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Unveiling Assigned Amount Unit (AAU) Trades: Current Market Impacts and Prospects for the Future

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Unveiling Assigned Amount Unit (AAU) Trades: Current Market Impacts and Prospects for the Future Atmosphere 2012, 3, 229-245; doi:10.3390/atmos3010229 OPEN ACCESS atmosphere ISSN 2073-4433 www.mdpi.com/journal/atmosphere Article Unveiling Assigned Amount Unit (AAU) Trades: Current Market Impacts and Prospects for the Future Elizabeth Lokey Aldrich 1,* and Cassandra L. Koerner 2 1 Sustainability Studies Department, The White Mountain School, 371 West Farm Road, Bethlehem, NH 03574, USA 2 Energy Policy Institute, Boise State University, 1910 University Drive, Boise, ID 83725, USA; E-Mail: [email protected] * Author to whom correspondence should be addressed; E-Mail: [email protected]; Tel.: +1-303-898-558. Received: 13 December 2011; in revised form: 30 January 2012 / Accepted: 27 February 2012 / Published: 7 March 2012 Abstract: The sale of assigned amount units (AAUs) from countries whose emissions have declined since their baseline year under the Kyoto Protocol has led critics to be skeptical of carbon markets due to the lack of actual emission reductions that occur as a result of these trades. This policy review describes the historical context of AAU trading, current market price and volumes, and environmental and economic impacts of the current AAU trading rules. Options for how to handle current, and prevent the creation of future, surplus AAUs are discussed. Keywords: assigned amount unit; green investment scheme; hot air; international emissions trading; post-2012; Kyoto Protocol 1. Introduction Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’s (UNFCCC) Kyoto Protocol, developed countries and economies in transition, termed Annex B Parties, have individual emissions caps on their greenhouse gas emissions for 2008 through 2012. The caps are expressed as a fraction of a base year, 1990 for most countries. Each Party is issued Assigned Amount Units (AAUs), each of which corresponds to 1 metric ton of carbon dioxide (CO2) equivalence, equal to its cap. To Atmosphere 2012, 3 230 comply with its commitment, each party must retire AAUs or other compliance instruments called Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) and Certified Emission Reductions (CERs), which are created through projects which absorb or reduce emissions under Joint Implementation (JI) and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), in an amount equal to its actual emissions for the 2008–2012 period. On a side note, CDM projects are hosted by developing countries while JI projects are hosted by either developed countries or Economies in Transition. Trading of AAUs, CERs, and ERUs, known as International Emission Trading (IET), has been a key element of the cost-containing flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol and could prove to be a useful tool in the future. However, trading of AAUs from countries whose emissions have declined since their baseline year under the Kyoto Protocol has led critics to be skeptical of carbon markets due to the lack of actual emission reductions that occur as a result of these trades. Green investment schemes (GISs) are meant to try to allay the fears of those that think there is no environmental integrity in AAU trading; these schemes use the proceeds of AAU trades to create projects that absorb or reduce greenhouse gases [1]. However, GISs have no required criteria for crediting, and actual determination of what qualifies as a GIS is left up to the discretion of the buying and selling countries. Inconsistent application of GISs as AAU trades ramp up toward 2012 when the Kyoto Protocol ends and post-2012 during the next global greenhouse gas accord or second Kyoto compliance period could erode the price of emission reductions and allowances worldwide and may elicit a harsh rebuke from those concerned with reductions in current emissions. The wide-ranging results of AAU trades include the promotion of projects that encourage emission reductions but do not always ensure them on a one-to-one basis; creation of projects that attempt to yield an emission reduction for each AAU sold; and satisfaction of Kyoto targets with below-market priced permits to pollute that do not represent any emission reductions. We argue that policy makers need to clearly define the goal of AAU trading as (1) a way to address current carbon market failures through promotion of “soft” greening projects; (2) a means to promote investment in a selling country; (3) a trade that must be accompanied by a one-to-one emission reduction project; or (4) a method of promoting cost containment in the next global agreement and create an accord that effectively achieves the goal selected. This paper will describe the historical context of AAU trading and the current market price and volumes. Then, the environmental and economic impacts of the current AAU trading rules will be illuminated. Finally, options for how to handle the current and future surplus AAUs that could be created will be discussed. 2. AAU Background Under the Kyoto Protocol’s Article 17, IET is meant to provide a flexible mechanism that allows countries to meet their emission reduction targets while providing cost containment. IET is based on the principle that the least-cost emission reductions can be used to meet reduction targets since greenhouse gases mix evenly in the atmosphere and have the same warming potential regardless of where they are released. At the start of the Kyoto compliance period in 2008, AAUs were allocated to each country based on their emissions in a baseline year and their individual reduction targets. At the Atmosphere 2012, 3 231 end of the Kyoto Protocol’s first compliance period in 2012, each country will have to surrender enough AAUs to cover their emissions over the five year period. The baseline year of 1990 was selected for most countries except those in the process of transitioning to a market economy. These transitioning countries were able to choose their baseline year [2]. The year 1990 was particularly advantageous to parts of Eastern Europe and Russia, which had a heavy industrial year before the Soviet Union dissolved completely in 1991. In fact, Russia’s decision to ratify the Kyoto Protocol was based on the selection of 1990 as a baseline year; it was well-known among both Russian bureaucrats and international negotiators that the country would earn surplus allowances under the Kyoto Protocol [3]. Under the Protocol, the reduction commitments of countries are dependent on the development of the country. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development designation of countries was used to lump countries into categories including Annex I and non-Annex I. Annex I countries that ratified the Protocol are known as Annex B countries and are required to meet emission reduction targets. Non-Annex I countries are not required to meet emission targets but are eligible to host CDM projects whose offsets, known as Certified Emission Reductions can be used to meet reduction targets. Some economies in transition, like Russia and the former Soviet Union, that are neither considered developed or developing countries must stabilize their average annual emissions between 2008–2012 at 1990 levels under the Kyoto Protocol. Eastern European countries have individual reduction targets that range from 5 to 8% below baseline year emission levels. Calculated cumulative surplus AAUs in the Kyoto commitment period 2008–2012 in literature is approximately 8–13 billion metric tons of greenhouse gases, which represent 6% of 1990 Annex I emissions [1,4,5]. On average, all Annex I countries only have to reduce their emissions 5.2% below 1990 levels [6]; therefore, there are more surplus emissions than reductions necessary. And, assuming that countries take on reasonable targets they have discussed in negotiations, the carbon market news and analysis firm, Point Carbon, estimates that this surplus could fill assumed reduction targets until 2020, and there would still be 6.9 billion excess AAUs [7]. Because these AAUs that can be sold do not represent emission reductions that were made to comply with Kyoto targets, they are frequently dubbed “hot air” by critics of the use of these AAUs. 3. AAU Trade Details 3.1. Trading Parties AAU trades historically occurred at the governmental level where AAUs purchased can be used to meet the country’s obligations, but recent trends have shown an increasing number of trades among private entities. Within Europe, no AAUs are allowed for emitters’ compliance obligations under the EU Emission Trading Scheme; however countries within the EU can use AAUs to fulfill their country-wide compliance obligations. In Japan, if the government agrees to the trade, individual companies can purchase AAUs from other governments in order to meet their reductions under Japan’s Voluntary Emission Reduction Scheme (JVETS) that provides up-front financing for up to one-third of the total capital costs of emission reduction projects undertaken by industrial companies [8]. Also, carbon brokers and banks have begun to be involved in the market. Camco, a carbon offset project Atmosphere 2012, 3 232 developer and aggregator, purchased AAUs from Hungary for resale to a Japanese company that participates in JVETS in April 2010 [9]. Dighton Carbon, Tawhaki International, Fortis Intertrust, Interblue, and various World Bank funds have also made AAU purchases [7,10]. Some market critics, however, believe that these intermediate firms are just helping to obscure the market, allowing for arbitrage and unmitigated corruption in some cases. An example of this type of corruption occurred in a trade of 15 million AAUs between the newly-created company Interblue and the Slovakian government for the cheap price of €5.05 per AAU. Interblue then resold these AAUs for €8 or more each [11]. Due to concerns over this type of resale of AAUs and the secrecy of private AAU transactions, the Ukrainian government canceled the two largest AAU deals ever agreed upon–one with Dighton Carbon for 100 million AAUs and another with Tawhaki International for 50 million AAUs.
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