Dr. Modupe Oshikoya, Department of Political Science, Virginia Wesleyan University – Written Evidence (ZAF0056)

Dr. Modupe Oshikoya, Department of Political Science, Virginia Wesleyan University – Written evidence (ZAF0056)

1. What are the major security challenges facing Nigeria, and how effectively is the Nigerian government addressing them?

1.1 Boko Haram The insurgency group known globally as Boko Haram continues to wreak havoc in northeast Nigeria and the countries bordering Lake Chad – Cameroon, Chad and Niger. The sect refers to itself as Jamā'at Ahl as- Sunnah lid-Da'wah wa'l-Jihād [JAS], which in Arabic means ‘People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teaching and Jihad’, and rejects all Western beliefs. Their doctrine embraced the strict adherence to Islam through the establishment of sharia law across all of Nigeria, by directly attacking government and military targets.1 However, under their new leader, Abubakar Shekau, the group transformed in 2009 into a more radical Salafist Islamist group. They increased the number of violent and brutal incursions onto the civilian population, mosques, churches, and hospitals, using suicide bombers and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The most prominent attack occurred in a suicide car bomb at the UN headquarters in Abuja in August 2011.2 Through the use of guerrilla tactics, Boko Haram’s quest for a caliphate led them to capture swathes of territory in the northeast of the country in 2014, where they indiscriminately killed men, women and children. One of the worst massacres occurred in Borno state in the town of Baga, where nearly an estimated 2,000 people were killed in a few hours.3 This radicalized ideological rhetoric of the group was underscored by their pledge allegiance to Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) in March 2015, leading them rename themselves as Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP).4 One of the most troubling characteristics of the insurgency has been the resultant sexual violence and exploitation of the civilian population. Young girls and women have been kidnapped, raped, used as suicide bombers, and forcibly married off to fighters within the insurgency group.5 Young boys and men have been

1 Human Rights Watch. 2012. Spiraling Violence: Boko Haram Attacks and Security Force Abuses in Nigeria. Human Rights Watch; 2 “Deadly blast hits UN office in Nigeria”, Aljazeera News, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/08/2011826103616188370.html, 26 Aug 2011 3 “Boko Haram's 'deadliest massacre': 2,000 feared dead in Nigeria”, The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/09/boko-haram-deadliest-massacre-baga-nigeria, 10 January 2015 4 “Nigeria's Boko Haram pledges allegiance to Islamic State”, BBC News Online, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-31784538, 7 March 2015 5 “‘Bad Blood’: Perceptions of Children Born of Conflict Related Sexual Violence and Women and Girls

1 forcibly conscripted or executed if they did not swear allegiance to the group.6 Boko Haram have deliberately used gender-based violence as a tactic of war against the civilian population.7 The most disturbing case of this gendered insecurity was kidnapping of the 276 female schoolgirls in Chibok, northeast Nigeria in April 2014. This generated both national and international headlines and led to the international #BringBackOurGirls twitter campaign.

The Nigerian government at first responded to the insurgents through conciliatory approaches. They tried to negotiate a cease-fire that included an end to the violence, and compensation payments to the families of those killed by the military.8 has responded to the Boko Haram insurgency in a number of ways. Boko Haram primarily targeted political and military targets, which led to ad hoc armed responses from the military and police. However, the government mobilized a more formal response in June 2011 with the launch of Joint Task Force ‘Operation Restore Hope’ that comprised of all branches of the military, as well as the police force and the State Security Service (SSS). The government also enacted counter-extremism and deradicalisation programs to deal with the growing religious extremism in northern Nigeria.9 These measures were followed by the Former President Goodluck Jonathan declaring a state of emergency in April 2012 in 14 local government areas across 4 states in north Nigeria most affected by the insurgency violence, which led to the military deployed in the northeast as a counterinsurgency measure.10 However, the indiscriminate use of force by the military towards the civilian population and suspected insurgents, including extortion of civilians, extra-judicial arrests and killings has deeply alienated the civilian population and has been criticized by leading NGO’s.11

Associated with Boko Haram in Northeast Nigeria.", Toogood, Kimairis. https://www.international- alert.org/sites/default/files/Nigeria_BadBlood_EN_2016.pdf 2016. 6 “’Our job is to shoot, slaughter and kill’: Boko Haram’s reign of terror”, Amnesty International, https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AFR4413602015ENGLISH.PDF, April 2015;

7 Agbiboa, Daniel Egiegba. 2013. “The Ongoing Campaign of Terror in Nigeria: Boko Haram versus the State.” Stability: International Journal of Security and Development 2 (3):Art. 52; Barkindo, Atta, Benjamin Tyavkase Gudaku, and Caroline Katgurum Wesley. 2013. Boko Haram and Gender Based Violence Against Christian Women and Children in North-Eastern Nigeria Since 1999. NPVRN Working Paper; 8 Agbiboa, Daniel E. 2014. “Peace at Daggers Drawn? Boko Haram and the state of emergency in Nigeria.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 37 (1):41-67 9 Onapajo, H., & Ozden, K. 2020. Non-military approach against terrorism in Nigeria: deradicalization strategies and challenges in countering Boko Haram. Security Journal, 1-17; Office of the National Security Adviser. 2015b. Violent radicalization in northern Nigeria: Economy & Society. https://www.qeh.ox.ac.uk/sites/www.odid.ox.ac.uk/files/onsa-pb05.pdf; 10 Sampson, I.T., 2015. Between Boko Haram and the Joint Task Force: assessing the dilemma of counter-terrorism and human rights in Northern Nigeria. Journal of African Law, 59(1), pp.25-63. 11 Amnesty International, 2015. “Stars on Their Shoulders. Blood on Their Hands: War Crimes Committed by the Nigerian Military.” Amnesty International. https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AFR4416572015ENGLISH.PDF

2 In 2015, a renewed counter-insurgency military offensive comprising of a coalition of troops from the Lake Chad Basin Commission – Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria (labeled the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) seized back territory previously held by Boko Haram. This renewed military push not only led to the displacement of civilians, but also led to the regionalization of the crisis.12 Despite these difficulties, the MNJTF was successful in recapturing swathes of territory and prevented Boko Haram from having free access across the borders.

In spite of their success in countering the insurgency, Boko Haram still pose a security threat to Nigeria and the greater Lake Chad region. Security forces have struggled to contain the insurgency in rural areas and Boko Haram continue to attack the civilian population through indiscriminate suicide bomb attacks and kidnapping. The group has now splintered into two different factions: Abubakar Shekau commands Boko Haram, and the second an ISIS-endorsed offshoot calls itself the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). A worrying aspect of ISWAP’s violence is the kidnapping and killing of national and international aid workers in the region.13 In an effort to combat the growing violence of the insurgents, the military have sought to blame other entities for their failures. In September 2019, the Nigerian government closed down the offices of several international humanitarian aid agencies and accused them of acting as conduits for cash that has ended up in the hands of Boko Haram, as well as aiding and abetting group members by supplying them with medical drugs and food.14

1.2 Settler/herder conflict Violent conflict has plagued Plateau state in central Nigeria since 2001. The conflict in Plateau has taken the form of land disputes between the majority Berom, Anaguta, and Afizere groups who are farmers and considered to be ‘indigenes’ of the state, and the ‘settlers’, the semi-nomadic Fulani and Hausa herders.15 Being classed as indigenous to a state gives citizen’s preferential treatment to land, education, and employment opportunities, as well as control over local government resources.16 Restrictions on indigene

12 “Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram”, The Africa-EU Partnership, https://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/files/apf_factsheet_-_mnjtf.pdf 13 “Nigeria: Boko Haram executes second female aid worker”, Al Jazeera News, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/10/nigeria-boko-haram-executes-female-aid-worker- 181015194542623.html 14 “Nigeria warned it risks humanitarian disaster by expelling charities”, Guardian News Online,29 September 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/29/nigeria-warned-it-risks- humanitarian-disaster-by-expelling-charities 15 Krause, J., 2011. A deadly cycle: ethno-religious conflict in Jos, Plateau State, Nigeria. Geneva Declaration. http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.395.1527&rep=rep1&type=pdf 16 Aaron Sayne. 2012. “Rethinking Nigeria’s Indigene-Settler Conflicts”, USIP Research briefing, https://www.usip.org/publications/2012/07/rethinking-nigerias-indigene-settler-conflicts

3 certificates has led to increased political competition over declining state economic resources. As a result, local administration and elections have become an arena of fierce and often violent conflict and struggle. In the city of Jos, violence broke out in 2001 after the September 11 attacks in the United States and also again in 2004 and 2008, where over 700 people were killed and property destroyed.17 Violence has escalated between farmers and herders over the scarcity of, and access to land and has led the conflict to take on ethno-religious overtones.18 The depletion of arable land due to climate change as well as the Boko Haram insurgency in the northeast has led to an increase in violent confrontations and conflict over grazing land between the Fulani and Hausa herdsman who are predominantly Muslim and the indigenes Berom, Anaguta, and Afize Christian farmers. As a result, local politicians have manipulated these ethno-religious tensions in order to foment violence in Plateau state.

The response from the Nigerian government has been ineffective at best. They have increased the number of police officers as well as deploying the military on a near permanent basis in Plateau state to protect communities from further onsets of violence. However, the police and military have been accused of fomenting violence and killing ordinary civilians.19 This has led to the communities to create and maintain vigilante groups that has led to further outbreaks of violence and conflict. Violence continues unabated to this day.

1.3 Violence in the Niger Delta The Niger Delta region has experienced violent instability since oil was discovered in the region in 1956.20 The oil boom in the 1970s vastly increased the opportunities for corrupt personal wealth accumulation by the military government and has been exploited by the Northern Hausa ruling political elite for their own personal enrichment.21 This oil rich region, which is comprised of 9 states and over 28 million people, generates billions of dollars in revenue and profits and yet remains one of the most deprived and

17 Human Rights Watch. 2001. “Jos: A City Torn Apart.”. https://www.hrw.org/report/2001/12/18/jos/city-torn-apart on; Osaretin, Idahosa; AKOV, Emmanuel. Ethno-Religious Conflict and Peace Building in Nigeria: The Case of Jos, Plateau State. Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies, [S.l.], v. 2, n. 1, p. 349, mar. 2013. https://www.mcser.org/journal/index.php/ajis/article/view/89 18 Chris Kwaja, “Nigeria’s Pernicious Drivers of Ethno-Religious Conflict”, Africa Security Brief, No. 14, https://africacenter.org/publication/nigerias-pernicious-drivers-of-ethno-religious-conflict/, July 31, 2011 19 Dufka, C., 2008. Arbitrary Killings by Security Forces: Submission to the Investigative Bodies on the November 28–29, 2008 Violence in Jos, Plateau State, Nigeria. New York: Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/12/19/nigeria-arbitrary-killings-security-forces-jos 20 Watts, Michael. 2007. “Petro-insurgency or criminal syndicate? Conflict & violence in the Niger Delta.” Review of African Political Economy 34 (114):637-660 21 Omeje, Kenneth. 2005. "Oil conflict in Nigeria: Contending issues and perspectives of the local Niger Delta people." New Political Economy 10 (3):321-334

4 least developed regions in Nigeria. Numerous oil spills has led to environmental degradation that has led to discontent amongst the civilian population. Specifically, the Ogoni ethnic group started non-violent opposition to oil exploration by the multinational Shell Petroleum Corporation after their farmlands and fishing were decimated by repeated oil spills.22 Ken Saro-Wiwa, a leading Nigerian environmental activist and celebrated author, successfully mobilised international interest to the plight of the Ogoni people and the environmental destruction of their homeland. He established the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) in 1990 in order to further the environmental activism of the Ogoni ethnic group.23 Various other youth and militia groups also emerged, including the Nigeria Delta Peoples Volunteer Force [NDPVF], the Niger Delta Vigilante [NDV], and Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta [MEND] and together organized a militant resistance to the Nigerian government through continuous direct action to disrupt oil production and supplies, through shutting down oil facilities and abducting staff for ransom.24

The Nigerian government responded with a massive onslaught of violence through a huge deployment of armed forces troops in order to curb and contain the resistance.25 They deployed the Navy guard to patrol oil installations and shipments. The continued attacks on the region’s oil infrastructure oil had cost the Nigerian government enormous amounts of revenue. Chatham House estimates that in 2013, 100,000 barrels per day (bpd) were stolen, both on land and via piracy, costing the government $3- $8 billion a year.26 Oil companies also used private military contractors to protect the oil facilities. The military also specifically targeted Ogoni activists and community members, adding to the increased militarisation of the region. Amnesty International revealed how the counterinsurgency tactics of the Nigerian armed forces included rape and sexual slavery, as a

22 Osaghae, Eghosa E. 1995. "The Ogoni uprising: oil politics, minority agitation and the future of the Nigerian state." African Affairs 94 (376):325-344 23 For more information regarding the Ogoni resistance to Shell oil exploration in the Niger Delta region, see Boele, R., Fabig, H. and Wheeler, D., 2001. “Shell, Nigeria and the Ogoni. A study in unsustainable development: II. Corporate social responsibility and ‘stakeholder management’ versus a rights‐based approach to sustainable development”. Sustainable Development, 9[3], pp.121-135; Frynas, J.G., 1998. Political instability and business: focus on Shell in Nigeria. Third World Quarterly, 19[3], pp.457-478; Obi, C.I., 2000. Globalization and local resistance: the case of Shell versus the Ogoni. In Barry K. Gills [eds.], Globalization and the Politics of Resistance (pp. 280-294). Palgrave Macmillan UK 24 Ikelegbe, Augustine. 2005. "The economy of conflict in the oil rich Niger Delta region of Nigeria." Nordic Journal of African Studies 14 (2):208-234 25 Watts, Michael. 2007. "Petro-insurgency or criminal syndicate? Conflict & violence in the Niger Delta." Review of African Political Economy 34 (114):637-660; Ebiede, T.M., 2017. Beyond rebellion: Uncaptured dimensions of violent conflicts and the implications for peacebuilding in Nigeria’s Niger Delta. African security, 10(1), pp.25-46. 26 Katsouris, C. and Sayne, A., 2013. Nigeria's criminal crude: International options to combat the export of stolen oil (pp. 1-39). London: Chatham House.

5 collective punishment, as well as to intimidate and coerce them into submission or to divulge information regarding individuals.27

Despite the military onslaught, the violence and oil disruption continued, and led the former president, Umaru Musa Yar’Adua to introduce an amnesty program in 2009 to stabilise and enhance security in the region. A huge part of the amnesty included disarming, demobilising and reintegrating militants back into communities. They also negotiated development projects that would benefit local communities. The Nigerian government also awarded contracts to ex-militant leaders to protect the oil infrastructure, worth millions of dollars. This led to regional stability and an increase in oil production and government revenue. However, when President Buhari came to power in 2015, his government started investigations into many of the security contracts awarded to ex-militants for alleged corruption.28 He also reduced the DDR program’s budget, thus reducing the payments to ex- militants. As a result, new militant groups have emerged and have resumed violent attacks in the Niger Delta region, disrupting oil production and increasing insecurity for the population at large.29

1.4 Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea Piracy off the coast of West Africa has become so prevalent that it is compromising the economic development of the region and is now a growing international security concern. Much of the maritime insecurity is focused off the coast of Nigeria in the Gulf of Guinea, where the ongoing insecurity in the Niger Delta region helped piracy to proliferate. The competition for looted resources as well as poor governance has encouraged violent opportunism around the political economy of oil. Much of the global attention previously centred on Somali piracy, where from 2005-2011, 1099 ships were attacked and 200 were successfully hijacked.30 At its peak, Somali pirates hijacked 49 ships and took over 1,000 hostages in 2010.31 A concerted international effort led to a near halt in attacks and hijacking of ships off the coast of Somalia. Despite the significant decrease in the global number of piracy attacks and attempted attacks since 2010, the Gulf of Guinea has become the world’s piracy hotspot, with more than a quarter of worldwide attacks in the region.32

27 Amnesty International. 2006. Nigeria: Rape - the silent weapon. Amnesty International. https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/68000/afr440202006en.pdf 28 “Militants are devastating Nigeria’s oil industry again. Here’s what you need to know”, Washington Post, July 11, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/07/11/militants- are-again-devastating-nigerias-oil-industry-heres-the-background-you-wont-find-elsewhere/ 29 Moody, J., 2016. “The Niger Delta Avengers: A new threat to oil producers in Nigeria”. Terrorism Monitor, 14(2). 30 “Pirates of Somalia: Crime and Deterrence on the High Seas” World Bank, 26 January 2017, http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/689501484733836996/pirates-of-Somalia-on-the-high-seas.pdf 31 “Piracy threat returns to Africa waters”, CNN Online, https://www.cnn.com/2017/05/25/africa/piracy-resurgence-somalia/index.html

6 The Gulf of Guinea is geostrategic important body of water. There are over a dozen countries in the region, and it hosts 70% of Africa’s total oil production, as well as large mineral and marine resources, and fishery reserves.33 Piracy in this region often takes place in Nigerian waters and is carried out by well-organised criminal gangs who have fought in separatist groups.34 It is important to note that most of the piracy attacks in the Gulf of Guinea occur within territorial waters and according to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), for an attack to be classed legally as piracy, it must occur outside a 12-mile range of territorial waters.35 Most of the attacks carried out in the Gul of Guinea are violent and the perpetrators are usually well-armed, and focus on raiding oil-tankers to sell the cargo on the black market, indicating links in the area between piracy and other types of organised crime such as oil bunkering and drug trafficking.36 However, kidnapping crew for ransom has now become their modus operandi and rose to international attention when two US sailors were kidnapped in 2013.37 Kidnapping and holding crew members for ransom has become the primary target of pirates in this region since oil prices fell in 2015.38 As a result, this has increased the insurance premiums for ships, which now must include their crew and vessel, as well as the added cost extra security.39

The Nigerian response has been poor at best. The Nigerian Navy are ill- equipped and under-resourced to deal with the threat of piracy. However, piracy is a regional concern, and several countries lack the capacity to tackle maritime insecurity in the region. Regionally, Nigeria, Ghana, Cameroon, Senegal, Equatorial Guinea, Benin among other key states in the region have stepped up their naval presence and maritime policing to suppress piracy and other maritime security concerns in the region. These states have also implemented the Yaoundé Declaration on the Gulf of Guinea

32 “Piracy and armed robbery a threat to ships’ crews, warns IMB”, International Chamber of Commerce Commercial Crime Services, https://icc-ccs.org/index.php/1289-piracy-and-armed- robbery-a-threat-to-ships-crews-warns-imb 33 Onuoha, F.C., 2013. Piracy and maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea: Trends, concerns, and propositions. The Journal of the Middle East and Africa, 4(3), pp.267-293. 34 “Crime waves: The Gulf of Guinea is now the world’s worst piracy hotspot” The Economist, 29 June 2019, https://www.economist.com/international/2019/06/29/the-gulf-of-guinea-is-now-the-worlds- worst-piracy-hotspot 35 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), https://www.un.org/depts/los/piracy/piracy_legal_framework.htm 36 UNODC. 2013. “Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa”. https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/West_Africa_TOCTA_2013_EN.pdf 37 “Nigeria pirate attack: US sailors seized”, BBC News Online, 24 October 2013, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-24657515 38 “Gulf of Guinea crews more valuable to pirates than unsold oil”, The Africa Report, 29 April 2020, https://www.theafricareport.com/27031/gulf-of-guinea-crews-more-valuable-to-pirates-than-unsold- oil/ 39 Oceans Beyond Piracy report, 2017, http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/reports/sop/west-africa

7 Security to help prevent piracy and other illegal maritime actions on 25 June 2013. The resolution created a Regional Coordination Centre on Maritime Safety and Security for Central and West Africa.40 Further regional anti- piracy efforts and strategies also took place in 2019, when Nigeria and other states affected by piracy in the Gulf of Guinea took part in Exercise Obangame Express, a multi-national maritime training exercise sponsored by INTERPOL, the UNODC, and the United States Military Africa Command (AFRICOM).41

Recognising the piracy threat, the international community has taken several steps to address the problem. Several international organisations, including the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) have taken different initiatives to facilitate an international response to piracy. The UN Security Council has adopted a series of resolutions targeting piracy. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has acknowledged this threat through its Resolution 2018 (2011) and 2309 (2012).42

To what extent and how have the security challenges facing Nigeria and its neighbourhood changed over the past decade? The security challenges Nigeria is currently facing include an upsurge in violence associated with ethnic, religious and political conflicts, kidnappings, armed robberies. These challenges have led to a deterioration in the level of security in Nigeria over the last 10 years and pose a grave threat to both national and regional security. As the most populous country in Africa, its security and stability is vital to other African countries in the region. Yet, emerging and growing transnational threats, including terrorism, cross- border arms proliferation, drug and human trafficking, and the increase in refugees pose a grave threat to both national and regional security. These specific manifestations of violence reflect shortcomings in the political institutions that have further fuelled instability and insecurity both within Nigeria and its border regions. More importantly, a lack of democratic consolidation has resulted in political corruption and mismanagement and has directly promoted the emergence and penetration of transnational threats.43

40 “Africa: New Regional Anti-Piracy Agreement”, Global Legal Monitor, 9 July 2013, https://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/africa-new-regional-anti-piracy-agreement/ 41 “West Africa loses $2.3 billion to Maritime Crime in Three Years as Nigeria, UNODC rally multinational efforts to thwart Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea” UNODC, 17 May 2019, https://www.unodc.org/nigeria/en/press/west-africa-loses-2-3-billion-to-maritime-crime-in-three- years-as-nigeria--unodc-rally-multi-national-efforts-to-thwart-piracy-in-the-gulf-of-guinea.html 42 UN Security Council Resolutions - http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2018; http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2309 43 Obi, C.I., 2008. Nigeria's foreign policy and transnational security challenges in West Africa. Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 26(2), pp.183-196.

8 How would you assess international efforts to prevent sexual violence in conflict, particularly in the context of Nigeria? Sexual and gender-based violence has become more prevalent and widespread in ethnic and civil conflicts since the end of the Cold War, with a high proportion of civilians deliberately targeted. Extensive work by women’s NGOs to publicize the occurrences of sexual violence during the conflicts in Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia44, Rwanda45, and Sierra Leone46 led to the recognition of sexual violence in conflict as a ‘weapon of war’.47 This led the United Nations General Assembly to adopt the UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women in December 1993. It defines gender-based violence as any act of violence “that results in, or is likely to result in physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life”.48 This new policy language articulated by the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda led to the recognition and institutionalization of violence against women as a human rights violation. As a result, protecting civilians in conflict and warfare through the elimination of gender-based violence became the top priority for both global policy makers and international governmental organizations. As of early 2018, the UN Security Council has since adopted eight resolutions to address these gender-specific forms of conflict and insecurity.49

The Boko Haram insurgency has increased the prevalence of sexual violence committed towards women and girls in Nigeria. Human rights organisations

44 In the conflicts in Bosnia and former Yugoslavia, sexual violence committed against the ethnic Muslim population was a systematic element of Serb warfare, and served the purpose of emasculating the ethnic and religious identities of the male and female victims. 45 In Rwanda, sexual violence was specifically targeted towards Tutsi women and Hutu women married to Tutsi men and formed part of a larger campaign of ethnic elimination. 46 In Sierra Leone, the sexual violence committed was brutal, widespread and indiscriminate on girls and women from all socioeconomic and ethnic groups and was carried out by all factions fighting in the conflict, insurgents, soldiers and peacekeepers. 47 UN Security Council Resolution 1820 (2008) https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/CAC%20S%20RES%201820.pdf 48 UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, 1993, https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity- crimes/Doc.21_declaration%20elimination%20vaw.pdf 49 UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 (2000) recognized the crucial role of women in restoring and maintaining peace and security; UNSCR 1820 (2008) recognizes sexual violence as a strategic tactic of war and as such can constitute as a war crime and crime against humanity; UNSCR 1888 (2009) establishes to help prevent sexual violence in conflict; UNSCR 1960 (2010) establishes reporting mechanisms to help end sexual violence in armed conflict; UNSCR 2106 (2013) reiterates the importance of preventing sexual violence in conflict; UNSCR 2122 (2013) recognizes the need for women to participate in conflict prevention and resolution to address root causes of armed conflict; UNSCR 2242 (2015) reaffirms UN’s commitment to the WPS agenda and incorporates the importance of having a gender perspective in efforts to counter-violent extremism. For more information and details regarding these UNSCR, see http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/women- peace-and-security/.

9 and media reports have widely reported these abuses, which include, abduction, rape, physical and psychological abuse, forced labour, and forced marriage.50 The Nigerian government has responded with several initiatives with international partners to try and reduce the amount of sexual violence in conflict areas, as well as build community capacity to help those who have suffered from violence.

The Nigerian government in partnership with DFID, the British Council, Social Development Direct and International Alert implemented the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP), a conflict-management and peacebuilding programme that ran from 2011-2017.51 It worked at the federal level in 8 of the most conflict-affected parts of Nigeria at both state and community levels to strengthen the capacity of institutions, organisations and activists to manage conflict in a non-violent way and reduce its impact on the most vulnerable and marginalised within society. One of the main principles of the programme was reducing violence against women and girls while also increasing their influential participation in peacebuilding initiatives. The Nigerian government in partnership with the European Union also implemented a 4 year programme, Promoting Women’s Engagement in Peace and Security in Northern Nigeria, from 2014-2018.52 The specific objective of this programme was to ensure the practical implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 in the three northern states in Nigeria.

These programmes demonstrate the firm commitments Nigeria and the international community has made at the international level to highlight and stop sexual violence and gender inequality. However, it is difficult to gauge the impact and effectiveness of these programmes as many victims of sexual and gender-based violence face social stigma when they return to their communities, and fail to report sexual violence they have suffered. As such, more work needs to be done on the ground in communities.53

50 Amnesty International: Boko Haram victims suffer sexual violence - https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/boko-haram-victims-suffer-sexual-violence-amnesty/1413067; Guardian Online: Boko Haram abductees tell of forced marriage, rape, torture and abuse - https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/27/boko-haram-forced-marriage-rape-torture-abuse- hrw-report; Human Rights Watch: “Those terrible weeks in their camp” - http://features.hrw.org/features/HRW_2014_report/Those_Terrible_Weeks_in_Their_Camp/ 51 British Council Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme website, https://www.britishcouncil.org/society/womens-and-girls-empowerment/our-work/nigeria-stability- and-reconciliation-programme 52 UN Women - https://www2.unwomen.org/- /media/field%20office%20africa/attachments/publications/2017/04/northern%20nigeria%20women% 20peace%20and%20security%20program.pdf?la=en&vs=5907 53 “Bad Blood”, International Alert, 2016 https://www.international- alert.org/sites/default/files/Nigeria_BadBlood_EN_2016.pdf

10 To what extent is there willingness within the Nigerian government to work with international partners, such as the UK, in addressing security and human rights challenges? The Nigerian government has been very willing in working with international partners in tackling ongoing security challenges related to the Boko Haram insurgency. Currently, the UN, U.S., and UK are supporting the Nigerian government’s effort in supporting Nigeria’s fight against Boko Haram. In August 2018, former Prime Minister Theresa May signed a joint UK-Nigeria Security and Defence Partnership with President Buhari and pledged UK military support, training and co-operation in the fight to combat Boko Haram.54

International partners have also pledged aid and financial assistance to help civilians displaced by the Boko Haram insurgency in the Lake Chad region. In January 2019, UNHCR launched the Nigeria Regional Refugee Response Plan (RRRP), to raise $135 million in aid to help the 2.5 million civilians displaced by violence caused by the insurgency.55

Are there other issues you would like to draw to our attention? Corruption remains a major challenge in Nigeria. Transparency International ranks Nigeria as one of the most corrupt countries in Africa and estimates that $157 billion has illicitly left the country.56 President Buhari campaigned in 2015 as an anti-corruption candidate, and since then has prosecuted several former government officials accused of stealing government money.57 He has also implemented some reforms that have recovered embezzled monies and assets from abroad. This has led to decreasing levels of bribery in 2019.58 However, Buhari’s anti-corruption campaign has only selectively targeted his political rivals, while his friends and allies are overlooked.59 More worryingly, corruption within state institutions, particularly the security

54 “UK and Nigeria step up cooperation to end Boko Haram threat”, Press Release – UK government, 29 August 2018, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-and-nigeria-step-up-cooperation-to-end- boko-haram-threat; “Theresa May signs security partnership with Nigeria's president”, Guardian Online, 29 August 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/aug/29/theresa-may-signs-security-partnership-nigeria- president-military-training-fight-boko-haram 55 “As Boko Haram violence surges, UNHCR seeks US$135 million to aid displaced”, UNHCR website, https://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2019/1/5c50156f4/boko-haram-violence-surges-unhcr-seeks- us135-million-aid-displaced.html 56 “Nigeria’s corruption challenge”, Transparency International, https://www.transparency.org/en/news/nigerias-corruption-challenge 57 “Nigeria sees more high level corruption convictions under Buhari”, Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/blog/nigeria-sees-more-high-level-corruption-convictions-under-buhari 58 “Corruption in Nigeria: Patterns and Trends”, UNODC, Dec 2019, https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and- analysis/statistics/corruption/nigeria/Corruption_in_Nigeria_2019_standard_res_11MB.pdf 59 “Nigeria election: ‘Mr Honesty’ tainted by failure to tackle corruption”, Guardian Online, 11February 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/11/nigeria-election-mr-honesty-muhammadu- buhari-tainted-by-failure-to-tackle-corruption

11 sector have compounded their failure to deal with the ongoing violence and insecurity within Nigeria.60 Transparency International Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index measures corruption risk in defence establishments around the world, and ranked military corruption in Nigeria an ‘E’ grade on a scale from A to F.61 Not only does this compound the security challenges currently facing Nigeria, but also undermines trust in the government.

Received 21 May 2020

60 “Corruption in Nigeria, not just Boko Haram, is at the root of violence”, Guardian Online, 11 July 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2014/jul/11/boko-haram- nigeria-violence-corruption-security 61 Transparency International Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index – Nigeria, http://government.defenceindex.org/countries/nigeria/