-t TA3LE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOI,üLEDGE}ÍENTS ii INTRODUCTION íii CHÄPTER 1 The Defections 1 CHAPTER 2 A TurnÍng Point 9 CHAPTER 3 AnÈí-Connunism in Australia, Ig45-I954 37 CHAPTER 4 The Conrnission Assembles 72 CHAPTER 5 Fírst Appearances 103 CHAPTER 6 hrhat Is In Document J? 116 CHAPTER 7 trrrhere the Cross Turns Over L46 CHAPTER B The Interím ReporË 163 CHAPTER 9 A Guide to Documents A-G L7L CHAPTER 10 A Man of Mystery l.79 CHAPTER 11 Inmigrants in the Net 206 CHAPTER 12 EspÍonage by Association 222 CHAPTER 13 l,Iitnesses of Truth? 240 CHAPTER 14 ASIO and the Absent trIiÈnesses 264 CHAPTER 15 The Comnissíonrs Opponents 285 CHAPTER 16 The Fínal Report 302 CONCLUSION 3L6 AITERI^ÍORD 3'19 APPENDIX 1 Analysis of Witnesses at the Royal Commissj-on on Espionage, L954-I955, excluding Èhose ca1led either solely in an official capacity, or ASIO informants and officers. 32j. APPENDIX II Analysis of Instructions in The Moscow Letters about r.riLnesses called at the Royal Commission. 327 BIBLIOGRAPITY 330 l,¿ ACKNOI,ùLEDGEI'ÍENTS Acknowledgements are due to those who allowed me to fnterview thern or who wrote to me concerning aspects of my topic: Dr. J.l^I. Burton, Dr. C.B. ChrÍsÈesen, Professor R.A. Gollan, E.F. H111, C. McCaffrey, C.J. Meeking, R.A. Murray, Sir George pape, J.V. Ramsden, The Hon. lù.C. I,Jentworth. Also to Dr. Judith Keene, Curator, I{eanjin Archive, Baillieu Library, Universíty of Melbourne, and Ms. J. Reid, in charge of Èhe H.V. EvatÈ Collection, Flinders Universíty. J.¿J. INTRODUCTION This is a study of the Royal Comnissíon on Espíonage. The Royal Comrnissioners heard evidence between May 1954 and March 1955 concerning documents and disclosures made by former Soviet. dipiomats, Mr. V.M. Petrov and Mrs. E.A. Petrov. My purpose Ís to analyse the Royal Commission in deÈai1 Èo under- stand its conÈext, its purposes and iËs fíndings. This analysj-s cannoË be done easily. Though the Transcript of the proceed- ings ís readily available, a mere sunmary would achieve nothing. The Transcript compríses nany fragmentary episodes. The Commissioners did not pursue their inquíry ín a thoroughly systemaÈic manner; Eopícs were partly invesÈigated, then dropped, perhaps to be picked up again months later. The Cornmission wandered from one uat,ter to another, and so a bald sunmary would lead the reader on an exhausting path up numerous blind alleys and countless by-ways. Even at the end, it would be hard to make sense of where one had been and why. It has therefore been necessaïy, even in sectfons of apparently straightforward narrative, Èo re-order the Transcript and to dfscard much that turned out later to be irrelevant. AÈ Èhe same tirne, care has been taken Lo represenÈ the sËages of the ínquiry fairly to ínclude the arguments on both sídes. A brief sketch of the argumenÈ may be helpful, alÈhough it is not to be taken as a substitute for the detailed argument itself. By chapÈers, the study proceeds as f ollo¡*rs: The Defections: Mr. PeËrov defected on 3 April, L954. Ten days later, the Prime Minister announced it to the r¡ation and to the SovieÈ Embassy. Mrs. Petrov \^ras put aboard a flight to l"Ioscow by the Embassy, but she defected at Darwin. A Turnins Point: Itlhen the Petrovs def ect.ed, the Cold trIar rvas waníng. European economic recovery, the rise of the non-aligned movement in Asía IV and Africa, and changes in Soviet policy alEered fundamenEal bases of Ínternational relaEions. Australians 'hrere not certain whaÈ to do about this, and it was hoped the PeËrovs could thror,r tight on the problem. p Anti-Communism ín Australia: L945-I954: Anti-Communism in Australia arose ! after 1945 in response to a number of problems, particularly the militancy of .Australian workers and the difficulties of restrucÈuring the Australian economy after the war. By 1954, the craditÍonal anti-Cornmunist tactícs and organísation were being re-thought. Opinion was divÍded. Again, some people thought thaË what Èhe Petrovs had Ëo say at the Royal Commission ¡soul-d resolve many questions. t The Cornníssion Assembles: The Royal Cor¡mission r¡ras set up just before Èhe 1954 elections. Its opening session aroused expectations of starLling disclosures to follow. Some aÈtempt r^/as made t.o use the Commission in the elections against the Labor Party, but it is doubtful that thj.s had much influence. FÍrst Appearances: After the elections the Petrovs made Ëheir first publíc aPpearances as witnesses at the Commission. They evoked an enthusiastic resPonse. t Is In Document J?: Document J was broughE out of the Embassy by Mr. Petrov. It named three members of Dr. Evattrs sÈaff as sources of informa- tÍon. The Document, and a relat.ed one, Document H, v/ere not obviously espionage documenÈs. AllegaEíons were made that J \¡ras a forgery designed t'Pet,rov as part of a conspiracy". Important problems r¡¡ere raísed, buÈ noÈ satisf actorily resolved. tr{here The Cross Turns Over: The evi-dence of ASIO undercover agent, Dr. Michael BialoguskÍ, revealed that Mr. Petrov ancl, to a lesser degree, l"lrs. Petrov had cornpromised themselves with the Australian security service some tine before their defections. Their credibiliÈy hras more ín question. Interim f : The Commissioners sought to rebut the allegaÈions that had been made so far by íssuing an Interim Report. It was not thoroughly v discussed by the Parliament; and it was not entirel_y convincing. A Guide to Do cuments A to G: A basíc explanation is gi.ven of the documents to r,¡hich the conmissÍoners nexÈ turned their attention. A Man of Mvsterv: This is Èhe central theme of Èhe Commíssion. I,rlalter C1ayton, a Communist Party functionary, rÂras charged with being a spy-masËer and talent scout for the Russians. Many witnesses were called as the Conmissioners sought to establish the connectíon between Communism and. SovÍet espionage. Despite their efforts to nake a hrater-tíght case, they faÍled. Immisrants ín the Net: One recent ímmigrant, the Petrovs said, was intended to set uP an underground espionage fifth column in Australj-a. The man concerned, Mr. V. Divisek, did not seem suiÈed to thi.s task. Another man, Andrew Fridenbergsr htas accused of passing information Èo petrov. His case üras handled one-sidedly by -the Conmissioners. Esp ionage by AssociaËíon: The treatment of four non-CornmunÍst wÍtnesses menÈioned in Soviet documents ís detaíled. The Counissioners bel-ieved that people who associated voluntarily with Co¡omunÍsts ürere likely suspecËs, whflst people who seemed respectable were not, even if the evidence suggest.ed dÍf f erent conclusions. I{ítnesses of Truth?: The evidence of the petrovs and the authentÍcÍty of their documents are examined. The Comnissioners did not thoroughly test eíther. There hrere reasons for belíeving that, prima facie, the petrovts accounÈ of the documents should have been rejected. ASIO and the AbsenÈ I,{i tnesses : The AustralÍan Security Intelligence organisation, which held strongly anti-Communist views, prepared a great deal of the evidence heard at the CommissÍon. It also seemed to have pre-conceived ideas about the connectÍon betr,rreen overt CommunísË actÍvity and secret espíonage for the USSR. ASIOt s bríefings and views provided Èhe framework through which the cornmissioners interpreted evídence. vJ. The Connnissíonr s Opponents : The Corrnissioners sa\^r their opponents as CommunisÈs and other like-rninded persons. This was inaccurate. Quite a successful campaign l¡ras conducted against the Commíssion, wÍth the result Èhat the Coumissionts judgements and worth rdas questioned. The CornmÍssioners! onm behaviour provided ammunit.ion for their criÈics. The Fínal Report: The Report of the Cornmissíon r¡/as scarred by prejudice and misreporting. It received a mÍxed reacËion. AtÈentíon was drarnm away from its weaknesses by Dr. Evattrs letter t.o Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov. The letter rnlas falsely represente<l as EvatÈrs acceptance of Molotovrs r,¡ord above that of the Commissioners. Conclusion: The argument is drarnm together. Afterword: A few details are given about the later l.ives of some Comnissíon participants. CHAPTER 1 THE DEFECTIONS on Friday 2 April, 1954, Mr. V.M. Petrov boarded the aeroplane at, Canberra Airport to fly to Sydney. A few rows further back in the aircraft sat G.R. Richards, Deputy-DÍrector of the Australian Securíty Intelligence organfsatíon (ASr0). For a long time now, Richards had believed that Petrov, who was Third Secret.ary and Consul aÈ the Embassy of the USSR, was unlike other Soviet díplomats. Petrov travelled more freely. He maintaíned social contacts wíth people who could be described only as diverse and unusual. In Canberra, Petrov rías often to be seen drÍnking in publíc bars. He was most enthusiastic in demonstrating to his Australian frÍend.s how vodka should be drunk in the pïoper Russian sty1e.l Richards also belíeved thaË the SovÍet Embassy ín Australia would conceal withÍn its dÍplomatic ranks someone responsible for directÍng the AustralÍan end of the vast and sprawling network of Soviet espionage operatÍons.2 Early posÈ-h7ar scandal-s unmasked Soviet espÍonage agents and theír contacts with Embassies in a number of countries. The revelations of Gouzenko, Fuchs, and others had rocked the public service and scientífic establishments of Canada, Èhe United Kingdom and Arnerica. FaiÈh had been undermined in Ehe 1 t'Mr. Petrov likes hÍs glass of beertt, Argus, 15 April 1954; al'so Ase, 15 April, and Sgdneg Morning HeraLd. (SIIH), same daËe. 2 G.R. Ríchards, Transcript of the RogaT commission on Espionage, p.734, paras. L95-203. (Flenceforth all references to the transcript will be abbreviated thus, Ín this example, Tt., 734 (L}1-ZO3)) 1 2.