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Nigeria Overview Nations ( // Africa ( Region=Africa) (/) Weapons (/weapons) Armed Forces (/armed-forces) Terrorist Organizations (/terrorist-organizations) News & Reports (/news-reports) Overview (/armedforces/africa/nigeria/overview) Air Force (/armedforces/africa/nigeria/air-force) Army (/armedforces/africa/nigeria/army) Navy (/armedforces/africa/nigeria/navy) Nigeria Overview Nations (https://www.militaryperiscope.com/armed-forces) // Africa (https://www.militaryperiscope.com/armed-forces? region=africa) Armed Forces Structure OVERVIEW Nigeria is one of the largest military powers in sub-Saharan Africa, bordered to the west by Benin, to the north by Niger, to the northeast by Chad, to the east by Cameroon and to the south by the Gulf of Guinea. After years of military rule, there is a civilian and Armed Forces Structure elected government in Nigeria. Since Paramilitary Forces independence, the Opposition Forces country's leadership has alternated between inept Deployment civilians and brutal military Budget dictators. Much of the country's oil wealth was Issues and Notes lost, and the gross Plans and Programs domestic product per capita took a major hit for at least two decades. Due to economic reforms beginning in 2000, Nigeria's non-oil markets have grown steadily. The country's GDP per capita rose significantly as well. However, violence remains a problem -- most recently with attacks on oil facilities and Islamic terrorism led by the Boko Haram group. The militant group, which seeks to establish an Islamic state in northern Nigeria, has thrown development into a tailspin. A top U.S. diplomat in August 2013 rightly noted that Boko Haram had increased tensions between largely Christian and Muslim communities and scared both investors and Nigeria's neighbors. The growing influence of Boko Haram, which has taken over large areas of the country's northeast, added suspense to the elections in mid-February 2015. The inefficacy of the military against the Islamist group was featured by retired general Muamammadu Buhari in his campaign against incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan. Buhari is a Muslim from the north; Jonathan is a Christian from the south. Buhari, a former military dictator (1983- 1985), was defeated by Jonathan in 2011. Buhari won the election in March 2015, pledging to fight Boko Haram and combat corruption throughout the government. After taking office, Buhari fired or investigated dozens of officials part of the Goodluck administration and ordered audits of key government agencies. In December 2015, former National Security Adviser Sambo Dasuki and four others were charged with 19 counts of money laundering and criminal breach of trust. Sambo was the first former official to be charged with graft; he was also accused of fraud involving US$68 million in defense spending. Vice President Yemi Osinbajo said in May 2016 that about US$15 billion had been lost under the previous government through fraudulent arms deals. Nigeria has stationed large peacekeeping forces in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Sudan. Many Nigerian peacekeepers were withdrawn from Sudan's Darfur region in 2013 to beef up security at home. Officials announced the withdrawal of its peacekeepers from Mali in 2014. By January 2015, Nigeria had also significantly reduced its forces in South Sudan. Nigeria has been caught up in territorial disputes with Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea over oil-rich areas. In 2006, Nigeria formally ceded control of the long-disputed Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon. The handover began in August 2008 and was declared completed in August 2013 after a transition period. Local militia still oppose being governed by Cameroon. In early January 2015, Nigerian energy company Taleveras agreed to build a major oil storage hub in Equatorial Guinea. Northern Clashes Northern Nigeria is predominately Muslim, while southerners are largely Christian or practice native religions. This has been a source of friction. Sharia law was implemented alongside the secular law in a dozen predominately Muslim northern states in 2000. In November of 2002, hundreds died in riots sparked by the publication of an article on the Miss World beauty pageant being held in Nigeria and a reference to Muhammad that some Muslims considered blasphemous. Police forces clashed in mid-2009 with an armed Islamic sect in northern Nigeria. The Boko Haram sect rebelled following the arrest of some of its members in July in Maiduguri. Hundreds of sect members were killed in the fighting, including sect leader Malam Mohammed Yusuf. Similar attacks resulted in numerous deaths over the course of 2011 and thereafter. In one incident, a suicide bombing attack on the U.N. headquarters in Abuja killed 23 people. Boko Haram claimed responsibility for that and multiple other bombing and gun assaults, including attacks on military barracks and Christian churches. Additional deaths resulted from retaliatory attacks by targeted Christian groups and security forces. Approximately 90,000 people were displaced by fighting between Nigerian forces and the Islamist sect in December 2011. Human-rights groups accused the military with illegal killings in its efforts against the group. In June 2011, the Nigerian government established a task force to combat Boko Haram. Plans called for the force to be 3,400-strong and based in Borno state -- the operating headquarters of the terrorist group. The group, however, grew stronger. One academic study put the number of deaths associated with fighting Boko Haram, in 2014 alone, at more than 8,300. For more on the terror group, see these special reports: "Boko Haram's Bloody Hands," (Feb. 27, 2012), "Boko Haram Adjusts Its Methods," (April 24, 2014) and "Boko Haram Keeps Gaining Ground" (Jan. 28, 2015.) On March 14, 2012, Boko Haram entered into peace talks with the Nigerian government via the Supreme Council for Sharia, the sect's chosen liaison. Conditions for a cease-fire included the release of all arrested Boko Haram members and safety and security for all group members. Five days later, negotiations broke down. Abu Muhammad, leader of a Boko Haram faction, died in custody in March 2012 as a result of injuries sustained during his arrest two days prior. Intelligence gained during that arrest reportedly led to a failed rescue mission of two European hostages in Zaria that involved British special operations forces. The hostages were killed before Nigerian troops entered the building where they were being held. In March 2012, the U.S. pledged assistance for development and security in Nigeria's north. The U.S. State Dept. said it would install a consulate in the northern state of Kano, the site of many of Boko Haram's attacks at the time. Talks between the Nigerian government and the militants broke down in late 2012 and 2013. In May 2013, President Goodluck Jonathan ordered a state of emergency in the northeastern states of Adamawa, Yobe and Borno. Boko Haram second-in-command Muhammed Bama (Momodu Bama) was killed by Nigerian troops in August 2013. Later in August, Nigerian military officials said they believed Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau had recently died of wounds sustained in a firefight on June 30, 2013. Intelligence indicated the Islamists had taken a wounded Shekau to Cameroon, where he died in late July or early August. The death of Shekau has been reported on multiple occasions. In January 2015, a man claiming to be Shekau appeared in a video claiming responsibility for recent attacks and taunting nearby nations. Boko Haram was widely condemned in April 2014 when its members kidnapped 276 female students from a school in Chibok. Various nations sent experts to help the Nigerian government find the girls. The help waned as the hostage situation showed no sight of progress. In August 2016, Boko Haram released a video purportedly showing some of the girls and demanded that they be exchanged for captured Boko Haram fighters. Most of the girls remained missing as of November 2016; many were believed to have been "married" to the Islamist fighters. Throughout early 2015, Boko Haram kept up its assaults against Nigerian towns and cities in the northwest. There were repeated clashes with security forces. For instance, as many as 3,700 homes were destroyed and as many as 2,000 people massacred in the town of Baga on Jan. 3, 2015. Boko Haram also captured military bases, giving the group access to heavy arms. By early 2015, Boko Haram had gained control of around 20 government districts in northeastern Nigeria, an area about the size of Belgium. Around the same time, the group made cross-border attacks in the Lake Chad region, including Chad and Niger. The neighbors began operating jointly against the g roup in Nigerian territory. The Nigerian government announced in March 2015 that it had pushed Boko Haram from all but three of the 20 districts that the terrorists held at the beginning of the year. In March 2015, Boko Haram pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. The pledged was quickly accepted by ISIS (https://www.militaryperiscope.com/weapons/aircraft/airshipsaerostats/integrated- sensor-structure-isis) . At least one faction of the group began referring to itself as the Islamic State's West Africa Province. By May 2015, Boko Haram fighters had largely been pushed back to areas around its stronghold in Sambisa Forest, about 37 miles southeast of Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state. U.S. Gen. David Rodriguez, the head of U.S. Africa Command, pointed out in November 2015 that Boko Haram had been losing territory of late, but still remained a significant threat to the civilian population in the region. The group was modifying its propaganda and tactics to match those of the Isla mic State, he said. Though hurt by the government offensive against them, Boko Haram continued attacks in northern Nigeria. A trademark has been its use of child suicide bombers. That tactic was employed repeatedly on market and mosque attacks in 2015 and 2016.
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