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Order of Battle, Mid-September 1940 Army Group a Commander-In-Chief
Operation “Seelöwe” (Sea Lion) Order of Battle, mid-September 1940 Army Group A Commander-in-Chief: Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt Chief of the General Staff: General der Infanterie Georg von Sodenstern Operations Officer (Ia): Oberst Günther Blumentritt 16th Army Commander-in-Chief: Generaloberst Ernst Busch Chief of the General Staff: Generalleutnant Walter Model Operations Officer (Ia): Oberst Hans Boeckh-Behrens Luftwaffe Commander (Koluft) 16th Army: Oberst Dr. med. dent. Walter Gnamm Division Command z.b.V. 454: Charakter als Generalleutnant Rudolf Krantz (This staff served as the 16th Army’s Heimatstab or Home Staff Unit, which managed the assembly and loading of all troops, equipment and supplies; provided command and logistical support for all forces still on the Continent; and the reception and further transport of wounded and prisoners of war as well as damaged equipment. General der Infanterie Albrecht Schubert’s XXIII Army Corps served as the 16th Army’s Befehlsstelle Festland or Mainland Command, which reported to the staff of Generalleutnant Krantz. The corps maintained traffic control units and loading staffs at Calais, Dunkirk, Ostend, Antwerp and Rotterdam.) FIRST WAVE XIII Army Corps: General der Panzertruppe Heinric h-Gottfried von Vietinghoff genannt Scheel (First-wave landings on English coast between Folkestone and New Romney) – Luftwaffe II./Flak-Regiment 14 attached to corps • 17th Infantry Division: Generalleutnant Herbert Loch • 35th Infantry Division: Generalleutnant Hans Wolfgang Reinhard VII Army -
Airpower in the Battle of the Bulge: a Case for Effects-‐‑Based Operations?
Journal of Military and Strategic VOLUME 14, ISSUE 1, FALL 2011 Studies Airpower in the Battle of the Bulge: A Case for Effects-Based Operations? Harold R. Winton ȱ ȱ dzȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ throughout are those of a campaign on land in which the primary problem at the time is the defeat of an enemy army in the field.1 J.C. Slessor, 1936 ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ work, Air Power and Armies, the published version of lectures he presented to his army brethren at the Staff College, Camberley in the mid-ŗşřŖǯȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ǰȱ ȱ paper is focused historically on an air effort to defeat an enemy army, or in this case an army groupȯField Marshal ȱȂȱ¢ȱ ȱǰȱȱȱȱ to which Adolf Hitler entrusted his last, desperate gamble to win World War IIȯa campaign that became known in history as the Battle of the Bulge. But in keeping with ȱ ȱ ȱ ȃ ȱ ǰȄȱ t will relate the course and consequences of that campaign to an ongoing doctrinal debate in the American armed forces over a concept known as Effects-Based Operations, or EBO. The issue on the table is to determine the 1 J.C. Slessor, Air Power and Armies (London: Oxford University Press, 1936), p. xi. ©Centre of Military and Strategic Studies, 2011 ISSN : 1488-559X JOURNAL OF MILITARY AND STRATEGIC STUDIES extent to which the evidence of using airpower in the Bulge confirms, qualifies, or refutes the tenets of EBO. While this question may seem somewhat arcane, it is not without consequence. -
Fighting Patton Photographs
Fighting Patton Photographs [A]Mexican Punitive Expedition pershing-villa-obregon.tif: Patton’s first mortal enemy was the commander of Francisco “Pancho” Villa’s bodyguard during the Mexican Punitive Expedition. Left to right: General Álvaro Obregón, Villa, Brig. Gen. John Pershing, Capt. George Patton. [A]World War I Patton_France_1918.tif: Col. George Patton with one of his 1st Tank Brigade FT17s in France in 1918. Diepenbroick-Grüter_Otto Eitel_Friedrich.tif: Prince Freiherr von.tif: Otto Freiherr Friedrich Eitel commanded the von Diepenbroick-Grüter, 1st Guards Division in the pictured as a cadet in 1872, Argonnes. commanded the 10th Infantry Division at St. Mihiel. Gallwitz_Max von.tif: General Wilhelm_Crown Prince.tif: Crown der Artillerie Max von Prince Wilhelm commanded the Gallwitz’s army group defended region opposite the Americans. the St. Mihiel salient. [A]Morocco and Vichy France Patton_Hewitt.tif: Patton and Rear Admiral Henry Kent Hewitt, commanding Western Naval Task Force, aboard the Augusta before invading Vichy-controlled Morocco in Operation Torch. NoguesLascroux: Arriving at Fedala to negotiate an armistice at 1400 on 11 November 1942, Gen. Charles Noguès (left) is met by Col. Hobart Gay. Major General Auguste Lahoulle, Commander of French Air Forces in Morocco, is on the right. Major General Georges Lascroux, Commander in Chief of Moroccan troops, carries a briefcase. Noguès_Charles.tif: Charles Petit_Jean.tif: Jean Petit, Noguès, was Vichy commander- commanded the garrison at in-chief in Morocco. Port Lyautey. (Courtesy of Stéphane Petit) [A]The Axis Powers Patton_Monty.tif: Patton and his rival Gen. Bernard Montgomery greet each other on Sicily in July 1943. The two fought the Axis powers in Tunisia, Sicily, and the European theater. -
A War of Reputation and Pride
A War of reputation and pride - An examination of the memoirs of German generals after the Second World War. HIS 4090 Peter Jørgen Sager Fosse Department of Archaeology, Conservation and History University of Oslo Spring 2019 1 “For the great enemy of truth is very often not the lie -- deliberate, contrived and dishonest -- but the myth -- persistent, persuasive, and unrealistic.” – John F. Kennedy, 19621 1John F. Kennedy, Yale University Commencement Address, https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/jfkyalecommencement.htm, [01.05.2019]. 2 Acknowledgments This master would not have been written without the help and support of my mother, father, friends and my better half, thank you all for your support. I would like to thank the University Library of Oslo and the British Library in London for providing me with abundant books and articles. I also want to give huge thanks to the Military Archive in Freiburg and their employees, who helped me find the relevant materials for this master. Finally, I would like to thank my supervisor at the University of Oslo, Professor Kim Christian Priemel, who has guided me through the entire writing process from Autumn 2017. Peter Jørgen Sager Fosse, Oslo, 01.05.2019 3 Contents: Introduction………………………………………………………………………...………... 7 Chapter 1, Theory and background………………………………………………..………17 1.1 German Military Tactics…………………………………………………..………. 17 1.1.1 Blitzkrieg, Kesselschlacht and Schwerpunkt…………………………………..……. 17 1.1.2 Examples from early campaigns……………………………………………..……… 20 1.2 The German attack on the USSR (1941)……………………………..…………… 24 1.2.1 ‘Vernichtungskrieg’, war of annihilation………………………………...………….. 24 1.2.2 Operation Barbarossa………………………………………………..……………… 28 1.2.3 Operation Typhoon…………………………………………………..………………. 35 1.2.4 The strategic situation, December 1941…………………………….………………. -
Heeresgruppe B (Army Group B)
RECORDS OF GERMAN FIELD COMMANDS, ARMY GROUPS (PART II) Heeresgruppe B (Army Group B) Army Group B was formed from the prior Army Group North on October 5, 1939, and was placed in the West until September 1940 when it was moved, after a short stay in Germany, to the German-Soviet border area in occupied Poland. On April 1, 194-1, it was renamed Army Group Center. Army Group South was designated Army Group B in July 194-2 and controlled the armies advancing in the region between Stalingrad and Kursk. Disbanded in February 194-3 it was re-formed in May 194-3 as OKW-Auffrischungs- stab Rommel. In July 194-3 it was reorganized as Army Group B and was located in south Germany, the Balkans, north Italy, and France. The Army Group was charged with control of anti-invasion forces along the Channel coast and was commanded by Gen, Erwin Rommel until July 1944-• Field Marshal Guenter von Kluge took it over for a short time and from August 18, 1944, until the capitulation it was under Field Marshal Walter Model. Army Group B took part in operations in France and controlled the Ardennes counteroffensive,* Item Item No. Roll 1st Frame Ic, Anlage zum T'atigkeitsbericht. Reports relating to the political and military situation in Italy, Italy's capitulation, and disarmament of Italian units; also includes German military communiques. Jul 30 - Nov 14-, 194-3• 49354 276 Ic, Meldungen. Daily activity reports covering Allied progress in France. Jul 1 - Dec 31, 1944. 65881/1-2 276 195 Ic, Meldungen. -
German Zepplin and Air Attacks, 1917
German Zepplin and Air Attacks 1916 Date Month/Day Target Attacking Units 1/17 Dünaburg Fliegerabtielung 4 1/22 Kischinev LZ 97 1/30 Petersburg LZ 98 2/16 Boulogne LZ 107 2/25 Tassi (Rumania) LZ 101 2/27 Dundular (Macedonia) Kampfgeschwader 1 3/1 Dundular (Macedonia) Kampfgeschwader 1 3/12 Vertekop (Salonika Kampfgeschwader 1 Railroad Station) 3/20 Monastir Kampfgeschwader 1 (Macedonia) 3/20 Murdos LZ 101 (Macedonia) 3/30 Monastir Kampfgeschwader 1 (Macedonia) 3/31 Brod (Macedonia) Kampfgeschwader 1 4/1 Etsisu & Soroviceva Kampfgeschwader 1 (Macedonia) 4/3 Vertekop RR Station Kampfgeschwader 1 (Macedonia) 4/4 Tecuciu (Rumania) Fliegerabtielung 36, 41 & 42 4/5 Karasuli (Rumania) Kampfgeschwader 1 4/8 Janes (Macedonia) Kampfgeschwader 1 4/10 Leikovo (Macedonia) Kampfgeschwader 1 4/22-23 Between Vardar & Kampfgeschwader 1 Dorian Sea (Macedonia) 4/24 Dobroveni Kampfgeschwader 1 (Macedonia) 4/24 Murdos (Macedonia) LZ 101 4/25 Valona (Macedonia) LZ 97 4/25 Kalinova (Macedonia) Kampfgeschwader 1 4/28 Kilindir (Macedonia) Kampfgeschwader 1 4/29 Skocivir (Macedonia) Kampfgeschwader 1 4/30 Bodena (Macedonia) Kampfgeschwader 1 5/7 Tecuciu & Ciuslea Fliegerabtielung 41 & 42 (Rumania) 6/18 Dünaburg Fliegerabtielung 4 7/7 London Kampfgeschwader 3 7/13 London (?) Kampfgeschwader 3 7/22 Harwick Kampfgeschwader 3 7/27 Paris Kampfgeschwader 4 7/28 Paris Kampfgeschwader 4 7/29 Paris Kampfgeschwader 4 8/12 Southend & Margate Kampfgeschwader 3 8/18 English Coast Kampfgeschwader 3 1 8/22 Ramsgate, Margate & Kampfgeschwader 3 Dover 8/23 Dunkirk & St. Omer Kampfgeschwader -
Heinkel He 111: the Spade
© 2008 Magnus Kimura [email protected] Heinkel He 111: The Spade The German Heinkel He 111 Twin-Engine Bomber variant for B-17: Queen of the Skies by MAGNUS KIMURA PLAY TEST VERSION 3-4 22 MAY 2008 25 JULY 2008 25 SEPTEMBER 2010 11 SEPTEMBER 2011 21 NOVEMBER 2012 B-17: Queen of the Skies needed to play Heineken He 111: The Spade CONTENTS He 111 Starting Model ……………………….………….……p. 2 ___Tour of Duty ___Starting Model, Replacement Model ___ He 111P-1 ~ H-3 ___ Explanation of the Crew Positions Your First Assignment ………………………..………….……p. 3 ___Kampfgeschwader 1, 4, 27, 53, 55 Intelligence about the Geschwader and Luftwaffe Ranks ….…p. 4 The First Mission ………………………………………………p. 7 ___Staffelkeil formation ___Take-Off, To and from the Target ___Gazetteer and RAF Defense Areas ___Table B-1, B-2 and B-3 ___Mechanical Failures ___In the Target Zone B-17 Tables in He 111 ….……………………………………….p. 14 Barrage Balloons ……………………………………………….p. 15 He 111 Cable Cutters ……………….….………………………p. 16 Evasive Action …………………………….…………………….p. 17 Night Missions …………………………..………………………p. 18 Low-Level Missions ……………………..………………………p. 23 Mining Missions ………………………..….……………………..p. 24 Reconnaissance Missions ……….………………………………..p. 24 Burst Inside Plane ………………………………………………..p. 25 Flying on One Engine ………..………..…………………………..P. 25 Out of Formation ………………..…..……………………………p. 25 Passing Shots Exchange …………………………………………..p. 25 Oxygen ……………………………………………………………..p. 26 Greenhouse Plexiglas ………………………………..……………p. 27 Dive Bombing ……………………………..………………………p. 27 Fighter Types ………………………………………….………….p. 27 ___Defiant ………..………….p. 27 ___Gladiator ………………….p. 28 ___Fulmar ……………………p. 28 ___Hurricane …………………p.29 ___Spitfire ……………………p. 30 ___Blenheim …………………p. 31 ___ New Weapon in He 111 …p. 31 ___Beaufighter ………………p. 32 Special Squadrons …………………………………………….p. 33 ___19 Squadron * 1st Spitfire Squadron * Will use Spitfire MK 1b ___303 Squadron * Polish Squadron * Fierce Fighters ___401 Squadron * Canadian Squadron * Green Squadron 1 He 111 Starting Model You will begin your campaign with a He 111 P-1. -
Involvement of Partner City Wrocław/Oleśnica World War II
Involvement of partner city Wrocław/Oleśnica World War II Author: Piotr Michałowski 20.02.2016 Poland, the liberated state as created in 1918 after the end of the WWI, was dreamed of for many years. When it appeared, the happiness didn’t last for a long time. Poland was in that time deeply into inside conflicts and when building the governing system it was romantic to think that in an environment of growing powers, like the Third Reich or Soviet Russia, the country would be left untouched. The German philosopher Edmund Husserl would say that Poland was deep in the Lifeworld (Lebenswelt) -sometimes defined as a bubble- that it is hard to put on an equal rule with the others. In his ‘Crisis of the European Science and Transcendental Phenomenology’ (published in 1936) he wrote: “In whatever way we may be conscious of the world as a universal horizon, as a coherent universe of existing objects, we -each “I-the-man” and all of us together- belong to the world as though living with one another in the world; and the world is the world, valid for our consciousness as existing precisely through this ‘living together’”1. World War II started on the 1st of September, 1939 with an attack on the Polish harbour in Gdańsk in the west and with the bombing of the city of Wieluń in central Poland. The country was invaded by Nazi Germany from the West and on the 17 th of September from the East by Soviet Russia. The second date, after The War ended, would be forbidden to mention due to Soviet propaganda. -
Adams on Hürter, 'Hitlers Heerführer: Die Deutschen Oberbefehlshaber Im Krieg Gegen Die Sowjetunion 1941/42'
H-German Adams on Hürter, 'Hitlers Heerführer: Die deutschen Oberbefehlshaber im Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion 1941/42' Review published on Thursday, November 1, 2007 Johannes Hürter. Hitlers Heerführer: Die deutschen Oberbefehlshaber im Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion 1941/42. München: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 2006. 719 Seiten. EUR 49.80 (cloth), ISBN 978-3-486-57982-6. Reviewed by Bianka Adams (Defense Threat Reduction Agency)Published on H-German (November, 2007) They Were Hitler's Generals They were his contemporaries, shared his anti-communism and--even if not to the same degree-- his antisemitism.[1] They experienced Germany's surrender in World War I and the turmoil that gripped the country in its aftermath as traumatic, life-altering events that shattered their world. They were the twenty-five generals who led the Wehrmacht in Adolf Hitler's war of annihilation against the Soviet Union. After the end of World War II, when military tribunals tried them as suspected war criminals, they defended their actions by shifting the blame for the killings of millions of Soviet Russian prisoners of war, civilians, and Jews to the dictator. Later, they perpetuated the myth of their own powerlessness in the face of Nazi terror with the (unwitting) help of the U.S. Army's Historical Division's Foreign Military Studies, which employed them to write about the German war effort on all fronts--especially in the East. The challenge for an author of another book about this group of much- studied and -publicized generals--among them famous names such as Heinz Guderian, Erich von Manstein, Fedor von Bock, Günther von Kluge, Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb, Walter Model, and Friedrich Paulus--is to offer a fresh perspective and to present new research to contribute to a better understanding of their motives. -
The Wehrmacht Retreats: Fighting a Lost War, 1943
31 July 1012 2012012222––––043043 Robert M. Citino, The Wehrmacht Retreats: Fighting a Lost War, 1943. Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 2012. Pp. 428. ISBN 978978––––0000––––700670067006––––182618261826––––2.2.2.2. Review bybyby Jeff Rutherford, Wheeling Jesuit University ((([email protected]([email protected]@wju.edu)))).... In The Wehrmacht Retreats , Robert Citino (Univ. of North Texas) continues his campaign to rescue the his- tory of operational warfare from the dark shadows of academia. He has published extensively in the subject area for both scholarly and, increasingly, popular audiences. 1 More specifically, he has focused on the Ger- man approach to warfare. While the present volume may stand on its own, it would most profitably be read in conjunction with two of his previous studies—The German Way of War and Death of the Wehrmacht (see note 1). In this trilogy, Citino examines the use—both successful and unsuccessful—of Bewegungskrieg (war of movement) in various wars fought by the Prussian/German state. As the title here suggests, Citino is primarily interested in “how … a military establishment historically configured for Bewegungskrieg—violent aggression, relentless assault, and mobile offensive operations—react[ed] when it suddenly and unexpect- edly [found] itself thrown on the defensive” (xxviii) after Germany lost the initiative in World War II. Citino concentrates on the Western Allies’ invasions of North Africa and Italy and the challenges faced by the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front at Kharkov and Kursk to “describe the mentalités of the German military caste in a period when the fortunes of war had definitely turned against the Wehrmacht” (xxiv). -
Airpower in the Battle of the Bulge: a Case for Effects-Based Operations?
Journal of Military and Strategic VOLUME 14, ISSUE 1, FALL 2011 Studies Airpower in the Battle of the Bulge: A Case for Effects-Based Operations? Harold R. Winton It should …be clearly understood that the conditions envisioned throughout are those of a campaign on land in which the primary problem at the time is the defeat of an enemy army in the field.1 J.C. Slessor, 1936 These words were penned in the introduction to Wing Commander Slessor’s work, Air Power and Armies, the published version of lectures he presented to his army brethren at the Staff College, Camberley in the mid-1930s. Like Slessor’s work, this paper is focused historically on an air effort to defeat an enemy army, or in this case an army group—Field Marshal Walter Model’s Army Group B, the operational formation to which Adolf Hitler entrusted his last, desperate gamble to win World War II—a campaign that became known in history as the Battle of the Bulge. But in keeping with the theme of “New Perspectives,” it will relate the course and consequences of that campaign to an ongoing doctrinal debate in the American armed forces over a concept known as Effects-Based Operations, or EBO. The issue on the table is to determine the 1 J.C. Slessor, Air Power and Armies (London: Oxford University Press, 1936), p. xi. ©Centre of Military and Strategic Studies, 2011 ISSN : 1488-559X JOURNAL OF MILITARY AND STRATEGIC STUDIES extent to which the evidence of using airpower in the Bulge confirms, qualifies, or refutes the tenets of EBO. -
Kirchubel on Citino, 'The Wehrmacht's Last Stand: the German Campaigns of 1944-1945'
H-War Kirchubel on Citino, 'The Wehrmacht's Last Stand: The German Campaigns of 1944-1945' Review published on Saturday, May 5, 2018 Robert M. Citino. The Wehrmacht's Last Stand: The German Campaigns of 1944-1945. Modern War Studies Series. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2017. Illustrations, maps. 632 pp. $34.95 (cloth), ISBN 978-0-7006-2494-2. Reviewed by Robert Kirchubel (Purdue University)Published on H-War (May, 2018) Commissioned by Margaret Sankey (Air War College) Printable Version: http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showpdf.php?id=51318 Robert M. Citino, presently at the National WWII Museum, has again teamed up with the University Press of Kansas for his latest installment on modern German military history. The Wehrmacht’s Last Stand investigates Germany’s final battles against the Soviet Union and the Western Allies to its east, south, and west. As we have come to expect from Citino, the book is thoroughly researched, clearly narrated, and tightly argued. While Wehrmacht’s Last Stand synthesizes a great number of secondary materials—a review of its bibliography reveals only a couple pre-1945 German military journals that could be considered primary sources—it is full of new insights and thought-provoking interpretations of key events in late World War II.[1] Citino takes military historians to school by demonstrating how operational history should be written, at a time when elements of the academy consider that subdiscipline passé and of doubtful utility. The Wehrmacht had a good run during the first two years of the war, then a couple years of transition (notably against the USSR), but in Wehrmacht’s Last Stand it is reeling backward on every front.