The Proposed Territorial Exchange Between Serbia and Kosovo
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
ARTICLE ALEKSANDER ZDRAVKOVSKI and SABRINA P. RAMET COMMENTARIES The Proposed Territorial Exchange Republic of Macedonia or North Macedonia? between Serbia and Kosovo ZHIDAS DASKALOVSKI ALEKSANDER ZDRAVKOVSKI and SABRINA P. RAMET The European Crisis and Turkey’s The Role of Croatia in Bosnia and Unpredictable Role in the Balkans Herzegovina: Antemurale Christianitatis as a ILYA ROUBANIS Policy of Choice EMIR SULJAGIĆ China’s Investment in the Balkans under the Belt and Road Initiative: A Chinese Turkey’s Balkan Policy and Its Skeptics Perspective MEHMET UĞUR EKİNCİ LIU ZUOKUI The Macedonia Name Dispute: A Few Drivers and Spoilers of Success CVETE KONESKA 10 Insight Turkey COMMENTARYTHE PROPOSED TERRITORIAL EXCHANGE BETWEEN SERBIA AND KOSOVO The Proposed Territorial Exchange between Serbia and Kosovo ALEKSANDER ZDRAVKOVSKI* and SABRINA P. RAMET** ABSTRACT Serbia and Kosovo have initiated a process of territorial exchange that could have serious repercussions, both in the West- ern Balkans and internationally. Historically speaking, territorial exchanges have a mixed record. In some instances, these projects have inaugurated periods of protracted cooperation and recon- ciliation. However, on a number of occasions, such agreements have had devastating consequences and have led to carnage, vio- lence, and ethnic cleansing. Whereas Serbia and Kosovo have the sovereign and democratic right to engage in a genuine dialogue and decide on adjustments to their borders, it is important for the international community to pay close attention to the dynamics of the process and to consider the stability and security of the wider region should this project materialize. Vučić’s Proposal its former autonomous province and compensate Pristina by ceding three n February 2018, former U.S. Pres- towns in southern Serbia –Bujanovac, ident Bill Clinton congratulated Medvedja, and Presevo– to Kosovo. Ithe people of Kosovo on the 10th Needless to say, Vučić’s proposal pro- anniversary of their independence voked a flurry of negative reactions, from Serbia. By way of a warning, he both internationally and domesti- emphasized the fact that the young- cally. In Kosovo, the plan has gained est country in Europe needed to some traction with President Hashim * Independent strengthen the rule of law and the pro- Thaçi; on the other hand, Prime Min- 1 Researcher, tection of minorities. That same year ister Ramush Haradinaj and various Czech Republic in July, Serbian President Aleksandar opposition groups have vehemently ** Norwegian Vučić reintroduced the old idea of opposed the idea, stating that such a University of an exchange of territories between land swap could trigger a local war.2 Science and Technology, his country and Kosovo. According In Serbia, the plan was immediately Norway to this scheme, Belgrade would ac- rejected by the Serbian Orthodox quire direct control over the northern Church and by nationalist parties Insight Turkey Vol. 21 / No. 2 / part of Kosovo and, in return, Serbia such as the Serbian Radical Party and 2019, pp. 11-21 would recognize the independence of the Dveri Movement. Among Serbs, DOI: 10.25253/99.2019212.01 2019 Sprıng 11 ARTICLE ALEKSANDER ZDRAVKOVSKI and SABRINA P. RAMET provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina. The 2008 fait accompli of While the regime claimed that this move was intended to restore and as- Kosovo’s independence forced sure security to the Serbs who were al- official Belgrade to engage in legedly under threat from Albanians negotiations with Prishtina that in Kosovo, the Serbian leader’s real objective was to build his personal had the aim of normalizing and power, bolstering his preponderance regulating relations between within the collective presidency of Socialist Yugoslavia. With the help the two countries of the security apparatus, Milošević successfully crushed the largely peaceful ethnic Albanian resistance an opinion poll conducted in Octo- in Kosovo.5 The Albanian commu- ber 2018 found that, while a majority nity responded by boycotting Ser- of Serbs favored direct talks between bian institutions, elections, censuses, Serbian and Kosovar government of- etc. Serbian authorities showed their ficials, 61 percent opposed ceding the contempt for local Albanians, who Presevo valley, where the three towns constituted the majority of the prov- with large Albanian populations are ince’s population, by dismissing many located, and 76 percent opposed Ser- Albanians from their posts, bringing bian recognition of Kosovo.3 Interna- in Serbian students to attend classes tionally, the idea also received mixed at the University of Pristina, renam- reactions. The U.S. administration did ing streets and public squares, and re- not oppose the project, but within the moving the names of Albanian heroes EU, no consensus was reached. The and replacing them with the names of German government expressed neg- Serbian heroes. The simmering con- ative attitudes regarding Vučić’s plan, flict continued throughout the first while the European Union’s Foreign part of the 1990s; it metastasized Policy Chief, Federica Mogherini into a full-blown insurgency in 1998, defended the proposal to carry out when a group calling itself the Kosovo the exchange of territories.4 In order Liberation Army (KLA) launched an to understand the current develop- armed insurgency against Serbian se- ments and possible outcomes of these curity forces.6 Having no air-power novel political dynamics, a short syn- and relying on old and inefficient opsis of the Kosovo crisis is essential. weaponry, the Albanian insurgents were not able to sustain their ini- tial momentum. However, in terms The Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s of drawing the attention of Western and the Kosovo Crisis media and politicians to the Kosovo conflict, the KLA’s rebellion was a In 1989, Serbian President Slobodan resounding success. The atrocities of Milošević and his government sup- the Serbian security forces and the pressed the autonomy of Serbia’s two humanitarian crisis were covered in 12 Insight Turkey THE PROPOSED TERRITORIAL EXCHANGE BETWEEN SERBIA AND KOSOVO High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Mogherini (C), Kosovo President Thaçi (R) and Serbian President Vučić (L) pose for a photo during a meeting in Brussels on June 24, 2018. Presidency of Kosovo / Handout - AA Photo much detail by Western media outlets activities in Kosovo and agreed to and, as a consequence, pressure in- withdraw its security forces and po- creased on Western governments to litical apparatus from Kosovo. The try to resolve the crisis diplomatically UN Security Council then passed or, if necessary, by force. When thou- resolution 1244, under the authority sands of Kosovo Albanians fled to of which the United Nations Interim North Macedonia,7 the crisis threat- Administration Mission in Kosovo ened to destabilize the Southern Bal- was created. Once Serbia withdrew kans. After a number of diplomatic its police, army, and other institutions attempts failed to end the conflict, in from Kosovo, the province became de March 1999 U.S. President Bill Clin- facto independent of Belgrade. This ton, with the backing of his British withdrawal brought with it an exodus counterpart Tony Blair, decided to of ethnic Serbs from Kosovo, along intervene directly by launching an air with members of some other ethnic campaign against Serbia.8 minorities such as the Bosniaks and Roma who were subjected to pressure The Serbian air-defense systems were and harassment.9 In the northern part no match for the NATO air force of Kosovo where ethnic Serbs form a which repeatedly pounded Serbia, in- majority of the population, however, flicting devastating blows to the mili- Pristina has not been able to assert tary and civilian infrastructure of the its authority, since Belgrade has con- country. Fearing a possible ground tinued to maintain a certain limited offensive, in June 1999 the govern- influence. Consequently, northern ment in Belgrade ceased all military Kosovo became a no-man’s land 2019 Sprıng 13 ARTICLE ALEKSANDER ZDRAVKOVSKI and SABRINA P. RAMET where crime, corruption, and nepo- Nevertheless, the 2008 fait accom- tism reached levels that were unprec- pli of Kosovo’s independence forced edented even by Balkan standards.10 official Belgrade to engage in nego- The situation in the remaining part of tiations with Pristina that had the Kosovo which was controlled by the aim of normalizing and regulating UN was also dire. Economic hard- relations between the two countries. ships, lack of strategic planning, and Although Serbia has not recognized corruption worsened the situation in the independence of Kosovo to date, the region. In March 2004, Kosovo the Serbian government and its then was rocked by a number of incidents Prime Minister (currently Foreign when ethnic Serbs were attacked and Minister), Ivica Dačić, negotiated the in some instances killed by mobs of normalization of relations with Koso- Albanians.11 Only on February 17, vo’s Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi in 2008, after a number of political, le- 2013. The negotiations were chaired gal, and economic reforms, and co- by the High Representative of the Eu- ordinating their move on a multilat- ropean Union for Foreign Affairs and eral basis with Western powers, did Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, in the Kosovar authorities declare the Brussels. Belgrade’s main objective independence of Kosovo from Ser- was to remove the parallel institu- bia. While this move obtained the tions in Kosovo and to iron out a legal approval