Hitlers Letzte Offensive

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Hitlers Letzte Offensive 18. HITLERS LETZTE OFFENSIVE Für jene amerikanischen Einheiten, die im Dezember 1944 in die Ar- dennenregion geschickt wurden, sah es nach einer ruhigen Weihnachts- pause aus. Aus dem Grenzgebiet von Belgien, Luxemburg und Deutsch- land abziehende Veteranen riefen den neu ankommenden Einheiten ein Welcome to the rest zone! zu – der Krieg an der Westfront schien sich anderswo abzuspielen, nicht hier. Überhaupt schien es nur noch eine Frage der Zeit, bis die Wehrmacht im Westen endgültig besiegt sein würde. Nach der Eroberung von Paris waren die Alliierten relativ zügig durch Frankreich in Richtung Belgien vorgestoßen. Die Eroberung der Hafenstadt Antwerpen im Oktober war für die Logistik der Amerikaner, Briten, Kanadier und der mit ihnen kämpfenden kleineren Kontingente der, wie Roosevelt die Anti-Hitler- Koalition gern nannte, Vereinten Nationen ein großer Fortschritt; die immensen Mengen von Munition, Treibstoff, Lebensmitteln und was immer das Millionenheer unter Dwight D. Eisenhowers Befehl sonst noch brauchte, konnten jetzt näher an die Front geliefert werden – auch wenn der Nachschub weiterhin ein großes Problem war und die alliierte Führung den Vormarsch gezielt verlangsamte, um die Versorgungslinien nicht zu überdehnen. Ende Oktober standen US-Soldaten auf dem Ter- ritorium des Deutschen Reiches, Aachen wurde die erste Großstadt, über der (oder deren Trümmern) das Sternenbanner wehte. Allerdings gab es auch Rückschläge: Die Operation »Market Garden«, die Landung alliierter Fallschirmjäger hinter den deutschen Linien in den Niederlan- den, wurde zu einem Fiasko, da der größte Teil der überwiegend briti- schen Luftlandetruppen in Gefangenschaft geriet oder fiel. Der Oberkommandierende der missglückten Aktion, Bernard Montgomery, plante in diesem Dezember den Vormarsch durch die Niederlande in den Westen Deutschlands hinein. Weiter südlich stand der amerikani- 248 18. HITLERS LETZTE OFFENSIVE sche General George S. Patton, dem Hitler so viel Hochachtung entge- genbrachte, bereit, über das Saarland in Richtung Rhein vorzustoßen, der letzten großen natürlichen Grenze vor dem Marsch auf Berlin. Der Frontverlauf von den Niederlanden bis zur Schweizer Grenze brachte es mit sich, dass selbst eine solch große Streitmacht einige Front- abschnitte nur mit begrenztem Personal besetzen konnte und dort eher passiv agierte. Hierzu gehörten die Ardennen. Das Waldgebiet, das den an der Westfront tätigen Kriegsberichterstatter Ernest Hemingway an die Märchen der Gebrüder Grimm erinnerte – nur sei es noch viel fins- terer –, wurde von der alliierten Militärführung als für größere motori- sierte Einheiten unpassierbar eingestuft. Bemerkenswerterweise war dies viereinhalb Jahre zuvor auch die Meinung der französischen Gene- ralität gewesen, die binnen weniger Tage durch den »Blitzkrieg« der Panzereinheiten Heinz Guderians ad absurdum geführt wurde. Doch das war vor langer Zeit – die Wehrmacht des Winters 1944/45 war für die Alliierten eine geschlagene Truppe. Hitler hingegen sah hier in den Ardennen noch einmal eine Chance für einen vermeintlich entscheidenden Sieg, auch wenn seine Generäle wie Walter Model und Gerd von Rundstedt eine Offensive im Westen angesichts des Zustandes der dezimierten Armeekorps, der totalen Luft- überlegenheit der Alliierten und der Materialknappheit (vor allem an Treibstoff herrschte ein eklatanter, die Operationen behindernder Man- gel) für Wahnsinn hielten. Nach wie vor blickte Hitler mit Geringschät- zung auf die amerikanischen Soldaten, die er gegenüber den eigenen Truppen für minderwertig hielt. So ließ er die Operation »Wacht am Rhein« planen und vorbereiten, die letzte große Offensive Hitlers, ge- richtet gegen die Truppen seines Todfeindes Roosevelt. Die Vorberei- tungen vollzogen sich unter einer diesmal erfolgreichen Geheimhal- tung und begünstigt durch die Unterschätzung der deutschen Möglichkeiten durch die U.S. Army – und einer Überschätzung des Wertes der Ardennen als natürlichem Hindernis. Hitlers Plan sah vor, durch die waldreiche Region in Richtung Antwerpen vorzustoßen und damit die alliierte Front in zwei Teile zu schneiden. Eine erfolgreiche Einkesselung der First Army und der Ninth Army sowie der britischen Armee unter Montgomery würde, so Hitlers Kalkül, die feindliche Koa- lition zerbrechen lassen. General Alfred Jodl erklärte im Namen des Führers den zweifelnden Generälen, dass ein Erfolg die Westmächte verhandlungsbereit machen würde – eine Einschätzung, die Roosevelts Entschlossenheit verkennt, den Krieg bis zur Vernichtung der Nazi-Dik- tatur fortzusetzen. Essentiell für das Gelingen der inzwischen von »Wacht .
Recommended publications
  • Order of Battle, Mid-September 1940 Army Group a Commander-In-Chief
    Operation “Seelöwe” (Sea Lion) Order of Battle, mid-September 1940 Army Group A Commander-in-Chief: Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt Chief of the General Staff: General der Infanterie Georg von Sodenstern Operations Officer (Ia): Oberst Günther Blumentritt 16th Army Commander-in-Chief: Generaloberst Ernst Busch Chief of the General Staff: Generalleutnant Walter Model Operations Officer (Ia): Oberst Hans Boeckh-Behrens Luftwaffe Commander (Koluft) 16th Army: Oberst Dr. med. dent. Walter Gnamm Division Command z.b.V. 454: Charakter als Generalleutnant Rudolf Krantz (This staff served as the 16th Army’s Heimatstab or Home Staff Unit, which managed the assembly and loading of all troops, equipment and supplies; provided command and logistical support for all forces still on the Continent; and the reception and further transport of wounded and prisoners of war as well as damaged equipment. General der Infanterie Albrecht Schubert’s XXIII Army Corps served as the 16th Army’s Befehlsstelle Festland or Mainland Command, which reported to the staff of Generalleutnant Krantz. The corps maintained traffic control units and loading staffs at Calais, Dunkirk, Ostend, Antwerp and Rotterdam.) FIRST WAVE XIII Army Corps: General der Panzertruppe Heinric h-Gottfried von Vietinghoff genannt Scheel (First-wave landings on English coast between Folkestone and New Romney) – Luftwaffe II./Flak-Regiment 14 attached to corps • 17th Infantry Division: Generalleutnant Herbert Loch • 35th Infantry Division: Generalleutnant Hans Wolfgang Reinhard VII Army
    [Show full text]
  • Airpower in the Battle of the Bulge: a Case for Effects-‐‑Based Operations?
    Journal of Military and Strategic VOLUME 14, ISSUE 1, FALL 2011 Studies Airpower in the Battle of the Bulge: A Case for Effects-Based Operations? Harold R. Winton ȱ ȱ dzȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ throughout are those of a campaign on land in which the primary problem at the time is the defeat of an enemy army in the field.1 J.C. Slessor, 1936 ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ work, Air Power and Armies, the published version of lectures he presented to his army brethren at the Staff College, Camberley in the mid-ŗşřŖǯȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ǰȱ ȱ paper is focused historically on an air effort to defeat an enemy army, or in this case an army groupȯField Marshal ȱȂȱ¢ȱ ȱǰȱȱȱȱ to which Adolf Hitler entrusted his last, desperate gamble to win World War IIȯa campaign that became known in history as the Battle of the Bulge. But in keeping with ȱ ȱ ȱ ȃ ȱ ǰȄȱ t will relate the course and consequences of that campaign to an ongoing doctrinal debate in the American armed forces over a concept known as Effects-Based Operations, or EBO. The issue on the table is to determine the 1 J.C. Slessor, Air Power and Armies (London: Oxford University Press, 1936), p. xi. ©Centre of Military and Strategic Studies, 2011 ISSN : 1488-559X JOURNAL OF MILITARY AND STRATEGIC STUDIES extent to which the evidence of using airpower in the Bulge confirms, qualifies, or refutes the tenets of EBO. While this question may seem somewhat arcane, it is not without consequence.
    [Show full text]
  • Fighting Patton Photographs
    Fighting Patton Photographs [A]Mexican Punitive Expedition pershing-villa-obregon.tif: Patton’s first mortal enemy was the commander of Francisco “Pancho” Villa’s bodyguard during the Mexican Punitive Expedition. Left to right: General Álvaro Obregón, Villa, Brig. Gen. John Pershing, Capt. George Patton. [A]World War I Patton_France_1918.tif: Col. George Patton with one of his 1st Tank Brigade FT17s in France in 1918. Diepenbroick-Grüter_Otto Eitel_Friedrich.tif: Prince Freiherr von.tif: Otto Freiherr Friedrich Eitel commanded the von Diepenbroick-Grüter, 1st Guards Division in the pictured as a cadet in 1872, Argonnes. commanded the 10th Infantry Division at St. Mihiel. Gallwitz_Max von.tif: General Wilhelm_Crown Prince.tif: Crown der Artillerie Max von Prince Wilhelm commanded the Gallwitz’s army group defended region opposite the Americans. the St. Mihiel salient. [A]Morocco and Vichy France Patton_Hewitt.tif: Patton and Rear Admiral Henry Kent Hewitt, commanding Western Naval Task Force, aboard the Augusta before invading Vichy-controlled Morocco in Operation Torch. NoguesLascroux: Arriving at Fedala to negotiate an armistice at 1400 on 11 November 1942, Gen. Charles Noguès (left) is met by Col. Hobart Gay. Major General Auguste Lahoulle, Commander of French Air Forces in Morocco, is on the right. Major General Georges Lascroux, Commander in Chief of Moroccan troops, carries a briefcase. Noguès_Charles.tif: Charles Petit_Jean.tif: Jean Petit, Noguès, was Vichy commander- commanded the garrison at in-chief in Morocco. Port Lyautey. (Courtesy of Stéphane Petit) [A]The Axis Powers Patton_Monty.tif: Patton and his rival Gen. Bernard Montgomery greet each other on Sicily in July 1943. The two fought the Axis powers in Tunisia, Sicily, and the European theater.
    [Show full text]
  • Operation Overlord James Clinton Emmert Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College
    Louisiana State University LSU Digital Commons LSU Master's Theses Graduate School 2002 Operation overlord James Clinton Emmert Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_theses Part of the Arts and Humanities Commons Recommended Citation Emmert, James Clinton, "Operation overlord" (2002). LSU Master's Theses. 619. https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_theses/619 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Master's Theses by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. OPERATION OVERLORD A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Liberal Arts in The Interdepartmental Program in Liberal Arts by James Clinton Emmert B.A., Louisiana State University, 1996 May 2002 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This thesis could not have been completed without the support of numerous persons. First, I would never have been able to finish if I had not had the help and support of my wife, Esther, who not only encouraged me and proofed my work, but also took care of our newborn twins alone while I wrote. In addition, I would like to thank Dr. Stanley Hilton, who spent time helping me refine my thoughts about the invasion and whose editing skills helped give life to this paper. Finally, I would like to thank the faculty of Louisiana State University for their guidance and the knowledge that they shared with me.
    [Show full text]
  • A War of Reputation and Pride
    A War of reputation and pride - An examination of the memoirs of German generals after the Second World War. HIS 4090 Peter Jørgen Sager Fosse Department of Archaeology, Conservation and History University of Oslo Spring 2019 1 “For the great enemy of truth is very often not the lie -- deliberate, contrived and dishonest -- but the myth -- persistent, persuasive, and unrealistic.” – John F. Kennedy, 19621 1John F. Kennedy, Yale University Commencement Address, https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/jfkyalecommencement.htm, [01.05.2019]. 2 Acknowledgments This master would not have been written without the help and support of my mother, father, friends and my better half, thank you all for your support. I would like to thank the University Library of Oslo and the British Library in London for providing me with abundant books and articles. I also want to give huge thanks to the Military Archive in Freiburg and their employees, who helped me find the relevant materials for this master. Finally, I would like to thank my supervisor at the University of Oslo, Professor Kim Christian Priemel, who has guided me through the entire writing process from Autumn 2017. Peter Jørgen Sager Fosse, Oslo, 01.05.2019 3 Contents: Introduction………………………………………………………………………...………... 7 Chapter 1, Theory and background………………………………………………..………17 1.1 German Military Tactics…………………………………………………..………. 17 1.1.1 Blitzkrieg, Kesselschlacht and Schwerpunkt…………………………………..……. 17 1.1.2 Examples from early campaigns……………………………………………..……… 20 1.2 The German attack on the USSR (1941)……………………………..…………… 24 1.2.1 ‘Vernichtungskrieg’, war of annihilation………………………………...………….. 24 1.2.2 Operation Barbarossa………………………………………………..……………… 28 1.2.3 Operation Typhoon…………………………………………………..………………. 35 1.2.4 The strategic situation, December 1941…………………………….……………….
    [Show full text]
  • Field-Marshal Albert Kesselring in Context
    Field-Marshal Albert Kesselring in Context Andrew Sangster Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctorate of Philosophy University of East Anglia History School August 2014 Word Count: 99,919 © This copy of the thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is understood to recognise that its copyright rests with the author and that use of any information derived there from must be in accordance with current UK Copyright Law. In addition, any quotation or abstract must include full attribution. Abstract This thesis explores the life and context of Kesselring the last living German Field Marshal. It examines his background, military experience during the Great War, his involvement in the Freikorps, in order to understand what moulded his attitudes. Kesselring's role in the clandestine re-organisation of the German war machine is studied; his role in the development of the Blitzkrieg; the growth of the Luftwaffe is looked at along with his command of Air Fleets from Poland to Barbarossa. His appointment to Southern Command is explored indicating his limited authority. His command in North Africa and Italy is examined to ascertain whether he deserved the accolade of being one of the finest defence generals of the war; the thesis suggests that the Allies found this an expedient description of him which in turn masked their own inadequacies. During the final months on the Western Front, the thesis asks why he fought so ruthlessly to the bitter end. His imprisonment and trial are examined from the legal and historical/political point of view, and the contentions which arose regarding his early release.
    [Show full text]
  • Heeresgruppe B (Army Group B)
    RECORDS OF GERMAN FIELD COMMANDS, ARMY GROUPS (PART II) Heeresgruppe B (Army Group B) Army Group B was formed from the prior Army Group North on October 5, 1939, and was placed in the West until September 1940 when it was moved, after a short stay in Germany, to the German-Soviet border area in occupied Poland. On April 1, 194-1, it was renamed Army Group Center. Army Group South was designated Army Group B in July 194-2 and controlled the armies advancing in the region between Stalingrad and Kursk. Disbanded in February 194-3 it was re-formed in May 194-3 as OKW-Auffrischungs- stab Rommel. In July 194-3 it was reorganized as Army Group B and was located in south Germany, the Balkans, north Italy, and France. The Army Group was charged with control of anti-invasion forces along the Channel coast and was commanded by Gen, Erwin Rommel until July 1944-• Field Marshal Guenter von Kluge took it over for a short time and from August 18, 1944, until the capitulation it was under Field Marshal Walter Model. Army Group B took part in operations in France and controlled the Ardennes counteroffensive,* Item Item No. Roll 1st Frame Ic, Anlage zum T'atigkeitsbericht. Reports relating to the political and military situation in Italy, Italy's capitulation, and disarmament of Italian units; also includes German military communiques. Jul 30 - Nov 14-, 194-3• 49354 276 Ic, Meldungen. Daily activity reports covering Allied progress in France. Jul 1 - Dec 31, 1944. 65881/1-2 276 195 Ic, Meldungen.
    [Show full text]
  • Adams on Hürter, 'Hitlers Heerführer: Die Deutschen Oberbefehlshaber Im Krieg Gegen Die Sowjetunion 1941/42'
    H-German Adams on Hürter, 'Hitlers Heerführer: Die deutschen Oberbefehlshaber im Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion 1941/42' Review published on Thursday, November 1, 2007 Johannes Hürter. Hitlers Heerführer: Die deutschen Oberbefehlshaber im Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion 1941/42. München: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 2006. 719 Seiten. EUR 49.80 (cloth), ISBN 978-3-486-57982-6. Reviewed by Bianka Adams (Defense Threat Reduction Agency)Published on H-German (November, 2007) They Were Hitler's Generals They were his contemporaries, shared his anti-communism and--even if not to the same degree-- his antisemitism.[1] They experienced Germany's surrender in World War I and the turmoil that gripped the country in its aftermath as traumatic, life-altering events that shattered their world. They were the twenty-five generals who led the Wehrmacht in Adolf Hitler's war of annihilation against the Soviet Union. After the end of World War II, when military tribunals tried them as suspected war criminals, they defended their actions by shifting the blame for the killings of millions of Soviet Russian prisoners of war, civilians, and Jews to the dictator. Later, they perpetuated the myth of their own powerlessness in the face of Nazi terror with the (unwitting) help of the U.S. Army's Historical Division's Foreign Military Studies, which employed them to write about the German war effort on all fronts--especially in the East. The challenge for an author of another book about this group of much- studied and -publicized generals--among them famous names such as Heinz Guderian, Erich von Manstein, Fedor von Bock, Günther von Kluge, Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb, Walter Model, and Friedrich Paulus--is to offer a fresh perspective and to present new research to contribute to a better understanding of their motives.
    [Show full text]
  • The German Military Mission to Romania, 1940-1941 by Richard L. Dinardo
    The German Military Mission to Romania, 1940–1941 By RICHARD L. Di NARDO hen one thinks of security assistance and the train- ing of foreign troops, W Adolf Hitler’s Germany is not a country that typically comes to mind. Yet there were two instances in World War II when Germany did indeed deploy troops to other countries that were in noncombat cir- cumstances. The countries in question were Finland and Romania, and the German mili- tary mission to Romania is the subject of this article. The activities of the German mission to Romania are discussed and analyzed, and some conclusions and hopefully a few take- aways are offered that could be relevant for military professionals today. Creation of the Mission The matter of how the German military mission to Romania came into being can be covered relatively quickly. In late June 1940, the Soviet Union demanded from Romania the cession of both Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. The only advice Germany could give to the Romanian government was to agree to surrender the territory.1 Fearful of further Soviet encroachments, the Roma- nian government made a series of pleas to Germany including a personal appeal from Wikimedia Commons King Carol II to Hitler for German military assistance in the summer of 1940. Hitler, Finnish Volunteer Battalion of German Waffen-SS return home from front in 1943 however, was not yet willing to undertake such a step. Thus, all Romanian requests were rebuffed with Hitler telling Carol that Romania brought its own problems upon itself by its prior pro-Allied policy.
    [Show full text]
  • Island Farm Camp
    UNITED KINGDOM On the A48. just outside the town of Bridgend, in South Wales, the traveller may note a group of battered and overgrown huts, the access to which is barred by a hedge and two twisted gate posts with a length of rusty chain strung between them. No indica­ ISLAND FARM CAMP tion is present from the road as to the ment for crops, but the subsoil is yellow- historical significance of the place, which is orange clay, a detail of some importance as By Jeff Vincent known as Island Farm. Indeed, apart from we shall see. The terrain is slowly undulat­ some of the local community, few people ing, gently rising from the north side, the floor. Some buildings, of special use, do not appreciate that Island Farm Prisoner-of-War side of the A48 and the camp entrance, conform to this pattern. Amongst these are Camp saw one of the biggest escape attempts towards the sea (which is only three miles the Motor Transport (MT) shed, the cook­ of the Second World War by German prison­ away). house, laundry, HQ block, and two wooden ers and was the home for two years to most The layout of the camp is fairly typical of structures at opposite ends of the camp, one of Hitler’s senior officers. It still stands its time. The accommodation huts were built used as a coffee shop and the other as a tailor virtually untouched. in prefabricated materials; they represent and barber’s shop. On the higher side of the The camp was built of prefabricated huts ‘wings’ of the central ablution block which camp a larger than average hut was built, on rich agricultural land in one of the prime was built of red brick.
    [Show full text]
  • The Wehrmacht Retreats: Fighting a Lost War, 1943
    31 July 1012 2012012222––––043043 Robert M. Citino, The Wehrmacht Retreats: Fighting a Lost War, 1943. Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 2012. Pp. 428. ISBN 978978––––0000––––700670067006––––182618261826––––2.2.2.2. Review bybyby Jeff Rutherford, Wheeling Jesuit University ((([email protected]([email protected]@wju.edu)))).... In The Wehrmacht Retreats , Robert Citino (Univ. of North Texas) continues his campaign to rescue the his- tory of operational warfare from the dark shadows of academia. He has published extensively in the subject area for both scholarly and, increasingly, popular audiences. 1 More specifically, he has focused on the Ger- man approach to warfare. While the present volume may stand on its own, it would most profitably be read in conjunction with two of his previous studies—The German Way of War and Death of the Wehrmacht (see note 1). In this trilogy, Citino examines the use—both successful and unsuccessful—of Bewegungskrieg (war of movement) in various wars fought by the Prussian/German state. As the title here suggests, Citino is primarily interested in “how … a military establishment historically configured for Bewegungskrieg—violent aggression, relentless assault, and mobile offensive operations—react[ed] when it suddenly and unexpect- edly [found] itself thrown on the defensive” (xxviii) after Germany lost the initiative in World War II. Citino concentrates on the Western Allies’ invasions of North Africa and Italy and the challenges faced by the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front at Kharkov and Kursk to “describe the mentalités of the German military caste in a period when the fortunes of war had definitely turned against the Wehrmacht” (xxiv).
    [Show full text]
  • Airpower in the Battle of the Bulge: a Case for Effects-Based Operations?
    Journal of Military and Strategic VOLUME 14, ISSUE 1, FALL 2011 Studies Airpower in the Battle of the Bulge: A Case for Effects-Based Operations? Harold R. Winton It should …be clearly understood that the conditions envisioned throughout are those of a campaign on land in which the primary problem at the time is the defeat of an enemy army in the field.1 J.C. Slessor, 1936 These words were penned in the introduction to Wing Commander Slessor’s work, Air Power and Armies, the published version of lectures he presented to his army brethren at the Staff College, Camberley in the mid-1930s. Like Slessor’s work, this paper is focused historically on an air effort to defeat an enemy army, or in this case an army group—Field Marshal Walter Model’s Army Group B, the operational formation to which Adolf Hitler entrusted his last, desperate gamble to win World War II—a campaign that became known in history as the Battle of the Bulge. But in keeping with the theme of “New Perspectives,” it will relate the course and consequences of that campaign to an ongoing doctrinal debate in the American armed forces over a concept known as Effects-Based Operations, or EBO. The issue on the table is to determine the 1 J.C. Slessor, Air Power and Armies (London: Oxford University Press, 1936), p. xi. ©Centre of Military and Strategic Studies, 2011 ISSN : 1488-559X JOURNAL OF MILITARY AND STRATEGIC STUDIES extent to which the evidence of using airpower in the Bulge confirms, qualifies, or refutes the tenets of EBO.
    [Show full text]