Bara also worked at his uncle’s company part-time. I was introduced to Bara’s uncle,
Songo, during Ramadan in 2014. One week later, Songo’s wife, whose Islamic name was
Fatima, called me to ask if I could help her show some clients from Nigeria, who were new in town, around Xiaobei’s markets. I accompanied them on a short trip to the Tianxiu and Yueyang markets for some personal shopping. After that, I began “working” in Songo’s office informally for two months, since her former secretary had just quit. Most of the time, I stayed in the office, helping Fatima organize the room and run errands. Sometimes she also gave me tasks like taking clients to the markets or showing them around the city.
Besides these four primary locations, I also met Africans regularly at other places all over the city: in several undocumented prayer rooms ( musallahs ) in trading buildings; at my apartment building; at the gym; at restaurants; at friends’ apartments or offices; and in their own homes and offices. I also communicated (and continue to communicate) with some of them through social media and chatting platforms (e.g., WhatsApp, WeChat, Facebook messenger, and Skype).
Deep Hanging Out
While in the city, I made extensive use of qualitative data collection techniques. My primary research methods were participant observation and interviews. My actions in the field were very much in line with what Clifford Geertz (1998) calls “deep hanging out,” a research
28 methodology by which an anthropologist immerses herself in a collective, social, and/or cultural experience on an informal level (see also Roy 2013; Wogan 2004).
Working with Africans in Guangzhou involves operating according to a different time frame. African traders do business with clients who are currently in Africa, and they work according to the local time zone in that African country, resulting in a different work schedule than most local Chinese. Most African and Chinese businesspeople with contacts in Africa, for instance, would sleep through the morning, start their business around noon, and then finish work at 9 pm at the earliest. Some Africans who work in the service industry (in cafes, restaurants, or hair salons, for example) work until after midnight and those who do not have a shop/office would hang out somewhere near the markets waiting for client calls. Sometimes I spent time with African traders at work, and other times I would go out with them for midnight drinks and snacks. 8 During their working hours, most of my interviews were done in an intermittent, chatting form; by contrast, I learned that the best time to do a lengthy interview was either dinner time (8-10 pm) or during midnight snacks (12-2 am). This worked well for people I already knew. But for people I had just met, arranging a time and location for a formal interview could be tricky. In the next chapter, I will discuss in detail my experiences having to negotiate multiple positionalities of gender, age, and nationality/ethnicity while researching a predominantly male group.
People I Worked with
During my fieldwork in Guangzhou, I interviewed a total of 46 African migrants and ten
Chinese nationals. Among the Africans I interviewed, I selected 29 as my key interlocutors based
8 Most times, I was with my Muslim interlocutors who do not take acholic drinks. They prefer juice, soft drinks, and coffee.
29 on the frequency of our interactions, their willingness to share their experiences, and the depth of the information they shared with me. All of the key interlocutors were interviewed two to four times. My African interlocutors came from different countries, with a significant number from
West Africa. 23 of my interlocutors were involved in Sino-African trade based out of
Guangzhou; two Africans worked as wage labourers for cargo companies, and the remaining four were students or housewives. 27 of the African interviewees were Muslims and lived in
Xiaobei. All names used in this study are pseudonyms except for Bah, who asked that I use his real name.
Languages in the Field
As I interacted with different groups of interlocutors from various language backgrounds, the language I used in the field varied. English is the universal language in Guangzhou for business, hence African migrants from different language background all acquired some level of proficiency in it. I am fluent in English, and after having completed several courses in French since my arrival in Montreal, I have reached a conversational level of French. I also took additional French courses upon my arrival in Guangzhou. Most of the interviews and conversations with Africans were held in English, though a small number in French.
The official language of China is Mandarin, and I am a native speaker. Although he traditional local dialect in Guangzhou is Cantonese, local residents and Chinese internal migrants from other provinces are fluent in Mandarin due to the mandatory language program in the educational system, which is enforced by the central government. As a result, all Chinese merchants speak fluent Mandarin.
30 I make some use of non-English terminology in this thesis, drawn mainly from Mandarin.
Where non-English words are used, they are italicized, with translations included in parentheses upon their first appearance. In the case of Mandarin, the pinyin is italicized, with Chinese characters and their translations in parentheses. Exceptions are made for Chinese geographic terms such as the names of roads, buildings, districts, and cities, which are recorded in the form of pinyin without italicization, for example, Xiaobei, Tianxiu, Dengfeng, etc.
The Use of Narrative Materials and Data
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the vigilance among the African population has shaped how I carried out my research from a logistical perspective: since cameras and recorders raised suspicion, I did not record most of my interviews. Most information was therefore gathered during casual conversations either face-to-face or online and subsequently written down. Besides the short excerpts of conversations/fieldnotes within the text of each chapter, there are a few lengthy excerpts of conversations and fieldwork moments, sandwiched between chapters as interludes. I have included these in order to present an ethnographic setting that unfolds the discussion to the readers. This is in line with Catherine Riessman’s (1993, 4) advice that researchers should “preserve narratives and not fracture them, as they constitute essential meaning-making structures.” Finally, it should be noted that I did my fieldwork between 2013 and 2014. Therefore, I have decided to use data from 2013 and 2014 (when possible) to present a more accurate analysis when accessible. This also applies to the use of the exchange rate between currencies that I reference. 9
9 The exchange rate of the US dollar (USD) to the Chinese yuan (CNY) fluctuates. For the convenience of the readers, in this dissertation, I use the average value of the exchange rate between 2013 and 2014, that is, 1 CNY/yuan to 0.162 USD. See: https://www.currency-converter.org.uk/currency-rates/historical/table/CNY- USD.html
31 Terminology
A responsible social researcher should be aware of the implications of the terms that she or he employs (Suter 2012). Therefore, several terms in this dissertation should be clarified at the beginning.
African(s): The term African in this dissertation refers to Black Africans from sub-Sahara
Africa; as Mathews, Lin, and Yang (2017, 55) states, “this is what ‘African’ typically means when used in Guangzhou”. Similarly, “Africans/Black people ( 黑人 , heiren )” are used frequently
and interchangeably by Chinese media and in academic research to refer to dark-skin, sub-
Saharan Africans in Guangzhou. Moreover, the term was used by many Africans I met to self-
identify. However, it nonetheless can overgeneralize and ignore the diversity among the
individuals with whom I interacted. Therefore, I use the term “African(s)” in this dissertation
mainly to signal geographic origin rather than identity. An exception applies when I need to
address national differences, such as in Chapters 3 and 4 where I compare the different visa
challenges faced by Guineans and Nigerians.
African traders and African small-scale business owners: I use “African traders” and
“African small-scale business owners” to emphasize occupation and economic status. “African trader” includes both small- and large-scale traders, and “African small-scale business owner” includes small-scale traders as well as Africans who engage in either legal, semi-legal or illegal commerce, like operating restaurants and hostels. These small-scale business owners are part of what Mathews, Lin, and Yang (2012; 2017,2) describe as “low-end globalization,”—global migrants who only have a small amount of capital and who make a living through semi-legal or illegal activities. It is important to note that although many African traders who are considered
32 “low-end” and small-scale due to their economic status on the global market are part of the middle class in their home countries.
African migrants: I use this term to emphasize one’s (im)mobility and his or her
immigrant status in China. This category includes Africans who holds various types of visas
(except permanent residency) and Africans whose Chinese visa has expired; in these cases, I also
refer to these migrants as overstayers. The term “migrant” is usually applied to people of low
socio-economic status who are culturally, religiously, or racially different from the dominant
local population (Suter 2012). While this definition is largely applicable to the Africans I
interacted with, I have tried to present diverse cases in order to highlight how not all African
traders face the same socioeconomic situation.
Due to the rigid immigration control, many Africans have a precarious status (Castillo
2016), and some scholars prefer to use terms such as “sojourner” to emphasize this temporary
status and the weak ties Africans has with Guangzhou. For example, Dong Niu (2018) calls
African migrants’ household structure in Guangzhou a transient household ( 过户 家户, guohu jiahu ), characterized by an intense relationship with the Chinese government, isolation from their
neighbors, the ambiguity in the rental contract signed with landlords, and lack of female
members in a household. For Niu (2018), these Africans temporarily live in Guangzhou like
passengers. Yuan and Pang (2018) also vouch for this “guest” status, and use a similar term
Guoke (过客 , meaning global transient guests), a term in Chinese that has similar concept as
“sojourners,” to refer to Africans in Guangzhou. However, in my research, I use “African
migrants” rather than “sojourners” as the former covers a wider range of Africans. In particular,
it includes Africans who have established some ties with local Chinese, and those who have
developed a sense of belonging with Guangzhou. In addition, even people on the move “may
33 develop a sense of ‘being at home’ in the world despite relatively transient connections to particular places” (Conradson and Latham 2005: 288). Therefore, I prefer the term “migrant” to
“sojourners”.
Islam: In this dissertation, the term Islam has two concepts. For the Chinese government,
Islam is a constructed category by the state. It is an important component of public culture that
under Chinese state’s regulation and management (Ashiwa and Wank 2009, 5; Turner 2011, xi).
For example, China has attempted to manage Islam through a national policy that recognizes
certain Muslim groups as official minority ethnic groups (Gladney 2009, 160). It is also a
regional historical asset (Van der Veer 2013, 206) that can be mobilized for economic growth,
which I will discuss in detail in Chapter 4. For African Muslims, Islam is a belief and value
system that guides their everyday practices, which I will discuss in Chapter 5.
Chinese: China is a highly ethnically homogenous society (Mathews, Lin, and Yang
2017). As of the national census in 2010, Han Chinese represented 91.51% of the total
population. Besides the Han, 55 other ethnic groups are recognized by the central government,
numbering approximately 105 million people (National Bureau of Statistics of China 2011). In
this dissertation, referring to someone as ethnically Chinese means they come from any of the
country’s 56 officially recognized ethnic groups.
Foreigner : This term is used from the perspective of Chinese citizens to differentiate
Chinese citizens from non-Chinese nationals.
Overview of Chapters This dissertation is made up of five chapters divided by three interludes that relate
fieldwork moments that help introduce the theme of the following chapter. In Chapter 1,
“Business Cards and Smart Phones: Positionality and Methodology in Fieldwork,” I discuss my
34 positionality as a female Chinese scholar among a male-dominated group of Africans. I also discuss how trust was built and established in my fieldwork. I explain how my positionality and the legal restrictions placed on Africans by the Chinese government worked together to shape my choice of research sites and research tools.
In Chapter 2, “An Additional Tier of China’s ‘Floating Population’: Managing African
Migrants in Guangzhou,” I focus on how the Chinese government uses visas to manage foreigners, especially African migrants. I explain that African migrants, as well as other foreign migrants, are classified as a “floating population.” Therefore, the visa and immigration problems that African migrants face should be examined in the context of the unique characteristics of
China’s citizenship structure. I further argue that African migrants’ presence in Guangzhou is mediated by both the local and central government’s immigration policies, Guangzhou’s urbanization, and the changing social, political, and economic relations between Guangzhou,
China, and the world.
The third chapter, “Individual Strategies and Visa-Partnerships: Navigating China’s
Immigration Control,” discusses how Africans respond to the Chinese government’s population and immigration regulations. While it is true that there is an anti-African prejudice in how immigration laws are enforced, this chapter argues that the visa problems many African migrants face should be examined through multiple frameworks. Specifically, how factors such as one’s socioeconomic statues, citizenship, and ties to Chinese society, along with broader events and trends should be taken into consideration when studying how African migrants obtain visas.
Since migrants’ rights within Chinese society are closely tied to the type of visas they possess, I argue that informal economic relationships called “visa-partnerships” have developed among
Africans and Chinese in order help Africans obtain long-term visas and maximize their rights.
35 While Chapters 2 and 3 discuss African migrants’ legal navigation, Chapters 4 and 5 focus on African Muslim migrants’ religious practices. Chapter 4, “Guangzhou's Muslim
Community: Migration, Connections, Development,” examines how Guangzhou’s unique attributes and history have created a vibrant, multi-ethnic Muslim community in the city.
Borrowing the concept of “complicity” (Siu 1999), I examine the roles of multiple players, including historical actors, the Chinese party-state, local governments, and Muslim traders engaged in economic development. I argue that the government’s agenda in developing
Guangzhou’s economy, as well as Guangzhou’s history as an important religious centre, have produced an inclusive Islamic environment for both Chinese and foreign Muslims to flourish.
The final chapter, “‘New’ Guests in the Old Fanfang : African Muslims’ Daily Religious
Lives, Economic Activities, and Social Interactions,” focuses on how sub-Saharan African
Muslims in Xiaobei navigate their lives in China. While most scholars have studied Africans
migrants to Guangzhou as a new group of immigrants, this chapter argues that African Muslims
should be seen in the context of a long history of trade and migration between Guangzhou and
the Islamic World. Further, I argue that there is a shared Muslim identity and religious values
called a “religious common ground” that regulates individuals’ social, economic, and religious
conduct. This religious common ground transcends individuals’ ethnic and national differences
through daily religious practices, business transactions, holiday celebrations, and social
gatherings. It is also the foundation of networks that provide financial and social aid. Despite
efforts at creating a common Islamic identity, however, I note that conflict, bias, and stereotypes
still exist within the Muslim community, and that these affect the interactions between different
Muslim groups.
36 Interlude I
First Encounter and the Woman in Aquamarine
In September 2013, I arrived in Guangzhou from Montreal to conduct fieldwork for my doctoral project on African migrants in China. After looking for accommodation in different neighbourhoods in Yuexiu district, I signed a lease for a studio apartment in Xiaobei and settled there. I went to the Dengfeng and Tianxiu Trading malls and was shocked to see that many of the shops there had changed completely since my preliminary research in June 2012. I tried to search for familiar faces in the malls but I found no one. I could not help feeling frustrated by how fast things could change and the transient experience some Africans had in China.
The day after I moved into my studio apartment, I went to the bakery near Xiaobei Metro to get some dessert. It was around 6 pm. On the way there, I was thinking about an email I sent to my colleague, who at that time was at her field site in Northern Canada. Doing fieldwork at the same time made us fieldwork support buddies. We had spoken previously about how to make the first contact with potential interlocutors, and in my email to her, I admitted that this was something I was finding challenging. I told her that “I am in the place of fieldwork but not in the field” – there were so many Africans in my neighborhood, but I did not know where to start and whom to talk to. In my head, I imagined a thousand times how to break the ice. Like my colleague in Northern Canada, I was learning that while it is one thing to describe making contact with locals in a research ethics application, it is a completely different thing in the real world. The paragraphs we wrote on paper often felt like they not apply to real, breathing people.
I walked along the pedestrian bridge next to the Tianxiu Building and passed by the
Western Union on the other side. I returned the same way. As I walked down the pedestrian
37 bridge, I saw an African man in a dark purple polo shirt standing by the road. It looks like he was waiting for a taxi. He turned around and saw me. And he said,
“Hi, how are you?”
I was speechless for 10 seconds. I admit that at that moment I was super excited: it was like God had just answered my prayers. But I tried my best to look calm and said, “Oh fine, how are you?” Then we started chatting. He told me that he usually does not say hi to local people. But earlier when he was at the Western Union wiring some cash home, he saw me passing by, and soon after, he saw me again when he was on the other side of the bridge waiting for the taxi after I bought some desserts. He then told me, “I told myself, aiya ( Aiya , 哎呀 , a
Chinese expression word adopted by him, similar to “my god” or “wow” in English), I saw this girl twice per day, I have to say hi to her.” And to his surprise, unlike most Chinese who would pretend they were not being spoken to, I responded.
That was how I met Bah, a sports shoe trader from Conakry, Guinea. He later turned into one of my key interlocutors. Bah asked me if I wanted to have a coffee with him later that evening. He had to take care of some business in Dashatou, a market that was fifteen minutes by car from Xiaobei and was famous for new and second-hand small electronics. But he would call me around seven in the evening after he finished his business.
I went home and waited until around ten that night. Still no calls. Anxiety set in and I wondered if I had given him a wrong number or if he was not serious about meeting later. It was only later in my fieldwork that I found out that many Africans have a different time system – when the set a time to do something, it is just an estimation. As my time doing fieldwork progress, I came to realize that Africans usually showed up hours after the time they told me.
38 Finally, around half-past ten o’clock at night, I gave up and decided to go to bed. Then my phone rang. It was Bah. He apologized for being late and asked me if I would like to have some coffee in Taojin, a high-end multi-ethnic international neighborhood which is one metro stop, or fifteen minutes of walk, away from Xiaobei. I was a bit concerned. I was new to the neighborhood. It was so late. He was a stranger. I suggested the Lounge Coffee on the first floor of the Tianxiu Trading mall instead, which is less than five minutes on foot from my apartment.
When I arrived, he was already waiting outside of the café. After we sat down, Bah told me that he did not like the cafes in Xiaobei, as they were always very noisy. I was surprised as I thought that a café in the nieghbourhood where most Africans gather, would be more in his comfort zone here than one outside of Xiaobei. Starting with why he preferred cafes outside Xiaobei, we moved on to talk about Guangzhou, local people, and his life in this city. He was a little surprised that I was a researcher, but then he smiled and commented,
“No wonder you are different”.
“Different how?”
“Different than other Chinese. They would not say hi to us.”
I see. He might have thought we were going on a date, but I was interested in meeting him because my project was on African migrants in Guangzhou. I thought I would only spend one hour talking with Bah, but it turned out we talked for more than two hours. When I left for home, it was nearly two o’clock in the morning. The lounge café was still busy with people dining, having coffees, chatting, and making loud phone calls. On the way home, I also saw some Africans hanging with friends on the street, as if the time zone here was at least three hours behind the local Beijing time. I did not realize it at that time, my biological clock would be running on “African time” for the duration of my fieldwork.
39 During my conversation with Bah that first night, he invited me to go to the market with him if I was interested. Bah told me later that he was one of the “committee organizers” in the
Guinean community in Guangzhou, and that he knew most his countrymen in the city. Slowly, I was introduced to his circle and some of his friends became mine. 10 Not only my earlier fear
expressed in the email to my colleague about not being able to initiate contact and develop
relationships with the individuals in the field were gradually reduced, but also, I could not
believe how “lucky” I was at the first fieldwork encounter. Little did I realize, though, that this
luck has a lot to do with me being an ethnically Chinese female. 11
***
Once I became friends with Bah, he started to introduce me to his friends and brought me to group gatherings, except to the ones that were completely in Arabic or Fulani – languages that
I am not able to understand. One day in November 2013, Bah told me that they were organizing a party for a friend’s baby and asked if I would like to come. It took me a while to figure out that what he meant was similar to a baby shower, although they hosted it after the baby's birth.
The party was held on the 12th floor in one of Tianxiu Building Blocks. The place was an open room with glass walls. There were boxes of all kinds of canned soft drinks in the centre, a brown leather sofa near the windows on the north side, and some red plastic stools folded on one another by the left side of the wall. Besides the stools, at the left corner, there were several big plastic basins covered by aluminum foil to keep food inside warm. In the entrance of the room, a man who looked like he was in his early 30s was standing with a baby in his arms. Clearly, he
10 The role Bah served was informal, volunteering work such as the icebreaker for newcomers, informing sharing, mediating among people in the Guinean community in times of emergency like sickness, arrest by police, etc. 11 See Chapter 1 for a more detailed discussion on my positionality and how it has affected my research.
40 was the father. People arriving immediately surrounded him and greeted him, so did us. As more and more people arrived, I noticed that all the guests were male.
Figure 3a and 3b. The baby shower site (left) and food covered with aluminum foil (right) (Photo by author)
“Bah, why are there no women?”
“Oh, they are not coming. It is not for them. They will have another one [event] soon.”
Bah told me that the father had invited every Guinean in town to come and that some women helped the mother to cook the food, but they had already left. I was surprised by this gender separation. But I was also curious about all the things around me.
“Bah, who is that old man? Is he the grandpa? Why does everyone say hi to him?”
41 “That is the oldest man in the village here. 12 We respect him, come, you should too.”
We went up and greeted the oldest man who is in his 60s and has a white beard. Bah kept
me company while answering my questions, but our conversation was cut off constantly as
people came and greeted each other. At one point, a man walked up to chat with Bah. While Bah was talking to him, I introduced myself to a man standing next to me. His name was Amadou.
He had been living in China for almost two years, but still could not speak Chinese, nor did he have any Chinese friends. Amadou said that at home in Guinea, while men and women would come to the same party, they would stay in separate sections. For today’s party, spaces were not big enough places to allow men and women to be separated at the event. People with better financial resources would rent a hotel to host a baby shower sometimes, but this family could not afford that. The current room was paid for by community membership fees based on voluntary donation and all Guineans could then host parties and meetings there for free. I told him that the family centre offered free Chinese classes and he should give it a try. But I never saw him again.
Soon, I realized that people started to stare at me. I got used to the gaze due to being a
Chinese woman amongst African men. Bah noticed this too. When some friends of the father started to distribute the food, Bah thought it would be weird that I ate among men so moved me to a small office room just next to the main social room. He brought me a plate of food: some fish, some lamb on top of the rice. I was by myself in the room, sat in front of the office computer and ate while trying to figure out what was going on. I peeked my head out the door every so often, but I could not see much more than a crowd of men. I counted more than 70 men at the party. But Bah said that not everyone who are invited was there. They were mostly in their
12 “The oldest man in the village” is an expression meaning the oldest man in the Guinean group in Guangzhou, and it does not refer to a specific village. This old man is well respected and leads some social events, as well as in charge of some disputes.
42 30s and they dressed semi-casually in dark-colored jackets and pairs of jeans. Some wore the traditional long robe, and some seemed to be coming directly from work as they were more formally dressed in suits.
Later, the older people and some other men, including Bah, came into the room while I was eating. They were counting cash, some were in Chinese yuan and some were in US dollars. I realized then that this was how this party worked. I asked an old man if I should contribute money too. He laughed and refused. Then they talked intensely in Fulani – later Bah told me that they were discussing how to divide the money. In the end, they reached an agreement. They divided the money into three parts: 1,200 yuan (194.4 USD) for the father; 1,550 yuan (251.1
USD) as the communal fund for the next baby who would be born into the group; and, 500 US dollars for the mother. 13 The elder then went back to the main room, made an announcement
about praising Allah and asking peace for the newborn and thanked everyone for coming to the
party before handing the money to the father.
The next week was the women’s baby shower for the same baby. It was inappropriate for
Bah to attend this time. I asked Bah if he could introduce me to a woman before I went to the women’s baby shower party so that I could feel less awkward and also I would look more trustworthy if there was a Guinean woman to introduce me to her peers). That was when I met
Bah’s cousin, Sita, who lived with her husband in one of the residential communities behind
Dengfeng. She had been in China for almost one year when we met. While being a housewife,
she also went to Chinese language schools.
13 Bah told me later that the reason why the money was not evenly divided between father and mother was that the father came from a different village than the mother. Most guests at the party were from the mother's village. Hence, people thought it was fair that the mother received more.
43 On the day of the party, I first went to meet her at her friend’s place. Before heading there, I decided to put on a scarf to cover my hair as I knew most women there would be
Muslims. A young lady opened the door for me. I immediately knew that she was Sita. She and
Bah shared the family resemblance: big round eyes, round cheeks, and a plump forehead. She
greeted me in Chinese, Ni hao (“Hello” in Chinese) and told me that she had been taking Chinese
classes. Then she looked away and had a flush, “I do not go [to] school often. Chinese is hard.”
There were four other women in the living room. They nodded to me in greeting.
One of Sita’s friends turned to me and ask, “You Muslim?”
“I am not.”
“You don’t have to wear it”. And she took the scarf off my head. I was a little offended as I thought it was a polite thing to do while she did not appreciate it. I did not say anything but waited on the couch quietly. Ladies in the room did not have much time for me, as they were busy doing the final touches on their make-up and deciding what they would wear. Later, two other women arrived. They were all well-dressed in colourful dresses with golden or silver embroidery that matched their traditional hats: a headscarf was intricately folded on top of their hair. Their delicate appearance— emphasized by their flawless makeups, shining shoes, and party clutches— made me worried that I was inappropriately dressed since I wore a black casual leather jacket, a long-sleeve T-shirt and a pair of black leggings. As everyone was waiting and doing their makeup, Sita received a phone call and told us that the cameraman had just arrived downstairs. Five minutes later, I saw a slim Chinese man in his 30s with two bags of equipment enter the house. His name was Pan.
As we were the only Chinese, we chatted a lot while waiting for Sita and her friends rush
to finish their makeup. He told me that his business was filming parties for Africans. After
44 everyone was satisfied with their appearance, we went up to the host’s apartment on the 15 th floor. There were more well-dressed women inside, crowding the 15 square meters living room.
The room is moderately decorated in China’s 90’s style, with some faux leather couches and simple furniture. Everyone was sitting around against the walls on all sides, either on the couch, on chairs, or on stools, leaving the centre of the room unoccupied.
Pan quickly set up a video camera at the left inner corner and started shooting. I thought it was funny that this foreign man was the only adult male allowed at the party, with other
Guinean males not allowed. Sita introduced me to the hostess and she welcomed me. Sita saved me a seat at the right inner corner of the room. I sat down and looked around. Compared to the men’s casual clothes and the men’s gathering of a calm, semi-business-like atmosphere, the women’s baby shower looked like a beauty contest. Everyone was trying their best to be colourful and shinning, and they all looked cheerful. Loud music accompanied people talking and occasionally yelling at the kids to stop them from running in the hallway and/or messing around with their mothers’ clothes or makeups. I also noticed two women in the group who, unlike everyone else who wore traditional long dresses, were in “Western” attire: tight short shirts, high heel platform shoes, and no hajibs. I asked Sita if they were Muslim. Sita told me that their husbands did not care what they wore. They like their wives showing their hair, she said.
Of course, the spotlight was on the hostess, who changed into three different outfits during the six-hour party, rather than the baby who was sleeping most time in the bedroom. It seems to me that this kind of event was also an excuse for females who were mainly housewives to have a fancy social gathering. When I saw many guests interrupt Pan and ask him to take photos of them with his SLR camera while he was occupied with filming, I introduced myself
45 and offered my SLR camera to take individual portrait photos for the women as a souvenir.
Many of them gladly accepted my offer.
Until – “Hey you, Chinese! Why are you taking photos of us?”
The voice came from a petite woman who was in an aquamarine robe. She looked at me and repeated her question. Suddenly, everyone was looking at me. I felt my face tingle in embarrassment. I explained my research and that I was a friend of Bah. Sita also vouched for me.
But the woman still suspected me of being a spy for the government by telling the story she heard from a friend that a Chinese man went to the Yueyang and Tianxiu Trading mall and took photos of Africans for the Chinese Police. Her attitude affected others, as people start to avoid eye contacts with me.
You’d better act low key, I told myself. I went back to my stool and sat quietly.
Unexpectedly, the woman’s question got my attention from some kids. They came over to me and looked at my camera. I thought it was a great chance to diffuse the current unnecessary attention, and I began teaching them how to use it (Figure 2).
Figure 4 : One kid took a photo of me using my camera (Photo credit: Pan).
46
The conversation about spying on Africans and the unwelcome attention I received began to decrease after about 30 minutes. As I started looking around again, I noticed an elderly woman at that party. She was in her 60s, and her dark purple dress made her look very serious. Parallel to the men’s party, the women respected this woman as the oldest woman in the group and hence she was kind of authority figure. I noticed some women came and handed some money to this old woman. I then took out 100 yuan (16.2 USD) and handed it to her.
She laughed. Very loudly. Then she grabbed my arm and pushed my 100 yuan bill away.
She stood up and announced something to the group. I did not understand much as it was a combination of French and Fulani – all I heard was something about Chinoise and Chinoise – a
term that I knew referred to me. I stood there, not knowing what was going on or what should I
do. I felt a bit worried because I did not know if I had offended her. The scary feeling lasted until
the woman sitting next to me poked me and signaled for me to sit down. She told me in a
whisper and broken English that the old woman was telling the group that everyone should pay
the hostess since even a Chinese woman knew she should pay the gift money. However, this also
implies that she did not see me as a member of the community (in the sense that the community
is based on ethno-nationality), so the community norms did not apply to me.
Thank God. I began feeling myself breath again.
“Give her some food,” the old lady said in the end, referring to me.
That was a great endorsement. All the women in the room laughed. And then, they started to talk to me again.
Soon the food was ready. Some helpers of the hostess offered me a plate full of all kinds of food: some steamed rice, some steamed plantain chips, some deep-fried plantain chips, some bean paste, some chicken stew in a red sauce and an extra spoon of pure chili sauce aside. As
47 more plates were being handed out and passed around, the room smelled tasty. And then there was a sudden silence as everyone concentrated on eating. The chicken was very spicy. Although
I have a high tolerance for spice, I still could not finish all the food with that degree of spiciness.
They laughed again as I burst into tears from the spice but still kept trying to eat the food. While everyone was eating, some women quickly went to talk to the old woman and ask for forgiveness. One of them explained to me later that her husband had not given her the monthly allowance yet and hence she could not contribute to the gift money at that moment. This made it clear that many women were dependent financially on their husbands or brothers. 14
After the food, the peak of the party came. The music got louder and four or five of the most active young women in the group started dancing. They moved in small footsteps. Some waved their hands in the air and eventually everyone placed hands on the shoulders of the person in front of them, and they danced in circles. Soon many others were affected by the celebrating mood and stood up. The room suddenly got steamy with the heat of a crowd, as well as the food.
Some children excitedly chased each other around the room, or into the hallway. But their mothers ignored them, as they were immersed in the dance.
“Come, Choo!” Sita invited me. I hesitated a bit because I do not normally dance at parties. But she insisted. Oh whatever, no one knows me anyway. So I jumped in, and to my
surprise, my participation resulted in hoorays and many more joined. They were all cheered by
this Chinese woman with crazy, not-rhythmic movements. Of course, all these moments were
recorded by Pan. I was officially part of the party. During the break, I gazed at the woman in
aquamarine, because she still sat in corner of the sofa, as if she was not part of the group.
14 When the party finally ended around 11 pm, I offered to help clean up. Pan also was there. I asked him why he had stayed, as it was very late for a workday. He told me that the wife did not have the cash to pay him, so he waited until the husband came home, and took some additional photos for the couple together as the cover of the DVD. I noticed that the wife asked the husband for cash to pay Pan.
48 Chapter 1
Business Cards and Smart Phones: Positionality and Methodology in Fieldwork
One day, I was chatting with Majid, a Yemenese trader who lived downstairs of my rental apartment in Xiaobei. He asked me what I was doing. I told him that I was doing research. To convey this in a way that Majid would understand, I told him that conducting business and research are similar in that the interlocutors I worked with are like my business partners. Majid thought for a while and said, “I think there is a fundamental difference between doing business and research. Business nowadays is standardized. You choose your products, you order, you pay, you ship, and some days later you get your cargo back home. Every link on the business chain is clear, it is rigid. Business is business. But research is not. It is flexible, too many factors will interfere and have an effect on the final results.” (Fieldnotes, October 10, 2013)
The FBI Lady Majib later told me that for a long time he thought I worked for FBI or CIA, as I kept throwing questions at people around me. “Choo, you have to be careful. Nobody asks that many questions here. People only care about business in Guangzhou,” he said (Majib, October 27,
2013). Indeed, in a trading city like Guangzhou, people cared a lot about exchange rates, business regulations, and economic ups and downs. Few cared or understood who I was and what I did there. Instead, people made all kinds of assumptions about me: a businesswoman, a journalist, a commercial spy, a Chinese teacher, a Canadian student, a Chinese woman who was looking for an African boyfriend/husband, and many more, depending on where and how they got to knew me. Few saw me as a researcher, or specifically, an anthropologist, even though I had that piece of information printed on my business card next to the vivid, red McGill logo, and handed it to people the first time I met them.
Two months into my time in Guangzhou, I started to accept that terms such as
“anthropologist” and “Ph.D. Candidate”—terms that form my identity in my academic life—
49 were nothing but a combination of letters to most Africans I met in the city. No matter how much
I explained, they still held onto their assumptions about me. I could not help but draws parallels with an anthropologist, Paul Rabinow, who faced a similar situation in his fieldwork in Morocco:
My initial entry accomplished, I was now faced with the task of conveying who I was and what I was going to do in the village. My purpose in being there remain unclear to most of the villagers, even to these with whom I spent many, many hours (Rabinow 2007:89- 90).
My sense of being constantly misunderstood continued until the day I met Abba, a Nigerian
trader and a friend of Abdul’s who came to visit him from Beijing. I told Abba what I was doing
in Guangzhou, and joked that Muji, a rich Hausa businessman who we both knew, used to think
that I was a commercial spy. He laughed and then told me it was not that Africans did not want
to believe me, but more because they did not think what I had told them made sense:
Not many Africans are willing to believe that you have a research fund that you can just do research and get paid. So it is better to say that your parents are sponsoring you. Also, if you are just saying you are doing research about African culture, but sometimes you ask questions about their business, [and] they are like, wow, wow, wow…this is not culture! So [that might be why] Muji would think you are a [commercial] spy. Next time you should tell people you are studying African business culture. Therefore, people won’t feel strange about your topic and your questions. And they won’t think you are a spy.
“But is that not a lie?” I was wondering about ethics.
Abba said, “you won’t be seeing most of these people anymore. You say the same thing [as you did before], you get nothing. But [if] you say this, you will get the information you want, isn’t it?” (Abba, March 4, 2014)
My encounter with Abba reminds of me the conversation I had with Muhammad, a Nigerien businessman and a student in my Chinese class, who also questioned the value of telling people that I am a researcher: “You should just say you are a teacher so people won’t feel afraid to talk to you. If you say you are a researcher, then people will be afraid” (Muhammad, February 4,
2014). The gap between how Africans view me and how I identify myself, as well as the gap
50 between what is believable to Africans and what is not, reveals two issues that were crucial in my fieldwork: my positionality and their trust.
Ethnography is fundamentally empirical, in that the researcher and his/her personal relationships serve as primary vehicles for eliciting findings and insight, resulting in one of the peculiarities of participant observation in ethnographic fieldwork (Amit 2000, 2). On one hand, the positionality of a researcher matters. As anthropologist Johannes Fabian (2014) points out, anthropologists and interlocutors create knowledge by being in the same place at the same time – a process he calls the coevalness. Fabian’s idea echoes other anthropologists who also argue for the co-created nature of ethnographic knowledge; they see anthropological knowledge as a mutual production (Rabinow 2007) or the result of collaborations between anthropologists and their interlocutors in cultural interpretation (Bourdieu 2008). On the other hand, the trust between the interlocutor(s) and the researcher(s) is key as information gathered in the field, which serves as the foundation of this co-production in ethnographic research, is based on it.
This chapter is a reflection on my positionality and trust-building during my ethnographic fieldwork with African migrants in Guangzhou. I examine how trust was built and maintained in my fieldwork, and the personal and institutional limitations that impacted this fieldwork. I argue that my fieldwork was mutually-constructed research influenced by multiple factors. These include my positionality and the trust of my interlocutors, as well as the Chinese government’s ambiguous attitude towards foreign migrants. Bringing out these issues of positionality and trust are important in terms of making clear the context of where and how my fieldwork data were gathered. I also think it is necessary to consider how my personal history and social relations have informed the present study; the environment in which I got to know my interlocutors; how my relationships were built; the questions I asked (and how I asked them); and my Chinese-ness,
51 my Han-nese, my anthropologist-ness, and my female-ness, were always important parts of my interactions with the subjects of this study.
This chapter has three sections. The first answers the question “who am I to them?”. I examine the researcher-interlocutor relationship between me and African migrants in Guangzhou through a discussion of my positionality as a female Chinese scholar among male-dominated
African groups. While my positionality gave me access to some fieldwork locations, at the same time, the fieldwork locations I choose influenced how these Africans saw me. My positionality also shifted when interacting with different individuals in different fieldwork locations. In the second section of the chapter, I argue that Chinese government’s policies toward foreign migrants act as an invisible hand that influenced my image to Africans, who in return have different readings of my positionality. In addition, the mutually constructed fieldwork experience led me to adopt certain methodologies, specifically, the use of smartphones and social media application tools, that became effective tools for conducting fieldwork. In the final section, I discuss different layers of trust that I encountered in my field research, and how trust was established, maintained, and/or broken.
Positionality in Migration Research The issue of positionality has been widely discussed in social research, including the potential advantages and challenges of different positionalities. I have met more than a dozen scholars of African migrants during my research in Guangzhou, each of whom had his or her own way of making contacts, creating their own pathways through which to enter communities and obtain information. As a result, we each built our own unique niche in this field. My positionality resulted from a combination of factors: my ethno-nationality, gender, the language I speak, and my existing social ties in China and in Guangzhou specifically. The fact that I am a
52 young woman, ethnically Han Chinese, educated in both China and Canada, an English and
Mandarin speaker, and a volunteer Chinese teacher to some Africans (and that I volunteered at a mosque where Africans congregate) each helped determine my niche: my positionality is different than that of a male researcher with the same ethno-nationality, that of a female researcher with a different ethno-nationality, or that of a Chinese female researcher with different social ties.
Ethno-nationality is the most vivid physical marker a researcher carries. Due to the tenuous relationship between the Chinese government and the African population, Africans tend to distrust Chinese scholars more than Western scholars (Mathews, Lin, and Yang 2017). During my fieldwork, many Africans I met worried that I was one of the journalists who worked for the government; distrust had been developing between Africans and Chinese “journalists” for a while. I was told that there was once a Chinese man who claimed to be a journalist, who came to the trading malls and took photos of all the Africans working in the shops. These photos were later used by the police to identify Africans in that area. I did not locate the source of the story, but it was a story firmly rooted in the Guinean community (see Interlude I). This story explains the high levels of vigilance and initial distrust towards local Chinese population by the Africans I met in the field.
After ethno-nationality, gender is the biggest determining factor of positionality in my field. On one hand, my gender provided me with advantages, such as being able to begin conversations. For example, I met my gatekeeper, Bah, on the street, when he greeted me with a
“hi.” If I were a man, he might not have spoken to me. Likewise, I could not have gained access to the female part of the baby shower (see Interlude I) if I were a man. Many African men were very interested in talking to me at first, although this popularity could be very fleeting: lots of
53 them stopped talking to me once they understood that I was not interested in becoming their girlfriend, or after they found out that I was a researcher. On the other hand, despite the fact that
I benefited from the friendship I had with the Imam who would introduce me to some African
Muslims, his endorsement did not guarantee that I could fully observe male-only activities, such as Thursday prayers and dinner gatherings (see Chapters 4 and 5).
My gender also restricted me from recruiting my interlocutors in certain ways. In the summer, when Guangzhou could get really hot and steamy, many Africans liked to grab a drink after work. There are plenty of simple-style terrace bars (some tables and chairs on the street) in the Dengfeng trading mall area, which are also good places to meet and chat with people. In this context, if a male researcher goes to have a drink with a potential interlocutor, then this is often seen as a sign of friendship. However, as a female researcher, the chances of meeting individuals and obtaining information in a bar is less promising. Specifically, proposing to meet an interlocutor or prospective interlocutor in the bar would send a wrong message to that person, giving him a false impression that I am romantically interested in him.
My social ties in Guangzhou also helped form my positionality. As mentioned in the methodology section in the Introduction to this dissertation, I would not have been able to make contact with the Imam in the mosque had it not been for my cousin’s help. Similarly, I would not have been able to volunteer in the family centre as a Chinese teacher had not a Taiwanese
American filmmaker introduced me to the staff. My teaching experiences at the family centre opened up opportunities for me to know more Africans, but my role as a language instructor also created the conditions for some misinformation. For example, in the family centre where I taught
Chinese, I noticed that some people spoke to me in a very respectful and formal way, which I did not encounter in any other social situation. Were they so polite and nice to me because I was
54 their teacher, a person who has authority over them and/or a person who was helping them learn a new skill? Or were they willing to talk to me because I was in a position that could provide benefits to them? How did their possibly different behaviour shift my subjective impressions of them, I wondered, and could I therefore make accurate and objective judgments about them and their situations?
Often, these questions are left unanswered, except once, I have encountered a vivid example of how this unique positionality led me to form a misleading impression of someone.
Through the same Taiwanese American documentary filmmaker, I had met many Americans who were working in Guangzhou while I was conducting my fieldwork. Their friendship provided an alternative engagement in my otherwise research-oriented social life in Guangzhou.
One night, the group of us went out for dinner to celebrate a birthday, we then decided to go to a dance club. I suggested the M Club that an African student recommended to me, in the Party Pier area (a vast bar area in the city, similar to Saint Laurent Boulevard or the Gay Village in
Montreal but significantly larger in size), partially because I wanted to combine the outing with some observational fieldwork.
We arrived around 11 pm. The bar was very spacious with modern decorations, but only a few people were inside. My American friends began to doubt if this would be a good choice. And I thought maybe my African friend was not telling the truth. How can this be a popular bar among Africans if not a single African was even present? But I was glad we decided to stay, as more and more Africans started to show up after midnight. Soon the bar was packed with a majority of Africans with some Chinese, as well as some Eastern Europeans. 11 pm was just too early for Africans who usually start their nights out at midnight.
My group started to dance. Suddenly, I noticed a familiar face: It was one of my students from the family centre. He was standing in the corner of the dance floor, chatting with his friend, with a soft drink in his hands. I was very excited so I waved my hands and yelled a loud “hi.” He saw me, stopped chatting with his friend, and joined us to dance. I was very impressed as he was very shy in class. After several rounds of dance, people began taking breaks and talking to each other. This could be a good opportunity to ask him for an interview, I thought.
55
As I introduced myself – “Hi, it’s me, Choo, your teacher at the centre!” – Almost at the same time, he looked at me and said, “Nancy!”
He continued, “how much this time?”
“But I am …, hey wait…” Suddenly, both of us realized something, and after a moment of silence, he turned over and disappeared from the bar. I never saw him again in my class (Fieldnotes, December 16, 2013).
That was one of the most awkward but also valuable encounters of my fieldwork. First, it reminded me how important long-term fieldwork is, and how complex interpersonal relationships across cultures can be. In hindsight, in the dim light of the bar, he had mistaken me for someone he had met before – possibility a sex worker. Second, this awkward encounter opened up a new way of seeing him. Before, based on our interactions in the classroom, I was under the impression that he was a shy and introverted person, since he was always awfully quiet in my classes. However, within the context of the bar, as a single man being invited to dance with a young woman, and regarding me as someone he knew, he presented a different side of himself. But coming from an Islamic background, it was inappropriate for him to interact with me in the way that he did. The fact I was his teacher at the family centre made the encounter more awkward and complex. Thus, he avoided future encounters with me. Third, the incident revealed to me an unspoken knowledge of the relationship between Chinese women and African men, which I would not be able to see if I just did my fieldwork in my classroom as a Chinese teacher and/or in the mosque.
Another aspect of my positionality involved my experience as a student in Canada. I met some Africans who were interested in talking to me because they considered me to be
“international and more open-minded” since I had travelled and studied abroad. Some people also initiated a conversation with me, hoping I could help secure them a Canadian visa or
56 citizenship, and some would shut down the conversation once they realized that I could not offer them these things.
Finally, my language also limited my chances to work with some interlocutors who did not speak English or Chinese fluently. Xiaobei is inhabited with many Francophone Africans, and some women there could only speak French and/or ethnic dialects. In addition, luck
(randomness) also plays a role in my positionality. For example, as mentioned in the Interlude I,
I would not have been able to enter the Guinean community that easily had I not become friends with an active member– Bah, who I met by chance on the street. If I had been on the street at a different time, I would not have met him.
Shifting Positionality
As Virginia Caputo (2000) argues, doing anthropology at home (as I did) is marked by instability because it requires a constant shifting of positionings between situations, people, identities, and perspectives. My role among my interlocutors is changing and constantly shifting.
Due to the various roles I played during my research, I was addressed differently. Most of the time, I was referred by my African friends as Choo, a name that I invented for the field because it is hard to pronounce my name Qiuyu (in the Chinese pinyin system, it is pronounced as “Cho- ieu,” instead of “Kiu-u” in English). I decided to give myself a fieldwork name as I needed people who were not familiar with the Chinese pinyin system to not be ashamed by being unable to pronounce my name properly. On various other occasions, I was also called other names by other members of the African community. For example, these who did not know me well in the
Guinean community addressed me as “ La Chinoise ” (meaning “the Chinese”, a name that always made me laugh). I was also called “ Laoshi ” –“teacher” in Mandarin – by my students from the
57 Chinese class in the family centre. For Chinese people at the mosque and in the shopping mall, they liked to address me as Xiao Jiang , a common Chinese way to address someone “younger”
by adding “xiao” (meaning “small” in English) to one’s family name. And sometimes, males I
met in bars and restaurants referred to me as “Baby.” Each name helped reveal a facet of my
positionality to each person I encountered.
My positionality not only influenced how I conducted my field research and whom I
interacted with but also in some way, my positionality provides (and restricts at the same time)
where I could gain access. My options for field sites were constrained by many of the
aforementioned factors such that, sometimes, I did not feel like I had any choice over where I
could conduct research. For example, some Christian churches in Guangzhou exclude Chinese
citizens. Western (non-ethnic Chinese) scholars such as Gordon Mathews, Lin, and Yang (2017)
and Heidi Haugen (2013) were able to conduct research in Nigerian underground Pentecostal
churches due to their non-Chinese physical appearance as well as their non-Chinese passports.
This helped shape their research findings, as more than half of the churchgoers were overstayers
(Mathews, Lin, and Yang 2017). As a Chinese woman, access to these venues was denied to me.
Me: An Apparent insider?
In migration studies, researchers have discussed positionality with regard to insider- outsider divides based on ethno-national factors (Carling, Erdal, and Ezzati 2014; Kusow 2003).
This binary division produces a researcher landscape with two opposite positions: 1) outsider researchers who belong to the majority population and do research on specific immigrant groups, and 2) insider researchers who are migrants or descendants of migrants and do research on their own immigrant group. Ethnographic literature on research practices recognizes the advantages of both positions: for instance, insiders can have linguistic or cultural skills that facilitate access to
58 and interaction with group members, while outsiders can encourage research participants to make explicit and explain the things that are taken for granted within the group (Carling, Erdal, and Ezzati 2014).
In the insider/outsider classification of researchers, status is often determined by ethnic background or national origin. For example, my outsider-ness showed many times in the
Interlude I. I was able to attend a male-only event because I am a non-Guinean woman, I was excluded from gift-giving at the baby shower because I was not part of the group, the woman took off my hajib because I am not a Muslim – all of these reminded me of my outsider status to this group of Guineans. However, global transnational migration has complicated the simple division of insider-outsider, as ethnographic research is often conducted from hybrid positions that did not fit the binary insider-outsider divide. Multiple social-cultural factors, other than ethno-national factors – such as personal, social class, occupation, gender, age group, physical appearance, and clothing style – can lead to same or different experiences within or across ethno- national boundaries, and therefore, impact the researcher’s insider/outsider status. Therefore, some researchers propose a third position, which takes into account these various factors. For example, Miller (2010) points out that clothing style is a key identity marker, as it can reinforce or compensate for ethno-national markers such as physical appearance and language by indicating traits such as a researcher’s religious, educational, or migration background.
In my research, I also used dress to gain access to my subjects, break social-cultural barriers, and establish trust. When I went to the mosque to meet with the Imam for the first time,
I chose to wear a hijab and a long-sleeve T-shirt out of respect. The Imam was a bit surprised when he saw me and asked if I was a Muslim. I told him that I was not, but that I had some friends with Islamic background so I knew the religiously-appropriate clothing style. He was
59 very pleased. He said that for non-Muslims, it is not a requirement to wear a hijab to meet him, but he was glad that I did. My choice of clothing showed respect to him and also became a way of engaging with the Muslim population’s specific inventory of social categories. I kept my conservative dress code when I later volunteered in the mosque and met other African Muslims while conducting fieldwork.
Another example of various factors within the third position comes from the field of
Chinese studies, in which language and gender play key roles. There are two researchers whose works are often compared: Li Zhang and Biao Xiang. L. Zhang (2001) and Xiang (2000) both study the Wenzhou enclave in Beijing ( Zhejiangcun , Zhejiang Village). Despite conducting and publishing their research within similar time frames, their books go in different directions. Xiang is from Wenzhou, and so he can engage in conversation in the local dialect. Zhang, by contrast, is from a different province, and she mostly converses with villagers in Mandarin. While we can argue that Xiang is more of an insider researcher than Zhang is, he is an outsider in that he comes from a different background than these Wenzhou merchants (Xiang is from a teacher family and came to Beijing to study). The biggest difference that influenced these two researchers’ work are not their insider/outsider status, but rather their opposite gender, as the local custom of Wenzhou forbids women to engage in business. Xiang, as a male researcher, was able to follow the bosses and participate in decision-making meetings, including contentious meetings about urban development. On the other hand, Zhang, as a female researcher who had limited access to “real business,” mainly gathered information from the wives of the male businessmen, or at the restaurant where she worked part-time. The gender and language difference between the two researchers led them to view Zhejiangcun through different lenses, making their two works very different.
60 Another example of how the insider-outsider classification of researchers is an oversimplification comes from the work of anthropologist Cecilia Menjivar. In her book about
Salvadoran migrant networks in the United States, Menjívar (2000, 245) points out that her research context made her “simultaneously an insider and an outsider.” Her insider qualities are markers such as her name and the biographical fact of being born and raised in El Salvador, while her outsider status shows in her personal experiences comparing to her interlocutors.
Menjívar (2000, 245) describes her typical positioning that shares some similarities with the insider (migrant groups) but with fundamental differences, a positionality that Carling, Erdal, and Ezzati (2014) call “an apparent insider”. As Menjavir explains,
From the outset of the study, even though my interlocutors were my compatriots, I knew that I would be crossing boundaries of age, class, education, and gender… I was never an undocumented immigrant, never lived in the neighborhoods where my informants lived, never held the kinds of jobs they did, and never experienced most of what has shaped their lives (Menjívar 2000, 245).
My case positioning is somewhat similar to Menjívar’s, in that I am a Han Chinese who was born in Chongqing, a major metropolis in Southwest China. I am therefore an insider to mainstream Chinese society and am part of the ethnic majority group. According to the insider- outsider division, though, which emphasizes ethno-national factors, on paper I fit the profile of a typical outsider researcher when studying African migrants. As discussed earlier, my role as an outsider/guest within African communities was manifested in my daily interactions with them.
Meanwhile, each person is multi-dimensional; my position would be much simpler had I not gone to study in Canada and later immigrated there.15 Like my African interlocutors, I am also
part of a transnational migrant population – I am a Chinese citizen, but also had experience as an
immigrant to a foreign country. I also had visa challenges: like my interlocutors who had
15 I was an international student to Canada during my fieldwork in 2013-14 and I became a landed immigrant in 2015.
61 Chinese visa issues, for example, I was refused by the Senegalese Consulate in Ottawa to go to an invited conference in Dakar in 2012 with no explanation provided.
Moreover, my student experience had similarities with the experiences of African students in China. Sharing my personal experiences as an international student and other school- related stresses like exams and language barriers has been many times an ice-breaking moment between me and those who are going to schools in Guangzhou. As Carling, Erdal, and Ezzati
(2014) note, sharing personal experiences can create common ground between the researcher and the people who he/she works with, helping to reduce barriers created by ethno-national markers.
Besides these experiences sharings, sometimes, unexpected moments also create opportunities to bridge the gap between me and my interlocutors.
In late August 2014, when I concluded my fieldwork research, fully packed and had my going-away parties. I received my renewed Canadian visa 4 days before my departure, and for some unfortunate misunderstanding, the effective date on the visa was wrong: I was scheduled to fly on September 4 th but the visa was only effective by August 31 st . And that affected me immediately. I could not enter Canada. Instead, I had to re-apply my study permit, canceled my flight and notified the Department of Anthropology at McGill of my visa problems. It was very stressful as my lease in Guangzhou had just ended and I have a teaching assistantship job in the fall term at McGill to fulfill. While I was anxiously staying in China waiting for my visa to be re-issued, my African interlocutor friends were curious to see me in the market again, after I told them that I departed for Montreal. I had to tell them about the visa incident. Soon, the news that “Choo did not get a Canadian visa” spread like a virus. Although some African interlocutors were sympathetic to my situation, at the same time, I sensed that they also had this “wow, she also could not get a visa” moment, as I noticed that they enjoyed to ask me to repeat again and again the story of how I did not get the visa, which they have heard several times already. (Fieldnotes, September 3, 2014)
Like Clifford Geertz gained entry into the Balinese village by running away with local villagers rather than simply explaining himself to the police, my personal visa-crisis, balanced the positions between me and those Africans who had visa problems. Not only it has brought us closer, but also it made them talk to me more. And more importantly, this incident has brought me unexpected trust from them.
62 However, despite similarities, there are fundamental differences between my situation and that of my interlocutors. More specifically, my own migration experience was different from that of the Africans I studied. I was never undocumented. I was never stopped by Canadian police to check my visa on the street. I come from a family who always supported me, I have never encountered financial difficulties when living in Montreal. Whenever some interlocutors told me about their hardship with the Chinese immigration, they would ask if I had my passport and visa checked by police in Canada. For some people who have relatives in North America, they would often add something along the lines of, “I think you don’t have to deal with that in
Canada, because my cousin in the States told me that police don’t check visas [on streets]”
(Diallo, December 30, 2014). Often at these times, I felt out of place: despite my transnational migrant experiences, I am still an outsider to transnational migrant groups like Africans in China.
Because I lacked such experiences, I might not have the capacity to fully understand their struggles.
A Researcher Friend?
The longitudinal nature of the anthropological field study allows an anthropologist to build a close relationship with interlocutors over time. The ability to build rapport and trust between anthropologist and interlocutor is vital to unveiling “subjugated knowledge” (Hesse-
Biber 2010), the lived experiences of interlocutors and the meanings associated with those experiences. Yet in fieldwork, anthropologists often grow close to their participants, resulting in a blurred line between the role of a friend and that of a research subject (Johnson and Clarke
2003). The term “researcher-friend” ( Watson, Irwin, and Michalske 1991) has been used to acknowledge that researchers often get involved in friendship-like relationships with research
63 participants. This situation raises difficulties in research as well as ethical uncertainties if the researcher collects data that the participants did not plan on sharing with the researcher as a research, but did so based on their perception of personal closeness. This type of relationship can also raise issues of power disparity when the research relationship is made with individuals from vulnerable groups, such as some African migrants sitting in my Chinese class who saw me as their teacher.
In my fieldwork, most Africans considered me more of an “odd friend” than a researcher since I socialized with them informally on various occasions. I also had the opportunity to do a lot of “gift exchange,” such as helping them call Chinese factories to make orders, negotiate prices in shops, mediate between Chinese partner and African traders, and translate in various settings. I also turned down marriage proposals, requests to bring their kids to Canada, and requests to serve as a guarantor for renting a shop in Guangzhou or obtaining a Canadian visa.
Sometimes, my interlocutors would introduce me to their friends as a friend or their teacher, even though they knew I am a researcher. Abdul explained that sometimes if his friends thought that he was hanging out with someone doing research about Africans, they would assume he would tell me some secrets that might harm other Africans. So they intentionally avoided any potential conflict with my (and sometimes their) best interests in mind.
I did become what I consider to be friends with some African interlocutors, and this definitely influenced my positionality as a researcher and the kinds of information I had access to. Sometimes I had to make a judgment about whether I could use some information obtained when I was treated as a friend rather than a researcher. For example, I have heard stories that are very personal, but that also would have been valuable for my research. After careful consideration, I decided not to include these in my dissertation. Sometimes, friendship means
64 exclusion as well. I had met many Igbos during my fieldwork, but some eventually cut me off when they found out that I went to mosques, or socialized with Hausas, or were not interested in being their girlfriend. Even after I told them that I went to mosques for work, some Igbos really took it personally. On the positive side, the research-interlocutor relationship brought many personal and professional benefits. For instance, I kept in touch with my interlocutors either as
Facebook friends or in social media communicational tools, like WeChat and WhatsApp.
Sometimes, Africans also commented on my Facebook posts and WeChat moments. These casual communications helped in deepening mutual trust, and in establishing bonds of genuine friendship.
Methodologies: Smart Phones, Social Media Apps, and Alternative Tools Smart Phones
In her book about fieldwork methodologies, anthropologist Vered Amit (2000, 7) points out that, “It is the circumstance which defined the method rather than the method defining the circumstance.” In this way, Amit explains the diverse strategies that researchers adopt to keep in touch with interlocutors in pursuing ethnographic possibilities in a disparate range of situations.
As explored in the preceding sections, my methodologies and analysis were informed by my own histories, positioning, and social ties, from the relationships I subsequently sought in Guangzhou, from the questions that emerged from those relationships, and from my attempts to create, sustain, and reflect on the ideals of reciprocity, trust, and respect in those relationships.
As mentioned in the Introduction to the dissertation, I was not able to record some of my interviews due to the vigilance of the Africans and most information was gathered during casual conversations and subsequently written down. I used smartphones and social media communication tools during my research, as smartphones are becoming increasingly common in
65 both personal and professional spheres in China. The use of smartphones as a methodological tool is well studied among scholars (Gurrin et al. 2013; De Vries et al. 2014; Robinson et al.
2013). Smartphones’ many features allow for rapid access to information and instant communication, thus expanding the realm of empirical investigation. They are powerful tools for knowing the social world. The technological and social characteristics of this device make it very useful in social sciences as a data collection tool among disadvantaged and hard-to-reach groups
(Raento, Oulasvirta, and Eagle 2009; Sugie 2016).
The smartphone applications WeChat and WhatsApp were the two most-used communication tools in my fieldwork. Most Africans who lived in Guangzhou had one or both of the applications installed on their smartphones. WeChat, as my primary online communication tool, is a combination of Skype (that allows one to make voice and video calls), Facebook and
Instagram (where one can post and share pictures and comments), and WhatsApp (that allows one to send text and voice messages). WhatsApp was less commonly used in Mainland China but was very popular among Hongkongese and Africans. I used WhatsApp to communicate with people who did not have a WeChat account.
Launched in 2010, the popularity of WeChat in Mainland China increased considerably
during my fieldwork period, as the number of WeChat users increased from 336 million in the
third quarter of 2013 to 468 million in the third quarter of 2014. It has a function called “people
nearby” – allowing WeChat users to locate other users who are within two kilometers distance
from them and send messages and friend requests to these users. If the person is willing to talk,
then he/she will accept the friend request and the chat would begin. This popular function has
been used by WeChat users I knew as an efficient tool for getting to know new people. It has
also been used romantically: I have met Sino-African couples who first met via WeChat.
66 The adoption of smartphones and their applications allowed me to conduct research that overcame the boundaries of physical sites, providing information especially on areas that I could not physically access. Phenomena accessible to smartphones can be studied without the researcher being present (Raento, Oulasvirta, and Eagle 2009). For example, I managed to stay in touch with my interlocutors when they travelled outside of Guangzhou, and even after I returned to Canada. At the time of the Ebola outbreak in September 2014, I was really worried about my friends who had returned to Western Africa or those still living in Guangzhou. Smartphones allowed me to communicate constantly with them, despite the physical distance. I was, therefore, able to continue my field research while maintaining my friendship with them from afar. Raento,
Oulasvirta, and Eagle (2009) argue that smartphones are an integrated and nonintrusive part of both the individual and their social life, and therefore allow observational access to domains of behavioral data not previously available without either constant observation or reliance on self- reports only. The “WeChat moments” function (posting photos and comments) enabled me to see aspects of my African interlocutors’ lives that I otherwise would not have been aware of. In this sense, while looking at the social media of my interlocutors can be read as a rather intrusive approach to research, they are sharing their information knowing that it is accessible for everyone within their circle of friends. 16
The information I gather from social media was often very useful in helping me build trust with Africans who I share my social media platform with. For example, I saw how some
Africans promoted their business by posting their products on WeChat. I learnt what someone’s home in Africa or Guangzhou looked like, and I also got a glimpse into their family lives and their social lives. I also found out the news about my interlocutors, e.g., someone building a new
16 There is a function in WeChat that allows users to customize the accessibility of their audience by grouping them or individually.
67 house in their hometown, getting married, or starting a new business. As much as WeChat revealed information about my African interlocutors’ lives, I also found WeChat a good platform to present myself. I posted photos of my daily life in Guangzhou so that they could also see my life beyond being just a researcher, e.g., the food I ate, the places I went, interesting things that I saw in the city. This informal “presentation” on WeChat said something more about me in addition to the formal introduction of who I was and where I came from.
Specific to my research on Africans in Guangzhou, a mobile and vigilant group, smartphones were of great help in two major aspects. First, the various communication applications allowed me to keep in touch with interlocutors who migrated frequently. New SIM cards were relatively cheap and convenient to obtain in China. For those who traveled frequently between Africa and China, many would come back with a new Chinese phone number as the old one would expire if the payment discontinued. Hence, having their cell phone number was not the best way to keep in touch. In short, communication platforms like WeChat and WhatsApp were more permanent and stable.
Second, smartphones aided my research since they have great cameras and recording tools, but look much less ominous than larger cameras or recording devices. I bought a professional single lens reflex (SLR) camera specifically for my research. However, it turned out not to be bulky and flashy, and some Africans were concerned that I was a journalist. As they explained to me, whenever I took out my camera, I looked too professional to them, and it confirmed their assumption that I was working for the government. My SLR camera became the terminator of my interview or friendship between me and them. I finally gave up the idea of taking perfect photos with the SLR camera and used my iPhone instead. With my iPhone, I looked more like a curious Chinese than a professional journalist.
68 Trust Building and Truth-Construction Different Shades of Distrust
Throughout my fieldwork with sub-Saharan Africans, I came to be aware of the vigilance of my interlocutors, through their rumors and assumptions about me, their rejections, silences, withholding of information, and made-up stories. These stories, coated in different shades of distrust, permeated my daily life in Guangzhou. As mentioned in Interlude I, at the baby shower, the woman in aquamarine rejected me based on her belief that I was spying for the government.
Her calling me out showed great distrust and fear. Her silence throughout the rest of the party highlighted the fact that my relationship with these Africans is delicate.
There is a withholding of information. People withheld information from me from time to time for different reasons. Even Bah, who understands that I am a researcher and has been very open about sharing his experience in Guangzhou, would not tell me all he knew about him and his countrymen at once. Every day, I learned new details about Bah and his experiences living in
China. For example, in the beginning, Bah told me that he and another Guinean businessman shared an office, along with a full-time Chinese employee as a secretary. One day, I found out he goes to the office every day. Before, he told me that he would only go there when he needed to prepare some document. “I told you that business is about secrets, private lives are also secrets too. It takes time to trust someone,” he said, “maybe in the next ten years, you will find something new about me every day” (Bah November 30, 2013).
As he promised, two months after we knew each other, Bah told me a “secret,” that some
Africans chose to have a student visa in order to avoid the complicated process of business visa application and the monthly procedure of leaving mainland China as part of the business visa regulation. Telling me this information was a very serious decision for Bah, not just because of the information itself, but more because he was sharing it with me . It is not his intention to
69 withhold this piece of information from me, but he thought that this action would jeopardize the interests of other Africans in the country. As a citizen of Guinea, a country that is diplomatically friendly with China, Bah never worries about visas for himself, as he always manages to get one. 17 He knew I was going to write papers in order to graduate (that is how he understands a
Ph.D. dissertation), and thought that if he told me information and my story got published, then
Chinese police and immigration officers would pay attention to the visa manipulation of
Africans. He feared, in sum, that it will be harder for Africans to obtain visas in the future.
Eventually, Bah chose to trust me and my judgments, that I would treat this piece of information with caution. Ultimately, Bah’s concern was unnecessary, since I already knew about the ways in
Africans manipulated their visa. So too did many Chinese. One Chinese trader who I met in
Tianxiu, for example, told me the same information Bah provided.
There are silence and rejection. Of course, trust is not unconditional, as it has its limits.
Bah, who has always been supportive of my research, also refused my requests for meeting
someone he knew or information on some occasions. Bah has a friend, for instance, whose visa
expired and has been hiding since. I begged a few times to talk to him, but Bah refused to
introduce him to me, partially because he was worried about his friend’s identity being revealed,
but also he did not think that his friend would like to talk to me if he found out that I am a
researcher. 18
There are also invented stories. In fieldwork, especially in complicated socio-political settings, the possibility of hearing embellished, distorted, or made-up stories is high (Fujii 2010).
17 Note that this was in 2013 and early 2014, before the 2014 Ebola Outbreak, when people from West Africa found it relatively easy to obtain a visa to China. 18 Later Bah told me briefly about the story of his friend – he came to China trying to make a living, but his business did not go well. His relationship with his father was also deteriorated. Hence, he refused his father’s help to pay the fine for overstay and go home.
70 A lot of people I met in Guangzhou warned me to not to trust Africans, as “they lie too much.” It is very likely that my African interlocutors did not tell me the exact truth in many situations.
However, there is a blurry line between invented stories and lies. Sometimes, there are invented stories about things that they are ashamed to let me know or exaggerations that they tell so to give them a better image. For example, Issac’s friend, Oury, told me during our first meeting that he had a shop in Tianxiu; he even invited me to sit in his shop. I was surprised he was able to establish himself as a shop owner despite being quite young (in his early 20s) and still in school.
But later, a common friend told me that Oury was just hanging out in that shop every day as he knew the owner and hoped to learn some business skills and to get some errands to run from the actual owner or some businessman. Oury did not tell an outright lie by referring to “his shop” in
Tianxiu, but he clearly wanted me to believe he was more successful than he actually was. In another example, an African student showed me photos of him and his European girlfriend. After that, every time I saw him, I always asked how the long-distance relationship was going as part of our greetings. I did this until one day, his friend told me, “Choo, He just showed it to you to brag. She ain’t his girlfriend. He sees her on the street and asks for a photo.” Moreover, most often, the big mansion my interlocutors showed me from their cellphones turned out to be the house of a much, much wealthier countryman.
Another common exaggeration I encountered in the field was that some Africans I met would claim that they are from a more developed country which they are not. For example, being a South African citizen is desirable among some Africans as it implies that this person comes from a better financial background. In October 2013, through another researcher from
Vancouver, I met Francis in Foshan (a satellite city near Guangzhou), who claimed he was from
South Africa, He told me that he was supposed to go to school in Hangzhou but he went to
71 Guangzhou to do business instead. I was very excited, as Francis would be the first South
African I have ever met in the field. So I tried to schedule a meeting with him and I told him that there was a place in Sanyuanli where most South Africans liked to gather and wondered if he would like to go with me. He did not answer, and he disappeared completed. It took me a while to understand that he might have actually lied about his nationality.
Another similar incident happened at my gym on the top floor of a hotel that is in the centre of Xiaobei. I joined the gym partially to stay physically healthy, but also because I hoped to meet some potential interlocutors, as the manager told me that many Africans also went there.
Slowly, staff working at the gym came to learn that I was a researcher. My personal coach, Rick, who had never met an anthropologist before, was very excited by my research and volunteered to help. One day, he told me that he got a new African customer from the States, and asked me if I would like to talk to him. I had met international Africans from France, Spain, and the States in
Guangzhou, so I was not surprised to hear this. Nonetheless, I was curious to find out what he was doing in China. I asked Rick to set a time with him. Two days later, Rick told me that he refused to meet me after he asked again and again, so he went to the office and double-checked his ID. It turned out that he was not American at all.
Truth Matters?
Some invented stories are harder to identify than the case of the “American” gym patron.
In January 2014, I met an African businessman, Ivan, in the elevator of a trading mall. We exchanged contact information. He told me that he was from South Africa and I believed him at first. I was thrilled and told everyone in the research cohort that I might have found my first south African interlocutor after the mysterious Francis.
72 One week later, we finally were able to set down a time to meet properly and we decided to grab a bite after his work. Before going there, I asked if he had any preference. He said, “I can eat anything.” So I suggested a quiet Thai restaurant in Taojin for a change instead of my usual venues of halal restaurants in Xiaobei. When we ordered the food, I asked if he had any food restrictions. He said, ‘I cannot eat pork.’ I was surprised and felt bad that I took a Muslim to a non-halal restaurant. I apologized, as I would not have suggested the Thai restaurant if I had of known that he was a Muslim. I suggested we change to a halal restaurant in Xiaobei, but he said it was ok to remain, just that he could not eat pork.
As I was explaining to him my research, he took out my name card that I gave to him last time when we met and asked me what a “Ph.D. Candidate” was. I noticed that the way he used English was very simple, and included slight grammar mistakes. He did not go to college as I assumed. I thought South Africans would speak better English but I did not doubt his words.
He told me that he has been in Guangzhou for 3-4 years. He paid around $2,000 USD per year for his visa (business, one-year multiple entries). He has to pay to the agent to rent offices, which he shares with others. He said he and his partner have registered a company in Hong Kong, where “it is almost the same as here (mainland), but everything you can get from the government very easily.” “In 2 month, I will get my residence visa.”
During our conversation, he picked up a phone call, and he replied, “C’est bon. Je vais vous rappeler” (“Good. I will call you back” in French.) It was the second time I was surprised: most South Africans cannot speak fluent French. But still, I tried to put my doubts aside.
Later, as we were chatting, he got another phone call. This time, he said something that enhanced my doubts about his true identity. Although I do not know any Fula, I had been spending a lot of time with Bah and his Fula friends, so I had become very familiar with the way (the tone and pitch) Fulani pronounce words. The way he answered that phone call and his pitch during the conversation really raised my radar and made me think he was a Fula.
Still, Fulas migrate a lot. Still, he might be telling the truth …
During our conversation, Ivan proposed that we go traveling together, and I explained to him that this was not my intention in meeting him. However, he kept pushing the idea until the restaurant was about to close. Then, he had to go back to close his shop. He said he would call me back.
I was glad that this dinner ended and decided to not keep in touch with him. I went to see Issac (a Guinean student who works as a barber) and his sister (boss) at the salon afterwards, as they had just moved to a new building and were worrying about business. During our chatting, Ivan called. When he learnt that I was with some Guinean friends, he asked me to answer his call outside of the salon, despite the fact that there was not
73 much background noise inside. That move confirmed my suspicion about him, but, at the same time, gave me an idea. Later, when Issac finished his work, I showed him Ivan’s photo I screenshot from his WeChat profile in private and asked if he knew this person. He said, “Yes, he is from Guinea. He is married. He used to have a shop somewhere in Yueyang Mall, but I do not know where he is now.”
Now, you see! (Fieldnotes, January 17, 2014)
I never met Ivan again. This experience taught me a valuable lesson, that I used to take the
information I gathered in the fieldwork for granted. It is virtually impossible to completely avoid
interlocutor bias in anthropological field research, as an anthropologist’s data collection is
largely based on the information told by a few interlocutors, and inevitably, their views shape
how an anthropologist views of a larger population.
Over time, I learned to treat the information I gathered in the field with caution. I have taken several steps to avoid taking what I heard from my interlocutors at face value. First, I evaluate my interlocutors’ information based on their position in the community. For example,
Bah is in charge of collecting newcomers’ contacts among Guineans, therefore, the number of
Guinean population he told me should be more or less accurate compare to other people who do not stay in touch with their countrymen, such as Momar, who claimed that he only knew two
Senegalese in Guangzhou. Second, I also double-check the information I gathered with other people I met in the field to avoid being misinformed when it was possible. For example, I had some doubts about Ivan’ nationality, I later took the opportunity to double-check this information with another person (Issac) who might know Ivan. Still, as I was typing my field notes after visits and interviews, I often began to wonder: Are these things they told me true? If not, is it worth recording these potentially made-up stories? How can I make sense of these non-facts or disinformation? Does it mean that some Africans are liars? Or simply that they did not tell me the exact truth because they do not trust me well enough? To what extent should I trust these
74 ambiguous and complicated narratives that are generated in such lack-of-trust contexts? While the previous set of questions left unanswered, it raises another set of questions – on my end, am I stereotyping some of these African migrants by preferring certain types of stories and interlocutors? If so, will my preference lead to and encourage the storytelling into certain directions that are desired to me?
In examining the stories told among genocide survivors in Rwanda, Lee An Fujii (2010) argues that the value of narrative data does not lie solely in their truthfulness or accuracy, but also lies in the meta-data that accompany interview responses. Meta-data are informants’ spoken and unspoken thoughts and feelings which they do not always articulate in their stories, but which emerge in other ways. According to Fujii, the absolute line between truth and lies is not that important. As he argues, “Researchers usually try to do their best to distinguish ‘fact’ from
‘fiction’ as a way to minimize ‘errors’ in their datasets. However, when it comes to data gathered in the field, fact and fiction may be a false and misleading binary” (Fujii 2010, 234). If this is the case, perhaps I need more time in order to tell the difference. Perhaps, the concept of truth is dynamic and complex. And my conception of “the truth” might differ from their conception of
“the truth”. Perhaps the reason why they are telling me such a story is more important than the
“objective fact”.
As I write this dissertation, I still do not know answers to all my questions about the truthfulness of my interlocutors and how I should make sense of their sometimes embellished or misleading stories. But I do know that I tried my best to process the information I gathered in the field with self-consciousness, and I seek to place this information and analyze it with as much context as needed. I explicitly write about this dilemma here, with no resolution, as it crystallizes some of my enduring doubt inherent in the research process itself.
75 Conclusion The next time I met the woman in aquamarine, it was two months after the baby shower party. At that time, I decided to register with Alliance France Guangzhou to learn some survival
French for my research. Hence, I had to get up early (8 am, a time almost impossible for most
African traders to get up) for my French classes. One morning, on the way out, I saw an African woman standing downstairs in my apartment building. She was trying to cross the road, but she seemed to be bothered by her physical conditions. She seemed to be in pain. I came over and asked how she was doing. When she turned around, we both were surprised – she was that woman in the aquamarine dress who gave me a hard time at the baby shower! Physical pain took her pride away, as I did not think she would have talked to me had she been in better shape. I then offered to accompany her to the hospital. She told me her name was Fanta, and we found out that we lived in the same building. Under such a serious situation, we laughed away from our previous unhappy encounter.
While we were waiting on the terrace of the hospital for the results, we exchanged stories. I told Fanta about my research, and Fanta told me hers. She had a university degree back in Guinea. After the marriage her family had arranged for her, she moved to Guangzhou with her husband who had an office in one of the trading Mansions near Xiaobei metro. She had two sons who were born in Guangzhou. She went to Chinese language school early in the morning, took care of her two sons after their daycare, and then cooked dinner and sent it to her husband’s office. Unlike Sita, who was very much enjoying her housewife life here, Fanta wanted to work.
She insisted that she needed to learn Chinese and seek employment after graduation. Her desire to work differentiates her from many other women in the Guinean community. Fanta does not like going to parties, but she sees it an opportunity to get away from her housework. She told me
76 that she was always tired when she went out to gatherings, and that was why she did not dance much during parties.
Later that afternoon, I went to Fanta’s apartment downstairs to check on her conditions.
She took out some photos and told me that someone took pictures of her oldest son and left them in her husband’s friend’s shop. Upon looking at them, I realized these were taken by me. I had given them to Bah, and it turned out that the cute boy I saw in the Yueyang trading mall was her eldest son. This coincidence made us laugh again.
Before I left Fanta’s apartment, I asked her, half-jokingly, “so, do you still think I am a
journalist working for the government?”
“No.” she laughed.
Finally, she got it !
However, my sense of achievement only lasted for a short moment before she continued,
“You are a Chinese teacher.”
Voila. Assumptions never go away, but rather transforms. And they stick.
Throughout my fieldwork, I still hand out my business cards, but my purpose is just to give
my contact information. I continue to meet new people, listen to new stories, be surprised by new
findings and new facets of people I know, build trust and cut ties, and take off old tags while
accepting new ones being attached to me. I have learned to not to expect assumptions about me
to go away completely – as long as Africans are not afraid of talking to me, I am okay with being
seen through lenses other than just as a researcher. It is part of the trust-building process in my
field. As Bah said, “it all takes time.”
77 Interlude II
Student Visa
Abdul called me at noon on a hot summer day in Guangzhou.
“Hey, Choo, can you go with me to the Guangwai (the Guangdong University of
Foreign Studies) registration bureau? I finally decided to apply for the Chinese course”.
“Yes,” I said.
“That’s good. Give me thirty minutes”.
Abdul is a Nigerian businessman living in Guangzhou. He worked as a middle man as
well as a merchant selling small electronic devices with his business partners in Kano and Abuja.
He holds a passport from Nigeria, his native country, and another one from Niger. He came to
China on a business visa, which allows him multiple entries during the course of a year, with a
maximum stay of thirty-days per visit. Guangzhou has an advantage compared to other cities in
terms of the convenience of “leaving China” every 30 days. Hong Kong and Macau are only two
and a half hours away by bus, and round trip bus tickets to either location can be as low as 125
yuan (approximately $20 USD).
After a one-year stay in Guangzhou, Abdul was tired of the monthly commute. The
long-term resident visa is more difficult to get in China. Abdul heard stories from his fellow
countrymen of the relatively lenient student visa application process and was inspired to apply
for it. A student visa is similar to a long-term resident visa in that it grants the visa holder the
same residential rights during the whole eligible visa period without a limitation of each duration
of stay. In addition, due to the language barriers he encountered daily in China, he also realized
that learning Chinese would be beneficial for his business in the long run.
78 “[My friend told me that] you find a school that accepts you. As long as you pay the school fees, you will get a [student] visa – a visa that you don’t need to get out of China every time [every 30 days when the visa expires]”. After consulting with some other African students from several local universities, it became clear that most Chinese language programs in local universities offer the same experience. There are standard tuition rates and limited space in the dormitories. Each class is composed of a mix of international students that are isolated from the majority of Chinese university students. We finally decided that Guangwai University might be slightly better for Abdul’s case because of its location (a 15-minute taxi ride from Xiaobei and accessible by public transportation).
Thirty minutes turned into two hours by the time Abdul took a shower and got dressed.
When we arrived at the bureau for registration to inquire about the enrollment, it was 3:30 pm.
There were five foreigners waiting already, three of whom were Africans. We nodded hello and waited quietly. The administrative staff on duty, Ms. Liang, who spoke fluent English, received us. She saw me coming with Abdul and asked me in Chinese,
“Which country does your friend come from?”
I was going to say Nigeria but my instinct made me hesitate. I had heard rumours during my fieldwork that the government of Guangzhou intentionally limited access to students from
Nigeria. Mugi, a Hausa Nigerian businessman, once told me that it is hard for them to get admitted into university if they present their Nigerian passports. According to him, this is due to
“too many Igbos making too many noises [troubles] in the city.” Igbo are an ethnic group in
Nigeria. In general, they do not have a good reputation in Guangzhou because they have been assumed as being drug dealers/users. As a result, visas of foreigners with a Nigerian passport are controlled more strictly by the Chinese authorities. As normal business visas become harder to get, the relatively easier process of obtaining a student visa attracts Nigerians as well as other
79 Africans who had trouble obtaining a business or a long-term residence visa. However, as mentioned in earlier chapters, most Africans came to China for economic reasons, and it becomes difficult for them to manage the workload of both school and business. The conflict between learning and earning has resulted in many Africans skipping language classes.
Classrooms remain mostly empty, a phenomenon that has finally caught the attention of immigration authorities. As a result, the school admission process has become much stricter for
Africans, especially for those who come from countries that are flagged by Chinese authorities, such as Nigerians.
“Hmmm… Does it make any difference?,” I answered. It turned out to be a smart move.
She immediately asked if Abdul was from Nigeria.
“Nigerians cannot get admitted into local schools now. We have too many Nigerians. We want to keep the numbers down. If you are from Nigeria, you need to go to schools in another city”.
Ms. Liang’s answer confirmed the assumptions of my African friends’ assumptions about
Nigerians not being allowed into schools in Guangzhou.
“Oh, no, he is not. He is from Niger”.
“Niger is no problem”.
She then informed us which document was needed: the application form, and most importantly, a valid passport and tuition, which costs is 8,200 yuan (approximately USD 1,500) per term, and an additional 500 yuan for medical insurance (approximately USD 90). She told us that due to the high demand of school dormitories, it was very hard to apply for student housing on campus, so Abdul would be responsible to find his own accommodation 19 .
19 Although Abdul rented his own place at that time, the dormitory was much cheaper (e.g., 2,000 yuan per person per year for a shared studio room for two people, the market value of which was 12,000 yuan per year. As
80 One week later, after Abdul collected all his documents and money needed, we went back to see Ms. Liang. After handing in all the documents, she gave us a formal receipt so that we can change Abdul’s current visa to a temporary resident visa at the Bureau of Exit and Entry
Administration of the Ministry of Public Security (公安部出入境管理局 , gong’an bu churujin guanli ju ). Abdul also learned that he had to stay in Guangzhou for three months, during which
he was not allowed to leave mainland China. Once these three months had passed, he could
obtain a valid school attestation letter allowing him to change his “temporary” visa for a student
visa.
“Are all required documents the same for different African countries?”
I asked just in case I needed to go through this process with another African friend in the
future. To my surprise, Ms. Liang said:
“Not the same. For some countries, you need to provide us with more documents, like a police declaration.”
I guess it is always good to double-check , I thought, surprised at the blatant inconsistency. Ms. Liang’s answer was a reflection of the stigma associated with certain African nationals, and its link with racialized prejudices.
mentioned in the chapter, there was social discrimination against Africans in the housing market whereby local landlords refused to rent apartments to Africans. Hence, the school dormitory is ideal for Africans in terms of having a stable lease.
81 Chapter 2
An Additional Tier of China’s “Floating Population”: Managing African Migrants in Guangzhou
Sidiki told me today that “he wants to have a life” here in China. He has been in China since 2005. Around four years ago, he started to have an idea of living in China forever. “I started to have this voice in my head and now it grows stronger and stronger every day. I want to do it. My life in China works well, and I want to live here. No going back.” I asked him why, as I heard so many Africans say that “no place is like home.” He responded, “there are so many Chinese in Africa, making a life here; why cannot I stay in Guangzhou and live here forever?”
(Sidiki, a Guinean trader and owner of a clothes shop, January 25, 2014)
Post-Reform African Migrants As mentioned in the Introduction to this dissertation, thanks to the substantial growth of the national economy, China has become a destination that attracts large numbers of international migrants from diverse countries. Between 1985 and 2012, foreign entries to China increased 35- fold (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2014). This large wave of transnational migrants, which occurred in the wake of economic reforms that commenced in 1979, is posing a significant challenge to Chinese immigration policies and laws (Haugen 2019), as China is not prepared, both socially and administratively, to meet the needs of these migrants as well as incorporate them into legal categories (Pieke 2012).
Among these international migrants, an increasing number of Africans now live and work in Guangzhou, China’s southern manufacturing hub, as a result of the strengthened Sino-African political and economic ties in the past two decades. Neither the first nor the only group of foreigners to begin migrating to the country, these post-reform African migrants occupy a special
82 position among foreigners in China. 20 Unlike other groups of foreigners who are mainly employed by transnational and Chinese companies for their specific expertise (foreign talents), the majority of Africans are seen as unskilled workers; most are small-business owners (see
Haugen 2012; Mathews, Lin, and Yang 2017) who came to China seeking financial opportunities in China’s growing economy. 21 In addition, Black Africans tend to face more social discrimination and racism in China than other foreign-born populations (Brady 2003; Chiu 2017;
Hood 2011; Pfafman, Carpenter, and Tang 2015; Sautman 1994).
Since the 1955 Bandung Conference, the first large scale Afro-Asian conference promoting the cultural and economic cooperation between the two continents, official Chinese propaganda has emphasized Sino-African friendship. Moreover, the Chinese government has enthusiastically embraced recent Sino-African economic exchanges. Yet despite this discourse of cooperation and economic agreements between governments, African migrants to Guangzhou have not been supported by either the national government, nor by the local communities in which they reside (Bork-Hüffer and Yuan-Ihle 2014; Li, Ma, and Xue 2009). In other words, there is a discrepancy between the central government's embrace of Sino-African relations at the propaganda level, and national and local authorities’ hostile treatment of Africans in daily practices (Lan 2015). On one hand, the Chinese government’s management of foreign workers
20 As discussed in the Introduction of this dissertation, the first wave of African migrants after the founding of communist China came in the 1950s; they were mainly international students who came thanks to Chinese scholarship programs. The second wave, the majority of whom were economic migrants, came in the 1990s (referred to as post-reform African migrants in this dissertation). The difference between the two waves of migrants is that in the era between the 1950s and 1980s, most Africans sent to China went for training and educational purposes, and then went back to their home countries. Almost all of them were part of this organized and temporary migration arranged through formal agreements between China and some African countries; they had no visa issues with Chinese immigration authorities during their stay/study in China. Previous research (Brady 2003) also shows that the first wave of Africans enjoyed a high social status in their home country, and all of them were on a Chinese government stipend which was above the average income in China at that time. By contrast, economic migrants from Africa since the 1990s have little of any governmental support, and they tend to stay in China for various reasons after their visas expire, either forced or willingly. 21 See discussion on “low-end globalization,” in Mathews, Lin, and Yang, 2017.
83 has consistently adhered to the principle of “attracting the high-end, restricting the average, and prohibiting the low-end” ( 引进高端，限制一般，禁止低端 , yinjin gaoduan, xianzhi yiban, jinzhi
diduan ), which has greatly impacted how the immigration policy is implemented. This has
resulted in providing work visas to high-skilled white-collar workers while limiting the number
of visas to so-called “low-end” (or unskilled) migrants such as small-scale African business-
owners. On the other hand, similar to Chinese internal migrants, African migrants have also been
marginalized as a result of Guangzhou’s increasing urbanization. In very recent research,
Guangzhi Huang (2018) studies the term sanfei (三非 , literally means “three illegals,” which
refers to foreigners who illegally enter, reside, and/or work in China) and argues that this word is
used as a racist code word against Africans by news media and law enforcement in supporting
local government’s attempts to gentrify the Xiaobei area. The association of Africans with sanfei
and low-suzhi (low-quality), in parallel to viewing Chinese internal migrants as a “low-end
population,” makes Africans as well as internal migrants members of an unwanted population.
Therefore, they are often the target of police crackdowns and anti-migrant campaigns, and they
tend to face increased discrimination during periods of political stress, as the government sees
their presence as negatively impacting the image of China it wants to project.
Li, Ma, and Xue (2009) suggest that only a limited number of African migrants have
legal status in Guangzhou, leaving the majority of African migrants in a state of legal insecurity.
Some journalists claim that due to economic constraints (e.g., the expense of airfare) and strict
Chinese visa controls, up to 90% of African migrants in China are on expired visas (S. Xu 2012).
Though this number had been critiqued as being exaggerated (Castillo 2014; Mathews 2015b), it
reveals the undeniable fact that there are a significant number of Africans in Guangzhou without
valid visas. Local police frequently stop African migrants on the street to verify their visa status,
84 creating tense relations. These surveillance actions lead many African overstayers to limit their mobility to evening hours when police activities are reduced. Locals in turn frequently associate this behaviour with criminality, though police statistics do not indicate that Africans commit crimes with greater frequency than the local population. 22
There is a growing body of research that focuses on the Chinese state’s legal responses to undocumented African migrants (Haugen 2013b; 2018; Lan 2015; Mathews, Lin, and Yang
2017; Huang 2019). Lan (2015), for instance, highlights the tension between the central state’s pro-Sino-African friendship propaganda and local government’s anti-African policy and immigration controls. Echoing Lan’s argument, Haugen (2019) argues that the lack of uniformity in China’s 2012 immigration legislation and management has resulted in local variations concerning how the law is implemented, providing African migrants in Guangzhou with both difficulties and opportunities in navigating the law, leading to a black market for migration services.
The above scholars provide insights into various ways through which the state and local authorities limit and regulate African migrants’ visas, as well as how these constraints affect their lives in Guangzhou. However, there is a tendency in the scholarly literature to portray
China’s immigration system, policies, and enforcement as targeting Africans specifically (e.g.,
Haugen 2019). My research challenges this generalization. While it is true that Africans face discrimination in the Chinese immigration system, that is not the only factor that contributes to their immigration exclusions.
22 During an interview with the Yangcheng Daily, Detachment Leader Liu of Guangzhou Police Bureau commented that the criminal rate among foreigners in Guangzhou is 1.65% in 2013, and it was not as high as what the general public thought (Yangcheng Daily 2014).
85 The term “immigration exclusion” in this chapter and the following, Chapter 3, refers to a series of exclusions experienced by Africans in China’s immigration system. These experiences concern two main aspects. One is Africans’ “visa problems,” which is also an umbrella term covering various visa-related difficulties Africans face. These include the difficulty of obtaining a visa, renewing a visa, switching to a new visa, obtaining residence permits or long-term visas, and of keeping an existing visa (for example, once a visa is granted, the fear of authorities confiscating or not recognizing the visa). The other is the hostile environment created for undocumented immigrants, including frequent street visa checking and police raids based on racial profiling, authorities coming for the person who overstayed his or her visa, and the jail time imposed on a person who overstayed once caught by the police.
In this chapter, I examine attempts by the state to control, mediate, and regulate the
African migrants in Guangzhou from a historical and comparative perspective. I argue that rather than treating Africans as a particular, isolated foreign migrant group, a better way to understand the issue of Africans’ immigration exclusions is to situate it within the context of China’s attempts to manage and regulate foreigners, the internal division within the Chinese citizenship, and Guangzhou’s urbanization process. This contextualization is partially in line with Jessica
Wilczak’s (2018) critique of previous scholarship on evictions in the urban village of Dengfeng,
Xiaobei that attributed the event solely to anti-Black racism, as she has pointed out, the evictions actually had more to do with the efforts of Guangzhou’s government to become a global city, in which most African migrants who are mainly small-scale traders do not fit. In addition, my research also expands on Lan’s (2015) observation about the similarities between African migrants and Chinese internal migrants, as both belong to the category of “floating population,” members of which are largely excluded from the state support system.
86 First, in the context of the policing and managing foreigners in China, the chapter provides a historical analysis of Chinese immigration laws and regulations, showing that Chinese immigration laws are not only unable to cope with the current influx of foreign migrants, but also serve as an institutional barrier that prevents unskilled foreigners from accessing to long-term, stable visas. Second , the chapter examines the internal divisions within Chinese citizenship law and how this system of classification adds to the complexity of Africans’ immigration exclusion.
By comparing the rights and benefits accorded to Africans, local residents, and China’s internal migrants in Guangzhou, I show how Africans are both excluded from and included in China’s legal category, as many of the legal rights denied to Africans are also denied to internal migrants
– how they represent an “extra tier” in China’s large “floating population.” I conclude by reiterating that the exclusion of Africans in China’s immigration system should be examined in the context of Chinese citizenship, immigration policies, and Guangzhou’s urbanization process.
Managing Foreigners: Chinese Immigration Laws since 1949 The 1985 Law: Regulating Visas from “by Politics” to “by Law”
In order to understand the impact of immigration policy changes in China, and before turning to some of the ways in which China’s immigration system affects foreigners, especially
African migrants living in Guangzhou, in this section I describe the development of Chinese migration law from 1949 to the post-economic reform and post-WTO era. Immigration in China since 1949 has gone through several different phases. 23 After the founding of communist China in 1949, the Chinese government developed an entry and exit administration system which placed controls on the flow of foreigners, as well as their activities in the country (G. Liu 2009).
23 For detailed information on Chinese immigration policies and regulations since 1949, see Pieke (2012).
87 In the three decades since 1949, only a very small number of foreigners, who were either supportive for the Chinese Communist Party or employed by the state, were allowed to enter and/or remain in the country (Brady 2003). In addition, this small foreign population lived in exclusive communities with minimum contacts with local Chinese (Bork-Hüffer et al., 2014).
Changes to the immigration system were slowly implemented alongside the economic reforms of 1979, due largely to the need to deal with the increasing numbers of international immigrants from diverse countries who moved to China attracted by its rapidly growing economy. In part to address this growing challenge, in 1985 the Thirteenth Meeting of the
Standing Committee of the Sixth National People’s Congress passed the “Law of the People’s
Republic of China on Control of the Entry and Exit of Aliens” (hereafter referred to as the 1985
Law, 中华人民共和国外国人入境出境管理法 , Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Waiguoren Rujing
Chujing Guanli Fa ). The 1985 Law was adopted in November 1985 and was the first comprehensive legal framework for regulating foreigners’ visas, residence, and legal rights in
China. It was implemented through specific rules that were approved and promulgated in
December 1986 (G. Liu 2009, 2016). The law itself was revolutionary in the sense that it recognized the presence of foreigners as a normal aspect of Chinese society that had to be regulated by law rather than politics (Pieke 2012).24 According to the 1985 Law, a person from a
capitalist country applying for a Chinese visa could not have his or her application rejected, as
long as he or she complied with requirements such as having a valid passport, a legitimate reason
for staying, and adequate financial support. Additional amendments included the abrogation of
24 Previous to the 1985 Law, Chinese visas were issued largely based on the political system in foreigners’ home countries. See what Haugen (2015) calls the “international friends” of the Chinese Communist Party.
88 the Exit Visa or Exit Certificate ( 出境证 , Chujing zheng ) for foreigners, which had been a
requirement since 1954 (G. Liu 2009).
Among other things, the 1985 Law emphasized the importance of regulating the foreign
population in China. Its first article outlines the purpose and reason for establishing the 1985
Law: “In order to regulate exit/entry administration, safeguard the sovereignty, security and
social order of the People's Republic of China, and promote foreign exchanges and opening to
the outside world, this Law is hereby formulated. 25 The order of the rationales listed (to regulate movement, safeguard sovereignty, secure social order, and then to promote foreign exchange and become open to the outside world) represents the tension between managing the challenges and opportunities of transnational immigration. Indeed, the word “regulate,” part of the first rationale, indicates that the foremost objective of the 1985 Law was to control population flows.
This confirms Frank Pieke’s (2012, 56) observation that Chinese immigration is handled primarily as an issue of public order. The order of the rationales listed also indicates that the law places the maintenance of the government’s sovereign power before the promotion of foreign exchange and communications. Maintaining social harmony is also important, as the need for social order is prioritized over the opening up to the outside world.
For more than two decades, Chinese immigration was regulated according to the 1985 Law until it was replaced by a new exit and entry administration law in 2012 (see discussion later).
Some major modifications have been made during the two decades due to the flow of international migrants triggered by market reforms since the 1980s and China’s accession to the
25 This is the official translation to the original Chinese version, which goes: “ 为维护中华人民共和国的主权、安 全和社会秩序，有利于发展国际交往，特制定本法 ” ( Wei weihu Zhonghua renmin gongheguo de zhuquan, anquan he shehui zhixu, youliyu fazhan guoji jiaowang, te zhiding benfa.).
89 World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. 26 Meanwhile, some other aspects of the 1985 Law still remain in place today, including the first article emphasizing the importance of regulating the foreign population, and the obligation on foreigners to report their place of residence to the authorities within 24 hours of arriving in urban areas (and 72 hours in rural areas), which allows close monitoring of their movements (Bork-Hüffer and Yuan-Ihle 2014). I explain the rationale and implementation of this policy in greater detail in the following sections.
The 1996 Regulations on the Management of Employment of Foreigners in China
The Regulations on Managing the Employment of Foreigners in China (外国人在中国就业
管理规定 , waiguoren zai zhongguo jiuye guanli guiding , hereafter referred to as The 1996
Regulations) was launched in 1996 and is still in effect today. 27 The 1996 Regulations adds to the
1985 Law in that it introduces the “policy of managing foreigners through classification, monitoring, and regulation” ( 外国人管理分类调控政策 , waiguoren guanli fenlei tiaokong
zhengce ) which divides foreigners into 3 major groups: the high-end (the foreign talents), the average, and the low-end (low-skilled workers). By doing so, it reveals the selective nature of
Chinese immigration policy, as the aim of this classification has been described in The 1996
Regulations as “attracting the high-end, restricting the average, and prohibiting the low-end.” In other words, the 1996 Regulations prevents people with minimal job skills from immigrating to
China.
26 These included ending the strict separation of places of work and residence for foreigners and locals in the 1990s (Brady 2000; Bork-Hüffer and Yuan-Ihle 2014) and the abolition of the Foreign Exchange Certificate (FEC) in 1994, a surrogate currency that foreigners in China were required to use for all purchases they made in the country (Petracca 1990). 27 The 1996 Regulations was revised to a small extent in 2017, though the principle of favouring high-end labourers still exists.
90 In addition to impacting national immigration policy, this principle has also influenced how local authorities manage foreign workers, especially in limiting certain jobs, namely low- skilled ones, available for foreigners. For example, based on The 1996 Regulations, the
Guangdong provincial government (the Department of Labor and Social Security of Guangdong
Province ( 广东省人力资源和社会保障厅 , guangdongsheng renli ziyuan he shehui baozhang ting)
and The Guangdong Provincial Public Security Bureau ( 广东省公安厅 , guangdongsheng gong’an
ting ) have launched The Measures for Guangdong Province to Implement the Employment
Promotion Law of the People's Republic of China (《广东省实施〈中华人民共和国就业促进法〉
办法》, guangdongsheng shishi 〈zhonghua renming gongheguo jiuye cujin fa 〉banfa ). Article
34 of this document states that the provincial government would launch an Occupational
Classification System for Foreigners Working in Guangdong (推行外国人入粤就业职业管理目录
制度 , tuixing waiguoren ruyue jiuye zhiye guanli mulu zhidu ), under the guidance of the principle
of “attracting the high-end, restricting the average, and prohibiting the low-end” in The 1996
Regulations. Article 34 urges each regional authority within Guangdong Province to make a list
of the Occupational Classification for Foreigners based on local economic development needs
and shortages in the labour market. It also states that no work permits should be issued to low-
skilled or unskilled foreigners, and that the jobs offered to foreigners must already be included on
the list of Occupational Classification for Foreigners , comprised of mostly high-skilled jobs. The
1996 Regulations and the corresponding provincial measures in Guangdong legal and
institutionally established the principle of excluding low-skilled foreigners from the Chinese
economy, while African small-scale business owners in Guangzhou fall into this category.
91
The 2004 Measures: The Near Impossibility of Obtaining Chinese Permanent Residency
One of the most progressive changes made to the entry and exit system for foreigners
during the period following China’s ascension to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001
was the modification to the residence permit system and the introduction of permanent residence.
Although a process for obtaining permanent residency was mentioned in the 1985 Law, in
practice it remained vague. For example, Article 14 of the 1985 Law states that to be eligible for
permanent residence, individuals must first invest and/or work in China. It is not clear, however,
what scale of investment is required. In addition, the article does not clarify what “other reasons”
would allow people to reside in China.
Article 14. Foreign citizens who invest in China or work with Chinese companies and organizations, conducting economic, scientific, technical, and cultural collaboration under the regulation of Chinese law, as well as those who need to reside in China for other reasons, once granted permission from Chinese government institutions in charge, can obtain permanent residency. 28
On August 15, 2004, the “Administration of Examination and Approval of Foreigners’
Permanent Residence in China” ( 外国人在中国永久居留审批管理办法 , waiguoren zai zhongguo yongjiu juzhu shenpi guangli banfa, hereafter referred to as the 2014 Measure) was implemented
to encourage foreigners to apply for Chinese permanent residency. After the piloting projects of
residence permits were tested in Shanghai and Beijing in 2004, this measure was applied to the
rest of China (G. Liu 2016). The permanent residence permits not only entitled the holder to
legally reside in China, but it also replaced his or her visa and allowed for (multiple) entries into
the country for the duration of the residence permit (G. Liu 2016). However, the extensive
28 Original text in Chinese: “ 依照中国法律在中国投资或者同中国的企业、事业单位进行经济、科学技术、文 化合作以及其他需要在中国长期居留的外国人，经中国政府主管机关批准，可以获得长期居留或者永久居 留资格 .”
92 criteria required to be eligible for this visa (such as the minimum amount of direct investment being half a million USD) makes it difficult for anyone but wealthy foreigners to apply. 29 The
Chinese green card/permanent residence permit ( 中国绿卡 /中国永久居留证 , Zhongguo Lüka/
Zhongguo Youngjiu Juliu Zheng ) is therefore regarded by scholars as among the most difficult to
access in the world (Jin 2013; Solinger 1999).
Indeed, there is a very strict quota of Chinese green cards/permanent residence permits
for foreign citizens. In 2013, 848,500 foreigners were residing in China, with an annual increase
rate of 3.9% in the past decade. However, from 2004 to 2013, only 7,356 foreigners obtained
Chinese permanent residency (Centre for China and Globalization 2015). While China was
attracting more and more foreign workers, it was not simultaneously welcoming these workers
into society as full residents or citizens. Contributing to the difficulty of obtaining permanent
residency, applications for permanent status are usually influenced by economic and political
factors: they are primarily issued for “international friends” of the Communist Party—people
who either advocate for the Chinese government or Chinese Communist Party internationally, or
who work for the Chinese government as foreign experts (Haugen 2015). Current immigration
policy also tends to encourage accepting immigrants who are considered talented or skilled in
29 There are five main ways to become a Chinese permanent resident: 1) Direct Investment: Having a stable investment (consecutively for 3 years). The minimum requirement for such investment varies depending on the region. For example, if the investment is made in less developed areas (such as Western China), it is half a million USD; the amount goes up to 1 million in Middle China, and to 2 million if there is more than one region of investment. 2) Employment: For positions such as deputy general manager or associate professors in a recognized institution, it is necessary to have a contract that is for more than four years, with good revenue records (during which one must reside in China at least for three years). 3) Outstanding Aliens: Being a high-level foreign expert holding a position in a business that promotes China's economic, scientific, and technological development, or its social progress, or have made a major and outstanding contribution to China. It is unclear what a “major and outstanding contribution” actually implies. 4) Dependents: Being the child of a person who fits one of the three above categories and is under 18 years old; 5) Spousal Reunion: One has to have been married to a Chinese citizen for at least five years or more, during which this person has resided in China for at least nine months each year. The person who applies for this category has to have a stable income and accommodation.
93 ways that meet the country’s needs: those who are highly educated and can work in the high-tech industry, for instance, or who can bring large investments with them (e.g., half a million USD minimum). Almost all African small business owners – most of whom are characterized as players in the so-called “low-end globalization” (Mathews 2011:9-10) – are not part of this group.
The 2012 Law: An Emphasis on the Sanfei Issue
In June 2012, during the Twenty-seventh Meeting of the Standing Committee of the
Eleventh National People’s Congress, the Exit and Entry Administration Law of the People’s
Republic of China ( 中华人民共和国出境入境管理法 , Zhonghua renmin gongheguo churujing guanli fa, hereafter referred to as the 2012 Law), which applied to both Chinese citizens and foreigners, was passed. It came into force in July 2013. While the 2012 law has been seen by some as a sign that China is more open to accepting foreigners than in the past, others argue that the 2012 Law places more regulations on marginalized groups and excludes them, especially foreigners who own small businesses (Ives 2017).
The 2012 Law is much more developed and tougher than the 1985 Law in terms of addressing the issue of sanfei by establishing a more rigid visa issuing process and raising the penalties for immigration offenses. The revisions include higher fines for activities related to sanfei or any person or entity helping foreigners to illegally exit, enter, work, or reside in the country (see Articles 71-74, 78-80). The cap for the fine for overstaying a visa, previously 5,000 yuan, was doubled to 10,000 yuan (1,620 USD). 30 The stipulated detention time for the offense,
30 The official translation of the Article 78 states that “Foreigners who reside in China illegally shall be given a warning; where circumstances are serious, they shall be imposed with a fine of 500 yuan (82 USD) per day, with a cap of 10,000 yuan in total, or be detained for not less than five days but not more than 15 days,,” and “Where guardians or other persons responsible for guardianship fail to perform the guardian obligation and result in
94 which could be served instead of paying the fine, increased from three to ten days to five to 15 days, and up to 60 days if the case is complicated (e.g., if the overstayer’s identity is unknown).
An order to leave China sometimes also comes with a fine or detention. Unauthorized migrants who are unable to pay for their own repatriation can be detained for months and even years.
During fieldwork, I asked interlocutors what the general length of jail time was in detention centres for foreigners who overstay their visas. The longest period of time I heard about was about four months for a Guinean man who could not afford the 10,000 yuan fine and was released because the jail was full.
Additionally, specific measures applicable to foreigners guilty of being a sanfei were codified for the first time in the 2012 Law. These measures include on-the-spot interrogation
(Article 59), detention (Article 60, 63), restriction of foreigners’ movements (Article 61), and repatriation (Article 62). For example, Article 7 grants police and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the authority to collect fingerprints and biological data from foreign travellers at borders and ports. Article 43 stipulates that a foreigner shall be considered illegally employed if he or she lacks either a work permit or work residence permit, or if he or she works in fields other than those prescribed in the work permit. An international student shall be considered illegally employed if he or she works in violation of the rules for international students or works beyond the prescribed occupation category or time limits.
The 2012 Law also emphasizes that foreigners must register their lodgings at the local
foreigners below 16 years of age residing in China illegally, the said guardians or other obligated persons shall be given a warning and may also be fined not more than 1,000 yuan.” Article 79 states that “Persons harboring or hiding foreigners who illegally enter or reside in China, or assisting such foreigners in evading inspection, or providing, in violation of the law, exit/entry documents for foreigners who illegally reside in China shall be fined not less than 2,000 yuan but not more than 10,000 yuan; where circumstances are serious, such persons shall be detained for not less than five days but not more than fifteen days and shall also be fined not less than 5,000 yuan but not more than 20,000 yuan, with the illegal gains confiscated if there are any” (China Consular Affairs 2013).
95 police station within 24 hours of taking up such a dwelling in China, other than hotels. 31 The local authorities thus have information about where foreigners live and when their visas expire.
The law imposes a 2,000 yuan (324 USD) penalty on those who fail to register their rental housing. Housing can only be registered with the consent of the landlord, who may retract his/her approval if, for example, the tenant owes overdue rent. Haugen (2018:54) discussed an incident that happened to her interlocutor, Christian, whose landlord changed the locks on his studio when he travelled to Macao and was two days late with a payment. When Christian returned, the landlord refused to renew his lease, meaning Christian now had no residence registration and therefore had to back to Togo. Due to the central role of landlords in obtaining this registration requirement and the ability of landlords to discriminate, there emerges a vicious circle in which many overstayers cannot rent on the housing market, so instead rent from other
Africans who have legal residences, and who usually charge a higher price. Some local governments deliberately manipulate the residential pattern of immigrants by declining to register housing for foreigners in certain areas. For example, Huang (2018, 146) witnessed that in Dengfeng (one of the most popular neighbourhoods of Guangzhou where Africans congregate) police issued a new rule for registration whereby only foreigners who had previously lived in Dengfeng in 2015 were eligible to register with the police, meaning that newcomers were excluded from living in the neighbourhood.
31 According to Article 39 of the 2012 Law, foreigners who reside or stay in dwelling places ( 住所 , zhusuo ) other than hotels, or the persons who accommodate them, shall, within 24 hours after the foreigners’ arrival ( 入住 , ruzhu ) at that dwelling place, register at the local police station. Official translation: “Article 39: Where foreigners stay in hotels in China, the hotels shall register their accommodation in accordance with the regulations on the public security administration of the hotel industry, and submit foreigners’ accommodation registration information to the public security organs in the places where the hotels are located.” “For foreigners who reside or stay in domiciles other than hotels, they or the persons who accommodate them shall, within 24 hours after the foreigners’ arrival, go through the registration formalities with the public security organs in the places of residence” (China Consular Affairs 2013).
96
Figure 5: Police notice in a popular bar near Dengfeng/Xiaobei neighbourhood (Photo by author)
Local Regulatory Practices: The 2011 Guangdong Act
In addition to various nation-wide immigration laws, there have also been regulations devised by local governments to manage the foreign population in their area during specific periods of time, usually in response to certain emerging social issues. These local regulations, in many ways, are more important than national laws, as it is local authorities who interpret and implement laws that affect the lives of Africans on a day-to-day basis. Following the African protest in 2009, for example, the Guangzhou municipal government began to receive pressure from Beijing to implement more stringent immigration control policies (Lan 2015). On May 1 st ,
2011, the “Interim Provisions of Guangdong Province on Administration and Services” ( 广东省
97 外国人管理服务暂行规定 , guangdongsheng waiguoren guanli fuwu zhanxing guiding , hereafter
referred to as the Guangdong Act) in regards to foreigners came into effect.
Designed specifically to target illegal immigrants in the Pearl River Delta region, the
Guangdong Act promotes a reward and punishment scheme by encouraging Chinese civilians to
report illegal ( sanfei ) foreigners to local authorities. For example, Article 10 of the Guangdong
Act states that any Chinese civilians or work units will be rewarded for reporting sanfei
foreigners to local authorities. This shift in the duty of immigration control from official
institutes to ordinary civilians proves Haugen’s (2018) observation that the 2012 Law charges
Chinese citizens with enforcing national borders. There is also a fine of 5,000 to 10,000 yuan for
the hotel that fails to verify the passports, visas, or other identity certificates of foreigners, or
fails to report cases of expired documents to a public security organization (Article 55). The
inconvenience of more frequent police checking and the risk of being fined have led some hotels
to refuse to accept African guests entirely. This, in turn, has increased the sense of insecurity and
the feeling of exclusion that have already existed among Africans.
In addition, while the 1985 Law states that only “foreign affairs police” (外事警察 , waishi
jingcha ) can stop foreigners to verify passports, in the Guangdong Act, the term “foreign affairs
police” was changed to the general term “people’s police” (Article 48). This alteration means
that now any local police can stop foreigners to check passports and verify their visas. While
visa-checking applies to all foreigners in theory, often the practice of visa checking is based on
physical appearance or racial profiling (see also Lan 2015; Mathews, Lin, and Yang 2017;
Haugen 2019).
One of the common features of China’s several immigration laws is the monetary fines
for sanfei , which is increasing with the implementation of each new law. Lan (2015, 297)
98 attributes heavy fines to the 2011 Guangdong Act, which later influenced the increase in monetary punishment in the 2012 Law. In 2006, the Guangzhou Municipal Police began fining foreigners who failed to carry passports with them 50 yuan (about 8.1 USD) (“Tens of
Thousands of Foreigners,” 2007). Between 2006 and 2012, in order to motivate officers to catch more foreigners without passports, the police force used surcharges from this fine as a bonus to reward local officers, as Huang (2018,120) noted in his study of the experience of African traders in Guangzhou.
For Africans who are already having problems with visa applications, the confiscation of one’s passport (visa) would be a nightmare. This happened to Bara, a Nigerian trader. As he learned, losing one’s passport can be more costly than the accompanying fine.
Bara today told me that once he had lost his passport, in the inner garden of Jinlu Shanzhuang, a gated community, where he was taking a break from working in his office. He was sitting on the bench in the garden and it must have fallen out from his pocket without him noticing. Two hours later, when he realized it was gone, it was too late. With his visa just renewed, he was terrified. He asked his friends to spread the message, hoping someone would return the passport. Later, a Kenyan contacted him via text message, informing him that he found his passport. In exchange for the passport, he asked 600 USD for “his service.” They finally agreed on 300 USD. After hearing of this experience, I was a bit upset, but Bara was peaceful with it. He said, “I might have had to pay 1,200 USD [to the visa agent] to replace the visa if I lost it. So 300 USD is a small fee compared to the mafan [hassle and economic loss].” I then asked him to carry a photocopy of the passport and keep a photo of the visa page on his phone instead. He gladly agreed (Fieldnotes, May 5, 2014).
While the 2012 Law repealed the 50 yuan fine on foreigners for not carrying their passport at all times, foreigners are still given a warning if caught without it. However, the fines for overstaying and not registering with the police upon arrival are increased in the 2012 Law. As mentioned earlier, the new fine outlined in the 2012 Law for not registering in time (within 24 hours upon arrival) is 2,000 yuan (about 324 USD), a jump from 500 yuan (81 USD). Overstayers now face a fine at a rate of 500 yuan per day with a cap of 10,000 yuan, while it used to be 5,000 yuan
99 prior to 2013. The heavy visa fines imposed on the African migrants have been widely discussed among scholars (Haugen 2012; Lan 2015), many of whom note that catching foreigners without proper immigration documents has become a significant source of extra income for Guangzhou police (Castillo 2016; G. Huang 2018). The monetary incentives provided to officers not only makes African communities even more vulnerable to police harassment, but also the high cost of visa fines make the economic situation of disadvantaged Africans more precarious.
Thus far in this chapter, I have outlined major laws and policies that regulate the flow of foreign migrants in China, which have a direct impact on foreigners’ lives. These laws and their implementation are particularly disadvantageous for African migrants, who do not fit the government’s ideal of foreign talent (the high-skilled workers). Nor are small scale African business owners financially able to become investors in a business based in China, a prerequisite for applying for Chinese permanent residency. In addition, as Chinese immigration law becomes more focused on sanfei and anti-sanfei measures, it reveals the negative attitude the state has
towards undocumented immigrants. In order to further unpack the complexity of immigration
exclusion for Africans, in the next section I introduce the categories of Chinese citizenship and
explain how the hukou system has created an internal division among citizens, and how that, in turn, adds extra complexity to population management in China.
Chinese Citizenship: The Internal Divisions Hukou: The Internal Division
Established in 1951, the hukou system in Communist China is closely linked to exit and entry administration in China as a way through which the government regulates the migration of
100 its residents (Chan and Zhang 1999). 32 By dividing the population into urban residents (cities or towns, or industrial and mining areas) and rural residents (villages or state farms), the hukou system also creates the internal divisions and exclusions among Chinese citizens through providing each category with a sharp differentiation of rights and privileges. One’s hukou status is usually static. 33 Based on one’s parent’s hukou status, each citizen is required to register only
one place as his/her regular residence ( 户口所在地 , hukou suozaidi ). A person’s hukou determines his or her access to job markets, education, housing, health care, and even the right to move to and live in a city and maybe is the most important determinant of differential privileges in China (Wu and Treiman 2004). In most cases, urban residents are entitled to more social, economic, and cultural benefits than rural residents. For example, a person who has a rural hukou cannot get enrolled (or has to pay extra tuition) to a middle school that is not in the same place of his or her hukou (see discussion on educational inequality, Montgomery 2012). Therefore,
Chinese citizenship is not a nation-state based project, but rather is a set of different statuses of entitlement based on one’s rural/urban status. 34 Because it classifies citizens according to urban
32 For a detailed examination of the 1950s hukou system, including its origins and social consequences, see Cheng and Selden (1994). Chan and Zhang (1999) examine the role of the hukou system in managing rural-urban migration and the changes in hukou policies since the beginning of economic reforms in the late 1970s. Jason Young (2013) offers an in-depth discussion of the change and adaptation of the hukou system over three decades from 1978 to 2007. 33 There are a few formal and informal channels to change one’s hukou , including obtaining higher education, joining the People’s Liberation Army, working for the Chinese Communist Party/government, and through marriages and family ties (X. Wu and Treiman 2004). 34 Of note, China’s citizenship is not based solely on rural-urban place of residence. Rather, in addition to the urban- rural division, there is another layer in Chinese citizenship: ethnicity. Different ethnic groups have access to different entitlements. Therefore, the 55 officially recognized ethnic minorities that live in the country creates a variety of different sets of citizenship categories. For example, officially recognized ethnic minorities are awarded certain privileges, such as exemptions from the one-child policy, lower taxes, and preferential university admission (Gladney 2004). At the same time, some scholars argue that members of these ethnic minorities are deprived of language rights (A. Lin 1997), and face enforced cultural assimilation (Zang 2015). In addition to ethnicity, some scholars even claim that there is another layer of indigenousness for Chinese citizenship (see discussion on Tibetans, Yeh 2007). The binary rural-urban division I discuss in this chapter is to avoid such complication, because China’s ethnic minorities are not the focus of my thesis.
101 or rural status, the hukou system is sometimes seen as a form of the caste system (Young
2013). 35
Beyond Hukou: From Binary to An Extra Tier
Since the mid-1980s, “spontaneous” economic migrations have grown rapidly due to the growing economies of China’s cities. For example, as one of the first cities that benefited from
China’s economic reform, Guangzhou’s thriving export-oriented markets has not only attracted foreigners but also migrant workers and entrepreneurs from different regions of China. These internal migrants—mainly from rural to urban areas—are referred as China’s “floating population,” as most migrate without being able to change their permanent hukou status to correspond with their new place of residence. 36 As these internal migrants live and work in the
city far removed from their hukou , they have fewer legal rights than Guangzhou hukou holders.
Although increased internal migration has challenged the rural-urban binary on which the hukou
system is based, and has created the need for a new mode of governmentality to control the
mobile “floating population” (L. Zhang 2001), the hukou nevertheless remains a tool that
discriminate against China’s rural population and migrants both socially and economically (Chan
and Zhang 1996; Young 2010, 2013).
Since the 1990s, the growth of foreign migrants into China, mainly workers, traders, and
students, is reshaping the demographic structure that was previously divided into three
populations: rural residents, urban residents, and the floating population (internal migrants).
Consequently, international migrants have changed China’s stratified citizenship by adding a
35 The differences sometimes vary between different urban hukou holders. For example, the residents of Guangzhou and Shanghai, though both considered urban residents in the rural-urban division, are entitled to different levels of access to the social welfare system, medical care, retirement funds, etc. 36 Most scholars agree that there are now well over 140 million rural workers residing in Chinese cities without urban household registration (Young 2010).
102 fourth tier, and in so doing have posed a significant challenge to current Chinese immigration policies and laws (Haugen 2019; Pieke 2012).
In August 2008, the Guangzhou government announced that foreigners would be included in the “floating population” category and subject to the rules and regulations for internal migrants. Internal and foreign migrants in China share many similarities, for example, areas where Africans have congregated have become visible and sizeable to the extent that some scholars argue that they are ethnic enclaves in terms of physical space (Li, Ma, and Xue 2009).
This echoes the urban villages ( 城中村 , chengzhongcun ) where internal migrants congregate,
which have established an alternative form of power and authority that challenges the existing
two-tiered concept of governance (G. Huang 2018; Solinger 1999; L. Zhang 2001). African
enclaves in Guangzhou are further similar to Chinese internal migrant enclaves in that they are
always in a state of “flow” – they belong to neither rural nor urban categories of population
control strategies devised by the nation-state. Yet despite these and other similarities, African
migrants are different from internal migrants in important ways. Most significantly, racial factors
make them stand out compared to the local population, Chinese migrants, and foreigners from
other Asian countries. There are also types of discrimination directed against Black Africans that
are not directed against Caucasians in China (see Hood 2011). In the next section, I explore in
greater detail some of these similarities and differences between African migrants and internal
migrants.
103 Urban Citizenship Locality Matters
Introduced by British sociologist Thomas Marshall (1950), the classic definition of citizenship has traditionally emphasized a collection of rights and duties built largely on legal residency or nationality that determines socio-political membership and provides access to resources and benefits (see also Craith 2004, 2005; Turner 1993; Turner and Hamilton 1994;
Roche 1992). However, the changing global economy has led to increasing border crossings and growing migrant populations that challenge the applicability of nation-state-based citizenship projects: People can live in a country but not be the citizens of it. As a consequence, a country’s citizenship involves not only citizens of that country, but also transnational migrants who live, work, and participate in social lives in it (see Jacobson 1995; Soysal 1994; Abu-El-Haj 2007).
As discussed in the previous section, the hukou system demonstrates that there is still a significant internal disparity between different regions and cities in China. And due to these disparities, one’s hukou registration location is central to determining the rights and opportunities a person possesses (Cai, Wang, and Du 2002; Zhang, Zhu, and Nylan 2017). Hence, to determine
Africans’ access to legal and other rights in China, it is useful to look at the kind of citizenship status they hold, independent of nationality or legal residence. In this sense, therefore, I employ what other scholars (Anjaria 2006; Bauböck 2003; Bhowmik 2007; Brown, Lyons, and Dankoco
2010; Frug 1993) call urban citizenship to examine how both Africans and Chinese internal migrants are excluded from full Chinese citizenship.
The key feature of urban citizenship is the flexible association individuals have within a city
(Brown, Lyons, and Dankoco 2010). Scholars debate the definition of this flexible association.
For example, Rainer Bauböck (2003) suggests that urban citizenship should be seen as entailing a set of temporary entitlements based on residency and places of work. This temporary status can
104 be taken up by people on arrival to a place and later discarded on departure. But Bauböck insists on the importance of the traditional grounds of citizenship, such as birth, parentage, and naturalization, to determining these entitlements. Jerry Frug (1993, 329), on the other hand, suggests that urban citizenship should be based on “any form of connection” that people feel which expresses an aspect of themselves at the moment. Other scholars (Anjaria 2006; Bhowmik
2007; Brown, Lyons, and Dankoco 2010), highlight how citizenship is sometimes denied to poor and marginalized populations in cities. For example, Anjaria’s (2006) research shows that marginalized street hawkers in the city of Mumbai often face violent expulsion by city authorities, which deprives them of their right to access public space. Bhowmik (2007, 103) further points out that migrants and informal workers are granted an “outsider status” by urban elites instead of a full entitlement of citizenship. In the case of African small-scale business owners and traders in Guangzhou, a city that considers itself world-class, they too experience processes of marginalization.
To better understand what constitutes Africans’ urban citizenship in Guangzhou – what is given and what is denied in African migrants’ daily lives – below (Table 1) I present a comparison of different entitlements afforded to Africans, internal migrants, and local residents of Guangzhou (Guangzhou hukou holders). 37 By the end of 2013, Guangzhou had a floating
population of 8.37 million, while the population of local residents (Guangzhou hukou holders)
was 8.32 million (Guangzhou Statistics Bureau 2015). As mentioned in the previous section, the
legal status of Africans and internal migrants entitle them to different rights and privileges than
Guangzhou hukou holders. Therefore, it is important to compare the rights of Africans and
members of both categories of Chinese citizenship. Some of the denials of benefits to Africans
37 Different cities of China may employ different measures for managing the floating population.
105 cannot be simply labelled as against Africans (or foreigners in general), as they apply to internal migrants as well. These include higher educational fees than local hukou holders, police
registration upon arrival in Guangzhou, and possible discrimination in media and housing rental
markets.
Table 1: Comparing Key Entitlements among Africans, Internal Migrants, and Guangzhou hukou Holders
Category Content Guangzhou Internal migrants Africans * hukou holders
Tuition 0 (Free) N** plus 40,000-100,000 yuan N plus 20,000-30,000 yuan Education (compulsory in one-time involuntary primary-middle “donation”*** schools)
Tuition (high N N plus 40,000-100,000 yuan N plus 20,000-30,000 yuan school) one-time “donation” Tuition N N About 2N to 3N (college/graduat e school) Housing N N N plus100-500 yuan Commercial Rent directly Not much difference as local In most cases, foreigners pay Leasing shops/offices from the residents. May suffer some more than Chinese; management/ discriminations sometimes endorsement agents from a Chinese person is required Work Student Can work Can work Not allowed to work Others Free to work Free to work Visa-based Medical The social Eligible Complicated. Largely depends Not eligible (except Care medical on the contract, the internal international students who insurance migrant population can also pay 600 yuan per year and provided by the benefit from the same medical enjoy almost the same government services as locals. benefits as those with private insurance companies). The private insurance companies do not differentiate nationality or hukou. Private Insurance charges vary, depending on the person’s age and occupation. E.g., A Insurance basic medical insurance for a 35-year-old Guinean man is 2,600 yuan /year from a private Chinese-Italian cooperated insurance company, which covers up to 90% of the medical care fees excluding certain diseases and regular medical check-ups. Fees are paid by the insured and later reimbursed by the insurance company. Residence Duration of Permanent Permanent Visa-based residency in China Police Not Applicable Within 3 days of arrival. Within 24 hours of arrival, registration P.S. Travellers do not need such regardless of work or travel upon arrival in registration Guangzhou Surveillan ID/visa/permit Unlikely Unlikely Highly likely (Racial ces check profiling)
106
* It also applies to all non-Chinese nationals, as the immigration laws in China do not differentiate Africans from non-African foreigners. ** N here refers to the amount of money that mainlanders, Chinese whose hukou is associated with a location in mainland China, pay for the service. *** Donation ( 赞助费 , Zanzhufei ) here refers to a special fee that foreign-city hukou holders must pay to a Guangzhou public school (either a primary, middle, or high school) in order to enroll as the locals do. The amount varies between schools.
From the table above, we can see that there are two major categories of entitlements that individuals access differently based on their type of visa or hukou . Economically, there are certain areas in which Africans, as well as other foreign nationals, might have to pay more than
Guangzhou hukou holders to get similar services. This includes the price of education. For example, up until college and university, foreigners have to pay more in tuition fees than
Guangzhou hukou holders, a similarity that they share with internal migrants, as educational entitlements are closely linked to one’s hukou status. 38 The children of internal migrants who do
not have a local hukou have to make a one-time “donation” to the local school in order to attend,
in addition to the school fees. The exact amount varies depending on each public school. 39 In
addition, in the housing rental market, Africans (as well as other foreigners) tend to pay more to
rent apartments and offices. This is not legally required (like with higher school fees) but results
from the fact that some landlords and agents take advantage of Africans being foreigners.
Socially and institutionally, Africans sometimes need additional documentation to achieve
the same services and results as Chinese nationals. For example, an African needs a Chinese
person’s endorsement to rent a shop in certain trading malls. While this requirement exists for all
foreign nationals, due to social discrimination, Africans have more difficulties than merchants
38 The tuition fees for college and university are the same for all Chinese nationals, despite their hukou . However, foreigners pay more than Chinese citizens. 39 Like Canada, most schools in China are public. The tuition differences among Guangzhou hukou holders, Africans, and internal migrants apply mostly in public school system but may not apply to private schools which usually do not differentiate between one’s hukou and/or nationality.
107 from elsewhere. For example, in January 2014, Issac and his sister wanted to rent a shop in the
Yueyang Building in Xiaobei, a neighbourhood within Dengfeng with a large concentration of
African migrants. The agent for the mall’s management insisted that they needed a Chinese co- leasee, in case they did not pay rent on time, the Chinese person would have to pay it for them, even though they showed their bank statements to prove that they were financially able to do so. I was surprised to find out that the agent told them that I could be the Chinese co-leasee due to my citizenship, even though I am a student without any income and a non-Guangzhou hukou holder.
In the end, they got the lease with the help of the Chinese girlfriend of Issac’s friend, who had a shop in the same trading mall.
Though migrant Africans in Guangzhou can access certain rights by paying extra money or relying on personal networks, racial profiling and legal discrimination remain common.
Africans are subject to significance police surveillance and are almost always unable to prolong their visas. In other words, the rights that are the most difficult to access are related to political rights. Lacking financial resources and powerful connections, political rights such as mobility and freedom from state surveillance are often out of reach for small-scale traders, who form the majority of the African population in Guangzhou.
The Marginalization of “Floating Populations” in Guangzhou’s Urban Development In the above section, I discussed Chinese citizenship and the Chinese immigration laws
and regulations as institutional and legal tools designed to restrict the political freedom of
African migrants in China. In this section, I discuss the social stigma attached to African
migrants. In particular, how they have come to be seen as a low-skill, undesirable part of the
“floating population.” I explore the term low-suzhi and low-end population and discuss how
108 African migrants and internal migrants, as the majority of the “floating population,” are marginalized in Guangzhou’s urbanization process due to their low-end status.
Sanfei, Low-Suzhi, and Low-End Population
The influx of Africans in Guangzhou was initially considered by the Guangzhou
municipal as a positive stimulus for the city’s economy (Lyons, Brown, and Li 2012), as they
contributed to the city’s export industry. Before 2007, there was no mentioning of sanfei
problems brought by Africans either in the national or local Guangzhou news (G. Huang 2018).
However, in the run-up to the Beijing Olympics in August 2008, the Chinese government
tightened its visa policy for foreigners and changed its formerly lenient attitude towards Africans
in order to limit the foreign population in the country as part of its Olympic security measures
(see Chapter 3). 40
Table 2: The Demographics of Sanfei Foreigners in Guangzhou (2013)
Different kinds of Sanfei Overstay (Illegal-Stay) Illegal-Work Illegal-Entry foreigners Percentage in 96.3% 2.6% 1.1% total sanfei Unintentional-overstay* Intentional-overstay foreigners (84.6%) (15.4%) Major groups’ Western countries, Japan, Nigeria, Ghana, Cameroon, India, Nigeria, Vietnam, country of South Korea, and oversea and some Middle Eastern Pakistan, etc Cambodia, North origin Chinese countries (83.4% are Africans) Korea, etc.
* The category of “unintentional-overstay (非主观恶意居留 , fei zhuguan eyi juliu )” is set by the police bureau to refer to foreigners who overstayed their visas due to a lack of knowledge of Chinese laws and regulations. Accordingly, the category of “intentional-overstay ( 主观恶意居留 , zhuguan eyi juliu ) refers to foreigners who choose to overstay their visas, with a knowledge of it being a law-breaking action. The definition is subjective and the line between unintentional and intentional overstay is blurry. For example, there are some determining factors such as a longer period of overstay time (several months to years), multiple overstay times, etc (J. Liu 2016). Most African overstayers who were considered intentional
40 Similar evictions of foreigners (including Africans) happened in the 2010 Asian Games. See the next chapter for a detailed discussion. Other “mega-events” also contribute to accelerating the marginalization of small-scale African migrants and Chinese internal migrants. For example, Guangzhou’s Anti-drug campaign in 2013 and the Ebola outbreak in 2014 each impacted how African migrants ware treated in practice, which I will discuss in detail in the next chapter.
109 were those who did not register with a local police bureau when they arrived or who did not even have a passport with them (X. Pan 2017, 12). It is important to note that these determining factors are subjective and thus it is hard to draw a clear distinctive line between intentional overstayers and unintentional overstayers.
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, sanfei was first introduced as a classification for all
foreigners who illegally entered, resided, and/or worked in China. Between 2009 and 2014, 91%
of Guangzhou’s sanfei were overstayers, 8% were working without a permit, and only 1% were
illegal-entry (J. Liu, 2016, 10-11). As shown in Table 2 above, in 2013, 96.3% of Guangzhou’s
sanfei were overstayers, 2.6% were working without a permit, and only 1.1% were illegal-entry
(X. Pan 2017, 11-12). This last group was comprised mainly of migrants from China’s
neighboring countries, especially Southeast Asian countries such as Vietnam and Cambodia
because Guangdong Provence is close to China’s Southern border (J. Liu 2016).
Although Africans are not the largest group of sanfei foreigners over 2009-2014, they are the largest group who overstayed intentionally (meaning they know about the consequences of breaking the laws and regulations but still choose to overstay). In 2013, 15.3% of the total sanfei foreigners are intentional overs-stayers, among which 83.4% were African overstayers. In addition, the number of African overstayers reported increases. During the first ten months of
2014, Guangzhou police arrested 2,788 sanfei foreigners, among which 904 were Africans
(32.42%) (B. Zhou 2014), compared to the official number of 16,000 Africans legally residing in the city at that time.
However, this does not mean that Africans are the largest sanfei foreigners. One possible explanation is that, since around 2008, Africans have become the most targeted group of the many anti-sanfei campaigns (G. Huang 2018). There is a possibility that due to the racial profiling of how police executed the visa checking and during visa raids, sanfei s from Southeast
Asian countries were overlooked due to similar ethnic features they shared with Chinese, while
110 Black Africans were not. Some Chinese scholars have pointed out that the majority sanfei foreigner group are from Southeast Asian countries (J. Liu 2016; X. Pan 2017). Due to their similar ethnic feature with Chinese and adopt of Chinese language skills, these sanfei foreigners from Southeast Asian countries can mingle among Chinese without raising the radar of the police
(J. Liu 2016). For example, in April 2014, I have witnessed that my Canadian Chinese friends who visited me were mistaken for Chinese nationals and hence escaped from being checked for visas and carrying passport with them.
Huang (2018) argues that discourses around public security, including through the media, the shortening of the Registration Certificate of Temporary Residence, constant street visa checks, visa, and drug raids have all contributed to the social construction of sanfei as a specifically Black problem. His argument echoes what Shanshan Lan refers to as the “legal production of ‘African illegality’” (Lan 2015, 290). Even more so than the internal “floating population” in urban China, Africans migrants are blamed for increasing crime rates in cities (Li,
Ma, and Xue 2009). The official media portrays this population as creating pressure on China’s labour market and draining social resources reserved for Chinese citizens (G. Huang 2018; Lan
2015). In Guangzhou specifically, the news media has also racialized the sanfei discourse and has linked some Africans to public security problems and illegal activities. African-related crimes and even simply the congregation of Africans are portrayed as challenges to public safety, and the media has urged stricter management and surveillance of them (Z. Qiu 2011; Pan and
Qin 2011). For example, in 2007, a major report was published outlining foreigners’ (especially
Africans’) connection to drugs, stating that the police had already arrested more than three hundred Africans on charges of drug smuggling (Chen, Wang, and Liao 2007). The police targeting of Africans not only contributes to the production of a higher number of illegal
111 Africans in media but also to the public association of sanfei with Africans. By 2010, some netizens began to use the term “ sanfei Blacks” ( 三非黑人 , sanfei heiren ) to refer to Africans, underscoring “ sanfei ’s” growing racial connotation (G. Huang 2018).
Like sanfei , the discourse of low-suzhi (low-quality) has become another way of
marginalizing African migrants. Suzhi , “quality” or “human quality,” is a term referring to three
aspects of the quality of an individual: moral behaviour, educational attainment, and physical
appearance (Jacka 2009; Kipnis 2006, 2008). According to Hairong Yan (2003), suzhi marks a
sense and sensibility of one’s self-worth in the market economy and is often used as a negative
term by social elites to refer to the lack of quality of the laboring masses, of which the floating
population is a large part. Similar to the rural-urban migrants who are often described as low-
suzhi (Anagnost 2004), Guangzhou media and netizens depict Africans as also lacking in suzhi
(Lan 2017). Words such as “uncivilized,” “dirty,” “lazy,” and “aggressive” are likewise used to
describe Africans (Lan 2017, 53).
In addition to the term low-suzhi (low-quality), the term 低端人口 (diduan renkou ), which literally means “low-end population,” was introduced in the official media in 2010 and refers to those individuals (mostly from the floating population) who work in low-skilled service jobs such as those offered by manufacture and construction industries. In 2017, local officials from
Beijing’s districts employed the phrase in official documents about restrictions on migration to cap Beijing’s rapid population growth (Zhu 2017). The use of the term echoes the finding of
Mathews, Lin, and Yang (2017, 2) in that Africans in China are engaging in what they call “low- end globalization”— that is, globalization that involves small amounts of capital, and semi-legal or illegal transactions. The small economic scale and precarious legal status of those engaged in
112 low-end globalization, such as African small-scale business owners, underscores their low-end status.
Guangzhou’s Urban Development Plan
The depiction of African migrants as low-suzhi foreigners is also reflected in the
Guangzhou governments’ urbanization projects. Guangzhou’s selection as host of the 2010 Asian
Games provided new impetus to redevelopment projects and boosted urban elites’ ability to attain
a world-class status for their city (Shin 2014). A crucial part of preparing Guangzhou ahead of the
games was focused on creating the appearance of a modern, global city. For instance, the
orientation of the city was transformed from being centred on the old city centre to a multi-centric
layout consisting of several so-called “New Towns (xincheng )” with massive flagship projects.
In 2009, Yang Wang, the Communist Party Secretary in Guangdong Province, launched
an urban renewal project called the “Three Olds Renewal Project” ( sanjiu gaizao ). The “three
olds” consisted of demolishing and modernizing old towns, old industrial factories, and old urban
villages ( 旧城镇、旧厂房、旧村居 ), though the majority of the areas targeted by the project (54
percent) were urban villages whose primary residents are the floating population, with a small
portion of low-income Guangzhou hukou holders (Schoon 2014, 108). The “Three Olds Renewal
Project” and subsequent development projects each involved debates over what to do with the
Dengfeng urban villages, including the neighbourhood of Xiaobei where Africans congregated.
From late 2013 to early 2014, I constantly heard rumours that the provincial government wanted
to renovate the Dengfeng area in order to evict both African and Chinese internal migrants living
there – a theory believed by some Africans and some Chinese staff working in the family centre
where I volunteered. Finally, in October 2014, the Guangzhou government launched the
“Beautification Project” campaign in order to “clean up” the Dengfeng area. However, around the
113 same time, there was an outbreak of Dengue fever in Guangzhou followed by the global Ebola
Outbreak in West Africa. Hence, the actual purpose of the project (an anti-African prejudice or preventing the Dengue fever) was not fully clear.
The following year, in July 2015, Guangzhou municipality launched The Three-Year
Special Action Plan for Clean, Tidy, Safe Rental Housings in Guangzhou (广州市出租屋专项整治
暨干净整洁平安有序出租屋创建活动 3 年行动计划 , guangzhoushi chuzuwu zhuanxiang zhengzhi ji ganjing zhengjie ping’an youxu chuzuwu chuangjian huodong sannian xingdong jihua , hereafter referred to as the Three-Year Action Plan) to enforce laws against illegal residential housing. This city-wide plan, although it did not specifically target Africans, further enforced the rental housing registration for tenants, and therefore placed undocumented migrants in a more disadvantaged position.
Although Africans are significantly affected by such action plans and clean-up projects, as
Wilczak (2018) argues, they are not the only target of Guangzhou’s urban renewal project in
Xiaobei, as other members of the “floating population” are also affected. Both Chinese and
Africans I met in the field complained about the negative impact that urbanization projects and campaigns had on their businesses. Following government efforts to revitalize Xiaobei, for instance, many Africans were afraid to come to markets to check products as there were more people from the government on the street checking on them. My Chinese business owner friends also witnessed a decrease in business in trading malls in that area. I was in Montreal at that time and was deeply worried about the fates of the migrant families who had become my personal friends, as well as the impact of urban development on the future of Dengfeng more broadly, which hosted many of African migrants.
114 The phenomenon of using urban development to displace unwanted social groups per se is by no means unusual in post-reform China (see, for example, research on Zhejiangcun, an urban village area in Beijing, L. Zhang 2001; Xiang 2005). The Chinese government often conducts urban village ( chenzhongcun) renewal projects to modernize areas of cities as part of its urban planning. In the early 2000s, as cities have begun transitioning to post-industrial economies, urban villages became the focus of local policy-makers, who issued a series of projects aimed at upgrading and integrating them into the urban fabric (G. Huang 2018; Y.
Huang and Li 2014; Wilczak 2018).
Though these above mentioned urban development campaigns were not explicitly anti-
African, they did provide new tools to manage the African population of Guangzhou, as well as internal migrants in the city. Urban development projects not only have restructured
Guangzhou’s physical space, prioritizing economic goals over social policy goals, but also have provide the excuse for massive evictions of undesirable residents and/or the relocation of ethnic enclaves in cases where the immigrant population was seen to have grown too large (L. Zhang
2001; Wu et al. 2006; Haugen 2012; He 2013). Amid de-industrializing, Guangzhou is increasingly interested in creating space for high-end labourers. African migrants, as part of the low-end population, who are largely associated with the negative category of sanfei and low- suzhi , are excluded from the city’s vision of globalization (Wilczak 2018).
Conclusion This chapter had argued that the immigration exclusions that African migrants face cannot simply be portrayed as “anti-African” racism. Rather, they should be examined in the context of the policing of foreigners in China, Chinese citizenship, and Guangzhou’s urbanization. Above all, the Chinese immigration system, which is primarily designed to
115 advance economic objectives, clearly favours high-end workers, of which African migrants, who are mostly small-scale business owners, are excluded.
African migrants, as well as other foreign migrants, are classified within the “floating population” category in China. The term “floating population” originally referred to the internal migrants who worked and lived in places outside of one’s hukou —a household registration system. Foreign migrants who live and work in China give new meanings to this term and are reshaping the country’s demographic structure by adding a fourth tier—foreign residents. Through a comparison of legal rights between Chinese internal migrants and African migrants in Guangzhou, the chapter has shown not only that many of the issues Africans encounter are also faced by other foreign nationals living in China, but also that Chinese internal migrants are denied many of the same rights that African migrants are denied, since their rights are determined above all by China’s hukou system. Yet, there still remain certain areas where
Africans are subjected to racial profiling or legal discrimination, such as visa and resident permit checking.
Chinese immigration laws and their local implementations have a major impact on small- scale African business owners and traders, as they tend to be more legally and economically vulnerable than more skilled foreign workers. This is particularly evident in Guangzhou, where the city is transferring from a low-end manufacturing centre to a post-industrial city based on a skilled and service economy (see also Wilczak 2017). In the midst of this change, African migrants are excluded through racializing sanfei , in addition to the discourse of low-suzhi , a term that is used to marginalize both African and Chinese internal migrants as members of the “low- end population”.
116 Chapter 3
Individual Strategies and Visa-Partnerships: Navigating China’s Immigration Control
There is a Chinese proverb that says “ 上有政策，下有对策 ” (Shang you zhengce, xia you duice), meaning that where there is a policy, there is a countermeasure. Thus, there is always a way to circumvent top-down policies to make them work in one’s favour.
(Fieldnotes, July 21, 2014)
Bah’s Departure at the Airport Since the start of 2014, Bah has been thinking about returning to Conakry, Guinea to spend more time with his family, especially his eldest son, who at the time was 6 years old: “I am always travelling and doing business out of Guinea. I am doing this for many years now! You see, I came to China in 2004, [and] it is almost 10 years. I did not see him growing up!” Bah talked about becoming a traveller-trader, coming to Guangzhou only to fill important orders and check cargo, instead of residing full-time in the city. At first, I thought it was just a thought of the moment, but after seeing him cancel his lease on his studio apartment, and asking his friend
Mobby to take care of some of his business while he was away, I realized that he was serious.
After endless farewell gatherings, he finally booked his flight back home. One evening in March,
I went to Baiyun airport to say goodbye to Bah.
While we were waiting for some of Bah’s friends to come to see him off, we saw another
African man with his hands cuffed in front of him. Two Chinese police officers in uniform each held one of the man’s upper arms and were walking by his side. They walked quickly passed us and disappeared beyond the security check. Bah told me that this was how the immigration bureau deported overstayers, and they would only take off the handcuffs once the flight started boarding. “It is humiliating,” Bah said. “They [Chinese immigration officials] are afraid that
117 people will run away at the airport. Once I saw a guy like that at the airport. A Chinese young woman was following them. Maybe his girlfriend. She cry [cried] and cry[cried] so much.”
Undocumented Africans usually enter China with a valid business or tourist visa, but for various reasons many overstay. In most cases, the Bureau of Exit and Entry deports those who are arrested shortly after paying their fine and purchasing a one-way ticket back home. Those who cannot afford to pay the fine and buy the ticket are put in jail until friends or family pay the fees. If there is no room in local jails for the person arrested, or they cannot afford such fines, then they are sent back to their home countries with the fees waived and tickets paid by the local
Chinese government. However, the waiting time can be as long as three months before deportation in these cases. 41
As illustrated in the previous chapter, African small-scale business owners, like most
China’ internal rural-urban migrants, are marginalized in Guangzhou. They are associated with negative stereotypes and face social discrimination (Brady 2003; Hood 2011). In addition, as mentioned in Chapter 2, Chinese authorities tend to crack down on Africans who overstay their visas, which results in constant visa checks by local police forces, and further creates tense relations between Africans and the local government.
In the previous chapter, I discussed how Chinese governments, at both central and local levels, manage the influx of African migrants, and the extent to which the Chinese government supports or limits African’s visa benefits. In this chapter, I examine African’s “visa problems,” an umbrella term that covers a wide range of visa-related problems that each African faces.
These include a wide variety of difficulties with their visa applications, such as the difficulties of
41 In some cases, longer jail time is a result of a lack of the identification document of the overstayer. In such case, the Guangzhou police bureau can only deport an overstayer once his/her identity is verified and a travel document is re-issued by the embassy of the overstayer’s country. Some verification process can take a long time, depending on the corresponding time.
118 obtaining a visa, renewing a visa, and sometimes switching to a different category of visa. The term also includes challenges in maintaining one’s visa, such as avoiding or navigating daily visa checks on the streets and dealing with the fear of authorities confiscating or not recognizing one’s visa. I also look at Africans’ response to the Chinese government’s tightened immigration control, especially the harsh conditions for overstays, meaning authorities coming for a person if they've overstayed their visa, and how Africans manage to negotiate immigration laws and regulations while creating a legal niche for themselves.
In examining relationships between Africans and Chinese, scholars have pointed out that they are mainly economic. For example, as local businesses targeting Africans in Guangzhou boomed, Roberto Castillo (2014) coined the term “catering networks” to describe systems of interdependent micro-industries that provide supplies and services geared towards Africans. In addition to the growing economic ties between Africans and Chinese engaging in trade, there is a growing body of research that focuses on Africans’ response to visa control measures, mostly with collaboration from Chinese. Tao Xu (2009a; 209b) documented a few cases in which
Africans have bribed police in exchange for being exempt from visa checking. Lan (2015, 291) insightfully points to what she calls the “transnational brokerage services,” specifically, the collaborations between Chinese internal migrants and Africans that enable the latter to bypass some of the constraints imposed by state immigration laws. Similarly, Mathews, Lin, and Yang
(2017) document different strategies employed by some undocumented African traders to circumvent the visa checking system besides bribing police and landlords. For example, they call attention to “ethnic camouflage”—a tactic in which Africans who are overstayers, or who lack proper visas to work, hide behind their Chinese partners (most often their girlfriends or wives) who appear in the shop to avoid police raids while allowing them to work under the table. In a
119 recent study, Haugen (2018) argues that the African migrants in Guangzhou take advantage of the lack of uniform enforcement of China’s immigration legislation by engaging in a black market for immigration services. The above scholars provide insights into the various ways
Africans experience and maneuver within or around the immigration system in China. My research builds on and expands these findings, in that I argue that “visa-partnerships,” an informal form of economic cooperation between African migrants, Chinese, and visa agents, has developed to maximize Africans’ visa benefits in China.
To make this argument, I first present an overview of the legal rights and benefits associated with different types of Chinese visas for Africans. Here, I show why certain visas are preferable to others. I then outline the difficulties some Africans encounter obtaining a visa and explain why some Africans overstay. The chapter then analyzes various cases to show the complexity and diversity of visa problems in practice. Here, I compare the experiences of two groups of Africans, Guineans, and Nigerians. I then discuss in greater detail the strategies
Africans employ in their dealings with the Chinese state, particularly when they navigate visa problems. This includes individual strategies such as changing one’s citizenship and changing one’s visa category, as well as the abovementioned “visa-partnerships.”.
Visa Types and Overstaying One’s Visas As discussed in the previous chapter, obtaining either Chinese citizenship or Chinese permanent residency is difficult for African migrants, due to the fact that Chinese citizenship is largely based on ethnic belonging (Methews, Lin, and Yang, 2017), meaning one gets Chinese citizenship through blood-ties and ethnic heritage. Therefore, Africans’ best option to stay in
China legally is to obtain a temporary stay and to follow the restrictions specified by their visa type. During my fieldwork, I only met one African who had obtained a residence permit granting
120 him unlimited entry to China without restrictions. This man was a Somalian trader, who gained his permit because he had first immigrated to Hong Kong, and therefore was able to obtain a
Home Return Permit to mainland China (equivalent to a resident visa). The vast majority of his
African peers, however, can only dream of having this kind of immigration status. During fieldwork in Guangzhou between 2013 and 2014, I did not come across any cases of Africans who had obtained Chinese citizenship, even though some were married to Chinese citizens. Only their children born into legally-registered Sino-African marriages became Chinese citizens.
Entitlements Associated with Different Visa Statuses
African migrants’ rights within Chinese society are closely associated with the type of visas they possess. With the 2012 Law, followed by the “Administrative Regulations of the
People’s Republic of China on the Entry and Exit of Aliens” ( 中华人民共和国出境入境管理条例 , zhonghua renmin gongheguo churujing guanli tiaoli, hereafter referred to as the 2013
Regulations) (State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2013) passed in 2013, new types of visas and measures have brought stricter management of foreigners living in China. As a result of these measures, the number of visa types available to foreigners increased from 8 (C, D,
F, G, J, L, X, Z) to 12 (C, D, F, G, J, L, X, Z, R, M, Q, S).
While the types of visas that African professionals hold varies, the majority of small- scale African traders have been issued business visas [F] and travel visas [L], as most of them are not eligible for work visas [Z], which require employment in a larger company and sponsorship from that employer. Those who enrolled in schools obtain student visas [X], which to some extent are similar to resident visas. Below is a table summarizing the benefits and restrictions associated with these most common visas among Africans.
121 Table 3: Most Popular Visas Obtained by Africans
Visa Purpose of Stay Duration of Stay Work Who would be Type Restrictions interested
L Tourist visa, for Varies case to case, Cannot work Africans who travel those who come to some only for 30 days, frequently to China as a tourist some for multiple order goods, verify entries during the market/products, etc. course of one year. M Business visas, for Usually 6 months to Requires African traders, small those who intend one year, multiple minimum and major business to conduct trading entries with a maximum financial proof owners or commercial stay of 30 days each activities. time. X Student visas for Equivalent to 4-12 Cannot work Some full-time students those who intend months of residency who were sponsored by to study in China, over the duration of their family. Also including X1 (for visa popular among African more than 180 traders as a way to days of study) and extend their stay in X2 (for no more China. than 180 days) D Residence visas, One year, renewable Need to obtain Most desirable but hard for those who a work permit to get. Usually issued to intend to reside in from Chinese direct relatives of a China permanently government to Chinese citizen, e.g., work legal spouse, children, and parents. Z Employment visas, Duration of stay is Need a Rare but desirable. those who intend similar to business company to work in China visas, varying from 30 contract days to a maximum of 5 years.
As we can see from the chart above, the types of visa that provide the most legal benefits are the work visas [Z] and residence visas [R], which in practice are very hard for small-scale
African business owners to get. This is mainly because a work visa [Z] requires a formal employment contract, which echoes the principle of Chinese immigration in favour of high-end foreign workers (see discussion in the previous chapter). During my entire year of fieldwork, I met only two Africans (one from Kenya and one from Uganda) who were in this visa category.
They had been hired by an international Chinese cargo company. On the other hand, a student visa [X] is similar to a residence visa [R] in that the holder does not need to leave the country
122 every 30 days, unlike the business visa [M] holders. Several researchers have reported that
African traders who do not manage to obtain business visas either overstay or switch to student
[X] or tourist visas [L] before their original visas expire (Haugen 2012; Mathews and Yang
2012). Although there is the concern of being caught doing business on student visas, the fact that they are easy to obtain (as shown in Interlude II before Chapter 2) and last longer than travel visas makes them desirable. In addition to the convenience, economically speaking, paying tuition to be a student and getting a student visa can be less expensive than purchasing a one-year business visa for some Africans. As discussed in Interlude II, Abdul, a Nigerian businessman, paid almost the same visa application fees to the agent as his tuition.42 He could also enjoy more residential rights with a student visa, compared to his business visa, provided he is not caught working by the police.
Tourist visas [L] are very popular among Africans who do not reside in Guangzhou and only travel to the city to do some business-related errands off the table. They also serve as the lowest-cost entry visa for many Africans who cannot afford a business visa. While [L] visas are easier to obtain than business or work visas, the risk of doing business or anything work-related on such visas is high, as I discuss in the next section. Moreover, [L] visa holders can only stay in
China for one to three months, which can result in some business risks.
Table 3 above does not apply to other foreign groups in Guangzhou, especially to high- end foreign workers from developed countries. For example, in a comparison between Japanese migrants and African traders in Guangzhou, Mathews, Lin, and Yang (2017) note that most of the Japanese migrants in Guangzhou are white-collar workers who have work [Z] visas arranged
42 This would not be true for Guineans, as they usually pay less for visa application, see discussion in the next section.
123 by their companies, whereas self-employed African traders need to constantly worry about their visas since they lack sponsorship and support from knowledgeable and wealthy companies.
Overstaying Visas: A Strategic Choice?
Although I did not meet many overstayers in my fieldwork, I did get a very clear sense of the rigidity of the Chinese immigration system. 43 During fieldwork, I constantly heard stories of
people who did not get visas and how their inability to get visas had caused problems either in
their business or personal lives. I also heard about phone calls my interlocutors received from
relatives or friends who were jailed for violating or overstaying their visas regarding jail
conditions and food; fund-raising calls among Africans for their countrymen who were caught;
and gossip about the embarrassment and humiliation those who were caught faced in jail or at the
airport. 44 For example, in June 2014, a Chinese trader, Jessie, told me that her Igbo business associate’s business visa got cancelled at the border of Hong Kong when he was on his monthly trip to abide by the 30-day limit on his time in mainland China. The immigration officer was suspicious of his frequent movement between Guangzhou and Hong Kong and cancelled his visa on-the-spot. The man was forced to buy a ticket and get on a plane to Lagos, leaving unfinished business, as well as his apartment and shops unattended. It took him three months to return to
Guangzhou after obtaining a new visa.
Studies have shown that stringent visa policies and border control in the United States
and Europe not only fail to deter undocumented migration but also that these things actually
43 As discussed in the Introduction and Chapter 1, I recruited my interlocutors from public places where overstayers were less likely to be present. In addition, most underground churches, where the undocumented migrants tend to congregate, do not allow Chinese nationals. Therefore, based on these recruitment techniques, my interlocutors were unlikely to be overstayers. 44 I was informed that there was a time when dining in jail was hard for Muslims, as the food offered contained pork with no alternatives. Although I was told that in order to survive in such conditions Muslims can break their religious rules, it was unpleasant for them to do this. However, in 2014, I heard from Bah that a non-pork option had been made available.
124 encourage unauthorized migrants to overstay their visas due to the increased difficulty of re- entrance (Andreas 2001; Cornelius 2001). Similarly, in the case of Guangzhou, overstaying has become a rational choice for some foreign migrants who are economically disadvantaged, since it is more expensive to fly home and re-apply for a visa than to stay in China and pay the overstay fine if caught (see also Lan 2015; Mathews, Lin, and Yang 2017).
Mathews, Lin, and Yang (2017) state that one of the most common reasons that Africans overstay their visas is that many ends up going to China on short-term tourist visas due to the difficulties of obtaining a long-term visa. These African traders come to Guangzhou, hoping that their short-term visa will allow them enough time to secure employment and/or make business arrangements. Generally, there are several steps to take before products made in China get shipped abroad: checking products in the market, placing an order, visiting the factory to check product quality, organizing cargo, and loading goods for shipment. If an African trader orders a large number of goods, and/or needs to order directly from the factory (which usually offers a lower price than ordering through middlemen), this process would be significantly longer. Ada, a
Tanzanian fashion clothes trader, explained to me:
How can business [be] finish[ed] in one day? You go to the market, you look and look for several days. You check all the products. After that, you ask around: do you know this man [Chinese/African trader]? If no one says bad things [about him/her], you can make an order. [The] factory will take like one week or longer to finish making my goods. After that, you have to go to check the goods [for their quality]. Yes, this would be easier if I know more people that I can trust fully. But still, I need to ship my goods. I have to make sure the shipping company does not fool me and load a different thing. Because once the goods arrive in the port of Dar, it is too late to exchange! (Ada, December 28, 2013)
The short-term tourist visa makes African traders vulnerable to failure because it does not give them sufficient time to stay in China and supervise the whole process of placing, preparing, and shipping an order. This also makes establishing long-term, trusting relationships and networks
125 difficult. In other words, by remaining in China for a short amount of time only, African traders take greater business risks. Ada told me a story of one of her associates who was taken advantage of by another African in Guangzhou due to his short-term visa:
He had to leave before the goods [were] loaded into the container. After 2 months, when the goods arrived, they’re all garbage. That man lost about 4,000 USD! That is [was] some of his money and some loan from his wife’s brother. His wife did not believe him. She’s never been to China and did not believe Africans would cheat Africans. She got angry and said, “you must have spent the money on a mistress!” Finally, she divorced him and kicked him out. He used to live in the same city as me, and now he goes back to live in the village because he is broke. He has no money. He cannot afford a ticket to come back and fight with the guy who cheated him! (Ada, December 28, 2013)
Since this episode, Ada pays more attention to checking the goods she orders. Still, risks exist, as making sure that her orders are prepared correctly and that the goods loaded for shipment are intact takes longer than the time allocated in her tourist visa (which in her case was for a maximum 30 days for each stay).
A similar incident happened to Sekou, a West African trader. He once purchased a carton of shoes but left the country before he could check the final products being shipped to Conakry.
He had no idea that the shoes shown in the pictures sent by a Chinese businessman were made from cardboard that eventually got destroyed by the humid conditions in the ship. This became apparent only after the goods had reached customs in Conakry two months later. After that,
Sekou only bought products from people he trusted or ordered smaller quantities even though that meant an increase in his purchasing costs.
As cheating in business can happen (see Chapter 5), some African traders without trusted contacts in the city choose to overstay their visa so as to avoid business failures. This is especially true for small-scale business owners, like Ada and Sekou, for whom one or two failures would be devastating. In addition to the insufficient amount of time allocated by the tourist visa, African traders also fear not being able to get another business visa in the future
126 once they leave China. Indeed, the difficulty in obtaining a long-term visa forces these African small-scale business owners to rely on the mediation services of local middlemen who help establish a relationship of “trust” between African traders and local Chinese vendors. Together, both circumstances help explain why some Africans decide to risk overstaying their visas.
The Complexity of Visa Problems in Practice While it is true that many Africans face immigration difficulties and are concerned about
their visas, visa problems do not affect all Africans in the same way. Previous scholars have
looked at African visa problems as a collective experience. They either see Africans as a whole
(Li, Ma, and Xue 2009; G. Huang 2018), or by focusing on specific groups, for example, Igbo
Nigerians (Haugen 2013b; Mathews, Lin, and Yang 2017). But the members of these groups are
individuals, who each have their own unique backgrounds and circumstances. My research, by
focusing on the experiences of individuals, shows that the visa challenges of African migrants,
and how they respond to these challenges, are more diverse and nuanced than studies of groups
indicate. I argue that characteristics of different individuals, such as country of citizenship (and
the diplomatic relationship between China and that African country), marital status, and
economic status all have an impact on how Africans’ visa processes are implemented in practice.
Therefore, the visa difficulties experienced by Africans should be examined case by case in order
to fully address their complexity.
Citizenship and Nationality
One’s nationality matters, as a visa is fundamentally a diplomatic issue, constantly
determined and altered based on diplomatic relationships between individual countries, as well
as changing social-political situations globally. As the first Sub-Saharan African country to
127 establish a diplomatic relationship with communist China in 1959 (and vice versa, China being one of the first countries in the world to recognize Guinea's independence), Guineans have been treated favourably in Chinese immigration policies. Guineans rarely complained about not getting a visa between 2013 and 2014 when I did my field research.
Bah, who is from Guinea, told me that he never had any problems getting a one-year,
multiple-entry business visa between 2004 and 2013. When we met the first time, Bah spoke
fondly of the Sino-Guinean political relationship, which he said helped him secure a stable visa.
“You know my country recognized China very first in Africa and now we have [a] good
relationship. Getting a visa is easy” (Bah, September 23, 2013). 45 Bah applied directly to the
Chinese embassy in Conakry, filled out the application form, and obtained a one-year multiple-
entry business visa for about 70-80 USD. If he had used a visa agent, it would have cost around
200-400 USD. 46 Other interlocutors from Niger, Senegal, and Congo also reported a relatively lenient visa application process, but not as easy as Guineans according to my interlocutors. In contrast, people from Nigeria, in general, had to use an agent in applying for Chinese visas or obtain a visa directly from a Nigerian government official through bribery. In addition, visa agent fees for Nigerians are quite steep considering the actual visa application fee payable to the
Chinese embassy for a one-year business visa is about 15,000 Nairas (44.6 USD). 47 For example,
for a 12-month multiple entry business visa, one needs to pay at least 1,200 USD to a visa agent.
In some cases, that amount can go above 2,000 USD. 48
45 This is partially accurate, as Guinea was the first sub-Saharan country to have established diplomatic relations with China. Egypt was the first African country to establish diplomatic relations with China in May 1956. 46 However, during the Ebola outbreak in fall 2014, most West Africans, including Guineans, were restricted from traveling to China. After the 2014 Ebola outbreak, it is still relatively easy for Guineans to obtain a short-term visa (one to three months) to China. Long-term visas, however, became more difficult to obtain. 47 Information from 2012, one year before my fieldwork. 48 In 2018, I learned that one Nigerian businessman paid 550 USD for a 6-month multiple entry business visa through someone he knew working in the Nigerian government. It is safe to assume that, for people who lack such connections, the price for a same-length visa is higher.
128 Besides the steep visa application fees, Nigerians found it difficult to obtain a Chinese visa of any kind, which in a way contributes to a vicious circle in that many Nigerians choose to overstay precisely because it is hard for them to obtain a new visa. This results in Nigerians, especially Nigerian Igbos, being identified by both researchers and Africans migrants from other countries as the largest ethnic group of visa overstayers in Guangzhou (Haugen 2012; Lan 2015;
J. Liu 2016; Mathews, Lin, and Yang 2017). 49 This partially because they are the most populous
African group by ethnicity in Guangzhou, but also partially because, culturally, they had more
social pressure to be successful so that they deliberately overstayed their visa to work in China
until they can afford to go home in their terms (Mathews, Lin, and Yang 2017). Their high
overstay-rate contributes to the association of Africans with the sanfei issues discussed in
Chapter 2 and further stigmatizes Africans as a whole. Due to the alleged bias associated with
their nationality, a Nigerian Hausa businessman complained to me that Chinese immigration
treats all Nigerians the same. He claims, instead, it should consider having separate visa rules for
Igbos and Hausas (and other ethnic groups) as “[t]hey [the Igbos] are the ones who are causing
problems.”
Global Social-Economic Status
In examining the experiences that foreigners from different backgrounds have in
Guangzhou, Mathews, Lin, and Yang (2017, 38) point out that “Nationality, skin color, and
gender matter, but in their lives, global social class and the variations in how individual lives
unfold are the most important.” Their observations echo my findings. While most times, one’s
nationality determines a person’s chances of getting a Chinese visa, the ability to obtain a visa
49 Statistics show that the top African overstayers by nationality are Nigerians, followed by Ghanaians and Cameroonians (J. Liu 2016,11).
129 also varies based on an individual’s financial resources and social ties. For example, although
Guineans can obtain a visa more easily than Africans from most other countries, I have encountered several cases of Guineans failing to obtain the visa they applied for or being denied visa renewals. 50
In September 2013, for instance, I met Aicha, a young Guinean woman in her mid-20s, in
an African hair salon owned by a Guinean businesswoman, Kourouma. Aicha is very pretty and
was doing some odd jobs for Kourouma, such as cleaning the floor and washing hair for clients.
She told me that just had a baby girl in Guangzhou and was waiting for her visa extension. Six
months prior, she had come to Guangzhou with her husband, who was doing business. Her
husband had to leave Guangzhou prior to our meeting due to multiple business failures. She
wanted to stay in Guangzhou and hoped that since she just had a baby, the government would
give her a longer extension. She preferred to stay and hoped that her husband could collect
enough money to come back to Guangzhou so they could reunite and try again to build a future
together in the city. One week later, when I met Aicha again, she looked disappointed – her new
visa came through, but she only got a one-month extension. There was no point re-applying, as
she did not have enough money. She left the city soon after, and I have not seen her since.
Aicha’s story shows that even though China and Guinea enjoy a strong diplomatic relationship,
and many Guineans get visas without too much difficulty, there are still other variables – like a
person’s financial status in this case – that can alter the outcome of a visa application. Although
Aicha did get an extension, it was not the one she desired or applied for.
Contrary to Aisha’s story, John, an Igbo businessman from Lagos, never worries about his visas. I met John when Abdul and I were watching football in a bar in Taojin. He was sitting
50 I have encountered three cases of Guineans who overstayed during my fieldwork. They did not renew their visas due to lack of funds to apply for visa extensions, not because they were refused to a renewal.
130 at the table next to us. We started talking and became friends. John is a man with very few words and is the most reserved person among my interlocutors, yet he is always very composed. No matter what I said (as I tried several times to provoke him intentionally to get him to talk more), he managed to remain polite and answer my questions as concisely as possible. When I came to learn that he held a one-year business visa and was an Igbo, I began to ask lots of questions, inquiring how he obtained his visa, “Hi John, where do you apply for visas? Hi John, who is your visa agent? Can I introduce my Nigerian friends to him/her?” He would smile and tell me that he got his visa from the “Beijing Embassy,” which (this way of getting visas) I had never heard of. He added, “I have a friend,” and would say no more.
Despite John being discrete, I slowly got a sense of his financial abundance. He lived in a high-rise building in Tianhe District, a modern, newly developed area of Guangzhou. He told me that he was doing business, but he was never busy. And he partied a lot. He would go to bars and clubs, and once opened a bottle of Johnnie Walker at 200 USD (club price), and invited strangers to have shots. Clearly, John’s economic ability and his mysterious connections with the Nigerian embassy in Beijing contributed to his worry-free life in Guangzhou. Even during the harsh visa control in 2007 before 2008 Beijing Olympics, when many Africans (like Bah) had to run out of the city to avoid having their passports canceled, John still lived in the city without any problems. He came from a developing country with a passport that gave him few privileges, but he was indeed what Mathews, Lin, and Yang (2017) call a “global citizen.” However, not many people are as wealthy or as well-connected as John.
Ties with Chinese
For the non-affluent Africans in Guangzhou, one common strategy for obtaining a stable visa is marrying a local person. In most cases – based on my observation as well as other
131 scholars’ work – it is an African male and a Chinese female (see also Lan 2015; Mathews, Lin, and Yang, 2017). Mixed marriages are not a new phenomenon in China. Generally, marriages between ethnic Chinese women and Western men who remain in China involve the Chinese woman giving up her citizenship for a Western passport. In Sino-African marriages, however, the African man almost never gains Chinese citizenship (though in a few cases can obtain a
Chinese permanent residency visa). In these unions. most children have a Chinese passport rather than one from an African country.
During fieldwork, I spent some time in the company of a Nigerian Hausa businessman,
Songo, and his Chinese wife, who later converted to Islam and adopted the name, Fatima. Fatima is Cantonese but from a small town outside of Guangzhou. She used to work with Songo. Then they fall in love and got married five years ago. Songo’s marriage to Fatima allowed him to have access to a yearly-renewable resident visa, but he could not become a Chinese citizen. His two daughters, however, have naturalized Chinese citizenship thanks to Fatima (and their legally- registered marriage). Although Songo would like his children to be Nigerian as well, he admitted that it is wiser for them to have Chinese citizenship officially. His rationale became clear during an interview when he explained: “Of course we want them to be Chinese! Chinese visas
[passports] are harder to get.” (Songo, July 14, 2014) If he chose to let his daughters have
Nigerian citizenship, Songo would have to pay international school rates for them, which, as mentioned in Table 1 in Chapter 2, are much higher than Chinese rates. 51 Not to mention the time and financial hassle of applying to renew their visas regularly. Further, being recognized officially as Chinese citizens does not mean that Songo and Fatima’s daughters lose their ability
51 As Fatima did not obtain a Guangzhou hukou , her two daughters do not have a Guangzhou hukou either, even though they both were born in Guangzhou. The couple paid extra fees for their daughters’ school as Chinese internal migrants, which is still cheaper than international fees.
132 to gain Nigerian citizenship, as the Nigerian government allows multiple citizenships, and the parents could arrange a Nigerian passport for their daughters at a later stage. Therefore, a common practice for this kind of marriage is that the child would obtain Chinese citizenship officially, while the African parent would arrange an African passport for his/her child.
Compared to Songo’s case, one of Bah’s close friends, Mobby, a Guinean trader, decided to have his wife and daughter come live with him in Guangzhou in 2015. While his wife was enrolled in university learning Chinese, they had another baby girl in 2016 in Guangzhou.
Although both Songo and Mobby got the same residential visas, there is a huge financial difference due to their spouse’s citizenship: Mobby has to pay 3,500 USD each year to sponsor his family, in addition to his daughter’s international tuition fees, while Songo only pays 800 yuan (129.6 USD) for as his annual visa-renewing fee. Clearly, the type of visa a person holds has big financial implications.
Variables: Global and Local “Mega-Events”
In addition to various factors discussed above, obtaining a visa for an African migrant is also affected by larger social and political events, which I refer as “mega-events,” beyond their control, at both the national and international levels. In the past decade, the 2008 Beijing
Olympics, the 2010 Asian Games, Guangzhou’s Anti-drug campaign in 2013, the 2014 Ebola outbreak, and the Dengfeng urban village renewal project since 2014 have all impacted some, if not all, Africans’ visa practices. This confirms Castillo’s (2016) finding that African migrants’ status in China is precarious, and is dependent on a variety of often unpredictable factors.
Prior to 2007, the influx of Africans into Guangzhou was considered by city officials to be
a positive stimulus for the city’s economy (Lyons, Brown, and Li 2012). Consequently, the city
government and local authorities were lenient when it came to visa overstayers. Many African
133 interlocutors, including Nigerians, also recalled that before 2007 it was relatively easy for them to obtain a Chinese visa. Further, in this period there was no mention of immigration problems brought by Africans either on the national or Guangzhou news channels (Y. Huang 2017).
Both obtaining visas for Africans and Africans overstaying their visas slowly became issues in the run-up to the Beijing Olympics held in August 2008. The authorities claimed that there was a serious threat of terrorism, both from outside and from domestic separatist forces in
Tibet and Xinjiang, and that preventing an incident was the country’s number one priority. As the event approached, the Chinese government tightened its visa policy for all foreigners, as part of the Olympic security measures (Branigan 2008). In Guangzhou, the police carried out special anti-sanfei raids every two months in the areas where Africans were concentrated (Lyons,
Brown, and Li 2012). This included street visa checking and door-to-door apartment raids. One
Guinean businessman recalled his experience during the pre-Olympic Games crackdown:
That [the year 2008] was hard times. So many police on the street asking you for passport[s]. Everyday! If you show [it to] them, they just take[took] away your visa and send [sent] you home. It doesn’t matter if your visa is still good. They write[wrote] something [on the visa page] and told you that it is[was] cancelled. I run to Thailand for one month. The boss of Moka coffee at that time, I think [he is an] Egyptian. He was forced to go back home. Never come back since. (Bah, October 23, 2013).
The daily apartment checking and on-street visa checking became so extensive that it scared many Africans, no matter which passport they are holding, leading them to leave China. Bah also recalled the following when policemen woke him up in his apartment in Dengfeng at 3 am:
I was sleeping after [watching] some YouTube. Suddenly, there’s light. I opened my eyes, and that policeman’s face is just above my head! God knows how they got my keys? They did not knock. They have [had] my keys! … No, I did not ask my landlord about this. I don’t want [any] mafan (麻烦 , troubles). (Bah, November 29, 2013)
As the Chinese government tightened visa issuing to foreigners, the stricter visa policies led even
Guineans had to use agents to renew or apply for new visas. This not only increased the amount
134 of money Africans had to spend, but it also made some Africans vulnerable to visa scams. In
2007, the Imam of a Guinean prayer room (see Chapter 5) applied to extend his visa in China. He used a Chinese agent who assured him that he could send his passport to the Chinese Embassy in
Mongolia, where “there are fewer people applying for visas” as he was told. He trusted that agent and got his visa renewed shortly. But in one police visa raid, the new visa he got was identified as fake. Even though the Chinese agent was caught, and the Imam was a victim in this fraud, he was deported nonetheless. And he never came back.
In July 2008, in preparation for the Guangzhou 2008 Olympic Scientific Congress
(August 1-5) held at the Baiyun International Convention Centre, the Guangzhou Municipal
Public Security Bureau launched “Special Operation Hurricane” (“ 飓风 ”行动 , jufeng xingdong ).
In this operation, the police inspected over 3,000 rental houses and 400 hotels in Baiyun District
(where Sanyuanli, another highly concentrated African neighbourhood, is located) and caught a
number of overstayers (unclear of the nationalities or the exact number) (Tong 2008).
Following the Beijing Olympics, the tightened visa situation loosened somewhat. But it
did not fully go back to normal (pre-2007). Many Africans, especially Nigerians, continue to
encounter problems obtaining a Chinese visa, and many remain targets of police raids (such as
the Nigerian man who died fleeing a police raid in 2009). Similar security measures and
evictions of foreigners and internal migrants happened prior to the 2010 Asian Games. During
the 2010 Asian Games, the police would install as many as three checkpoints on a single street
(G. Huang 2018). Many Africans were forced to move out of their rental apartments or the city
due to frequent visa checks.52 Obtaining and renewing visas also became increasingly difficult at
52 The 2010 Asian Games also led to the relocation of a large number of local residents and floating Chinese living in the urban villages. Arguably, the relocation and eviction of the marginalized population in the city during mega-
135 the borders in Hong Kong and Macau, where foreigners whose visas only allowed them to stay
30 days maximum often fulfilled their visa runs (Lan 2015).
Increased visa-checking has created a vicious circle: as the frequent visa checking makes it difficult for overstayers to continue working in the job market, illegal activities, such as drug trafficking, have become a more attractive way for some African migrants to earn a living
(Haugen 2012). This, in turn, leads to media coverage about Africans’ involvement in drug dealing, which further encourages the negative stereotypes of Africans in China, and leads to greater crackdowns on visa overstayers. Due to several high-profile drug-dealing cases involving undocumented Nigerians over the past decade, Africans have become the target of the local government’s anti-illegal immigration campaign (Haugen 2012, Lan 2015; Lyons, Brown, and Li
2012). In 2013, for example, the Guangzhou police arrested 168 people in an anti-drug operation.
Most of those arrested were West Africans, predominantly from Nigeria and Mali (Global Times
2013). As a by-product of this nationwide crackdown on drug trafficking, Lan (2015) noticed a decline of undocumented African migrants in Guangzhou at the same time. They either left the city, or simply went underground.
The association of sanfei and drug-dealing with Africans was replaced by a fear of the spread of the Ebola outbreak that began in West Africa in fall 2014. While the central government issued travel restrictions and froze visas to West Africans, the Guangzhou government responded by monitoring and quarantining passengers arriving from Ebola-affected countries for fevers (Y. Huang 2017). 53 While some of these Africans were long-term residents,
events do not happen in Guangzhou alone (see the eviction of small business owners prior to the London Olympics, Raco and Tunney 2010). 53 Passengers from West Africa were asked to stay at designated hotels and report their body temperature at required intervals using a global positioning system (GPS)-enabled mobile phones. However, one Nigerian trader told a different story. He reported that he picked up his countryman from the airport without anyone checking up on them (see Dirlikov and Jiang 2014).
136 most were frequent travellers engaged in border-crossing activities between the African continent and China, either formally or informally (see also, Mathews, Lin, and Yang 2014). The high mobility and frequency of travel by African migrants led to a widespread belief that
Africans could bring the Ebola virus to China. This theory received particular attention on social media (Dirlikov and Jiang 2014). Many Chinese believed that there would one day be an Ebola outbreak in their country and that there was a high possibility that an African currently living in
Guangzhou could carry it. For example, several mentions of Ebola appear on the “Africans in
Guangzhou Board” ( 广州黑人吧 , Guangzhou heiren ba ) discussion forum, and the “Ebola
Board” ( 埃博拉吧 ) also frequently cited Guangzhou in its user posts. On Tianya Club (the largest online forum in China), one user stated: “If China has an Ebola outbreak, [I] guess it will begin to explode out of Guangzhou’s African community.” 54 Along with other consequences, this negative association has affected Africans’ abilities to obtain visas. For example, even after the
Ebola outbreak, my Guinean interlocutors claim that it is more difficult for them to obtain a long time (one-year) visa, although short-term (3-months to half-year) visas are still easy to access.
The above cases demonstrate the complexity and diversity of the visa problems, which are determined by many factors, such as nationality, economic status, marital relationships, and
“mega-events” at various levels. Not only are visa problems diverse, but they are also different for each individual. For some Africans, to get any visa is a great achievement (such as Jessie’s associate); for others, obtaining a specific visa is more important (such as Aicha’s request for longer legal terms of stay and Songo’s choice for his daughters’ citizenship). Some, frustrated by the high visa agent fees and the hardship of applying and renewing their visas, seek alternatives.
54 The original Chinese goes, “ 如果中国爆发埃博拉病毒估计先从广州黑人群体爆发 , ruguo Zhongguo baofa aibola bingdu guji xiancong Guangzhou heiren qunti baofa ”.
137 In the next two sections, I discuss a variety of strategies that Africans employ to maximize their visa benefits, either as individuals or through collaborate visa-partnerships.
Individual Strategies Among various individual strategies, I present in this section some most common ones,
which are becoming a student, obtaining dual citizenship, and engaging in strategic migration
movement.
Becoming a Student
Despite maintaining rigidity with regards to issuing business visas (one year, multiple entry, maximum 30 days of stay) and residence visas (one year, multiple entries, maximum one year of stay), China actively recruits African students in order to generate income from education fees (Haugen 2013a). This means that the government issues a significant number of student visas each year. As mentioned in Abdul’s case in Interlude II, some Africans see the benefit of this less competitive route to temporary residence, which allows them 4 to 6 months of residence at a time. Economically, it is not a bad idea either. One Nigerian interlocutor paid his visa agent
$2,000 USD for a one-year business visa, while the tuition for a Chinese language course is about $2,600-3,100 USD per year. Both visas allow for the same length of residence, except the student visa requires its holder to pay for the basic health insurance and benefits required for international students, which is about 600 yuan (97.2 USD) per year. As Africans are responsible for their own medical insurance in China, this mandatory health insurance is an advantage for student visa holders. However, certain rights are denied to people who hold student visas, most notably the right to work on and-off-campus. Interlocutors who were students complained about limited work or internships offered on campus, and about not being able to work off campus. If found working in China without a permit (most internships require permits), an international
138 student faces the possibility of being deported. Even so, the student market is booming in
Guangzhou due to the high demand of Africans who want to find a way to enter the city.
Flexible (Dual) Citizenship
Unlike China, dual or triple citizenship is allowed in many African countries. Echoing
Ong’s (1999) notion of global flexible citizens – people who change citizenship affiliations according to their situation in order to maximize benefits— Africans also take advantage of being “flexible” in using their multiple passports. If citizenship in one country increases the chances of accessing a Chinese visa, African migrants will apply for that country’s citizenship.
For example, Mathews, Lin, and Yang (2017) note that one African man used a second passport to obtain a Chinese visa two months before his current one expired from a visa agent, and once he got the new visa from his second passport, he went to Macau or Hong Kong (considered outside of mainland China) and re-entered Guangzhou using the new visa.
The case in Interlude II is another example of an African who “migrates” between different nationalities (Abdul switched between his Niger and Nigeria passports) in order to have his school application accepted. One Nigerian trader, Mamadou, who pays $1,500 USD annually to an agent for his Chinese business visa commented after hearing stories about Abdul:
[N]ow Niger is in a good relationship with China. I have a friend from Niger. He only spent 2,000 yuan (324 USD) on [his] visa. I heard your government helped them build a big hospital… as a Hausa, it is easy for me to get [a] Niger passport. This Chinese New Year, I will to go back and drive across [the] border to apply for a Niger passport. Next time [when] I apply for [a] visa, I will use this Niger passport. I think it will be easier, right? (Mamadou, January 10, 2013)
Mamadou’s statement shows how a person can take advantage of diplomatic relationships in their efforts to obtain Chinese visas. He is one of many Nigerians who have difficulties applying for a visa and now considers switching between passports or getting a new passport from a
139 different country for visa application purposes. The increasing need to change one’s passport has created a transnational black market of visa services. As Lan (2015) notes, this includes the practice in Lagos where visa agents buy fake passports from neighbouring countries for their
Nigerian clients.
Strategic Migration Resulting from Uneven Law Enforcement
In Chapter 2, I discussed the discrepancy between law enforcement in different places in the Guangdong province (See also Lan 2015; Haugen 2019). The 2012 Law was created in order to provide a more coherent framework for managing immigration. However, in practice, the enforcement of immigration laws still varies throughout the country. This is partly because of the inconsistent and often vague nature of the laws but is also due to the fact that local police departments are in charge of the day-to-day enforcement of immigration policy (Haugen 2019).
Therefore, law enforcement at the local level is largely governed by provincial regulations or individual law enforcement officers. In the absence of central regulations that can be used as guidelines, the police take orders from local authorities with their own political priorities.
There is substantial local variation regarding the management of foreigners in the different cities in China where Africans congregate. For example, in a comparison of Guangzhou and Yiwu, Bodomo and Ma (2012, 288) note that “more efficient, more professional, less corrupt and more racially tolerant” enforcement personnel are found in Yiwu, and Haugen (2013b) argues that Christian Africans in Yiwu experienced greater religious freedom compared to those in Guangzhou. The uneven enforcement of laws has created opportunities for Africans to take advantage of these inter-city differences and organize their business activities accordingly. Some prefer living in smaller cities such as Foshan, Zhongshan, Dongguan, and Shenzhen and only commute to Guangzhou when it is necessary (Lan 2015; Haugen 2019). For example, the
140 neighbouring city of Foshan, which is 15 minutes to half an hour car ride from Guangzhou, is surrounded by numerous furniture markets. Although both Guangzhou and Foshan fall under the same national and provincial rules, their implementation of immigration law differs greatly.
Many migrants who overstay their visas move from Guangzhou to Foshan to escape strict controls on visa and housing registration in Guangzhou, since the Foshan police are known for being less rigid with foreigners (Lan 2015). African migrants who have overstayed their visas also approach the police in Foshan for exit visas more often than those in Guangzhou (Haugen
2019). Beyond less hassle from authorities, Africans living in Foshan generally pay lower rent and have more housing options. However, the growing African population has led to changing attitudes among authorities, and has resulted in an unofficial order beginning in 2010 (the year when the Asian Games was held in Guangzhou), that all registered housing agents must stop leasing apartments to Africans (Bork-Hüffer and Yuan-Ihle 2014). As long as the policy towards residency remains strict, Africans who have overstayed their visas will remain on the run, migrating strategically to other cities/townships where laws are interpreted and enforced more leniently. In other words, the strategic migration cycle continues.
Visa Partnerships Collaboration: An Economic Choice
To a certain extent, the migrant Chinese and African business communities in Guangzhou have formed a mutually beneficial economic relationship (Lan 2015). Roberto Castillo (2014) argues that small business networks have developed in the city to cater to the needs of African migrants, mainly operated by Chinese internal migrants. He calls these “catering networks.”
Further, Lan (2015) has noted that stringent immigration control has also given rise to various types of transnational brokerage services, thus increasing inter-ethnic collaboration between
141 Chinese and African migrants. Mathews, Lin, and Yang (2017) note that Chinese shop owners, mall security guards, and mall management help Africans escape from the police raids partially because they rely on African traders who rent floor space. In practice, the government’s tightened visa policies affect not only the livelihood of Africans, but also that of local residents and internal migrants who depend on African migrants for their businesses to thrive, such as hotels, inns, shops, rental houses, factories, and markets, as well as black markets of money exchanging, motorcycle taxis, etc.
In this section, I demonstrate how African migrants adapt to the Chinese socio-political environment by establishing informal economic relationships with other African migrants,
Chinese, and visa agents. I refer to these as “visa-partnerships,” as they are used to maximize
Africans’ visa rights in China, such as prolonging one’s legal stay, getting a better visa that used to beyond one’s ability and being able to work when one’s visa prohibits it. In addition to more formal and traditional visa brokerage—where visa brokers offer visa renewal services to African migrants, as well as invitation letter services to business visa applicants—most of the “visa- partnerships” I identify are informal, and are based on person-to-person (not organization-to- organization) connections Due to the different types of visas required for entry into China, the visa-partnerships take different forms. The following are some examples of different kinds of visa-partnerships.
142 Migrant-Employer Cooperation
Frequent police raids have resulted in many Africans taking shelter with someone who
has the legal status to work in China. Collaboration with these legal migrants and Chinese
citizens enables African migrants to bypass some of the constraints imposed on their mobility in
the city by state immigration control by enabling them to work under the table and/or
maintaining business remotely. They can also avoid registering with landlords. In this situation,
one side of the partnership is a person who has the legal right to work in Guangzhou, be it a
Chinese citizen (most times Africans’ girlfriends and wives) or someone with a business or work
visas (most times their relatives or friends). The other side is an African overstayer, or someone
only on a student or tourist visa, who cannot be legally employed in the city.
As more and more Africans seeking business opportunities come to Guangzhou on
student visas, they look for ways to circumvent the regulation of not being able to work.
Consequently, an informal system has developed whereby African students collaborate with
Chinese businessmen to establish business partnerships. The businessman partner sets up a
company in his/her name and deals with all the legal documentation, while the African partner
works under the table. 55 This by appearance is a win-win situation: the student partner brings more cash flow, networks, and extra manpower to the business, while the Chinese businessman receives inexpensive labour. However, this arrangement is an informal collaboration based on mutual trust and hence can lead to abuse since there is no legal contract to protect the worker who only has a student visa.
55 This relationship is different from African students who were hired by a business person and who worked illegally. In this partnership, both sides contributed to setting up the company. The main purpose of the African “student” was not to study, but rather to make money. Being a student was simply a way to prolong his stay in China.
143 For example, Jalloh, a young man in his mid-20s from Guinea, came to Guangzhou on a student visa in fall 2013. Without much family support (his family was only able to provide the first semester’s tuition), he had to work to support himself. Thanks to connections he made in
Guangzhou, he managed to work with another Guinean trader, Cellou. Though using a student visa to enter China to work might appear an effective way to circumvent visa restrictions, it does present challenges. For example, during the time Jalloh and Cellou worked together, although
Jalloh paid a portion of the shop’s rent and worked as much as his friend, legally, the shop and its stock belonged to Cellou. Jalloh was content with the arrangement, yet sometimes worried about being caught; he had to hide every time the police came to the mall. In June 2014, one
Gambian young man on a tourist visa started a small catering business in Tianxiu, and soon got caught by the police – possibly because another African man who had a feud with him may have reported him. Jalloh heard the story from his friends and worried that he too might be reported in the same way. After less than two years working under the table, in 2015 Jalloh saved enough money, changed his visa, quit school, and got his own shop. For him, the visa partnership with
Cellou was an effective first step in becoming a successful businessman in Guangzhou.
In addition, as schools adopt more rigid requirements concerning class attendance, students must attend classes regularly in order to maintain a good record; otherwise, they will be kicked out of school, resulting in the loss of their student visa. Most Africans who are involved in both business and school are unable to do both these things simultaneously for long periods of time. Rago, a Nigerien businessman, first came to Guangzhou on a short-term tourist visa. As he could not start a business or obtain a business visa, he switched to a student visa on the advice of his boss (a Nigerien he knew from college) in order to extend his stay. His boss paid for his schooling as a non-interest loan. Rago went to school for one semester. However, Rago had to go
144 to the market every day to check the business for his boss as a way of paying back his “loan.”
During our conversation, he explained the difficulties he had with his school schedule:
The school here starts too early. I take care of customers until 2 or 3 am in the morning, so 8:30 am is like impossible [for me to get up]. And if I am at the shop, the police come to check my visa. If they find out I am a student, I am in trouble. I worry [about getting caught by the police] every day. I have to hide every time [when the police come to check visas] (Rago, March 15, 2014).
After a while, Rago realized that he could not keep doing both. After picking up some basic
Chinese phrases and saving up enough money, he quit school, worked under the table until his student visa expired, switched to business visa and started his business as a middleman full time.
Combined Resources: Cost-Sharing for Visa Upgrades
Business visa holders have to leave mainland China every 30 days. It is most convenient for people who stay in the Canton area to travel to either Hong Kong or Macau since both destinations are close and therefore neither time-consuming nor financially burdensome.
However, sometimes this travel causes problems, as Africans lose one day to do the visa-run.
Abdul told me that he lost a business opportunity when he had to go on a visa run to Hong Kong.
Therefore, even businessmen who have a one-year stable visa prefer having a residence visa.
However, the strict criteria for obtaining residence visas prevent many people from applying for them. For example, in order to get a residence visa, one has to have a company registered outside of Mainland China and have office space in China. A new market has, therefore, emerged to fulfil these visa requirements.
In this context, the visa-partnership works as a strategic economic collaboration between
two or more companies whose owners are trying to obtain better visa status. Barry, one of Bah’s
friends from Conakry, was in the process of applying for a residency visa. He explained that he
and his partner had registered a company in Hong Kong with a branch office in Mainland China.
145 In order to meet the residence visa requirement, as well as to reduce costs, they are sharing their office and staff with another company. They hired a local visa agent who specializes in finding
“good matches” for this special purpose. Basically, they share everything one needs for a company to qualify for the residence visa: office space, staff, and a product showroom. They rent an office in a trade mall for 2,800 yuan (453.6 USD) per month and hire a Chinese staff member with a monthly salary of 2,500 yuan (405 USD). According to Barry, in some cases, the cost can be as low as 1,600 yuan (259.2 USD) each month per each partner in this system.
Above I discussed several forms of visa partnerships, most of which are based on economic relationship. But there is one that is left out but needs to address here – Sino-African marriage. As a marriage provides both financial and visa benefits (see the comparison between
Songo and Mobby), and in some sense can be seen as a type of visa-partnership.
What Does Love Have to Do with It?
In her study of correspondence relationships between Chinese and Filipino women and
American men, Constable (2003; 2010) criticizes the Western bias towards polarizing love and pragmatics by arguing that romantic love often coexists with material concerns. In the case of her interlocutors, there are generally few contradictions between the two. To many African-Chinese couples in Guangzhou, romance and business relations are often intertwined. Most couples I encountered during this research got to know each other in a business or business-related setting.
For example, Songo’s Chinese wife, Fatima, worked with him; Rose’s friend, Xiaoyun, a
Chinese woman from Guilin, was the business partner of her current Guinean husband, with whom she used to share a shop.
Lan (2015) argues that interracial romance is both structured and constrained by opportunities and challenges in trade activities and visa policies between China and Africa. In
146 her research, the stringent immigration policy has created structural opportunities and incentives for the development of a romance between Nigerian men and Chinese women who are internal migrants from less developed regions. Many are attracted to Guangzhou by jobs or business opportunities and marry Africans in their pursuit of social mobility when an urban hukou is not possible for them (Lan 2015). For undocumented Nigerian men, a marriage to a Chinese woman may provide a path to legalization. On the other side of the story, this is not an easy option due to the many obstacles involved in registering a foreign marriage in China. Even though romance with an African man may promise an alternative path to social and transnational mobility for some Chinese women, I also heard many heartbreaking stories of betrayal, long-term family separation, and discrimination from the women’s family and from the larger Chinese society as a result of marrying an African man. For example, Fatima’s family (parents and two brothers) stopped talking to her for more than two years after she married to Songo.
In regards to the hardships in obtaining Chinese visas, transnational marriage is usually the best way to secure a long-term and stable stay in China since residence visas renewed annually are available to spouses of Chinese citizens. During my fieldwork, I met many African men who asked that I find them a Chinese wife, in addition to being asked myself. “I want to marry a Chinese, you know? Hey, can you find me one?” But when I asked back to see if they meant it, they would deny it and try to hide any strategic interest in marrying a Chinese citizen in order to obtain a residential visa. This, of course, related to my positionality as a single Chinese woman with citizenship. Perhaps these men would have been more explicit with their intentions if I was not someone who could provide them with a visa through marriage. However, much is communicated through humour, even if the message remains – purposely – ambiguous.
147 Conclusion As this chapter unfolded, I presented the visa problems Africans encounter as more nuanced than other scholars have suggested. I argued that variables such as country of citizenship, economic and marital status, and social connections all have an impact on how
Africans’ obtain and maintain their visas. In addition, the African presence in China is also mediated by changing political and economic relations between China and individual countries and regions. In practice, African migrants learn China’s rigid immigration system and navigate it using whatever resources they have. They employ different strategies, both individual and collaborative, to circumvent visa requirements and regulations. Individual strategies include switching to be a student, obtaining a passport which gives them better visa access and changing their places of residence. The collaborative strategies are what I call “visa-partnerships,” an economic relationship among African migrants and Chinese to maximize how they navigate the challenges and drawbacks of the visa system. These include business collaboration between an
African on a student visa and another person who can legally work in China and several small- scale business owners combining their resource for a visa upgrade. In the end, I discussed Sino-
African marriage as a special form of visa-partnership.
148 Interlude III
A Foreign Volunteer
One steamy afternoon in July, like all summer days in tropical Guangzhou, it was unbearably hot and humid. At around 5:30 pm, Balde arrived at the mosque. Twelve dinner tables had already been set up in the courtyard when he entered it. The work has started already.
Some people were swiping the floor. Some people were tidying the table clothes. And some are distributing dishes. “As-salamu alaykum,” He and other volunteers at the mosque greeted with each other. Balde had lived in Guangzhou for seven years. Besides going to the market and his office, he liked to spend time in the mosques. Being a foreigner and a single young man, he told me that being with people in the mosques made him feel at home and less alone.
It was another day in the month of Ramadan. Every day starting at 5 pm of this holy month, the mosque started to get busy as staffs and volunteers prepared for the meal and daily prayer. People were assigned different tasks: some set the tables in the courtyard, some washed fruits and dishes, and some distributed dinner delivered by local restaurants. Today, Balde’s task was cutting watermelons. He pulled up his sleeves, picked one melon from the big water bucket like a skilled worker, and cut it into slices. At the same time, his partner put the pieces on plates and distributed them to the tables. Meanwhile, beggars dressed in Muslim clothing already waited outside of the gate of the mosque. Some Chinese people in their early 20s with commercial fliers targeting foreign Muslims stood nearby. They were all regulars, waiting eagerly for the daily prayer to finish.
People came slowly and scattered. The prayer started at around 6:30 pm. During prayer,
Africans, Arabs, and Chinese all sat together. The prayer was combined with Chinese and
Arabic. Although they could not understand much, foreign Muslims sat quietly when the imam
149 talked in Chinese about proper Islamic conduct in daily lives or some updates in the neiborghood. As soon as the guide for prayer in Arabic arose, everyone stood up in prayer poses.
After the collective prayer, people started to sit by the tables and lining for food. Some stayed for a short private prayer. At dinner time, the situation was more relaxed. The Africans liked to sit together in two long tables at the corner of the courtyard. It was their reserved spot. Although there was plenty of free Chinese food offered by the mosque (usually dishes with rice), Africans sometimes preferred to bring their own African-style food: fufu, barbequed lamb, chicken, and fried fish served with beans and/or rice, which they shared with the Chinese in the mosque. It is a quick dinner. Most people finished it in 20-30 minutes and left volunteers to clean up the site for night prayers. With other volunteers, Balde quickly swept up the dirt on the ground and set blankets and plastic sheets on the ground.
150 Chapter 4
Guangzhou's Muslim Community: Migration, Connections, and Development
“In some cases Islamic heritage was seen by the authorities as a regional asset. To highlight the presence of Muslims and Islamic heritage has been a local and provincial state policy in Fujian, for instance, making it possible to invite Kuwaiti businessmen to witness the age-old legacy of Arab traders as a step toward funding large-scale projects in the province.”
(Van der Veer 2013, 206-07)
The Demographic Myth As described in the Introduction to this dissertation, after the market reforms in 1979,
Guangzhou became China’s leading manufacturing and trading centre. Thanks to both its long history of trade and its geographic location, the city continues to attract domestic and foreign migrants who come to conduct business or find employment. Beside the local Cantonese Muslim population, Guangzhou now hosts a number of Muslim groups from other places, including: elsewhere in China (known as Chinese Muslim migrants, hailing from the country’s northwest and central provinces such as Ningxia, Xinjiang, Henan, and Qinghai, with a few from
Southwest regions like Yunnan); Arab Muslims from the Middle East and North Africa; African
Muslims; and Muslims from South and Southeast Asia.
The markets in Xiaobei, where the export-oriented businesses in Guangzhou are concentrated, are located within walking distance from mosques, which attract many Muslims to live and work nearby. Here, these businesses are either owned by Muslims or targeting the
Muslim consumer boom, catering to both the Chinese and foreign Muslim populations. The markets surrounding the Tianxiu and Dengfeng-Yueyang buildings in the centre of Xiaobei’s trading zone are dominated by migrants from West African (Li et al. 2008) and Arab countries
(Mathews, Lin, and Yang 2017). In these buildings, Fulani and Hausa shopkeepers sell clothes
151 and shoes, Mandingo and Malian women run barbershops and hair salons, and Hausa and
Bambara businessmen operate cargo and trading companies. The shop signs are written in
Chinese, English, and Arabic, reminding visitors that this is a multi-lingual zone. Many types of halal restaurants, butcher shops, cafés, teahouses, and shisha shops owned by Arabs, Africans,
Pakistanis, Indians, and Chinese are sandwiched between the trading buildings and shops. The visibly expanding Muslim population in Guangzhou, especially in the Xiaobei neighbourhood, raises questions about the factors that have enabled Muslims to flourish in this otherwise secular metropole. 56 By looking at Guangzhou’s Muslim population in both historical and contemporary
contexts, this chapter examines how Guangzhou, with a unique economic and religious history,
has nurtured an environment that makes it a multi-ethnic Muslim zone today. The chapter also
examines how the religion of Islam operates in Guangzhou’s unique contexts, simultaneously
upsetting both the Islamic and the Chinese traditional values.
I have estimated the number of Muslims living in Guangzhou in 2013 and 2014 (the years when I did my fieldwork) since I could not locate any official information. In 2011,
Guangzhou’s local Cantonese Muslim population was approximately 15,000; it also was home to about 25,000 Chinese Muslim migrants and 25,000 foreign Muslims (Guangzhou Islamic
Association staff, personal conversation, November 20, 2013). The number of Muslims in
Guangzhou grew quickly in the following years, reaching a total of 120,000 by 2016, among which almost half (60,000) are foreign Muslims (Su 2017). 57 These numbers indicate that the
56 Here I consider Guangzhou a secular society because: 1. The population of local Cantonese Muslims remains low. According to the 2010 census, Guangdong province (where Guangzhou is the capital) hosted 45,073 Chinese Muslims who hold Guangdong hukou, and that number ranked 27th among 34 provincial administrative regions in China (National Bureau of Statistics of China 2011). Therefore, Guangzhou is not a city that typically considered as a Muslim concentrated city; 2. Administratively, Guangzhou is not a Muslim autonomy state like Linxia, where Chinese Muslims enjoy a limited right to govern themselves according to their own Islamic law (see Erie 2016). 57 Some website says there were 150, 000 both Chinese and foreign Muslims by 2012; (http://sara.gov.cn/ztzz/zjjcsgycshd/jyjlk_csz/16764.htm); while other website says 60,000 in total in 2012, with half being foreign Muslims (http://www.scio.gov.cn/zhzc/2/32764/Document/1421020/1421020.htm)
152 growth of the foreign Muslim population is significant. According to a staff member working in the Islamic Association of Guangzhou, there were fewer than 20,000 local Cantonese Muslims by the end of 2013. If we say 20,000 is the number for local Cantonese Muslims in 2016 – considering that the local Cantonese Muslim population is more stable – that means there were approximately 40,000 Chinese Muslim migrants in the city in 2016. Thus, the foreign Muslim population has not only grown by 2.4 times in five years (from 25,000 in 2011 to 60,000 in
2016), but it has also surpassed the Chinese Muslim migrants, which grew by only 15,000 people during this same period of time.
Based on the above information (Table 4a), I estimate that the population of foreign
Muslims in Guangzhou from 2013 to 2014 was between 30,000 and 40,000. Indeed, if we consider the growth – from 25,000 in 2011 to 60,000 in 2016, with an average growth rate of
7,000 per year – then the number of foreign Muslims is approximately 39,000 for 2013 and approximately 46,000 for 2014 (Table 4b). This estimation has its limitations, as a number of variables need to be taken into account, and the growth fluctuates from one year to another.
Table 4a: Muslim Population of Guangzhou, 2011-16
Year All Local Cantonese Chinese Muslim Foreign Muslims Muslims Migrants Muslims 2011 60,000 15,000 25,000 25,000 2013- 20,000 2014 2016 120,000 60,000
Table 4b: Estimated Muslim Population of Guangzhou, 2011-16
Year All Local Cantonese Chinese Muslim Foreign Muslims Muslims Migrants Muslims 2011 2013- 100,000 34,000-41,000 39,000-46,000 2014 2016 20,000 40,000
153 I have also estimated the total Muslim population for 2014. The website of the
Guangzhou government shows that, in July 2014, there were about 26,000 Muslims, both foreign and Chinese, who participated in special prayers on the day of Eid al-Fitr. In 2016, that number increased to 27,300. 58 As we already know that the number of total Muslims in Guangzhou in
2016 was 120,000, then the 27,300 people who went to the prayers constituted about a quarter of
the total Muslim population of that year. If we apply this ratio to the year of 2014, we can say
that the total number of Muslims in 2014 is about 4 times of the number of Muslims who went to
prayer, or about 100,000. A staff member from the Guangzhou Islamic Association vouches for
this number (Guangzhou Islamic Association staff, personal conversation, November 20, 2013).
As mentioned earlier, if there were fewer than 20,000 local Cantonese Muslims by the end of
2013 then we can safely assume that the number for 2014 is more or less the same, meaning that
the Chinese Muslim migrants and foreign Muslim population were about 80,000 in 2014.
As shown in Table 5 below, within a city of 13.08 million residents (among which 8.42
million are Guangzhou hukou holders), the total number of Muslims (100,000) in 2014 is tiny
(0.76%). However, if we look at the figures within specific categories – such as the ratio between
Muslim migrants (80,000) and total Muslims (100,000), and the ratio between Guangzhou’s
migrant population (4.66 million) and Guangzhou’s total population (13.08million) – we can see
that the city has a high concentration of Muslim migrants, both domestic and foreign.
Specifically, migrants make up about 35.63 percent of Guangzhou’s total population, while
about 80 percent of the city’s total Muslim population are migrants. In addition, the statistics
58 The total number of prayers in 2014 on the special Eid al-Fitr prayer, accessed May 1, 2019, http://www.gz.gov.cn/gzmzzjjg/gzdt/201407/2710162.shtml another website says the total number of 2014 is 25,716, accessed May 1, 2019, http://news.21csp.com.cn/c11/201407/73252.html The total number of prayers in 2016 on the special Eid al-Fitr prayer, accessed May 1, 2019 http://www.gz.gov.cn/GZ06/5/201607/7255ebd53c124d5d9ff67fd529e1b484.shtml
154 above show that, not only have Muslim migrants, both Chinese (34,000) and foreign (46,000), outpaced the local Cantonese Muslim population (20,000), but most importantly, the total number of foreign Muslim migrants makes up a large percentage of both the total population of
Muslims (100,000) and the total population of all foreign residents (118,000) in the city. The high figures demand a deeper explanation beyond Guangzhou being an economic centre. This chapter thus makes sense of this high concentration of Muslim migrants in Guangzhou, especially in a city that is seen as secular.
Table 5: Percentage of Population within Each Category as of 2014 59
Guangzhou’s Total Guangzhou Guangzhou’s Guangzhou’s Guangzhou’s General Population hukou Chinese Foreigner Chinese Population of Holders Migrant Population Migrant Guangzhou Population Population in Total Population 13.08 million 8.42 million 4.66 million 118,000 35.63%
Guangzhou’s Total Local Guangzhou’s Guangzhou’s Guangzhou’s Muslim Muslims in Cantonese Chinese Foreign Muslim Population Guangzhou Muslims Muslim Muslim Migrants (Guangzhou Migrants Population (Chinese and hukou Population Foreign) in Holders) Total Muslim Population 100,000 20,000 34,000 46,000 80.00% Percentage Total Cantonese Chinese Guangzhou’s Guangzhou’s within Each Muslims in Muslims in Muslim Foreign Chinese Category the Total All Migrants in Muslims in Muslim Population Guangzhou All Chinese the Total Migrants in of hukou Migrant Foreigner All Chinese Guangzhou Holders Population in Population Muslim Guangzhou Population 0.76% 0.24% 0.73% 38.98% 62.96%
59 I use the data in 2014 for comparison because it was the year when I conducted most of my fieldwork. All numbers that are italicized are estimated by the author.
155 This chapter has four parts. In the first two sections, I present a brief history of Islam and of the migrant Muslim population in Guangzhou: the first section focuses on the evolution of industry and the ethnicity of the Muslims in the area from the Tang dynasty (7 th -9th century) to
pre-economic reform era (the 1970s); the second section outlines major features of the Muslim
community in the post-economic reform era, demonstrating how the Muslim community in
Guangzhou has historically been multiethnic and highlighting the impact of the central
government from different periods on trade and Muslim migration. In the third section, I discuss
how the history of Islam in Guangzhou has created an inclusive environment for foreign
Muslims, and in the final section I examine some economic policies that could potentially impact
the Muslim migrant groups in Guangzhou, including the government’s recent focus on ocean
transport to revive the historic Maritime Silk Road. In these two sections, I argue that the
economic development of Guangzhou has combined with the city’s history as a religious hub to
produce an inclusive Islamic environment. This is twofold. On the one hand, the historical
migration of foreign Muslims to Guangzhou enabled the integration of foreign Muslims in
material forms (such as the establishment of mosques and prayer rooms, which promote
interaction between Muslims from different parts of the world) and intangible forms (such as
religious catering networks that offers a sense of belonging). On the other hand, the party-state
incorporates these historical accounts into its strategy for economic development and pursues
policies that further reinforce religious connections between Guangzhou and Muslim countries in
other parts of Asia and Africa.
Muslim Communities: from the Ancient Maritime Silk Road to Pre-Economic Reform The history of the Muslim community in Guangzhou is closely linked to its history as an
international trading hub along the Maritime Silk Road ( Haishang Sichou Zhilu, 海上丝绸之路 )
156 (Su 2017), which refers to the ancient ocean trade routes between China, South Asia, Europe, the
Middle East, and Africa that were established in the Han Dynasty (207 BCE – 220 AD) as parallels to the land Silk Road.60 In addition to examining the economic influences of the two
Silk Roads, many scholars have also considered their cultural inflences (Bentley 1993; Gordon
2007), arguing that cross-cultural conversations took place alongside the exchange of products and goods between the East and the West. Asian, African, and European peoples were regularly interacting and intermingling with each other for centuries, effecting encounters that spread technologies, ideas, beliefs, values, and religions (Bentley 1993).
One of the intellectual systems that spread from West to East along the Silk Roads was
Islam, which was introduced to Guangzhou around the 7 th Century AD by Muslim migrants (Ma
1998; Lipman 1997). 61 Since then, Islam has developed in the area for almost 1,400 years and is now one of the five major religions of China. 62 While the Maritime Silk Road helped create and shape Guangzhou’s religious identity, its growth as a commercial centre is also significant in terms of understanding migration patterns and their intersection with religious identities, as the entry of Islam into China was “neither the result of diplomatic visits nor missionary activities.
Rather, it was a social phenomenon brought about by large migration of Muslims from West
Asia” (Wei 2010, 2).
60 During the Tang Dynasty (around 6 th century AD), the official name of Maritime Silk Road was called “Guangzhou Oversea Path” ( Guangzhou Tonghai Yidao, 广州通海夷道， Xin Tangshu , juan 48, p. 1506.), indicating the key role Guangzhou played in China’s oversea trade. This ocean route included two main maritime routes. The first route followed a path from Guangzhou to central Vietnam, crossing the Singapore Strait, connecting Java, Sumatra and Nicobar Islands and what is now Sri Lanka, and then proceeding along the West Coast of the Indian Peninsula to the Persian Gulf and the mouth of Euphrates River, and finally ending in Baghdad, Iraq. The second route followed the same path to the Indian peninsula, veering across the eastern part of the Indian Ocean and proceeding northwards to Tanzania's Dar es Salaam before finally reaching Baghdad after passing through several small countries en route. 61 Instead, the establishment of the fanfang in Guangzhou marked the beginning of Islam’s presence in China. For more detail and full reference, see (Leslie 1986, 14, 36). Note that the time when Islam was introduced to China was debatable among scholars. Some scholars argue that the coming of Muslims to China and the entry of Islam into China are different issues (Bai 2003). 62 The five major religions in China include Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Catholicism, and Protestantism.
157 During this long history of Guangzhou’s interaction with the Muslim world, the integration of foreign Muslims into local society occurred gradually. The common employment and ethnicity of the Muslim population have changed over time. The first significant waves of foreign Muslims to China were primarily Arab and Persian traders who arrived during the Tang dynasty (618-907 AD). 63 Saad ibn Abi Waqqas, an uncle of the Prophet Muhammad, with
permission from the Tang Emperor, built China’s first mosque, Huaisheng Mosque ( 怀圣 ,
Memorial Mosque), in Guangzhou in 627 AD. These Muslims primarily resided around the
Huaisheng Mosque and later built the Xianxiangumu Mosque area, forming the first Muslim settlements in China. They were referred to locally as fanfang (蕃坊 or “foreigner quarters”),
whose residents were called by locals as fanke (蕃客 , foreign guest/sojourners). 64 While Muslims constituted the majority of the fanke , there were still followers of other religions, such as
Zoroastrianism, Manicheism, Christianity, and Judaism, living in the fanfang (Wei 2010; Su
2017). Though the Muslims living in the fanfang were of various nationalities, they identified with each other due to their shared religious beliefs and together constituted China’s earliest
Muslim community (Su 2017). By the time of the Song dynasty (960-1279 AD), these Arab
Muslim traders dominated the import and export industry in Guangzhou and had begun to have a significant economic impact on the city and region. Unlike in North Africa and in West Africa, the Muslims who migrated to China did not aim at converting locals or spreading their religion
63 Note that although the Persians were conquered by the Arabs in the mid-7th century, not until about two centuries later did most Persians convert to Islam (Wei 2010). Therefore, these Persians came to Guangzhou in Tang dynasty were most likely non-Muslims. 64 The fan (蕃, 番) means foreigner (non-Han) and in this case, refers to an undifferentiated multitude of non-Hans and the fang means residential neighborhood/community. The fanfang thus refers to the foreign quarter(s) that accommodated numerous fanke 蕃客 (non-Han sojourners). For a full detailed discussion of how fanfang serves as a path of the entry of Islam into China, see Wei (2010), in which the author argues that Islam was implanted into Chinese society through fanfang.
158 but focused instead almost exclusively on business and economic activities (J. Ma 1998; Ding
2016).
Despite the economic influence of Muslim migrants, the Tang and Song states held a conservative attitude towards these foreign traders, restricting them to fanfang area in order to contain “the spread of their political influence” and prevent “confusion in the allocation of territoriality” (Grydehøj 2015, 432). Official restrictions on settlement elsewhere in China produced an insular culture within the foreign Muslim community in the fanfang area during the
Tang and Song Dynasties, despite the fact that many members of the community acquired
Chinese language skills, were exposed ideologies such as Confucianism, adopted Chinese names,
intermarried with the Chinese population, and/or worked in the local government. Indeed, during
the Song Dynasty, almost all Muslims in China, who were still called by locals as fanke , were
considered by both themselves and by the Chinese “to be temporary residents rather than
permanent settlers.” 65 As Lipman (1997, 28-29) notes, “neither they [Muslims] nor the Chinese state desired their acculturation or assimilation”. In other words, they were foreign Muslims in
China rather than Chinese Muslims.
After the Tang and Song periods, the Mongol-Yuan period (1219-1259 AD) brought a large influx of Muslims from Middle Asian countries to China, as a result of expeditions by
Mongol armies (Leslie 1986). These Muslim migrants, who were mainly soldiers with diverse ethnicities, developed into what is now considered the Hui (回) ethnic group, the largest Muslim
ethnic group in contemporary China. 66 Meanwhile, the expansion of the Maritime Silk Road also
65 Some of them were called native-born fanke ( 土生蕃客 , tusheng fanke ) or the fifth-generation fanke 五世蕃客 (wushi fanke ), indicating a long history of residence while remaining as foreigners in China. 66 For a description of the Muslim population during the Mongol-Yuan period, see Leslie 1986, 79-103; Rossabi 1981, 275-295. For a description of the integration of Muslims into Chinese society, see Leslie 1998.
159 incorporated other coastal cities of China, such as Quanzhou in Fujian Province and Ningbo in
Zhejiang Province, into long-distance trading networks. This resulted in many Arab traders, who used to live in Guangzhou, relocating for new trading opportunities, leading to a decline in
Guangzhou’s Arab population (Wang and Zhu 2007). 67
During the Ming (1368-1644 AD) and Qing (1644-1912 AD) dynasties, China’s foreign policy became increasingly isolationist, and the central government cut off maritime trading ties with the outside world, particularly the Arab world (Ma and Zhu 2013). 68 This resulted in a
decreased migration of Arab traders into China. As a result, Arab Muslims who were already in
Guangzhou began to integrate into local society as their “ties with the Muslim world outside
China had been completely severed” (Lipman 1997, 46). They not only acquired Chinese
language, culture, and local customs, but most importantly, they began to see China as their
home, becoming loyal to state authorities (Su 2017).
At the same time, the Ming and Qing government sent two waves of Hui soldiers to put
down several rebellions in the Guangzhou area (J. Ma 1996). These soldiers set up their own
mosques in Guangzhou, including two of which are still standing: the Xiaodongying Mosque ( 小
东营 , “The Little Eastern Barrack”) and the Haopan Mosque ( 濠畔 , “The Bank of the Moat”), whose names clearly show their military connection (Wang and Zhu 2007). A lasting impact of their occupation of the city, therefore, was the expansion of Muslim influence in Guangzhou beyond simply the areas surrounding the Huaisheng and Saad Ibn Abi Waqqas Mosque.
67 For example, a famous Muslim trader of Arab origin, Shougeng Pu ( 蒲寿庚 )’s family, moved to Quanzhou in late Song Dynasty. 68 Their isolationist trade policies later were interrupted by the two Opium Wars in the mid-19th century, which forced China to re-open Guangzhou to trade with the Western World.
160 These Muslim soldiers were encouraged by the Ming government to intermarry with the Han
Chinese, in contrast to the conservative attitude towards intermarriage in the Tang and Song eras
(X. Li 2011, 82). As a result, the influx of Hui soldiers changed the composition of the Muslim population in Guangzhou from primarily Arab traders to a combination of Hui military soldiers and the descendants of Arabs. Besides these groups, Guangzhou’s Muslim migrants also included a small number of traders and craftsman from other provinces, Muslim criminals/rebels sent by the central government to Guangzhou as a punishment, and few pilgrims from West Asia
(Wang and Zhu 2007). Indeed, though the Ming-Qing governments cut off trading ties with
Arabic regions, missionaries still came to China from West Asia. However, their numbers are insignificant compared to the number of Hui who participated in government-organized migration (Wang and Zhu 2007, 576).
In the Republic of China era (1911-48), Hui was one of the five officially recognized ethnic
groups in China; during this period, all Muslims in Guangzhou were categorized under the Hui
ethnicity. This identification continued after the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was founded
in 1949. 69 However, during the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), mosques were destroyed, and all open religious activities ceased (Gladney 2009, 163). As Su (2017, 6) describes,
Muslim communities were split up, and Muslims were sent to work in the countryside or in factories, where they had to eat together with non-Muslims in the dining hall. Surrounded by Han people, many Muslims ended up marrying non-Muslims, who did not themselves convert to Islam. As a result, the local Hui Muslims of Guangzhou were almost completely assimilated into the dominant Han culture.
69 Ethnicity policies after the 1950s was mainly based on Joseph Stalin’s 1913 definition of an ethnic group ( 民族 , minzu ) as “a historically constituted community of people, having a common territory, a common language, a common economic life and a common psychological makeup which expresses itself in a common culture” (Hyde 2007).
161 After the Cultural Revolution, various religious activities were resumed, and Islamic culture revived slowly in Guangzhou. However, in the late 1970s and the 1980s, the Muslims in
Guangzhou were still mainly composed of the Hui ethnic group, who had scattered throughout the city, with some of them becoming secular (Su 2017).
Below is a table summarizing the industry and ethnicity of the Muslim communities in
Guangzhou and China until the pre-economic reform era.
Table 6: The Muslim Groups and Their Activities in Guangzhou and China
Dynasty Year Main Group in Main Group State Involvement Muslim /Period Guangzhou in China Space Tang and 618-907 Arab and Arab and Open to trade while fanfang Song AD, and Persian traders Persian being socially 960-1279 (dominated in traders conservative by AD trade during restricting fanke in Song) fanfang Mongol- 1271- Arab traders Hui Muslims Brought Muslims Surrounding Yuan 1368 AD (declined) from Central Asia to mosques China, who later (but not became Hui Muslims. called fanfang ) Ming and 1368- Hui soldiers Hui Muslims The isolationist trade more Qing 1644, (Central Asian policy led Arab mosques and Muslims population to and 1636- integration with decrease; surrounding 1911 AD Arab and Han Relocation of Hui barracks descendants) soldiers to Guangzhou; Encouraging Huis to integrate The 1912- Hui Muslims Hui Muslims The cultural Scattered in Republic 1970s revolution, and the city of China religious activities to pre- seized. economic reform (sources: J. Ma 1996; Su 2017; Wang and Zhu 2007)
These migration patterns show that, for one, Guangzhou historically has been a hub for
Muslim migrants, be they transnational or domestic. Second, Muslims in Guangzhou are foreign
162 in their origin but have always been multiethnic, with many interacting with (and often intermarrying with) Han Chinese. Third, trade, rather than proselytization, drove these foreign
Muslims to China, especially in Tang and Song periods. Fourth, and most importantly, the central government in different periods of time has played an important and influential role in trade and Muslim migration to Guangzhou. For example, the Tang and Song governments welcomed foreign traders to settle in fanfang , even setting up a foundation for overseas trade and
Islam in order to encourage Muslim merchants in Guangzhou. Later, in the Mongol-Yuan period,
the government brought a large influx of Muslims from Middle Asian countries to China. As part
of the isolationist policy of the Ming-Qing dynasties, Arab Muslims were largely assimilated,
becoming Hui Muslims. These Hui Muslims were sent by the government to Guangzhou, where
their settlement changed the racial composition of Guangzhou’s Muslim population. In the 1960-
70s, during the Cultural Revolution, the geography of the Muslim population of Guangzhou also
changed, as settlement became diffused throughout the city instead of being concentrated in the
areas around the mosques. At each stage in its history, though, it is important to note that state
authorities have played a major role in determining the size, origins, identification, and
occupation of Muslims in Guangzhou. In the post-reform era, the Chinese communist party-state
has continued to play a central role in shaping the migration patterns of Muslims into
Guangzhou, which I will discuss later in this chapter.
Muslim Community: Diversity and State Involvement in the Post-Reform Era It was not until the economic reforms of the 1980s and the re-opening of maritime trade that the southern coastal areas of China, especially Guangzhou, experienced an increase in the migration of both domestic and foreign Muslims, reclaiming its status as home to the most diverse and one of the largest Muslim migrant communities in China (Q. Ma 2006). The arrival
163 of these migrants has not only revitalized commerce and trade in the region and rebuilt historical ties with the Muslim world, but it has also diversified the local Islamic culture (Min 2013). In an interview conducted by The China Daily , the head of the Guangzhou Islamic Association, Abdul
Mohammad Wang Wenjie (Chinese: 阿布杜拉 ·穆罕默德 ·王文杰 ), told reporters that as one of the earliest Chinese cities introduced to Islam, Guangzhou has a long-standing Islamic culture and a healthy religious environment, which are important factors in attracting foreign Muslims. 70 With more and more Muslims coming to live in the city, Muslim communities are no longer restricted to a fixed geographic neighbourhood (e.g., fanfang or Barracks), but are instead “floating” throughout the city while remaining linked together through religious practices and social gatherings (Q. Ma 2006; Su 2017). While this concept of a “floating” community applies more to
Chinese Muslims, especially local Muslims, most foreign-born Muslims, especially Africans, still congregate in the Xiaobei area surrounding their mosques and markets.
Today’s Muslim community in Guangzhou is much more diverse in terms of ethnicity, country of origin, and occupation than ever before. It includes Muslims from China’s northwestern and central regions, North and West African countries, the Middle East, South
Asia, and Southeast Asia. Mainly, there are three major Muslim groups: Chinese Muslims,
African Muslims, and Arab Muslims. In the following section, I will discuss each in detail.
70 The original Chinese goes: “ 作为中国伊斯兰教最早传入的城市之一 , 广州有着悠久的伊斯兰文化和良好的 宗教生活环境 , 而这也是吸引外籍穆斯林来华的重要因素 , zuowei Zhongguo yisilanjiao zuizao chuanru de chengshi zhiyi, Guangzhou youzhe youjiude yisilan wenhua he lianghaode zongjiao shenghuo huanjing, er zheyeshi xiyin waiji musilin laihua de zhongyao yinsu ”.
164 Chinese Muslims
Chinese Muslims, especially Chinese Muslim migrants, constitute a large percentage of the Muslim population in Guangzhou. Like “African Muslim” and “foreign Muslim,” the term
“Chinese Muslim” is an umbrella term for all Chinese nationals from various ethnicities who believe in Islam. Therefore, like foreign Muslim groups, Chinese Muslims are also characteried by being multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, and multi-lingual. According to the 2010 census, the total number of Chinese Muslims is approximately 23.308 million nationwide, which is 1.8% of the total population in China. The official classification (only of groups that the Chinese government recognizes as connected with Islam as shown on one’s national ID card and hukou record)
includes 10 ethnic minority groups with different mother tongues/dialects, history, and customs:
Hui, Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Dongxiangs, Kyrgyz, Salar, Bonans, Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Tatars. If a
Chinese citizen belongs to one of these ethnic groups, the government considers him/her Muslim
(de facto Muslims). In addition to these de facto Muslims, there are also Chinese from other 46
ethnic groups who have converted to Islam because of marriage or personal choice. 71
Chinese Muslims are predominantly Sunni. Although Islam contains different sects,
Chinese Muslims associate more with their ethnicities and hometown networks than their specific branch of Islam. Although Guangzhou hosts de facto Muslims from all 10 ethnic minority groups, previous scholars often generalize Chinese Muslims in Guangzhou as either
Uyghurs or Hui (Castillo 2014), mainly because they are the two largest ethnic Muslim groups in
71 Chinese Muslims are categorized by their official ethnicity. If one side of one’s parents fall into the 10 ethnic minorities above, then he/she is a de facto Muslim in the official documentation. There are Chinese citizens who are from other ethnic groups but converted to Islam, however, they cannot change their official status. Such as Utsul in Hainan Province, Han, Mongolian, and Tibetans Muslims are not included in the official document. Hence the total number of Chinese Muslims is likely more than the number from the national census.
165 both China and Guangzhou by size. 72 But they are also focused on because they represent two
distinct stereotypes of the Chinese Muslim. Specifically, Uyghurs and Hui have different
historical relationships to the Han and the Chinese state (Erie 2016). Due to their different
histories and interactions with the Han majority, the Hui are often perceived as a model minority
by the current party-state, since they are complicit with state power. 73 In other words, they are
the “good Muslims.” In contrast, the Uyghurs are seen by authorities as “bad Muslims,” whose
attitudes toward the Han and the state are “less amenable to collaboration” (Erie 2016,11). Hui
and Uyghurs are considered the two ends of the binary regarding the relationship with the central
government, while the other eight Muslim ethnic groups fall somewhere in-between (Gladney
2009,164).
In addition to diversity and complexity between different groups of Muslims in China, there is also diversity and complexity within the groups themselves. The Hui, for instance, are scattered throughout the country, meaning that Hui from different regions may have different customs, dialects, and social networks. For example, a local Cantonese Hui identify differently with a Hui migrant from outside of the province; a Hui from Henan Province speaks a different dialect than a Hui from Qinghai; a Hui from Qinghai often has better networks and resources in
72 In a study on the Muslim floating population in Pearl River Delta (where Guangzhou located within), data suggests that Hui consists 89.89% and the second, Uyghurs takes up 9.14%, and the rest less than 1% are other 8 Muslim minorities (Ma and Zhu 2013) 73 Uyghurs identify strongly with Tuikic-speaking Muslims. They speak their own Turkic language, and physically they look more like Central Asians than like Han Chinese. Due to these linguistic, racial, religious, and political traits, Uyghurs have a strong sense of identity, one that is largely defined against that of the Han and other Muslims like Hui. Unlike Uyghurs who are concentrated in Xinjiang province, Hui are geographically dispersed throughout China. Hui identify as the descendants of the Persian and Arab merchants, migrants, and envoys who entered China beginning in the Tang Dynasty (618–907 CE). Today’s Hui are found in almost all major cities in China. However, there are larger concentrations of Hui in Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai, and eastern Xinjiang. As a result of their multiple origins and dispersion, Hui have had a much longer history of interaction and intermarriage with Han as well as with other ethnic groups, including Mongolians and Tibetans. Consequently, a Hui physically looks like a Han; furthermore, they speak Mandarin (although their language is often inflected with Arabic and different dialects). (Erie 2016; Gladney 2009)
166 operating ramen businesses than a Hui from other provinces. Therefore, there is an extra layer
(i.e., regional) to their identity, resulting in people from the same ethnic and religious group not necessarily identifying with each other.
Compared to the multi-ethnic Chinese Muslim migrant communities, local Muslims holding Guangzhou hukou are more homogenous, consisting mainly Hui who are the descendants of Muslim migrants from Arab regions and Central Asia. Local Muslims live throughout the city and work in many occupations, not just trade. After economic reforms, influenced by the presence of international Muslim traders and Guangzhou’s rapidly developing international trade, more and more local Muslims began to engage in businesses due to language and cultural conveniences. Some worked as interpreters or agents for Arab businessmen, some operated their own trading businesses, and others engaged in various services catering to other
Muslims. I discuss this in the next section. In 2014, there were about 1,000 Muslim-operated trading companies, 60-70% founded after the economic reforms of the 1980s. Business cooperation between Muslims of different origins are common. For example, the wife of one of mosque staff operates a trading company for eyeglasses with a Muslim businessman from Egypt.
Foreign Muslims
Like Chinese Muslims, foreign Muslims are also a quite diverse classification. Mainly, they are divided into three groups, with Arabs and Africans as the majority. Arab Muslims comprise the largest group among foreign Muslims and accounted for approximately 20,000 in
2013 (personal conversation, Guangzhou Islamic Association staff, November 20, 2013). This is greater than the official number (16,000) of all Africans (Muslims and non-Muslims) in
Guangzhou in 2014. Arab Muslims are primarily from Middle Eastern and North African
167 countries such as Egypt, Morocco, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia. In most cases, North Africans associate themselves more with – and often are considered by others to be
– Arabs. 74 In some situations, though, some prefer to be considered as Africans. I will point out these nuances as this chapter unfolds. In general, Arab traders’ businesses are larger than the businesses of other foreign Muslim groups. They not only hold offices in Xiaobei, but also congregate in several newer office buildings in Zhongshan Ba Road in Yuexiu District and
Tianhe District, another newly developed area in Guangzhou. Their presence in newly-built, desirable areas is a signal of their economic success.
Most of the African Muslim population in Guangzhou comes from West African countries, such as Guinea, Nigeria, and Niger, some from East African countries, such as
Uganda, Somalia, and Tanzania. 75 Relatively few Africans have immigrated from other places or
hold passports from countries like Spain, the United States, and France. As there is no
consistency in the documentation of the size of the African population (see Introduction), it is
hard to estimate the size of the African Muslim population due to their high mobility. I have
asked people from each nation to give me an estimate. Based on their answers, in 2013 and 2014
the Guinean community was about 500 in total; Nigeria Hausas were about 500-1,000; Malians
were about 2,000-3,000; and Senegaleses were about 200. 76 It is estimated that between 2,500-
3,500 Sub-Saharan African Muslims (they were identified by skin color through the mosque’s
Chinese staff) attended the morning prayer on Eid al-Fitr in 2014 (Guangzhou mosque staff,
74 See the next chapter on examples in which Arab traders looked down on Africans for being economically disadvantaged. 75 A good number of Somalians I met in Guangzhou were in a transit status as they were waiting for the United Nation’s hearing for their refugee application. 76 Please note that this estimation may not be accurate as it largely depends on how well one knows his fellow countrymen. For example, one Hausa businessman from Nigeria told me that he thought there were only 50 Hausas in the city. Some might be more accurate than others. For example, the around 500 Guinean population is reported by Bah, who was the liaison person in the Guinean community and kept most people’s contacts.
168 personal conversation, July 30, 2014), which constituted about 10-15% percentage of the total number of 26,000 Muslims who prayed. 77
Although Muslims in Guangzhou share the same religious identity, nationality still plays a key role in the division of foreign Muslims. There is a difference in the degree of community involvement among different foreign Muslim groups. Based on my observations, the smaller the size of the home country, the tighter the bonds tend to be made among members of that Muslim group. For example, in the Guinean Muslim community (about 500 Muslims), members host various activities in the community, such as daily prayers, special prayers for individual members facing difficulties, meetings, Islamic lectures, and celebrations of new-borns. Each gathering involves the participation of approximately 40 to 50 people. On the other hand, in larger-size Muslim groups, such as those of Hausas from Nigeria (500-1,000), unless there is an emergency, most Hausas go to such community gatherings (usually involving a dinner) only once or twice per year.
The Historical Legacy of Muslims in Guangzhou In the following section, I discuss how the material and cultural legacies of Islam in
Guangzhou shape the lives of Muslims today, with a focus on mosques, prayer rooms, and religious catering networks. The multiple historical migrations of various Muslim communities have left Guangzhou with a material legacy that includes religious institutions, such as mosques and prayer rooms, as collective places where people share religious practices (including prayers,
Islamic holiday celebrations, and casual gatherings), but also cultural dynamics such as religious catering networks (Muslim markets, restaurants, shops, etc.). In this community, mosques,
77 An important holiday which marks the end of Ramadan, the Islamic holy month of fasting.
169 Muslim markets, shops, companies, and restaurants provide spaces for Muslims of different national origins and ethnic backgrounds to interact and communicate, thus creating cultural bonds based on shared religious values that could transcend individuals’ ethnic and national differences.
Religious Catering Networks
Foreign Muslims and Chinese Muslim migrants tend to live close to the four mosques located in the Yuexiu District (Mathews, Lin, and Yang 2017). The Yuexiu District, especially the neighbourhood of Xiaobei, has become a place where Muslims of diverse origins, as well as many Chinese who would partake in aspects of Islamic culture, congregate. In his study of the booming businesses targeting Africans in Guangzhou, Castillo (2014) coined the term “catering network” to describe the system of interdependent sub-economies and micro-industries that provide supplies and services to a targeted group. Borrowing Castillo’s term, in this section I use religious catering networks to describe systems of interdependent sub-economies and micro- industries that provide services and supplies to both Muslims and Islam-related business. For the most part, the traders and businesses that cater to the needs of Muslims are also owned by
Muslims. On the one hand, since these catering networks support and provide services specifically to a Muslim clientele, they help provide Muslims from different origins with a sense of belonging. On the other hand, Muslim catering networks also function as cultural bridges, linking together both different Muslim groups and non-Muslim groups. This section looks at both the inward- and outward-facing aspects of Muslim catering networks in Guangzhou.
Indeed, flows of Muslim migrants, both foreign and Chinese, have nurtured the development of industries that cater to the needs of a Muslim clientele. In the Yuexiu District,
170 for instance, restaurants serve various kinds of halal food, ranging from Chinese Muslim cuisines
(Xinjiang-style restaurants serving Uyghur barbeque and baked goods; food stands selling
Xinjiang dried fruits and snacks; Dongxiang restaurants serving roast lamb and mutton soup;
Qinghai-style restaurants serving ramen), to different Middle Eastern, Indian, Senegalese, and
Egyptian cuisine. Moroccan cafés and shisha bars provide lively spaces for socializing. There are shops operated by Muslims such as barbershops, salons, manicurists, money exchanges, and international telephone booths. There are also halal grocery and butcher shops/stands, lambs that are sold on streets, shops that offer traditional Muslim clothing and shoes, and those that sell religious items and Quran bookstores.
Different Muslim groups take different niches in these religious catering networks. For example, some industries are dominated by Chinese Muslims, such as the black-market money exchange, and international phone cards and booths dominated by Hui and Dongxiang. 78 A further example: more than 90% of the ramen restaurants in Guangzhou (with a concentration in
Yuexiu) are owned by Qinghai Hui. In 2003, there were about 60 Qinghai Ramen Restaurants. 79
This number increased during my fieldwork, as Yanxia Li (2012) mentions in her Master’s thesis, that there are 2,000 ramen restaurants in Guangzhou according to Hualong County office.
The rapid increase in ramen restaurants indicates a flourishing and growing Muslim population, which continues to attract more businessmen investing in catering.
A personal story helps to illustrate how and why religious catering networks have flourished within the Muslim community in Guangzhou over the past decade. Gambo, a Hausa
78 In China, there is a limit on currency conversion. During my fieldwork in 2013-14, one person can purchase the equivalent of 50,000 USD of foreign currency per year. However, this amount is not sufficient for most traders engaged in international trading businesses. Hence, a black-market for money exchange has become popular in places where there is a demand. 79 These Hui are mainly from Hualong Hui Autonomous county, Qinghai, a Northwestern province with sizeable Hui population.
171 businessman from Niger who owned a men’s fashion shop in the Yueyang Trading Mall in
Dengfeng, later shifted his business into halal restaurants in shopping malls. He opened his first one next to his shop around 2012, and another one in 2014. He told me that in addition to food- selling being easier and less competitive than selling fashionable clothes, the influx of Muslims in the area has made his restaurant business profitable, thus convincing him to invest in a second restaurant:
When I sell jeans, I worry a lot. I worry about customs, I worry about shipping, and I worry about the market – if they [local customers] don’t like my jeans, I don’t get money. For food, you worry about something different, but you worry less. If they don’t like my food, they still have to pay me. Many Muslims come here buy stock, I always have business if I sell food. They come to my restaurant, they say “Salam”, then they are my brothers and sisters. They ask me for information, I tell them where to go get goods and where to go to sleep. They sometimes buy clothes from me. In this market, so many shops have Jeans. This kind of Jeans (he said while he starching the one he was wearing), you can get from my shop, you can get from that person’s shop, you can [also] get from the factory if you buy many. People need to eat. [Even if] They don’t buy Jeans from me, they can come here to eat my food. Muslims can come, other Africans can come, and Chinese can come. (Gambo, June 20, 2014)
The convenience of life in Xiaobei in terms of catering to Islam, in turn, attracts more and more
African Muslims to Xiaobei. Bara and his business partner, Ruwa, for instance, had moved from
Xiaobei to Panyu, a southern suburban district that is far from Xiaobei, into a relatively cheap but good quality apartment. However, without any micro-industries like halal restaurants nearby that catered to their tastes, they had to commute to Xiaobei every day for goods and services.
After realizing how much time they spent in Xiaobei, they moved back to Xiatangxi Road behind
Dengfeng market.
Religious catering business, whose owners, staff, and customers are often Muslims, not
only function as “hubs of belonging that gather together different Muslims” that makes
Guangzhou feel like home for many Muslims (Su 2017), but also serve as cultural bridges
between Muslims and Chinese who are not infused in Muslim sub-cultures. Indeed, the
172 mushrooming of Muslim catering businesses has added significant diversity to society at large.
For example, shisha bars became popular in Guangzhou during my fieldwork, where I saw many
Chinese (mostly Hans) trying shisha the first time in their lives.
As the Muslim-oriented religious catering businesses boom, non-Muslim Chinese traders also start to partake in Islamic culture. As mentioned in my methodology section, during my year-long fieldwork in Xiaobei, once a week in the evening I visited a shop at the Tianxiu
Trading Mall, helping Rose, a cosmetic trader from Zhejiang, with English translations during business negotiations. Rose’s clients were mostly Sub-Saharan African Muslims, but she herself is not a Muslim, nor did she have any knowledge of the religion. Even though her husband had been selling generator parts to Western Africa for more than eight years, before Rose started her own business in the winter of 2013, all she knew about Islam was that some of her husbands’ customers refused to eat pork when he invited them to dinner. Now, due to the nature of her clientele, she found it important to pay attention to her potential customers’ religious practices.
She asked me to teach her how to say hello to her Muslim customers in Arabic. “As-sa-la-mu a- lay-kum – this is too complicated! Is Salam good enough?” she complained. Still, she wrote it down in pinyin, trying hard to pronounce the greeting correctly and hoping that this gesture would bring her closer to her Muslim customers.
Religious Spaces: Mosques and Prayer Rooms
Mosques in any Muslim community are both a place where religious ethics are taught and a focal point of religious communal activity. Collective Islamic religious activities conducted in
Arabic provide a common language and break down language barriers that divide foreign and
Chinese Muslims, allowing them to pray together. This is not the case for many Christian
173 churches in Guangzhou, where foreign and Chinese congregations often attend different services. 80 For Muslims who pray in mosques, engaging in collective religious activities assists
them in building ties to other Muslim groups, marking social connections beyond national,
cultural, and ethnic networks (see also Mathews, Lin, and Yang 2017). For example, Edel, a
Hausa businessman from Niger, and Ahmed, a young man from Yemen, met at a restaurant near
one of the mosques and later developed a working partnership.
Currently, there are four mosques and two officially-registered prayer rooms in
Guangzhou. 81 The two prayer rooms, located in remote districts, are attended mainly by Chinese
Muslim migrants. Each of the four mosques are located within a 2-kilometer radius in the Yuexiu
District near the Xiaobei trading markets. 82 The Saad Ibn Abi Waaqas and Huaisheng mosques
are famous internationally, and many foreign Muslims, especially those of Arab origin, prefer to
go to these for Friday prayers. The mosque, where I volunteered and conducted research, is the
smallest of the four mosques. However, because it is a 10-minute walk from the trading
buildings in Xiaobei, it has the highest percentage of foreign Muslims (mostly Africans) of all
the mosques in Guangzhou. When I was doing fieldwork in 2013, the mosque staff estimated
that between 1,300-1,500 of Friday prayer goers were non-Chinese, of which 300 to 500 were
Sub-Saharan African Muslims. Only 570 square meters, the mosque cannot accommodate many
people, and therefore the local government allows the mosque to use the entrance (which
connects to the main Yuehua road) and the adjacent public park on the south-side of the mosque
for Friday prayers.
80 For example, the largest church in the city, Cathedral of the Sacred Heart (Shishi ), holds a separate Sunday mess in English for foreigners in the afternoon, which Chinese can attend as well. Some other smaller churches exclude Chinese presence, which I will discuss further in later section (see also Haugen 2012, 2013b) 81 During my fieldwork (2013-14), the Haopan Mosque was under construction and was not open to the public. Hence, it is less known to almost all my interlocutors. Therefore, it is not included in my study. 82 The farthest two mosques are Haopan and Saad ibn Abi Waqqas Mosque, which are roughly 3.8 kilometers apart from each other, as google map indicates.
174 In addition to the mosques, informal prayer rooms have been established in many parts of the Xiaobei trading zone, which make it convenient for Muslims to fulfil their religious requirements while maintaining their businesses. 83 In 2013 and 2014, each trading mall in
Xiaobei had several rooms for prayers. In addition to prayer rooms, some big Halal restaurants and companies who employed a number of Muslims provided a separate room or a corner for this purpose. For some special holidays like the holy month of Ramadan, foreign Muslims would also rent temporary rooms to break the fast together every evening and participate in special religious gatherings.
Like mosques, all informal prayer rooms are open to the public, although they are paid for and maintained by different Muslims groups. The participants are usually people who work or live close by. Most of these rooms are small (about 10-20 square meters), and thus the size excluded females. For example, the Guineans rent a small room to provide convenience for people (mainly Guineans working in Tianxiu) who are too busy to go to mosques for prayers: this room does not include a separate space for women, as most people who work in the surrounding office buildings are male. In addition, in West African culture, most Muslim women do not work, and hence usually pray at home. During my fieldwork in 2013-14, I also witnessed some Muslim women praying in the corner of the hallways in some trading malls.
Most African Muslims were familiar with the Arabic in the Quran, but did not know conversational Arabic. Therefore, prayers were always conducted half in Arabic and half in their native language. The language at the service does not necessarily define the audience. For example, in the Guinean prayer room, prayers were conducted in Arabic, Fula, and occasionally
83 Informal in the sense of not officially registered with the Bureau of Ethnic and Religious Affairs of Guangzhou Municipality. As Chinese laws forbid religious gatherings wihtout governmental registration, these informal prayer rooms are consider illegal in China. Nontheless, these prayer rooms are largely practiced without much intervention (see more discussion in the later part of this chapter).
175 in French. When explaining religions doctrines, rather than speaking in Arabic, the Imam used
Fula, his mother tongue. His intention was not to exclude other people whose mother tongue was not Fula (for example, Mandingo or Susu, two ethnic minority groups that constitute about 5-
10% of the Guinean population in Guangzhou). Rather, the Imam spoke in Fula because it was comprehensible to a majority of his audience; while most Guineans do not speak Arabic fluently, almost all Mandingo and Susu people understand conversational Fula. In addition, Fula speakers from other countries (such as Mali, Gambia, and Ghana) can also attend prayers and understand everything. Tellingly, the rent for this prayer room is paid by donations from the Guinean community called namo (a Fula word equivalent to social money). Bah, a member of the
Guinean community committee in charge of managing namo , explained how prayer rooms worked to me,
Everyone can go. The room is for everybody. It is like the Guangzhou mosque there. We don’t pay to go or to take care of the [Chinese] mosque, we just go. But here, it is us Guineans is taking care of things: fix the AC [air-conditioner], buy mats, and clean the room. Sometimes a big boss will pay for 6 months, and after the money finishes, someone else will pay another one month – [it] is like that. And everyone will put money, some give 50 yuan, some 100 yuan. We keep the money there in the community and we can take from that money and pay when we need”. (Bah, February 11, 2018)
Due to my gender and language barriers, I did not attend these prayers while in
Guangzhou. But according to those who did attend and with whom I spoke afterwards, the prayer experience was similar to ones in Chinese mosques, where the Imam would give a short discourse beforehand. The topics varied: daily religious lives and then a reading from the Quran; sometimes news from the community and home; political updates on elections; examples of people who overcame difficulties. For Guineans, attending prayers with others from similar cultural backgrounds gave them a sense of belonging and strengthened their bonds with each other.
176 So far, this chapter has discussed the history and current situation of Muslims living in
Guangzhou, as well as how this history has created a positive environment for all Muslims. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the history of Guangzhou also shows the determinative impact that the central government in different dynasties placed on trade and migrant populations in
Guangzhou. Understanding the agendas behind the Chinese policies is thus of great importance in understanding the current Muslim migration.
State Involvement and Economic Strategies: From Stability to Development The complexity of Chinese socialist market economy includes a combination of market
forces and government intervention, or a free market within a party-state control. Over the last
40 years of economic reform, the party-state’s economic development interventions have had
significant consequences. For example, Shenzhen has transformed from a tiny village into a
major metropolis in less than three decades. After 1949, Guangzhou’s development too has been
closely linked with the party-state’s economic strategy. In the 1950s, there was a wave of
deportations of foreigners nation-wide by the party-state (see Chapter 2), and Guangzhou’s trade
industry suffered a short period of stagnate. But in 1957, in an effort to revive the economy,
Guangzhou began hosting the Canton Fair, with the support of the central government. Before
the economic reforms in 1979, Guangzhou’s Canton Fair was the only place where China
conducted trade with the outside world, reinforcing Guangzhou’s central role in the trade
economy. This is one of the reasons why Guangzhou began to re-attract foreign and domestic
migrants from the era of economic reform onwards.
Alongside economic reforms, the Chinese government also launched various policies that
affected Guangzhou’s migrants, as China’s pattern of economic development effected different
regions—and therefore different groups of people—in different ways. Policy-wise, China’s
177 economic reforms enabled coastal regions in the east to develop faster than the inland regions in the west of the country, largely through initiatives like resource endowments. 84 Since the 1990s, however, the Chinese government has tried to redistribute wealth and reduce regional imbalances. At the central level, Chinese government launched nation-wide development policies like the “Seven-Year Priority Poverty Alleviation Program” (1994-2000), the “Western
Development Program” (also named China’s Western Campaign, 2000-onwards), and the “East-
West Partnerships in Poverty-Alleviation” (2010-onwards) (Lu and Xiang 2011). These policies have largely reflected the country’s economic development strategies to narrow the gap between the East and the West, but also to redistribute the population country-wide through a variety of pro-poor labor transfer programs, relocating surplus laborers in the west to industrial areas in the east.
Particularly in the Xinjiang area where most Uyghurs live, the party-state launched a new model of development in 2010, moving from concern for political stability to economic development (Shan and Weng 2010). 85 At the National Conference on Providing Assistance to
Xinjiang’s Development ( 全国对口支援新疆工作会议 , Quanguo duikou zhiyuan Xinjiang gongzuo huiyi, March 2010), 19 affluent provinces and cities, including Beijing, Tianjin,
Shanghai, Guangzhou, Zhejiang, and Shandong, under a “pairing assistance” model, were placed in partnership with 82 city/counties and 12 divisions of Xinjiang Production and Construction
Corps ( 新疆生产建设兵团 , Xinjiang jianshe bingtuan ). The goal of these pairings is for other
84 For example, a series of tax exemption policies are only applicable for foreign enterprises operating in the eastern coastal regions. 85 Shan and Weng (2010, 61-62) points out that the party secretary of Xinjiang has been reappointed around the same time, shifting from formerly Wang Lequan, who was known for his hard-liner stance, to Zhang Chunxian, who is more soft-liner but had more economy-related experience. Though after several Uyghur uprisings in 2014, the situation changed.
178 cities in China to support Xinjiang’s development by providing human resources, technology, and funds. Guangzhou, for instance, is paired with Shufu ( 疏附 ) County, Kashgar (Guangzhou
Municipal Development and Reform Commission 2016). As such, there are various
governmental projects between Guangzhou (as well as Guangdong province) and Kashgar region
(Estrin, 2016). Factories of companies (many are state-owned) based in Guangzhou driven by
such policies, for instance, are opening up in Xinjiang, offering jobs to locals. The Guangzhou
Aids Xinjiang Team ( 援疆工作队 ) sends experts and construction corps to build infrastructure in
Xinjiang. Most importantly for this research, the “pairing assistance” development model has contributed to some extent to Guangzhou’s domestic migrant boom, especially among ethnic minorities from Western China. For example, 1,062 Uyghurs from Xinjiang went to work in
Guangdong (training schools, factories, etc.) via governmental organized projects in 2014
(Renmin Net 2015).
I have discussed the Chinese government’s intervention in the economy as a driving force that influences local development and the composition of the migrant population. For the purposes of this study, though, the big question is: what does religion have to do with it? In
November 2014, President Xi Jingping announced plans to create a 40-billion USD development fund to provide financial support, expertise, and industrial technology to establish massive infrastructural projects for “The Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21 st -century Maritime Silk
Road” (Chinese: 21 世纪海上丝绸之路 , known as the “Belt and Road Initiative”). This “Belt and
Road Initiative” aims to increase financial investment and foster cultural collaboration along the historic Silk Road and Maritime Silk Roads between China and Asia, the Middle-East, Europe,
179 and Africa. As part of this project, Guangzhou is expected to play a significant role both in trade and cultural exchanges internationally, especially throughout the Islamic world.
A mutually beneficial relationship between Islam and long-distance trade has been
widely acknowledged by scholars: Islam has historically offered networks and ties through
which trade relations operate, and the expansion of international commerce has allowed Islamic
influence to extend into new territories (Lovejoy 1971; Osella and Osella 2009). In examining
“Belt and Road Initiative” regions like Yiwu and Ningxia’s recent economic development, and
the boom in the foreign Muslim population, especially from Arab countries, Lei Zou (2015)
further discusses the ties between religion and the economy/trade in the Chinese context. 86 He
agrees that new trade opportunities create avenues for religious expansion, while pre-existing
religious ties create a new space for economic corporation. He also points out that the global
economic structure and China’s political and economic development agenda play key roles in
promoting and restricting religious development. Although religious ties are used as positive
resources to effectively enforce the economic ties between China and the Islamic world, recent
government policies (such as Developing the West, the Belt and Road Initiative, etc.) are
fundamental to allowing these trades systems to flourish (Zou 2015). Guangzhou is not immune
to this political logic, either.
Anthropologist Helen Siu (2016) introduces the concept of complicity to illustrate the
paradox of human agency. Unlike James Scott’s model of power, which he divides into
domination and resistance (1990), Siu emphasizes a complicity of both sides. She argues that
individuals within specific historical movements – villagers, urbanites, cadres, entrepreneurs, and
intellectuals – actively engaged in and ventured forward, but nonetheless became victims of the
86 The former is another hub in the Maritime silk road since Song Dynasty, and the latter is one of the major hubs of the historical land route silk road.
180 circumstances created by their own actions. Borrowing the concept of “complicity” from Siu, I examine the roles of multiple players including the Chinese party-state, local governments,
Chinese and Muslim traders engaged in economic development. I argue that the central and local governments work together under an umbrella of economic development. They take advantage of Guangzhou’s historical background and pre-existing Islamic ties, and use them to help guide economic strategies associated with the “Belt and Road Initiative,” thus further contributing to the multi-ethnic Muslim migrant boom in Guangzhou. Religious connections and histories, in short, align with the government’s economic development plans. Here, the party-state uses religion as a tool to further strengthen economic ties between old and new partners along the former and future Silk Road.
Echoing the central government’s economic policies, local governments at various levels cooperate to create an ancillary force to accommodate domestic Muslim migrants in Guangzhou.
For example, Guangzhou’s ramen industry is dominated by Hui from Qinghai. As the labor receiving destination, the Guangzhou government issues special policies towards all ethnic minorities who conduct business in the city. For example, starting around 2010, government granted tax exemptions for Qinghai ramen restaurant business conducted by Chinese Muslims, whereas others operated by Han have to pay 12.5% of the total income (Mo 2014). The
Guangzhou government also set up a “fast track” (as well as a simplified process) for issuing business permits to entrepreneurs who belong to Muslim minority groups – now, the only requirement for opening a business in the city is to have a health certificate and a lease for the space. By contrast, Han Chinese require more documents (Y. Li 2012). As the region where the majority of workers in the ramen industry come from, Hualong Hui Autonomous County in
Qinghai offers various incentives for locals (mainly Hui) to work in ramen businesses, such as
181 free professional training and low or no-interest loans from banks. In addition, there are 172 liaison offices throughout China offering various assistance on spot, for example, to help with the business set up, and to provide legal advice if there is a dispute (Y. Li 2012). The central and local government policies have created an environment designed to accommodate floating
Chinese Muslims, resulting in a lenient attitude towards Islam from the Guangzhou government, which I will discuss in the next section.
The Chinese Government’s Selectively Lenient Regulations on Islam:
Generally speaking, the state’s control and regulations are more lenient towards Islam than Christianity, as Islam is seen as part of China’s heritage in a way that Christianity is not.
This is especially true in Guangzhou (see also Mathews, Lin, and Yang 2017). Previous research has pointed out that while tensions between the party-state and Islam exist (Erie 2016), China’s rigid policy towards Islam on paper is only selectively enforced. Comparing everyday practices in the Northwest where the official and the religious practices are far from static, resulting in micro-conflicts from time to time (Erie 2016), Guangzhou’s Islamic environment is much more stable and agreeable. I argue this is largely the result of different party-state development plans for Xinjiang and Guangzhou. For the party-state in Guangzhou, the advantage of including
Muslims in plans for economic development supersedes the desire to control or restrict Islamic activities.
Nonetheless, local authorities have ambiguous attitudes towards Islam. This ambiguity presents itself in some cases where the government encourages and promotes Islamic culture and practices, while in other cases it restricts and regulates. For the most part, promotion of Islam comes in the form of cultural events, such as encouraging the celebration of Islamic holidays,
182 culinary customs (as shown in the fast-growing halal restaurants and vivid Islamic signage), and the preservation of historical religious sites. For example, Saad Ibn Abi Waaqas Mosque and
Huaisheng Mosque are internationally famous, and have become places designed to foster a long-standing friendship and cultural connections between China and the Arab World. Islamic holy day celebrations are open to all Chinese national and are officially portrayed as a symbol of religious and cultural pluralism. The donations made to Chinese mosques and societies from foreign Muslims are highly praised in the media and by the Guangzhou Islamic Associations and local government as evidence of international friendship.
An example of cooperation between the state the Islamic community came after the 2008
Wenchuan Earthquake. After this event, the Division of Politics and Laws in the State
Administration for Religious Affairs reported that Guangzhou hosted a special prayer session for earthquake victims at the Friday prayers, and Imams in each mosque urged all Muslims to donate to the affected areas. The Arabic association in Guangzhou took an active role in this. In five
days, foreign Muslims donated more than 5 million yuan (810,000 USD), the most of any
Muslim group in Guangzhou. 87 A representative of the Arabic association in Guangzhou said,
“We got much support from China in doing business, now the natural disaster happened in
Sichuan, we should contribute in return. Through these donations, we also strengthen ties
between the brotherhood among Arab countries to work together in helping the Chinese people.”
(the Division of Politics and Laws in the State Administration for Religious Affairs 2012) As in
other cases, Islam here is seen as a valuable heritage, strengthening the friendship between
foreign Muslims and Chinese Muslims. Further, the party-state’s media indicated that the local
87 The original Chinese is 外国穆斯林 (foreign Muslims, waiguo musilin ), hence I literally translate it as foreign Muslims, although it is highly possible it meant Arab Muslims in the context.
183 government of Guangzhou was keen on fostering a positive environment for foreign Muslims by emphasizing the reciprocal relationship between foreign Muslims and Chinese society.
Chinese government policies also specify that only officially registered religious activities are protected by the state, and religious gatherings without governmental registration and recognition are not allowed. This is also true for Christians. As mentioned earlier, some churches, for example Pentecostal churches, are not allowed to be active; while in other officially registered churches, Chinese nationals are forbidden to attend services (see Mathews, Lin, and
Yang 2017). This is not the case for Islam, where foreign and Chinese Muslims can gather and pray together in the officially registered mosques and prayer rooms in Guangzhou. There also seems to be a higher tolerance of Islamic informal prayer rooms than Christian underground churches. As mentioned earlier, foreign Muslims set up prayers rooms in trading malls for convenience. Usually, the Guangzhou government is quite lenient about the existence of these informal prayer rooms. In 2007, however, all informal prayer rooms were shut down prior to the upcoming 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. Bah recalled this event:
I think China [the Chinese government] don’t [doesn’t] like [that] many people come to stay and talk and talk, [especially] if they don’t know what people come to talk about. At that time, they just asked us to move [away] everything inside…It is not the management of the building [who shut down the prayer room]. How can I know it is not the management [who shut it down]? Because the management just wants to take money. They don’t care [what we are doing there]. It is the police. (Bah, February 11, 2018)
As some of the prayer rooms were there for more than ten years, this raid rate is rather low compared with that of some Christian churches that constantly receive police visits and are forced to frequently change locations (see Mathews, Lin, and Yang 2017). These prayer rooms, by contrast, were re-located to a different floor in the same building, and still function today.
Still, Bah and his countryman intend to keep them low-key as they are afraid that once the government knows, they will come to shut them down again. However, after 2007, no prayer
184 rooms have been shut down as far as my Muslim friends know, not even during the 2009 Urumqi riot, or the Uyghur riots in Beijing and Kunming in 2013 and 2014 respectively .88 One of the reasons that local authorities still let them run – besides being generally more tolerant than authorities elsewhere in the country – is that these prayer rooms are not seen as a threat partly because their location is easily accessible for the government. Inside busy trading malls that cater to both Muslims and non-Muslims, it is hard for the government not to notice these prayer rooms. Government officials can ask the mall management for their location if necessary, and the management would fully cooperate.
While China-Foreign Islamic cultural exchanges are encouraged in Guangzhou, foreign- run religious activities usually raise a red flag and are treated with caution. Guangzhou has nine officially appointed Imams, all Chinese nationals (Hui). Unlike foreign pastors who are allowed to lead sessions in officially registered churches (and again, almost all of these services exclude
Chinese attendants), foreign Imams are forbidden from practicing in China, and from hosting any religious activities, except a few invited guest lecturers (see also Mathews, Lin, and Yang 2017).
However, despite these prohibitions, I learned during my fieldwork that there were several foreign Imams (three Guineans and one Malian) in the Guinean prayer room who have been leading prayers as early as 2000. As primarily middlemen themselves, these Imams were not professional Imams back home, but, among this African Muslim group, they are the knowledgeable persons who lead prayers, provide religious guidance, and answer religious questions, complementary to the prayers at the Chinese mosques.
88 Location and government endorsement is very key in the religious practices. For example, the official website of Guangzhou government specifically mentioned the prayer room service at the Canton Fair as a model example for providing the religious service/needs to foreign Muslims on one hand, creating a positive trading environment on the other (http://www.gz.gov.cn/GZ06/5/201504/2217aca5a6f845a3a62b0ec3ab1f255e.shtml). On July 5 th , 2009, Uyghurs and Han kill each other in Urumqi, the capital city of Xinjiang, resulting 197 people died, more than 1,700 injured, and many more arrested. It is one of the worst interethnic riots in modern Chinese history. See more https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/July_2009_Ürümqi_riots
185 There are always more than one Imam in the Mosque, in case of people travel or sick. People rank the Imams by their knowledge in religion. We call them Imam Number one, Imam Number Two, Imam Number Three, and Imam Number Four. Imam Number One always leads the prayers, unless he allows the imam Number Two to do it for him, then Imam Number Two can. Language is not an issue. The Imam Number Four is a Bambara (Malian). He speaks French and Arabic. Many Guinean people speak French. But if some people don’t understand French, people will translate it for them. (Bah, February 11, 2018)
The current Imam Number One has led prayers since 2007, although there were others before
him. 89 Since he has been doing this for over a decade, it is safe to assume that this demonstrates a
lenient attitude by the party-state towards Islam. Part of the reason for this tolerance might also
be due to the nature of Sunnism – supposedly, it contains no rigid hierarchy that appoints Imams.
This results in cases where a knowledgeable person leads prayers followed by others, which
potentially makes it harder for the government to accuse individuals. Therefore, non-professional
Imams can easily portray themselves as simply devout Muslims who read Quran aloud. While it
is hard to tell whether this tolerance is the result of a lenient attitude towards Islam, or whether it
is due to the legal difficulty of pursuing potential charges, it nonetheless demonstrates the
ambiguous and tolerant attitude of Chinese party-state towards foreigners’ Islamic practices in
Guangzhou. This is especially true in comparison with places like Xinjiang, where religious and
daily lives of Uyghurs are constantly under close surveillance.
Due to the generally tolerant attitude that exists in Guangzhou, foreign Muslims engage
not only in religious and economic activities, but also in social ones. One is tempted to assume
that foreign Muslims are less attached to local mosques and community activities than their
Chinese counterparts; but in reality, they are very involved in their local communities as
mentioned in the previous section. In 2010, when the Saad Ibn Abi Waqqas Mosque called for
89 The previous Imam before him was cheated by a visa agent, and, unfortunately, he was deported in 2007 (see details in Chapter 3).
186 donations for a restoration and for a bigger space to accommodate the increasing number of prayer goers, many foreigners made generous contributions. Among these, the largest donation was from a Saudi Arabian businessman who donated 600,000 yuan (around 97,200 USD)
(mosque staff, personal conversation, November 15, 2013). During my fieldwork in 2013 and
2014, after Friday prayers, there were occasionally calls for donations for building mosques in other cities in China, to which many foreigners would contribute.
In contrast to the above example of how both the state and foreign Muslim groups used a specific incident to solidify bonds between them, the Chinese party-state’s “selective” attitude reflects in the tightened controls and surveillance rates for major political and social events, such as the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, the 2010 Guangzhou Asian Games, the 2013 Uyghur riots in Beijing, and again, the 2014 Uyghur riots in Kunming. Every year before Eid al-Fitr in
Guangzhou, there is a deputy mayor-level meeting about security measures designed to reduce
“unexpected incidents ( 突发事件 ).” 90 While tightened controls and surveillance do not specifically targeting Muslims (other religious and social groups are targeted as well), they nonetheless reveal an atheist government's distrust of religious minorities.
The selective enforcement of religious policies is also reflected in the different attitudes towards various Muslim sub-groups, especially Uyghurs. In 2014, there were three incidents involving Uyghurs that raised national public security questions: the Kunming train station
90 My interpretation of the “unexpected incidents” is not entirely negative. It means both ways: to protect ordinary prayers from any extremist activities on one hand, to control and to prevent any incidents organized against the government on the other. The original Chinese goes: “… 加强安保工作不放松。继续做好对礼拜室的监管，整个 展会期间，要对礼拜室实行驻会监管，每日派出工作人员到现场指导和检查，确保礼拜室及净礼间等场所 安全，要确保通讯畅通，随时做好突发事件的应对工作 .” In English: “to constantly strengthen the security work. To continuously conduct surveillance on the prayer room. During the entire session of the Canton Fair, [There] should be onsite surveillance and management. [We will] send staff on the site to supervise and do check- ups every day, guaranteeing that the security of the prayer room and the washroom. To make sure the communication is stable and constant, and be prepared for any unexpected incidents at any time”. (http://www.gz.gov.cn/GZ06/5/201504/2217aca5a6f845a3a62b0ec3ab1f255e.shtml).
187 terrorist attack (March 1st); the Urumqi train station terrorist attack (April 30th); and the
Guangzhou train station attack (May 6th). The suspects for all three attacks were Uyghurs, and each incident involved the suspects attacking commuters with knives or other sharp objects, with
Urumqi attack also involved suicide bombing. In the third attack that took place in Guangzhou, six people were wounded. After this incident, it is reported that the Uyghurs who were living in
Guangzhou, especially in Xiaobei area, were placed under heavy surveillance by the local police.
While the authorities did not force the closure of these businesses, their frequent presence had the effect of scaring off many customers, especially in restaurants. Partly as a result in this significant loss of business, Uyghurs largely disappeared from Xiaobei after the May 6 th incident in 2014 (Mathews, Lin, and Yang 2017).
Figure 6 : Surveillance cameras in the garden side of one mosque. It is unclear – like the ambiguous attitude of the government –whether these cameras were meant for the public park (general population), or if they were targeting the religious gathering (Muslims).
188 Conclusion As this chapter has shown, multiple factors contribute to the treatment of Muslims in today’s Guangzhou, where Muslims from all over the world congregate. The historical presence of Islam in addition to the region’s extensive trading economy has attracted Muslims from diverse origins, including from China’s Northwestern and central regions, North and West
African countries, the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. Mainly, there are three major Muslim groups: Chinese Muslims, Sub-Saharan African Muslims, and Arab Muslims. The historical legacy of Guangzhou contributes to the creation of a multi-ethnic Muslim community in two ways. First, the religious catering networks provide services specifically directed at a
Muslim clientele and functions as a cultural bridge to non-Muslim groups. Second, the prevalence of mosques and prayer rooms represent the material aspect of Guangzhou’s Islamic history.
In terms of contemporary factors that help maintain this multi-ethnic Muslim community, the party-state plays a central role. Driven by economic development strategies, the Chinese party-state’s sees Islam as a tool that can be leveraged to re-enforce ties with the Islamic World.
Governments at different levels also engage in this process by issuing policies (and by selectively enforcing others) designed to make Guangzhou an inclusive environment for Islam to flourish. Muslims, under this encouraging environment, engage themselves in social economic activities, and reinforce an inclusive society that attracts more and more Muslim traders. In the next chapter, I discuss interactions with different groups of Muslims, with a focus on sub-
Saharan African Muslim groups, in order to further discuss this inclusiveness and complexity in
Guangzhou’s multi-ethnic Muslim community.
189 Chapter 5
“New” Guests in the Old Fanfang : African Muslims’ Daily Religious Lives, Economic Activities, and Social Interactions
"The social situation of today's Muslim community in Guangzhou is quite like that of the Tang Dynasty. Both communities came into being at a time when China was open to the World and had a prosperous economy." (Q. Ma 2008, 70)
The Mosque in a Trading Metropolis
Surrounded by old, dilapidated buildings from the 1970s, the narrow street of Yuehua
Road in Guangzhou is barely noticeable compared to the wide boulevards lined with skyscrapers
and modern architecture that surround it. During most days of the week, the 633-meter-long road
is quiet, with few cars and people passing by. However, early Friday afternoons, the road fills
with people of different ethnicities, as worshippers arrive from all parts of the city to congregate
in the mosque on the north side of the street. They remove their shoes and sit or stand on their
own mats that are placed on a plastic canvas patterned with white, red, and blue stripes that cover
the ground. Among these worshippers, those from Sub-Sahara Africa make up a significant
proportion. They are more readily distinguished from other Muslims due to their skin color, to
many Chinese. Local pedestrians, curious about the large number of Black Africans, often peek
inside the mosque as they pass by. The visibly expanding Black African Muslim population in
Guangzhou raises questions about how these migrants flourish in a city so far away from home.
What kind of support do they have in Guangzhou? Does sharing a religion with others not from
their home countries, including Chinese Muslims, help bridge cultural divides?
190
Figure 7 : Pedestrians walking by while peeking over Friday prayers sitting on a canvas near the entrance of the mosque.
Building on my findings in the previous chapter, this chapter focuses on the religious practices of sub-Saharan African Muslims in Guangzhou. In the previous chapter, I presented the history of Guangzhou as a longstanding religious hub and explored the economic and political factors that have contributed to the formation of a multi-ethnic Muslim community in the city.
But what does the history of Chinese-Islamic ties have to do with today’s sub-Saharan African
Muslims in Guangzhou? An increase in the number of African migrants who come China is often perceived as a recent phenomenon (Bertoncello and Bredeloup 2007). However, as Adams
191 Bodomo (2012,12-13) points out, “Africans did not just start moving into China in the 21 st century,” and their history therefore “must be placed in the context of the wider African presence in Asia, which itself has not yet been the subject of sustained research”. The historical link between Guangzhou and the Islamic world shows that it is likely that Africans came to China during the long history of the Maritime Silk Road (Campbell 2016). Historians have not yet established the date of the first Africans coming to China (Campbell 2016; Wilensky 2002).
However, Chinese literature in Tang (618-907 A.D.) and Song (960-1279 A.D.) Dynasty has two terms, “Sengzhi” and “Kunlun,” that refer to Black people. 91 Anshan Li (2014) argues that many
“Kunluns” may have arrived in China as part of foreigners’ annual tribute to Chinese authorities,
while some enslaved “Kunluns” were sold by Arab traders to China’s coastal regions. To be
specific, Wilensky (2002) points out that Arab traders exported East African slaves to China. The
recent rise in migration from Africa to China should therefore be seen as part of a long history of
trade and migration between Guangzhou and the Islamic World, not as something without
precedent. In this light, African Muslims coming to Guangzhou are not a contemporary
phenomenon, but rather an evolution in the historical, religious, and commercial ties that have
long linked Guangzhou with the broader Islamic world.
Africans in China has drawn considerable scholarly attention as a growing migrant group.
Some studies in 2008 mention the important role of religion (both Islam and Christianity) in building close personal and business networks among African traders. However, these studies either fail to explain how and to what extent religion impacts African traders’ lives (Li et al.
91 Especially, Kunlun was widely adopted by Han Chinese to record the presence of black people during the Tang and Song dynasties (Wilensky 2002). There are generally two views regarding the identity of Kunlun: they are either seen as Negroid from Africa (Wyatt 2010) or as Negrito from Southeast Asia (Cheng 2002).
192 2008; Zhang 2008), or focus only on the African Christian community in China (Haugen 2012).
Besides the large group of African Christians, Guangzhou experienced growth in its African
Muslim migrant population (Q. Ma 2006; Su 2017). 92 However, there is little research
specifically on African Muslims and their interactions with Chinese and other foreign Muslims.
In a more recent study, Mathews, Lin, and Yang (2017) offer a more thorough and comparative
study of religion among African groups, yet they focus primarily on Christian Nigerians. Li et al.
(2008), by contrast, mention that African Muslims in Guangzhou have established a tightly-knit
and active community in which members interact socially and economically. However, while
this generalization of African Muslims might hold some truth, it overlooks the divisions and
stereotypes existing among African Muslims. Here, I will examine how Islam impacts on
African Muslims’ lives and their interactions with other Muslim and non-Muslim groups while
accounting for diversity among individuals despite their shared religious belief. In sum, I take a
more nuanced approach to understand this population, one that looks at both similarities and
differences in their experience.
In the last chapter, I identified three main groups of Muslims in Guangzhou: the Chinese
(including local Cantonese Hui and Muslim migrants from other parts of China), Arabs
(including North Africans), and Africans (sub-Saharan Africans). In this chapter, I continue to
refer to sub-Saharan African Muslims as “African Muslims.” However, there are some
individuals from North African countries who self-identify as African, so there is an overlap in
these two categories. This chapter has three sections. First, I talk about the daily religious lives of
African Muslims, and how their devotion is practiced both individually and collectively. I argue
92 As discussed in the previous chapter, there is no official record or scholarly estimation of the African Muslim population. It is estimated that between 2,500-3,500 Sub-Saharan African Muslims (they were identified by skin color through the mosque’s Chinese staff) attended the morning prayer on Eid al-Fitr in 2014.
193 that the moral and ethical values shared among the Muslim community—what I call “religious common ground”— regulates each member’s social, economic, and religious behaviour, producing a common understanding so that Muslims from different backgrounds can interact with each other. In particular, shared physical religious spaces like mosques and prayer rooms play an important role in social integration by providing venues where foreign Muslims can engage in various religious activities and interact with others. Second, as most African Muslims engaged in economic activities in Guangzhou, I discuss how religious devotion impacts economic lives in a variety of ways, as well as the economic benefits of the religious networks built on this “religious common ground.” In the third section, I examine the interaction and conflicts that African Muslims have with other groups, including both Muslims (Arabs, Chinese
Muslims, and other African Muslims), and non-Muslims (including Chinese and Africans). I conclude that while religion provides a common ground through which individuals can interact and leads to many benefits for individuals, sharing a religion does not protect an individual from being cheated in business or socially excluded.
The “Religious Common Ground” Africans in Guangzhou, in general, are quite devout in religion, either in Christianity or
in Islam. Unlike Christian Africans who tend to preach Christianity to Chinese and engage in
proselytizing activities (Haugen 2012; 2013b; Mathews, Lin, and Yang 2017), African Muslims
are less concerned with spreading their religious message. When I was volunteering in the
mosque, I was occasionally asked why I did not believe in a religion. The furthest my
questioners went was to encourage me to know more about Islam and the Quran by sending me
links to YouTube videos of some Islamic scholars talking about religious wisdom. But most of
the time, they accepted me being a non-religious person. They also seemed not to be bothered by
194 my presence in the mosque, even though they knew I was not a Muslim. During my volunteer time at Friday prayers, I stood in the corner on the garden side of the mosque, and on holidays and Thursday evening gatherings, I went to pray with women in separate rooms or corners. On various occasions (holidays, prayers and gatherings), my presence did not offend them. Instead, I was welcomed with warmth.
In this section, I use the term “religious common ground” to describe the moral and ethical values shared among different Muslim groups. This “religious common ground” is characterised by what Portes and Zhou (1992, 514) refer to as “bounded solidarity,” or what
Whitehouse calls “a highlighted sense of shared identity, a common bond with their fellows which is much stronger than any bonds which exist in their homeland above the level of kinship.” (Whitehouse 2011, 95) In a minority group (for example, a minority based on ethnic difference or immigrant status), this sense of solidarity is often stronger because of socioeconomic pressures such as discrimination from the host society, and/or fewer alternative livelihood and employment opportunities outside their own cultural community (Granovetter,
1995). As members of a distinct foreign minority facing social discrimination (see Introduction),
African Muslims in China experience this “bounded solidarity” as a force that unifies a diverse population who would have had little in common back at home, yet become a close-linked community in Guangzhou. Stemming from Islamic religious beliefs and ethics, “religious common ground” provides a framework of ethical and moral responsibilities guided by Islam that regulate each member’s religious, economic, and social behaviours, in both individual and collective forms.
195 Individual Religious Practices: Personal Piety and Alms
Although most African Muslims engage in various religious activities, there is a difference in the degree of personal piety among them. For example, Bah, a Guinean sports shoe trader mentioned in previous chapters, would not miss one single prayer. When he first came to
China in 2004, he did not know where to pray in the market, so when the time came, he prayed on the pedestrian sidewalk with a lot of Chinese looking at him. When he was living in Xiatangxi
Road, Xiaobei, in 2013 and 2014, he attended the 5 am prayer in the mosque every day, which was quite hard to keep considering he sometimes finished work around 2 or 3 am. I witnessed
Bah’s devotion first hand when he was invited to have dinner by his two friends in Tianxiu. We had stewed chicken with rice delivered in big thermos containers by his friends’ wives. After eating, as we were chatting on the office couch, they excused themselves to wash up and pray in the smaller office next to their workplace, where other Muslims were already lining up.
While religious practice is essential for people like Bah, during my fieldwork I also got to know some Muslims, including both Chinese and foreigners, who admitted to occasionally breaking religious laws by grabbing an alcoholic drink, or dining in a non-halal restaurant. Some even visited sex workers. Some also admitted that they saw Guangzhou (as well as other foreign cities) as a place where they could take a break from their religious restrictions and conduct religiously-inappropriate activities that they dared not to do in their hometowns for fear of being judged. However, they still identify themselves as religiously pious (they believe in Islam but they practice in different ways). I also met people who engaged in a less orthodox lifestyle: they were pious, but they did not display physical markers showing their piety (e.g., women who did not wear hijabs). Piety has multiple meanings and is highly dependent on the outlook of the individual.
196 But most of the time, I was around Muslims who were devoutly faithful – people who would order a coke while watching 2014 World Cup in a Canadian sports bar; people who pray in extra sessions on Monday and Thursday evenings (it is not mandatory but one gets extra credit); people who went to the mosque for first prayer of the day before dawn instead of doing it at home; and people who would consider the distance from a mosque essential when renting apartments. Islam as a structured religion consists of a set of prayers and daily conduct.
Therefore, religious activities are heavily embedded in the everyday lives of the devout. Many
Muslims in Guangzhou, especially foreign Muslims, conduct sal āh (5 times daily prayers). 93 On
Fridays, more people manage to go to the mosques for Jumu’ah (a congregational prayer held
around noon on Fridays). The majority of those I encountered would make effort to fast during
the month of Ramadan, despite the steamy Guangzhou summer weather. Almost all foreign
Muslims would attend prayers during the two main Islamic festivals, Eid al-Fitr (the Festival of
Fast-Breaking) and Eid al-Adha (the Festival of Sacrifice).
Besides prayers and religious rituals, giving religious alms (donations) is another
example of how Muslims show their commitment to Islam. Making donations to mosques is an
obligatory practice for Muslims, and is considered one of the five pillars of Islam (giving zakat,
or “obligatory Islamic alms”). 94 African Muslims (as well as other foreign Muslims) often contribute zakat to the mosques in Guangzhou during their stay. One mosque staff member commented that foreign Muslims were quite generous, but were also modest about such actions.
He praised the way they delivered the zakat:
93 The word in Islam refers to a physical, mental, and spiritual act of worship, which Muslims observe five times every day within a certain period of time. 94 Zakat, one of Islam’s Five Pillars, is the practice of giving a fixed proportion (2.5%) of one’s financial assets to those in need. The literal meaning of the word Zakat is “to purify,” “to develop,” and “cause to grow”. Zakat purifies the believer by encouraging a charitable disposition. While for some country zakat is obligatory, in countries like Indonesia, zakat has been a means of worship, and its collection has been voluntary and decentralized (Salim 2008)
197 Many times after Friday prayers, we would find a lot of 100 yuan bills [the largest amount in Chinese currency] rubbed in small balls in the donation box. I don’t usually see things like that. I noticed that when they [foreign Muslims] donate, they hold their hands in a fist, and put the fist in the box, then release. That’s how they make these 100 bill-balls. This action exemplifies what the Quran says, that secrecy should be kept when one does good deeds – that is, if you do a good deed with your right hand, you should not let your left hand know. (Mosque staff, personal conversation, November 15, 2013)
While it could look like foreign Muslims are more generous than Chinese Muslims, however, to make a comparison between the two would be inaccurate, since the amount of zakat one gives depends on one’s financial ability. Also, since zakat is a private action, I do not have enough evidence or data to make such a claim.
Collective Religious Practice: Mosques, Prayer Rooms, and Holidays
As discussed in the last chapter, Muslims, especially African Muslims, usually prefer to live near mosques, which play an important role in strengthening the community’s sense of solidarity and cohesion (see also Su 2017). As material and symbolic carriers of Islam, mosques have been credited with cultural preservation, public welfare, mediation of social conflict, and promotion of social stability (Barton 1986; Z. Ma 2009; X. Qi 2007). In this chapter, we will see how mosques offer African Muslims a common space where cross-cultural activities can happen, especially in breaking language barriers and expanding social networks.
First, in terms of language, collective Islamic religious activities conducted in Arabic provide a common language and break down the language barriers that divide foreign and
Chinese Muslims, allowing them to pray together. This is even true among Chinese Muslims. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Chinese Muslims include 10 ethnic minorities, most of whom have other mother tongues than Mandarin. Su (2007) argues that the unified language of Arabic offers different Chinese Muslims a cultural communication space. The fact that Islam uses a
198 unified language enables these Muslim minorities who do not have language skills in Mandarin to communicate with each other through Arabic. Similarly, the diverse native languages used by
African and Arab Muslims are reconciled by a standard ritual in Arabic. This is not the case for the many Christian churches in Guangzhou, where foreign and Chinese congregations attended different services. 95 Attending the same prayer services and participating in the same religious
holidays offer Muslims the possibility to make social connections beyond national, cultural, and
ethnic networks. While the country of origin still plays an important role in African Muslim
communities, collective religious activities provide the basis for African as well as other foreign
Muslims to interact across cultural and linguistic boundaries and to integrate into Chinese
Muslim social networks (see also Mathews, Lin, and Yang 2017). 96
Second, in terms of social networks, religious sites like mosques and prayer rooms
provide a very important venue for people to expand their social ties (X. Qi 2007). In particular,
they unite African Muslims from various parts of the world by reinforcing the similarities shared
by Islamic rituals. For example, the mosque where I conducted my research held social
gatherings hosted by African Muslims from various countries and regions (including North
Africa). Every Monday and Thursday evening, people who fasted during the daytime
spontaneously arranged a dinner gathering. 97 These dinners included approximately 15-25 people from diverse Sub-Saharan African countries (Nigeria, Mali, Niger) and North African countries
(Morocco and Algeria). People contributed to food, tea, milk, fruit, or labour by setting up tables or cleaning up. They prayed before eating and socialized amongst themselves afterwards. The
95 For example, the largest church in the city, Cathedral of the Sacred Heart ( Shishi ), holds a separate Sunday mass in English for foreigners in the afternoon, which Chinese can attend as well. Some other smaller churches exclude Chinese (for further discussion see Haugen 2012; Mathews, Lin, and Yang 2017). 96 See the previous chapter on the different gathering frequency between Guinean and Nigerian Muslims. 97 Except for the month of Ramadan, the Monday and Thursday fast is not mandatory but whoever practices would get extra credits.
199 event was not exclusive to African Muslims, and anyone who prayed at the mosque was welcomed. There were always extra dishes offered to the mosque staff on night duty as well as to anyone who came for prayers.
Friendships and mutual trust between different Muslim groups grew during these weekly gatherings and religious activities. In these cases, the “religious common ground” that is shared among the Muslims broke down barriers of national and ethnic difference and supported integration. During dinner, participants often discussed and exchanged business information.
Some established good relationships with the Cantonese mosque staff, and ties built within the mosque setting also extended to other areas of their lives. In one example, an African student who volunteered at the mosque received free Chinese tutoring from one of the Imams. In another case, a mosque staff member took on the responsibility of being the guarantor for an African man who needed to rent a shop in the Xiaobei market.
As mentioned in the Interlude III, Balde, an African trader of small electronics, had been volunteering in the mosque for more than two years. Being a foreigner and a single young man, he explained that being with people in the mosques made him feel at home and less alone.
During Ramadan of 2014, Balde, along with other African and Chinese volunteers, helped hand out food, set up tables, and clean up after the dinner each night. On the day of Eid al-Fitr (the festival of fast-breaking), Balde was one of five African volunteers who played an important role in maintaining order among the 26,000 visitors to the official Eid al-Fitr morning prayer in that year. Balde’s hard work in the mosque paid off. On the last day of his service during Ramadan, he was recognized as an “Outstanding Volunteer” by the Imam of the mosque. As a religious institution, the mosque provided a venue for Balde to participate in organized activities, allowing him to interact with other members of the Muslim community. Through volunteering, members
200 of this close-knit group worked together and built mutual trust among peers (both Chinese and international Muslims). This created the opportunity for Balde to gain social recognition and develop a sense of belonging outside of mainstream society, where such recognition would not have been easily obtained. 98
In addition to daily and holiday prayers held at the mosques, African Muslims also gather for certain religious events. 99 During the holy month of Ramadan, African Muslims’ (as well as other Muslim groups’) willingness to make alms increase, driven by the belief that extra credits would be granted if one does good deeds in Ramadan. It is quite common to see free food and soft drinks offered to everyone in the mosques and prayer rooms, which are often paid secretively by someone unknown. During Ramadan in 2014, some Africans Muslims rented the basement of a building next to the Yueyang Trading Mall so that people could pray together overnight together right after finishing work to gain additional credit in the holy month, such as
Laylat Al Qadr (the “Night of Power”). 100 The following story from the “Night of Power” in
2014 illustrates how personal piety can be enhanced in the context of Ramadan, as well as the diversity in African Muslims’ collective religious activities.
Bara tried to convince me to go to the “Night of Power” pray and told me that his uncle (Songo), a successful Hausa businessman, and his wife Fatima, a Chinese from Guangdong province, would attend as well. I was surprised that Fatima would be there as she wasn’t a de facto Muslim, considering some local Cantonese Muslims would not participate in such night-long prayer if they had to work the next day. Around 11 pm on that day, Bara brought me to the basement of a building next to Yueyang Mall. When I entered the basement, I was amazed by how unnoticeable the prayer room was. Outside and above the prayer room were bars, and night markets, where non-Muslims were enjoying their nightlife. There were several rooms parallel to a long hallway. All of them
98 In addition to religious sites, study shows that non-religions sites, such as Muslim places of business in Guangzhou, play an important role in promoting a sense of community among Muslims of different origins (Su 2017). 99 Similar actions were recorded by Mathews, Lin, and Yang (2017) in that Arab Muslims also rented places to hold religious gatherings during Ramadan in 2014. 100 This "Night of Power (or Night of Decree)" is considered the most appropriate time of the entire year to pray for salvation and blessings. It is believed that a Muslim’s past sins are forgiven if the person prays throughout this night. Many Muslims assemble at mosques that night and pray from midnight until dawn.
201 seemed to be full as many African men were setting up their praying mats in the hallway outside of these rooms.
“Who rents this place?” I asked as we tried to pass these mats and people. “I don’t know. Some guy. During this month, many people are trying to do good deeds and hope to have more blessings back.”
Bara guided me to the women’s prayer room. It was about 15 square meters. When I entered, it was almost packed with women sitting quietly facing the front wall which I assumed was the west direction. As I squeezed myself and sit at the left behind corner, the woman who was there before me seemed to be annoyed by my arriving late. But she also was happy to see me as I was the only Chinese in the room. She told me that she was from Ghana, and we exchanged greetings. Then she started explaining to me about the process of worship and lecturing me on how the fact that I was late to such an important event was disrespectful. The room was small so there was no privacy for such a conversation. Some other women sitting in front of the room turned over and peeked at me. Their attention made me feel very embarrassed. In the middle of her “lecture,” the door opened once again, and a petite Chinese woman in her early 30s came in. That was when I first met Fatima. She wore a long white robe which made her look even smaller. She glanced at us and sat quietly beside me. After the woman finished talking, she turned to me and asked me in Chinese why I was lectured at. I told her that I was a bit late. She told me that she and her husband were late too because they had to put their daughter to sleep at home first. She then said, “you don’t have to listen to her. It is not the time, but the deed, that matters.”
They started praying and I followed. Luckily, I learnt a few movements in the mosque so I did not make big mistakes. Also, their attention was focused on making duas , not me. The prayer lasted for about 2 hours. After the event, some guys came in with food supplies. There were some pizza take-outs, some rice with chicken, some fufu, boxes of bottled water and soft drinks. Someone unknown donated them to the whole group based on the generosity encouraged by religious holidays. (Fieldnotes, July 26, 2014)
The story of the special night prayer reveals many aspects of African Muslims’ collective religious lives. First, it shows how devout many Muslims are, in that they managed to do business during the day and still fulfilled their religious obligations at night. Second, it shows the diversity of the African Muslim community and the inclusiveness of their activities, as it expands to non-African members like Fatima and non-Muslims like me. Third, it shows that by performing religious rituals collectively, these Muslims from different backgrounds reinforced a certain degree of religious uniformity. For example, the Ghanaian woman lectured me in order to
202 make me obey certain ritual rules and conform to the group. By contrast, it also shows conflict in the community, in that different members can view religious piety differently: Fatima’s idea of ritual actions is more flexible than that of the Ghanaian woman.
Islamic rituals are also apparent in other aspects of African Muslims’ lives, especially during holiday celebrations. Almost all Islamic holidays are celebrated with the public killing of an animal, be it a lamb, a chicken, or a cow. But most often, it is a lamb. The market demand for slaughter lambs resulted in an on-the-spot lamb butcher businesses: one can easily buy an alive lamb from Chinese Muslims and kill it on the street near Dengfeng market. On the day of the Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha, hundreds of lambs were killed on spot on the street.
Around noon, Bah came out from Yueyang Trading Mall. Unlike his usual business casual outfit, he wore a traditional robe so I asked what was the occasion. He said he was praying there and told me that today was Eid al-Adha (the Festival of Sacrifice) so he will join some countrymen later to celebrate. In the morning, they went to kill lots of lambs. They hired some restaurant staff to cook them. It was a big celebration . Bah said. As we walking towards Tianxiu, I saw about 10 lambs in front of Dengfeng hotel being killed. (Fieldnotes, Ocotber 15, 2013)
People also need lambs for other occasions, like birthday gatherings. Bah was asked several times to help in buying and killing a lamb for these special occasions. For example, on the day of the baby shower mentioned in the Interlude II, Bah later told me that he went to kill a lamb and bring back the meat for cooking.
On that morning, the father gave me the name of the baby in a piece of paper. I go[went] to buy a lamb. We have to kill it in [a] Muslim way. I usually go with another person, sometimes, I go alone. That person will hold the neck [of the lamb] so it is easier to get out the blood. We kill the lamb at 8 or 9 am because the party for the baby is around noon. After the lamb is killed, I call the name of the baby 3 times. And I bring back the meat to the party room. Some women, usually the mother, will cook it. (Bah, February 11, 2018)
These two stories of lamb killing show not only how central religion is in African Muslim’s daily lives, but also how devout some African Muslims are, in that even in a foreign city, they still
203 manage to keep strict religious rules of conduct. In addition, they demonstrate how effective religious-based commercial networks (what I identify as “religious catering networks” later on) are in providing both convenience and a sense of home mentioned in the previous chapter. To the groups of Muslim migrants described in this chapter, Islamic catering networks in Xiaobei allow for the continuation of traditions that may otherwise be hard to maintain in a foreign society.
The Economic Implications of Religious Common Ground
The religion of Islam is clearly advertised among businesses run by African Muslims, as shown on their shop signs – the colour of green, the sign of the star and the crescent moon, and the Arabic phrases. The “religious common ground” shared by African Muslims explored in the previous section reveals that the lives of these migrants largely revolve around religious obligations. Since most African Muslims are also economic migrants, they have to fulfil their economic needs. As a useful tool for creating business networks and finding business partners, sometimes religion helps them expanding their business networks and providing economic benefits. However, other times religious devotion can be challenging, as it can be hard to reconcile religious duties with economic needs. In this section, I show that religious devotion impacts African Muslims’ economic lives in a variety of ways.
Business Conduct
Sharing a “religious common ground” impacts African Muslims’ business in two
principal ways: in terms of morality and the selection of business partners. First, sharing the
same religion means recognizing a “universal morality” that Muslims across different cultures
acknowledge and follow (Osella and Osella 2009). More importantly, Islamic religious values
are embedded in their business conduct, as Islam sets moral and ethical boundaries for followers
204 when engaging with the market economy. For example, Muslim traders need to balance money- earning and religious modesty, as being greedy is not advocated by Islam (see Mathews, Lin, and
Yang 2017). A-Ming, a Libyan middle man who is quite fluent in Chinese and even adopted a
Chinese name, held that one should get as much profit as possible in a business deal. But nonetheless, he kept a picture in his phone as the screen background – which says “I am a
Muslim. Islam is perfect, but I am not. Please do not blame Islam for my fault. Blame me” – in case people blame him for being a profit-driven Muslim, as according to the Quran, being profit- driven is a sin.
In addition, religious beliefs limit what types of business Muslims can conduct, and how they conduct it. As Bah explained to me,
[Being a Muslim,] You don’t kill. Don’t sell beer [alcoholic beverages]. Don’t lie. Don’t sell drugs. Religion tell you what to do, [and] how to do. there are things you don’t do. If you sell these things — When you get the money — it is haram (refer to any act that is forbidden by Allah) you cannot use that money to do anything. You cannot build a mosque [with that money]. You must do things that make God happy. The person does bad things – [even if] you build a house, you have a lot of money, but when you die, all these [you] cannot bring with you. You have to be careful because when you die, God will judge. (Bah, April 9, 2018)
As Bah's remarks illustrate, religious customs mean that not all money is viewed equally, and religious outlooks can limit certain economic activities. 101 Just as Islamic regulations say
something about how much profit one can make, they also say that how one earns a profit is
important (perhaps even more important than the amount of profit).
Aside from regulations on profit, Islam also contains rules about how business should be
conducted, and what values should be central to business transactions. Honesty in business, for
example, is an important value. While all Muslims regard cheating and selling religiously
101 Such cultural views on money are not exclusively Islamic. Similar cultural views on money were observed by anthropologist Sharon Hutchinson (1992). She points out that Nuer people in southern Sudan also distinguish the origin of money, which constrains the usage of that money.
205 prohibited items in business as a disgraceful behaviour which is forbidden by Islam, the concept of proper business conduct sometimes varies due to different economic backgrounds of the
Muslim trader(s). Guangzhou is notorious for its counterfeit products (see Mathews 2015b;
Mathews, Lin, and Yang 2017), where one can buy a fake – but look-alike – Prada purse for 100 or 200 USD. In discussing the attitude towards the copied goods among small-scale African traders in Xiaobei, Mathews, Lin, and Yang (2007) demonstrate the complicated relationship between the moral and the legal aspects in informal business that African traders engage in.
Morality is how one conduct one’s life (meaning being honest with clients and helping the client ship copied items as if they are standard goods), and legality is the arbitrary rules that are often neglected (meaning knowing the copied goods are not legal but still ship and sell them).
During my fieldwork, I found that whether it is acceptable to make and sell these counterfeit products is conceived differently by different Muslim traders from different economic backgrounds. For some Muslims, counterfeit goods are not acceptable, and it is considered a distinguishing factor for Muslims and non-Muslims, as one Moroccan Trader states:
… some of the non-Muslims, not all of them, steal, lie, and sometimes are racist. Sometimes [they] cheat. They make fake goods. This is the small problem of the non- Muslims. But the Chinese Muslims don’t make fake things. Actually, sometimes I try to tell them [non-Muslims] to not make these things. (Ali, February 16, 2018)
But his observation is limited. Some Chinese Muslims do make and sell fake products. Many
Hui from Henan Province congregated in a shopping centre in Baiyun District, making a living
by selling counterfeit designer leather goods. Nancy, a Han Chinese who converted to Islam
through her marriage to a Cantonese Muslim, works in an Arab trader’s company. She sells
counterfeit high-fashion designer jewelry part-time. She provides her own theory on selling
counterfeit goods, which, according to her, is shared by other Huis.
206 I don’t think Allah would be mad if I sell fake goods. I think as long as I tell my clients that this is fake, it is ok. I will always be honest with my clients. I made this piece of Tiffany necklace using the same material as the original one, but I sell it at about 1/4 of the price they would have to pay for the original one. I earn my share but I would not sell a fake one to someone as the original, or tell them it is made of 18-carat gold but actually, it was gold plated – That is a cheat. That is not allowed by Islam! (Nancy, August 1, 2014)
Nancy’s case is a perfect example of the different understanding of the moral and the legal
debate mentioned above (Mathews, Lin, and Yang 2017). For Nancy, the morality in business
required by Islam is honesty, which she understands as being honest with clients about the
condition of her goods. But it doesn’t matter to her whether her action – making and selling
copied goods – is legal, or whether her morality is in fact selective, meaning that she is dishonest
to the original brand by plagiarizing the design.
For other people who are selling copied goods, the reasons are different. As devout as
Bah is, he would not sell religious forbidden items like cigarettes, alcohol, and drugs (mentioned previously), but he sells counterfeit goods. When I first came to a shoe market with him, I noticed that the puma sports shoes he ordered were only 65 yuan (about 10 USD) per pair. So I warned him about these shoes being fake, concerning that he’d be cheated. He laughed and said,
Of course, I know this is [these are] fake. No one wants to buy fake if they can afford the original. But in my country [Guinea], many people cannot even afford shoes. So they don’t care. If I sell them the original puma for over 100 USD, no one has the money for it. But some people can pay 20 or 30 USD for fake shoes. Of course, the quality is not the same. They know! But at least they can wear a good-looking shoe at a cheaper price. If this fake one, one [can] wear [for] one year, and the original one, one [can] wear [for] 3 years. Even they have 100 USD, they still will not pay for the original puma. They will buy 3 pairs of fake ones. Because they like wearing new shoes. (Bah, Ocotober 14, 2013)
Bah’s case shows that, on one hand, selling copied goods is more about the economic status of one’s clients, than the moral and the legal debate as argued by Mathews, Lin, and Yang (2017).
On the other hand, Chinese copied goods, to some extent, offer economically disadvantaged people an opportunity to enjoy new things for a small cost. While the legitimacy of making and
207 selling counterfeit products is debatable among Muslims, and there are different reasons for selling (or not selling) copied goods, the morality embedded in the “religious common ground” is the same. A Muslim trader should be honest, be it honesty regarding the condition of the goods to the clients (as seen in Bah’s and Nancy’s cases), or be it honesty in legal terms (as seen in
Ali’s case). However, as a customer, buying counterfeit goods might be just a personal choice, which has less to do with religion or morality. For example, Majib, a small electronic items trader from a middle-upper class in Yemen, would buy copied items for his personal use, but selectively:
I think we should all take advantage of China’s copy industry. For T-shirts or jeans, I would not care much if it is copied or not. I would by a D&G T-shirt just for the design for 30 dollars. I would not spend $300 on an original T-shirt, that is stupid. But I am willing [to] spend $300 on a running shoe. I would never buy sports shoes in [a] copied version! They are functional items. I go to Hong Kong to get the originals (Majib, October 27, 2013).
However, in some cases, this results from the local culture of consumption, in which appearances takes priority over quality. A Hausa trader from Niger who grew up in Gabon explains that counterfeit goods bear both economic and cultural factors in different regions of Africa:
For countries like Central Africa, like Angola, people value more quality than [over] quantity. But in West Africa, people like [to] buy more things at [a] cheap price. They do not care about quality. People also like brand names. If there is one fake product that carries a designer name, people will buy it. They see the brand over the quality. No matter what the quality it is, as long as it is cheap, they will buy it. (Aziz, March 17, 2014)
Second, the acknowledgement of a “religious common ground” plays an important role in how
Muslim businesspeople choose their business partners. Many Muslim traders prefer doing
business with other Muslims, and business cooperation between Muslims of different origins is
very common. As mentioned in the previous section, the mosque in any Muslim community is
both a place where religious ethics are taught and a focal point of religious communal activity.
208 The community, the mosque, and religious authorities like Imams exert social pressures that reinforce moral standards in business conduct. For example, Edel, a Hausa businessman from
Niger, and Ahmed, a young man from Yemen, met at a restaurant near one of the mosques and later developed a working relationship. Sharing the same religion adds a mutual trust between the two sides, rather than shared nationality or ethnicity (Su 2017), as Edel explains:
I will buy [stuff from] and sell [stuff to] non-Muslims, but I prefer to do business [develop a partnership] with Muslims. Do you know what is Islam? It is about how to conduct life. You see, we have a similar rule on how to conduct life, so there will be less unnecessary conflicts. I trust Ahmed. I work with him because he has a belief [Islam], so we both have the same thing to guide us. I found it is interesting how many Chinese do not have a religion.… What if someone cheats you in business? You [Chinese people] cannot do anything about it. But, for us, at least we have a God to look for. If we did something wrong, we have this guilt in ourselves, and inshallah this bad person will be punished. But I don’t know what you can do with people without beliefs? (Edel, April 30, 2015)
Some Muslim business owners even explicitly expressed their preference for hiring Muslim
employees due to the mutual trust based on shared religion rather than shared nationality,
ethnicity, or place of origin (Su 2017). They believed that sharing a similar moral code would
reduce the rate of dishonesty, and believing in the same religious values would be a good
mechanism to prevent cheating, as “there are only a few mosques where you can go.” (Edel,
April 30, 2015) Others admitted that they would not place more weight on the religious
background of their trading partners, as Bah said,
I trust some. Not all [Muslims]. You know Muslims don’t allow [to] drink beer, but some do. You know even cigar is not allowed. Cannot smoke a cigar. Same reason here, [If people break religious rules, then I] cannot trust [them]. Some [Muslims] are good. Some are not good. (Bah, April 9, 2018)
Religion also influences how they view business incidents that have happened in their lives. For
a devout Muslim, one sees business ups-and-downs as the will of Allah. Attribute business
successes to Allah’s generous offerings are quite common. Bah is always convinced by such
209 views, which made him acquiescent in looking at business failures. If he makes money, it was
God’s will; if he lost money, it was God’s will again. Others would attribute business losses to a human flaw (i.e., cheating), which I will discuss in the latter part of this chapter.
Economic Aid
Scholars have pointed out that Guangzhou’s African migrants (Muslim and non-Muslim) have built various forms of social ties to help them adapt to life in Guangzhou (Li et al. 2008).
The importance of social networks for enhancing the economic capacity of African migrants in
China has been emphasized by a number of researchers (Bertoncello and Bredeloup 2007;
Bredeloup 2012; Xu 2009a; 2009b). In most cases, due to the nature of their occupations and the religious background of most African Muslims, there is a large overlap of kinship ties and religious, business, and social networks (see also Lyons and Snoxell 2005).
One of the most important roles of these religious networks for African Muslims is the provision of various forms of financial support, besides the increased business opportunities mentioned earlier in this section, as financial support also comes in the form of welfare arrangements. In addition to zakat, there are a variety of welfare arrangements supported by the
African Muslim community. Many of these are based on personal donations (voluntary alms or sadaqa ). Often, in the situation of unexpected or unfortunate events, requests for help are
circulated. This kind of welfare arrangements is also made in the African Christian churches in
Guangzhou, which also provide community assistance in the form of donations and guidance to
people who are in need (Haugen 2012; 2013b). During my research, I heard of several cases in
which money was collected in order to send an ill or deceased person back to their home country.
According to municipal law, foreign Muslims are not allowed to be buried in Guangzhou. The
transportation fee for sending the body of the deceased home is quite high (approximately 70,000
210 yuan, or 11,340 USD). In most cases, this fee is paid through donations from community members. There were also donations for members who had to pay the overstay penalty or who experienced unfortunate events such as robbery. Bah, as a member of the Guinean community committee, described the case of a female Muslim trader who went to Guangzhou in 2009:
That mama [a term refers to older women], she came here to get some wigs…she carried all her money in her pocket [purse]. [It was like] that much [he made a sign of about 8 or 10 centimetres]. She carried her bag [purse] like this [on her shoulder], and was walking [around] near [the] Qinghai Hotel. She walked outside of the pedestrian road because it was packed with people, and two young guys riding moto-cycles behind her grabbed her purse and ran away. She sat and crying and crying. She lost everything! [She was] very sad. She knew one person, my friend. She called him. The friend called me. We [Guineans] had a meeting that night. After that, some started sending texts to people, some called people in our group, asking people to help her go home. We also tell[told] people about this on Friday [prayers]. [it] is like that. Some gave 100 yuan, some gave 100 USD, like that… (Bah, November 20, 2013)
Many Muslims, regardless of ethnic or national background, donated to support her in the
Islamic spirit of helping people in need. Eventually, they collected about 1,200 USD that allowed
the Guinean female trader to return to her home country.
Not to mention the beggars (predominately Chinese) in the neighbourhood who benefited
such aid system. After Friday prayer, there are always several Chinese beggars receiving a
handful of one hundred bills in their bowls (see also Mathews, Lin, and Yang 2017). As we can
see from the photo below, the Hui beggar’s fund-raising banner was in three languages –
Chinese, English, and Arabic, indicating not only the majority groups/languages spoken in
Xiaobei but also the religion ethics it aimed to target.
211
Figure 8: Hui beggars with trilingual banners on the pedestrian bridge in front of the Tianxiu Trading mall (Photo by author)
Aid provided within the African Muslim community can also take the form of personal favours. Migrants who are more settled help newcomers by providing important knowledge to help them perform basic tasks like secure accommodation and take out loans. Daran, a fashion clothing trader and middleman from Niger, would not be successful today were it not for the financial and social assistance of his “Muslim brothers” (his current boss, who was from his country and whom he addressed as “bro”). One day when we were hanging out in a café after work, Daran told me his story of how he first came and settled in Guangzhou:
When I first came to China in 2009, I do [did] not have much money. I have [had] some but not enough. My parents gave me some money to buy the tickets. Even the flight tickets from Niamey to Guangzhou are [were] expensive for me. I travelled on a bus for
212 24 hours to a city that has a cheaper ticket to China. When I arrived [in Guangzhou], I told the custom that I am here to travel. The customs lady asked me, how much money do you have? I only have 300 USD on me, I did not speak English well. I took the 300 USD from my pocket and showed [it to] her. It was a big amount for me, but she would not believe me, so she asked a lot of questions, like how I am gonna live in China with this little money. I told her that I have this piece of paper with this man’s number on it. He will help me. She did not even want to give me a visa. So she asked her boss inside of a room. The man said, give him a visa, and let him go . That is how I got here. Almost did not make it [he laughed].
I live with my bro. My bro provides me food so I am not starving but I was not happy at that time. For the first few months, I just sitting at home, watching movies. I do not know what to do. Where to find business.
I met a lot of people from my city (Niamey) here in Guangzhou. Before [coming to China], I do not know them. At that time, I am doing errands for lots of Africans. Sometimes I help my bro do small things like, ordering meals for him, or booking him a car…, like someone will pay me 50 yuan to get food and I got like 12 yuan back [he kept the change like a tip]. Like that. Small money. Sometimes my bro will bring me to cargo and I help him load goods, he will pay me like 200, or 300 yuan.
This lasted for 5 months!
I cried in [a friend’s shop in] Dengfeng and I said [that] I wanted to go back to Africa. People at Dengfeng are still joking about me. They say, Daran, when do you go back to Africa? But at that time, I do not know how to do business, and I do not see the future. I am[was] worried.
My bro helped me a lot. When he knew about my travel visa was gonna expire, he paid me to [attend] school [so that he can extend his visa as an international student].
Later, he taught me how to do business: what to buy, where to take your clients… I owe him. One day, one of my bro’s friend – that guy has a shop in Yueyang Market. He called me. He had 2 customers coming to his shop asking him to show them around. And since he has [had] a shop he does [did] not want to leave his business. He ask[ed] if I want to show them around. I came and take [took] them from Dengfeng to Yueyang and to Tianxiu. They made orders, and when [they] finished, they gave me 3,000 yuan (486 USD) for commission. This is my first big payment. These 2 men introduced a lot of customers to me, even now, they do not come to China, they just order through me. They trusted me.
I used that money with some other money I saved and brought 20 pieces of suits. I sent them to home, and ask[ed] my brother to sell it. I was so excited. I calculated every day before I go to bed (he said with his left-hand fingers touched his right paw – mimicking a posture of pressing the buttons of a calculator). [I was] Calculating how much I will earn in 2 months (as the shipping by sea route would take 2 months to arrive).
213
And now you see, 2 years later, I can buy 500 pieces (he said with a smile). (Daran, January 1, 2014)
Daran’s story shows that religious networks help enable foreigners to start businesses and
accumulate resources. Pre-existing religious networks provide an aid system for newcomers
without ties in the city, thereby helping with aspects of the transition to moving to a new place,
such as finding cheap accommodation, food from home, and surviving advice.
The Limits of “Religious Common Ground” Weak-Ties of the Religious Engagement = Insufficient Aid
Even though religious community brings many benefits, it’s not entirely sufficient to
meet all peoples’ needs in difficult circumstances. While aid based on religious networks is
effective, religious networks cannot replace other social ties. Compared to some underground
Churches in Nigerian Igbo community which offered 3,000 yuan to each member who got
caught by the police for overstaying their visas (Mathews, Lin, and Yang 2017), the Muslims’
method of donation is much less structured but more embedded in an individual’s relationship
with other members of the community. A group of Guinean traders has weekly meetings during
which people pray, attending lectures by their own Imams, and socialize with each other.
However, as there is a membership fee, many members of the younger generation either do not
want or do not have the cash ability to join. 102 In November 2013, two Fulani men (34 and 25
years old) were caught by local Police for overstaying their visas. Although they shared the same
religious practice and went to the same mosque to pray, the leader failed to collect enough
102 The exact amount differs based on each member’s occupation or economic background (with students paying less and traders paying more). Most times, it relied on a voluntary donation of 100 yuan (16.2 USD) on average per month.
214 money to support these two men, as many members were upset at their lack of attendance at meetings. On the contrary, Bah, an active member of the community, told me his story:
If they come to the meetings more, do you think people in my community won’t give money for them? Choo, did I tell you what happened when my father died? In 2011, I was in China, and my brother called me. I had to go home fast [for the funeral]. I bought the ticket for the next day. When I was at the airport, they [people in his community] came! They came to put 6,000 USD in my hands. [it was] collected from my people. You see? If you know people, people will help you. Sometimes, I don’t know what these [younger] people in my community think. They hide! They do not engage with people in meetings! When they are in trouble, some people will say, I do not want to help them because I do not know them. They do not come to meetings . This time, these two men, people are angry also because they did not tell [the community that their visas had expired in advance]. Now instead of paying a fly ticket [for them to go home], we have to pay the big amount [ the 10,000 yuan/1,620 USD per person penalty for overstaying their visas] and we still have to collect money for their tickets [to go back to Guinea]. That is stupid. (Bah, January 23, 2014)
In this case, these two young men have failed to establish their personal ties in the community.
Hence, when they are in trouble, they have no one to seek help from. In her research, Heidi
Haugen (2012) recorded that in African Christian communities, whenever the demand for assistance exceeds the capacity of the church assistance, members often seek alternative ways to seek help. Similarly, for Muslim Africans, if their religious networks prove unreliable or do not serve a particular function, people turn to extended family ties. In the end, the relatives of these two young men paid the majority of the penalty. While religious networks can provide many benefits to Africans, in such situations only blood ties can be relied upon. As observed by the older brother of one of these two Fulani men mentioned above, one cannot get rid of the obligation of being a family member easily. According to him: “You can run away from your boss, even your friends, but not your family.”
In some other cases, failed aid is just a result of selfishness. A Guinean man told me that he used to play football with some friends from Guinea regularly. Before he came to Guangzhou in 2013, there was a very kind, nice Guinean guy who always helped others. At the time, he was
215 friends to all the people on the team. One day, it turned out that he was caught by police due to overstaying his visa. The captain of the football team asked for donations from members of the community to collect the fee for his ticket and overstay fees. But to his surprise, many people, including those who had received help from that guy, refused. “Some people, they don’t have much. Some people, they have money. They just want to enjoy their lives. They are selfish. That man stayed in jail for more than 3 months and it was the Chinese government who paid for his tickets to go back home,” he said with disappointment. (Issac, November 12, 2013)
Micro-Conflicts, Misunderstandings, and Prejudices
While religion ties provide a common ground for Muslims from different backgrounds to build social relationships, there are always divisions and conflicts. Like any multi-ethnic group, conflicts inevitably arise as a result of differences between ethno-nationalities, stereotypes, regional differences, and individual personalities, either in Muslims’ daily social lives or in their business.
As mentioned before, Chinese Muslim is a category covering diverse people who come
from different ethnicities and regions of China. Besides the general tension between Hui and
Uyghurs (Erie 2016), misunderstandings arise as there are class differences within the same
ethnic group of Chinese Muslims. As the Hui are widely dispersed in China, the tensions
between different groups of Hui results from different customs in their hometown environment.
In the foreign Muslim community, a dominant stereotype-led tension is that Arabs
(especially these from Middle East) and Africans do not usually mingle together. Many Arab
traders were quite proud of their country’s economic development. They generally had higher
economic statuses than Africans. I have encountered several cases where Arabs looked down
216 upon Africans for being poor. In November 2013, I was introduced by a friend to a Saudi trader,
Saad, who was quite blunt about this. When I first met him, I showed him around the market of
Tianxiu and told him that many Africans come here to do business. He was impressed by the variety of goods, but not quite happy with the quality as he was looking for better ones. Later in a café, he asked me if I had been to Dubai. I said no. He showed me photos of infrastructures like the Hkahifa tower and the Burj Al Arab (a 7-star hotel) – then he took over my notebook, wrote down a few country names: Saudi, Kuwait, Emirates, Bahrain, and Qatar. “See, these are rich people. And…, your African friends – are –”, he paused writing, looked at me, and said, “poor.”
(Saad, November 11, 2013)
Other times, this economic superiority usually was not conveyed explicitly like in the above case, but instead unintentionally mentioned in conversations with me. For example, A-
Ming, the Libyan middleman, once told me that he would go to Tianjin to supervise the shipment of two containers of goods. I was surprised that he had to go there himself, considering the cost of the air tickets and hotels would be at least 5,000 yuan (810 USD). He said,
My clients are quite wealthy. This trip cost, compared to my commission, is nothing. I never do small business like your friend (referring to some Africans’ one-time purchase was about 10,000 yuan/1,620 USD), whose profit is so little that can be easily worn away by taxi bills and one or two dinners with custom guys. (A-Ming, October 17, 2013)
This biased attitude also shows in other aspects, when he first learnt that I was doing research
among Africans, he told me to be careful. In the beginning, I thought he just wanted to be polite
to show his care. But he actually took it seriously. His reasons were: “They have AIDS!” (A-
Ming October 17, 2013) I was shocked and said that was not true. In defending himself, he
approached his laptop and searched online, and showed me what he found: “Humans had sex
217 with chimpanzees in South Africa in 1959 which spread aids around the world”. 103 Despite this possibly not even being true, in the text, there was no mentioning that that human was an
African, nonetheless, A-Ming firmly believed so, “That is how Africans got AIDS and it will pass [on] to us!” (A-Ming, October 17, 2013)
According to some Africans (especially these from sub-Saharan regions), Arabs’ superiority is not only shown in their pride at their higher economic statue but also in their attitude to their religion. One of the Africans told me that he was annoyed by Arabs’ superiority regarding Islam:
“Once there was an Arab guy coming to pray in the mosque, he was so surprised that we were there too. He looks [looked] like this [mimicking the eyebrow frown of the Arabs]. They [Arabs] think they are the real Muslims. They think they know better the religion and the Quran because it is in their language. But Allah says we are all equal.” (Bara, April 7, 2014)
But his resentment is not just targeted at the Arabs, but also towards the media from the Western world; after the “Je suis Charlie” movement in France in January 2015, he was a bit upset that the media was overwhelmingly reposting about the incident, while “no one cares much about the terrorist attacks in northern Nigeria. There are more people dying in Africa by Islamic terrorists.
But no one cares!” (referring to the terrorist attack on November 28, 2014 at the Central Mosque in Kano)
Even Bah, a person who had never been to Arab countries, learnt negative stories as
second-hand information from the news on TV and Facebook, as well as stories told by friends.
Still, he holds a negative view of Arabs as all the stories he heard were negative, which also
contributes to his own stereotyped impressions of Arabs in general.
Arabs, really I don’t like [them]. Because they are racist. Why? You ask everybody. They [would] say the same. Because of this [that they are racist], I never go there. Never do
103 The web article A-Ming showed to me is titled “Who was the first person infected with HIV and how were they infected?” (https://www.theguardian.com/notesandqueries/query/0,5753,-27837,00.html)
218 business with them. In Libya, some months ago, what they [were] doing to black people, kill them like animals 104 . It is bad! How come they do this? They [Libyans] are also Africans! For [From] my heart, really, I don’t like any [Arab] people there. Also, Islam is not just Arabs’. It is a religion that everybody can join. Not all Arabs are Muslims, some are even Christians! (Bah, April 9, 2018)
Since these Muslims are mainly in Guangzhou for business, some other African Muslims see the conflict should take precedent to individuals’ economic goals. Momar, a Muslim trader from
Dakar, has a more neutral and non-judgemental view. Coming from a middle-class family, he was in Dubai working for his family business, before coming to Guangzhou in 2012.
I don’t mind doing business with Arabs. They never treat me badly. In fact, I have some clients from there. Two actually. I think as long as you are doing good [deeds], people see you doing good [deeds], they will do good [deeds] too. I don’t mind doing business with non-Muslims, either. I don’t think [that] if you are [a] Muslim, you are better, or if you are not [a] Muslim, you are bad. Maybe [this is] because I don’t socialize with my business partners much. I like to keep my life and business separate. Business is just business. I offer you this, and you take it if you like. When business is done, I go my way, you go your way. (Momar, April 9, 2018)
Besides stories between the two main foreign Muslim groups—Arabs and Africans— there are
also tensions resulting from different religious practices between Chinese and foreign Muslims.
Su (2017) documented conflict between an African Muslim and local Cantonese Muslims, in
which the Africans thought that the Cantonese Muslims who used incense in the mosque were
disrespectful to Allah, whereas the latter was just following local customs, which was accepted
by many local Cantonese Muslims. Many local Cantonese Hui is quite flexible in their practices,
especially those work in white-collar jobs in the office buildings, where rigid daily prayer is not
so convenient. Many Chinese Muslims think that if one cannot perform prayers during the
required time, as long as one makes up these prayers at home after work, it is acceptable. The
head of the Islamic Association in Guangzhou supports such actions and provides an
104 Referring to the Libya slave trade reported in November - December 2017.
219 explanation, quoting from the Quran, “Allah gives you convenience, not troubles.” This flexible attitude is not understood by all other foreigners (Zhang and Wang 2010).
There are also tensions growing out of ignorance of Islam and individual personalities. Rose is a Chinese trader in cosmetics, and her husband, Victor, runs a store selling machine parts like farm generators. Rose told me, after hearing that I went to the mosques, that her husband always had some clients “who do not eat pork.” Usually, he would invite their clients for dinner after the business is done, especially when the client made a big purchase. Rose said, “my husband would just give that guy some cash and point out which restaurants have halal food, and let him/them go eat there. He is shy, and he feels weird to be in that kind of restaurant”
(Rose, April 2, 2014). This doesn’t mean Rose and Victor were racist against Africans or
Muslims, but rather, it shows their discriminatory and dismissive attitude towards the Muslim population based on ignorance. After Rose began her business with sub-Saharan Africans, the couple’s attitudes, especially Rose’s, changed. Unlike Victor, who is more of an introvert, Rose is quite outgoing. Many times I saw her joking around with her African customers. As a result of increased interactions with African Muslim clients, she now greets clients by saying “ Salaam ,” and sometimes goes out with her clients to halal restaurants. Once or twice, Victor and their kids even joined them. Rose’s attitude changed more after her good friend in the shopping mall, Lily, married her Guinean boyfriend and converted to Islam. Though Rose and Victor’s interactions with Muslims were for an economic purpose (to attract and retain business), through such interactions they became more and more open to a religion that they previously knew nothing about.
220 Business Cheating
Mathews, Lin, and Yang (2007) discuss cheating in the business between Chinese and
African traders caused by the “mistaken cultural assumptions”. Africans assume the Chinese will always cheat so they bargain for a low price to reduce their potential losses, while the
Chinese side will substitute the quality for such low price in order to keep the business going.
Being a Muslim doesn’t mean one is immune to cheating. In the business world, while sharing a common belief of Islam sometimes does help create trust, but most often it does not – cheating in business is very common, even among Muslims. 105 I overheard a tragedy in the mosque during the 2014 Ramadan. The son of Yang, a woman from Gansu, was cheated of 300,000 yuan
(48,600 USD) by his business partner from Lebanon. They were working together for a long time, and her son thought they had established mutual trust between them. So one time, he sent the money without asking the guy to send back dollars immediately. After the money was wired, the guy vanished. Rumors said that that guy had already fled to China. Besides printing out the passport information of the person and circulating it among prayer attendants, there seemed nothing the poor woman could do for her devastated son.
Foreign Muslims also often complained that Chinese are short-sighted in their approaches to earning money. A-Ming recalled that his client once was cheated and lost 3,600 yuan (583.2
USD) when he went to the black market money exchange site with Uyghurs (He was quite certain that man was an Uyghur, although it is possible that he was from another ethnic group from Xinjiang that looked like Uyghur). “He [A-Ming’s client] wanted to exchange 20,000 USD for Chinese yuan. He saw for himself that the counting machine showing the right amount, but
105 No one knows for sure the percentage of business cheating among China-Africa businesses, but it is common hearsay among Africans that Chinese cheat (see also Mathews, Lin and Yang 2017).
221 when he counted the money again at home, they were 3,600 yuan short! I never go to them for this again. I have a Hui guy I can trust.” (A-Ming, October 17, 2013)
Dina, a second-hand clothes trader from Zambia, who was introduced to me by a Chinese cargo businessman, told me a story about how she and her business partners were cheated by a
West African man. Dina is Christian.
In China [ever since 2005], the time I was cheated is by an African guy 2 years ago [2011]. We are 4 people in Guangzhou together. We have 3 women and 1 man together. All of us are from Zambia. This Guinean man has an office in Tianxiu, he showed us some items [that] we like. So each of us bought something from him and we put things together for one shared container. There is no direct port in Zambia, so when the goods arrive either they go to a port near Angola or somewhere else. The goods have to be transported on land. Everything was good until the land part. The goods arrived in the right port, but I do not know why somehow the goods were transported to Guinea on land, and disappeared since! I still have not figured out why. We were angry. He obliviously cheated us. We lost 59,000 USD in total, in which my money is 22,000 USD.
This is the disadvantage of being a woman – the man in our group said, you are women, let me go back to deal with it. We put some money together so that he can buy a ticket and go back to argue with that man.
We trusted him. He should fight for us together, but he fights for himself – he got his money and disappeared.
You know how they cheat people? They have an office – a big room with all samples on the wall for a display to show customers. They will tell you that they have resources for all kinds of goods from all kinds of factories. The items they showed to us are of good quality. They say they can give you a good price because the Chinese wife has connections with factories. They just want you to think like that! After you pay and you go [leave China]. Your money is gone as well.
Next time I came here, I went to argue with him. The Chinese wife was rude to me. She also cheats like her husband! She asked me to go out. She said nothing happened and I was lying. We ended up in a fight. I scratched him.
The Chinese wife has some connections with police I think. I went to the police twice for this. But the police is[was] defending the Guinea guy. I see something going on there: The first time I went to the police, they asked me to come back the next day at 12 pm. The next day I went there, the policeman was not there, but another one was there. The Guinea guy did not even show up. And the other policeman talked to me. He said, what do you want us to do? If we deport him, you won’t get your money back; if we send him to court, you still cannot get the money back. The next time they say if this is a case
222 between Chinese and Africans, they can take care of it. But if this is between Africans, they cannot do anything about it. You see, they are defending him!
After that, I do not do business with Africans. I see a shop opened [operated] by Africans, I go [leave]. (Dina, December 20, 2013)
After two years, Dina still keeps the business card of that Guinean man. “I am telling everyone about him! So I took a photo of that guy’s business card, thinking perhaps I can follow up on this.” Coincidentally, a few weeks later, a Hausa businessman from Niger I knew mentioned that his friend being cheated by a Muslim in Tianxiu, which reminded me of Dina’s story, so I showed this Guinean man’s business card to him. He saw the name and shop location, and said, I know this man. He is the guy who cheated my friend.
That was two years ago (2012). I brought my friend to Tianxiu to this Chinese lady who I always buy things from. I introduced them. But next time when he went alone, he found this Guinean guy who offered him a cheaper price. So he paid 2,000 USD as the deposit. The next day I went to Tianxiu, the Chinese lady told me, Daran, I saw your friend ordered from that guy but he does not have [any] things. He is cheating.
So I went to ask him for money back. He speaks French. He said, ne pas avoir d'argent [‘don’t have any money’ in French]. How come no money? I flight and flight. And I called the police. The Chinese woman [who, according to Dina was his wife] works there, also cheats. She lied to the police. The police knew him! They asked him to give back the money to us. Finally, he did.
The next time, he saw me, he said, sorry bro . And we made peace. After that incident, I find out that he is even a friend’s friend. Now we just say bonjou r (‘hi’ in French) if we meet on the street, but he is not my friend. I identify myself as a Muslim. Muslim is not just about praying, not [to] eat pork, these kinds of things, but it is about here (he pointed to his heart). He is not a true Muslim. (Daran. January 21, 2014)
Based on these two cases, it is most likely the Guinean man did cheat. But the different attitude this Guinean man displayed with Dina and Daran is interesting. First, he gave back the money to
Daran and Dina’s male partner, but not to Dina, demonstrating gender bias. Second, he apologized to Daran – perhaps this came out from a sense of morality based on religious merits?
Perhaps he felt peer pressure from the Muslim community? Perhaps the conversation with Daran
223 was done in French – which both sides are fluent in – so that they avoided any miscommunication which might have taken place in Dina’s case. Moreover, the police handled these two cases differently; but why did the alleged connections between the Chinese wife and the police work in Dina’s case, but not in Daran’s? Perhaps this was because Daran was a tough- looking African guy, and Dina was a woman. Perhaps because Daran has a resident visa, and
Dina is on a two-entry tourist visa? Perhaps Daran speaks fluent Chinese and Dina speaks none?
Perhaps this happened so many times, that the police finally got tired of this couple and decided to take actions? I tried to locate this Guinean man but he and his wife moved, so my questions will remain unanswered for a while.
Conclusion Having built on the last chapter’s discussion of the development of a multi-ethnic Muslim community in Guangzhou, this chapter focused on one group of foreign Muslims in the city:
African Muslims. The presence of African Muslims to Guangzhou today is the result of a longstanding link between China and the Islamic world through Maritime Silk Road. Most
Muslims interviewed during my fieldwork admitted that they migrated to China not because of religion but for economic reasons. However, the religious environment of Guangzhou has facilitated the integration of African Muslims with other Muslim groups in the city. In particular, this appears to represent “religious common ground,” the moral and ethical values shared among the Muslim community.
In most respects, especially the attitudes towards cheating and being cheated in business, and the support of religious networks and institutions provided to individuals (despite the amount and the kind of the support may vary for different individuals), these African Muslims are similar to African Christians as depicted in previous scholarly work (e.g., Mathews, Lin, and Yang
224 2017; Haugen 2013). In this sense, one may argue that religion is not the key factor in preventing business fraud or in determining the social support like charitable donations and providing guidance in their everyday lives. However, religion is still a pivotal factor for the different attitudes that the Chinese government has towards managing and regulating the religious activities of African Muslims and African Christians. This is especially apparent in these religious activities considered “illegal” in China, such as the informal prayer rooms are widely existed and allowed while these underground churches are subjected to constant police raids
(Mathews, Lin, and Yang 2017).
The “religious common ground” not only regulates African Muslims’ religious conduct individually and collectively, but also helps shape African Muslims’ social and economic lives, such as social integration, economic opportunities, welfare security, and providing aid to those in need and strategies to navigate the city. Although many of the activities within the Muslim community are based on nationality, a “religious common ground” often enables a common
Muslim identity to transcend ethnic, religious, and national differences. Particularly important are mosques and prayer rooms, which provide spaces for African Muslims to interact with other groups. However, sharing a religion does not guarantee that a person will not be cheated or negatively judged. And all communities are at fault with divisions and conflicts: stereotypes and divisions among different Muslim groups still exist; cheating in business can happen among
Muslims; aid from religious circles would not be sufficient if one does not have strong ties to the community.
225 Conclusion: Transience and Mobility
The next time Bah called me via skype, he had already been in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam for a month. He told me that he switched from buying and selling sports shoes to boxed juice. He had some friends who were previously in Guangzhou and had relocated to Ho Chi Minh in 2015. After several conversations with his friends, Bah learned that boxed juice in Vietnam was inexpensive and saw the potential in entering that industry. A few months later, Bah arrived in Ho Chi Minh to do some market research. He purchased a small quantity of boxed juice to ship back to Conakry to test the local market. He sounded happy. Compared to Guangzhou, Bah reported that “in Ho Chi Minh, life is little easy [easier]. It is very quiet here [fewer Africans]. The police leave you alone.” But there is one thing Bah was not very pleased with – the halal food market and the city mosque are far away. “If I go out to eat, I do not know if I would order pork by mistake. Because of this I have a bad time in Vietnam. I cook my food at home.”
(Notes, February 1, 2018)
Since the end of 2014, lower oil prices and the weakened global economy have led to claims that the African population in Guangzhou is shrinking. In June 2016, a popular CNN
(Cable News Network) article circulated in Chinese and in the international media claimed that many Africans were giving up their “China dreams”—a term that both alludes to and parallels the “American dream”—by going back to Africa or relocating their businesses to Southeast
Asian countries like Vietnam or Laos (Marsh 2016). During a trip to Lagos, Nigeria in March
2016, I also learned that many Chinese traders were relocating their factories to Africa because labour costs were cheaper there, and their African clients could order directly from these factories. As a result, these African traders did not need to travel to Guangzhou/China or use middlemen to obtain products.
Guangzhou’s police bureau disputed these claims about decreasing African economic activity in China. Instead, the city government showed that 11,000 Africans had registered in
226 2015, including 5,000 long-term residents, a number that was 1,000 higher than that of 2014
(4,000). This statistical evidence further supports my claim in Chapter 3, where I argue that
Africans are excluded from Chinese immigration system not merely because of racism, but also because small-business owners have a “low-end” (unskilled) status in the global trading economy. The total number of Africans registered in Guangzhou in 2015 was 5,000 fewer than those who did so in 2014 (16,000). Nonetheless, there have been more than 600,000 visits from
Africans to the city each year since 2013, accounting for nearly 10 percent of the total visits from foreigners, according to Chen Rugui, Deputy Party Chief of Guangzhou (Q. Qiu 2015).
Indeed, the aftermath of the “Beautification Project” mentioned in Chapter 2 and 3 resulted in a much smaller African presence in Dengfeng area, as shown in the comparison between Figure 9a and 9b (below). But this does not mean Africans stopped coming to the city.
The Canton Fair is still attracting many foreign buyers, daily trading businesses continue, and the
Hong Kong factory owner who told me about moving to Vietnam for cheaper manual labor in
2013 is still in Guangzhou. The former informal business conducted by both Chinese and
African migrants has been relocated from the square in front of the Dengfeng Hotel (as shown in
Figure 9a) to the pedestrian bridge, the alleys, and office buildings, and is therefore now less visible than it was before. But it nonetheless continues. The empty square (Figure 9b) only indicates that the formerly visible migrant population has become much less visible—it has not disappeared (Van Wyk 2016).
227
Photo 9a (top): The Entrance to Dengfeng-Yueyang area in 2014 Photo 9b (botton): The Entrance to Dengfeng-Yueyang area in 2016 (Photo source: Marsh 2016)
As I write this conclusion, some of my interlocutors like Bah, Sita, Abdul, and Barry are no longer in China. Among those who have left, some are still connected with Sino-African businesses in various ways. Some, for instance, have asked their friends who remain in
Guangzhou to purchase goods for their clients when new orders are made. Issac graduated from
228 Guangdong University of Foreign Studies. He got married and become a buyer for his family’s trading business in Conakry, Guinea, using his Chinese language skills. He and his wife now alternate between spending time in Guangzhou and Conakry. Meanwhile, some stay. Bara, after going home to Abuja and getting married, returned to Guangzhou with some other Nigerians in
2017 and continues his business trading small electronic devices. Songo still lives in Guangzhou with his Chinese wife, Fatima, and their two daughters. Every year, he goes back to Abuja for one or two months to connect with the other side of his family and clients. Mobby, although he keeps complaining about his business not being as good as it was before, remains in Guangzhou.
As mentioned in Chapter 3, his wife started studying at a Chinese language school in 2015; she has since become his business assistant and translator. Sidy still manages his clothes shop and has not yet given up his dream of finding a Chinese wife.
As long as China remains a major international manufacturing centre, Africans will still come. Some migrants will then leave, while others will stay. As an old Chinese expression goes,
“the merchants are like water, as they come and go like ocean waves; the market is like iron, as it remains unshakable” ( 流水的商人 , 铁打的市场 , Liushui de Shangren, Tieda de Shichang ). There will be new Bahs, new Sitas, new Abduls and new Barrys, coming, going, and/or staying, leaving their stories in Guangzhou.
***
Throughout the dissertation, I have discussed how the Chinese government’s immigration and economic policies control, mediate, and regulate the lives of Africans in the context of post- socialism, and in turn how Africans in Guangzhou seek to circumvent these limits. The study has focused in particular on how they create their social, economic, and political niches in the city through their interactions with local residents, including local Cantonese, Chinese internal
229 migrants, and other foreigners. I also attended to migrants’ religious conduct in Guangzhou as a form of community generated law—a system of enforceable rules, ethical norms, and community identity—what I term a “religious common ground,” that serves to regulate African Muslims’ religious practice, establish social order, transcend ethnic-national differences, and shape African
Muslims’ business conduct. I conclude that the ways in which the Chinese government regulates
African migrants, including through tightened visa controls, daily surveillance, and strict border management, discloses its conservative and exclusionary attitudes towards low-skilled migrants like African small-business owners. One major consequence of this approach is that almost all the Africans I engaged with were unable to obtain the legal documents necessary for a stable, long-term stay in China. Meanwhile, the lack of uniform enforcement of immigration laws creates spaces in which African migrants negotiate and work around the formal legal system.
“Visa-partnerships,” for example, constitute an informal form of economic cooperation between
African migrants, Chinese, and visa agents that has developed to maximize African migrants’ legal benefits in China.
My Positionality as Researcher
Before I examined how Africans are treated in the Chinese legal system, I first looked at various factors that have affected the ethnographic data that were accessible to me. As this dissertation is ethnographically centred, my writing drew inspiration from anthropologists who recognize the limits of the ethnographic form in describing social reality (Marcus and Fischer
1986). In particular, I recognize the relative truth-value of an ethnographic account (Fujii 2010).
That is, the value of my narrative data does not lie solely in their accuracy, but also in the meta- data that accompany interview responses—interlocutors’ spoken and unspoken thoughts and
230 feelings that are not always articulated in storytelling but emerge in other ways. In recognition of this, I believed it was necessary to consider how my personal history and social relations have informed my ethnographic work. To that end, I have reflected on my positionality as a female
Chinese scholar among a male-dominated group of African migrants, questioning how gender, ethnicity, and nationality shaped the stories my interlocutors told me, as well as the kind of materials accessible to me.
Chinese Government’s Control over African Migrants
Building on diverse ethnographic examples, the dissertation demonstrates the various ways in which China’s legal system attempts to control, mediate, and regulate African migrants’ presence in Guangzhou. For instance, I focus largely on the multiple ways in which black
African are discriminated against under China’s immigration law. Through a historical analysis of Chinese immigration laws and regulations, I show that Chinese immigration laws are not only unable to cope with the current influx of foreign migrants, but also design to prevent unskilled foreigners, like African small-scale traders, from accessing to long-term, stable visas.
In revealing the complexity of how Africans are treated in the Chinese legal system, I also compare the legal rights of African migrants, Chinese internal migrants, and local
Guangzhou residents. I point out that many of the legal rights denied to Africans, as well as other foreign migrants, are also denied to internal migrants. This is largely because China’s hukou system creates an internal division among citizens, with implications for population management. I emphasize that while Africans are discriminated against in the Chinese immigration system, some of the denial of benefits to Africans cannot simply be understood as
‘anti-African’ (or ‘anti-foreigner’ in general), as they apply to internal migrants and other
231 foreigner groups as well. My analysis not only shows Chinese social context that distinguishes itself from other Western countries, it also provides a nuanced perspective in understanding the complexity of exclusion and inclusion in Chinese immigration system that African migrants in the city experience. Therefore, the way in which Africans are treated in Guangzhou should to be analyzed in the context of Guangzhou and Chinese society, including Guangzhou’s accelerated economic development, China’s exclusionary citizenship policy based on ethnicity, and China’s restrictive immigration policy that favours high-skilled foreign workers.
Another example of Chinese government’s impact on the African population comes in my discussion of the central role the party-state plays in creating a relatively inclusive religious environment for African Muslim migrants. Borrowing the concept of “complicity” (Siu 1999), I examine how the Chinese party-state, local government, and Muslim traders have all contributed to making today’s Guangzhou a city where Muslims from all over the world congregate.
Especially significant in establishing Guangzhou as a major centre of Islam in East Asia is the city’s historical role as a hub in China’s maritime trade, as well as its centrality to the party- state’s recent Belt and Road Initiative. Driven by economic development strategies, the party- state regards Islam as a potential tool that can be leveraged to re-enforce its ties with the Islamic
World. Therefore, the Chinese government treats Islam with a more lenient attitude in
Guangzhou compared to other “foreign” religions such as Christianity. Governments at different levels also engage in this process by issuing policies (and by selectively enforcing others) designed to make Guangzhou an inclusive environment in which Islam can flourish.
232 African Migrants’ Legal Navigation
Throughout this dissertation, I draw attention to the agency of African migrants, and contrast it with the Chinese party-state’s control of African’s presence in Guangzhou. While
Chinese law is designed to deny Africans long-term stays in the country, inconsistent law enforcement creates spaces in which African migrants can negotiate and sometimes work around legal structures (cf. Lan 2015; Haugen 2019). My work therefore highlights both the formal and informal strategies that African migrants use in navigating China’s immigration system. In practice, African migrants employ different strategies, both individual and collaborative, to circumvent visa requirements and regulations. Individual strategies include becoming a student while in country in order to switch visa statuses, obtaining specific foreign passports in order to gain better access to visas, and changing places of residence. Building on Lan’s (2015, 2016) argument about informal cooperation between Africans and Chinese internal migrants, and
Castillo’s (2015) research on catering networks, I argue that a “visa-partnership”— an economic relationship between African migrants, Chinese, and visa agents— has developed in order to maximize Africans’ visa rights. These include business collaborations between an African on student visa and another person who can legally work in China and several small-scale business owners combining their resource for a visa upgrade. I also highlight Sino-African marriage as a special form of visa-partnership. This concept of the visa-partnership has provided a more comprehensive framework through which look at relationships among Africans, and between
Africans and Chinese.
233 Muslim African Migrants’ Religious Networks
My dissertation also explores how migrants engage in business and practice religion in trans-ethnic and trans-national ways while holding tenuous legal statuses. I attended to African migrants’ religious conduct in Guangzhou as a form of community generated law—a system of enforceable rules, ethical norms, and community identity. Drawing on various examples, my work has shown that religious networks built on shared religious identities not only provide
African Muslims with financial and social aid, but also facilitate social integration. Perhaps the most important role of religious networks for African Muslims is the provision of various forms of support, including financial aid and social networks. Beyond such material considerations, a shared Muslim identity and religious values, what I term a “religious common ground,” regulates migrants’ social, economic, and religious conduct through daily religious practices, business transactions, holiday celebrations, and social gatherings. It also reinforces certain religious obligations such as participating in community activities, as members who do not join in the religious life of the community are excluded from the benefits offered by religious networks.
Related to the notion of “religious common ground,” the dissertation also looks at the special importance of religious institutions such as mosques and prayer rooms in providing the physical spaces in which African Muslims build community and develop a sense of belonging outside the mainstream of Chinese society. Through examining the religious networks among
African Muslims, largely developed out of these locations, I point out that religious networks function as a mechanism for African Muslims to cope with everyday challenges, including those related to their tenuous immigration statuses and social discrimination. A communal space in which to discuss and attempt to collectively address these difficulties is especially important in
234 Guangzhou since the city’s formal welfare system is insufficient and/or cannot be accessed by transnational migrants.
Contextualizing African Migrants
As I argue throughout this dissertation, the experiences of Africans in Guangzhou should be analyzed in the broader context of Chinese society, including Guangzhou’s historical maritime trading ties, its urban and economic development processes, and China’s restrictive system of citizenship based on ethnicity. First, demographically, I examined Africans in relation to other migrant groups in the city rather than looking at Africans as if they were an isolated group. Inspired by previous scholars who situate Africans alongside either Chinese internal migrants (e.g., Lan 2015) or other groups of foreigners (e.g., Mathews, Lin, and Yang 2017), I present Africans as neither the only nor the largest group of foreigners in Guangzhou:
Guangzhou is a diverse and complicated city. This holistic approach leads me to compare the legal rights of Chinese internal migrants, Guangzhou hukou holders, and African migrants. By doing so, I challenge the tendency in previous scholarship to portray China’s immigration system, policies, and enforcement as targeting Africans specifically (e.g., Haugen 2012;
2018;Huang 2019). Moreover, by comparing the legal rights of Africans and members of both categories of Chinese citizenship, I am able to see that the denial of benefits to Africans is not solely the product of anti-black racism, it is also a product of China’s rigid hukou system. This leads me to understand that Africans’ legal and political marginalization is also the result of their
“low-end status,” another similarity with Chinese internal migrants. This also explains why
Chinese immigration laws and their local implementation have a major impact on small-scale
African business owners, as they tend to be more legally and economically vulnerable than more
235 skilled foreign workers. Second, studying African migrants within the context of Guangzhou’s multi-ethnic society also sheds light on diversity within the city’s Muslim community. I pointed out that the historical presence of Islam combined with the city’s extensive trading economy has attracted Muslims from diverse origins, including from Central and Northwestern China, North and West African countries, the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. The ethnic and regional diversity among Muslims in Guangzhou has provided a context that enabled me to examine African Muslims’ interactions with other Muslim groups in the city. Third, attentiveness to the diversity within the African Muslim community in Guangzhou demonstrates that scholars should avoid generalizations when making conclusions about Africans’ visa problems. As my research highlights, visa problems do not affect all Africans in the same way. Variables such as country of citizenship, economic and marital status, and social connections all impact how
Africans’ obtain and maintain their visas. Therefore, I present the visa problems that Africans encounter from a more nuanced perspective other than focusing on their collective experience.
***
Although this study is of a specific locality, it is valuable for the study of urban China and religion in the era of globalization more broadly. It also speaks to Anthropology of law and religion, South-South migration, as well as Chinese urban studies. In studying African Muslism,
I want to make them appear just compatible with other non-Muslim Africans, especially in their legal navigation, network building, and moral code establishment. This perspective also allows us to understand the African migrants as a whole, and to analyze them within their own social, economic, and historical background.
Overall, this dissertation complements and builds on the work of other scholars both theoretically and ethnographically. Theoretically, I create two new terms to better understand
236 Africans’ experiences in and interactions with Guangzhou society. First, I employ the term “visa- partnerships” to explain one of the ways in which African migrants navigate China’s immigration control. Second, I introduce the term “religious common ground” to refer to the religious networks that African Muslims and other Muslim groups have built, and on which many of their interactions are based. This “religious common ground” consists of a shared set of values that regulate individuals’ social, economic, and religious conduct. These two terms are based on the insights of both previous scholars and findings from my fieldwork, and each highlight African agency. Ethnographically, I conducted a detailed study of a group that is often overlooked: African Muslims. As there is little research specifically on African Muslims and their interactions with Chinese and other foreign Muslims in Guangzhou, by studying the role of
Islam in the lives of African Muslim migrants in Guangzhou, my work adds a new perspective to a growing literature on the African presence in China broadly. Further, my work also challenges the perception that an increase in the number of African migrants who come into China is a recent phenomenon (Bertoncello and Bredeloup 2007). Namely, I show that there is a strong historical link between Guangzhou and the Islamic world, and that the recent rise in migration from Africa to China should therefore be seen as part of a long history of trade and migration.
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