Canada: The Challenge of Doing Better
John W. Foster
Canada: The Challenge of Doing Better
Canada: The Challenge of Doing Better
John W. Foster
“Alleviating world poverty is our must alter: “If we hope to achieve common cause. We must share the the MDGs, we must make radical benefits of globalization. We must changes in how we foster human give it a human purpose and a development.”3 human face.” Key members of Cabinet appear Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, to be aware that even the limited Address to the Plenary Session targets of the MDGs are in of the Millennium Summit of danger of remaining unachieved. the United Nations, As Finance Minister Ralph September 7, 2000.1 Goodale noted to the World Bank’s Development Committee in April 2004, with regard to the US$1/day poverty target, anada was part of the inau- “continuing inequalities threaten guration of the Millennium to leave millions below this CDeclaration, and will be pres- meagre threshold.” “It is clear,” ent at the five year review of the the Minister continued, that “we Declaration and the Millennium need to strengthen our efforts to Development Goals (MDGs) in ensure that the promise of the September 2005. The Canadian MDGs translates into reality for contribution to the achievement of the world’s poorest citizens.” the goals has been repeatedly noted by the current Minister of Minister Goodale summarized the International Cooperation, Aileen ingredients in the Canadian Carroll. As she stated in April 2004, approach to the MDGs: imple- “ending poverty is the overriding ment the Doha commitments, development objective of the 21st increase aid and extend the HIPC century and the aspiration of the (Heavily Indebted Poor Countries) Millennium Development Goals.”2 Initiatives sunset clause, mobilize The Minister also seems aware of the private sector creating a more the modesty of the goals them- enabling investment climate, and selves, as she noted in November improve the quality and coordina- 2004, “These goals...represent a tion of aid utilizing the Rome minimum for action.” She stated at Declaration on Harmonization. the same time that approaches Donors should focus on priorities
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identified through the Poverty Reduction remain relevant guides to policy. Similarly Strategy Papers (PRSPs), support commitments made at the G-7/-8 on Education for All, encourage a debt Africa continue to inform policy. G-7/-8 sustainability framework and longer-term initiatives on HIV/AIDS, together with debt sustainability, and pay special atten- commitments made at the 2001 UN tion to low income countries, small island Special Session on HIV/AIDS, as well as developing states and sub-Saharan Africa. the relevant MDG, need to be taken into Minister Goodale noted that small states consideration in evaluating Canada’s may be particularly vulnerable to external response and contribution. Some of shocks given extreme “openness”, and these dimensions are touched on below. thus need help with their specific chal- lenges, with disaster mitigation and risk management. He also recognized the The 2005 Federal Budget necessity of “substantial assistance in combating the spread of HIV/AIDS”.3 Canada’s approach to international engagement is also embodied in the More recently, Minister Carroll, on the annual budgets of the federal release of the Millennium Project Report government. The February 23, 2005 in January 2005, noted that it is budget is a case in point. Three key imperative “that we remain focused on elements merit attention. longer-term objectives.” The Report gives us a “positive road map to help First, the budget provides a five-year generate new momentum for achieving commitment on foreign aid, including long-term goals by 2015”. Thus Canada the doubling of aid to Africa over the was doubling its aid budget by 2010, coming three years. The 8 per cent per working through international organiza- annum increase to official development tions to provide market access, untie aid, assistance (ODA) promised by Canada in and further debt relief. Gender and Monterrey in 2002 is confirmed to 2010. environment continue to be overarching This accrues to an overall increase of themes with sub-Saharan Africa at the $3.4 billion over five years. However, centre of efforts. 4 even if overall Canadian aid doubles over 2001/02 by 2010, as promised, Canada This and following chapters examine will be at 0.33 per cent of gross national how these priorities are expressed in income (GNI), well below the 0.49 per Canadian development assistance cent achieved in the early 1990s, and and related policies. Case studies even farther from the UN target of from Bangladesh, Bolivia and Mali 0.7 per cent. There is no commitment, explore how these priorities appear to date, to reach 0.7 per cent by 2015. from the field. There is a surprising lack of specific Clearly Canada’s commitments in reference in the budget to its impact on component areas of the Millennium Canada’s achievement of the UN target Declaration and the MDGs go far beyond of 0.7 per cent, an omission made even the particular formulations of these more apparent by the increasing number documents. Orientations to the gender of specific commitments to its achieve- dimensions of human development set ment on the part of other countries. In a by the 1995 Beijing Women’s Conference stinging editorial, “Ralph? Is that you?”
24 Canada: The Challenge of Doing Better
The Globe and Mail highlighted the Development Research also by FAC. The contradiction between Finance Minister fifth pool, Crisis Response, will be jointly Ralph Goodale in his role as a member of managed. Political and priority decisions the UK’s Commission for Africa calling on as to allocation among the various pools donors to specify plans for meeting the will be made by Cabinet’s Global Affairs 0.7 per cent target, and the Minister Committee. When asked about the announcing a 2005 budget without any criteria for allocating funds, officials such plans. “Mr. Goodale should be respond that the Cabinet Committee hanging his head.”5 would be the site of a “combat of ideas”. Questions about parliamentary participa- One of the strangest rationales for tion in developing priorities, public Canada’s failure to reach 0.7 per cent is consultation, and the possible develop- that cited by Finance officials stating that ment of standards to evaluate the since Canada has such a good overall relative efficacy of particular channels economic performance and growth rate, in achieving objectives like the MDGs, it is hard to meet the target. Jeffrey remain without positive answer to date. Sachs, Director of the UN’s Millennium Thus, the new approach remains largely Project, told an Ottawa audience in a “management device” rather than April that he had never heard a worse opening doors for participation in “excuse”. Canada can’t reach the priority setting. target because it’s running surpluses and doing so well? Second, these increases are dwarfed by The Declaration and the Goals: the biggest jump in defence spending in Commitment or passing fancy two decades, a total of $12,828 billion of new money between 2005-06 and The North-South Institute set out the 2009-10. While continuing its support of case for the “achievement of human “human security” in all its dimensions security through sustainable and internationally, Canada’s money is equitable development” in its submission predominantly spent on the hard security to the International Policy Review.6 end of the spectrum. We urge prime ministerial leadership in Third, the budget previews a new utilizing the Millennium Declaration and approach to the organization and the Millennium Development Goals as a management of Canada’s International basis for Canada’s vision of the world we Assistance Envelope. The Envelope is seek to work toward. divided into five component “pools”. We propose, among other things: While the pools do not represent specific departmental commitments, each of the • A “whole of government” and a pools, with one exception, will be “whole of Canada” approach, managed by a particular government involving not only diverse departments department: Development, the largest, and agencies, but engaging provincial by the Canadian International and municipal governments as they Development Agency (CIDA); the develop global interests and International Financial Institutions (IFIs), involvement. by Finance; Peace and Security by • The introduction of legislation defining Foreign Affairs Canada (FAC); and
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sustainable and equitable development that commitment and the significant as the fundamental objective around contribution to Iraq stand out as excep- which international policy should be tions which put the overall policy of organized and against which regular country focus in question. Similarly, the reports should be made to Parliament pressure to take on a formal role in on Canada’s contributions and “missile defence” threatened to distort achievements. debate over nationally appropriate policies for Canada’s peace and security • A role for the Global Affairs Committee contributions. of Cabinet, and a parallel Parliamentary Committee (with public participation) As for development policy, the issue in regularly reviewing Canada’s contri- remains of achieving a coherent and butions and in establishing Canada’s identifiable Canadian role in a field in “road map” toward achieving the which this nation has had a long and at Millennium Declaration and MDGs times “illustrious” record. The impor- over the coming decade. tance of innovative policies and resource utilization is perhaps greater than ever Finally, we situate Canada’s policy, when “harmonization” tends to oriented as we suggest by the dominate rhetoric and practice. The Declaration and the Goals, within an difficulty and art in doing so in a positive overall commitment to fair and inclusive manner is significant, but a strongly globalization, accompanied by a articulated development policy might be commitment to peace and security. not only a guide but a defence against distortion of priorities. What is the effective significance of declaring Canada’s development role and priority countries, if their priority can be geopolitical pressures so easily undermined? Would a policy defined in an act of Parliament be more “Despite CIDA’s declaration of nine ‘focus vigorously defended? countries,’ Canada’s two largest aid recipients are not even on the priority list: The trade-offs which the current Afghanistan and Iraq.” government projected around the coincident announcements of refusal to Rieky Stuart, “Aid should be used to fight endorse missile defence and “the biggest poverty and nothing else.” 7 jump in funding in two decades” for defence have both been phrased and reviewed by the press in terms of The difficult road Canadian governments Canada’s relationship with the United must navigate as an ally to a superpower States. The issue of whether the future of with an aggressive international agenda the planet and the predominant interests places significant counter-weights to of the Canadian people lay in making the principle and even declared policy in big jump in ODA rather than the defence overseas development. While an investment sought by the former US argument can be made that assistance Ambassador to Canada, among others, to Afghanistan is merited by its status as has hardly been broached. The priority of a least developed country, the size of defence expenditure is far down the list
26 Canada: The Challenge of Doing Better
of preferred investments of Canadians, Canadian values are embodied, as polls while the recent outpouring of support testify, in the Canadian public health for assistance in southern Asia demon- insurance system and the principles that strated in material as well as spiritual guide it: universality, accessibility, porta- terms a significant commitment to bility, comprehensiveness, and public global solidarity. administration. There is thus a demon- strable conflict between the approach to health as practiced for some decades in Canada’s values and dominant Canada and the approach defined by development policy formulations IFI policy and delivery, in which Canadian development programming Among the key elements guiding is increasingly integrated. Comparisons Canadian foreign policy in recent years of effects on the poor in Canada and in has been its use as an expression of states which lack such a universal and “Canadian values”. As overseas develop- accessible approach demonstrate the ment initiatives become more and more negative impact of the latter approach integrated in multilateral approaches, the on the poor and marginalized. In other extent to which Canadian objectives per areas, our contributors indicate that in se remain effective, whether desirable or some areas—gender, for example—a not, is put in question. In some cases particular Canadian development priority much-respected Canadian values may and approach has made a significant conflict with multilateral policy. contribution abroad. Why then is it not possible to extend Canadian health Several of the contributions to this study policy abroad and support public health indicate the increasing integration of systems which embody principles which Canadian aid and policy approaches have won such extensive support at articulated and managed by the home, and had considerable impacts on International Financial Institutions, princi- equal accessibility and pro-poor impact? pally the PRSP formula. The Bangladesh In what theatres would such a debate be study emphasizes questions about real best pursued? country “ownership” despite the pledges that accompany the PRSP approach. It also questions the implementation of neo-liberal privatization and market-led Canada in context: Civil society policy approaches which are embodied and public engagement in PRSPs. The possible further narrowing In recent months a number of donor of scope implied by a greater focus on countries have prepared review reports the targets of the MDGs in particular on their progress in meeting MDG com- adds a further danger. mitments, among them the European In one of the fields under review, health, Commission, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the extension of private market models the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and and approaches—curative rather than the United Kingdom. CIDA is committed preventive medicine, for example—is to a similar report during 2005. The used to demonstrate the negative impact reports do not follow an identical pat- of PRSP-related policies on the poor and tern. Some are oriented by Goals 7 and 8 the underlying causes of poverty. that describe the primary responsibility of
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donors. Some detail contributions against CSOs are playing a diminishing role in all eight goals. Denmark’s report is rather Canadian international cooperation, general. Norway’s details its contribution, particularly in relation to new program- not only through resources but in policy matic approaches to aid delivery. and political leadership. According to CCIC calculations, CIDA disbursements in partnership with CSOs Even though Canada has not, at time of have decreased by 6 percernt in the writing, published its report, those of three years between 1999/2000 and the other donors make it possible to 2002/03, the last year for which statis- compare Canadian practice to date with tics are available. This reduction has more and more dimensions of other been particularly pronounced in the nations’ development engagements. Bilateral Branches, with an overall reduc- Because of the recent receipt of a tion of more than 25 per cent during number of these documents and their these years. Canadian aid resources volume, we do not attempt a full channeled for joint donor funding of comparative analysis. However, the Sector Wide Programs (SWAps) or treatment of civil society in strategies Budget Support has resulted in corre- for accomplishing the MDGs at home sponding increases in government to and in developing countries is examined. government partnerships. While the CIDA’s Partnership Branch identifies civil emphasis on program approaches is a society and the private sector “in Canada welcome innovation, the Agency to date and in host countries [as] key contribu- has not put sufficient attention in its pro- tors to international development. They grams and policies for aid effectiveness are agents of change, introduce new on continued roles for civil society.10 thinking in development and provide This trend contrasts with the renewed direct benefits to people. Development investment made by the UK’s is a ‘non-linear’ process that occurs Department for International through civil society and the private Development (DfID), which, since 1996, sector, as well as through governments has enlarged support for UK CSOs by 8 and international organizations.” 32 per cent to $223 million in 2003/04, The recognition of the importance of civil and which is committed to increasing its society has much in common with other central funding to UK aid agencies by donors, like the Netherlands, which almost 28 per cent in 2005/06. A similar states “sustainable poverty reduction and trend is found in Finland which states: the development of civil society are “the share of NGO cooperation will inseparably connected.”9 increase gradually by 2007 to 14 per cent of operational development However, one of the areas of contrast cooperation as NGOs strengthen their between Canada and a number of other own capacity.” Norway simply states donor countries is in the commitment to that 20 per cent of its ODA is delivered NGO partners on the part of the official through CSOs.11 aid agency. The rationale for these increases is The Canadian Council for International evident. The Netherlands, which granted Co-operation (CCIC) underlines the €329 million via CSOs in 2002, cites negative trend in CIDA’s allocations to the importance of “a well-organized civil partnerships with CSOs. society” in achieving reasonable
28 Canada: The Challenge of Doing Better
governance, essential to poverty the MDGS, but public awareness of the reduction. “In countries where reason- goals is probably even more marginal able governance is lacking, support to than that reported in Europe. civil society by foreign civil society organ- Nevertheless, CIDA has stated in its izations is often the only way to improve strategy for 2004-06 a commitment to the governance situation.”12 Sweden “develop and resource a renewed emphasizes the unique development strategy for public engagement through contribution of CSOs: “their often long- partners”16 and has “contributed signifi- term presence and close cooperation cant resources and programming experi- with local organizations, enables them to ence in partnership with Canadian CSOs cooperate more directly with poor to engage Canadians as global citizens.” people and communities, and develop A strategy, developed in concert with initiatives based on local needs.”13 experienced CSO representatives in Norway emphasizes their political and Canada, is long overdue. policy roles: “these organizations are also important driving forces in political If the government wants to be taken efforts to safeguard human rights in seriously in these commitments, fresh general, and to ensure that poor, mar- and increased financial support is over- ginalized groups in particular attain a due, CIDA must reverse the trend of better standard of living and are able to expenditure. While in 1994/95 CIDA realize their rights. Civil society organiza- invested $23 million in public engage- tions contribute to the political dialogue ment through partners, by 2002/03 its and to the general effort to monitor gov- expenditure was down to $12 million, or ernment policies.”14 In April 2005, CIDA only 0.45 per cent of Canadian ODA. announced three new funding windows, amounting to approximately $25 million over four years, for civil society and pri- Conclusion vate sector partnership, citing the impor- Speaking to a large audience in Ottawa, tance of CSOs to the global effort against in early April, Jeff Sachs challenged the poverty; it marks a small step toward Canadian leadership in the context of the enhanced collaboration.15 1969 Partners in Development report This contrast is particularly important in from the Commission on International an area like public engagement. A recent Development, led by Lester Pearson. The poll of European residents showed that rationale for development support, so knowledge of the Millennium clearly stated then, is as relevant today, Development Goals was extremely decades later. The clear target for each limited, with 83 per cent of the popula- rich country to reach 0.7 per cent in tion unaware of the targets. Against this overseas development assistance was so background, of particular importance is forcefully stated then, that the failure the initiative of the Government of to reach it on the part of Canada and Sweden to inaugurate a lively campaign a number of other donors is stark on behalf of the MDGs, utilizing close and shocking. partnerships with CSOs and private Will 2005 yield a dramatic change of companies. Canada has taken a few steps course, on commitment of resources and to encourage public engagement with other key dimensions? The signs are not
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encouraging as we finalize this edition of 7 The North-South Institute, Paper on the the Canadian Development Report. But International Policy Review. Human objectives have been set. Plans have Security, Sustainable and Equitable been developed that require adequate Development: Foundations for Canada’s and scaled-up funding. The costs of International Policy (Ottawa, 2005). inaction have seldom been more clearly 8 Rieky Stuart, “Aid should be used to fight and graphically portrayed. poverty and nothing else.” Ottawa Citizen, March 2, 2005. Public support for humanitarian action has seldom been more dramatically 9 CIDA, Partnership Branch, Mission demonstrated than in the post-tsunami and Vision www.acdi-cida.gc.ca Updated response of early 2005. Government 2003-09-11. spokespersons repeatedly endorse action. 10 Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zakm, The Minister of Finance has signed the Millennium Development Goal 8: Commission for Africa report calling for Developing a Global Partnership for 0.7 per cent. What are we waiting for? Development. Progress Report by the Netherlands (The Hague, 2005). 11 Brian Tomlinson, “Strengthening Civil Endnotes Society in Canadian International 1 Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, “Address to Cooperation.” Briefing Paper, unpub- the Plenary Session of the Millennium lished, October, 2004. Summit of the United Nations,” 12 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, September 7, 2000. Finland’s Report on the Millennium 2 CIDA. Making business work for the poor. Development Goals, Helsinki, 2005; HM Notes for Remarks by The Honourable Government, The UK’s Contribution to Aileen Carroll, Minister for International Achieving the Millennium Development Cooperation, at the 12th Annual Goals, London, 2005; and Norwegian Canadian Awards for International Ministry reports. Cooperation. Calgary, Alberta, April 22, 13 Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zakm, p. 39. 2004. 14 Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sweden, 3 CIDA, The Millennium Development Making it Happen. Sweden’s Report on Goals-Moving from Consensus to the Millennium Development Goals 2004, Momentum. Notes for remarks by the Stockholm. 2005, p. 16. Honourable Aileen Carroll, Minister of International Cooperation at International 15 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cooperation Days, November 1, 2004. Global Partnerships for Development. Progress Report by Norway 2004, Oslo, 4 Ralph Goodale, Address to the World 2005, p. 26. Bank Development Committee, April 2004. 16 CIDA, CIDA strengthens its partnership with Canadian voluntary and private sec- 5 CIDA, Statement by The Honourable tor. News Release, 2005-16, April 12, Aileen Carroll on the release of the UN 2005. Millennium Project Report. News Release, (2005-02) January 17, 2005. 17 Tomlinson, Strengthening Civil Society. 6 “Ralph? Is that you?” Editorial, The Globe and Mail, March 12, 2005 p. A 16.
30 The Millennium Development Goals and Poverty Reduction Strategy
Rodney Schmidt
The Millennium Development Goals and Poverty Reduction Strategy
The Millennium Development Goals and Poverty Reduction Strategy
Rodney Schmidt
n present trends in growth growth. They cannot escape the and development, most trap without great good luck, Opoor countries, especially which cannot be written into a in sub-Saharan Africa, will not strategic plan, or a discrete rise in achieve the first of the Millennium the amount and efficiency of use Development Goals (MDG 1), that of outside resources for invest- is to halve, between 1990 and ment. For many of them, the 2015, the share of the population primary MDG solution is to find whose income is less than US$1 a way to initiate and sustain per day and who suffer from economic growth. hunger. This is the foremost MDG Simultaneously, incomes in most problem, for which there are two poor countries, especially in solutions. The first, advocated by sub-Saharan Africa, are unequally Jeffrey Sachs and the United distributed. This immediately Nations Millennium Project, calls limits the poverty-reducing effect for donor countries and the World of growth and, over the long Bank and International Monetary term, likely constrains the rate Fund (IMF) to double aid to poor of growth. When incomes are countries to finance a substantial unevenly distributed, poor coun- increase (scale-up, in Sachs’ jar- tries have to grow much faster to gon) in investment and growth.1 reduce poverty to achieve the first The second, with numerous inde- MDG than otherwise, yet are less pendent advocates but weak offi- able to do so. cial recognition, is for poor coun- tries to combine economic growth Can poor countries improve with a modest improvement in the income distribution in the next distribution of income over the 10 years without compromising next 10 years. growth? How would this approach affect poverty reduction These potential solutions to the strategy, as expressed in country MDG problem are not essentially Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers alternatives, but complements of (PRSPs) and supported by donor each other. Many poor countries countries and international finan- are stuck in a poverty trap charac- cial institutions (IFIs)? terized by negative or near-zero
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Growth alone is not enough...... because income inequality is An influential early expression of doubt too high that economic growth is sufficient to Countries with similar growth rates reduce poverty surfaced in the 1970s often experience different poverty from research at the World Bank and the rates. This is mostly because of the vari- Institute for Development Studies ation in the equality of income distribu- (University of Sussex): tion between them. Similarly, within a The fact of poverty is not country the responsiveness of poverty new....What is new is the suspicion to growth varies across sectors and that economic growth by itself may over time with differences in the distri- not be able to solve or even alleviate bution of income. The poverty-reduc- the problem within any ing effect of growth is lower in less “reasonable” time period.2 equal countries. Recent calculations of the potential Poor countries are among the most contribution of economic growth to unequal in the world. Sub-Saharan halving poverty by 2015 reach the same Africa, which contains most of the conclusion (see Table 1).3 If growth world’s poor countries, ranks second as continues at historical rates, poverty in all a region in inequality only to of the world’s major regions will fall. Latin America (see Table 2). These However, it will not fall fast enough to countries must grow faster to halve achieve MDG 1 in Latin America and the poverty in the next 10 years than those Caribbean, South Asia or, especially, with a more equal income distribution. sub-Saharan Africa.4 These regions By contrast, following on the calcula- contain most of the world’s poor coun- tions reported above, a significant tries. In many of them required growth reduction in inequality with no change rates exceed their PRSP growth targets, in growth would nearly halve poverty 7 which are also criticized as unrealistically or better. ambitious without large, new and exter- nal investment resources.5
Table 1 Regional MDG 1 growth gaps Eastern Middle Europe & Latin East & Sub- East Asia Central America & North South Saharan Percent & Pacific Asia Caribbean Africa Asia Africa
Annual growth rate needed to achieve MDG 1 2.7 2.4 3.8 3.8 4.7 5.6 Historical annual growth rate 1960-90 3.3 2.0 1.3 4.3 1.9 0.2
Source: Besley and Burgess, 2003, p. 8.
34 The Millennium Development Goals and Poverty Reduction Strategy
Table 2 Median values of Gini co-efficient by region6 (A larger co-efficient, lying between 0 and 1 inclusively, indicates a less equal distribution)
Region 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s
Eastern Europe 0.23 0.22 0.25 0.29 South Asia 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 OECD and High income 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.33 East Asia & the Pacific 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.35 Middle East & North Africa 0.42 0.44 0.41 0.40 Sub-Saharan Africa 0.50 0.49 0.40 0.42 Latin America 0.53 0.50 0.51 0.50
Source: Adapted from Deininger and Squire, 1998, as reproduced in Bigsten and Shimeles, 2003, p. 2.
This simple reasoning emphasizes the simultaneously influence growth and danger of focusing too much on the rate inequality. In principle, it should be of growth in poor countries and disre- possible to use policy and development garding the growth pattern. When China strategy to obtain growth with started its economic reforms in the late redistribution, although in practice, there 1970s it had a relatively uniform distribu- seems to be little evidence to that effect. tion of income (a rural Gini co-efficient of 21 in 1978; see Table 2 for an interpreta- tion of the co-efficient). By 1990, China’s Official strategy still relies rural Gini co-efficient in China had risen heavily on growth to 38, and it continued to rise to 46 in 1998. China’s rapid growth coincided The recent elections in India revealed with fast poverty reduction, but also with starkly that poor people care not only diverging incomes, largely along regional about economic growth but also about lines. Today China is one of the most how the income generated by growth is unequal countries in the world and distributed. In May 2004 “India’s elec- poverty increasingly resists growth.8 torate ...stunned both the world and itself by throwing the ... government out Looking at experience in other poor of office in the middle of one of the countries, about half managed to country’s strongest periods of economic combine growth with falling inequality, expansion.”9 Although net poverty was while the others had rising inequality falling, the speed of the fall among the with growth. Apparently there is no two-thirds of Indians living and working structural relationship between growth in the rural economy was not commen- and changes in inequality in the course surate with the rate of overall growth. of development. The relationship probably depends on other factors, such Despite the presumption illustrated by as local policies and institutions that this example that social welfare responds
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to both growth and distribution, official and international financial institutions. development strategy relies almost exclu- One influential analyst clarifies that sively on economic growth. The primary “The aid bureaucracies define their final statement of strategy in poor countries is objective as “poverty reduction” supposed to be the PRSP. This document (today’s more politically correct name guides both policy and relations and for “growth”)...”14 programs with external donors and the IFIs. For example, according to the IMF, IMF programs in poor countries “The targets and policy conditions in a supported by the PRGF tend to treat [Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility— poverty as separate from and subordi- PRGF] supported program are drawn nate to growth strategy. Once a growth directly from the country’s PRSP.”10 strategy that is consistent with the PRSP is designed, individual policies may be PRSPs identify economic growth as the modified or social programs added to key means to reduce poverty.11 Many of address transition or adjustment costs them, in fact, see growth as the only way that particularly affect poor people. Such to do so on a broad scale. costs would be identified through a “Poverty and Social Impact Assessment” All PRSPs and [Interim]-PRSPs...give (PSIA) exercise. However, these exercises absolute priority to economic growth do not influence the design of growth as a means of poverty reduction.... strategy as such, and are often foregone Surprisingly, only a quarter of these altogether. In the words of the IMF: PRSPs and I-PRSPs use the term “pro-poor growth” or contain state- About half of all PRGF-supported ments about ensuring that growth is programs refer to some form of equitably distributed, suggesting a poverty and social impact analysis continuing faith in the power of (PSIA), and about one-third refer to growth alone to reduce poverty with- formal PSIA-based on more rigorous out significant attention to equity.12 analysis. In some cases, this has led to a modification of policies, due to Some PRSPs state that growth should be concern over the possibly adverse spread throughout the economy, so that effects on the poor. About two-thirds the poor are better placed to participate. of PRGF-supported programs include To accomplish this, they promise to countervailing measures, which aim prioritize agricultural development, since to offset the potentially adverse within poor countries 70 per cent of the short-run effects of exogenous poor live in rural areas and most work in shocks or macroeconomic or struc- agriculture. However, the PRSPs do not tural reforms on the poor...Most elaborate a growth strategy based on the notably, the majority of the policies features of poverty in the country and in PRGF-supported programs with they do not explain how PRSP policies important social impacts are covered 13 will reduce poverty. neither by PSIA nor countervailing The PRSP emphasis on economic measures.15 growth accords with dominant attitudes The general official preference for growth and official stances of donor agencies policies in poverty reduction strategy is
36 The Millennium Development Goals and Poverty Reduction Strategy
consistent with the Washington should include distribution targets Consensus, an informal statement of backed up by analyses of how growth international conventional thinking about policies will achieve them. development. The policies incorporated in the Consensus have about doubled Growth policies and strategies that since their original expression by John simultaneously initiate growth and Williamson in 1990.16 In the current improve the distribution of income are version, of 20 policies, only two directly likely to feature two elements. One is a address poverty, and these are restricted large-scale effort to directly enable poor to separate social safety nets and people to participate in and contribute to targeted programs. The others intend growth. This involves systemic public to initiate and sustain growth without spending on health, education, and regard to its distributional consequences. nutrition, among others, that goes well beyond social safety nets and targeted local poverty programs. Income distribution and poverty The other is to invest directly in poor reduction strategy sectors, to exploit improvements in income distribution as a source of The Independent Evaluation Office of the growth for the whole economy. Much IMF criticizes PRSPs for failing to identify of the inequality of poor countries is binding constraints on growth or links associated with rural-urban income between growth policies and poverty in disparities and regional poverty traps. individual poor countries.17 These are These can be addressed by large-scale needed to make strategic policy choices investments to improve agricultural to use resources effectively and achieve productivity, a focused version of the MDG 1 efficiently. The same criticism can “big push” advocated by Sachs and the be made of the Washington Consensus. UN Millennium Project. At a minimum, The failure to adopt a strategic attitude this would aim to reverse the decline in is facilitated by the tendency to separate agricultural productivity in sub-Saharan poverty from growth policy and Africa of 0.6 per cent per year since relegate poverty policy to narrow public 1980.18 It may require complementary social spending. policies such as land reform and export The scale and depth of poverty in poor support. As rural incomes rise, they can countries is such that growth and distri- support a market for domestic industry. bution are inherently interdependent A coherent approach to growth and processes. Poverty and income distribu- poverty strategy may also involve tion affect growth prospects just as they avoiding policies such as trade liberaliza- are affected by growth. A growth process tion, which can, in some circumstances, that aggravates inequality is much less worsen income distribution. likely to achieve MDG 1 than one that improves it. In this way income distribu- Poor countries suffer from both low tion is one of the key links between growth and high inequality. It will not growth and poverty. In addition to be possible to halve poverty in these growth targets and PSIA exercises, PRSPs countries in the next 10 years by
37 Canadian Development Report 2005
addressing growth alone. In recognizing Easterly, William. 2003. “Can foreign aid the interdependence of growth and buy growth?” Journal of Economic distribution processes, the prospects for Perspectives 17/3: 23-48. achieving MDG 1 are much better if growth strategy addresses both growth Gottschalk, Ricardo. 2004. “The and distribution outcomes and poverty macroeconomic policy content of the reduction strategy encompasses growth PRSPs: How much pro-growth, how and redistribution policies. much pro-poor?” Manuscript, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex. Author e-mail: [email protected]. RODNEY SCHMIDT, a Principal Researcher (Finance and Debt) with The North-South Hanmer, Lucia, Niek de Jong, Rachel Institute, was previously Program Advisor for Kurian, and Jos Mooij. 1999. “Are the the International Development Research DAC targets achievable? Poverty and human development in the year 2015.” Centre (IDRC) and Coordinator of the Journal of International Development 11: Vietnam Economic and Environment 547-63. Management Research Program (VEEM) in Hanoi. He managed research programs in IDA and IMF. 2002. “Review of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) economic and environment policy for IDRC approach: early experience with interim in Vietnam, Bangladesh, Cambodia and PRSPs and full PRSPs.” Washington, DC, Nepal. He has also worked as International March 26. Economist for the International Finance and IMF. 2002. “Review of the Poverty Economic Analysis Division of the Reduction and Growth Facility: Issues Department of Finance. He holds a PhD in and Options.” Economics from the University of Toronto. IMF. 2004. PRGF Factsheet. September www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/ References prgf.htm. Ahluwalia, Montek S. 1974. In Hollis IMF. 2004. Evaluation Report: Evaluation Chenery, Montek S. Ahluwalia, C.L.G. of the IMF’s Role in Poverty Reduction Bell, John H. Duloy, and Richard Jolly Strategy Papers and the Poverty Reduction (ed). Redistribution with growth Oxford: and Growth Facility Washington, DC: IMF, The University Press. Independent Evaluation Office. Besley, Timothy and Robin Burgess. IMF, Independent Evaluation Office. 2003. “Halving global poverty.” Journal 2004. Evaluation Report: Evaluation of the of Economic Perspectives 17/3: 3-22. IMF’s Role in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and the Poverty Reduction and Bigsten, Arne and Abebe Shimeles. 2003. Growth Facility, Washington, DC). “Prospects for ‘pro-poor’ growth in Africa.” Economic Commission for Africa, Marcus, Rachel and John Wilkinson. Economic Policy Research Center, 2002. “Whose poverty matters? Research paper ESPD/NRP/2003/4. Vulnerability, social protection and www.uneca.org/eca_resources/ PRSPs.” Working paper no. 1. London. Meetings_Events/espd/poorgrowth/.
38 The Millennium Development Goals and Poverty Reduction Strategy
Childhood Poverty Research and Policy 5 See Schmidt, forthcoming. Centre. 6 The Gini co-efficient is a measure of Rodrik, Dani. 2004. “Growth strategies.” inequality in income distribution. It takes Manuscript, August, available at on values between 0 and 1, with 0 indi- http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~drodrik/ cating a perfectly equal distribution growthstrat10.pdf. (everyone has the same income) and 1 a perfectly unequal distribution (one person Schmidt, Rodney. Forthcoming in 2005. has all the income). “Poverty-reducing growth strategy in 7 Besley and Burgess, 2003, p. 11. poor countries.” Policy Brief. Ottawa: The North-South Institute. 8 Yao et al., 2004. UN Millennium Project. 2005. Investing in 9 Financial Times, May 14, 2004. development: A practical plan to achieve 10 IMF, September 2004. Elsewhere the IMF the Millennium Development Goals. New judges that in practice PRSPs are too weak York: United Nations. to provide a policy framework for PRGF- supported programs—see IMF, 2004, World Bank. 2000. Rural Development pp. 3-4. Indicators Handbook (Washington, DC). 11 Gottschalk, 2004. Yao, Shujie, Zongyi Zhang and Lucia Hanmer. 2004. “Growing inequality and 12 Marcus and Wilkinson, 2002, p. 9. poverty in China.” China Economic Review 13 IDA and IMF, March 26, 2002, p. 32. 15: 145-63. 14 Easterly, 2003, p. 34. 15 IMF, February 14, 2002, p. 10. Endnotes 16 Rodrik, 2004, p. 5. 1 UN Millennium Project, 2005. 17 Independent Evaluation Office, 2004, 2 Ahluwalia, 1974, p. 3. pp. 3-4. 3 Besley and Burgess, 2003. 18 World Bank, 2000, p. 16. 4 See also Hanmer et al., 1999, who esti- mate that poor countries in sub-Saharan Africa will need to grow by 8 per cent per year until 2015 to reach MDG 1.
39
Aid Flows, MDGs and Poverty Eradication: More and Better Canadian Aid
Brian Tomlinson
Aid Flows, MDGs and Poverty Eradication: More and Better Canadian Aid
Aid Flows, MDGs and Poverty Eradication: More and Better Canadian Aid
Brian Tomlinson1
oal 8 of the Millennium poorest countries. However, in Development Goals (MDGs) the past, its positive benefits for Goutlines the North’s commit- reducing poverty have been ment to a global partnership for undermined by donor trade and development. It has been widely investment policies. Donors have accepted as a flawed but impor- used their aid to further their tant step for holding developed foreign policy interests and to countries accountable for making exercise strong policy influence progress in achieving the MDGs. over the governments of the At the March 2002 Monterrey UN poorest countries. Commitments Conference on Financing for to increase aid therefore must go Development, donor countries hand-in-hand with far-reaching pledged that “no country genuine- reform of the system of setting ly committed to poverty reduction, priorities and delivering aid. good governance and economic reform will be denied the chance Goal 8 provides some very to achieve the MDGs through lack modest objectives and indicators of finance.” This pledge builds on to measure developed countries’ the Millennium Declaration in progress, including “more gener- which all countries committed in ous ODA for countries committed September 2000 to “spare no to poverty reduction” and an effort to free our fellow men, “enhanced program of debt women and children from the relief”. However, these objectives, abject and dehumanizing condi- and their related targets (net tions of extreme poverty.” ODA to least developed countries, proportion of bilateral ODA to “Sparing no effort” should oblige basic social services, untied ODA, developed countries to subject all and debt relief committed under of their international policies to the HIPC, or Heavily Indebted an assessment of their impact on Poor Countries Initiative), unlike global poverty, inequality, and other MDGs, have little specificity human rights. Among these poli- and no timelines. They fail to cies, aid, or official development cover areas for ODA reform assistance (ODA) is an essential essential to the achievement catalyst for financing poverty of these goals. reduction, particularly in the
43 Canadian Development Report 2005
An assessment of donors in relation to assessment of donor performance should more and better aid must take into be this same 25-year period—1990 to account a range of issues and indicators 2015. Between 1990 and 2003, aid from that are not addressed by Goal 8. Has all donors declined from 0.33 per cent increased aid since 2002 focused on the of GNI in 1990 to 0.25 per cent in broad objective of poverty reduction and 2003. In 2003, total ODA for all the MDGs? Or has it been redirected to donors amounted to US$61.0 billion, donor interests in the “war against compared to US$55.8 billion in 1990 terrorism” and conflict management (in 2002 dollars). in countries that are selected for their foreign policy relevance? How is In its January 2005 report, the UN increased aid being delivered? Are Millennium Project concludes that donors taking a comprehensive approach US$135 billion of ODA will be required to reducing poverty that situates social in 2006, rising to US$195 billion in 2015. spending within the need for progress on When measured against the UN target livelihoods for the poor, an area largely of 0.7 per cent, ODA at these levels will missing from the MDGs? Is increased aid require an overall donor performance (and debt relief) targeted at the MDGs of 0.44 per cent of GNI in 2006 and 2 increasing the capacities of citizens of 0.54 per cent in 2015. developing countries to set their own Due to deep aid cuts in the 1990s, aid strategies for poverty reduction? Or is recipients experienced a cumulatively net this new aid accompanied by increased loss of more than US$26 billion between and inappropriate policy influence by the 1990 and 2003, including a net gain of donor countries? US$13 billion from 2000 to 2003.3 In answering these questions for Canada, ODA has begun a slow recovery in recent this chapter reviews both indicators for years, rising from US$58.3 billion in 2002 Goal 8, as well as additional questions on to US$69 billion in 2003 (in actual the quality of aid and its impact on dollars). However, these new resources achieving the MDGs and significant have not necessarily been directed to the poverty reduction. MDGs, nor do they come close to making up for the loss of ODA receipts by developing countries since 1990. Of the US$10.7 billion increase between How are donors measuring 2002 and 2003, almost 75 per cent is up to what is required to finance accounted for by inflation and exchange the MDGs? rate movements, a further 18 per cent by aid increases to Iraq, leaving a mere The long-established international goal US$1 billion of new aid resources that for donor assistance is 0.7 per cent of might be applied to the MDGs.4 Gross National Income (GNI), a measure set by the Commission on International Development in 1969, and so far achieved by only five out of 22 donor Assessing Canada’s performance countries. The MDGs use 1990 as the Since 2002, the federal government has reference year for measuring progress in reversed the sharp decline in Canadian achieving the MDGs by Southern coun- ODA disbursements that occurred tries. Since Goal 8 has no timeline, a fair between 1994 and 2000. Following
44 Aid Flows, MDGs and Poverty Eradication: More and Better Canadian Aid
Prime Minster Jean Chrétien’s announce- fair share of new resources required to ment at the 2002 Monterrey Conference meet the MDGs and also so far fail to to double Canada’s aid by 2010, make up or even exceed overall Canadian aid has been increasing by at Canadian aid performance in 1990.7 least 8 per cent per year. Furthermore, at the Kananaskis G-8 meeting in June of that year, the government promised to Canadian ODA failing to meet the devote half of these aid increases to UN 0.7 per cent target sub-Saharan Africa. The March 2005 Chart 1 sets out Canadian aid perform- federal budget “locked in” the 8 per cent ance since 1990. Canada’s ODA has aid increases to 2010, but also signifi- fallen from 0.45 per cent of GNI in 1990 cantly accelerated increased aid to to a projected 0.32 per cent in 2010, sub-Saharan Africa. With this budget, under current government aid spending total Canadian aid to Africa more than plans.8 Based on Canada’s fair share doubles between 2002 and 2008, from (3 per cent) of the additional aid less than $1.1 billion in 2002 to almost resources needed to achieve the MDGs, $2.8 billion in 2008.5 The Canadian increases of 8 per cent a year to 2010 International Development Agency will leave us still about $5 billion short of (CIDA), Canada’s official aid agency, has meeting these requirements by that asserted the central importance of the point. Projecting the 8 per cent increases MDGs as both an overarching set of to 2015, Canadian aid would reach goals for Canadian aid as well as the 0.37 per cent of our GNI, well short of basis for setting priorities for the the UN target of 0.7 per cent. Indeed it Agency.6 While these recent aid increases will take until about the year 2027 to are certainly welcome and long overdue, reach this target at the rate of 8 per cent they nevertheless fall short of Canada’s per year.
Chart 1
Canadian ODA Performance, 1990-2010 (Canadian ODA as a percentage of Canadian GNI)
0.50 (0.45%) 0.45 0.40 (0.34%) 0.35 (0.32%) (0.32%) 0.30 0.25 (0.23%) 0.20 0.15 0.10 0.05 0.00 1990/91 1995/96 2000/01 2004/05 2010/11 Source: CCIC calculations from CIDA Statistical Reports, various years, and the Federal Budget Plan 2005. Canadian ODA after 1994, excluding support for refugees in Canada; 2004/05 and 2010/11 CCIC estimates.
45 Canadian Development Report 2005
On top of holding firm to its 8 per cent consistent increase in Canadian aid by commitment for annual increases, for 15 per cent between 2006 and 2015 will each year from 2001 to 2004, the in fact achieve the UN target of 0.7 per government has made one-off additions cent of GNI by that year, and will during the year to CIDA’s budget provided predictable resources for long- through supplementary estimates. The term planning to achieve the MDGs and result is actual increases to Canadian aid accelerate progress in poverty reduction. of between 12 per cent and 18 per cent for each of these years. These additions have been allocations at the end of the Reduced concentration of Canadian aid fiscal year to cover major new funding on least developed countries announcements for such initiatives as the Canada has not improved its concentra- Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis tion of aid on least developed countries and Malaria or the Global Alliance for since 1990. In 2002, less than 27 per Vaccines and Immunization, or for urgent cent of Canadian aid was concentrated in humanitarian emergences such as the these countries, compared to 31 per cent tsunami, or for large aid packages to in 1990. The 2001 UN Conference on Afghanistan and Iraq. the Least Developed Countries reaffirmed the target of 0.15 per cent of GNI for Larger increases in aid are therefore these countries. Canada’s disbursements entirely consistent with the government’s in 2002 represented a mere half of this commitment to fiscal responsibility. The target— 0.08 per cent of Canadian GNI, Canadian Council for International a slight improvement from 0.07 per cent Co-operation (CCIC), a coalition of in 1990. Canada ranked tenth among Canadian organizations working in inter- 22 donors in the degree to which its aid national development, argues that a
Chart 2
Concentration of Canadian Aid on Least Developed, Low Income, and Sub-Saharan Africa Countries Percentage of Canadian ODA, 1990 to 2002
50.0% 45.5% 45.6% 45.0% 44.1% 40.0% 39.2% 35.0% 32.9% 30.9% 31.7% 30.0% 28.5% 27.4% 25.4% 25.0% 23.7% 23.7% 20.0% 15.0% 10.0% 5.0% 0.0% 1990/91 1995/96 2000/01 2002/03 Least Developed Countries Low Income Countries Sub-Saharan Africa
Source: CIDA Statistical Report, various years.
46 Aid Flows, MDGs and Poverty Eradication: More and Better Canadian Aid
is concentrated in these countries in Finance Minister Ralph Goodale was a 2002. Approximately 45 per cent of Commissioner, called for a doubling of Canadian aid is devoted to low income aid to Africa by 2010. Total Canadian aid countries, including the least developed. to sub-Saharan Africa continues to grow significantly as a proportion of total In December 2002, the government Canadian ODA, from 25 per cent in announced that it was improving its aid 2000 to 32 per cent in 2002. As noted effectiveness by focusing new aid earlier, aid to Africa will more than resources on nine priority countries— double by 2008, when it is expected to Honduras, Bolivia, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, be more than 50 per cent of Canadian Tanzania, Mozambique, Ghana, Mali, ODA disbursements. and Senegal. All but Honduras and Bolivia are classified as low income Canada’s policy to cancel 100 per cent of countries. The emphasis on these nine bilateral debt is affecting its reporting of has increased significantly, from 18 per total aid to Africa between 2002 and cent of bilateral disbursements in 2006. In those years, large bilateral debt 2001/02 to 30 per cent in 2003/04, less cancellation for Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, than two years after the announcement. and the Democratic Republic of Congo The government’s April 2005 will make up a significant proportion of International Policy Statement made Canadian ODA for Africa. some significant adjustments to the current choice of priority countries for The sectoral distribution of aid in sub- international cooperation, increasing Saharan Africa has become more focused the number of focus countries from on sectors affecting poverty reduction. nine to 25. Country and sector priorities Disbursements for education, health and outlined in the Statement reflect a con- agriculture, for example, rose rapidly tinued commitment to centre Canada’s from 37 per cent of total African aid program on some of the poorest disbursements in 2000 to slightly less countries and on sectors relevant to than 50 per cent in 2003. These shifts in the rights of people living in poverty. sectoral priority were the result of CIDA’s For a review of the Statement and its adoption of financial targets for social implications for Canadian aid, see: development priorities in 2000 and http://www.ccic.ca/e/docs/002_ipr_ greater contributions to Sector-Wide 2005-04_ips_key_messages.pdf. [French: Approaches (SWAps) for these sectors. http://www.ccic.ca/f/docs/002_ipr_ 2005-04_ips_key_messages.pdf].9 Improving sector allocations towards basic social services Greater concentration of Canadian aid An indicator of Canada’s commitment to in sub-Saharan Africa the MDGs is the degree to which its aid Sub-Saharan Africa is the region in which program is concentrated in meeting absolute poverty continues to grow as a basic social services within an overall proportion of the population and in strategy for poverty reduction. Alison which the MDGs are least likely to be van Rooy in 1995 calculated that CIDA’s achieved. The recent UK-sponsored allocations for sustainable basic human Commission for Africa, for which needs were only about 13 per cent of its
47 Canadian Development Report 2005
ODA disbursements in the early 1990s.10 reduction and governance. However, Unfortunately, there is little comparable CSOs are playing a diminishing role in data to the present. However, in Canadian international cooperation, par- 1996/97, CCIC estimated CIDA disburse- ticularly in relation to new programmatic ments for basic human needs at about approaches designed to improve aid 17 per cent. By 2002, CIDA disburse- effectiveness in CIDA’s priority countries. ments to the four social development According to CCIC calculations, CIDA priorities amounted to more than 25 per disbursements in partnership with CSOs cent of CIDA’s ODA in that year. have decreased by 6 per cent in the Disbursements for basic education from three years between 1999/2000 and CIDA’s bilateral Branches and Canadian 2002/03, the last year for which statistics Partnership Branch more than doubled are available. This reduction has been between 1996 and 2002. Similarly, aid to particularly pronounced in the Bilateral primary health increased by 40 per cent Branches, with an overall reduction of between these years.11 more than 25 per cent during these years.12 Conversely, CIDA bilateral In March 2005, the Minister of disbursements directly to government International Cooperation, Aileen Carroll, ministries or through programs managed announced that CIDA will be focusing its by the World Bank tripled for the nine attention on four sectors—basic educa- priority countries in these years. The tion, health, governance, and the devel- emphasis on program approaches is a opment of the private sector. Notably welcome innovation for CIDA, but missing from the Minister’s discourse on according to Canadian CSOs, CIDA has private sector development was any not put sufficient attention on the role for mention of commitments to CIDA’s agri- civil society in its programs and policies culture and rural development strategy, for aid effectiveness. The Agency is urged developed only the previous year. to engage with civil society partners to Seventy-five per cent of the world’s poor clarify how CIDA and civil society organi- depend on rural livelihoods. Without zations can work together to achieve substantial progress on rural livelihoods, shared goals for poverty reduction and progress in the set goals for health, the MDGs in Canada’s priority countries. education, and governance will never be sustained. Canadian aid tying remains high Less emphasis on civil society in In 2003, the proportion of Canadian implementing CIDA’s aid bilateral aid that remains tied to Canadian goods and services puts While governments have a central role in Canada seventeenth among 18 reporting realizing the MDGs and poverty reduc- donors to the Development Assistance tion, civil society organizations (CSOs) Committee (DAC) of the Organisation also play crucial roles in strengthening for Economic Co-operation and development innovation, in public Development (OECD). The degree to accountability, and in enabling the poor which Canadian aid is tied, however, and marginalized to realize their rights. improved from 60 per cent in 1990 to Civil society is essential to participatory 47 per cent in 2003. Canada has approaches in sectors vital to poverty implemented the 2002 DAC agreement
48 Aid Flows, MDGs and Poverty Eradication: More and Better Canadian Aid
on untying aid to the least developed Beyond tied aid, there seems to be countries (LDCs). Also in 2002, Canadian significantly reduced ownership by local policy changed with the Minister of partners over the allocation of aid dollars International Cooperation having greater since 1990, with much less Canadian discretionary power in determining the bilateral aid under the direct control of tying status for Canadian aid. The big developing country partners. Using a exception is Canadian food aid, which methodology set out in the 2002 Reality remains tied at 90 per cent of purchases. of Aid Report, an estimated 60 per cent The UK Commission for Africa estimated of bilateral aid in 1990 was under devel- the additional cost from tied food aid at oping country partner control; this had more than 40 per cent.13 The Canadian shrunk by almost half to 34 per cent in Foodgrains Bank, a coalition of Canadian 2002. For donors as a whole, The Reality churches and farmers working with food of Aid estimated that 37 per cent was aid, has called on the government to under the ownership of developing substantially untie Canadian food aid, country partners in 1999.14 allowing local purchases, particularly in emergency situations. It is important to note that all donors Improving the quality of exclude their considerable use of techni- Canadian ODA cal assistance when reporting bilateral Increasing use of program-based aid tying. For Canada, including techni- approaches cal assistance as tied aid would raise the level of tying from 47 per cent to 67 per In 2002 the government set out a num- cent in 2003. Likewise, including techni- ber of reforms to improve aid effective- cal assistance for other donors with ness, particularly in moving away from much lower tying status would see their project-oriented aid modalities and levels substantially increase. Finally, adopting program-based approaches.15 untying aid does not necessarily benefit While these new approaches did not developing country partners and their derive from Canada’s commitment to the local businesses. Donors untie their aid MDGs, they have affected the delivery of by putting their aid contracts up for aid for these purposes. Since 2002, there international tender, under liberalized has been a dramatic increase in directing procurement regulations. Often Canadian aid through joint programs developing country businesses are not with other donors, providing budget able to compete with highly specialized support to developing country govern- Northern firms for the delivery of these ments for general budget support and goods and services, thus reducing the sector programs in health, education, economic benefits in the poorest coun- and agriculture, all important areas for tries. Aid untying should be accompa- achieving the MDGs. Fully 60 per cent nied by measures that allow developing of CIDA’s aid to Africa, for example, will country partners the option to give be channeled through these mechanisms priority to open and transparent local by 2006. Canada, along with other procurement. major donors, has been committed to improving country direction for these
49 Canadian Development Report 2005
programs by aligning assistance with the require progress before the release of country’s Poverty Reduction Strategy donor funds, and 60 additional results Papers (PRSPs). related to Tanzania’s PRSP that are systematically reviewed by the Tanzanian While PRSPs offer some limited opportu- government. Strengthening the role of nities for greater participation by devel- government in the poorest countries for oping countries in determining appropri- the delivery of socio-economic programs ate strategies for poverty reduction, to people living in poverty is essential. many Southern and Northern CSOs However, some donors now realize that remain critical. In the past four decades, the myriad of conditions associated with both aid and debt relief has been used budget support and SWAps have as tools for donors to impose their own unintended political and economic policy prescriptions on the poorest consequences, which may undermine countries. These donor policies—limiting the domestic political accountability the role of the state, liberalizing trade so necessary to sustain progress on policy, privatizing state roles in health or poverty reduction. education, commonly referred to as the Washington Consensus—often have had As it moves toward program approaches, devastating consequences, reducing the CIDA should be improving its own capacity of poor governments to meet capacities to make niche investments in their obligations to their citizens. These areas of particular strength—such as policies remain at the heart of the PRSPs, gender equality, basic education, or over which the World Bank and the agricultural livelihoods—and assess the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have overall impact of attached conditions on final approval in determining eligibility the attainment of the program’s stated for debt relief. Poor and marginalized goals and the MDGs. Equally important communities are rarely able to express is an assessment of PRSPs and sector their views on development options. programs in terms of a holistic approach While delivering more aid, donors are to poverty that is guided by shared engaging in largely technocratic discus- human rights obligations on the part sions with government official and of both donors and developing political elites in the countries concerned. country partners. The jury is still out in assessing the effec- tiveness of current donor practices in Diverting aid to foreign policy program approaches for aid delivery for considerations sustained poverty reduction.16 By As noted earlier, there is reason to be adopting this approach for much of the concerned about the potential for aid aid directed to MDGs, CIDA largely increases to be diverted to foreign policy accepts the “gatekeeper role” of the IMF considerations, particularly the war on and World Bank, and the dozens of terrorism, instead of sustained poverty policy conditions that those institutions reduction. Fully 30 per cent of new attach to the funding mechanisms. Canadian aid resources between 2001 Donors supporting the Tanzania General and 2003 have been allocated to Budget Support Program, for example, Afghanistan and Iraq. Increased attention have imposed 50 prior actions, which to security sector reform may provide for
50 Aid Flows, MDGs and Poverty Eradication: More and Better Canadian Aid
human security at the local level for poor adoption of strategies for social develop- people, but it may also be directed to ment priorities in 2000 and more recent- areas that relate to security interests of ly for agriculture and rural development. the North—airport and port security or Aid levels are again climbing after precip- improved computer-based tracking of itous declines in the late 1990s. Canada’s citizens in countries with potential leadership in the G-8 to focus on the “terrorist” threats, for example. Canada needs of sub-Saharan Africa in 2002 has has joined with some other donors at the been taken up by the United Kingdom in DAC to try to stretch the criteria for what 2004. Finance Minister Goodale, as an donors can count as aid. In the security- individual, signed onto the many centric, post-9/11 world, donors are progressive recommendations in the UK’s seeking to count resources earmarked for Commission for Africa Report and his military and security aspects of peace 2005 budget dramatically increased aid operations as aid. In this regard, how resources for Africa up to 2008. much of the $500 million “peace and security” initiative announced in the On the other hand, Canada is not doing 2005 budget will be considered its share, relative to growing wealth and Canadian ODA? a healthy fiscal situation for the federal government. At 0.33 per cent of GNI, The Canadian iteration of the global planned aid increases will not reach even Make Poverty History campaign is half of Canada’s long-standing commit- seeking legislation to establish poverty ment to 0.7 per cent of GNI by 2010. reduction as the exclusive mandate for The quality of Canadian aid and its effec- Canadian ODA.17 This mandate would tiveness in reaching the poor and direct the government to deliver aid in a marginalized remains an overarching manner consistent with Canada’s human concern. Rhetorical support for local rights obligations and respectful of the ownership of development strategies is perspectives of those living in poverty. accompanied by continued high levels of aid tying. Positive support for program- based approaches, coordinated with An overall assessment: modest donors and recipient governments, is improvements in a mixed record accompanied by high levels of donor- imposed policy conditions and “under- Canada, along with all nations, acknowl- takings” to be carried out by developing edged the central importance of rights country governments in exchange for aid and justice in signing the Millennium dollars for the MDGs. Neither CIDA nor Declaration in September 2000 and later the Department of Finance (in its over- made specific commitments to realize sight over the World Bank and the IMF) the MDGs by 2015, with 1990 as the has given any indication that they are benchmark year. Canada’s record in considering a more flexible approach to meeting these obligations and commit- conditionality, such as the one adopted ments is mixed. On balance, in the recently by the UK’s Department for period 1990 to 2003, Canadian aid has International Development (DfID) and improved its focus on poverty as its goal reflected in the Report of the and target for its aid interventions. Commission for Africa.18 Particularly important were CIDA’s
51 Canadian Development Report 2005
Canada has signed onto the 1986 UN CCIC’s web site, www.ccic.ca. The author resolution on the Right to Development is grateful for comments on earlier drafts which suggests that donors have a by colleagues at CCIC and The North human rights obligation to contribute to South Institute. an equitable, non-discriminatory system 2 UN Millennium Project, Investing in of international cooperation. While Development: A Practical Plan for Achieving Canada has demonstrated some progress the Millennium Development Goals, January in aligning its aid program with these 2005, available at http://www.unmillenni- obligations, the government has yet to umproject.org, Tables 8 and 10, pp. 55-65. articulate a rights framework for inter- This report estimates a need for additional national cooperation. Such a framework aid of US$46.6 billion in 2006, rising to would direct aid resources to strengthen US$73.5 billion in 2015. Their estimates the capacities of civil organizations and include ODA not directed to the MDGs governments alike in the progressive that will still be required in these years (emergency assistance and infrastructure realization of social, economic and development, for example). cultural rights for citizens in the poorest countries, of which achieving the MDGs 3 Calculation by the author, using the are but one indicator of success. DAC Table for “Net ODA from DAC Countries 1950 to 2003,” accessed at http://www.oecd.org/docu- ment/11/0,2340,en_2649_34485_ BRIAN TOMLINSON is the Coordinator of 1894347_1_1_1_1,00.html and Table 36, the Policy Team at the Canadian Council for “Deflators for Resource Flows from International Co-operation (CCIC). Special- DAC Donors (2002 = 100)” , in the izing in Canadian aid policy, he has been DAC 2004 Statistical Report, accessed at http://www.oecd.org/document/9/ with the Council since 1995. Previously he 0,2340,en_2649_34485_1893129_1_1_1_ worked for CUSO in the Americas’ program. 1,00.html. From 1973 to 1980 he worked for Oxfam- 4 Calculated from DAC, “Final ODA Canada as a Political Affairs Officer. He has Data for 2003”, accessible at a Master’s degree in Political Economy from http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/48/0/ the University of Toronto. 34282401.pdf. The recently published report of the UK Commission for Africa, using World Bank sources, points out that 87% of the nominal aid increases Endnotes between 2001 and 2003 has not gone to 1 This chapter reflects the analysis and countries struggling to reach the MDGs. views of the author. It is written in his Our Common Interest: Report of the capacity as Policy Officer for the Canadian Commission for Africa, March 2005, Council for International Co-operation p. 323, accessible at http://www.commis- (CCIC), but does not necessarily reflect sionforafrica.org/english/report/introduc- the view of the Council or its members. tion.html. The paper is drawn from a longer analysis 5 The 2005/06 Budget Plan sets out a by the author, “The Politics of the timetable of increases for Africa which Millennium Development Goals: result in at least 30 per cent more Contributing to Strategies for Ending resources for Africa up to 2008 than were Poverty?” April 2005, accessible on
52 Aid Flows, MDGs and Poverty Eradication: More and Better Canadian Aid
planned in the commitment to devote 9 This paper was written prior to the publi- half of the aid increases in each year to cation of the government’s International Africa. See Canada, Department of Policy Statement expected at the end of Finance, The Budget Plan 2005, February March 2005. For a review of the 2005, p. 213, accessible at Statement and its implications for http://www.fin.gc.ca/budget05/pdf/ Canadian aid, visit CCIC’s website, bp2005e.pdf. www.ccic.ca, following the publication of the government’s Statement. 6 See for example, CIDA, Departmental Performance Report 2004, p. 7, accessible 10 Alison van Rooy, A Partial Promise? at http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/INET/ Canadian Support to Social Development in IMAGES.NSF/vLUImages/Publications2/ the South. (Ottawa: The North South $file/FINALDPREn04.pdf. Institute, 1995). 7 The MDGs, in the view of the author, 11 CCIC calculations based on coding of provide a useful set of time-specific project data provided to CCIC by CIDA. benchmarks for assessing donor commit- ments and orientation toward poverty 12 These calculations have been made by reduction in their aid programs. However, CCIC based on detailed project informa- the MDGs are also a modest and tion provided by CIDA and CIDA’s official incomplete agenda for an approach to statistical reports for these two years. sustainable poverty reduction that is 13 Commission for Africa, Our Common rooted in global equality and justice. The Interest, p. 348. long-term contributions of aid to poverty reduction should be explicitly situated 14 The calculation is made by CCIC, based within existing human rights obligations on total bilateral aid for the given year, of all states based on the International less technical cooperation, support for Covenant on Economic, Social and refugees in their first year, imputed stu- Cultural Rights, the Convention on the dent costs in Canada, debt forgiveness, Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination the cost of Canadian tied aid (@25 per against Women, and the Right to cent), emergency relief, and interest Development. For an elaboration of this received by Canada. The original outline thesis please see Brian Tomlinson, The of this calculation comes from The Reality Politics of Millennium Development Goals: of Aid 2002 Report, Manila: IBON Contributions to Strategies for Ending Publishing, www.realityofaid.org p. 157. Poverty April 2005, accessible at The data source is the DAC Development http://www.ccic.ca/e/002/aid.html. Cooperation Report, various years. 8 Canada did not include an estimate of 15 CIDA, Canada Making a Difference in the assistance to refugees for their first year in World: A Policy Statement on Strengthening Canada as part of Canadian ODA until Aid effectiveness. (Ottawa: Supply and 1994. In comparisons with the years prior Services Canada, September 2002), to 1994, these estimates (ranging from accessible at http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/ $150 to $200 million) should be aideffectiveness. deducted from total Canadian ODA. Canada’s “fair share” is a calculation of 16 For an assessment of CIDA’s objective to Canada’s GNI as a proportion of total GNI improve local ownership in its shift to for all 22 donor countries in the OECD. program based approaches see, Brian Tomlinson and Pam Foster, At the Table or
53 Canadian Development Report 2005
in the Kitchen? CIDA’s New Aid Strategies, 18 DfID, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Developing Country Ownership and Donor and HM Treasury, “Partnerships for pover- Conditionality, CCIC/Halifax Initiative ty reduction: rethinking conditionality. A Briefing Paper, September 2004, UK policy paper”, March 2005. Accessible www.ccic.ca/e/docs/002_aid_2004- at http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/ 09_at_the_table.pdf. See page 7ff for conditionality.pdf. further information on current conditions in budget support programs. 17 For further information on the Make Poverty History campaign, go to www.makepovertyhistory.ca.
54 Canada and MDG 8: Focus on Trade
Ann Weston and Bill Morton
Canada and MDG 8: Focus on Trade
Canada and MDG 8: Focus on Trade
Ann Weston and Bill Morton
Background between North and South. Second, the targets are fairly oal 8—“Develop a global clear and accompanied by some partnership for develop- quantifiable indicators. Third, Gment”—was a late addition they can be used to hold to the MDG portfolio, included in governments to account for the “Road map towards the imple- their commitment to a global mentation of the Millennium partnership. Declaration” in 2001. It attempts to redress the imbalance in earlier However, the targets also contain versions of the goals, by setting out a number of weaknesses. First, specific commitments which devel- the focus is rather narrow, with oped countries must make to most attention being given to the support developing countries’ treatment of exports. Second, achievement of the other seven they are inadequately specified; goals. As the UN Development in particular, unlike other MDGs, Programme (UNDP), in its 2003 the trade targets are not time- Human Development Report, bound. These issues are addressed stated: “If Goal 8 is ignored, it is in the next section, followed by hard to imagine the poorest coun- an examination of Canada’s tries achieving Goals 1-7.”1 performance. Goal 8 covers five broad areas: trade, finance/debt, youth employment, and access to Key contentious issues affordable medicines and new technologies, for which a number Narrow focus of targets and indicators are spec- While access to Northern markets, ified. Here we focus on those that agricultural subsidies, and support are related to trade, as set out for trade-related capacity-building in Box 1. (TRCB) are critical issues, this focus represents a limited inter- The inclusion of such trade-relat- pretation of the measures ed targets as part of MDG 8 is required if developed countries welcome for three reasons. First, and the global trading regime are trade is a key tool for economic to deliver real benefits for devel- growth as well as being a critical oping countries. In the Doha aspect of the relationship
57 Canadian Development Report 2005
Box 1 Trade-related targets and indicators
Targets Indicatorsa
Target 12: Develop further an Market access indicators: open, rule-based, predictable, non- (Indicators 38-41 refer to Targets 12 discriminatory trading system and 13)
Target 13: Address the special needs of Indicator 38: Proportion of developed Least Developed Countries (LDCs). country imports (by value and Includes: tariff and quota free access for excluding arms) admitted free of duties LDC exports and quotas from developing countries and LDCs Indicator 39: Average tariffs on agricul- tural products and textiles and clothing from developing countries Indicator 40: Agricultural support estimates for OECD countries as a percentage of their GDP Indicator 41: Proportion of ODA provided to help build trade capacity
Target 17: In cooperation with pharma- Indicator 46: Proportion of population ceutical companies, provide access to with access to affordable essential drugs affordable, essential drugs in developing on a sustainable basis countries
Target 18: In cooperation with the pri- Indicator 47: Telephone lines and vate sector, make available the benefits cellular subscribers of new technologies, especially informa- tion and communication technologies Indicator 48: Personal computer and Internet users
a Note that the numbering and the description of the indicators has changed over time. These are taken from UN, Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration, UN A/59/282, August 27, 2004.
Development Agenda (DDA), agreed by and other efforts to ensure that the World Trade Organization (WTO) trade needs and interests of developing coun- ministers in November 2001, a broader tries, who form the majority of WTO approach was recognized as being members, are addressed. important, including “balanced rules”
58 Canada and MDG 8: Focus on Trade
A key concern for many developing WTO and typically governments have countries is the extent to which they chosen not to limit their trade negotiat- themselves should be expected to open ing positions by making commitments in up their markets, and the importance of other forums. trade rules which allow them policy flexi- bility, that is, the ability to determine the Another problem is that the indicators do pace and extent of liberalization. This has not adequately capture the interests of been hotly debated in the area of the low income countries on the one agriculture, where the interests of small- hand, and the responsibilities of the holder farmers are at stake, as they are more advanced developing countries on unable to compete with heavily subsi- the other. While it is clear that LDCs face dized Northern crops. Even in the greater difficulties in taking advantage of absence of such subsidies, when the international trading system than implementing obligations specified in many other developing countries (as the WTO Agriculture Agreement, devel- illustrated by their declining share of oping countries should be allowed the world trade), others may still need to be flexibility to address their own needs in given special and differential treatment. terms of food security, defence of rural For instance, some low-income countries livelihoods, and poverty alleviation. may need to be exempted from regular Besides this general issue, particular WTO obligations for a certain period demands on developing countries, in during which they are given technical terms of intellectual property obligations assistance to build their capacity to take and commitments on services, may on these obligations. Conversely, some of compromise their capacity to meet other the more advanced countries are in a MDGs, notably on health, access to position to open up their markets to water, and education. imports from other developing coun- tries—and such changes should be encouraged by their inclusion in the Inadequate specification scope of the MDG 8 commitments. The actions on trade are not very specific and there is no date by which they are to Others’ criticisms of MDG 8 be taken. For instance, while the target for LDCs is to remove all quotas and Other commentators have also tariffs facing their exports, this is not suggested Goal 8 is flawed. The UN, time-bound. In the case of other devel- despite being official “author” of the oping countries, the extent to which MDGs, has noted that its targets and tariffs on their exports should be cut is indicators are “subject to further not specified, let alone by when. refinement”. The Center for Global Similarly, there are no details for the Development (CGD) called it a “hodge- 2 appropriate level of agricultural support, podge of elements”. The CGD has if any, or the ideal proportion of aid to proposed a “Commitment to be devoted to building trade capacity. Of Development Index” (CDI) while Oxfam course one of the reasons for this weak- has called for a “Double Standards 3 ness is that some of these issues are the Index”. Both address market access subject of ongoing negotiations at the issues similar to those that make up
59 Canadian Development Report 2005
MDG 8’s trade-related aspects, including Canada’s position at the WTO, the LDC tariffs and quotas, and domestic and Initiative (LDCI), and Bill C-9, as export agricultural subsidies. described further below. This partly derives from the 2002 policy statement, Canada Making a Difference in the World, How has Canada performed? which listed market access (tariffs, quo- tas, export subsidies, and regulatory bar- At time of writing, Canada had yet to riers on products of special interest to file a national report on its MDG 8 developing countries), the very low LDC performance.4 The following is therefore share of Canadian imports, and expand- based on a review of some policy state- ed support for trade capacity-building as ments and statistics, as well as interviews key agency priorities. CIDA’s “Sustainable with officials in CIDA, Foreign Affairs Development Strategy 2004-2006”6 Canada (FAC) and International Trade includes several MDG indicators amongst Canada (ITC). those chosen to assess CIDA’s achieve- ment of development outcomes. The Canada’s commitment to MDG 8 “Detailed Action Plan” attached to the on trade strategy addresses a number of trade issues, with a particular focus on TRCB. According to FAC staff, the MDGs serve “Sample indicators” to assess its trade- as a useful “focal point for policy related capacity-building include coherence” across different government “number of LDCs successfully engaged departments and agencies, such as in an integrated framework for trade,” Health, ITC, Industry and CIDA. There and “trade volumes and market access is little reference, however, to Goal 8 in for development countries.” Government of Canada policy statements on trade, nor any suggestion that MDG Despite the relative silence on MDG 8 in 8 per se has inspired trade-related initia- official documents, the Canadian govern- tives that take into account developing ment has taken a number of key steps country needs. Instead there is greater toward the MDG 8 trade targets: emphasis on Canada’s commitment to 1. In January 2003, all tariffs and quotas the DDA and helping developing were removed on all imports from countries “to realize their full economic 49 LDCs, with the exception of dairy potential” via the associated reforms in products, poultry, and eggs. In 5 the international trading system. contrast to other countries’ LDC duty- CIDA considers its work on trade is and quota-free provisions, Canada’s “directly related to MDG 8”. In addition LDC Initiative has fairly generous rules to trade-related capacity-building of origin, allowing LDC products to projects in several countries, Policy qualify for duty-free treatment even if Branch officials have participated in inter- they have as little as 25 per cent departmental discussions on trade, “in value-added domestically (provided support of poverty reduction and another 15 per cent of product value sustainable development objectives in comes from inputs from other developing countries”—notably on developing countries or from
60 Canada and MDG 8: Focus on Trade
Box 2 The UK’s innovative approach to the MDGs The UK has adopted an innovative approach, by integrating the MDGs into the departmental performance review criteria agreed with Treasury through the Public Service Agreements (PSA). Besides the Department for International Development (DfID), several others, including the Department for Trade and Industry (DTI), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), and the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), have integrated the MDGs, particularly MDG 8, into their PSAs. The overall aim of the PSA for DFID is to “Eliminate poverty in poorer countries in particular through achievement by 2015 of the Millennium Development Goals.” For each MDG, DfID has decided to build on the goal and target indicators set out by the UN. On trade, the 2005-08 PSA target is to “ensure that the European Union (EU) secures significant reductions in EU and world trade barriers by 2008 leading to improved opportunities for developing countries and a more competitive Europe.”7 One of the agreed measures concerns reductions in trade-distorting support under the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy, a measure which has also been adopted by DEFRA. The aim is to have eliminated export subsidies by 2010 or at least to be on an agreed track by this date to reach zero; to reduce EU production-linked domestic support by an additional 10 per cent over and above the cuts agreed to in May 2004; and to be on an agreed track by 2008 to cut the average EU tariff on a range of important agricultural imports by at least 36 per cent. Another UK trade-related measure is for an increase in the value of EU imports from LDCs of at least US$6.5 billion by 2010, that is, roughly 50 per cent of exports recorded in 2002. The intent here is to allow for a lag for LDC exports to respond to the new opportunities agreed in the Doha Agreement. The measure is intended as a “guide to the outcome of liberalization, i.e. whether there is an increase in the value of trade flows following liberalization,” and that this is based on the premise that increased openness of the EU, combined with support of capacity-building in LDCs, should facilitate increased EU imports from LDCs. In general, these targets and indicators are more meaningful than those contained in MDG 8 itself, as they are accompanied by baseline measures, and are quantifiable and for the most part time-bound, thereby allowing straightforward measurement of whether progress has occurred. The PSA’s statements on how targets are to be achieved also include reference to the role of other government departments such as the DTI, the DEFRA, and the FCO, which suggests that at least to some degree, the MDGs have been incorporated into policy at a cross-governmental level. In addition, during the course of discussions with other officials about policy options under consid- eration with EU colleagues in Brussels, DfID has found it useful to raise the UK’s com- mitment to MDG 8, and the trade dimensions. However, given the fairly limited trade indicators in MDG 8, other factors are also used to bolster the arguments for a more development-friendly approach to the trade negotiations.
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Canada). According to Finance 3. In 2004, Canada extended the Canada, Canadian imports from all General Preferential Tariff (GPT) and LDCs rose from $627 million to the LDCI to 2014. While there had $1,078 million from 2002 to 2003, been some improvements in the GPT while the average tariff they paid fell coverage since it was last renewed in from 5.36 per cent to 0.86 per cent. 1994, further changes in the form of Bangladesh was able to double its lower GPT tariffs, expansion of the exports to $351 million.8 (The impor- scheme to include clothing, further tance of this initiative for Bangladesh relaxation of the rules of origin, and is discussed in Titumir and Hussain’s binding these changes under the chapter in this volume.) WTO, would help to increase GPT utilization rates by non-LDC low- 2. On January 1, 2005 Canadian imports income countries. For the time being, of textiles and clothing from develop- however, the Canadian government ing countries were freed from quotas, seems to prefer to negotiate further as Canada lived up to its commitment tariff cuts reciprocally, as part of bilat- under the Uruguay Round to end the eral or regional free trade agreements restraints under the Multi-fibre (FTAs), or in the context of the multi- Arrangement. (In the 10-year quota lateral negotiations at the WTO. There phase-out period, however, Canada is no evidence of support for further delayed the ending of larger quotas.) unilateral tariff cuts to honour its Canada also went further than commitment to MDG 8. required by the WTO in that it removed quotas on imports from 4. In terms of agricultural subsidies, developing countries that are still not Canada shares the objective of many WTO members (Vietnam, Cambodia, developing countries for an end to Laos, Lebanon, Syria, and North trade-distorting measures.10 Its own Korea). The US has not been as gener- supply management policies and ous—preferring to maintain quotas on Wheat Marketing Board have Vietnam and other non-WTO mem- suggested some common interests bers, introducing trade “remedy” with developing countries, in particu- measures such as anti-dumping duties lar a sympathy for a more nuanced to restrain the surge in imports from approach to trade liberalization in the more competitive suppliers in China agricultural sector. Canada has and elsewhere, and imposing special supported the concept of “flexibility” safeguards on certain products as and “special products” for which low- allowed under the terms of China’s income countries would be exempted accession to the WTO in 2001. from the same degree of agricultural Instead, Canadian producers have liberalization as other countries (in preferred to seek positive support the form of lower tariff cuts and from the Canadian government in longer implementation periods). (In the form of lower tariffs on imported its bilateral FTAs it has also accepted inputs as well as subsidies for a the exemption of certain products range of initiatives to improve their sensitive to its FTA partner, as in the competitiveness.9 case of potatoes in Costa Rica.) However, Canada’s strong agricultural
62 Canada and MDG 8: Focus on Trade
exporting interests are likely to limit is particularly an issue for supply-side its tolerance for such exceptional projects involving trade development. treatment, including the use of For Canada, such projects account for “special safeguard”, and it will 47 per cent of TRTA/CB, with the bulk continue to advocate for increased being projects involving trade policy access to Southern—as well as and regulations. While there has been Northern—agricultural markets.11 no overall evaluation of this invest- ment, CIDA’s draft TRCB strategy, as 5. Canada was the first developed well as its resource tool on gender country to amend its drug patent equality and TRCB, suggest a develop- legislation (Bill C-9, passed in May mentally sensitive approach—one that 2004) in order to increase developing focuses on making trade work for countries’ access to cheap medi- poor women and men by focusing cines—a move which was expected on trade and development policy to be consistent with the WTO capacity, trade readiness, effective August 31 Decision on this issue, as participation in international trade well as its MDG 8 commitment (and agreements, and adjustment 12 Target 17). In the event, as outlined programs and policies. elsewhere in this report (see “The MDGs and Infectious Diseases: Focus While Canada has taken a number of on HIV/AIDS chapter), the amend- positive steps, there are other areas ments did not reflect the full scope of where more remains to be done if it is to that WTO Decision—for instance they live up to the spirit of MDG 8: are limited to certain medicines, whereas the Decision set none—and 1. In terms of improving market access, they introduced some procedural there is more that could be done, aspects which could limit their useful- particularly for the low-income coun- ness to health providers in developing tries, through improvements in tariff countries. On the other hand, it did cuts, ideally on a non-reciprocal basis set some useful precedents for other but bound under the WTO. There are countries, such as linking the calcula- good reasons for exporters in these tion of any royalty rate to be paid to countries to be given the same treat- the patent holder to a country’s ment as those in LDCs. Also important Human Development Index. will be to ensure that Canada does not use anti-dumping duties or safe- 6. Canada has contributed some guards on clothing imports. There $280 million to trade-related technical may be pressures to do so following assistance and capacity building such action in the US, which may lead (TRTA/CB) since 2001, ranking sixth to some diversion of exports to the among bilateral donors, according to Canadian market. Instead, Canada the WTO/OECD database on such could support affected countries to expenditures. Such comparisons are contest the US action through normal approximate as different reporting trade dispute resolution channels in methods are used, with some donors the US and the WTO. including the full value of a project while others only report that portion 2. Canada should consider including of a project that is trade-related. This some of its temporary labour
63 Canadian Development Report 2005
programs and other sectors of interest of the WTO, to at least 2006 for to developing countries in its offer on TRIPs and 2016 for pharmaceutical services. Canada should not make patents.13 In the ongoing negotiations services requests of developing coun- with CIDA partner countries such as tries which are likely to compromise Ethiopia and Vietnam, Canada their capacity to meet their MDGs. It should play an active role in is encouraging that the Canadian supporting policy flexibility to take government has said it will not ask into account national development commitments from others in areas priorities, and ensuring acceding where it is not willing to make offers countries are not required to accept itself, notably water and health. such “WTO-plus” standards. Canada’s position on education, how- ever, is ambiguous, with the govern- 5. Several issues in the area of ment unwilling to state categorically intellectual property rights (IPRs) that it will exclude education from remain to be resolved. There is a its requests. growing body of evidence that the present system of international rules, 3. Canada should support developing and those in bilateral or regional FTAs countries’ request for policy flexibility, which typically are more rigorous notably with respect to non-agricul- than the WTO, impose serious tural market access and agriculture. constraints on the transfer, use, and The approach set out in the July imitation of new technologies in 2004 Framework for the WTO developing countries. In other words, negotiations has raised concerns in trade treaties risk compromising many developing countries about MDG 8’s Target 18 on technology the capacity of their producers to transfer. To help reverse this trend, compete—and the likely negative Canada should support the recom- impacts if they have to liberalize mendations of the International further their agricultural and industrial Commission on Intellectual Property sectors. Major efforts are needed to Rights and as an immediate step, ensure that the results in these two support LDC requests for an extension key areas live up to the expectations of the period for them to enforce the of the Doha Development Agenda. WTO TRIPs obligations beyond its present expiry in 2006. Finally, 4. Experience with accession to the WTO Canada should support the initiative shows that new members are being by Argentina and Brazil to introduce a forced to accept obligations that go development agenda (including the well beyond WTO rules, even in the concepts of “public interest flexibilities case of LDCs such as Cambodia. and policy space”) at the World Cambodia was expected to enforce Intellectual Property Organization WTO Trade-Related Aspects of (WIPO) in October 2004.14 Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) rules, including pharmaceutical 6. Finally, there is a need for policy patents immediately upon its acces- coherence in Canada’s trade policies sion in 2003 instead of benefiting towards developing countries. ITC’s from the transition period granted to current focus is on the emerging LDCs, who were founding members developing country markets—notably
64 Canada and MDG 8: Focus on Trade
Brazil, China, and India—and how countries. A second preoccupation are these can be accessed by Canadian emerging markets and how to increase firms to secure investment opportuni- Canada’s share of their imports and ties, exports, and Canada’s place in investment. One response has been to global value chains.15 ITC is actively pursue bilateral trade agreements, pursuing bilateral FTAs with a number despite the risk that this undermines the of developing countries that would multilateral trading system. involve WTO-plus obligations. This risks undermining efforts by CIDA to With the support of CIDA, Canada has promote development through trade sought to promote trade as a tool of and Canada’s commitment, under human development. But more specific MDG 8 to an “open, rule-based, actions—in the area of market access, predictable and non-discriminatory policy flexibility, services and intellectual trading system”. property rights, amongst others—are needed to show that Canada is taking its trade/development linkages seriously. To ensure these occur, Canada should follow Conclusions the UK approach, namely set some joint There is still work to be done to inter-departmental (CIDA/ITC) targets. elaborate a clearer (time-bound and Finally, CIDA’s resources will need to be more specific) and more comprehensive strengthened if it is to play a more set of MDG 8 targets on trade that substantive part in reorienting Canadian ensure trade contributes to the trade policy and practice to MDG 8. achievement of the other MDGs. Canada has made some progress toward ANN WESTON is Vice-President and the trade targets presently included under MDG 8. As already noted, these Coordinator of Research with The North- include the action on LDC market access, South Institute which she joined in 1987. the ending of quotas on textiles and She has conducted extensive research on the garments, the extension of the GPT, consequences of the North American Free being a strong advocate of ending trade- Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Before joining distorting agricultural subsidies, the the Institute, she worked as Senior Economics regulatory amendments to help Officer in the Economic Affairs Division of the developing countries access medicines made in Canada, and supporting the Commonwealth Secretariat and as Research development of many poorer countries’ Officer with the Overseas Development capacity to trade. Institute (ODI) in London. She holds degrees from the University of Sussex and the Nonetheless, there is scope for a change of attitude and for further action. The University of London. government appears preoccupied by deeper integration with the US and the possibility of a common external trade BILL MORTON joined The North-South policy, which could seriously compromise Institute in August 2004. He previously Canadian trade policy toward developing worked as Coordinator of the Horn of
65 Canadian Development Report 2005
Africa Program for Oxfam Community Aid 8 The impact of the LDCI might increase if Abroad, and as Assistant Manager of the Canada were to invest some resources in its promotion—efforts to date have been Asia/Pacific Program for MEI International quite limited, in contrast to the extensive Projects. He recently completed a Master’s promotion by the US of its more limited program in International Development with special measures for African exporters, a focus on Canadian, UK and Australian pol- known as AGOA. icy on aid effectiveness. 9 “Government of Canada Introduces New Measures to Increase the Competitiveness of the Textile and Apparel Industries,” Ottawa, December 14, 2004 at Endnotes http://www.fin.gc.ca/news04/04-078e.html 1 UNDP, Human Development Report Consulted Jan., 17, 2005. The subsidies 2003. Millennium Development Goals: A involve approximately $135 mn annually compact among nations to end poverty in the form of tariff relief ($90 mn), (New York: Oxford University Press, measures to improve productivity 2003), p. 145. ($15 mn), and duty remissions ($30 mn) for at least the next three years. 2 Birdsall and Clemens, “From Promise to Performance: Rich Countries Can Help 10 “Canada continues to work with a Poor Countries Help Themselves,” CGD wide range of developing countries to Brief, Vol. 2, Issue 1 (Washington, DC: emphasize the importance of collectively Center for Global Development, 2003). pressing for the elimination or substantial reduction of trade-distorting domestic 3 Oxfam International, Rigged Rules and support.” Levelling the International Double Standards: trade, globalization Playing Field for Canadians. Reaching a and the fight against poverty (Oxford: Milestone in the WTO Agriculture Oxfam International, 2002). Negotiations at http://www.agr.gc.ca/ itpd-dpci/english/consultations/ 4 According to the Secretary-General’s 2004 infodocIII.htm Consulted Jan. 19, 2005. report on the Millennium Declaration, a report was expected from Canada 11 “In the area of market access, much work “soon.” Other country reports have been remains on determining an ambitious released by Belgium, Denmark, the harmonizing formula for tariff reductions European Community, Finland, Ireland, that will ensure real gains for all agricul- the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and ture and food products by cutting higher the UK. tariffs the most.” Ibid. UNCTAD data show that amongst developing countries, 5 WTO Framework Agreements, What was bound agricultural tariffs are the highest achieved. ITC Backgrounder, July 31, in low-income countries (79% in 2001). 2004, at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/ Cited in Sam Laird et al., Southern tna-nac/WTO/wto-backgrounder-en.asp Discomfort: Agricultural policies, trade and Consulted Jan., 17 2005. poverty, Research Paper No. 04/02 6 CIDA, Sustainable Development Strategy (University of Nottingham: Centre for 2004-2006, Hull, 2004. Research in Economic Development and International Trade, June 2004). 7 http://www.DFIDDFID.gov.uk/pubs/ files/PSA/technicalnotes.pdf Accessed February 2005.
66 Canada and MDG 8: Focus on Trade
12 That decision provided a way for coun- 15 “We negotiate bilateral and regional tries without domestic pharmaceutical agreements on trade, business services, manufacturing to take advantage of the air services, regulations and taxation that Doha Declaration on TRIPs and Public open doors for Canadian business. We are Health and its provisions for compulsory also pursuing investment agreements with licenses. China and India....We must recover lost ground in key markets such as China and 13 Ratnakar Adhikari and Navin Dahal, India. There is an urgent need to access “LDCs’ Accession to the WTO: Learning opportunities around the globe for from the Cases of Nepal, Cambodia Canadians.” Notes for an address by The and Vanuatu.” South Asia Watch on Honourable Jim Peterson, Minister of Trade, Economics & Environment International Trade, to the 2004 Asia- (SAWTEE), Kathmandu, Nepal, at Pacific Summit “Emerging Markets: Will http://www.un-ngls.org/SAWTEE.doc Canada meet the challenge?” Vancouver, Consulted Jan. 20, 2005. BC, October 13, 2004. 14 This proposal was triggered by WIPO negotiations around the substantive patent law treaty, which the two countries said had failed to take into account the interests and proposals of developing countries. BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest, Vol. 8, Number 29, September 8, 2004.
67
MDG 8 and Canada’s Debt Relief Efforts
Bill Morton and Roy Culpeper
MDG 8 and Canada’s Debt Relief Efforts
MDG 8 and Canada’s Debt Relief Efforts
Bill Morton and Roy Culpeper
n excessive debt burden to make debt sustainable in the represents a major develop- long term. MDG 8 also includes Ament challenge for poor three indicators of debt sustain- countries. These countries must ability. These are the number of repay bilateral debts to other gov- countries involved in the Heavily ernments, multilateral debt to Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) international financial institutions Initiative1 (Indicator 42); debt (IFIs) such as the World Bank, the relief committed under the HIPC International Monetary Fund (IMF) Initiative (Indicator 43); and and the regional development debt service as a percentage of banks, and commercial debt to exports of goods and services private lenders. These obligations (Indicator 44). absorb a considerable amount of domestic resources that could There is widespread agreement otherwise be used to promote on the need to reduce the debt development and directly address burden carried by the poorest poverty reduction, for instance countries. As MDG 8 indicates, through financing education and there is also agreement that bilat- health. eral debt should be cancelled. There is, however, much debate Debt is one of the key areas regarding how other types of covered by MDG 8, which debt should be handled. This includes two debt-related targets. applies, in particular, to multi- lateral debt: should developed Target 13, which addresses the countries assist in reducing it, or special needs of the Least Devel- in cancelling it outright? And how oped Countries, includes an should this be financed? In addi- enhanced program of debt relief tion, there is also the question of for heavily indebted poor coun- what constitutes a “sustainable” tries and cancellation of official level of debt that the poorest bilateral debt. Target 15 calls for countries can manage while also dealing comprehensively with the meeting important development debt problems of developing priorities. Linked to this is the countries through national and issue of future financing for poor international measures in order
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countries’ development, and whether Through the Paris Club, Canada has this should take the form of grants or provided debt relief to countries that loans. Grant financing allows poor owe it official bilateral debts, and that countries to avoid a debt build-up; and have an unsustainable debt burden. The concessional funding by multilateral Paris Club is an informal grouping of institutions such as the World Bank is 19 official bilateral creditors. It provides increasingly taking this form. On the debt relief to HIPC-eligible and other other hand, a complete move to grant countries through debt rescheduling financing may undercut the availability (postponement of debt payments) and of future resources by eliminating the by reducing debt payments. It has principal repayments that are made formed more than 380 debt agreements on loans. with nearly 80 debtor nations. Of these, Canada has provided debt relief, in many Each of these debates is complex and cases on multiple occasions, to 48 such nuanced, and there is no quick-fix countries. For instance, since 2001, solution. Here we focus on Canada’s Canada has cancelled more than policies and performance on debt relief. $419 million of interest payments owed Until 2005, the Government of Canada by Poland, and more than $158 million undertook debt forgiveness through (including principal and interest) owed 2 three mechanisms : by the former Yugoslavia. In 2004, the • HIPC Initiative Paris Club agreed to forgive 80 per cent of the US$38.9 billion public external • The Paris Club debt owed to it by Iraq.5 As Canada’s share, it will forgive $570 million over • The Canadian Debt Initiative. the next three years. The HIPC initiative, which was launched In 1999 Canada established the Canadi- in 1996 and enhanced in 1999, aims to an Debt Initiative (CDI), the first scheme reduce external debt that the world’s to provide bilateral debt relief additional poorest countries owe to the IFIs, foreign to that provided by the Paris Club and governments and commercial lenders. It the HIPC process. The CDI allows a 100 does so by providing relief for countries per cent moratorium on debt repay- to a level at which their debt is deemed ments for countries that have entered sustainable.3 Canada has supported the the HIPC scheme (compared to relief on HIPC initiative by providing $312 million 90 per cent of eligible debts provided by to two trust funds that provide the the HIPC plan), and full debt cancellation financial resources for debt relief. For the for countries that complete the HIPC HIPC Trust Fund, administered by the process (compared to 90 per cent that World Bank, Canada has provided bilateral creditors are required to provide $247 million or 4.7 per cent of total under HIPC). commitments. For the IMF-administered Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility Of the 16 HIPC countries taking part in (PRGF), it has provided $65 million or CDI, 13 have benefited from the 3.1 per cent of total commitments. moratorium. Benin, Bolivia, Ethiopia, (These shares compare with Canada’s Ghana, Guyana, Madagascar, Senegal, 3.5 per cent share of total ODA.4) and Tanzania have had their debts to
72 MDG 8 and Canada’s Debt Relief Efforts
Canada of $155.6 million completely This proposal for addressing multilateral cancelled. Canada will also stop debt placed Canada at the forefront of collecting debt service repayments developed-country approaches to debt from Rwanda and the Democratic relief. It was overtaken, however, by a Republic of the Congo. Cameroon, Hon- new proposal made by G-8 Finance Min- duras, and Zambia have received only isters in the lead up to the July 2005 G-8 partial debt relief to date. meeting. This proposal offered full can- cellation of an estimated $40 billion of The impact of Canada’s efforts at debt, owed to the World Bank, African bilateral debt reduction are hampered, Development Bank and the IMF by however, by other creditors, such as 18 low-income countries. Japan and Germany, which are less willing to reduce their claims on debtors. Significantly, the Finance Ministers’ In addition, while reductions in bilateral proposal also called on donors to provide debt through schemes such as the CDI additional contributions to the World are important, multilateral debt consti- Bank’s International Development Associ- tutes the most difficult part of the prob- ation (IDA) and the African Development lem. Low income countries’ outstanding Bank, to “reimburse” them for the debt external debt now totals US$523 billion, repayments they would otherwise have and of this, $US154 billion is owed to received from low-income countries prior multilateral institutions, in particular to to cancellation. This is consistent with the World Bank, the IMF, and for African Canada’s position, and supports the countries, to the African Development important principle that debt relief meas- Bank. The multilateral debt of HIPC ures should provide additional resources. countries amounts to US$70 billion, or Canada’s share would constitute approxi- 37 per cent of total external debt.6 mately 4 per cent of total additional con- tributions. There is growing agreement that the HIPC initiative does not go far enough in Funding for cancellation of debts owed addressing multilateral debt. In the lead to the IMF would be be found from its up to the February 2005 G-7 Finance own resources, most probably through Ministers’ meeting, Canada put forward use of the principal from a 1999 revalua- a new proposal in which developed tion of its gold. This avoids the earlier, countries would provide a “debt holiday” more controversial UK proposal that IMF for eligible countries, through 100 per debt relief should be financed through cent cancellation of debt-servicing pay- further sale or revaluation of its gold. ments owed to the key multilateral Canada has been lukewarm in its support institutions.7 This arrangement would for this initiative, mainly because it is extend to 41 countries in addition to the fearful of depressing international gold current 15 HIPC eligible countries. Cana- markets, and hurting the interests of da stated that its initiative was based on Canadian gold producers. four principles: that debt relief should provide additional resources; ensure The G-8 Finance Ministers’ proposal equity of treatment for other low- represents a breakthrough, most impor- income countries; maintain the financial tantly because it provides for full debt integrity of the IFIs; and provide proper cancellation (compared to Canada’s incentives for good governance and earlier proposal, which provided only for economic reform. cancellation of debt-servicing payments).
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In other respects, however, the G-8 BILL MORTON joined The North-South proposal is limited, in particular because Institute in August 2004. He previously it restricts debt cancellation to HIPC- worked as Coordinator of the Horn of Africa eligible countries, thereby excluding Program for Oxfam Community Aid other non-HIPC countries that are poor and that have significant debt burdens. Abroad, and as Assistant Manager of theA- In the immediate term, the proposal sia/Pacific Program for MEI International would be available to 18 countries that Projects. He recently completed a Master’s have reached HIPC “completion point”. program in International Development with This may extend in the future to the a focus on Canadian, UK and Australian 9 countries currently at HIPC “decision policy on aid effectiveness. point”, and in the longer term, to a remaining 11 HIPC-eligible countries. In this way, 38 countries are potentially ROY CULPEPER joined The North-South eligible; but this is less than the 56 coun- tries covered under Canada’s earlier Institute in 1986 and was Vice-President proposal, which includes debt relief for and Coordinator of Research from 1991 countries over and above those that are until 1995, when he became President of HIPC-eligible. It is also significantly below NSI.His earlier experience included positions the total of 62 countries that, according in the Manitoba government's Cabinet Plan- to Canadian NGOs, need full debt ning Secretariat, the federal Department of remission if they are to meet the Millen- nium Development Goals. Finance, and the Department of External Affairs and International Trade. From 1983 The success of Canada’s proposal to 1986, he was advisor to the Canadian however depends on other countries’ Executive Director at the World Bank in willingness to adopt it, and Finance Min- isters at the G-7 agreed only to place the Washington. He received his PhD in Eco- matter back in the hands of the IMF and nomics from the University of Toronto. World Bank, for them to make specific proposals at meetings later in 2005. The proposal’s success also depends on Endnotes whether other countries agree to provide 1 More specifically, the number that have the funds. Canada’s contribution— reached their HIPC “decision points”— $172 million over the next five years—is i.e., when they are deemed to be eligible modest, and at 4 per cent of total claims, for the HIPC initiative—and the number will make only a minimal impact. In addi- that have reached their HIPC “completion tion, Canada has shown a less than points”—i.e., they have fulfilled specified progressive response to another propos- criteria, and therefore qualify for full al, from the UK government, that debt debt relief. relief should be financed by selling or 2 For the following information, see revaluing the IMF’s substantial gold http://www.fin.gc.ca/toce/2005/ reserves. Canada has been lukewarm in cdre0105_e.html. Accessed February its support for this initiative, mainly 2005. because it is fearful of depressing inter- national gold markets, and hurting the 3 Under the HIPC Initiative, debt is consid- interests of Canadian gold producers. ered unsustainable if the debt-to-export ratio is above 150 per cent. There is, how-
74 MDG 8 and Canada’s Debt Relief Efforts
ever, much controversy regarding what 5 Iraq’s total public debt was estimated to constitutes a sustainable level of debt, and be US$120.2 billion at the end 2004. See how this is assessed. Kappagoda and http://www.clubdeparis.org/en/. Accessed Alexander, for instance, question the March 2005. World Bank definition of sustainability, and recommend taking into account gov- 6 From Sony Kapoor, “Paying for 100% ernment revenues and domestic debt, not Multilateral Debt Cancellation, Current just export earnings (see N. Kappagoda proposals explained,” EURODAD, 2005, and N. Alexander, “Debt Sustainability www.eurodad.org/articles/default.aspx?id Framework for Low Income Countries: =576. Accessed February 2005. Policy and Recommendations,” 7 This and following information comes http://www.g24.org/kapp0904.pdf from http://www.fin.gc.ca/news05/ Accessed February 2005). 05-008e.html Accessed February 2005. 4 2002 figures from OECD, “The DAC Jour- nal, Development Cooperation, 2003 Report,” Paris, 2004.
75
From Platform to Declaration: Beijing and the MDGs
Heather Gibb
From Platform to Declaration: Beijing and the MDGs
From Platform to Declaration: Beijing and the MDGs
Heather Gibb
he Millennium Declaration Progress reports on the MDGs by asserts that “the equal rights both developed and developing Tand opportunities of women countries not surprisingly tend to and men must be assured.” In iden- address gender equality mainly in tifying the kind of environment that the context of Goal 3 and the is conducive to eradicating poverty limited treatment of women’s and realizing the “right to develop- health needs in connection with ment”, however, the focus is on women’s roles as mothers (reduce macro level policy: “good gover- maternal mortality), although nance at the international level and some developing countries have on transparency in the financial, used a broader range of indica- monetary and trading systems...an tors. Where the Beijing Platform open, equitable, rule-based, pre- for Action (PFA) recognized that dictable and non-discriminatory globalization and the macro multilateral trading and financial economy, including trade agree- system”. Targets for Goal 3 (pro- ments and financial liberalization, mote gender equality and empow- have important gender dimen- er women) address micro-level sions, MDG 8 (develop a global interventions: eliminating gender partnership for development) disparity in primary and secondary upholds the traditional perspec- education, preferably by 2005, and tive that the macro economy is in all levels of education by 2015. gender neutral. In 2005, women’s But the framework for gender machineries land movements will equality adopted by the world com- be lobbying hard to remind gov- munity just five years earlier at the ernments that their obligations Fourth World Conference on and commitments to women’s Women in Beijing clearly identified empowerment and human rights priorities for gender equality in are much more far-reaching: the micro and macro domains. The MDGs must reassert an across-the Millennium Development Goals board commitment to gender (MDGs) persist in relegating gender equality if they are to succeed. equality to traditional arenas. Of equal concern, they reflect a back- What commitments has the world sliding on sexual and reproductive community made to women? Key rights in the face of religious and among them is the Convention fundamentalist pressures. on the Elimination of All Forms of
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Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) • women and the media that came into force in 1981. CEDAW is • women and the environment a legally binding treaty requiring its 177 signatory states to guarantee equality of • the girl child. civil, political, economic, social, and cul- tural rights between women and men. CEDAW makes discrimination against Progress since Beijing women a human rights violation, and There have been some important sets clearly articulated standards on accomplishments in the 10 years since women’s human rights against which the Beijing conference: increased aware- governments are required to report. The ness and passage of laws against violence Cairo Programme of Action adopted at against women; the appointment of a the 1994 International Conference on UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Population and Development (ICPD) set Against Women; growing attention to a target of 2015 for universal access to issues of women in armed conflict; and quality reproductive health services. inclusion of those issues in the statute of Women’s human right to have control the International Criminal Court, an over and decide freely and responsibly institution that Canada has strongly on matters related to their sexuality was supported. There have been increases in also affirmed in the 1995 PFA. women’s political participation as meas- Recognizing the “fundamental linkages ured by participation in parliaments. But between equality, development and the face of poverty remains predomi- peace” at Beijing, the world community nantly female: women represent 60 per committed governments, the United cent of the world’s 550 million working Nations system, regional and internation- poor and, while women represent about al financial institutions (IFIs), other rele- 40 per cent of the world’s workers, the vant regional and international institu- goal of economic empowerment for tions, and all women and men, as well as women remains elusive. Globalization, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), structural adjustment, and privatization to a comprehensive action plan for gen- present both opportunities and chal- der equality that addressed the following lenges for women. Additional threats are 12 strategic areas for action: the persisting gender gaps in literacy and the gender “digital divide”; increasing • women and poverty fundamentalism and conservatism, and • education and training of women militarism. In Africa, HIV/AIDs is assuming an increasingly female face. • women and health • violence against women • women and armed conflict Canada, gender equality, and the • women in the economy, including Millennium Declaration and Goals employment Canadian policy commitments arising • women in power and decision-making from the Beijing Platform for Action are • institutional mechanisms for advance- quite sweeping. In the Federal Plan for ment of women Gender Equality, the Canadian govern- ment’s contribution to the Fourth World • human rights of women Conference on Women in Beijing,
80 From Platform to Declaration: Beijing and the MDGs
Canada asserted that the promotion of of the MDGs, Canadian policy is clear: gender equality—as a human rights, Canada strongly supports respect for social justice and development issue—is sexual and reproductive rights, and has an important part of Canada’s foreign worked hard in recent years to maintain and aid policies. strong and consistent commitments on gender equality, sexual and reproductive Some areas of Canadian foreign policy rights, and families in all of their forms, have begun to reflect Canadian commit- as essential prerequisites for meeting ments to women’s rights and gender internationally agreed poverty reduction equality. At the United Nations, as a and development goals. member of the Security Council, Canada advocated for UNSC Resolution 1296 Commitments to ensure that all federal (Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict) policy and legislation undergo gender- and Resolution 1325 (Women, Peace based analysis have proved ambitious, and Security). Canada and the UK but gender mainstreaming is gaining support a Gender Training Initiative of ground in some departments. The 2002 the Human Security Program. Progress in Immigration and Refugee Protection Act “engendering” Canadian policy in some (IRPA) includes regulations to protect other sectors, for example, finance and women against violence, trafficking in international trade, remains a challenge, persons, and migrant smuggling. The although Canada has taken some steps Act includes an unprecedented legislative to encourage multilateral trade organiza- requirement that Citizenship and tions to address gender concerns. Immigration Canada (CIC) provide an annual gender-based analysis of the On sexual and reproductive rights, issues impact of IRPA in its Report to Parliament. central to women’s empowerment and to successful strategies to address many
Mainstreaming gender in trade organizations Canada has promoted integration and mainstreaming of gender equality in the work of several international organizations, including the United Nations, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation Development (OECD), the Commonwealth, the Organization of American States (OAS), and la Francophonie). In the area of trade, Canada has supported several initiatives to “engender” discussions in the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), and the OAS. Canada championed gender mainstreaming in APEC, culminating in that organization adopting a formal gender policy with its Framework for the Integration of Women in APEC (1999). In 2004, a Canadian-led project in the Committee on Trade and Investment examined the gender dimensions of APEC’s trade facilitation and trade-related capacity-building agenda and developed recommendations that will be taken up in 2005. Canada has also supported a number of policy discussions on gender and trade at the WTO including a panel on gender equality, trade, and development at the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference, Cancun, Mexico, 2003.
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Advancing gender equality gender-specific health and other needs through ODA of girls who are frequently left out of disarmament, demobilization, and CIDA has earned international recogni- reintegration programs for soldiers. tion for its leadership and innovative strategies to advance gender equality. Its 1999 Policy on Gender Equality is rooted Accountability for gender in international human rights treaties and the Beijing Platform for Action; the objec- equality in a “cross-cutting” tive is “to support women and girls in environment the realization of their full human rights.” In CIDA, gender equality has both CIDA’s expected “development results”, distinct activities and is a cross-cutting known as “Key Agency Results”, are theme. As a cross-cutting theme, it is based on but not limited by, in the case difficult for the Agency to identify the of gender equality, the MDGs. On sexual proportion of its total budget that is and reproductive rights, for example, devoted to gender equality. The 2002 reflecting Canadian policy that reproduc- OECD Development Assistance tive health, gender equality, and human Committee (DAC) review of Canadian rights underpin many of the MDGs, official development assistance (ODA) CIDA invested more than $40 million reported that in 2000 five per cent of in sexual and reproductive health the total value of CIDA projects had a programs in 2004 and a further principal objective of gender equality, $105 million to various initiatives 53 per cent had significant objective, targeting women and young girls three per cent were not targeted, and infected or affected by HIV/AIDS in 30 per cent were not screened against developing countries. the objective of gender equality. Figures CIDA also supports initiatives to build on bilateral program expenditures for capacity to implement CEDAW. In part- 2002-03 suggest that spending on gen- nership with the Swedish International der equality remained at approximately Development Corporation Agency five per cent of bilateral aid.2 (SIDA), CIDA collaborated with the CIDA is joining other OECD donors in International Parliamentary Union and increasingly linking its programming with the United Nations to produce the the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers Handbook for Parliamentarians on the (PRSPs), and reports some success in CEDAW and its Optional Protocol. working with developing country Currently, CIDA and the United Nations partners, for example Malawi, to ensure Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) that gender equality concerns are are collaborating on a major CEDAW included in their PRSPs. Some studies, implementation initiative with six however, have shown that integration of Southeast Asian countries. gender perspectives into the PRSP CIDA’s Child Protection Research Fund process has been minimal. One study targeted violence against women with found that gender equality was not research on the roles of girls in considered seriously as a determinant of fighting forces in Northern Uganda, poverty, and did not take into account Mozambique and Sierra Leone, and the many of the key priorities of women (maternal health services, support for
82 From Platform to Declaration: Beijing and the MDGs
food production and marketing in the ment, and housing) are not adequately country, eradication of gender discrimi- addressed from a gender perspective. natory practices within social services and economic infrastructure). In addi- tion, PRSPs focused on the market econ- Conclusions omy without recognition of the gender implications and the household economy As the fate of global commitments to was neglected.3 These concerns are gender equality in the MDGs suggests, reflected in regional reports that were mechanisms to hold organizations produced for the 10-year review of the accountable for their gender equality Beijing Platform for Action. They call for commitments and obligations are critical. gender analyses of macroeconomic Campaigns in 2005 will remind the policies to expose the differential impacts international community of the existence of poverty on women and men, and, of the integrated framework of goals, in the case of Africa, the abolition of targets, and indictors for gender agricultural subsidies to help ensure equality contained in CEDAW and the fair competition for Africa’s agriculture Beijing Platform for Action. While the products, the bulk of which are MDGs may offer a workable framework produced by women.4 for securing ongoing support for interna- tional cooperation aimed at poverty Another challenge to monitoring the eradication, addressing gender equality level and effectiveness of Canadian aid and empowerment of women requires from a gender equality perspective is more than gains in formal education. CIDA’s increasing move to program and Achievement of Goal 3, while important sector wide approaches (budget support, in itself, will not amount to achieving SWAps). Donor coordination, particularly gender equality and empowerment of in areas of health and education, may women, for the goal is de-linked from offer efficiencies to both donors and the broader context which sustains and recipients, but may also reinforce trends reproduces inequality. Investments in illustrated by the MDG approach to education for girls and women must be gender equality—a focus on education linked with equal access to jobs, skills and health issues, with no link to the training, finance, and markets for macro environment that frames and women’s businesses, within a trading and constrains governments’ responses to financial system that supports the sectors those issues. The UN’s common assis- where poor women create their liveli- tance framework, for example, which is hoods, or provides effective mitigating used to analyze the status of national mechanisms when they are threatened development and identify key develop- by open markets. ment challenges, also tends to focus on women’s concerns in education, health What steps could Canada take to stand and the micro-economy. Economic firm on its global commitments to policies and programs (finance, taxation, gender equality? For a start, in its Interim industry, and formal and informal sector Report to the UN on the MDGs, Canada employment) rarely reflect gender could strongly reaffirm its wholehearted perspectives, and critical areas for commitment to the implementation of women (agriculture, livestock and animal CEDAW and the Beijing Platform for husbandry, transport, water, environ- Action. Canada could more vigourously
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address the gender dimensions of its received her MA in Political Science from the obligations under Goal 8, the “developed University of British Columbia. countries’ goal”, by examining its own macroeconomic and trade policies from a gender equality perspective, and advo- References cating in international economic and trade forums for the world community to CIDA. Estimates 2004-2005. Part III. seriously take on the gender dimensions Report on Plans and Priorities. of their agendas. In the area of trade, for http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/est-pre/ example, Canada could lobby forcefully 20042005/CIDA-ACDI/pdf/ for gender impact assessments of trade CIDA-ACDI_e.pdf. commitments by the World Trade CIDA. Sustainable Development Strategy: Organization and other trade groupings, 2004-2006 Enabling Change. and prioritize trade policy concerns of http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cida_ind.nsf/ women and small producers. AllDocIds/F395F90E46BEEF1285256E3500 Accountability for gender equality results 699F9F?OpenDocument. and expenditures could be enhanced CIDA. 2004 Departmental Performance through legislated reporting require- Report. www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/INET/ ments, such as that for IRPA. Tools for IMAGES.NSF/LUImages/ gender analyses of budgets have been Publications2?$file/FINALDPREn04.pdg. developed to assist governments and the public identify whether funding commit- Gibb, Heather. Supporting Potential ments are commensurate with policy Women Exporters: Report to APEC. CD- objectives for gender equality: is 5 per ROM. The North-South Institute and Asia cent enough to mainstream an over- Pacific Economic Cooperation. 2004. arching policy concern? http://www.nsi-ins.ca/ensi/research/ progress/p18.html. Grown, Caren, Geeta Rao Gupta, and HEATHER GIBB is Senior Researcher (Gender Aslihan Kes. Taking Action: Achieving Equality and Workers’ Rights) with The Gender Equality and Empowering Women. North-South Institute. Previously she man- (New York: UN Millennium Project Task aged the Institute's APEC (Asia Pacific Force on Gender Equality, 2005). Economic Cooperation) project. She has a Lara, Silvia. “Beyond Parity: lengthy career which included positions as Development, Freedom and Women. the Director of the International Division's Notes on Women’s Rights in the Pacific Group at the Canadian Chamber of Millennium Development Goals. Paper Commerce. She also worked for the prepared for the UN Division for the Canadian National Committee on Pacific Advancement of Women Expert Group Economic Cooperation and the ASEAN- Meeting, “Achievements, Gaps and Challenges in Linking the Implementa- Canada Business Council. She was a tion of the Beijing Platform for Action writer/researcher for the Right Honourable and the Millennium Declaration and the Joe Clark during his tenures as Prime Millennium Development Goals.” Baku, Minister and Opposition Leader. She Azerbijan, February 7-11, 2005.
84 From Platform to Declaration: Beijing and the MDGs
Long, Carolyn M. The Advocates’ Guide to Endnotes Promoting Gender Equality at the World 1 At the national level, women’s machiner- Bank. (Washington, DC:Women’s EDGE, ies are formal mechanisms or institutions April 2003). are established by governments to design, The North-South Institute. “The World promote the implementation of, or to Trade Organization, Gender Equality, execute, monitor, evaluate, advocate and mobilize support for, policies that pro- and Trade.” Notes for the Gender mote the advancement of women (Beijing Equality, Trade and Development Platform for Action, Section 193). The Panel Discussion, Fifth WTO United Nations Commission on the Status Ministerial Conference, Cancun, of Women and the Committee on the Mexico, September 11, 2003. Elimination of Discrimination against http://www.nsi-ins.ca/ensi/ publications/ Women are examples of international wto.html. mechanisms. OECD, Development Assistance 2 Calculated by the author, based on statis- Committee. Development Cooperation tical information on all CIDA Bilateral and Review: Canada Paris 2002. CEE Project disbursements for the period 2002/03. Seventh African Regional Conference on Women (Beijing +10). Decade Review 3 Carolyn M. Long, 2003. on the Implementation of the Dakar 4 Seventh African Regional Conference on and Beijing Platform for Action: Women, October, 2004. Outcome and the Way Forward. Addis Ababa, October12-14, 2004. http://www.uneca.org/beijingplus10/ outcome_and_way_forward.htm. Waldorf, Lee. Pathway to Gender Equality: CEDAW, Beijing and the MDGs. (New York: UNIFEM, Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, Germany, and GTZ, 2005).
85
The MDGs and Infectious Diseases: Focus on HIV/AIDS
John W. Foster
The MDGs and Infectious Diseases: Focus on HIV/AIDS
The MDGs and Infectious Diseases: Focus on HIV/AIDS
John W. Foster
“We are still losing the The goals were set at a time battle and the war.” when the full developmental impact of HIV/AIDS was not fully integrated in development economic thinking and planning, he Millennium Development and in a context where access Goals (MDGs) related to to treatment was only beginning THIV/AIDS are at once ambi- to become a realizable objective tious and modest in the extreme. for the global community. The target for Goal 6 is to “have Achievement of the HIV/AIDS halted by 2015, and begun to goal is intimately related to reverse, the spread of HIV/AIDS.” achievement of goals relating to Related to this is Target 16 of the gender, and progress in Goal 8, “in cooperation with phar- extending recognition of sexual maceutical companies, provide and reproductive rights. access to affordable essential drugs in developing countries.” A similar A full evaluation of progress since goal for the reversal of malaria and 2000 should include standards set other major diseases accompanies since that time, including particu- that on HIV/AIDS. This section larly the results of the 2001 UN focuses on key elements in meeting General Assembly Special Session and transcending the goals related on HIV/AIDS (UNGASS), its to AIDS. principles and program of action as set out in the Declaration of Given the rate of the expansion of Commitment on HIV/AIDS. In the new infection, the objective of area of access to treatment, an halting the spread of HIV/AIDS by international campaign of public 2015, while ambitious, is tragically pressure led to a declaration by modest in that it condemns governments participating in the literally millions more to fall prey Doha Ministerial of the World to the disease. The target on Trade Organization (WTO). This drugs assumes no conflict Doha Declaration, adopted unani- between the profit and property mously by all WTO Members just preoccupations of pharmaceutical a few months after the UN companies and the human right General Assembly’s declaration, to affordable access. recognized the right of member
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governments to take measures protecting 6 million people die every year from public health. However, further action AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria—over promised in 2001 which would bring 16,000 preventable deaths every day.”1 most non-pharma-producing countries into the picture, did not occur until But even existing initiatives like the 2003. The context has been further Global Fund and the 3 by 5 initiative modified by program enhancements remain in danger of not being fully real- and funding initiatives, in particular the ized. The UN Special Envoy for HIV/AIDS launching of the Global Fund to Fight in Africa, Stephen Lewis, commented in AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria in 2001 Ottawa in February 2005, “if both debt and the World Health Organization’s relief and increased foreign aid are (WHO) 3 by 5 Initiative (treat 3 million contentious, or not yet in sight, then people living with HIV/AIDS by 2005), contributions to the Global Fund are which have shown the potential for similarly in jeopardy. And if the Global initiative and leadership, if not fully Fund, already in need of billions to meet realized. its anticipated targets, falls short, then we will not put 3 million people living Even given the modest objectives with AIDS into treatment this year, or embodied in the MDGs, the reality of millions more next year, and the great the emergency puts hope to an extreme plan to confound the pandemic in Africa test. In a recent evaluation of the will come crashing to the ground.”2 Global Fund, Canadian development expert Keith Bezanson interviewed donor In a recent survey of progress against the agency representatives and many others disease, New York Times editorial writer associated with the initiative. The overall Tina Rosenberg notes that even though conclusion: “We are still losing the battle today’s spending is 15 times what it was and the war.” in 1996, “it is insufficient to turn the course of AIDS today. In fact it doesn’t This assessment was universal in all even tread water.”3 interviews, as was a profound sense that unless much more is done—and Evaluation and re-orientation of the quickly—the promise of a global Canadian response to these emergencies response to the three diseases will turn is a work in progress. While a number of into yet another false dawn in interna- government departments are engaged, tional development. One interviewee and a significant number of initiatives commented that, “Even if we succeed in have been taken since 2000, two depart- 3 by 5 (3 million AIDS victims being ments with primary responsibility for the treated with anti-retrovirals [ARVs] by international dimension of Canada’s the end of 2005) we will still be going response to HIV/AIDS, as well as the backwards.” The figures speak for them- Canadian International Development selves. UNAIDS estimates that at the end Agency (CIDA), are currently finalizing of 2004, an estimated 720,000 persons new strategies on HIV/AIDS. In 2003, the in developing and transitional countries Ministerial Council on HIV/AIDS, at the were receiving ARV treatment and that in request of the Minister of Health (who the same year some 4.9 million became was responding to an invitation from the newly infected with HIV. Approximately Minister of Foreign Affairs), prepared a
90 The MDGs and Infectious Diseases: Focus on HIV/AIDS
brief on Canadian international policy access to treatment and that of global related to HIV/AIDS, with a focus on funding, together with a few concluding Africa, which went to both Ministers. In remarks about other salient dimensions. the case of Foreign Affairs, a first strategy for the ministry is expected shortly. In CIDA’s case, previous strategies will be The Jean Chrétien Pledge to replaced shortly by a new Strategic Africa Act Framework, and by an Action Plan announced for Fall 2005. More broadly, The issue of access to treatment has been Health Canada convenes an inter- perhaps the most important in the inter- departmental process which will release national response to HIV/AIDS since “Leading Together,” a pan-Canadian 2000. The debate has too often been action plan for HIV/AIDS. Under this framed by reference to the issue of umbrella, the federal initiative will protection of the privileges of the replace the existing Canadian Strategy holders of drug patents or “intellectual on HIV/AIDS and set out the federal property”. The official formulation of this government’s role in that larger frame is found in the agreement on Canadian response. In December 2004, Trade-Related Intellectual Property Health Minister Ujjal Dosanjh told AIDS (TRIPS) associated with the WTO. As time advocates that a coordinated inter- delays permitting developing-country departmental government policy would members to bring legislation in line be developed through an ongoing come to an end, the basic 20-year patent roundtable of senior-level officials from protection sought by pharmaceutical- several involved departments, convened producing corporations becomes law in by the new Public Health Agency. The more and more lands. long-anticipated International Policy A less visible but even more important Statement of the government lists both element is the relentless pressure of additional funding to combat HIV/AIDS, multinational pharmaceutical corpora- tuberculosis and malaria, via the WHO’s tions and their allies in the trade “3X5” and the Global Fund, as “key ministries of a number of developed initiatives” in its overall approach to countries to increase the existing official responsibility for development and the protections and for developing countries Millennium Development Goals. It high- to go beyond them whether in bilateral lights “improving health outcomes” as agreements, national legislation, or day- one of the elements of “a more strategic to-day practice. focus” to Canada’s development approach, and within that includes Rallying against this approach have been “prevention and control of high-burden, a diverse and active range of civil society communicable, poverty-linked diseases, actors, humanitarian and development including HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, agencies, medical and research bodies, co-infections and river blindness.”4 organizations of the HIV-positive, gay and lesbian networks, concerned journal- In this context, this chapter examines ists and jurists, and a few governments. two key aspects of the Canadian response to the emergency: the issue of
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The UK Commission on Intellectual of the multinationals.”7 This situation Property Rights declared in 2002, “There has been redressed somewhat in the are no circumstances in which the most last three years, but Canada is far from fundamental human rights should be exercising leadership. subordinated to the requirements of IP protection.”5 Many civil society organiza- For the purposes of this review, the first tions (CSOs) are engaged in the struggle key moment was the Declaration of to ensure that the right to health is fully November 14, 2001, at the Fourth WTO recognized, against well-funded and Ministerial in Doha, Qatar, which recog- relentless pressure from companies who nized the gravity of the public health constantly seek extended recognition of problems of many developing countries their property protections. Nevertheless, and which affirmed that the TRIPS agree- those supporting the human right to ment “does not and should not prevent health continue to challenge commercial members from taking measure to protect privilege and government timidity. public health” and that the agreement should be “interpreted and implemented Most recently, under pressure from the in a manner supportive of WTO Treatment Action Campaign and inter- members’ right to protect public health, national allies, the South African Trade and in particular, to promote access to Minister stated that the Southern African medicines for all.”8 Customs Union (SACU) had refused to accept the European Free Trade The Declaration and the WTO Ministerial Association’s (EFTA) proposals for referred the matter of assuring access for intellectual property provisions in a countries lacking domestic production proposed trading agreement between capacity to further negotiations which SACU and EFTA, because these “TRIPS lumbered on for almost two more years. plus” provisions went beyond WTO The countries in question, some of them requirements. South African officials among the most seriously affected, could commented that United States TRIPS not utilize existing provisions like (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual compulsory licensing. Anticipating the Property Rights) proposals in the US- possibility that lack of agreement would SACU negotiations, “may not be appro- be a deal breaker at the Fifth Ministerial priate” for developing countries.6 On in Cancun, Mexico, negotiators agreed the other hand, India, until now a site on a WTO General Council Decision, of strategic production of generic phar- August 30, 2003, on a formula that maceuticals available to poorer countries would enable such countries to import and consumers, has just passed patent medicines, applicable to any pharmaceu- law amendments which will, it is feared, tical product. make provision of affordable generics Following the Decision, a number of less likely. Canadian Cabinet members contributed A 2001-02 review of Canada’s perform- to a government decision to proceed ance with regard to the global HIV/AIDS with legislation by which Canada would crisis noted that “Canada’s response to apply the provisions of the Decision the crisis—at least in terms of access to in facilitating export of drugs to essential drugs—remains firmly anchored non-producing countries. in the trade docket and to the interests
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The resulting legislative initiative, Bill C-9 HIV/AIDS remains elusive. As UN Special (later the Jean Chrétien Pledge to Africa Envoy Stephen Lewis commented Act) was passed in May 2004, and at recently in Ottawa, “When it comes to time of writing awaits approval of final Africa, everything takes forever.”9 regulations by two government ministries and the passage of a minor amendment A bitter reminder was issued by the before it takes effect. Access to Drugs Initiative of the University of Toronto Faculty of Law early The preparation and passage of the in 2005: “Since the passage of Bill C-9, legislation, which became the first such however, not a single pill has been national initiative following the WTO exported from Canada to fight the Decision, was characterized by intense diseases the statute is designed to arrest. intra-governmental negotiation, as well In this period, over 3 million people have as consultation with industry groups and been infected with HIV/AIDS, more than NGOs such as the Canadian HIV/AIDS 1 million people in sub-Saharan Africa Legal Network, Médecins sans frontières, have died of AIDS-related conditions and the Interagency Coalition on AIDS and an additional 1 million deaths have Development (ICAD), Oxfam, CARE, resulted from tuberculosis and malaria.” World Vision, the Canadian Council for At time of writing, there is news that at International Co-operation, the Canadian least one Canadian generic producer is Labour Congress, and The North-South interested in working with a key NGO in Institute. Student-based treatment taking advantage of the Act’s provisions, advocacy associations, particularly the once it comes into full play. McGill International Health Initiative, were also active in lobbying the govern- Canada’s initiative, while first off the ment. The resulting Act was more a sum mark, did not create an expressway to of trade-offs between the interests at play access. When fully implemented the Act than a signal initiative dominated by the and regulations instead appear more like single objective of assuring speedy and a toll road with numerous collection affordable access to medicines for the booths and gates, each requiring legal seriously affected. expenditure or clearances from existing patent holders. Moreover, a patent The road to implementation of the Act manufacturers’ security vehicle is posed once passed has been a demonstration to flag down any generic truck, charging of the lugubrious nature of legislative them with “essentially commercial processes. Viewed from the perspective objectives”, or what legal critic of opponents of the Act, further delay Richard Elliott terms an opportunity for may be welcome. However, viewed from “vexatious litigation”.10 the point of view of those seeking access in Africa, or their advocates, we are now Possible impediments from the point of moving beyond the first anniversary of view of a potential importing country the Act’s passage, the second anniversary include the necessity for NGO importers of the August 30 WTO Decision, and to seek permission from each country in almost four years after the WTO Doha which they hope to import, the Declaration. Yet significant progress in Canadian list of products which reduces increasing the number of people who the flexibility of importing countries to can access affordable medicines for determine their own health needs, and
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the relatively short term of license (two Alternative approaches years) which restricts the ability of coun- tries to guarantee long-term treatment. There is the prospect that another pro- ducing country will pass better legisla- From the perspective of developing tion. In early commentary on the Act, countries seeking drugs, much cheaper Richard Elliott of the Canadian HIV/AIDS drugs, available more simply, can be Legal Network noted that “the bill falls sought from India and China. As a lawyer short of providing a ‘model’. Rather, for Canadian generic producers notes, other countries should learn from it and “If a developing country did secure funds avoid replicating its defects.”14 (i.e., through donor groups or interna- tional aid), these funds would probably The European Union’s approach is similar go further buying drugs from India or but has “fewer hurdles” and appears China.”11 This latter prospect is also “more responsive”. Norway was second threatened. India has adopted a new after Canada in proceeding with legisla- patent regime (January 1, 2005) that will tion, with an Act that came into force on reduce the ability of Indian producers to June 1, 2004. The UK is developing supply cheap anti-retrovirals, by recog- legislation at time of writing, as is South nizing product as well as process Korea. A summary evaluation of the patents.12 As the spokesperson for three existing approaches was published Nigeria’s Positive Action for Treatment in November 2004: puts it “rising treatment costs will spell “On balance, the Norwegian and EU disaster for people with HIV in India regulations are significantly better than and around the world.”13 The WHO the Canadian legislation in that they do requested that India not adopt not include a limited list of pharmaceuti- “unnecessary restrictions that are not cal products. The Norwegian regulation required under the TRIPS agreement and is the most expansive in terms of eligible that would impede access to medicines,” importing countries, while the Canadian but India went beyond TRIPS, potentially law is reasonably good but imposes an blocking generic production of some key unjustified higher standard on non-WTO medicines. Further, both India and the developing countries; the proposed EU importing country must issue compulsory regulation is the worst because it only licenses, further complicating processes. permits export to WTO members. Finally, The international intellectual property the Norwegian and EU regulations are regime, together with the ardent seriously flawed because they provide no pressure of privileged pharmaceutical clear definition of how long a generic manufacturers continues to delay, manufacturer must attempt to negotiate complicate, and restrict efficient, a voluntary licence before a compulsory effective, and affordable access to licence may be issued, nor any certainty treatment. The infected wait while about the royalties to be paid in the lawyers prosper, and managers and event of compulsory licensing. This shareholders continue in protected defect needs to be remedied, either at privilege. the EU level or during implementation by
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EU member countries...None of these Republic of Congo with assistance from three jurisdictions have produced a the German development agency and thoroughly sound model for other German sources.17 Nevertheless, implementing the WTO’s August 2003 Canadian agencies and generic decision and there remains considerable producers could follow a similar strategy room for improvement. Whether the in Africa. WTO’s decision itself is even workable to begin with is another question The challenge remains. Given the rate of entirely and one that must be addressed increase in infection, the location of the as WTO Members negotiate a more vast majority of affected people in sub- permanent solution to the problems Saharan Africa, and newer areas of crisis caused by the TRIPS restrictions on in Asia and elsewhere, how can an compulsory licensing.”15 “expressway” to treatment be opened? How can the needs of the ill and their In a brief requested by the Minister of human right to health be put first? The Foreign Affairs, the Ministerial Council on Ministerial Council brief suggested an HIV/AIDS in 2003 presented the recom- emergency “consortium” of generic mendation that among other strategies producers, one that would put profit and to assure access called on the competitive advantage aside, and, Department of Foreign Affairs and encouraged by governments, undertake International Trade (DFAIT) to: a “Marshall Plan” approach to massive scaling-up of treatment access. Such an • “support, and where necessary initiate, option would require parallel investment international cooperation to ensure the in health systems and related assistance • provision of affordable quality supplies with the various social determinants of of medicines by encouraging regional health and immune capability. It would also take signal leadership by a • generic production facilities, where government or consortium of like- possible; that DFAIT encourage the minded governments. • formation of an international consor- tium of generic-producing countries to Funding: resources and needs • scale-up production, distribution and sustainable supply...”16 How much funding is needed to achieve the minimum objective of MDG 6 or to It appears that the German rather than truly roll back the pandemic and save the Canadian government has taken the millions of lives? There are a good lead on the first suggestion, that is, number of claims and many estimates. encouraging the development of As Bezanson indicates, variables are production in situ. Pharmakina, a leading complicated. For example, while rolling quinine-based drug producer, in cooper- back the prices of key drug therapies ation with a Thai pioneer in generic could lower financial requirements, truly drugmaking, is to produce anti-retrovirals attending to the required health system- from a base in Bukavo, in the Democratic supportive human and institutional costs
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could drive costs up “exponentially”. The “aspirational” scenario would make Bezanson notes that while donor anti-retroviral therapy available to resources generally increased in the early 6.3 million or 86 per cent of those in years of this decade, the prospects “will need by 2007. This does not include probably be far less benign, at least with monies necessary for the infrastructural regard to ODA.”18 strengthening required for delivery. It also does not include certain other An assessment of funding needs programs, including workplace efforts in published by UNAIDS in February 2005 a number of countries. took note of “resource constraints” in projecting needs for the coming years, The UN Millennium Project Task Force on basing a scenario on current trends in HIV/AIDS, Malaria, Tuberculosis and expenditures and pledges made to Access to Essential Medicines did not 2007 by diverse donor sectors. This analyze costs overall, but did establish would provide an amount of about estimates on the basis of a small number US$10 billion by 2007, of which almost of case study countries. It did include US$3 billion is expected to come from costs of building health-system capacity, domestic public and out-of-pocket including management, physical infra- sources.19 The agency preferred a structure, improved salaries, and other scenario based on capacity constraints, system-wide costs. It concluded that a where current scale-up rates were “serious attempt to resolve the crisis in constrained by implementation capacity, human resources for health might add in which required resources by 2007 very substantially to the cost of a would be US$14.1 billion. A third “aspi- comprehensive response to HIV/AIDS.” It rational” scenario would ramp up much concluded that providing a set of basic more quickly costing US$18.8 billion by HIV/AIDS services to all those who need 2007. Many AIDS activists expressed them would cost well over US $10 billion concern that the estimates were put and as much as US$20 billion a year, forward in such a way as to dampen very close to the earlier UNAIDS estimate expectations and reduce demands. of US$19.9 billion.20 What do these figures imply in terms of In partial response to this order of need, prevention and treatment? With the the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, US$10 billion figure, comprehensive HIV Tuberculosis and Malaria was prevention is not reached till 2014, and inaugurated in 2001. Its objective of would be 55 per cent of expanded raising US$10 billion was announced at coverage targets in 2007. Anti-retroviral the 2002 Barcelona AIDS Conference. treatment would reach 2.8 million or Estimates for replenishment in 2006 and 41 per cent of those in need by 2007. 2007 are less than half that amount. Bezanson points out that the Fund “is With US$14.1 billion, 71 per cent of now fast running out of money. At coverage for prevention would be present, total pledges of only roughly reached in 2007, and 54 per cent of US$700,000, US$400,000 and those in need would get anti-retroviral US$200,000 have been made for 2006, treatment. 2007, and 2008, respectively.”
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The Global Fund is, of course, not the Millennium Development Goal 6 occurs. only funder to be considered in the over- Will 3 by 5 turn into 3 by 6, or 7, or all response to HIV/AIDS, as the United beyond? Funding levels remain States’ own PEPFAR (the President’s inadequate, and predictability and Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief) funding sustainability remain unclear. The initiative and multilateral facilities context, Keith Bezanson advises, “must including UNAIDS, WHO, and the World be expected to be less benign and Bank all have a role. The US PEPFAR more demanding. The donor and devel- pledge has yet to translate into signifi- opment landscape has become much cant real allocations, and comes with a more complex.”22 number of conditions including absti- nence-only programming, opposition to Against this background, Canada’s sex work, etc. performance has hardly been the worst among donor nations. Over the last five As noted, the UNAIDS draft study of years CIDA’s approach to the global fight needs provoked a sharp response from against AIDS involved expenditures of European, American, and Canadian inter- $600 million. CIDA states that it is national AIDS CSOs, as well as from the investing up to $100 million in African- Global AIDS Alliance. A February 24, led strategies for care, treatment and 2005 letter from the Health Gap coalition prevention of HIV/AIDS. It has pledged to the Executive Director of UNAIDS $62 million from the Canada Fund for predicted that the three scenarios out- Africa toward the development of an lined by UNAIDS “will create a self- AIDS vaccine (IAVI). It is not clear fulfilling prophecy of mediocrity,” leading whether a further investment will be donors to reduce their commitment. forthcoming, although the 2005 budget Pressure on donors must be sustained, commitment to double ODA for Africa the coalition argues. Accepting the should make that possible. Canada has “capacity constrained” scenario means also invested $15 million over three years the target of 3 million people in the in research on microbicides. developing world accessing ARVs by the end of 2005 will not be met, under- On May 10, 2004, responding to calls mining a project in which UNAIDS itself from Stephen Lewis, the UN Special is a co-sponsor. In addition, the coalition Envoy on HIV/AIDS in Africa, rock star objects to the exclusion of estimates of Bono, and Canadian civil society organi- human resource and institutional infra- zations, Prime Minister Paul Martin structural costs in the estimate, the announced a $100 million contribution elimination of funding for “universal to the World Health Organization’s 3 by precautions” to protect health workers 5 initiative, intending to stimulate similar from occupational exposure, and to an action from other donors and making underestimation of the costs of programs Canada the largest donor in the initia- for orphans and vulnerable children.21 tive. Canada committed $150 million over four years to the Global Fund in This year, 2005, is one of stocktaking: 2001 and in 2005 made two grants of the Global Fund faces replenishment US$70 million each, exceeding for the meetings; the four-year review of moment the recommended contributions UNGASS commitments takes place; the suggested by Canadian NGOs and by a five-year evaluation of progress on parliamentary committee. CIDA has also
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pledged $1 million to UNAIDS in support “essential services to those who need of the Global Coalition on Women them and to relieve the burden on and AIDS.23 impoverished households.”25 Canada has thus made a number of significant contributions in the five years since the Millennium Declaration. Conclusions However, the challenge still requires Countries most seriously affected by the something more, not only in the level of pandemic, donor nations, and agencies funding but in the sort of political leader- are still in the process of assessing the full ship required at a global level to scale up systemic impact of the disease on combined efforts on a sustained basis to people, economies, social systems, and the magnitude required to save millions. the relationship of human beings and Accepting the current consensus of an viral threats in the overall ecology. As a investment of US$19 or $20 billion per recent paper prepared for a CIDA consul- year, the amount is miniscule compared tation noted, AIDS is like a guerrilla war, to such current expenditures as the “HIV is not an external enemy across the US$400 billion annual US military border, but rather an invader that has budget. The Canadian share of such an already overrun the national territory, effort, while no pittance, would still be which requires a ‘people’s war’ to resist less than the funds recently committed and ultimately expel it. It means some- to increase our own defence budget. thing other than just a ‘military’ response, not just a matter of deploying Tina Rosenberg points out that time is of human and material resources and the essence. If the US$4.7 billion spent in making speeches calling for effort and 2003 had been invested in 1996, it sacrifice, but it is a systems change.”26 “would have provided new anti-retroviral drugs for most people who needed At the moment, we remain at the level them and paid for effective prevention of, perhaps, “enhanced” business as campaigns so that AIDS might have been usual, responses are not far-reaching or a minor disease today rather than a profound enough to be described as global catastrophe. That kind of systems-changing, although innovation spending would have been one of the breaks through here and there. most brilliant investments imaginable, eventually saving hundreds of billions of The centrepiece of Canadian leadership dollars and tens of millions, perhaps in the global fight against death by hundreds of millions, of lives.”24 HIV/AIDS and other diseases for the coming five years should be access to The Millennium Project study concludes treatment, affordable (in many cases that funding levels for AIDS at more than free), and available. With it must come US$19 billion by 2007 must be found, the necessary radical strengthening of and that donor funding must be more health systems, assuring enhanced predictable, less restrictive, and guided prevention and response to other health by a long-term perspective. challenges. Sensitivity to gender equality and empowerment, in which Canada has That perspective includes substantial an established track record, must charac- investment in health-system capacity, terize the next phase even more than with the overall objective of bringing
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previous ones. At the same time Canadians have contributed extensively, approaches of a system-changing nature, not only to the original international eradicating the social and environmental human rights framework but to contem- determinants—like poverty—which porary guides on human rights and AIDS undermine health and immune-capacity and access to treatment. Canada has must be elaborated and built in. made remarkable contributions to enhancing international policy on gender and the rights of children. Continued Health systems efforts are vital in the face of violation of In its report on MDG implementation, women’s rights because of customary or the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, a leader religious laws and practices, denial of in a number of aspects of access to sexual and reproductive health rights, treatment, notes “access to affordable and pressures against condom use, for medicines will not by itself ensure the example. Canada’s experience can be achievement of the human right to the carried forward, in such fields as gaining highest attainable standard of health, but international recognition and action on it is an important element in this broader risk reduction strategies and in assuring endeavour, which includes a holistic equitable access to treatment which approach to the development of national requires special attention to women and health systems.”27 This recognition family members. animates such proposals as those of the UN Millennium Project Task Force on Civil society HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis, and the Access to Essential Medicines The Doha Declaration, the pre-Cancun Working Group on HIV/AIDS 2005. August 30 Statement, and the advances They note that “the greatest barrier to of the Jean Chrétien Pledge to Africa Act meeting the goal of widespread access would not have occurred without contin- to treatment is the deplorable state of uous civil society pressure, alliances health systems in most of the hardest-hit between activists in South Africa, Brazil, countries.” Health services for over Europe, Asia, the United States, and 2 billion people have been left “dysfunc- Canada. The engagement of key tional, inaccessible, or priced beyond the academics and legal experts, as well as reach of the poor.” In addition to the utilization of alliances with leaders massive investment in these systems, the within sympathetic governments, have Task Force recognizes that in “the most all contributed to the advances that have affected countries there is an acute short- been achieved. Canadian organizations age of skilled healthcare workers,” and it convened by the Global Treatment places a welcome emphasis on the Access Group (GTAG), the Inter-Agency training of cadre in this regard.28 Coalition on AIDS and Development, and others developed a Global Health Summit in Spring 2003 and a declaration Human rights demanding action on a number of AIDS- “The AIDS paradox teaches that the most related issues. The Canadian government effective way of preventing the spread of has developed a series of instruments for the virus responsible for AIDS is by periodic as well as event-specific consul- protecting the human rights of those tation. Similarly, the engagement of civil most at risk.”29 society representatives and those directly
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affected by the disease in international continuous leadership by a Cabinet advisory and governing bodies has been member, coalescing Canadian resources an increasingly common characteristic of and initiating international action by like- the last five years. AIDS groups and minded countries. development-related NGOs are currently engaged in a “Make AIDS History” campaign leading through 2005. Further, The road ahead a “Free by 5” campaign to assure free Canada’s accountability in the light of access to treatment in Africa, is also the MDGs and the Millennium mobilizing support. In preparation for Declaration at the September 2005 the 2005 and 2006 reviews of progress General Assembly is an important under UNGASS, as well as preparation for moment. The positions Canada takes at the 2005 General Assembly Review the July G-7/-8 summit in Gleneagles, Summit, this experience should be Scotland will help determine whether the utilized in strengthening civil society Millennium Review Summit succeeds. participation. The review of UNGASS commitments in June 2005 and the five-year review in 2006, together with the World AIDS Leadership Conference in Toronto in 2006, offer Canada has been a leader in a number of important opportunities for the moments relating to HIV/AIDS since the exercise and showcasing of fresh Millennium Declaration. Two prime Canadian leadership. ministers and several Cabinet members have made salient statements and taken useful initiatives whether in the context JOHN W. FOSTER is a Principal Researcher of the UN, the G-7, or elsewhere. (Civil Society) with The North-South Nevertheless, there is room for much Institute. He joined the Institute in 2000. His more consistent leadership which might break through current limitations in earlier career included 17 years as a social effective and scaled-up response. The justice policy officer with the United Church report on HIV/AIDS, Human Security and of Canada and more than seven years as Canadian Foreign Policy, resulting from a CEO of Oxfam-Canada. He served as an workshop organized by The North-South NGO representative on the Canadian dele- Institute in March 2004, made a number gation to the Copenhagen Summit on Social of recommendations in this regard.30 Development in 1995 and the General One former Minister of Foreign Affairs toyed with the idea of a Canadian AIDS Assembly Review of that Summit in 2000. Ambassador, paralleling the leadership He holds a PhD in History from the on the global stage played by Stephen University of Toronto and has done post- Lewis for the UN or that undertaken by graduate work as a visiting scholar at the Canadian Ambassadors for Disarmament. Center for US-Mexican Studies at the The appointment has never been made. University of California, San Diego. A pan-governmental strategy or even a mission statement could be useful, but it could also be significantly enhanced, in the absence of an “Ambassador” by
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Endnotes March 7-9, (Ottawa: The North-South Institute, 2004), p. 42. 1 Keith A. Bezanson, Replenishing the Global Fund: An Independent Assessment. UNAIDS 11 Shonagh McVean, Gilbert’s LLP, February, 2005. “Implementing the Jean Chrétien Pledge to Africa Act” Power-point presentation, 2 Statement issued by Stephen Lewis, UN February 26, 2005. Special Envoy for HIV/AIDS in Africa, on the occasion of the launch in Canada 12 Previous recognition of only process of the “Make Poverty History” patents allowed Indian firms to make campaign, at a press conference in copies of patented drugs and sell them in Ottawa, February 11, 2005. India and abroad, forcing multinationals to reduce prices in competition. 3 Tina Rosenberg, “Is AIDS Forever?” Foreign Policy, March/April, 2005. 13 Rolake Nwagwu, as reported in Dinesh C. Sharma, “Indian patents may hamper 4 Keith A. Bezanson, Replenishing the Global access to anti-retrovirals globally,” The Fund: An Independent Assessment. UNAIDS Lancet, March 1, 2005. February, 2005. 14 Elliott, “Canada passes law...”, 2004, 5 Commission on Intellectual Property p. 40. Rights, Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy. The Report 15 Richard Elliott, “Generics for the of the Commission on Intellectual Property developing world: a comparison of three Rights. London, September, 2002. approaches to implementing the WTO (World Trade Organization) decision.” 6 “Southern African Countries Reject SCRIP - World Pharmaceutical News - ‘Trips-plus’ Demands in FTA Negotiation.“ www.scrippharma.com November 24, Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, Vol. 9, 2004; see also Elliott, “Steps forward, No. 8, March 9, 2005. backward and sideways: Canada’s bill on 7 John W. Foster, “Canada and International exporting generic pharmaceuticals,” Health: A Time of Testing on AIDS,” in Canadian HIV/AIDS Policy & Law Review, Norman Hillmer and Maureen Appel Vol. 9, (3), 2004. Molot, (ed), Canada Among Nations 16 John Foster and David Garmaise, 2002, A Fading Power (Don Mills: Oxford “Meeting the Challenge: Canada’s University Press, 2002). Foreign Policy on HIV/AIDS, With a 8 WTO, Declaration on the TRIPS agreement Particular Focus on Africa.” Ministerial and public health. Adopted on November Council on HIV/AIDS, September, 2003), 14, 2001. WT/MIN (01)/DEC/2. p. 48. www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/ 17 Stephanie Nolen, “Congo gains anti-AIDS min01_e/mindecl_trips-e.htm. Accessed in ally.” The Globe and Mail. December 11, February 2005. 2004. 9 Lewis, Statement, February 11, 2005. 18 Bezanson, 2005. 10 Richard Elliott, “Canada passes law on 19 UNAIDS, Resource needs for an expanded compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals response to AIDS in low- and middle- for export, but flawed bill fails to set income countries. Draft. February 7, positive global precedent,” in John W. 2005. Foster, HIV/AIDS, Human Security and Canadian Foreign Policy. Workshop Report.
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20 UN Millennium Project, Combating AIDS in 27 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Developing World. (London and Global Partnerships for Development, Stirling, Va.: Earthscan, 2005) p. 131-32. Millennium Development Goal No. 8, Progress Report by Norway 2004, 21 Asia Russell, Health Gap Coalition, et al, to Oslo, 2005. Peter Piot, Executive Director, UNAIDS, February 24, 2005. 28 UN Millennium Project, p. 6-9. 22 Bezanson, p. 34. 29 Foster and Germaise, p. 37. 23 Government of Canada. Backgrounder: 30 See for example recommendations L 1 The Fight Against Infectious Diseases. & 2, and T 12 & 13 in Foster, HIV/AIDS, Modified 2005-01-04 Human Security and Canadian Foreign Policy. The workshop was organized in 24 Rosenberg, p. 22. cooperation with Foreign Affairs Canada 25 UN Millennium Project, p. 149. and the participation of officials of several departments, Canadian and international 26 Alex de Waal, and Naresh Singh, experts, and civil society representatives. HIV/AIDS as a Societal Systems Challenge, February, 2005.
102 Canada and the Peace and Security Pillar of the Millennium Declaration1
Stephen Baranyi
Canada and the Peace and Security Pillar of the Millennium Declaration
Canada and the Peace and Security Pillar of the Millennium Declaration1
Stephen Baranyi
Introduction all governments to inject fresh energy into their fulfillment. Its he Millennium Declaration weaknesses are that it lacks the (MD) is a vast agenda for specificity of earlier instruments Tpromoting international secu- in areas like arms control; it rity, human rights, sustainable contains none of the concrete development, and UN reform. targets and follow-up mecha- Within that agenda the section on nisms built into the Millennium peace, security, and disarmament Development Goals (MDGs); its (PSD) includes general commit- links to gender equality goals ments to: are tenuous, despite the adoption • strengthen the rule of law in by the UN Security Council of international affairs Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security the same • enhance UN capacities for year; and finally, this pillar of conflict prevention, peace- the Declaration has few concrete keeping and peacebuilding provisions for civil society engagement. • implement existing arms control and disarmament The tragedies of 9/11 and their treaties aftermath have complicated follow-up on this pillar of the • take concerted action against Declaration. Since 2001 the terrorism United States and certain other • tackle the problems of illicit states have focused on the war on drugs and transnational crime terror and weapons of mass destruction. Their strategies have • end the illicit traffic in small polarized debates over multi- arms lateral versus unilateral • promote the implementation approaches, and power-based of the landmines treaty, and versus law-based perspectives. so on.2 Iraq has become a flashpoint in these debates. Other elements of This instrument brings together the MD-PSD agenda, such as many key multilateral engage- arms control or conflict preven- ments from earlier eras, and binds tion, have received less attention.
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The December 2004 report by the UN priorities for Canada. It also helps us see Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on beyond the limited peace and security Threats, Challenges and Change criteria used by the Commitment to proposes a strategy to revitalize the UN Development Index, Ranking the Rich, and bring the international community which focus on countries’ contributions back to the integrated approach articu- to peacekeeping.5 lated in the Millennium Declaration. It recommends the creation of a UN Peacebuilding Commission under the Canada and peacekeeping aegis of the Security Council, to operations strengthen UN engagement in fragile states and in postwar peacebuilding. It Canadians pride themselves in having endorses the Responsibility to Protect contributed centrally to the emergence (R2P) principles proposed by the of peacekeeping under the aegis of the International Commission on UN, and having deployed over 100,000 Intervention and State Sovereignty. It Canadian Forces (CF) personnel in UN recommends re-doubling efforts to and other peace operations since 1947. strengthen the peace and security capac- Three important shifts occurred during ities of regional organizations, especially the 1990s. Canada continued to support the African Union (AU). The High-Level UN peace operations by paying its Panel report also recommends measures assessed contributions “in full, on time to enhance links between the interna- and without conditions,” but Ottawa tional community’s international security moved toward providing fewer yet more policies and progress on the MDGs.3 In senior officers for planning and com- his March 2005 report, UN Secretary- mand positions, and played an active General Kofi Annan endorsed these role in fostering UN rapid deployment recommendations.4 capabilities.6 Canada’s human resource contributions broadened to include In 2000, Canada was a strong supporter police and civilian personnel. Canada of the Millennium Declaration and its also increased its contributions to peace PSD pillar. There was much convergence operations through regional organiza- between that pillar and the government’s tions, especially the North Atlantic Treaty positions, especially on issues like the Organization (NATO). These patterns implementation of the Ottawa reflect larger trends that have deepened Landmines Convention and the establish- since 2000, in Canada and globally.7 ment of the International Criminal Court. How has Canada fared since then? In December 2004, 208 CF personnel were deployed in UN peace operations This section looks at the Canadian record worldwide. In numerical terms this since 2000 on MD-PSD commitments placed Canada 34th in the ranking of UN related to peacekeeping, postwar peace- troop-contributing countries.8 Yet this building, and ex ante conflict prevention. does not convey the qualitatively impor- These emphases reflect the need to look tant role Canada plays in the develop- beyond the well-known campaigns that ment of UN peace support capabilities have been championed by Foreign through its diplomatic and staff contribu- Affairs Canada (FAC), and focus on other tions to the UN Standby Forces High areas that have been, or could be,
106 Canada and the Peace and Security Pillar of the Millennium Declaration
Chart 1
CIDA disbursements on post-conflict peacebuilding, 2000-2004
110 100 Post-conflict 90 peacebuilding 80 Demobilization 70 60 50 Landmine clearance
C$ Millions 40 30 Reconstruction 20 relief 10 Total 0 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 Years
Treasury Board Secretariat, 2000 and 2004. DND, 2000 and 2004; Powell, 2005. The data on Canadian contributions to UN peacekeeping only covers annually assessed contributions. It does not include core funding to the UN system, or additional contributions to particular UN peace operations. The data on Canadian contributions to NATO operations only covers additional (or “incremental”) costs incurred by DND to field Canadian troops in SFOR and ISAF. It does not include core funding to NATO or costs that DND would have assumed anyway had it not contributed to these operations. Data on contributions to UN and NATO peacekeeping reflect actual disbursements up to 2003-04, and estimates in 2004-05. The data on Canadian contributions to African peacekeeping is divided about evenly between capacity-building programs (from 2002 to 2004) and direct contributions to the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in 2004-05. It represents allocations rather than disbursements.
Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG), as well as 1,003 CF personnel deployed with the through the provision of senior officers International Security Assistance Force and specialized units to operations such (ISAF) in Afghanistan. The additional cost as the UN Organization Mission in the to the Department of National Defence Democratic Republic of the Congo. Nor (DND) of Canada’s contribution to SFOR does it capture the numbers of Canadian ranged from $173.6 million in 2000/01 police seconded to UN operations, to $180.7 million in 2003/04. The which stood at 106 in December 2004. additional cost of Canada’s contribution Canada’s assessed contributions to to ISAF amounted to $430 million in UN peace operations grew from 2003/04, and is estimated at $390 mil- $23.8 million in fiscal year 2000/01 to lion for 2004/05.10 This can be viewed $110.6 million in 2004/05.9 as a pragmatic contribution to the emergence of a decentralized interna- Still, Canada’s contributions to UN tional peacekeeping regime. Yet it raises missions are modest compared to its questions about the priority Canada involvement in NATO operations. At its assigns to strengthening other pillars of peak in 2000-01, Canada had 1,800 CF that emerging regime—especially the UN personnel deployed with the NATO and African regional organizations— Stabilization Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina in practice. (SFOR). In December 2004 Canada had
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In principle, Canada is committed to and 3,000 reservists to the CF by 2010, assisting the development of an effective partly to enhance Canada’s ability to human security architecture in Africa, the make rapid contributions to international region with the largest number of armed missions. The equipment purchases conflicts now and in the foreseeable announced in this budget (utility aircraft, future. Building on the G-8 Africa Action medium capacity helicopters, and logis- Plan of 2002, Canada seconded several tics trucks) could certainly strengthen military planners to help the West African Canada’s contributions to peacekeep- Economic Community (ECOWAS) and ing.13 A key question is whether this the AU develop their capacities for the expanded capacity will be deployed rapid deployment of peacekeeping and mainly in UN-sanctioned peacekeeping protection operations. Since 2002, and protection operations, or whether it Canada has allocated approximately will be used for operations that may not $45 million to ECOWAS, the AU, and La be clearly consistent with the UN Francophonie for this purpose.11 These Charter. A wider issue, rigorously are significant contributions but, as addressed in recent papers by the non- shown in Chart 1, they are small com- governmental organization (NGO) pared to Canada’s involvement in UN Project Ploughshares, is whether the and especially NATO operations. Indeed, large increases to the defence budget tensions exist between Canada’s policy announced in recent years are the best commitments to strengthening African way to meet Canada’s security priori- and other regional organizations’ human ties—or whether some of those resources security capacities over the long-term, should go to increasing investment in and the de facto priority it assigns to conflict prevention through development quick-impact, Northern-driven “coalitions assistance.14 Both issues require further of the willing”. discussion given current attempts to promote policy coherence around the The Canadian government has collabo- Millennium Declaration and Millennium rated with the UK to develop the Gender Development Goals. Training Initiative (GTI) for peacekeepers and police observers. Some peacekeepers and observers have received gender- sensitivity training through the Pearson Canada and postwar Peacekeeping Centre. Yet according to a peacebuilding recent study “GTI training does not Although Canada’s involvement in peace- appear to be widely used in the training building is of more recent vintage than of Canadian peacekeepers or civilian its historic role in peacekeeping, it also police.”12 There is also scope for further predates the adoption of the Millennium innovation, and deeper implementation, Declaration. In 1996 the government in this important area. established the Canadian Peacebuilding In 2004, Prime Minister Paul Martin Initiative to inject fresh vision and announced the creation of a new 5,000- resources into Canada’s then-fragmented person Canadian Forces rapid deploy- engagement in this field. The Initiative ment brigade. In the February 2005 initially rested on two mechanisms: a budget, the government clarified that it $10 million/year Fund managed by the will add that number of regular troops Canadian International Development
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Chart 2
Canadian Contributions to UN, NATO and African Peacekeeping, 2000-2005
650 600 AU/ECOWAS/Francophonie 550 NATO (SFOR only until 2002-03, 500 SFOR + ISAF for 2003-04 and 2004-05) UN 450 400 350
C$ Millions 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 Years
CIDA, 2005. These categories correspond to budget lines 015061 to 015066 and 106340 in the OECD DAC coding system employed by CIDA to track the distribution of its ODA expenditures. CIDA also includes anti-narcotics activities in its calculations of “peace, conflict and reconstruction” spending, but we do not view this line as central to postwar peacebuilding. In any case, the impact of adding this line to annual totals is marginal. More importantly, these sums do not include CIDA spending in other areas that are critical to sustainable peacebuiding, such as economic development policy and planning, legal and judicial development, and strengthening civil society. As such, CIDA spending on postwar peacebuilding may in fact be considerably higher than suggested by these figures.
Agency (CIDA) and a $1 million/year from about $300,000 in FY 2000/01 to Program managed by FAC. about $450,000 in FY 2003/04.15 In reality HSP peacebuilding funding was By 2000 the budget for the Foreign probably somewhat higher since key Affairs Peacebuilding and Human initiatives funded under other themes— Security Program (HSP) had grown to for example, the campaign to establish $10 million a year to match its expanded the International Criminal Court or the mandate. Peacebuilding came under the global implementation of UNSC HSP thematic priority of conflict preven- Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and tion, and was one of five sub-priorities in Security—are also crucial for postwar that area. Assuming that peacebuilding peacebuilding. received about 20 per cent of the funds that HSP spent on conflict prevention However, the real growth was in CIDA. during those years, this suggests that By 2000 CIDA’s support for peace- HSP peacebuilding disbursements grew building had grown far beyond the
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$10 million/year Fund to encompass In early 2004 Prime Minister Martin large programs managed by the geo- signaled his commitment to enhancing graphic and other branches. Several the coherence of Canadian policies mechanisms jointly managed by CIDA through an integrated “3D”approach— and Foreign Affairs—such as the better coordination of diplomacy, Landmines Fund and the Canadian Police defence and development. He mooted Arrangement—had also been established. the possibility of new money and As shown in Chart 2, peacebuilding announced the creation of a “Canada spending grew spectacularly from about Corps” to provide Canadian governance $53 million in 2000/01 to almost expertise to fragile states. In its February $80 million in 2003/04. 2005 budget the federal government announced the establishment of a Chart 3 shows how this growth also had $100 million/year Global Peace and distinct geopolitical inflections. In the Security Fund (GPSF) managed by late 1990s, CIDA’s Central and Eastern Foreign Affairs, to “support the renewal Europe (CEE) Branch led the Agency’s of the Human Security Program and peacebuilding disbursements, due to its provide security assistance to failed and large programs in Bosnia and failing states, as well as resources for Herzegovina, as well as in Serbia and post-conflict stabilization and recov- Montenegro. In 2002-03, Asia Branch ery.”18 According to Department of peacebuilding disbursements surpassed Finance officials, the GPSF will be used those of the CEE, Multilateral, and primarily to support activities that are Partnership branches due to the estab- not ODA-eligible, such as Canada’s lishment of a new program in $20 million contribution to the African Afghanistan, the largest country program Union Mission in Sudan. It will be part of ever managed by CIDA. CIDA’s peace- a larger Global Peace and Security Pool building expenditures in Africa have been that will also encompass CIDA program- modest compared to its expenditures in ming and multi-departmental programs these two regions, notwithstanding like Canada Corps, the Canadian Police Canada’s stated commitments to Africa Arrangement, and the Landmine Fund. and the dramatic scope of conflicts on This pool is expected to amount to 16 that continent. approximately $290 million in fiscal year These spending increases occurred in 2005/06.19 tandem with increasing Canadian These developments are important, yet contributions to multilateral policy inconsistent signals from government development in this area, especially have fueled concerns by civil society through the UN and the Organisation organizations (CSOs). Their concerns for Economic Co-operation and include: Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC). Foreign • a lack of clarity about the policy frame- Affairs and CIDA have also worked to work that would guide governmental integrate gender equality objectives in action in this domain Canadian and broader international peacebuilding programming.17 • a tendency for government, and especially FAC, to privilege rapid responses to geopolitically important
110 Canada and the Peace and Security Pillar of the Millennium Declaration
Chart 3
CIDA Disbursements on Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, Distribution by Branch, 2000-2005
55 Multilateral 50 AMEB 45 Americas 40 Asia 35 CEE Partnership 30 C$ Millions 25 20 15 10 5 0 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 Years
CIDA, 2005.
crises over long-term engagement in tum with the Millennium Declaration, peacebuilding the UN Secretary-General’s 2001 report on the prevention of armed conflict, UN • worrisome Canadian involvement in Security Council Resolution 1366 (2001), Afghanistan, Haiti, and Iraq and General Assembly Resolution 57/337 • weak monitoring and evaluation of in 2003. These bodies all view conflict government-funded activities prevention as encompassing ex ante measures like early warning; in-conflict • much unfinished business on the measures such as mediation; and post- gender mainstreaming front war activities such as the demobilization of combatants and law reform. Since • uneven engagment with and under- postwar peacebuilding has already been funding of important civil society covered, this section will focus on initiatives in this domain.20 Canada’s contributions to ex ante (pre) conflict prevention. Canada and ex ante Canada has supported efforts to foster a conflict prevention shift from a culture of reaction to a culture of prevention in the UN. Conflict prevention emerged as an inter- Canadian diplomats participated actively national priority of sorts in the late and constructively in the negotiation of 1990s, after the release of the Carnegie relevant resolutions in the UN Security Commission’s seminal work and its Council and General Assembly. As noted uptake by the DAC. It gathered momen-
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earlier, Foreign Affairs built a commit- and security programming should be ment to conflict prevention into the HSP guided by the principles of conflict in 2000. Its spending on ex ante conflict prevention—broadly defined. This would prevention stood at about $300,000 in entail taking a long-term, structural 2000/01 and grew to about $450,000 in conflict prevention approach to pro- 2003/04.21 Yet FAC’s conflict prevention gramming in fragile states. It would efforts and financial investments are entail supporting governance initiatives modest compared to its investments in in sensitive areas such as security sector priorities like the Responsibility to reform where these were compatible Protect (R2P). In this connection it is with DAC ODA guidelines. It would also worth noting that most of the require harmonizing governance inter- $1.75 million spent on R2P in 2003-04 ventions with socio-economic efforts, not was spent on the reaction pillar of the only via CIDA but also by fostering policy International Commission for coherence with finance, trade and Intervention and State Sovereignty’s defence initiatives.26 (ICISS) recommendations.22 These broader views seem to converge It is harder to ascertain CIDA spending in with that of Prime Minister Martin. So this area since there are no DAC-coded then, it is not surprising that the govern- budget lines corresponding directly to ment’s April 2005 International Policy conflict prevention. A recent calculation Statement commits it to an integrated of Agency spending on governance and approach that will include strengthened civil society in six “states in crisis” and rapid reaction capacities, increased four “low-income poor performers” funding for stabilization operations, as suggests that CIDA spending increased well as strengthened longer-term peace- from about $46 million in 2000-01 to building and conflict prevention via about $86 million in 2003/04.23 Yet CIDA. What remains to be seen is how these figures can only be used as a rough this will be implemented given the proxy for conflict prevention spending. vagaries of of parliamentary and electoral Moreover, they are hard to square with politics at the moment.27 the view of the CIDA official who led the Peacebuilding Unit from 1997 to 2003, that Canada and other OECD countries Conclusions “need to invest more than a pittance for prevention.”24 Since 2000, Canada has made important contributions to implementing the peace Indeed, one concern in the Canadian and security pillar of the Millennium conflict prevention community is that the Declaration, even though most of its government’s interest is pulled in other initiatives have not been explicitly framed directions by Foreign Affairs’ narrow view as such. Canada has provided substantial of human security, and by geopolitical financial and human resources to priorities such as managing the delicate strengthen UN, Economic Community of relationship with the United States.25 West African States (ECOWAS), and Despite this apparent tendency, in its African Union capacities for peace- mid-2004 submission to the Canadian keeping and rapid deployment, though International Policy Review (IPR) process, its largest contributions (by far) have CIDA argued that the Agency’s peace been made through NATO. This raises
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profound questions about the relative Key recommendations of the UN High- priority that Canada assigns to Level Panel’s report, the renewed apparently robust, efficient, yet momentum of engagement on the Northern-driven coalitions of the MDGs, the idea of codifying a peace and willing, versus more multilateral, long- security MDG,28 Canada’s International term and Southern-based approaches Policy Statement and the formulation of to peacekeeping. a CIDA strategy for fragile states—all converge to present unique opportunities Canadian involvement in postwar peace- to connect these agendas in 2005. These building also grew dramatically in the processes also provide openings to late 1990s and has continued to grow. address major questions facing Canada The geographic allocation of resources— in this domain: to the Balkans in the late 1990s and to Central Asia today—has been heavily • How should Canadians prioritize influenced by geopolitical priorities. support to NATO versus the UN and There is also a noticeable imbalance African peacekeeping operations? between the huge financial outlays for • How should Canada balance spending peacekeeping (and more broadly for on peacekeeping, peacebuilding, ex defence), the modest Canadian invest- ante conflict prevention—and more ments in peacebuilding, and the even broadly between defense and more limited investments in ex ante development? conflict prevention. Substantively, • How should Canada balance its Foreign Affairs involvement in peace- geopolitical and developmental building and conflict prevention has objectives, particularly in countries like been shaped by its narrow concept of Afghanistan, Haiti and Iraq? human security, while CIDA has demon- strated a more comprehensive and long- All these issues deserve much more term approach. FAC, CIDA and DND informed debate in 2005 and beyond. have taken initiatives to integrate gender sensitivity and gender equality into Canadian actions for peace and security, STEPHEN BARANYI is a Principal Researcher though there is room for progress on this (Conflict Prevention) with The North-South front too. Institute. He was previously with the Government commitments to 3D could International Development Research Centre certainly bring greater resources and and has also worked as a policy analyst with coherence to Canadian peacekeeping, the Department of Foreign Affairs and peacebuilding, and conflict prevention efforts. More rigorous evaluation of International Trade, the Canadian Inter- Canadian contributions, more systematic national Development Agency (CIDA), as mainstreaming of gender equality meas- well as NGOs in Europe, Latin America and ures, and deeper and better-funded Canada. He holds a PhD from York engagement with CSOs would also University and has pursued post-doctoral strengthen Canadian follow-up on the studies at the London School of Economics. peace and security pillar of the Millennium Declaration.
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References Department of Finance. 2005. The Budget Plan 2005. Ottawa: Government of Baranyi, Stephen. 2004. “Quel avenir Canada, February 23. pour le Canada et la consolidation de la paix? Innovation et efficacit/ dans une Department of National Defence. 2001. période de turbulence.” Ottawa: Yvan 2001-2002 Report on Plans and Priorities. Conoir et Gérard Verna, éds., 2005. Faire Ottawa: DND. la paix. Québec: Les Presses de l’Université Laval. _____. 2002. 2002-2003 Report on Plans and Priorities. Brown, Susan. 2005. “Vers la consolida- tion de la paix : moyens dérisoirs, _____. 2003. 2003-2004 Report on Plans résultants illusoires. La réponse du and Priorities. Canada à la consolidation de la paix,” in _____. 2004. 2004-2005 Report on Plans Yvan Conoir and Gérard Verna, éds., and Priorities. Faire la paix. Québec: Les Presses de l’Université Laval. Foreign Affairs Canada.2002. “Rapport sur le Programme de la sécurité humaine Canadian Council for International du Canada. 2000-2001 et 2001-2002.” Co-operation. 2004. “Contributing to Ottawa: FAC. Peace. Strengthening a Whole-of- Government Approach to Conflict and _____. 2004. “ DFAIT Human Security Peacebuilding,” Ottawa, October. Program Summary 2002/2003., Unpublished document, received Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating December 2004. Committee,Gender and Peacebuilding Working Group. 2004. A Civil Society _____. “DFAIT Human Security Program Perspective on Canada’s Implementation of Summary 2003/2004.” Unpublished United Nations Security Council Resolution document, received December 2004. 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and _____. “Canada and Peacekeeping.” Security. Ottawa: CPCC, October. Briefing notes available on Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/ Committee. 2004. “Canadian Action peacekeeping/menu-en.asp. Accessed Agenda on Conflict Prevention.” Ottawa: January 6, 2005. CPCC, November. See http://www.peace- Foreign Policy and the Center for Global build.ca for final version. Development. 2004. Ranking the Rich CIDA. 2005. “Briefing Note: CIDA 2004. Washington, DC: CGD, 2004. Programming in Post-Conflict Global Parnership on the Prevention of Reconstruction.” Unpublished note Armed Conflict, 2005. “Submission for received in January. the UN Secretary-General’s Report for the Collier, Paul. 2003. Breaking the Conflict Millennium +5 Review Summit,” Trap. Civil War and Development Policy. February. Washington/Oxford: World Bank and Government of Canada (2005). Canada’s Oxford University Press. International Policy Statement. Ottawa: Government of Canada, April.
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Jones, Bruce. 2003. Evolving Models of United Nations. 2004a.A More Secure Peacekeeping. Policy Implications and World: Our shared responsibility. Report Responses. New York: Center for of the Secretary-General’s High-Level International Cooperation, circa 2003. Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. New York: UN. Levin, Victoria and Dollar, David. “The Forgotten states: Aid Volumes and United Nations. 2004b. Monthly Volatility in Difficult Partnership Countries Summaries of Contributions (Military (1992-2002).” Paper prepared for the Observers, Civilian Police and Troops). Senior-Level Forum on Development As of 31 December 2004. See Effectiveness in Fragile States, http://un.org. Accessed February 10, January 13-14, 2005, London, UK. 2005. McGillivray, Mark. 2005. “Aid Allocation United Nations Secretary-General. In and Fragile States.” Paper prepared for Larger Freedom: Towards Developoment, the Senior Level forum on Development Security and Human Rights for all Effectiveness in Fragile States, (A/59/2005). 21 March 2005. January 13-14, 2005, London, UK. Powell, Kristiana. 2005. “The African Union’s Emerging Peace and Security Endnotes Regime: Opportunities and Challenges 1 The author thanks the following col- for Delivering on the Responsibility to leagues for their valuable input: Fayaz Protect.” Ottawa: The North-South Manji of Foreign Affairs; Michael Koros Institute, May. and Carole Piovesan of CIDA; John Davies of Finance; Peter Whelan and Ken Epps of Regehr, Ernie and Whelan, Peter. 2004. Project Ploughshares; and many col- “Reshaping the Security Envelope: leagues at The North-South Institute. The Defence Policy in a Human Security usual caveat applies. Context.” Project Ploughshares working 2 UNGA, 2000. paper 04-4. Waterloo: Project Ploughshares, November. 3 UN, 2004a. Treasury Board Secretariat. 2000. 2000- 4 UNSG, 2005. 2001 Estimates. Ottawa: TBS. 5 Foreign Policy and the Center for Global _____. 2001. 2001-2002 Estimates. Development, 2004. _____. 2002. 2002-2003 Estimates. 6 Foreign Affairs Canada, 2005. 7 Jones, 2003. _____. 2003. 2003-2004 Estimates. 8 UN, 2004b. _____. 2004. 2004-2005 Estimates. 9 Treasury Board Secretariat, 2000 and United Nations General Assembly. 2000. 2004. United Nations Millennium Declaration. A/RES/55/2 (September 18, 2000). 10 Department of National Defence, 2001 and 2004. 11 Powell, 2005.
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12 Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating 19 Briefing by John Davies, Chief, Committee, Gender and Peacebuilding Development Policy, Finance Canada, on Working Group, 2004. February 23, 2005, and correspondence with same on February 28, 2005. 13 Department of Finance, 2005. This inter- pretation of the new DND acquisitions 20 Canadian Council for International Co- draws on a conversation with Ken Epps of operation, 2004. For a more detailed Project Ploughshares on February 25, analysis of these policy debates, see 2005. Baranyi, 2005. 14 See Regehr and Whelan, 2004, for a 21 Foreign Affairs Canada, 2002 and 2004. detailed analysis of these spending For a somewhat more generous analysis trade-offs. of HSP expenditures, see Regehr and Whelan, 2004. 15 Foreign Affairs Canada, 2002 and 2004. For a somewhat more generous analysis 22 FAC, 2004. of HSP expenditures, see Regehr and Whelan, 2004. 23 CIDA, 2005. For a comparative perspec- tive on CIDA’s changing patterns of 16 CIDA, 2005. There are three problems spending on peacebuilding and fragile with using these figures as a proxy for states see McGillivray, 2005 as well as conflict prevention expenditures. First, Levin and Dollar, 2005. they only include CIDA spending in six “states in crisis” (Afghanistan, Iraq, West 24 Brown, 2005. Bank/Gaza, Haiti, Nepal, and Sudan) and 25 Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating four “low-income poor performers” Committee, 2004. See http://www.peace- (Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, build.ca for final version. Tajikistan, and Zimbabwe). Second, they cover a range of governance, civil society, 26 See Baranyi, 2004. and peacebuilding expenditures that goes beyond ex ante conflict prevention. Third, 27 In this regard, it is worrisome that Budget determining whether these or other pro- 2005 makes no reference to conflict pre- grams really qualify as conflict prevention vention – though it does contain numer- spending would require a qualitative ous references to security, failed states, analysis at the country level, to ascertain stabilization, and peace. whether they were programmed in a con- 28 This idea was first proposed by Paul flict-sensitive manner. This suggests that Collier of the World Bank in early 2003. It CIDA and other OECD donors should has recently been revived by the Global develop tools to track their conflict pre- Partnership on the Prevention of Armed vention expenditures more systematically Conflict (GPPAC), and is expected to be over the coming years. discussed at a major UN-civil society con- 17 Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating ference in July 2005. See Collier, 2003 Committee, Gender and Peacebuilding and GPPAC, 2005. Working Group. 18 Department of Finance, 2005.
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