Patronage Games: The Effects of Economic Reform on Intra-Party Politics in Venezuela Allyson Lucinda Benton University of California, Los Angeles Department of Political Science University of California, Los Angeles Box 951472 Los Angeles, California 90095-1472
[email protected] Prepared for delivery at the 1997 meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Continental Plaza Hotel, Guadalajara, Mexico, April 17-19, 1997. Introduction In December 1988 Acción Democrática's (AD) Carlos Andrés Pérez easily won the Venezuelan presidency, leading his closest rival by 12 percent. Pérez’s easy victory was largely due to memories of his first term in office (1974-79) when unprecedented oil income and easily accessible foreign loans enabled state-financed industrial growth, financial stability, and large-scale industrial and social development projects. Rather than returning the country to state-led economic growth akin to the 1970s, Pérez launched a series of reforms meant to correct macro-economic and structural distortions caused by years of state intervention in the economy. These reforms, however, were drastically different from those anticipated by a population and its politicians accustomed as much to years of state-led development as to the interventionist legacies of both Pérez and his AD party. The difficulty of initiating economic reform in such a context became apparent when, just three weeks after his inauguration, Pérez faced the most violent riots in decades, triggered by an increase in bus fares. During Pérez’s term, opposition continued in the form of strikes, demonstrations and criticism from ordinary citizens, factions in the military, the opposition party Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente (COPEI), and his own AD party.