Insurgency in Nigeria: a Comparative Study of Niger Delta and Boko Haram Uprisings

JAS0010.1177/0021909614520726Journal of Asian and African StudiesAghedo and Oarhe 520726research-article2014 Article J A A S Journal of Asian and African Studies 2015, Vol. 50(2) 208 –222 Insurgency in Nigeria: A © The Author(s) 2014 Reprints and permissions: Comparative Study of Niger sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/0021909614520726 Delta and Boko Haram Uprisings jas.sagepub.com Iro Aghedo Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Benin, Nigeria Oarhe Osumah Department of Public Administration, Ambrose Alli University, Nigeria Abstract The Niger Delta militancy and Boko Haram insurgency pose the greatest security threat to Nigeria since the end of the civil war in 1970. This article places both rebellions in comparative perspective. It argues that, though spatially and ideologically differentiated, both insurgencies are products of the dysfunctional character of the Nigerian state. Owing to poor governance, the state relies essentially on repression and the military option in managing challenges to its legitimacy, leading to the radicalization of violent non-state actors. The article recommends the need for developmental politics and a critical re-examination of the National Question to make the state more relevant to the people. Keywords Boko Haram, insurgency, militancy, Niger Delta, terrorism Introduction Durable peace has remained elusive in Nigeria since the country returned to civil rule in 1999 after 16 years of continued military dictatorship. The great expectation that democratic governance would engender political stability, national cohesion and ethno-religious tolerance has not been realized. Rather than peace and national cohesion, insurgency has remained an abiding feature of state–society relations. Though political instability is neither peculiar to nor new in the country, the radicalization of Niger Delta militants in the south and the Boko Haram insurgents in the north represent disturbing new trends. The growing strategic and operational effectiveness of the violent non-state actors engender enormous human and economic costs for Nigerians and visitors alike (Osumah, 2013a). Despite the repressive response of the state, insurgency and its growing lethality Corresponding author: Iro Aghedo, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Benin, Ugbowo Campus, PMB 1154 Benin City, Nigeria. Email: [email protected] Aghedo and Osumah 209 have remained a hard nut to crack. The ineffectiveness of brutal counter-insurgency has prompted a gradual shift from the traditional military calculus to more liberal and flexible alternatives including the use of dialogue and amnesty deals in some cases (Aghedo, 2013). Though agitations are also rife in other areas of the country, as exemplified by O’odua People’s Congress (OPC) in the south-western region and the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) in the south-east, the Boko Haram enclave in the north and the Niger Delta oil hub in the south-south zone of the federation represent the most violent spaces in the country. Violent agitations have not only been rampant in these areas, but they have also witnessed dramatic shifts in tactics and methodologies including the use of ransom kidnapping, hostage-taking and bombing (Osumah and Aghedo, 2011). Despite the spatial and ideological variations in the emergence of these insurgencies, there are several areas of convergence and divergence in the motivation, character, dynamics and costs as well as the appropriateness or otherwise of state–society responses to the management of the uprisings. However, while the insurgencies have generated great intellectual attention and attraction, a comparative analysis of these uprisings is rare. Against this backdrop, this article examines the Niger Delta militancy and the Boko Haram insurgency from a comparative perspective. Before proceeding to juxtapose these two home-grown insurgencies, the article discusses the background of the Nigerian state, and attempts a historical trip on uprisings in Africa’s most populous nation and second largest economy. The Nature of the Nigerian State Though the phenomena of militancy and insurgency got radicalized in Nigeria and became bold in the closing decade of the 20th century, the historical context and character of the state provide a fertile ground for them to mushroom. One distinctive character of the Nigerian state is that it is a colonial imposition. It emerged not as a product of consensus among the constituent units. It was neither created due to irreconcilable differences between the constituent units nor designed as a mediatory instrument for diverse constituent groups. The colonial state was largely created to serve the economic interests of the imperialists, helping to ensure law and order and guarantee an envi- ronment that enabled the colonialists to expand their interests. This disposition of the state was underpinned by the philosophy of the dual mandate; namely, ‘non-interference with native culture and institutions and the preparation of the native people for eventual self rule’ (Ebohon, 2012: 25). But the exclusivism which the dual mandate engendered further deepened the south–north divide and entrenched ethno-cultural cleavages in the country. Another distinctive element of the Nigerian state is its diverse ethnic composition. As a conse- quence of colonial imposition, the state harbours over 250 ethnic groups and about 400 linguistic groups (Mustapha, 2007). Among the diverse ethno-linguistic groups, the Hausa-Fulani in the north, the Igbo in the south-east and the Yoruba in the south-west are preponderant. These three groups make up about 68% of the Nigerian over 160 million population (Forest, 2012). The population in the Hausa-Fulani north is dominated by Muslims, while Christians are preponderant in the population of the south. The colonialists made little efforts to integrate these diverse identity groups. Rather than integration, the colonialists encouraged north–south dichotomy through various practices. For example, visitors from the Maritime (south) to the Soudan (north) were seen as ‘strangers’ and restricted to Sabon gari (strangers’ quarters) to prevent the ‘visitors’ from mixing with indigenous northerners (Osaghae, 2002). Also, most parts of the north were shut out from Christian missionaries and Western education (LeVan, 2013). This practice gave the south a head start over the north in terms of social and political education. The implication of the political ignorance of the north began to show vividly in the meetings the 210 Journal of Asian and African Studies 50(2) leaders of the regions had in the years before independence in 1960. A number of these meetings, such as the Ibadan Conference of 1950, were disharmonious. Anxieties, fears and apprehensions were expressed about ethnic domination and the feasibility of Lord Lugard’s experiment of ‘political cloning’, and ‘the mistake of 1914’ (Tamuno, 1970). In post-colonial Nigeria, the antagonistic relations among the different ethnic groups have often reflected in secessionist threats by any ethnic group which suffered disadvantage in the federation. Notably, the reference to the south often in opposition to the north does not presuppose that each is monolithic or united. There are minority ethnic groups in the two regions. Owing to the anomalous construction of the state, these sub- nationalities have also been involved in agitation for self-determination through the creation of autonomous states along primordial cleavages and institutionalization of social justice and equity since 1960 (Obi, 2002). A further distinctive attribute of the Nigerian state is arbitrariness. Like the colonial progenitor, the state essentially relies on the deployment of force in the management of threats to its authority from the various ethnic groups – at grave human and material cost. Efforts by successive govern- ments to forge unity among the diverse nationalities have not yielded considerable results. Political contestation among the ruling elite is intensely built along ethno-regional and religious identities (Jega, 2007). Though federalism was adopted as a political strategy to foster national unity, the protracted military incursion into politics and subsequent authoritarian rule has profoundly eroded the values of the political strategy. The frustration arising from the absence of social justice in the relationships among the political constituent units and lack of equity in the distribution of power and resources make many aggrieved groups seek to exit from the state, including resorting to insurgency. Another fundamental element of the Nigerian state is the privatization of collective interest by the ruling class. This is underscored by the inability of the state to cater for the genuine needs and aspirations of the vast majority of the populace. Though the country is Africa’s largest oil producer, and the world’s sixth largest oil exporter, the economy malfunctions with an average income of about US$1 a day (Peel, 2005). For decades its massive oil resources have been plundered by various kleptocratic leaders, and corruption is endemic throughout the political and economic systems. The average Nigerian can expect to die before they reach the age of 48 (Forest, 2012; Osumah, 2013a). The rate of unemployment, poverty, and infrastructural decay is very high, driving many, especially the youth, to criminality, violence and insurgent movements

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